Research completed: July 2024

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5342

Executive Summary

Heat loss from domestic buildings has been identified as a major source of carbon emissions. Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) present energy efficiency ratings for buildings. They will become an increasingly important tool in quantifying energy loss for individual properties in Scotland, as outlined in the proposed Heat in Buildings Bill.

This study reviews the approaches taken in European Union (EU) member states on operational governance of EPCs, through a desk-based literature review, expert interviews and in-depth case studies of three countries of interest.

We identify opportunities for Scotland to learn from examples of best practice in other countries. We also present a series of options that could be implemented as part of a potential reform of the operational framework for EPC governance in Scotland.

Key findings

Governance models

Member states allocate responsibility for EPC implementation and quality assurance of their EPC regimes in different ways. Some member states utilise a central government body, and others use a publicly funded arms-length body. A few member states use an external private organisation or allocate this responsibility at a regional level.

Minimum qualifications, training and accreditation for EPC assessors

Member states must ensure that EPC assessors are suitably qualified and certified. They do this by setting requirements for assessors, such as a higher education degree, and/or professional experience in a related field. Most member states also have approved training courses and/or examinations, which might be voluntary or mandatory. Some countries also require mandatory recertification or retraining after a set period of time or require programmes of continuous professional development.

Auditing and quality assurance in the production of EPCs

Member states must ensure that quality standards are upheld in the production of EPCs. They are required to carry out random sampling of EPCs, although some member states conduct random sampling of total EPCs issues, and others sample a percentage of EPCs per assessor. Some member states also choose to conduct additional targeted audits, which can be desk-based or on-site and are triggered by specific risk factors. Some member states also use digital screening systems, which automatically screen input data to identify incorrect or inconsistent data.

All member states implement some sort of penalty system for assessor errors to uphold quality standards. These usually depend on the severity of the infraction, but include reissuing the EPC, additional targeted training, or monetary fines. For severe or repeat offences, assessors in some member states can also have their assessor license suspended or withdrawn.

Enforcement mechanisms

Most member states can issue fines for failing to present a valid EPC at the point of sale or rental. However, many do not enforce this requirement or issue fines in practice and there are data gaps in how well the requirement is enforced. Analysis by the European Commission found that only a small number of member states have a robust system for enforcing the requirement to present an EPCs at the point of sale. Those that do require legal professionals to check that an EPC is present as part of the sale. However, rental agreements often do not involve a legal professional in the process, so they cannot be targeted in the same way as sales are more difficult to enforce.

Options for Scotland

We have established a list of potential options which could improve the operational governance of EPCs in Scotland.

Option 1 – Including standard training requirements for EPC assessors in the Operational framework

This could include introducing standard education and qualification requirements into the operational framework, approving a standardised mandatory training programme for EPC assessors, and/or requirements for assessors to attend mandatory annual re-training.

Option 2 – Develop standardised quality assurance procedures for approved organisations in the operational framework

This could include developing a digital quality assurance system to screen EPC input data, establishing a ‘Helpdesk’ function to receive complaints about EPCs, implementing targeted audits of EPCs based on specific risk factors and/or outlining a clear penalty system for assessor infractions.

Option 3 – Engage wider stakeholders in the rental/sales process to support enforcement of the requirement to present an EPC

Formalising the requirement for solicitors to check EPC documentation at the point of sale could help enforce this requirement in practice. Engaging stakeholders involved in the rental market, such as estate agents, could help encourage checking of EPC documentation for lettings.

 

Glossary and abbreviations table

ADENE

The Portuguese Energy Agency

AO

Approved organisations – whose members are approved to deliver EPCs in Scotland

APEL

Approved Prior Experiential Learning

BER

Building Energy Rating – energy efficiency ratings used for buildings in Ireland

CPD

Continuous professional development

CzK

Czech Koruna

EU

European Union

EPBD

Energy Performance of Buildings Directive

EPC

Energy Performance Certificate

HRK

Hrvatska Kuna (Croatian Kuna)

ICS

Independent Control System – EPBD requirement that member states must allocate responsibility for upholding the quality of EPCs and their associated QA procedures. This can be allocated to a government department or to an external organisation.

NVQ

National Vocational Qualification

Operational framework

The document which governs approved organisations in Scotland and outlines key processes to ensure that EPCs are prepared by sufficiently qualified persons

QQI

Quality and Qualifications Ireland

QA

Quality assurance

SEAI

Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland

VEKA

Flemish Energy and Climate Agency

Introduction

Context

Energy Performance Certificates in Scotland

The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) is the primary legislative instrument used to promote energy efficiency in buildings in the European Union (EU). First published in 2002, it was recast in 2010, 2018 and most recently in May 2024 to align with the higher energy efficiency ambition in the European Green Deal (European Union, 2024).

The Energy Performance of Buildings (Scotland) Regulations 2008 transposed the original EU’s EPBD into Scottish statute. The Regulations dictate how Energy Performance Certificates (EPC) are implemented in Scotland, and outline that an EPC must be produced when a new building is constructed and when a building is sold or rented. This applies both to homes and to non-domestic buildings. EPCs contain an energy efficiency rating, as well as recommendations on how to improve a building’s energy efficiency. Therefore, they are widely considered to be useful tools for helping to drive emission reductions from buildings.

However, using EPCs as a basis upon which to set standards can be problematic, as a result of issues including:

  • Poor quality or low robustness of assessments
  • Infrequently updated assessments
  • Use of modelled data rather than actual energy performance data
  • A lack of incentives for decarbonising heat

To ensure that EPCs are fit for purpose in the context of Scotland’s leading net zero objectives, the Scottish Government is planning to revise the role of EPCs in line with the proposed Heat in Buildings Bill. There could be a more prominent role for EPCs, particularly as a tool for demonstrating compliance.

Operational governance of EPCs in Scotland and reform

In Scotland, an EPC must be produced by members of six “Approved Organisations” (AOs). Regulation 8(3) of the Energy Performance of Buildings Regulations (Scotland) 2008 requires that AOs “ensure that members are fit and proper persons who are qualified by their education, training and experience to carry out the preparation and issuing of energy performance certificates”. AOs therefore hold primary responsibility for training and accrediting EPC assessors in Scotland. An operational framework outlines key processes that ensure EPCs are prepared and issued by sufficiently qualified persons, including (Scottish Government, 2012):

  • Ensuring integrity and operational resilience
  • Accreditation of energy assessor members
  • Administering the operation of energy assessor members
  • Maintaining records to facilitate effective operation of the scheme and periodic audit by the Scottish Government

A report by Alembic Research Ltd et al, (2019) and commissioned by the Scottish Government, made recommendations on minimum standard qualifications for EPC assessors, auditors, and AOs. It also suggested an independent redress avenue for EPC consumers. In line with this, the Scottish Government are looking to assess and potentially review the Operating Framework and its role in upholding the quality and robustness of EPCs. This will ensure EPCs are fit for purpose in their potentially enhanced role in the upcoming Heat and Buildings Bill.

Objectives and scope

In this study, we investigate how the operational governance provisions of the EPBD have been implemented in the EU member states. This will enable us to identify opportunities for Scotland to learn from examples of best practice in other countries. The key objectives of this study are therefore to:

  • Review the approaches taken to operational governance of EPCs in EU member states
  • Identify different methods of implementation and areas of interest for Scotland
  • Develop options for potential reform of the operational framework for EPC governance in Scotland.

We only consider approaches taken in EU member states in this review. In addition, we do not consider aspects related to EPC methodologies. The focus is on the operational aspects of EPC governance. These include:

  • Governance model – whether central government or arms-length bodies hold responsibility for EPC governance, or if this is delegated to external organisations.
  • Training for EPC assessors – including coverage of any education prerequisites to apply for certification, training courses or examinations that assessors must complete, and any requirements for re-certification or retraining after a set period.
  • Auditing, verification and quality assurance (QA) procedures – the systems and processes in place to guarantee the quality of EPC production, how the requirement for an independent control system (ICS) is met, including who holds QA responsibilities and any penalties issued for assessor infractions.
  • Enforcement mechanisms – how member states enforce the requirement to present an EPC at the point of construction, sale or rental of a property, and any associated penalties
  • Affordability – any information identified on how member states ensure the affordability of EPCs, in line with Article 16 of the EPBD.

Methodology

We collected data for this study primarily through a desk-based literature review. This was supplemented with a series of interviews with EPC experts,[1] which we used to triangulate findings from the literature review and to fill any identified gaps in the evidence. We then selected three countries of interest for Scotland (Belgium, Croatia and Ireland) and developed an in-depth case study for each. The collected data was used to derive policy options for improving the operational governance of EPCs in Scotland. Full methodological detail, including relevant limitations, is presented in Appendix A.

Operational governance of EPCs in the EU member states

Governance models

This section explores the governance models that member states use to implement Energy Performance Certificate regimes, including how they delegate the responsibility for the Independent Control System required in the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive.

EPBD requirements

member states can delegate the responsibility for implementing the ICS for EPCs as they deem fit under Annex VI of the EPBD. This system aims to ensure the quality of EPCs and their associated QA procedures. (European Commission, 2021a). Amongst other requirements, the ICS should:

  • Provide a clear definition of a valid EPC, which should include requirements to check the validity of input data and calculations used to generate the EPC
  • Clearly outline the quality objectives and level of statistical confidence that the EPC framework should achieve (these are further explained in Section 4.3.1)
  • Ensure that EPCs are available to prospective buyers and tenants so that informed decisions can be made on their decision to buy or rent a property
  • Account for different building typologies, such as single residential, multi-residential, offices or retail
  • Regularly publish information on the ICS, through the national database of EPCs.

Member state approaches

Scottish approach

Scotland follows the approach agreed in the UK when the EPBD was transposed into domestic regulation in 2008, when the UK was an EU Member State.

The Scottish Government implements EPCs, including the ICS, through six external private organisations, called Approved Organisations. The Scottish Government has an agreement with these AOs, who are governed by an operational framework, which was published in 2012. Members of AOs are often self-employed energy assessors, whom the AOs contract to produce EPCs in line with government-approved methodologies and tools (Delorme and Hughes, 2016). However, the role of the AOs is to ensure that their members have the skills and expertise necessary to prepare and issue EPCs. They are also responsible for upholding QA protocols and for issuing penalties for incorrect EPCs.

A similar approach is adopted in England and Wales, where six independent accreditation schemes are responsible for managing energy assessors and for ensuring they possess the appropriate skills for the role.

Table 1 gives an overview of the governance models adopted in the member states. The majority place the responsibility of implementing the ICS for EPCs on a Central Government body. This approach is adopted in Greece for example, where the Department of Energy Inspection hold QA responsibilities (CRES, 2020). Some member states have allocated the responsibility of implementing the ICS on government-funded, arms-length bodies. For example, this is the approach adopted in Ireland, where the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI) is responsible, and in Slovakia, where this falls to the Slovak Trade Inspection. Both bodies are publicly funded, non-profit organisations separate to the central government Ministries and Departments responsible for overall EPC policy (SEAI, 2017b) (Slovak Trade Inspection, n.d.).

Governance model

Description

Examples of Member State adoption

Government body (Central Government Ministry or Department)

Most common model of governance adopted – the Government Ministry or Department made responsible for implementing the ICS

Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Croatia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia

Government body (arms-length bodies)

Responsibility of implementing the ICS lies with government-funded, arms-length organisations that are separate from the Government

Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia and Sweden

External body

Responsibility of the ICS lies with an external private organisation

Portugal, Scotland, England and Wales[2]

Regional differentiation

ICS responsibilities are allocated differently at regional level

Austria, Belgium (Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia), Germany, Italy and Spain

Table 1: Overview of different governance models employed by MS.

Portugal has allocated the responsibility of implementing the EPBD and the ICS to an external body. The Portuguese Energy Agency (ADENE) oversees the central register and assessor accreditation. An EU-level EPC expert interviewed for this project perceived that this approach was adopted to separate EPC governance from changing political governments, instilling stability and allowing for a long-term vision for the system to be implemented.

Five member states implement the ICS at regional level. Each of the Belgian regions govern EPCs independently. In Austria, some regions have allocated responsibility of conducting QA on EPC data to the municipalities (OIB, 2020), whereas energy agencies oversee the QA in others (TU Wien, 2021). Italian regions and autonomous provinces had autonomy over energy topics until 2015, resulting in a complex regulatory framework. Guidelines for regulating EPCs were released in 2015 that implemented a new standardised EPC system at national level (Azzolini et al., 2020).

Minimum qualifications, training and accreditation for EPC assessors

This section outlines the training and certification schemes member states have adopted to ensure that EPC assessors are suitably qualified independent experts.

EPBD requirements

Article 25 of the EPBD sets out a requirement for member states to ensure that EPCs are carried out by ‘independent experts’. It outlines that:

  • Experts must be suitably qualified and certified, but can be self-employed, employed by public bodies or by private enterprises
  • Information on the training and certification process should be made available to the public
  • A list of certified experts or companies that offer the services of experts must be regularly updated and made available to the public.

Member state approaches

Scottish approach

The Operating Framework mandates that AOs reference the UK National Occupational Standards for Energy Assessors. These have been developed to ensure energy assessors are competent and possess the right skills to conduct energy assessments. A Level 3 NVQ qualification for assessors exists in Scotland, as well and in England and Wales. However, AOs are ultimately responsible for ensuring EPC assessors are suitably qualified in Scotland. Although some assessors obtain this NVQ, it is not mandatory and AOs use Approved Prior Experiential Learning (APEL), which considers relevant experience, skills, and training of a potential assessor.

EPC experts must complete a 3-5 day training course, designed and delivered by AOs. These can cost between £700 and £1250 (Kanzyl, 2020a). The type of accreditation depends on the building type to be assessed – with separate accreditations for:

  • Domestic EPCs (existing buildings).
  • Domestic EPCs (new buildings).
  • Non-domestic EPCs (existing buildings).
  • Non-domestic EPCs (new buildings).

Continuous professional development (CPD) is required, although the minimum level of CPD is specified by each AO (Delorme and Hughes, 2016).
As AOs in Scotland are responsible for ensuring assessors are suitably qualified, and there are no minimum national standards for qualifications, training, or continuous professional development. Therefore, there may be a variation in standards across the country.
The approach taken in England and Wales is similar, where accreditation schemes have discretion over whether assessors hold the necessary skills to become an assessor. However, energy assessors can satisfy requirements through training and examinations, or by demonstrating suitable qualifications and experience (Delorme & Higley, 2020).

Pre-Requisites for independent experts

Table 2 outlines the approaches member states have taken to setting pre-requisites for independent experts. Thirteen member states have set subject-specific educational requirements. These are all higher education requirements (either Bachelors or Masters) in subjects such as engineering and architecture. Sweden, Romania and the Netherlands are the only member states only requiring professional experience as a pre-requisite for accreditation. In Sweden for example, applicants must first have 5 years of professional experience to undergo the training for assessor accreditation (Hjorth et al., 2020).

Pre-requisite requirement

Description

Examples of Member State adoption[3]

Education

Higher education (Bachelors or Masters) degree required. These are always in subjects such as engineering or architecture.

Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Slovenia

Professional

Professional experience in a related field (such as construction)

Sweden, Romania and the Netherlands

Both education and professional

Combination of both educational and professional experience required

Estonia, Germany, Lithuania and Portugal

Flexible approach

Multiple pathways available to assessors (either education, or prior professional experience)

Belgium (Flanders, Brussels, Wallonia), Ireland, Scotland, England and Wales

Table 2: Overview of different pre-requisites for independent experts.

Some member states have more flexible requirements and recognise either professional or educational experience. Others, however, require both specific higher education degrees and professional experience. For example, in Lithuania applicants must have an engineering degree and three years’ experience in the construction sector (Kranzl, 2020a).

Training courses for independent experts

Table 3 outlines the approaches to training independent experts adopted by member states for assessor accreditation.

Training requirements

Description

Examples of Member State adoption[4]

Mandatory training programme

Mandatory accreditation training administered either by external certified organisations or government bodies

Germany, Estonia, Croatia, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden and Scotland

Mandatory training and exam

Mandatory accreditation training and examination administered either by external certified organisations or government bodies

Belgium (Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, England and Wales[5]

Voluntary training only

Voluntary training for assessor accreditation, accreditation authority responsible for granting accreditation

Austria and Germany

Voluntary training and exam

Voluntary training for assessor accreditation, accreditation authority responsible for granting accreditation. Mandatory examination also required.

Cyprus and Hungary

Table 3: Overview of the different training requirements for independent experts.

Most member states have implemented a mandatory training programme for EPC assessor accreditation. The majority of member states (including Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece and Ireland) have also implemented a mandatory written examination as a requirement for accreditation. Malta requires both written and oral examinations (BPIE, 2014). Six member states (Austria, Germany, Estonia, Croatia, Luxembourg and Slovenia) do not have a mandatory exam for prospective assessors.

Some member states have only introduced a voluntary training scheme for assessor accreditation. In these member states (Austria and Germany), the authority responsible for assessor accreditation certifies experts based on professional experience or education achievements, without the adoption of mandatory training (Kranzl, 2020a) (BPIE, 2014). In Cyprus and Hungary, despite the adoption of voluntary training, completion of a mandatory exam is required for accreditation (BPIE, 2014). The training requirements for member states do not appear to be linked to the stringency of pre-requisites, for example, the countries who implement a voluntary training programme only do not necessarily have more stringent pre-requisites (and vice versa).

Training course administration

In most cases, training is administered by external, private organisations that have been approved by the Government. In Ireland for example, the national agency for qualifications, ‘Quality and Qualifications Ireland’ oversees the accreditation of training course providers. Only courses administered by these organisations are accepted (SEAI, 2017a). Similarly, in member states such as Denmark and Greece, a singular accreditation body has been appointed (National Energy Agency in Sweden and the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change in Denmark) (Ruggieri et al., 2023). An interview with an EPC expert in the Belgium (Flanders) highlighted that whilst the Flemish Government had outsourced the delivery of training and examinations to external providers, they are now in the process of re-instating the administration of the accreditation internally. No further clarification on why this was the case was provided.

Recertification or retraining for independent experts

Table 4 outlines the approaches to recertification and retraining adopted in EU member states.

Recertification or retraining requirements

Description

Examples of Member State adoption[6]

Recertification or retraining requirements

Requirement for independent experts to recertify or retrain after a set period of time

Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg

Continuous professional development requirements

Requirement that independent experts complete programmes of Continuous Professional Development

Austria, Belgium (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels), Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Denmark, Croatia, Slovenia, Scotland, England and Wales

Voluntary refresher training

No requirements for recertification, retraining or continuous professional development

Romania and Portugal

Table 4: Overview of the different recertification or retraining requirements for independent experts.

Some member states require independent experts to recertify or retrain after a set period of time. This is achieved either by re-sitting the accreditation examination, taking refresher training or through proof of experience. Eight member states have a requirement that independent experts complete programmes of CPD. In Belgium (Flanders), for example, all independent experts must undergo training and sit an examination annually. This training is used to either introduce new concepts or developments (ensuring continuous improvement) or to provide targeted refresher training for specific areas where errors have been identified by a significant number of assessors. The annual training is administered by the Flemish Energy and Climate agency (VEKA) and is tailored each year.[7] In Germany however, no official continuous development or recertification procedures have been adopted but experts are required to take personal responsibility for the quality of certification and ensure they are up to date with developments in the field (BPIE, 2014). ADENE in Portugal administers regular refresher training for experts in Portugal who wish to improve their skills (Kranzl, 2020a).

Auditing and quality assurance in the production of EPCs

This section discusses the various approaches that member states take to ensure that the quality of EPCs and their associated quality assurance procedures are upheld.

EPBD requirements

Annex VI of the recast EPBD (European Commission, 2024) outlines provisions related to QA of EPCs that the ICS should implement. These include requiring member states to:

  • Provide a clear definition of quality objectives, including the level of statistical confidence that the EPC framework should achieve – at a minimum the ICS should ensure that at least 90% of all valid EPCs issued are evaluated with 95% statistical confidence over a period that cannot exceed one year.
  • Carry out random sampling of EPCs to assess the level of quality and confidence in the ICS for EPCs.
  • Use a third party to verify at least 25% of the random sample when the ICS has been delegated to non-governmental bodies.
  • Ensure the validity of the input data through an on-site visit for at least 10% of EPCs that are part of the random sampling (this is a new requirement of the 2024 recast of the EPBD).
  • Employ pre-emptive and reactive measures to ensure the quality of the overall EPC regime, including but not limited to:
  • Additional training for independent experts.
  • Targeted sampling (in addition to random sampling) to specifically detect and target poor-quality EPCs.
  • Obligations to resubmit EPCs.
  • Monetary fines.
  • Temporary or permanent bans for independent experts.

Article 24 of the EPBD states that member states should implement penalties with regards to infringements of aspects of EPBD implementation, including EPCs. These penalties are not prescribed, however must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.

Scottish approach

AOs hold responsibility for QA in Scotland. They must check a representative sample of EPCs, with a minimum of 2% of all EPCs produced being checked. In 2016, 260,206 EPCs were produced, and 6,604 (2.53%) were checked (Delorme and Hughes, 2016). The checks repeat the EPC calculations using data on the register, most checks are desk-based. Assessors’ outputs are checked every six months. Poor performance can lead to targeted auditing, retraining, suspension, or being struck off (Delorme and Hughes, 2016).

The Scottish Government audits AOs on a 3-yearly basis to ensure compliance with the Operating Framework. In addition, AOs are obliged to complete and return annual reports to the Scottish Government, which were recently reviewed to include more detailed QA information in an effort to better understand the nature of audit failures, complaints, and other important information. Organisations failing to meet the terms of the Framework are subject to corrective action and may have their agreement terminated (Delorme and Hughes, 2016).

A similar approach is taken in England and Wales, where Accreditation Schemes hold responsibility for assuring the outputs produced by their accredited energy assessors. The government then audits the Accreditation Schemes to ensure quality standards are upheld (Delorme & Higley, 2020).

Member state approaches

Digital quality assurance audits

Approach to digital quality assurance

Description

Examples of Member State adoption[8]

Random sampling of a percentage of total EPCs issued

Conducting digital audits on a statistically significant number of the total EPCs issued within a given timeframe (maximum one year)

Austria, Belgium (Brussels), Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Malta, Romania, Scotland, England and Wales

Random sampling of a percentage of EPCs per assessor

Conducting digital audits on a statistically significant number EPCs issued per assessors issued within a given timeframe (maximum the last year)

The Netherlands

Random sampling – per assessor and per total of EPCs issued

Conducting both audits on a random sample of a percentage of total EPCs issued and a random sample of a percentage of EPCs per assessor

France

Two-tiered approach to digital QA

Additional targeted audits conducted. These are identified either by errors flagged during the random sampling or by specific citizen complaints of non-compliance

Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Latvia, Ireland, Poland, Portugal and Sweden

Table 5: Overview of the approaches to QA audits in EU MS.

Digital screening systems

Some member states have adopted a digital system that automatically screens EPC input data before an EPC is issued. The Portuguese EPC database does this, and flags inconsistencies detected to prevent the input of incorrect or inconsistent data. An EU-level interviewee stated that implementing a mechanism like this limits the amount of QA that is required at later stages of the process.

This study found that all member states are conducting a statistically significant number of random sampling audits as per the requirements of the EPBD. Some member states collate a random sample by sampling a percentage of the total number of EPCs, which is the approach taken in Scotland. Others collate a sample of EPCs by sampling a percentage of EPCs per assessor. France reported conducting a two-tiered random sampling QA approach, conducting audits on both a random sample of total EPCs issues and on a percentage of EPCs per assessor.

Several member states reported that a second phase of targeted audits forms part of their QA procedures. These audits are carried out on EPCs whereby inconsistencies are identified during the random sampling auditing phase. Moreover, targeted audits are conducted in some member states where instances of non-compliance are reported. An interview with an EPC expert in Belgium (Flanders) highlighted that a system has been implemented, whereby citizens can notify complaints of non-compliance which can also lead to targeted audits.

It is understood that Slovakia is also conducting random sampling audits, although the nature of these audits is unknown. Moreover, Italy has reported that the approach to QA is implemented at regional level, resulting in variation. The literature review did not identify QA approaches for Slovenia.

A compliance study published by the European Commission in 2015 conducted analysis on the strength of the compliance checking systems implemented in EU member states. The analysis found that Belgium (Wallonia), Cyprus, Denmark, France, Italy and Lithuania had very robust compliance checking systems. Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Spain were found to have the lowest strength of EPC compliance checking systems (European Commission, 2015).

Public awareness and compliance

A Danish EPC expert we interviewed reported that the high strength and quality of EPCs in Denmark could be linked to high levels of public awareness and acceptance of EPCs and their benefits. It is believed that Danish homeowners have a strong understanding of EPCs and the benefits they can bring in raising property sale prices. This has resulted in higher levels of compliance and a desire to have high-rating EPC certificates.

On-site quality assurance audits

Mandatory on-site inspections were introduced in the 2024 recast version of the EPBD. Therefore, the data collected as part of this literature review may not reflect these most recent requirements and any subsequent changes to Member State QA regimes.

Approved organisations are responsible for carrying out QA checks in Scotland, and the majority of checks are desk-based. This is similar to the approach taken in England and Wales, where Accreditation Schemes are responsible for QA checks. However, Some member states (such as Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Hungary and Ireland) conduct on-site audits alongside digital audits. In the majority of member states, these are carried out where inconsistencies are identified during the digital random sampling audits (as in Denmark[9]) or where specific citizen complaints or reports of non-compliance are received (as in Belgium (Flanders)9). Moreover, as in Ireland9, specific risk factors such as multiple infractions per assessor or an assessor publishing an abnormally high level of EPCs result in on-site audits being conducted. This is because on-site audits can provide a more detailed understanding of the accuracy of the data reported. Auditors can see the properties of the building in person, allowing for an extra level of QA[10]. In a few cases however (as in Cyprus), experts do on-site sample checks to verify data (MECI, 2020).

Approach to assessor infractions

In Scotland, poor performance by assessors can lead to targeted auditing, retraining, suspension, or being struck off. However, this is at the discretion of Approved Organisations. Accreditation Schemes hold similar responsibilities in England and Wales. All member states implement some kind of penalty system for assessors to minimise the risk of producing incorrect or invalid EPCs. member states have different levels of penalties for assessors, which are dependent on the severity of their infraction. For some, including Ireland and Latvia, this is quantified using a penalty points system (BPIE, 2014). In both member states, the penalties range from requiring the assessor to undertake corrective training to a temporarily or permanently suspended licence (BPIE, 2014). In Ireland, points on an assessor’s portfolio last for 2 years before they are removed from the record (SEAI, 2016). In other member states, the level of penalty appears to be linked to the severity or number of errors. Common approaches to assessor infractions are detailed below.

  • Reissue of an EPC – Assessors may be required to reissue a correct EPC at their own cost, usually within a certain timeframe. This is one of the most common practices amongst member states. This occurs in member states including Austria, Belgium (Wallonia), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Croatia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia. In Finland, the penalty sometimes requires the original assessor to pay for a different assessor to carry out the re-certification (TU Wien, 2021).
  • Training – Assessors may be required to undergo corrective training. For example, this approach is used in Belgium (Wallonia), Ireland, and Latvia. In the case of Belgium (Wallonia), the assessor must also pass an exam in order to continue carrying out EPC assessments (Fourez et al., 2020).
  • Monetary fines – The majority of member states have monetary fines in place, the value of which is usually dependent on the perceived severity of the error. The value of monetary fines can vary greatly within and between member states. Examples of values are shown in Table 6.

Member state

Value of fines for assessors

Belgium (Flanders)

€250 – €5000 (TU Wien, 2021)

Germany

Up to €15,000 (TU Wien, 2021)

Estonia

Up to €6,400 for an individual or €64,000 for an organisation (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications et al., 2020)

France

Up to €1500 (Deslot et al., 2020)

Greece

€200 – €10,000 (CRES, 2020)

Italy

€300 – €10,000 (Azzolini et al., 2020)

Portugal

€500 – €700 (Kranzl, 2020a)

Romania

€250 – €2000 (Kranzl, 2020a)

Table 6: Table showing the value of fines imposed on EPC assessors when errors are found in certain EU MS.

In some member states, monetary fines are technically possible but not imposed in practice. This includes Bulgaria (SEDA, 2020), Czechia (BPIE, 2014), and Estonia (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications et al., 2020). Monetary fines are very rarely used in Germany (BfEE, 2020). In Cyprus and Portugal, monetary fines are only possible if the EPC assessor does not reissue the EPC in the required period (MECI, 2020; Fragoso and Baptista, 2016). In other member states, monetary fines are only imposed if the errors surpass a certain threshold. For example, in Croatia an assessor must have produced more than three incorrect EPCs to face a monetary fine (MCPP, 2020), and in Hungary the energy class must be wrong by at least two classes for the assessor to face a monetary fine (Jenei et al., 2020). In Poland, assessors only face monetary fines if the error is quantified at more than 10%, or if they use incorrect technical assumptions in their methodology (Kranzl, 2020a; Bekierski et al., 2016).

No evidence was found that Austria, Denmark (Energistyrelsen et al., 2020), Ireland (BPIE, 2014), Lithuania (Encius, 2016), Luxembourg (Worré et al., 2020), Latvia (BPIE, 2014), Malta (Degiorgio and Barbara 2016), Sweden, and Slovakia impose monetary fines on assessors.

  • Suspension or withdrawal of accreditation – In Scotland, poor performance by assessors can lead to penalties including suspension or withdrawal of accreditation at the discretion of Approved Organisations. Accreditation Schemes in England and Wales also have discretion over applying such penalties to assessors. In many member states, assessors can face temporary or permanent loss of accreditation to carry out EPC assessments as a result of infractions. This is the case in Belgium (Flanders) (TU, Wien, 2020; Kranzl, 2020a), Belgium (Wallonia) (Fourez et al., 2020), Cyprus (BPIE, 2014), Czechia (BPIE, 2014), Finland (TU Wien, 2021), France (BPIE, 2014), Greece (TU Wien, 2021), Croatia (Mardetko-Škoro, 2015), Hungary (Jenei et al., 2020), Ireland (BPIE, 2014), Lithuania (Encius, 2016), Luxembourg (Worré et al., 2020), Latvia (BPIE, 2014), and Poland (BPIE, 2014).

In a number of member states, the length of the suspension is dependent on the severity of the infraction. For example, in Greece assessors can face suspensions of between one and three years, depending on the severity of the mistake (TU Wien, 2021). In Croatia, assessors can lose their accreditation if they submit more than three invalid EPCs (Mardetko-Škoro, 2015). In Hungary, assessors can lose their license for three years if errors result in EPCs changing by more than 2 energy classes (Jenei et al., 2020).

In other member states, suspension or withdrawal of a license is only imposed if a threshold is passed. For example, in Ireland, if an assessor submits more than 10 incorrect EPCs in two years, they can be suspended for between 3-12 months (BPIE, 2014). In Latvia, if an assessor has more than seven points on their portfolio they face suspension of six months, and if they have more than 10 points on their portfolio, they face suspension of 12 months (BPIE, 2014). In Denmark, EPC assessors are employed by certified organisations, and the organisations can lose their accreditation in the case of repeated errors from their assessors (Energistyrelsen et al., 2020).

Use of administrative fees and levies

This section explores fees and levies implemented by Member States charged to assessors for the registration or lodgement of EPCs. It does not include fines implemented for assessor registration or fines associated with assessor infractions.

EPBD requirements

There is no requirement in the EPBD for what administrative fees or levies Member States can charge to assessors for EPC lodgement or registration. Therefore, Member States have taken different approaches in whether they choose to implement such a fee or its value.

Member state approaches

Scottish approach

Scotland has implemented a fee for the lodgement of EPCs of Existing Domestic Buildings and Non-Domestic Buildings in Scotland. The value of the fees varies based on the nature of the building. The Energy Performance of Buildings (Scotland) Regulations 2008 outline that the fee associated with a domestic EPC is £2.60, whereas the fee associated with a non-domestic EPC is £12.60. The revenue generated from these fees is ring-fenced to support the effective operation and maintenance of register systems. (Scottish Government, 2017).

Country

Description

Examples of Member State adoption

No administrative fee

Member State does not charge an administrative fee to assessors

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden

Administrative fee in place with no ringfencing

Member State does not ring fence revenue for specific purpose

Malta

Administrative fee in place with ringfencing of revenue

Member State ring fences revenue for EPC-related purposes, which can include maintaining the EPC registry or QA procedures, for example

Ireland, Portugal, England and Wales, Germany, Lithuania, Denmark

Table 7: Table showing the approaches taken to charging administrative fees and levies to assessors

Member state EPC regimes can be partly or fully financed through their lodgement or registration fees, in combination with other fees such as annual assessor registration fees. For example, the EPC system in Ireland was intentionally designed to be cost-neutral (BPIE, 2014). In countries that don’t charge specific administration costs, Borragán and Legon, (2021) report that this fee can also be indirectly covered by the overall EPC assessment price. However, in most cases, Member States rely partly or fully on public funds to support their EPC systems. The amount of public funds used to finance EPC systems can amount to as much as several million euros every year in some Member States (Loncour and Heijmans, 2018).

Lodgement fee value

Whilst the majority of Member States have not implemented fees or levies for issuing or publishing individual EPCs, Ireland, Malta, Lithuania, Portugal, Germany and Denmark have, as have England and Wales (BPIE, 2014). The value of these fees varies between the Member States. Although Malta has the highest fee for domestic EPCs at €75, it doesn’t appear for the other Member States that the size of the Member State or the number of EPCs they issue directly correlates with the value of the fee.

Germany, Lithuania and Malta charge one fee for all EPCs, whereas Denmark, England and Wales, Ireland and Portugal outline different fees for domestic and non-domestic EPCs. In all cases where a different fee is charged, the fee associated with a non-domestic EPC is higher than the fee for a domestic EPC. In England and Wales, the difference is very small, but in Denmark, Ireland and Portugal, the fee associated with a non-domestic EPC is at least double the value of the fee for a domestic EPC.

Country

Fee for domestic EPCs

Fee for non-domestic EPCs

Denmark [11]

€17.30

€35.30

England and Wales

£1.50

£1.70

Ireland (SEAI, 2019).

€30

€60

Germany [12]

€6.90

€6.90

Lithuania (Encius and Baranauskas, 2016)

€6

€6

Malta [13]

€75

€75

Portugal [14]

€28 to €65 (pus VAT)

€135 to €950 (plus VAT)

Table 8: Table showing the fees associated with lodgement of domestic and non-domestic EPCs in the Member States and England and Wales

Use of revenue generated

In the following Member States that have adopted a fee for registering and publishing EPCs, the revenue generated is ring-fenced and used for EPC-related purposes.

  • Ireland – the SEAI uses the revenue to make investments back into the EPC programme, such as by developing, upgrading or replacing the systems and increasing the resources to support assessors, industry, and the wider public through the EPC Helpdesk and quality assurance system[15].
  • Portugal – the revenue generated from the fees is used to support daily technical support to the experts, IT infrastructure and developments, quality assessment and enforcement, awareness and communication.[16]
  • Germany – the registry budget is supported through the fees for lodging EPCs (BPIE, 2014)
  • Lithuania – part of the revenue raised from the EPC lodgement fee is used to finance quality assurance of EPCs (Encius and Baranauskas, 2016).
  • Denmark – the fee charged by DEA in covers work carried out by DEA concerning the necessary supervision of the scheme. It involves taking EPCs out for quality control, handling complaints, but also answering general questions about the EPC scheme, developing and maintaining the IT systems (the EPC database, etc.), and the contact with the educational institutions for the training of EPC assessors[17].
  • England and Wales – the revenue generated from these fees is ring-fenced to pay for the technical team that run the register for the fees, as well as policy and operations salaries. Moreover, the revenue generated funds any technical running costs associated with the lodgement of EPCs as well as any opportunities identified for “register improvement”[18].

In Malta however, the money generated from the lodgement fee is not ring-fenced for any specific purpose. It joins other sources of revenue and then funding is allocated where and as necessary[19].

Enforcement mechanisms

This section investigates how member states ensure that the requirement to present an EPC for a building at the point of sale/rental is enforced.

EPBD requirements

Article 20 of the recast EPBD (European Commission, 2024) mandates that digital EPCs must be issued for buildings or building units when they are:

  • Newly constructed or have undergone major renovation.
  • Sold to a new owner.
  • Rented to a tenant (or a rental contract is renewed).
  • An existing building owned or occupied by public bodies.

It also requires that the EPC must be shown and handed over to prospective tenants or buyers at point of sale or rental. There are some exceptions to this, for example, when the building is only intended to be used for less than four months of the year or has an actual energy consumption of less than 25% of the expected annual energy consumption.

Member state approaches

Scottish approach

Failing to issue EPCs when marketing a property for sale or for rent can result in enforcement actions. Penalties, outlined in the Energy Performance of Buildings Regulations (Scotland) 2008, are £500 for residential dwellings and £1000 for other cases. Local Authorities are the nominated Enforcement Authorities and hold the duty to uphold EPC regulations within their jurisdictions, so are therefore responsible for issuing fines. Local Authorities can also consider criminal action (Delorme and Hughes, 2016).

The Scottish Government does not have a clear picture of the scale of enforcement activity undertaken by the Local Authorities and are currently engaging with all 32 local authorities to gain more detailed information on enforcement in practice.

In England and Wales, local authorities are responsible for enforcement and hold powers to request that copies of an EPC are produced for inspection. They also hold powers to decide the appropriate course of action to enforce compliance, which can include a range of actions from providing compliance advice to issuing a penalty (Delorme & Higley, 2020).

Only a small number of member states have a vigorous mechanism for ensuring EPCs are available at the point of rental or sale (European Commission, 2015) and availability of enforcement rate data is often low. In most of these member states, checks are made by notaries during the sale transaction, which is thought to be an effective system (European Commission, 2015). However, as rental agreements are often less formal, ensuring EPCs are made available here is more challenging. It is thought that ensuring the EPC is signed off by a lawyer in the rental agreement is a good way to address this problem (European Commission, 2015). However, rental agreements are often less formal and do not always involve a legal professional, meaning that the systems in place for enforcement can be less developed in the rental sector than they are for sales. This often results in lower compliance rates or poor data availability in the rental sector. However, in Hungary for example, it is a requirement that a legal professional signs off on rental agreements. They are then responsible for checking the presence of EPC documentation.

The member states found to have the highest level of compliance rates with requirements for new, sold and rented buildings, as well as the highest strength of EPC compliance checking systems, are Belgium (Wallonia), Cyprus, France, Italy, Lithuania and the UK (this study was conducted when the UK was an EU Member State). Latvia and Poland were found to have the lowest compliance rates, coupled with the lowest strength of EPC compliance checking system (European Commission, 2015).

Monetary fines

The majority of member states impose monetary fines on building owners if they fail to present a valid EPC at the point of sale or rental. The cost of fines vary within and between member states, as shown in Table 9.

Member state

Value of fines for building owners

Austria

Up to €1450 (OIB, 2020; Arbeiterkammer Oberösterreich, 2024)

Belgium (Flanders)

€500 – €5000 (Kranzl, 2020a)

Belgium (Wallonia)

€500 – €1000, which can double if the same individual or organisation reoffends within three years (TU Wien, 2021; Fourez et al., 2020)

Czechia

100,000 Czech Koruna (CZK) (€3979), up to 200,000 CZK (€7958) for apartment buildings (Mečíccrová, 2021)

Germany

Up to €10,000 (Olschner, 2024)

Spain

€300 – €6000 (TU Wien)

Greece

€200 – €2000 (TU Wien, 2020)

Croatia

5000 Hrvatska Kuna (Croatian Kuna) (HRK) – 30,000 HRK (€662 – €3976) (StanGRAD, n.d.),

Italy

€3000 – €18,000 (Azzolini et al., 2020)

Lithuania

Up to €289 (Encius, 2016)

Portugal

€750 – €7500 (Kranzl, 2020a)

Table 9: Table showing the value of fines imposed on building owners when EPCs are not presented at required times in certain EU member states.

In most member states, it is unclear what type of infraction results in a higher level of fine for building owners. However, in Spain there are clear guidelines: simple faults result in fines of €300 – €1000, while serious faults can result in fines of up to €6000 (TU Wien, 2021). Serious faults include knowingly falsifying data or having an EPC assessment performed by a non-accredited assessor (TU Wien, 2021). In Finland, the level of fine is dependent on the type of building for which an EPC was not presented, or for the size of the municipality in the case of public buildings (Ministry of the Environment of Finland & Motiva Oy, 2020).

Use of notaries in enforcement

In some member states, notaries or lawyers involved in the sale or rental process are liable for ensuring EPCs are presented when necessary and are also liable for monetary fines if EPCs are not presented. This is the case for lawyers in Hungary, who are required to sign-off the EPC included in a rental agreement (European Commission, 2015). Similarly, notaries in Portugal are required to notify the relevant authorities if an EPC is not presented at the point of sale and can be fined between €250 – €3500 for failing to do so (Kranzl, 2020a). Notaries may also be fined in Belgium (Wallonia), for failing to notify the authorities of an absent EPC at point of sale or rental (TU Wien, 2021).

 

Affordability of EPCs

This section discusses any action that member states take to ensure that EPCs are affordable.

EPBD requirements

Article 19 of the EPBD requires that member states “take measures to ensure that EPCs are affordable and shall consider whether to provide financial support for vulnerable households.” The EPBD does not require member states to provide any price caps or subsidies, although some member states have chosen to do so.

Little information was found on interventions taken by member states to provide financial support for households requiring EPCs, nor the ability of citizens in member states to pay for EPCs assessments. Therefore, the following discussion focuses on EPC pricing and price controls in member states.

Member state approaches

Scottish approach

The price of EPCs in Scotland is controlled by the market. Research in 2016 showed that indicative starting costs were £35 to £60 (€40 – €70) for residential EPCs and £129 to £150 (€150-€175) for non-residential EPCs. This includes the registration fee payable each time an EPC is recorded on the register (Delorme and Hughes, 2016). There is no cap on EPC prices, and affordability is not actively managed by the Scottish Government.

Price-caps

The majority of member states have not imposed any price limitations on the cost of EPCs and rely on the market to control the affordability of EPCs. However, three member states have imposed price regulations, as detailed in Table 10:

Member state

Details of price cap on EPC cost

Slovenia

€1.5 / m2 for residential buildings up to 220m2, €2 / m2 for residential buildings over 220 m2, and €1 – €4 /m2 for apartment buildings (between 5 and 51 dwellings) (BPIE, 2014). The total cost is also capped at €170 for one and two-dwelling buildings (Kranzl, 2020a).

Hungary

An EPC for apartments and single-family homes is capped at €40 (+VAT) (Kranzl, 2020a; Jenei et al., 2020). There is no legally defined price for an EPC in non-residential or public buildings (Jenei et al., 2020).

Denmark

EPCs in 2024 are capped at €1,067 for a single family house. For larger buildings, the price for EPCs is subject to the market[20].

Table 10: Table showing the price caps on the cost of an EPC assessment in various MS.

Greece and Croatia used to have price caps which have since been abolished (TU Wien, 2021). In Croatia, the price cap was introduced when there were few EPC assessors in the market which caused prices to increase. When more EPC assessors were accredited, the price cap was removed, and EPC prices are now effectively controlled by the market[21].

While the price caps imposed generally have a positive impact on building owners who face the costs of EPCs, the price caps are commonly criticised for being too low and having resulting impacts on the quality of the certificate produced. For example, in Hungary, there are concerns that the price cap is set unrealistically low which results in lower quality EPCs (Jenei et al., 2020). Similarly, in Croatia, it is thought that the low price cap resulted in the recommendations of energy efficiency measures included in the certificate being of poor quality (Sayfikar & Jenkins, 2024). In Demark, it is thought that competition within the market keeps EPC prices much lower than the price cap, as average prices for single family houses is reported to be around €66720,suggesting the price cap is not necessary here.

Member states which have not imposed price caps have been criticised for average EPC costs being too high. For example, in Bulgaria the average price of an EPC is estimated at €0.2–€1/m2, which is thought to be relatively high for the average EPC consumer in Bulgaria (Sayfikar & Jenkins, 2024). This, alongside low public awareness of EPCs, is thought to be a reason why only around 1% of residential buildings in Bulgaria have an EPC (BPIE, 2018). Appendix F shows a summary of estimated EPC costs across member states, however it is important to note that this data comes from a variety of sources with different publication dates. Some figures have also been subject to exchange rates from local currencies. As a result, price data between member states is not necessarily comparable.

Other measures to ensure affordability

Member states who have not imposed price caps have often not done so to reflect the true cost of an EPC calculation. The cost can vary greatly according to various factors, including the type and complexity of a building and the quality of existing data (TU Wien, 2021). For example, in Czechia the average cost of a standard EPC is thought to be between 3000 – 7000 CZK (€119 – €278). This is because many buildings in the country are old and do not have much existing documentation or data (Mečíccrová, 2021). These buildings require an on-site visit from a specialist assessor, which can increase the cost of an EPC to tens of thousands of CZK (Mečíccrová, 2021).

While no other member states actively control the price of their EPCs, some have introduced other methods of promoting affordability. For example, in Belgium (Wallonia) the EPC methodology is kept as efficient as possible to keep costs down (Fourez et al., 2020). In the Netherlands, the government imposed a system to minimise costs in which building owners first receive a temporary EPC, which is calculated using existing data on a property (e.g. building type, data of construction, insulation, and heating and energy systems). The building owner can then change or add information (alongside proof such as photographs), which is then approved by an assessor. The assessor then recalculates the EPC and uploads it to the national database (Kranzl, 2020a). This process is thought to minimise on-site visits and time spent by assessors, and minimise the final cost of an EPC.

Case studies

After we conducted our review of the approaches taken to operational governance of EPCs in the EU member states, we selected three countries of interest to the Scottish Government. These were countries with approaches which could have the potential to improve the current operational governance procedures in Scotland. The countries we selected were Belgium, Croatia and Ireland.

Full case studies are presented in Annexes B-D, however, an overview of the main findings from each case study is presented in Table 11 – Table 15.

Country

Overview of governance model

Belgium

EPCs are governed by authorities at the regional level. This is the Flemish Energy and Climate Energy Agency (VEKA) in Flanders, the Department of Energy and Sustainable Buildings in Wallonia and The Brussels Environment Office in Brussels.

Croatia

The Ministry of Physical Planning, Construction and State Assets (MPGI) is responsible for the implementation of the EPBD including EPCs, the ICS and accrediting independent experts. The Ministry of Economy, Market Inspectorate is responsible for ensuring EPCs are correctly advertised during the sale or lease of a building.

Ireland

The EPBD Implementation in Ireland is coordinated by senior officials of the following bodies with sufficient authority to make decisions and allocate resources: Department of Environment, Climate and Communications, Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, and the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI). The SEAI is responsible for administering the EPC scheme, which is called a Building Energy Rating (BER) scheme in Ireland. SEAI also govern the registration and performance of BER assessors.

Table 11: Overview of the main findings from each case study: Overview of Governance Model

Country

Affordability

Belgium

In Wallonia, EPC prices have been actively controlled by designing a short certification process to reduce costs. This reduced costs from €480 to €240 for single-family houses from the early stages of the scheme to 2020. In Flanders, the price of EPCs is regulated by the market. Prices range from €195 for a small apartment to €345 for a 5-bedroom house. No evidence was identified for Brussels.

Croatia

The price of EPCs was capped at €1.5 / m2, but this requirement was removed in 2014 and the price is now controlled by the market. The average price for an EPC is reported at around 200.00 EUR for an apartment and 380.00 EUR for a house.

Ireland

The price of a BER assessment is controlled by the market, meaning it can vary based on the supplier and size of a building. Prices are approximately €150 in apartments, while the cost for a standard house is between €200 and €300. Moreover, a levy of €30 is in place for the publication of a Domestic BER Certificate.

Table 12: Overview of the main findings from each case study: Affordability

Country

Minimum qualifications, training and accreditation for EPC assessors

Belgium

  • In Flanders, education pre-requisites are needed to assess certain building types. All assessors undergo training which varies based on the type of buildings they will assess. Assessors sit a central exam, and annual re-training is mandatory.
  • Wallonia has a flexible pathway to eligibility and accept either education or professional experience. Assessors attend a five and a half day training course and complete both an oral and written exam. There are no requirements for continuous professional development.
  • Brussels has subject-specific education requirements for all assessors, who must also sit a 5-day training course and complete an exam. There are no requirements for continuous professional development.

Croatia

Assessors must have both specific higher education qualifications and at least five years of work experience in the profession or two years of work experience in design and/or expert construction supervision.

They must then complete a two-week course, followed by a written and practical examination. Every year, assessors must attend eight-hours of training to upgrade their skills.

Ireland

Assessors are required to either hold an NFQ level 6 certificate in a construction-related disciplines or equivalent (demonstrated by a combination of appropriate construction-related qualifications or relevant experience). Assessors must also complete an accredited Domestic BER Training Course and achieve a minimum of 70%. Continuous professional development is obligatory for all BER assessors.

Table 13: Overview of the main findings from each case study: Qualifications, training and accreditation

Country

Auditing, verification and QA

Belgium

  • Flanders use a combination of random sampling and targeted audits, which include on-site audits on a less frequent basis. A citizen complaints system can trigger a targeted review.
  • Wallonia has a digital ‘control web’ which automatically screens all EPCs submitted and flags inconsistent data or values. Audits are conducted on a randomly selected statistically significant sample of the total number of EPCs submitted.
  • Brussels conducts audits on a yearly basis and reviews 1.5% of total EPCs issued. Refresher training is mandatory for accredited experts who make frequent mistakes.

Croatia

As of October 1, 2017, EPCs can only be issued using the Information System of Energy Certificates (lEC).

All EPCs go through administrative checks when uploaded to the EPC database. A random sample undergo more detailed checks, as well as EPCs which have received a complaint. Detailed checks are performed on the contents and accuracy of the EPC report, the input data, and the recommended energy efficiency measures.

Assessors are penalised when EPCs are found to be invalid. Penalties include warnings, re-issue of the EPC at their own cost, and having accreditation revoked. Monetary fines are possible but are rarely used in practice.

Ireland

Ireland conducts audits on both a targeted and random basis. Targeted audits are mostly desk-based reviews, but on-site audits are also conducted when certain risk factors are met. Training audits are also carried out for newly qualified assessors.

The SEAI have implemented a penalty point system, whereby the level of penalty imposed on assessors depends on the severity of the assessor infraction. The nature of these penalties ranges from corrective training to the permanent suspension of the license.

Table 14: Overview of the main findings from each case study: Auditing, verification and QA

Country

Enforcement

Belgium

  • In Flanders, the responsibility for enforcing the requirement to display an EPC at the point of sale lies with VEKA, although notaries are required to check the existence of an EPC. An administrative fine exists for notaries is possible in the case that a sale or rental is made without the existence of an EPC, but these have not been administered to date. A fine of minimum €500 can be administered to building owners for not displaying an EPC at the point of sale.
  • In Wallonia, minimum fines of €500 can be issued to building owners who do not present an EPC at the point of rent or sale.
  • In Brussels, the BEO are responsible for enforcement. Estate agencies repeatedly reported as non-compliant face fines or potential imprisonment.

Croatia

If building owners fail to produce an EPC at the point of sale or rental, they can receive fines between 662 – 3,976 EUR.

Ireland

The solicitor managing the sale of the property is responsible for checking the presence of an EPC at the point of sale. Failure to present a BER certificate at the time of rental or sale can result in financial or judicial penalties, with fines ranging from €500 to €5,000. Criminal records and prison sentences are also a possibility. Compliance with the requirement is higher with property sales than with property rentals.

Table 15: Overview of the main findings from each case study: Enforcement

Conclusions and options for Scotland

Our research has shown that a range of different approaches are applied in the EU member states to enable effective EPC governance. There is limited data available to evidence the effectiveness of the various approaches taken, making it difficult to determine the impact that each approach has on the overall quality of EPCs in each Member State.

To address this gap, we conducted interviews with EPC professionals in member states of interest to understand their opinions on the perceived effectiveness of the approaches they have adopted. We have established a list of potential options which could improve the operational governance of EPCs in Scotland based on evidence collected in the review of approaches taken in the EU member states, targeted interviews and case studies. The options are presented in Table 16.

Option

Rationale

1

Include standardised training requirements for independent experts in the operational framework

Many member states have standard requirements at a national level to ensure that independent experts have the necessary skills and training. As the Scottish Government currently delegates responsibility for training and certifying assessors to the AOs, there may be variations in the standards across the country.

2

Develop standardised QA procedures for AOs in the operational framework

QA procedures in Scotland are the responsibility of AOs, who are responsible for checking a representative sample of EPCs. However, many member states go beyond the random sampling approach to guarantee the quality of EPCs. A more stringent QA approach could be standardised in the Operating Framework to ensure higher quality EPCs across Scotland. For example, a digital system that screens EPC data or targeted audits based on certain risk factors.

3

Establish requirements for stakeholders involved in the rental and sales processes to support enforcement of the requirement to present an EPC

Enforcing the requirement to present an EPC at the point of sale/rental is difficult for the majority of member states. Those that are enforcing this successfully rely on notaries to check the presence of an EPC as part of the sales process. Although notaries are not generally involved in house sales in Scotland, considering different options for encouraging stakeholders to check the presence of an EPC at the point of sale could result in higher compliance rates in Scotland: for example, formalising the requirement for solicitors involved in sales processes to check whether EPC documents have been presented. For rentals, various options could be explored further to encourage stakeholders to check for compliance.

Table 16: Options for Scotland to improve their operational governance of EPCs

Options have not been assessed for feasibility of implementation in Scotland, or for potential long-term impacts. There is an opportunity for additional research, if the Scottish Government wish to explore any of these options in further detail.

Each of these options are outlined below, with a series of sub-options which outline how each overarching option could be operationalised in practice. These options are not mutually exclusive and could be implemented in conjunction with each other.

Including standardised training requirements for independent experts in the operational framework

Sub-option 1a – Introduce standard education and qualification requirements into the operational framework

This could include requirements for higher education and/or relevant professional experience. However, the flexible approach adopted in Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia and Ireland ensures that independent experts can access via multiple routes. In Scotland, this could mean that experts must either:

  1. Hold a National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) Level 3 or other similar (as required in England and Wales) or,
  2. Demonstrate they hold an equivalent level of experience, which could be in the form of another qualification alongside proof of significant industry experience.

Requirements could also be tailored by assessor type. For example, higher education is only required for EPC assessors who conduct EPCs for new buildings in Belgium (Flanders).

Although AOs in Scotland may be using similar pre-requisites for independent experts, these are not standardised and may vary by AO. Ensuring that requirements are clearly defined in the operational framework will reduce ambiguity in requirements and ensure standardisation across the country.

Sub-option 1b – Approve a standardised mandatory training programme for independent experts

This can be delivered by AOs, but the content should be regularly updated and approved by the Scottish Government to ensure independent experts have skills which are aligned with the most recent developments in the sector.

This could be combined with an examination and, on passing, certification proving the independent expert has attended and taken on board the content of the training modules.

Sub-option 1c – Introduce requirements to attend mandatory annual re-training

In addition to a Scottish Government-approved training module for assessors, the Scottish Government could approve an annual retraining course for assessors. Mandatory retraining for assessors to keep their license would ensure assessors are up to date with the latest developments in the field and present an opportunity to learn from and correct mistakes. The approach taken in Belgium (Flanders) could be adopted, where retraining includes both mandatory modules (which cover common errors or new developments in the field) and optional modules, tailored to the assessor type and/or any infractions identified for that assessor in the previous year.

Develop standardised QA procedures for AOs in the operational framework

Sub-option 2a – Develop a digital QA system and screening of EPC input data

To streamline current QA procedures, a central digital system could be developed that screens and sense-checks EPC input data for errors. For example, when an independent expert conducts an assessment, they can input data into a digital system which will flag when they have input data which falls outside an expected range. An example of this approach is the digital ‘control web’ in Belgium (Wallonia), which screens all submitted EPCs to flag inconsistent values or data.

Sub-option 2b – Establish a ‘Helpdesk’ function to receive complaints about EPCs

Some member states, including Croatia and Belgium (Flanders) operate a helpdesk function, which customers can use to submit complaints or report suspected non-compliance. This could be introduced in Scotland and co-ordinated by central government at a national level, with complaints being redirected to the relevant AO for further investigation.

Sub-option 2c – Targeted audits of EPCs based on specific risk factors

In addition to the minimum random sampling required by the EPBD, best practice among member states is to combine this sampling with more targeted audits in a two-tiered QA approach. The approach taken in Ireland and Belgium (Flanders) is that certain risk factors, such as assessors issuing a large number of EPCs, or a complaint from a customer, trigger a targeted audit. These can be desk-based or on-site, but the Operating Framework could clearly outline what risk factors trigger a particular follow-up audit.

Sub-option 2d – Outline a clear penalty system for assessor infractions

A penalty points system, which clearly outlines what infractions result in what penalties, could be outlined in the operational framework to ensure that all assessors and AOs are clear about the penalties which will be issued in identified cases of non-compliance. Linking infractions to points and setting a maximum number of points would result in the suspension of their accreditation.

Penalties for assessors should be developed alongside a standardised and regular training schedule. Working with assessors, by providing regular and up-to-date training opportunities, gives them the opportunity to refresh their training. It also allows repeat issues to be targeted in dedicated training sessions and would ensure assessors remain engaged and interested in the process.

Engage wider stakeholders in the rental/sales process to support enforcement of the requirement to present an EPC

Sub-option 3a – Formalising the requirement for solicitors to check EPC documentation at the point of sale

The European Commission’s 2015 compliance study reported that member states generally struggle to enforce the requirement to make EPCs available at the point of sale or rent and data availability on compliance rates is often low. member states that are enforcing this in a robust manner rely on notaries to conduct checks during the sale transaction (European Commission, 2015).

Solicitors are responsible for checking documentation during a property sale in Scotland. Formalising the requirement to check the presence of an EPC at the point of sale as part of a legal checklist could result in greater enforcement of this requirement in Scotland.

Sub-option 3b – Requirements for stakeholders in the rental market to check EPC documentation

Rental agreements often do not involve a legal professional in the process, so they cannot be targeted in the same way as sales (European Commission, 2015). Hungary was the only country we identified that required a legal professional to sign-off on all rental agreements. Generally, this means that the systems in place to enforce these requirements are less developed in the rental sector, resulting in lower compliance or limited data availability on compliance rates.

Various options could be explored as to how this requirement could be enforced in the rental market. These could include:

  • Requiring that a legal professional signs off on all rental agreements in Scotland
  • Formalising the requirement to present an EPC when registering on the Scottish Landlord Register
  • Introducing compliance measures for estate agents, such as legal obligations or linking compliance to incentives such as green financing
  • Encouraging estate agents to use the Helpdesk function to report instances of non-compliance

References

Alembic Research, Energy Action Scotland and Dr Patrick Waterfield (2019) A review of domestic and non-domestic energy performance certificates in Scotland. Available at: A Review of Domestic and Non-Domestic Energy Performance Certificates in Scotland: Research report for the Scottish Government, Heat, Energy Efficiency and Consumers Unit – Final Report (www.gov.scot)

Arbeiterkammer Oberösterreich (2024). Energy certificate. Available at: https://ooe.arbeiterkammer.at/beratung/wohnen/mieten/Energieausweis.html#:~:text=Fehlt%20ein%20g%C3%BCltiger%20Energieausweis%2C%20muss,Geb%C3%A4udes%20entsprechende%20Gesamtenergieeffizienz%20als%20vereinbart.

Arroyo, C. (2024). How much does an energy efficiency certificate cost? cronoShare. Available at: https://www.cronoshare.com/cuanto-cuesta/certificado-eficiencia-energetica

Azzolini et al. (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Italy status in 2020. Energy and Sustainable Economic Development (ENEA) and Italian Thermo-technical Committee (CTI). Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Italy-2020.pdf

Bekierski et al. (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Poland status in 2016. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/ca-outcomes/outcomes-2015-2018/book-2018/countries/poland

Berard (2023). So, what is it and how does it affect you? Available at: https://blog.se.com/homes/2023/09/21/navigating-the-changing-property-scene-in-france-a-quick-guide-for-renters-and-property-owners/#:~:text=The%20DPE%2FEPC%20is%20payable,is%20valid%20for%20ten%20years.

Borragán, G. and Legon, C. (2021). Guidelines on how national Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) schemes and the Smart Readiness Indicator (SRI) could be linked. ePANACEA. Available at: https://www.construction21.org/articles/h/epanacea-how-can-national-epc-schemes-be-linked-with-the-smart-readiness-indicator.html

BPIE (2014). Energy performance certificates across the EU. Available at: https://www.bpie.eu/publication/energy-performance-certificates-across-the-eu/#:~:text=This%20report%20explores%20the%20national,of%20the%20European%20building%20stock.

BPIE (2018). Factsheet: Bulgaria current use of EPCs and potential links to iBRoad. Available at: http://bpie.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/iBROAD_CountryFactsheet_BULGARIA-2018.pdf

BRE (n.d.). Fee Factsheet. Available at: https://www.bre.co.uk/filelibrary/Scotland/Fees_Sheet_7_April__update_(2).pdf

Centre for Renewable Energy Sources and Saving [CRES] (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Greece status in 2020. Available at: https://www.ca-epbd.eu/Media/638373599786588364/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Greece-2020.pdf

Certienergie (n.d.b). Prices of Energy Performance Certificates. Available at: https://www.certinergie.be/en/energy-performance-certificate/epc-prices/

Citizens Information (2024). Getting a building energy rating for your home. Available at: https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/housing/owning-a-home/home-owners/getting-a-building-energy-rating-for-your-home/#:~:text=The%20price%20of%20a%20BER,on%20which%20one%20to%20choose

Degiorgio and Barbara (2016). Implementation of the EPBD Malta. Building Regulation Office. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/ca-outcomes/outcomes-2015-2018/book-2018/countries/malta

Delorme and Higley (2020) Implemetation of the EPBD in the United Kingdom – England. Status in 2020. AECOM and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. Available at: https://www.ca-epbd.eu/Media/638373595508144645/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-the-United-Kingdom–England-2020.pdf

Delorme and Hughes (2016). EPBD implementation in the United Kingdom – Scotland. Status in December 2016. AECOM and Local Government and Communities Directorate. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CA-EPBD-IV-UK-Scotland-2018.pdf

Deslot et al. (2020). Implementation of the EPBD France status in 2020. General Directorate for Urban Development, Housing and Nature, General Directorate for Energy and Climate (DGEC). Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-France-%E2%80%93-Status-in-2020.pdf

Encius (2016). EPBD implementation in Lithuania. Status in December 2016. Certification Centre of Building Products (SPSC). Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CA-EPBD-IV-Lithuania-2018.pdf

Energistyrelsen, Aalborg University & Danish Housing and Planning Authority (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Denmark Status in 2020. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Denmark-%E2%80%93-2020.pdf

European Commission (2021a). Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02010L0031-20210101

European Commission (2015). Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) compliance study. Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/00e943a2-aa0a-11e5-b528-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-317980685

European Union (2024). Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the energy performance of buildings (recast). Official Journal of the European Union. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401275&pk_keyword=Energy&pk_content=Directive

Federal Agency for Energy Efficiency [BfEE] (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Germany status in 2020. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Germany-2020.pdf

Fourez et al. (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Belgium – Walloon Region Status in 2022. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Belgium-2020-%E2%80%93-Walloon-Region.pdf

Fragoso and Baptista (2016). EPBD Implementation in Portugal. Status in December 2016. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/CA-EPBD-IV-Portugal-2018.pdf

Hang.ee (2022). Energy label and energy efficient house. Available at: https://www.hange.ee/blogi/energiamargis-ja-energiatohus-maja/

Hjorth et al. (2021). Implementation of the EPBD Sweden status in 2021. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Sweden.pdf

Jenei et al. (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Hungary status in 2020. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Hungary-2020.pdf

Kranzl, L. (2020a). Energy Performance Certificates, assessing their status and potential. Available at: https://x-tendo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/X-TENDO-REPORT_FINAL_pages.pdf

Loncour, X. and Heijmans, N. (2018). Certification, Control system and Quality – 2018. Concerted Action Energy Performance of Buildings. Available at: https://www.ca-epbd.eu/Media/638373594206410585/CA-EPBD-CT3-Certification_Control-system_Quality-2018.pdf

Marđetko-Škoro, N. (2015). Implementation of the EPBD in Croatia – Status December 2014. In 2016 Implementing the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) – Featuring country reports. ADENE. https://www.epbd-ca.eu/outcomes/2011-2015/CA3-2016-National-CROATIA-web.pdf

Mečíccrová, L. (2021). How much does a certificate of energy performance of buildings cost and when do you need it? Finance.cz. Available at: https://www.finance.cz/538646-energeticke-stitky-budov-platnost-cena-pokuta/#:~:text=Vydat%20platn%C3%BD%20pr%C5%AFkaz%20energetick%C3%A9%20n%C3%A1ro%C4%8Dnosti,3%20a%C5%BE%207%20tis%C3%ADc%20korun.

Ministry of Construction and Physical Planning [MCPP] (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Croatia, Status in 2020. Available at: http://bpes.ypeka.gr/?page_id=21

Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, Tallinn University of Technology & Estonian Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Estonia Status in 2020. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Estonia.pdf

Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry [MECI] (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Cyprus status in 2020. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Cyprus.pdf

Ministry of the Environment of Finland & Motiva Oy (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Finland status in 2020. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Finland-%E2%80%93-2020.pdf

Motiva (2024). What does the energy certificate cost? Available at: https://www.motiva.fi/ratkaisut/energiatodistusneuvonta/mika_on_energiatodistus/mita_energiatodistus_maksaa

Netherlands Enterprise Agency (2021). Price survey and international comparison of the NTA 8800 Energy Performance Certificate. Available at: https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2022/02/price-survey-and-international-comparison-of-the-nta-8800-energy-perfermance-certificate-summary.pdf

Österreichisches Institut für Bautechnik [OIB] (2020). Implementation of EPBD in Austria, status in 2020. Available at: https://www.ca-epbd.eu/Media/638373591769297881/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Austria–2020.pdf

Olschner, S (2024). Energy certificate for the house: when it is mandatory and what it costs. Available at: https://www.adac.de/rund-ums-haus/energie/spartipps/energieausweis/

RTL Today (2014). Understanding the energy passport. Available at: https://today.rtl.lu/life/real-estate/a/1240940.html

Sayfikar, M. & Jenkins, D. (2024). Cross-country comparison of format and nature of recommended improvements in different EPCs. Available at: https://www.crosscert.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/crossCert_D3.4_Cross-country_comparison_recommended_improvements_EPCs.pdf

Schoenherr (n.d.). Slovenia: Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) – Additional Burden on Real Properties’ Owners or Welcomed Measure? Available at: https://www.schoenherr.rs/uploads/tx_news/schoenherr_Slovenia_Energy_Performance_Certificate__EPC_.pdf

Scottish Government (2012). Energy Performance Certificate approved organisations: operational framework. Available at: https://www.gov.scot/publications/energy-performance-certificate-approved-organisations-operational-framework/

Scottish Government (2017). Consultation on funding of the Scottish Energy Performance Certificate Register. Available at: https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/consultation-paper/2017/05/consultation-funding-scottish-energy-performance-certificate-register-consultation-funding-scottish/documents/00517537-pdf/00517537-pdf/govscot%3Adocument/?inline=true

SEAI (2016). Quality Assurance System and Disciplinary Procedures (QADP) for Building Energy Rating (BER) and Display Energy Certificates (DEC). Available at: https://www.seai.ie/publications/Quality-Assurance-System-and-Disciplinary-Procedure-New.pdf

SEAI (2017a). Training courses – Step 2: Complete the BER training course. Available at: https://www.seai.ie/register-with-seai/ber-assessor/training-courses/

SEAI (2017b). About us. Available at: https://www.seai.ie/about/

Slovak Trade Inspection (n.d.). Slovak Trade Inspection. Available at: https://www.soi.sk/en/SOI.soi

StanGRAD (n.d.). Energy certification of real estate in Croatia. Available at https://nekretnine-stangrad.hr/about-us/topics/constructing-real-estates-for-sale/energy-certification-of-real-estate-in-croatia

Sustainable Energy Development Agency [SEDA] (2020). Implementation of the EPBD Bulgaria status in 2020. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Bulgaria-2020.pdf

TU Wien (2021). Description of current Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) related policy framework in implementing countries. Available at: https://epanacea.eu/?smd_process_download=1&download_id=2670

Worré et al. (2020). Implementation of EPBD in Luxembourg, status in 2020. Ministry of Energy and Spatial Planning. Available at: https://epbd-ca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Implementation-of-the-EPBD-in-Luxembourg-%E2%80%93-Status-in-2020.pdf

Appendix A Methodology

Literature review

Identifying and logging sources

We conducted a literature review using key search terms and Boolean operators where relevant, to maximise the search outputs and refine results. We used key search terms including: ‘Energy efficiency in buildings’, ‘EPC’, ‘Implementation’, ‘[Name of Member State], in combination with each of the following terms ‘Legislation’, ‘Governance’, ‘Independent Control System’, ‘Assessors’, ‘Accreditation’, ‘Audit’, ‘Verification’, ‘Assurance’, ‘Enforcement body’, ‘Enforcement mechanism’, ‘Affordability’.

We conducted searches in English and in the official language of the MS in question, using machine translation software DeepL. We used Google and Google Scholar to conduct searches.

Data extraction into summary database

When we identified relevant data sources, we reviewed them in full and extracted relevant information into a summary database (Annex A). The summary database was structured with a row for each MS and Scotland (28 total) and columns representing an area of interest for the research. These included:

  • Key data sources used for the country in question.
  • Governance model.
  • Qualifications and training for EPC assessors.
  • Auditing, verification and QA of EPCs.
  • Enforcement of EPC requirements.
  • How affordability of EPCs is ensured.

Case studies

Based on the outputs of the literature review, we selected three case studies of interest, which adopted different approaches to that currently taken in Scotland for the operational governance of EPCs. These were jointly selected with the Scottish Government. The three final case studies selected were:

  • Belgium
  • Croatia
  • Ireland

We first drafted each case study from the outputs of the literature review, and the enhanced them with targeted consultation with experts from the MS in question.

Targeted interviews

We held eight interviews with key stakeholders to supplement this research, as well as an additional interview with a Scottish Government representative to better understand the operational governance. These consisted of:

  • Two interviews with overarching EU-level EPC experts.
  • One email-based interview with a Danish EPC expert.
  • Two interviews with Irish EPC experts.
  • One interview with a Belgian EPC expert from Belgium (Flanders), and one email-based interview with an expert from the Walloon region (representatives from Brussels were contacted, but either did not respond or were unavailable to participate in this research).
  • One interview with a Croatian EPC expert (additional interviewees from Croatia were contacted, but either did not respond or were unavailable to participate in this research).
  • One interview with a Scottish EPC expert.

In most cases, the country-level EPC experts worked on EPC regimes within national governments.

Case study limitations

We conducted this research on a relatively short timescale (between April and July 2024). The collected data was used to derive policy options for improving the operational governance of EPCs in Scotland. A detailed assessment of the long-term impacts of these policy options, including analysis of uncertainties associated with future scenarios and feasibility constraints, was not within scope of this project.

Appendix B Summary database

Submitted as a separate Excel document

Appendix C Case study – Belgium

Submitted as a separate standalone document

Appendix D Case study – Croatia

Submitted as a separate standalone document

Appendix E Case study – Ireland

Submitted as a separate standalone document

Appendix F Table of estimated EPC costs in member states

Member state

Estimate EPC cost

Austria

Average of €400 (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2021)

Belgium (Brussels)

Gap

Belgium (Flanders)

Prices range from €195 for a small apartment to €345 for a 5-bedroom house (Certinergie, n.d.b).

Belgium (Wallonia)

Single family house average of €480

Apartment average €165 (Fourez et al, 2020)

Bulgaria

€0.2 – €1 per m2 (BPIE, 2014)

Cyprus

Gap

Czechia

3000-7000 crowns, tens of thousands of crowns if an energy specialist is required to visit (Mečíccrová, 2021)

Germany

Single family home average of less than €100

If an on-site inspection is required, this is €300 – €500 (Olschner, 2024)

Denmark

EPCs in 2024 are capped at €1,067 for a single family house. However, competition makes the price lower – currently around €667. For larger buildings the price for EPCs is subject to a free market. For larger buildings the price for EPCs is subject to a free market[22].

Estonia

Average for existing house of €100 – €300 (Hang.ee, 2022)

Spain

Average price of €60 – €130 for a 50-100m2 building (Arroyo, 2024)

Finland

Small houses average of €300 – 400 (existing) and €200 – €300 (new)

Terraced houses and apartments average of €510 (existing) and €450 (new) (Motiva, 2024)

France

Average of €100 – €250 (Berard, 2023)

Greece

Gap

Croatia

Capped at €1.5 / m2 (BPIE, 2014)

Hungary

Price is regulated for apartments and single family homes at €40 + VAT (Jenei et al, 2020; Kranzl, 2020a)

Ireland

Apartments average of €150

Standard house average of €200 – €300 (Citizens Information, 2024)

Italy

Average of €150

Lithuania

Between €100 – €500 (Encius, 2016)

Luxembourg

Between €500 – €1000 (RTL Today, 2014)

Latvia

Gap

Malta

Gap

The Netherlands

Average of €255 (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2021)

Poland

Between €40 – €1300 (Bekierski et al., 2016)

Portugal

Average of €200 (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2021)

Romania

Gap

Sweden

Average for a single family house of €500 (BPIE, 2014)

Slovenia

Price is regulated at €1.5 / m2 for residential buildings up to 220m2 and €2 / m2 for over 220 m2, and €1 – €4 / m2 for apartment buildings (depending on number of dwellings) (BPIE, 2014)

There’s also a cap of €170 for one-dwelling and two-dwelling buildings (Kranzl, 2020a)

Slovakia

Average of an apartment (60m2) of €200

Average of a single family house (220m2) of €250

Average of small apartment building of €1000 (Schoenherr, n.d.)

© The University of Edinburgh, 2024
Prepared by Technopolis Ltd on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.


  1. In most cases, the EPC experts consulted work on EPC regimes within national governments.



  2. The UK devolved governments follow the approach agreed in the UK when the EPBD was transposed into domestic regulation in 2008, when the UK was an EU Member State.



  3. The literature review did not identify pre-requisite requirements for Spain, Latvia and Slovakia



  4. The literature review did not identify training requirements for Czechia, Spain, Latvia and Slovakia.



  5. Although Accreditation Schemes can ensure that energy assessors hold the right skills by requiring them to attend a training course and to sit an examination, it appears that assessors can also demonstrate suitable qualifications and experience in place of sitting this exam, so it may not be mandatory in all cases.



  6. The literature review did not identify re-certification requirements for Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Slovakia and Scotland



  7. We did not identify approaches to QA of EPCs for Slovenia. Italy has adopted a region approach to QA and Slovakia has adopted random sampling, but we did not identify a sampling approach.



  8. Information obtained during an interview with an EPC expert



  9. Information obtained during an interview with an EPC expert



  10. Information obtained during stakeholder consultation with a Danish EPC expert



  11. Information obtained during stakeholder consultation with a German EPC expert



  12. Information obtained during stakeholder consultation with a Maltese EPC expert



  13. Information obtained during stakeholder consultation with a Portuguese EPC expert



  14. Information obtained during stakeholder engagement with an Irish EPC expert



  15. Information obtained during stakeholder consultation with a Portuguese EPC expert



  16. Information obtained during stakeholder consultation with a Danish EPC expert



  17. Information obtained during stakeholder consultation with an EPC expert in England and Wales



  18. Information obtained during stakeholder consultation with a Maltese EPC expert



  19. Information obtained during an interview with an EPC expert in Denmark



  20. Information obtained during an interview with EPC experts from Croatia



  21. Information obtained during interview with Danish EPC Expert


Research completed: October 2023

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/3991

Executive summary

This project was commissioned to inform the Scottish Government on the evidence and arguments for and against the inclusion of metered energy consumption data in Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs). Methods included a literature review and interviews with stakeholders in Scotland, the UK and Sweden.

We outline the potential opportunities for and barriers to using energy consumption data; the practicalities of obtaining and using energy consumption data; and the value of including such data, when considering the variables that affect actual energy usage.

Key findings

Metered energy consumption data could be used in EPCs in two ways to provide information to occupants or potential occupants:

  • to provide more accurate information on building fabric performance, known as an asset rating
  • to give a rating of how energy is used in a building when compared with similar buildings, known as an operational rating.

These two uses of metered consumption data – asset rating and operational rating – are not mutually exclusive and could both be included in EPCs. This could be developed as a dynamic, digital EPC.

Neither of these two uses could be implemented immediately as 57% of homes in Scotland do not yet have smart meters, which are the most reliable means of collecting metered energy consumption data. Particular difficulties include:

  • A small proportion of homes will never have smart meter capability, including homes with unregulated heating fuels such as oil, LPG, or solid fuels.
  • There is no process to access smart meter data to generate EPCs. The Smart Meter Energy Data Repository Programme is investigating the commercial feasibility of a repository that would enable this.

The most straightforward use for metered energy consumption data is to include the operational rating value on an EPC alongside a reference figure, such as a national average, modelled archetype, or historic consumption data for a property.

  • Correcting energy consumption in a property for weather and normalising it by floor area would enable potential occupants to compare properties.
  • An operational rating could be included as a part of the EPC or exist as a separate document.

EPCs should retain an asset rating that is based on standard assumptions of occupancy and use, to allow comparison between properties. This could be based on modelled or measured data.

For an accurate asset rating, metered energy consumption data can be used to calculate the heat transfer coefficient of buildings. This requires collecting internal temperature data, as well as metered energy consumption data. The latest smart meter in-home display units have inbuilt temperature sensors. The possibility of transmitting temperature readings alongside meter readings is being investigated by the Data Communications Company.

Accurate heat transfer coefficient figures can inform retrofit decisions. Further consideration is needed around the level of retrofit recommendations provided by EPCs and how these are used in policy decisions. Using metered energy consumption data to inform retrofit recommendations may be more suited to detailed retrofit plans such as renovation roadmaps.

Consumer consent will be needed to collect and process metered energy consumption data.

Recommendations

This report explores whether it is possible for metered energy consumption data to be used within EPCs and outlines two ways in which this data could be useful. In order to progress with either or both of these options, we recommend that the Scottish Government define the purpose and intended outcome of using metered energy consumption data within EPCs.

Our research has highlighted that further work is needed in this area to explore:

  • The practicalities of collecting required data, including:
  • Metered energy consumption data at the individual building level, rather than from aggregated datasets. This will require a standardised process for collecting consumer consent. Public sector bodies can obtain household-level data without the need for individual consent through the legal basis of ‘public task’. However, this is for aggregated data and there are no examples of data being used to provide insights into individual households, so further investigation is needed into the legal basis for this. Legal routes for this were not explored as part of this research.
  • Processes for data collection, as these are mostly dependent on the rollout of smart meters. An alternative methodology will need to be developed for households using unregulated fuels, as their heating consumption will not be captured in smart meter data.
  • Additional information from occupants, which can be used to contextualise energy consumption data when used for an operational rating. Examples of this kind of data include the number of occupants or typical heating regime. Further work is required to understand the minimum amount of contextual information to enable metered energy consumption data to be useful.
  • Internal temperature data for the purpose of calculating a heat transfer coefficient as part of an asset rating. This would require the mass rollout of internal temperature sensors, which are already included in some in-home display devices. Internal temperature data could also be useful contextual data for an operational rating.
  • Different formats that could be used to display consumption data when used for an operational rating. This should consider whether consumption data would work best as one of multiple ratings within the EPC or separately.
  • For energy-generating homes, how total energy consumption, generation, export and cost can be displayed in a straight-forward manner.
  • Any regulatory or practical barriers to inputting the heat transfer coefficient as a measured value in Standard Assessment Procedure calculations for the asset rating.
  • The value of Display Energy Certificates for non-domestic public buildings in England and Wales, and whether there would be value in expanding their use in Scotland.

Glossary / Abbreviations table

Term

Definition

Asset rating

A measure of building fabric performance. It provides no information about how the building is used in practice.

BEIS

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy. Split in 2023 to form three departments, including the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ).

CCC

Climate Change Committee. An independent, statutory body whose purpose is to advise the UK and devolved governments on emissions targets and then report to Parliament.

DCC

Data Communications Company. A licenced monopoly regulated by Ofgem. Responsible for linking smart meters in homes and businesses with energy suppliers, network operators and energy service companies.

DEC

Display Energy Certificate. Shows the energy performance of a building based on the operation rating, on a graphical scale from A (very efficient) to G (least efficient). Measures the actual energy usage of a building based on annual consumption.

DESNZ

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero. The UK Government department responsible for securing long-term energy supply, reducing bills, and encouraging greater energy efficiency.

DNO

Distribution Network Operator. A company licensed to distribute electricity in the UK.

DOR

Domestic Operational Rating. A proposed operational rating scheme for domestic properties that quantifies the actual, in-use energy demand, greenhouse gas emissions and energy costs of homes.

EER

Energy Efficiency Rating. A review of a property’s energy efficiency which is then scored. The energy efficiency charts are divided into rating bands ranging from A+ to G, where A+ is very efficient and G is least efficient.

EPBD

Energy Performance of Building Directive. The key policy instrument to increase the energy performance of buildings across the European Union. Originally introduced in 2002, it was recast in 2010 and revised in 2018 and 2021.

EPC

Energy Performance Certificate. A document that provides information about the energy efficiency of a building. Used in many countries including Scotland.

FIT

Feed-in-tariff. A support mechanism designed to pay small scale renewable energy generators for the electricity that is exported to the grid.

GDPR

General Data Protection Regulation. A regulation that enhances how people can access information about them and places limitations on what organisations can do with personal data.

HDD

Heating Degree Day. A measurement designed to quantify the demand for energy needed to heat a building. It is the number of degrees that a day’s average temperature is below a base temperature of 15.5°C.

HTC

Heat Transfer Coefficient. A common metric for the thermal performance of a building. It describes the rate of heat transfer between two areas.

IEA

International Energy Agency. An international body that provides policy recommendations, analysis and data on the global energy sector.

IHD

In-home display. A portable device with a screen showing energy usage and its associated cost.

kWh

Kilowatt hour. A measure of how much energy is used per hour.

MEPI

Measured Energy Performance Indicator. A method to determine the energy performance of a building based on measured energy use.

MEP

Measured Energy Performance. A tool that utilises accurate measurements of the HTC of a property, along with an RdSAP-style survey to produce a more accurate EPC rating for a property.

MPG

Miles per gallon. Used to describe how many miles a vehicle can travel for every gallon of fuel used.

Operational rating

Shows the actual energy usage of a building.

Performance Gap

The difference between predicted and actual performance of a building’s fabric. Also sometimes used to describe the difference between predicted energy usage and actual (metered) energy usage, therefore also including the impact of occupancy factors.

PHPP

Passive House Planning Package. Modelling software developed by the Passivhaus institute. Used when designing energy efficient buildings to calculate their operational energy use and carbon emissions.

RdSAP

Reduced Data Standard Assessment Procedure. A simplified version of SAP calculated using a set of assumptions about the dwelling based on conventions and requirements at the time it was constructed.

Regulated energy

The energy which is consumed by the building and its fixed utilities including space heating, cooling, hot water, ventilation, lighting.

RHI

Renewable Heat Incentive. A Government financial incentive to promote the use of renewable heat.

SAP

Standard Assessment Procedure. The method for calculating the energy performance of dwellings in the UK. Scores typically range from 1 to 100+, with higher scores indicating more efficient building stock. SAP is owned by the UK Government. Building Research Establishment (BRE) is responsible for the development of SAP.

SBEM

Standard Building Energy Model. Government approved methodology that calculates the energy required to heat, cool, ventilate and light a non-dwelling.

SHCS

Scottish House Condition Survey. A national survey designed to look at the physical condition of Scotland’s homes as well as the experience of householders.

SMETER technologies

Smart Meter Enabled Thermal Efficiency Ratings technologies that measure the thermal performance of homes using smart meters and other data.

Unregulated energy

The energy which is consumed by the building in the form of fixtures or appliances like refrigeration, TVs, computers, kettles, microwaves, hobs, and ovens. The usage of these appliances varies based on occupants’ choices and behaviours.

US DoE

United States Department of Energy. Department of the US federal government that oversees national energy policy and manages domestic energy production and conservation.

ZDEH

Zero Direct Emissions Heating systems are systems which produce zero direct emissions at the point of use.

Introduction

This research has been commissioned in response to calls on the Scottish Government to make use of metered energy consumption data within Scottish EPCs. A common criticism of EPCs is that they do not provide useful information to householders about the actual energy consumption and real-life performance of properties. As a result, EPCs can be perceived as unreliable and unhelpful.

Increasing evidence shows that there are significant and consistent gaps between properties’ actual energy consumption and the consumption modelled in EPCs (BEIS, 2021; Few et al., 2023; The Times, 2023). EPCs were not designed to predict actual consumption (see Section 3). This raises the question of whether the methodology or format would benefit from including metered consumption data. The installation of smart meters in an increasing number of Scotland’s homes presents an opportunity to collect this data. In this report, we explore how such data could be incorporated into EPCs to potentially improve their usefulness and reliability.

The question of using energy consumption data is complex – there are many ways it could be included, and each has different implications. This report sets out two key uses for energy consumption data: to inform an asset rating; and to inform an operational rating.

EPC Overview and Research Scope

Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs)

An EPC is a document that provides information about the energy efficiency of a building. Their introduction was driven by the European Union’s Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD). Article 11 of the EPBD states the original purpose of EPCs was “to make it possible for owners or tenants of the building or building unit to compare and assess its energy performance” (Directive 2010/31/EU, 2010). Article 2 specifies that EPCs are intended to show “the energy demand associated with a typical use of the building” (ibid.). This makes it clear that the original purpose of EPCs was to enable the comparison of building performance under ‘typical’ conditions.

Annex I also states that the energy performance of buildings can be evaluated using either the calculated (producing an asset rating) or actual energy consumption (producing an operational rating) (Directive 2010/31/EU, 2010). Methods based on measured energy consumption must separate out building performance from other factors, primarily occupancy. The variability of these other factors can be controlled when using calculated methods. However, calculated methods are often associated with inaccuracy (Crawley et al., 2019; Hardy and Glew, 2019) and pose the problem that what is built can be different from what was designed or modelled (the performance gap).

In practice, most EPC methodologies use a calculated approach, incorporating real building data from surveys or physical tests (Arcipowska et al., 2014). In Scotland, as in the rest of the UK, EPCs are produced using SAP, RdSAP and SBEM methodologies. SAP (Standard Assessment Procedure) is used to generate EPCs for both new and existing residential buildings. Full SAP is primarily used for new dwellings whereas RdSAP (Reduced Data SAP) is used for existing dwellings. RdSAP uses the same calculation as full SAP but with a simplified data collection process. This enables the calculation to take place where a complete data set for a property is unavailable, and for a lower cost than full SAP.

Existing SAP methodologies used to calculate the domestic asset rating use standard assumptions for occupancy, energy-use, and climate to ensure that the thermal performance can be compared under the same set of conditions. This asset rating is not reflective of how the building is used, for example due to the specific energy requirements of the occupants or the local climate.

SBEM (Standard Building Energy Model) is used to produce EPCs for non-domestic buildings. SBEM utilises a different calculation methodology to SAP. For the generation of an EPC, the SBEM calculation utilises standardised information for several factors to allow comparability between similar building types. Like SAP, SBEM requires a certain amount of standardisation to enable comparability between buildings for benchmarking purposes.

Research scope

This report considers whether metered energy consumption data can and should be used in the production of EPCs in Scotland. This brings with it questions around the suitability of EPCs for their various uses. However, the purpose of this report is not to assess whether EPCs (or SAP / RdSAP) are the most appropriate tool for the functions set out in Section 4. Additionally, this report does not detail the limitations of EPCs or SAP. There is an existing body of research which evidences these limitations, for example Jones Lang LaSalle (2012), Kelly et al. (2012), Jenkins et al. (2017), Hardy et al. (2019), and BEIS (2021).

The scope of this research is to consider whether it is possible to access and include metered energy consumption data on Scottish EPCs, and whether this would be a valuable addition. In some instances, we have suggested that the information provided by metered energy consumption data may be useful but would be better presented elsewhere and not as part of an EPC. The focus of the research is on domestic EPCs as tools for providing information to occupants, rather than EPCs as a policy tool or for benchmarking purposes.

The focus of this report is domestic EPCs. The use of metered energy consumption data for non-domestic EPCs is briefly explored in Section 10.

 

Functions of EPCs in Scotland

EPCs in Scotland are used for a range of purposes, including (but not limited to):

  • Providing information to potential buyers and tenants on a building’s energy use, and estimated energy costs.
  • Providing information to property owners on suggested retrofit measures.
  • Serving as a policy tool to measure, regulate and set targets for the reduction of carbon emissions from housing.
  • Facilitating housing stock analysis by landlords to plan and implement improvements.
  • Supporting national housing stock analysis through the Scottish House Condition Survey (SHCS).
  • Acting as a proxy indicator to support the identification of households in fuel poverty, for example for the targeting of fuel poverty prevention or alleviation services.

This report does not assess how well EPCs can perform each of these functions. The use of energy consumption data within EPCs will have implications for all of the above uses. Our research considers whether the use of energy consumption data could improve EPCs for the following specific purposes:

  • Providing information on a building’s fabric performance.
  • Providing an estimate of energy costs.
  • Providing information on how buildings are actually used.
  • Informing retrofit decisions.

The case for including energy consumption data

The arguments for using energy consumption data depend on the use-case of EPCs that is being considered. As outlined in Section 4, EPCs now serve a number of purposes for which they were not originally designed. This, along with issues such as inconsistencies between assessors, means that they are perceived as unreliable (Crawley et al., 2020; Kelly et al., 2012). A major driver for using energy consumption data is the premise that this will make EPCs more reliable for users, by reducing reliance on assumptions and assessor judgement.

Currently, EPCs can be of limited value to householders who may expect EPCs to provide information reflecting actual energy consumption. Similarly, for policy or housing stock management decisions, EPC asset ratings do not reflect the actual energy consumption of buildings. The need for policy decisions to be based on actual rather than modelled energy efficiency of buildings is also a key argument for the use of metered energy consumption data in EPCs (Baker & Mould, 2018; Lomas et al., 2019).

This report considers two key uses for energy consumption data in EPCs. It can be used to provide a more accurate asset rating or to provide an operational rating. An asset rating is a measure of building fabric performance and does not consider how a building is used. An operational rating based on energy consumption data can help understand how a building is used, which is not currently addressed by EPCs. This has the potential to provide information to householders on actual energy costs associated with a building, as well as supporting wider decarbonisation policy.

Reducing the performance gap

Improving the accuracy of EPCs through the use of energy consumption data is intended to reduce the performance gap. The performance gap refers to the difference between modelled energy performance (e.g. through SAP) and measured energy performance (Fitton et al., 2021). There are a significant number of variables which influence this gap. These include factors related to the building fabric, building use, and the accuracy of the model.

The term ‘performance gap’ usually refers to the discrepancy between designed and as-built fabric performance, particularly for new-builds. However, it is also used to refer to the difference between predicted energy usage and actual (metered) energy usage. When used in this way, the term is also incorporating the impact of occupancy factors.

Recent research found that even when other factors are accounted for (i.e. in households that meet EPC standard assumptions), EPCs overpredict energy use (Few et al., 2023). This suggests that the methodology and its underlying assumptions also contribute to the performance gap.

Improving the accuracy of asset ratings

Energy consumption data can provide a more accurate calculation of a building’s fabric performance. Utilising real-world data to calculate actual space heating demand could improve accuracy and therefore, increase consumer confidence in the reliability of the asset rating. A more accurate asset rating would enable more accurate predictions of annual energy cost. The cost metric would be predicted under standardised conditions, which would maintain the ability to make comparisons between buildings.

A programme of work by the International Energy Agency known as Annex 71 sought to test demand amongst industry stakeholders[1] for a method to calculate HTC. Their survey results indicated a high level of demand for this across several different use-cases including energy certification (Fitton et al., 2021).

Providing an operational rating

Currently EPCs are based on a building fabric model, and do not consider how energy is used by occupants. Asset ratings alone are not sufficient to reduce energy demand. This requires measuring and achieving reductions in actual energy consumption in buildings (Few et al., 2023; Jones Lang LaSalle, 2012; The Times, 2023).

The use of energy consumption data can provide tailored information for consumers regarding the potential energy costs to occupy a specific property, i.e., a measure of the operational performance of the property. Research has shown that the ability to compare energy use with that of similar dwellings is perceived as beneficial to householders (Zuhaib et al., 2021). In order for comparisons between dwellings to be useful, some contextual information is needed to account for occupancy factors which impact energy use (Section 6).

The ways in which this contextual information could be collected and used are discussed in Section 9. However, some stakeholders (Richard Fitton, Professor of Building Performance; Alan Beal, Bacra; Thomas Levefre, Managing Director, Etude) were wary of using energy consumption data in this way, as we will never be able to fully account for or control all the variables that affect how energy is used in the home.

A significant benefit of introducing an operational rating is to provide more accurate cost saving figures to improve the energy efficiency improvement recommendations. Actual consumption data could also enable a better assessment of the impact of retrofit measures and whether they perform as intended.

There is evidence that householders would find it useful to see actual energy costs on an EPC. There are number of ways this information could be contextualised or compared. A study of five European countries (Zuhaib et al., 2022) found that the majority of householders who responded to their survey would like to see the energy costs of the previous occupier included in EPCs, as well as the energy cost of ‘similar’ households[2]. However, the same study notes that energy consumption comparisons were was perceived as more useful when comparing against the previous year than with similar households. Year-on-year comparisons of energy use may be more appropriately provided by energy suppliers rather than on an EPC (see Section 7.2 for detail on dynamic EPCs).

Informing retrofit decisions

Another purpose of EPCs (as described in EBPD) is to provide improvement recommendations for householders. The Scottish Government’s latest consultation on EPCs states that EPCs are intended as a starting point for householders, but not to provide bespoke recommendations for retrofit (Scottish Government, 2023). However, the information currently provided to householders on an EPC could still be improved using energy consumption data, particularly in relation to predicted savings (Baker & Mould, 2018). Energy consumption data could be used to provide accurate predictions of savings from retrofit measures (Cozza et al., 2020).

Aside from informing individual householders, retrofit recommendations on EPCs and their associated predicted savings are also used to support the targeting of investment in retrofit. The scale of investment required for retrofit means that estimates of potential financial savings must be accurate. Laurent et al. (2013) argue that the economics of retrofit should not be evaluated using normative models. This is because all normative models (not just SAP) have been shown to overestimate potential savings and the cost effectiveness of retrofit measures. For these reasons, if the Scottish Government intends to continue to use EPC retrofit recommendations as a policy tool for directing funding, further investigation is needed into how energy consumption data could support this (Baker & Mould, 2018).

The use of energy consumption data in EPCs could better reflect the actual energy performance of building fabric (Section 8). This would provide a more realistic baseline asset rating on which to base recommended retrofit measures. However, the recommendations on an EPC would still be generated automatically by SAP based on general property characteristics. Metered energy consumption data could also play a role in measuring the impact of retrofit, as explained in Section 8.

Energy consumption data provides information on how a building is used. It can therefore be used to support the development of bespoke retrofit recommendations. However, such EPCs are not the tool for developing bespoke retrofit plans (Scottish Government, 2023). PAS 2035 or renovation roadmaps (Small-Warner & Sinclair, 2022) provide a more appropriate framework for this. This view was supported by interviewees (Kevin Gornall and Sam Mancey of DESNZ; Richard Atkins, Chartered Architect) who stated that retrofit plans should be delivered through the industry professionals and not through EPCs. An example of a tool being developed to support this is provided in Box. 1

Box 1: HTC-Up: Informing retrofit using metered energy consumption data

Chameleon Technology were recently awarded funding through the Green Home Finance Accelerator project from DESNZ to develop the HTC-Up project (Chameleon Technology, 2023). Using smart meter data alongside internal and external temperature data, a more accurate HTC figure can be generated which better reflects the actual thermal energy performance of a property. With this data, Chameleon Technology designs a programme for retrofit specific to the home. They direct householders to approved suppliers and installers, and also offer financing solutions if needed.

Validating models and assumptions

The Elmhurst Almanac (Elmhurst Energy, 2022) refers to the need to use the ‘Golden Triangle’ to inform decision-making. This refers to a building’s asset rating (predicted energy cost and consumption based on standard occupancy), occupancy rating (predicted energy consumption based on how the building is used), and actual energy consumption (smart meter data). In the Golden Triangle, smart meter data is used as a validation point for comparison with figures generated as part of the asset and occupancy ratings. This validation can help to identify issues with performance and where to focus improvements.

Metered consumption data could also be used to improve assumptions contained within SAP/RdSAP. For example, Hughes et al. (2016) showed that the difference between modelled and actual energy consumption could be reduced by using assumptions for internal temperature, number of heating hours, and the length of heating season, that are developed based on actual consumption data.

At a larger scale, metered energy consumption data could also be used to calibrate and improve the modelling used for EPCs (Thomson and Jenkins, 2023). Similar exercises have been undertaken to validate the PHPP model (Mitchell and Natarajan, 2020; Passipedia, n.d.). Using real energy consumption data for this purpose was explored as part of the X-tendo project (Zuhaib et al., 2021). The project findings suggest that real energy consumption data from large housing stock datasets can be used to improve models and for benchmarking performance levels. This particular use is not explored further in this report as it is out of scope. Our focus is on EPCs as a tool for providing information to building occupants.

Factors affecting metered energy consumption

Many variables impact on the energy use of a building. These can be broadly split into variables impacting the building fabric, system efficiency (e.g. heating) and those that impact how energy is used within the building. All of these are influenced by wider variables such as fluctuations in energy prices, deprivation levels, social and cultural norms, and changes in climatic conditions.

There is no consensus on the relative importance that can be attributed to either building characteristics or to consumption behaviour in terms of their impact on domestic energy consumption. The variables affecting household energy consumption are understudied (Fuerst et al., 2019) and strong conclusions about how to control or account for them cannot be drawn. Jones et al. (2015) found that 62 household level factors have been studied in the literature as potentially influencing domestic electricity use[3], with varying significance.

In terms of occupancy factors, the review suggests that the number of occupants, the presence of teenagers, and level of household income and disposable income all have a significant impact on electricity consumption. Electrical appliances make a very significant contribution to a household’s electricity consumption (ibid.), however the review noted that only a few previous studies have analysed the effects of the ownership, use and power demand of appliances. The review also indicates that the following building fabric characteristics have a significant effect: dwelling age, number of rooms, number of bedrooms, and total floor area.

Building fabric

When considering the physical building characteristics alone, there is little consensus on the significance of physical building characteristics, other than floor area, that impact energy consumption. Research consistently suggests a significant positive correlation between floor area and consumption (ibid.), mostly associated with demand for space heating.

There is little consensus on the impact of dwelling age. Some studies reviewed by Jones et al. (2015) found newer dwellings have a higher electricity demand, attributed to high consumption appliances such as air conditioning. Other studies observed that newer homes had lower consumption due to efficient appliances and better insulation levels. Several studies also concluded there was no relationship, including a UK study by Hamilton et al. (2013).

Built-form type (such as terraced, detached, semi-detached) has also been investigated and a large number of studies concluded that electrical energy consumption increases with the degree of detachment of a building. However, it is not clear whether this relationship is explained by the building fabric or by occupancy factors. In general, the literature suggests that the influence of built-form type on electricity consumption is related to floor area. However, building occupancy is also a possible reason. For example, Wyatt (2013) attributed lower electricity consumption in bungalows to the fact they are normally occupied by elderly residents with comparatively lower energy consumption than the rest of the population. The review by Jones et al. (2015) suggests that there is a relationship between the level of detachment of dwellings and electricity consumption, but the effect could not be determined as either positive or negative.

Occupancy factors

A regression analysis of household energy consumption in England concluded that gas usage was largely determined by occupancy characteristics such as income and household composition, rather than physical characteristics of the building (Fuerst et al., 2019). This contrasts with the findings from other regression model studies across several countries which report that building characteristics have a greater effect on domestic energy consumption than occupancy characteristics (such as Santin et al., 2009, Estiri, 2014, Huebner et al., 2015).

Fuel poverty is another factor which impacts energy consumption. Levels of fuel poverty in Scotland are geographically uneven across the country, and are higher in rural areas (Changeworks, 2023). Fuel poverty is associated with coping mechanisms such as only heating one room – behaviours which would have a significant impact on energy use. It is well-recognised that households in homes with poor energy efficiency tend to ration energy, known as the ‘prebound effect’ (Sunikka-Blank and Glavin, 2012).

Any use of energy consumption data will need to be attuned to, for example, the difference between energy rationing and energy saving behaviours, and avoid approaches that inadvertently ‘reward’ underheating through favourable EPC ratings. For example, it would be problematic if a household with higher-than-standard heating regimes, such as for health reasons, received a more negative EPC rating. This highlights the importance of collecting internal temperature data (to measure heating outcomes), alongside consumption data (Section 8.1.1).

Regulated and unregulated energy use

The question of how and whether to include consumption data on EPCs largely relates to the purpose of doing so. Not all energy use is relevant to all audiences. The SAP calculations used for EPCs only consider regulated energy use, which includes energy used for heating and cooling, domestic hot water, mechanical ventilation, and fixed lighting. The total energy consumption of a property includes other uses (unregulated energy), such as appliances. This is primarily dependent on the occupants. Although unregulated energy generally accounts for a minority of the total energy consumption in most properties, it is also more likely to fluctuate more often. Factors that can impact this could be an occupant starting to work from home, an occupant moving out, or purchasing a new electrical appliance (Jones et al., 2015).

A householder may be interested in understanding the efficiency of their appliances, but this is less relevant to a building technician working to improve the building fabric or heating system. However, industry experts have suggested that SAP 11 should consider both regulated and unregulated energy use (BEIS, 2021). In part, this is to enable EPCs to better support Net Zero, which requires a reduction in all energy use – not just regulated energy. Another reason is that unregulated energy use is becoming a larger proportion of total energy use as buildings become more energy efficient and use less energy for heating.

Disaggregating energy use

Metered energy consumption data will account for both regulated and unregulated energy, and unless submetering is used it will be difficult to disaggregate these without relying on assumptions. This disaggregation issue was highlighted in the European X-tendo project (Hummel et al., 2022), where four countries tested a methodology for including energy consumption data on EPCs. Three of the countries encountered challenges around determining the energy consumption used for different purposes in the buildings. Metered data for the different energy uses was not available, so the consumption data for space heating and hot water were estimated based on energy bills. This was perceived as complex, time consuming, and inexact (ibid.).

In properties with natural gas heating, disaggregation is not a significant issue, as most of the metered gas consumption can be assumed to be used for heating. However, it poses a challenge in the increasing number of properties with electric heating. There is a risk that relying on assumptions of typical use will replicate the issues that the inclusion of metered data is trying to solve. In Sweden, the disaggregation of energy uses is carried out by the energy assessor based on their competence and judgement. Considering the existing inconsistencies identified among assessors in the generation of UK EPCs (Jenkins et al., 2017), it is likely this approach would introduce further inaccuracies in EPC output.

Box 2: An example scenario of the need to disaggregate energy use

A property with electric heating has recently had internal wall insulation installed. The household is interested in using an energy consumption metric to understand whether the wall insulation has resulted in the expected decrease in energy consumption. However, the same month they also bought an electric vehicle which they charge at home. Without disaggregating their electricity usage, they are unable to tell if their wall insulation is performing as predicted.

The use of sub-metering could help to alleviate these challenges. Chartered Architect Richard Atkins suggested that, in the future, smart meters will be fed into from a series of data points within the home (e.g., heating system, renewable generation assets, storage assets). However, Alan Beal of Bacra indicated that this granularity of metering is unlikely to be available for at least 10 years, and as noted in Section 8.1, regular smart meters are far from fully rolled out in Scotland.

Properties with energy generation

Further consideration is needed for properties with energy generating assets, which adds a layer of complexity to the question of how different aspects of household energy data can be displayed for different audiences.

MCS standards already require a generation meter, and smart meters record the amount of energy exported to the grid, so this data should already be available (Jon Stinson of Building Research Solutions), but it will need to be represented in a way that is legible to the relevant audiences. For example, David Allinson (Building Energy Research Group, University of Loughborough) suggested that consumers would want to see historic levels of energy generation displayed on an EPC.

Overall, the challenge is to design a methodology and an output that works for all properties in Scotland, from properties with no metered heating system and no smart meters, to those with complex systems that include various types of energy generation.

 

Considerations for using metered energy consumption data

Practicalities of data collection

The potential for using metered data to understand buildings’ energy performance is largely linked to smart meters, which provide accurate and frequent meter readings. The number of smart meters continues to increase. As of March 2023, 57% of all gas and electricity meters in the UK were smart (National Audit Office, 2023). However, in most of Scotland, the rates of domestic smart electricity meters were lower (43%), with rates below 10% in Na h-Eileanan Siar, the Orkney Islands, and the Shetland Islands (DESNZ, 2023). This has implications for the approaches reviewed in this report.

Accessing smart meter data

Aside from the rollout, the main challenge associated with accessing smart meter data relates to where the data is stored and how it can be shared. This also relates to General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Section 7.3). Energy consumption data is considered personal data under current GDPR and requires the consumer’s consent to access it. Consumption data (and export profiles in homes with generation technologies) are stored on individual meters.

There are currently two ways that third parties can access smart meter data (Energy Systems Catapult, 2023), though both require explicit consent from the consumer:

  1. Organisations (such as energy suppliers) can be integrated into the smart metering system. These organisations must lay out their approach to obtaining householder consent during the onboarding process. Work is underway within the DCC to make the on-boarding process easier and more streamlined.
  2. Through a Consumer Access Device (CAD). This is a read-only monitor fitted to the home area network. These can only be fitted by registered users of the DCC’s systems.

DESNZ are currently exploring options for creating a central repository for smart meter data through their Smart Meter Energy Data Repository Programme. The aim of this is to explore the feasibility of creating a central repository which would support the innovation of services and products for the benefit of consumers and the wider network. This could include all types of smart meter data, either aggregated or at householder level. The primary focus of projects funded through this programme is to enable access to aggregated data sets.

Public sector bodies, or any organisation carrying out a specific task in the public interest, can access household metered energy data without the need for individual consent. This is through the legal basis of ‘public task’. However, currently this route is only used to access aggregated consumption data. There are no current examples of data being used to provide insights at the individual level. For example, metered gas consumption data is collected by DESNZ from individual households (through Xoserve[4]) for the purpose of compiling subnational consumption statistics. In this instance, individual consent is not required from the householder, and data is presented in aggregate. Legal routes for accessing individual household consumption data under the basis of public task were not explored as part of this research. Further investigation is needed to understand the GDPR considerations.

Aggregated data sets could be used as a validation point to support the improvement of the existing SAP methodology (Section 5.5), though would have little benefit for the two approaches outlined in later sections of this report (improving the asset rating or calculating operational rating for individual EPCs). Our discussions with stakeholders indicate that the current focus of work is to enable access to aggregated smart meter data.

Matt James of the DCC explained that organisations seeking to access smart meter data via DCC must undertake a series of technical, security and administrative steps to on-board and integrate with the smart meter system.

Several policy initiatives, such as ‘Data for Good’ (Energy Systems Catapult, 2023) are making the case for improved, appropriate access to smart meter data for public benefit. An alternative access route to aggregated data is through the electrical Distribution Network Operators (DNOs). DNOs currently have access to anonymised half-hourly smart meter data, for the purpose of delivering an efficient network. By February 2024 DNOs will be obligated to report smart meter data as aggregated and anonymised open access data (interview with Matt James of the DCC). Phase 2 of the Smart Meter Energy Data: Public Interest Advisory Group Project is exploring how smart meter data collected by DNOs could be of value in delivering wider public policy objectives (Sustainability First & Centre for Sustainable Energy, 2021).

Properties without smart meters

For homes without smart meters there are sources of data for analogue (non-smart) meters. ElectraLink is responsible for operating the UK’s central energy data transfer function. They have access to metered electricity data, including from analogue meters, every time the meter is settled[5]. ElectraLink estimates that 95% of UK households with analogue meters have at least annual electricity meter data available (interview with ElectraLink) which may be a useful source of energy consumption data for EPCs. Similar daa is collected for gas meters by Xoserve. However, infrequent meter readings from occupants can result in assumed energy use based on the suppliers’ algorithms. This would not be an accurate measure of energy consumption.

Different strategies would be needed to collect non-smart metered data for the different approaches explored in Sections 9 and 10. The SmartHTC approach (see Section 9) developed by Build Test Solutions overcomes this by being able to also work with just an opening and closing meter reading over a set period. In such cases the meter readings could be read by an energy assessor or surveyor, or could be supplied manually by the householder. The latter could introduce a risk of incorrect readings, deliberately or not (Zuhaib et al., 2021).

Alternatively, an assessor could take the manual meter readings, though this would add additional cost. As a workaround for homes undertaking retrofit monitoring without smart meters, JG Architects fit additional monitors to capture live energy data over a set time period. The representative from JG Architects suggested it is more valuable to capture time series energy use data than static meter readings. Time series data provides more detail about how the property is performing.

The risk from incorrect readings depends on how the data is used; it is more serious if the data is used as the input data on an EPC with policy implications, but less concerning if the data only serves the purpose of providing an additional metric for householders to better understand their energy usage. Given the large number of properties in Scotland without smart meters, this should be given significant consideration.

Properties heated with unregulated (unmetered) fuels

The stakeholders agreed that properties heated with unregulated fuels (such as oil, coal, wood, and biofuels) pose the most difficult challenge. As noted by Richard Fitton, Professor of Building Performance, these properties are out of scope of the smart meter rollout and at risk of being excluded from new approaches to EPCs that use metered data. Lomas et al. (2019) state that their proposed Domestic Operation Rating method (Section 9) will not work for homes using these types of fuels.

Different solutions could be implemented depending on the specific approach but would be associated with significant uncertainty and be difficult to implement. Build Test Solutions suggested an overnight test that uses direct electric heaters[6]. This requires a property to be vacant for the 15-hour test period. It is also possible to add meters into LPG and oil supply feeds, which could be installed temporarily and then removed and reused. These are not generally fitted as standard. This does not overcome the issue of metering solid fuels.

Jon Stinson discussed that Building Research Solutions (BRS) has navigated this challenge by backtracking energy consumption from invoices, though noted that this is a time-consuming process. He also suggested a requirement for those using solid fuel to install some sort of heat meter (as with RHI, FIT and generation meters). This would still rely on some form of modelling and would also need an interface or programme through which people can submit their meter readings.

Alternatively, Richard Atkins, Chartered Architect, suggests instigating a requirement on coal and oil suppliers to keep a record and to provide this– though there would be no certainty of how the fuel is used in the property. Sam Mancey from DESNZ noted that for this data to be useful you would also need to know the length of time between refills to understand how long it takes to use a specific quantity.

Given the move toward ZDEH (Zero Direct Emissions Heating) systems, consideration should be given to whether it is proportionate to develop a system for assessing the metered energy consumption of properties using alternative fuels. An estimation based on an annual measure of fuel use may be more appropriate and proportionate (Lomas et al., 2019), although less accurate.

Dynamic EPCs

Most stakeholders supported proposals for dynamic EPCs. These will provide improved opportunities to utilise energy consumption data. Dynamic EPCs are live reports, and this will allow for some data inputs to be updated on a more regular basis than the required EPC timeline (currently 10 years but proposed to be 5 years). This could result in the inclusion of energy pricing or carbon emission factors.

Dynamic EPCs could also allow users to input their own contextual data (see 9.3) to tailor the reported consumption data to their own usage patterns. Stakeholders proposed a public EPC which contains building performance information, and a separate private element which allows users to input their occupancy data. A representative from Build Test Solutions suggested that if EPCs enabled householders to input their specific occupancy hours and set points, this would achieve an EPC much more closely aligned with actual consumption. This could overcome the challenges around collecting data on occupancy. Users can input this data if they would find the output useful, but otherwise a standard EPC for the building exists without the need for any occupancy data.

GDPR

Energy consumption data is considered as personal data under GDPR. GDPR is not a barrier to collecting and using energy consumption data for the purpose of EPCs, as exemplified by its use in Sweden and Germany. However, any process for collecting and processing energy consumption data will need to be GDPR compliant. Below are some of the key GDPR considerations for the use of metered energy consumption data at the individual household level.

Data ownership

Energy consumption data is owned by the person who consumed the energy (usually the energy bill payer). The stakeholders we consulted believed that householder consent would be required to access and use this data, and this was confirmed by the DCC. There was disagreement between the stakeholders we interviewed about the degree to which this poses a challenge for the use of energy consumption data.

The impact of GDPR on energy consumption data depends on how it is used and stored. For example, Build Test Solutions explained that they do not identify the individual or specific address associated with the energy consumption data they collect in order to calculate the heat transfer coefficient (Section 8), and they only hold location data at a partial postcode level. Kevin Gornall from DESNZ also noted that as part of the SMETER project (Section 8.1), there was a central database of metrics based on the metered data, but the metered data itself was not stored.

Data management

The stakeholders we interviewed agreed that the processing and management of personal energy data and consent poses a significant challenge. This is particularly true if live data is collected at scale, as mentioned in Section 7.2. The actors currently involved in energy consumption data management include energy utilities, DNOs, ‘Other Users’ (other registered users of the smart meter system), and the DCC.

Andrew Parkin at Elmhurst Energy highlighted the challenge of accessing energy consumption data which is decentralised and held by the energy utilities. Several stakeholders suggested that energy consumption data could be stored in a central repository. Householders could then have the option to consent to their energy data being used for different purposes. As indicated previously, work is being undertaken by DESNZ to explore the feasibility of this (Section 7.1.1).

Jon Stinson at Building Research Solutions pointed to the US Department of Energy (US DoE) as an example of how this could be done. He explained that the US DoE collates all energy data from utilities. Initially, this was done to enable academics to access these large data sets for research purposes. In this way, energy data is centralised, and there are fewer issues should the consumer change supplier or meters regularly.

Impact of tenancy type

There are also potential challenges associated with different tenancy types. Crawley et al. (2020) note that EPCs are often commissioned by a landlord, not the owner of the consumption data. In such cases the building owner would require the tenant to provide consent to access these data, adding a layer of complexity to the process.

Energy consumption data to improve the asset rating accuracy

Metered consumption data could be used to calculate a heat transfer coefficient (HTC), which is part of the calculation for EPC ratings. HTC is a common metric for the thermal performance of buildings. For the purposes of producing EPCs, HTC is predicted using SAP/RdSAP for domestic properties and SBEM for non-domestic properties. This is based on assumptions about the heat loss of various aspects of the building (walls, floor, roof, windows etc.) It is used as part of the calculations to estimate annual heating bills, CO2 produced by the building, and the A-G asset rating (Fitton, 2020).

HTC can also be measured in-situ through a co-heating test. This is an intrusive and expensive test which measures the rate of heat loss over a certain period (usually one to three weeks) (Hollick, 2020) and must take place whilst the building is unoccupied.

Research is currently ongoing to investigate how metered energy consumption data could be used to calculate the HTC more accurately than the current predictions in RdSAP, and a more cost-effective way than the co-heating test.

Several stakeholders interviewed[7] discussed the potential for energy consumption data to be used to calculate the HTC of individual properties. All were of the view that calculating an HTC using energy consumption data is more accurate than the HTC values predicted by RdSAP. However, some stakeholders did question the usefulness of this to householders. For example, the representative from the Climate Change Committee (CCC) suggested that this would be useful for improving building standards, but the information is unlikely to be something that householders want or need.

Current research

Several approaches are currently being developed and tested. The Smart Meter Enabled Thermal Efficiency Ratings (SMETER) Innovation Programme has undertaken field trials to test nine SMETER technologies. The trials took place in a non-representative sample of 30 homes (BEIS 2022). The accuracy of each SMETER technology was evaluated by comparison with the measured HTC[8].

Build Test Solutions has developed the SmartHTC method, which is commercially available and has been applied to over 10,000 buildings at time of writing. . SmartHTC is a technology agnostic algorithm. It can either be delivered as an assessment service led by an assessor, or embedded into smart devices such as a smart meter IHD or a smart thermostat. The algorithm was used by the two best-performing HTC technologies in the SMETER research (BEIS, 2022). The IEA’s Annex 71 is also investigating methods for measuring HTC, including through smart meter data (Fitton et al., 2021).

Common to all these approaches is the need for three key pieces of information; metered consumption data (provided by smart meters for gas and electricity), internal temperature data and external temperature data.

Internal temperature data

Internal temperature is critical to collect. Senave et al. (2019) demonstrate that estimated internal temperatures can lead to errors in the HTC of up to 26.9% compared to internal temperature data from one room in the home. Ideally indoor temperatures should be measured in two locations. The literature points to the increasing popularity of “on-board devices” (Fitton, 2020) such as smart heating controls as a valuable source of internal temperature data. However, this is not currently a viable option in the context of producing EPCs. The majority of homes do not have this technology, and it is unclear how this data could be collected centrally.

Newer models of smart meter in-home displays (IHD) also have the capacity to record temperature data. For example, Chameleon’s IHD7 IHD which is already being deployed in the smart meter rollout. The UK Government is currently funding projects to explore whether smart meter infrastructure can be used for more than just energy data (DESNZ, 2023b). As part of this, Matt James explained that the DCC is involved in an ongoing pilot to investigate whether temperature and humidity data can be transmitted through the system, alongside meter readings.

Research has also explored whether it is possible to use smart meter data to estimate thermal performance without the need for temperature data. Chambers and Oreszczyn (2019) only used smart meter data and used the building’s location to make assumptions about local temperatures[9]. Three of the SMETER trials also did not use internal sensors and demonstrated that it is possible to generate an HTC figure without collecting internal temperature data. However, these SMETER technologies were found to generate less accurate HTCs than those which also measured internal temperatures.

An interim solution, suggested by Baker and Mould (2018), is that until in-home sensing equipment is mainstream, homeowners and landlords could be incentivised to record this data voluntarily for inclusion in domestic EPCs. For their SmartHTC method, if internal temperature data cannot be collected via existing devices such as smart thermostats, Build Test Solutions send several low-cost temperature sensors to householders to collect temperature data over a period of 3 weeks.

External temperature data

External temperature is a key factor influencing the amount of energy used in a building. Whilst some smart heating controls do have external temperature sensors (for weather compensation), most studies and trials to date have relied on data from nearby weather stations and online tools. Stakeholders we spoke to commented that, generally, external weather data is readily available, detailed, and reliable (Richard Fitton, Professor of Building Performance and Build Test Solutions).

Potential applications

As an input to EPC calculations

The HTC is not weighted or normalised in any way. It does not account for the size, shape or age of a building. In general, the HTC is higher for larger homes (Fitton, 2020), and therefore does not allow buildings to be compared. For this reason, the majority of stakeholders interviewed for this research felt that the HTC figure should not be presented on EPC certificates and instead should be used in the calculation of EPC metrics.

As a standalone figure on EPCs

In contrast to the above, the IEA Annex 71 report recommends that the raw HTC figure is reported on EPCs. The report authors compare the HTC to the miles per gallon (MPG) metric used for vehicles. The MPG metric is widely understood by consumers and is not normalised for size (the cylinder capacity of the engine). Similarly, they propose the HTC value could become a recognised and well-understood metric. This would require householders to be provided with a bespoke annual heating degree day (HDD) figure, in the same way that motorists are usually aware of their annual mileage.

We did not find that this view was widely reflected amongst stakeholders that we interviewed, though David Allinson also used MPG as an analogy. He noted that when looking a purchasing a vehicle, we would not expect to know or predict exactly how much a particular vehicle would cost to run and that MPG is a useful metric to understand the relative fuel efficiency of a vehicle. He suggests that in the same way we should not look at an EPC and expect to know exactly how much a property will cost to run, though we could be using HTC figures in a more useful way. Richard Fitton suggested that if the HTC value is included on EPCs it should be normalised by floor space (m2) to become the ‘heat loss parameter’ or better still by volume (m3) to account for high ceilings.

The performance gap

The HTC can be used to identify where new buildings or retrofitted buildings are not performing in line with modelled predictions (Fitton, 2020). As outlined in Section 5, this is not uncommon.

In relation to new builds, Kevin Gornall from DESNZ suggested that one of the most promising applications for in-use HTC is to identify issues with building fabric. He suggested that if the modelled HTC derived through SAP is vastly different to the measured in-use HTC figure, then it may point to construction problems which needs to be addressed. This can prompt further investigation help to identify issues that would usually go unnoticed.

HTC readings can also be an effective tool for monitoring the impacts of retrofit. For example, Elmhurst suggests that their Measured Energy Performance (MEP) tool[10] is most effective as a tool for evaluating the impacts of retrofit projects. Calculating the HTC pre- and post-installation can provide a more accurate assessment of the impacts that retrofit measures have had on the thermal performance of the property. MEP can also be used as a part of meeting the PAS 2035 requirements for monitoring and evaluation (Elmhurst, 2021).

Challenges to this approach

As outlined in Section 7 there are a number of challenges around relying on smart meter data.Technologies to measure and transmit internal temperature data are also not widely available in most homes. Both interviewees from DESNZ, Jon Stinson from BRS and a representative from Build Test Solutions all discussed the use of a co-heating test as an alternative method for homes without smart meters. This is not a practical or cost-effective solution for generating EPCs at scale. Overnight HTC tests or temporary meters are likely to be the most practicalsolutions for homes with unmetered fuels. Additionally, the SmartHTC algorithm can be used with only opening and closing meter readings for non-smart meters.

A representative of Build Test Solutions stated that another challenge is accounting for electrical loads outside the building envelope such as electric cars, outdoor offices or hot tubs. Ideally, these should be metered separately.

Annex 71 (Fitton et al., 2021) highlights that the regulatory energy models in the UK do not allow for the HTC to be directly entered as a measured value. Multiple stakeholders confirmed that this is technically possible to overwrite the HTC value in SAP. Therefore, further investigation is required as to whether there are regulatory or practical barriers to doing this.

Energy consumption data for operational performance

Metered energy consumption data can be used to produce an operational rating which is more closely aligned with actual energy use and gives an indication of how a building is used. This type of metric will include the impact of occupant behaviour. The influence of occupant behaviour makes this approach less suitable for comparison between buildings. However, this can also be an advantage, especially when combined with a good benchmark. Comparison against a benchmark can be used to encourage both building energy performance and user behaviour change (Zuhaib et al., 2021).

The most straightforward use for metered energy consumption data is to include the value on an EPC alongside a reference figure. The reference figure could be historical energy consumption data for that property (Zuhaib et al., 2021). This would not allow for comparison against other buildings unless the data is normalised to account for factors such as size and occupancy.

Current examples

Display Energy Certificates

Display Energy Certificates (DEC) for public non-domestic buildings[11] are an example of an operational rating (section 10). Energy consumption is compared to a benchmark for similar types of buildings (Lomas et al., 2019).

Measured Energy Performance Indicator (MEPI)

The X-tendo project (Verheyen et al., 2019; Zuhaib et al., 2021) developed the Measured Energy Performance Indicator (MEPI) to be compatible with EPCs. It proposes that real energy consumption data is used to generate an ‘energy use indicator’ on EPCs. To enable comparison between buildings, this figure is weather-corrected and normalised for building size and primary energy factors[12]. This method relies on sub-metering to disaggregate consumption for heating and hot water. Sub-metering is not widely used in domestic buildings in Scotland.

This method has undergone testing in four European countries. This revealed that further corrections are needed to be able to make useful comparisons, for example the number of hours the heating system is used. The method contains an optional module to correct for indoor temperature.

EPCs in Sweden

A representative from Boverket explained that EPCs in Sweden are based on real energy consumption data, which is disaggregated by the energy assessor to only consider energy used for heating, cooling, domestic hot water, and fixed lighting, and then corrected to reflect typical use. This results in an operational rating than enables comparisons between buildings. A challenge of this approach is that it requires the energy assessor to make assumptions about a building’s energy use, since disaggregated metered data rarely exists for each of the different energy uses.

Domestic Operational Rating (DOR)

Researchers from Loughborough University and De Montfort University have proposed and tested a DOR scheme for assessing the energy performance of occupied dwellings (Lomas et al., 2019). They propose this scheme as separate and complementary to existing SAP methodology, similar to DECs for non-domestic buildings.

The DOR uses metered energy consumption data alongside the existing survey data for a property collected for an EPC. For example, a key piece of information needed to normalise the energy consumption figure is total usable floor area (Lomas and Allinson, 2019). The proposed DOR scheme provides three operational ratings for energy demand (DORED), GHG emissions (DORGG) and energy costs (DOREC). These are intended to correspond with current metrics on an EPC. The energy cost metric is derived from the energy demand figure. It could be based either on a nationally standardised fuel cost (similar to SAP look-up tables) or on the actual fuel prices paid by each household.

The authors also explore the idea that a DOR certificate could be used to convey additional energy-related behaviour and advice to households. It could also have particular relevance for identifying homes in fuel poverty or residents that are under-heating their homes. Another key benefit of DOR is that it accounts for all energy used (regulated and unregulated).

David Allinson (Building Energy Research Group, University of Loughborough) suggests that moving towards DOR with normalised data to account for anomalies (e.g., a particularly cold winter), would allow people to compare with other people in the neighbourhood or the same property type.

Enabling comparison

Normalisation of data

Experts have proposed different methods which use different degrees of correction or normalisation. In its purest form, annual metered data could be included as-is. With no correction, this would result in a worse score during colder years where the heating requirements are higher. Conversely, recommendations for a new heating system based on a particularly mild winter where the heating demand of the property was lower than usual, or energy savings measured between non-typical years would be misleading.

There is consensus in the reviewed literature that a metric of this type should be normalised at least by floor area (Baker and Mould, 2018; Lomas et al., 2019). In France, EPCs for pre-1948 buildings were previously calculated based on an average of three years of metered data corrected by floor area (Crawley et al., 2020). However, this option was removed as part of recent EPC reforms due to issues related to buildings with irregular occupancy (Rosemont International, 2021; Thomson and Jenkins, 2023).

Weather-correction

The DOR uses weather-correction to enable the comparison of ratings between homes in different locations across the country. The metered daily gas and electricity consumption of homes is corrected based on the number of heating degree-days. An alternative to weather-correcting the energy demand data is to instead correct the benchmark that the energy is compared to (see below).

Corrections for standard user behaviour have also been proposed (Zuhaib et al., 2021). The latter is possible if occupancy profile data is available, but the authors note that this is hard to obtain.

Benchmarks

The DOR proposes that weather-corrected and normalised energy demand is compared against a benchmark of the average energy demand for the UK. Selecting an appropriate benchmark requires careful consideration (Lomas et al., 2019).

Jon Stinson of BRS also recommended inclusion of an average energy use figure across the previous three years, normalised with internal and external temperature data. He suggests that this could be a rolling figure, updated annually, linked to a dynamic EPC.

Non-domestic DECs use a building-specific benchmark corrected to account for the duration of occupancy and weather conditions. However, this approach is less appropriate for domestic buildings, since the proportion of energy that is used for space heating (and therefore should be weather corrected) varies significantly (Lomas et al., 2019).

Contextual occupancy data

If energy consumption data is provided on EPCs then some level of contextual data about the occupants is also required. For example, a potential tenant or buyer would need to know some details of the previous occupant(s) to understand the relevance of their energy usage.

Three stakeholders (from Build Test Solutions; Thomas Lefevre of Etude; Alan Beal of Bacra and Richard Fitton, Professor of Building Performance) were wary of using energy consumption data in isolation as it is difficult to account for all variables and to collect this data from occupants.

Several stakeholders (Kevin Gornall, DESNZ; Barbara Lantschner, JG architects; and a representative of the CCC) suggested that a small number of key questions regarding in-use occupancy information could be sufficient to generate an output which is accurate enough for the purposes of an EPC. Key information identified included:

  • Occupancy (number of people in the household)
  • Heating regime (hours of heating and preferred temperatures)
  • Energy behaviours (information on unregulated energy use, e.g., large appliances)

Kevin Gornall from DESNZ suggested that in future there could be the option for occupants to answer several survey questions surrounding how they use energy in the home at the point of assessment. This information alongside internal temperatures and patterns of energy consumption could replace the occupancy assumptions used within SAP to generate more tailored outputs. His view was that the existing SAP model can generate accurate outputs providing that accurate information is fed in, and the key is to provide an open version of SAP where assumptions can be altered.

A similar exercise has been done with EPCs before, through the Green Deal Occupancy Assessment. This used standard EPC inputs and amended these with data from a series of additional questions. For example, standardised occupancy patterns were amended to reflect the household.

A representative of Build Test Solutions suggested that metered data could be used to achieve a more accurate baseline asset rating (see Section 8), with further occupational data added as a separate metric to achieve an output much more closely aligned with the total energy consumption.

As highlighted in Section 8.1.1, and by Jon Stinson of BRS, internal temperature data could be used to understand heating outcomes to contextualise the energy consumption data.

Alternatively, the DOR is designed so that it does not require any contextual data from occupants. Metered consumption data is normalised and compared to a national benchmark (Lomas et al., 2019). The authors note that not accounting for number of occupants may result in a poorer DOR for homes occupied by more people. They note privacy concerns over collecting this information, and the practicalities of defining occupant numbers, particularly in HMO properties (ibid.).

Presenting the data

An operational rating could be presented on an EPC alongside the asset rating. However, Lomas et al. (2019) suggest that the DOR is provided on a separate certificate. This would be similar to DECs for non-domestic buildings[13]. The move to dynamic EPCs will have implications for how an operational rating can be displayed (Section 7.2).

In contrast, Baker and Mould (2018) suggest that consumption data should replace the existing modelled SAP methodology rather than complement it, with all EPCs being based on an operational rating.

It is possible to use asset ratings and operational ratings to produce two different kinds of EPCs. This is the case in Germany, where EPCs can take the form of either a demand certificate, which provides an asset rating, or a consumption certificate, which provides an operational rating (Lomas et al., 2019). While the resulting energy certificates differ, they are both considered to be EPCs that fulfil the requirements of EPBD. It should be noted that in Germany, the operational rating based EPCs are only available for buildings with more than five flats, since including multiple households approximates normalisation for different occupant behaviours. This would not be possible in Scotland where EPCs are produced for individual dwellings rather than buildings.

Challenges to this approach

One challenge to developing an operational rating is determining whether and how much contextual data to collect from occupants. Additionally, Lomas et al. (2019) state that it is desirable for a DOR to disaggregate energy used for space heating, domestic hot water, and electrical energy use. Sub-metering is not widely used in domestic properties (see Section 6.3.1), so this will be challenging.

Non-domestic EPCs

The most obvious use for metered energy consumption data in non-domestic EPCs in Scotland is to extend the use of DECs. This was suggested as the best way to use metered consumption data for non-domestic buildings by Joshua Wakeling of Elmhurst Energy. The operational rating on a DEC is based on meter readings for 12 months of energy consumption and compared to a benchmark. The operational rating is a numerical indicator and is also illustrated on an A-G scale.

Additionally, Joshua Wakeling (Elmhurst Energy) noted the need for more investment in improving the DEC methodology and to better understand occupancy assessment. The DEC methodology has not been updated for over 10 years (Elmhurst Energy, 2022).

The considerations around different types of energy use, as discussed in Section 7, are also relevant to non-domestic buildings. An analysis by Jones Lang LaSalle (2012) of 200 non-domestic buildings in the UK found little or no correlation between EPC ratings and actual energy performance. This significant performance gap has been attributed to a combination of uncertainty in the modelling, occupant behaviour, and poor operational practices (van Dronkelaar, 2015).

Jon Stinson of BRS has found that accessing metered data is more straightforward for non-domestic buildings than for domestic. Many occupants of non-domestic buildings will already have processes in place to collate energy consumption data, and larger buildings tend to have sub-metering arrangements as well as Building Energy Management Systems (BeMS). However, Joshua Wakeling of Elmhurst Energy noted that in England and Wales the deployment of DECs to private sector buildings has been hampered by a reluctance to share energy data.

Stakeholders discussed the use of metered energy consumption data for the purpose of an operational rating, but not for an asset rating. The comparison of HTC figures is not as important for non-domestic buildings as it is for domestic buildings. This is because building fabric has a comparably lower impact on heat loss than ventilation and air-conditioning systems (Jon Stinson, BRS).

Conclusions and recommendations

This report has explored two ways in which metered energy consumption data can be used in EPCs and the factors that need to be considered to enable this. Metered energy consumption data can provide more accurate information on building fabric performance (asset rating) and give an operational rating of how energy is used in a building.

A more accurate asset rating can be generated by using metered energy consumption data to calculate the HTC (heat transfer coefficient) in properties. Although various methods have been tested in recent years, they are not yet sufficiently developed for widespread roll out in EPCs. This approach requires collecting internal temperature data and is limited in properties without smart meters. Further work is required within the industry to enable the reliable collection of internal temperature data and consumption data across properties with different meters and fuel types.

Accurate HTC figures calculated using energy consumption data will also have value for informing retrofit decisions. This is currently being explored through projects such as Chameleon’s HTC-Up project. The use of energy consumption data in EPCs will provide a more realistic baseline asset rating on which to base recommended retrofit measures. However, the recommendations on an EPC would still be generated automatically by SAP.

Metered energy consumption data can be used to produce an operational rating to give an indication of how a building is used. A wide range of different approaches have been explored in the literature. The most straightforward use for metered energy consumption data is to include the value on an EPC alongside a reference figure. Another option is a DOR showing the energy consumption of a property, corrected by weather and floor area. This rating could be included as a part of the EPC or exist as separate document.

Using energy consumption to provide an operational rating has the challenge that different energy uses are not yet disaggregated. As a result, it can be difficult to determine what causes increases or decreases in energy consumption. Sub-metering has been suggested as a potential solution, though this technology is not commonplace in Scottish homes at present. The X-tendo project also proposes a method to achieve an operational rating but requires further normalisation of the data to account for different energy uses.

This operational rating could be included as part of existing EPCs or could be presented separately to provide additional information as to how efficiently energy is used in the home. Generation of an operational rating has the potential to be incorporated as part of dynamic, digital EPCs where data can be updated and adjusted without the need for a new EPC to be created. This format could enable occupancy-related data to be separate from the public asset rating.

Energy consumption data could be used in both or either of the two ways outlined above. EPCs should retain an asset metric (whether based on modelled or measured data) that is based on standard occupancy assumptions to allow comparison between properties regardless of who occupies them. This should not be replaced with an energy use metric, which contains occupancy variables that cannot be fully accounted for. Such a metric could be useful in addition to a standardised metric for comparison. It was suggested that metered data could be used to achieve a more accurate baseline asset rating, with further occupational data added as a separate metric to achieve an output much more closely aligned with the total energy consumption.

In both cases, consumer consent will be needed to collect and process metered energy consumption data and further consideration must be given as to how this can be facilitated.

Recommendations

This research has highlighted that further work is needed in this area to explore:

  • The practicalities of collecting required data. This will include:
  • Metered energy consumption data at the individual building level, rather than from aggregated datasets. This will require a standardised process for collecting consumer consent. Currently, public sector bodies can obtain household-level data without the need for individual consent through the legal basis of public task’. However, this is for aggregated data and there are no current examples of data being used to provide insights at the individual household level. Further investigation is needed into the legal basis of public task for collection of metered data for reporting at the household level. Legal routes for this were not explored as part of this research.
  • Processes for data collection, as these are mostly dependent on the rollout of smart meters. An alternative methodology will need to be developed for households using unregulated fuels, as their heating consumption will not be captured in smart meter data.
  • Additional information from occupants which can be used to contextualise energy consumption data when used for an operational rating. Examples of this kind of data include the number of occupants or typical heating regime. Further work is required to understand the minimum amount of contextual information to enable metered energy consumption data to be useful.
  • Internal temperature data for the purpose of calculating HTC as part of an asset rating. This would require the mass rollout of internal temperature sensors, which are already included in some IHD (in-home display) devices. Internal temperature data could also be useful contextual data for an operational rating.
  • Different formats that could be used to display consumption data when used for an operational rating. This should consider whether consumption data would work best as one of multiple ratings within the EPC or separately.
  • For energy-generating homes, how total energy consumption, generation, export, and cost can be displayed in a straight-forward manner.
  • Whether there are regulatory or practical barriers to inputting the HTC as a measured value in SAP calculations for the asset rating.
  • The value of Display Energy Certificates for non-domestic public buildings in England and Wales, and whether there would be value in expanding their use in Scotland.

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Appendix: Research methodology

Desk research

This report was informed by desk research in the form of a literature review of academic articles and grey literature such as reports, statements, policy literature, and consultations.

An initial literature search was carried out using the search terms listed in table 1. The list expanded throughout the research process as key terms and concepts were identified. Further sources were identified from relevant sources cited in included literature. Literature from the past five years was prioritised, though some older works also informed the research. Through the search, 51 relevant pieces of literature were identified.

List of search terms (non-exhaustive)

Calculated (energy) use

EPC(s)

Measured (energy) use

Performance gap

Real/actual (energy) use

Building

Energy use/usage

Assessment

Consumption data

Heat transfer coefficient

Energy performance

Operational performance/rating

Smart meter(s)

GDPR

Table Search terms

Stakeholder interviews

Fourteen interviews were carried out with stakeholders in Scotland, the UK, and Sweden. These were semi-structured, 30–45-minute interviews undertaken in July and August 2023.

Interviews were held with the following stakeholders:

  • A representative from Boverket, the Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning.
  • Richard Fitton, Professor of Building Performance, University of Salford.
  • A representative from the Climate Change Committee.
  • David Allinson, Building Energy Research Group, School of Architecture, University of Loughborough.
  • Richard Atkins, Chartered Architect.
  • Jon Stinson, Managing and Technical Director, Building Research Solutions.
  • Thomas Levefre, Managing Director, Etude.
  • Alan Beal, Bacra.
  • Barbara Lantschner, Building Performance Specialist, John Gilbert Architects.
  • A representative from Build Test Solutions.
  • Sam Mancey, SMETER Implementation Team, DESNZ.
  • Kevin Gornall, SMETER Implementation Team, DESNZ.
  • Andrew Parkin, Director of Technical Development, Elmhurst Energy
  • Joshua Wakeling, Director of Operations, Elmhurst Energy.
  • Matt James from the Data Communications Company.

Qualitative analysis

The literature and interviews were analysed in NVivo using inductive coding. This allowed key concept (e.g. performance gap) and categories (e.g. asset vs operational ratings) to emerge throughout the analysis process. Findings from the interviews and the evidence review were analysed using the same coding structure. This approach also facilitated the identification of research gaps.

 

© The University of Edinburgh, 2023
Prepared by Changeworks on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.


  1. Survey respondents included engineers, architects, product manufacturers, social housing providers, policy makers and researchers.



  2. The term ‘similar households’ was not defined in the study. Because of the variance of occupancy influence on energy use, this could be interpreted as similar age or number of occupants, heating pattern, income, or other factors.



  3. For most studies included in the review the electricity use of dwellings may include electric space heating, electric water heating and electric space cooling. Not all studies explicitly stated whether these were included which makes it difficult to draw clear conclusions.



  4. Xoserve is the Central Data Service Provider for Britain’s gas market.



  5. Meters are ‘settled’ each time a meter reading is provided from the consumer.



  6. Examples of these tests include QUB and Veritherm.



  7. including a representative of Build Test Solutions, a representative of the Climate Change Committee, Sam Mancey and Kevin Gornall of the SMETER Implementation Team at DESNZ, Jon Stinson from Building Research Solutions, and Thomas Lefevre from Etude.



  8. Determined using the QUB test, which is an alternative to the co-heating test and can estimate the HTC within a day.



  9. Note that this study calculated Heating Power Loss Coefficient (HPLC) rather than HTC. The difference is that HPLC incorporates thermal losses from the heating system as well as the building fabric.



  10. This tool uses four temperature and humidity monitors throughout the home to record internal data for a three-week period. Measured energy use during this period is also taken to calculate the HTC figure.



  11. Public buildings in England and Wales over 250 m2 must have a DEC. In Scotland, public buildings are required to have an EPC rather than DEC.



  12. The amount of primary energy used to generate a unit of electricity or a unit of useable thermal energy in a building.



  13. Public buildings in England and Wales over 250 m2 must have a DEC. In Scotland, public buildings are required to have an EPC rather than DEC.


This project was commissioned to inform the Scottish Government on the evidence and arguments for and against the inclusion of metered energy consumption data in Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs). Methods included a literature review and interviews with stakeholders in Scotland, the UK and Sweden.

The report outlines the potential opportunities for and barriers to using energy consumption data; the practicalities of obtaining and using energy consumption data; and the value of including such data, when considering the variables that affect actual energy usage.

Key findings

Metered energy consumption data could be used in EPCs in two ways to provide information to occupants or potential occupants:

  • to provide more accurate information on building fabric performance, known as an asset rating
  • to give a rating of how energy is used in a building when compared with similar buildings, known as an operational rating.

These two uses of metered consumption data – asset rating and operational rating – are not mutually exclusive and could both be included in EPCs. This could be developed as a dynamic, digital EPC.

Neither of these two uses could be implemented immediately as 57% of homes in Scotland do not yet have smart meters, which are the most reliable means of collecting metered energy consumption data. Particular difficulties include:

  • A small proportion of homes will never have smart meter capability, including homes with unregulated heating fuels such as oil, LPG, or solid fuels.
  • There is no process to access smart meter data to generate EPCs. The Smart Meter Energy Data Repository Programme is investigating the commercial feasibility of a repository that would enable this.

The most straightforward use for metered energy consumption data is to include the operational rating value on an EPC alongside a reference figure, such as a national average, modelled archetype, or historic consumption data for a property.

  • Correcting energy consumption in a property for weather and normalising it by floor area would enable potential occupants to compare properties.
  • An operational rating could be included as a part of the EPC or exist as a separate document.  

EPCs should retain an asset rating that is based on standard assumptions of occupancy and use, to allow comparison between properties. This could be based on modelled or measured data.

For an accurate asset rating, metered energy consumption data can be used to calculate the heat transfer coefficient of buildings. This requires collecting internal temperature data, as well as metered energy consumption data. The latest smart meter in-home display units have inbuilt temperature sensors. The possibility of transmitting temperature readings alongside meter readings is being investigated by the Data Communications Company.

Accurate heat transfer coefficient figures can inform retrofit decisions. Further consideration is needed around the level of retrofit recommendations provided by EPCs and how these are used in policy decisions. Using metered energy consumption data to inform retrofit recommendations may be more suited to detailed retrofit plans such as renovation roadmaps.

Consumer consent will be needed to collect and process metered energy consumption data.

For further details, please read the report.

If you require the report in an alternative format, such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

The Scottish Government has set ambitions in its Hydrogen Action Plan to install at least 5 gigawatts of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen production capacity by 2030, and 25 gigawatts by 2045. Given Scotland’s hydrogen export ambitions, it is critical to understand any barriers to compliance with standards in potential markets, as well as Scotland’s international competitiveness as a hydrogen exporter.

This study aimed to compare existing and developing hydrogen sustainability standards globally; and to compare the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of hydrogen and derivatives exported from Scotland to the EU market with those from other regions in meeting EU requirements.

Summary findings

  • Key hydrogen standards globally already set out different GHG calculation methodologies and compliance requirements for producers.
  • With regard to GHG emissions, electrolytic hydrogen produced in Scotland and exported to the EU market could be one of the most competitive from the countries studied.
  • When transported over short distances as compressed hydrogen via pipelines or ships, electrolytic hydrogen produced using low-carbon electricity is expected to meet the EU GHG threshold.
  • Transporting hydrogen as ammonia leads to significantly higher GHG emissions.
  • Only countries with a high share of low-carbon electricity on their grid can meet the EU GHG emission threshold for hydrogen produced from grid electricity.
  • Many natural gas pathways modelled will not comply with the EU Gas Directive threshold. These pathways are highly sensitive to the GHG intensity of upstream natural gas production, which is uncertain and can be highly variable depending on the source (e.g. imported LNG with high intensities).
  • GB’s electricity grid as a whole has a significantly higher GHG intensity than Scotland, so further clarity on the definition of bidding zones in the EU RED Delegated Act is critical.
  • This GHG emission analysis could be combined with the previous ClimateXChange cost analysis to evaluate the overall competitiveness of these hydrogen pathways.

For further information on the findings please download the report.

If you require the report in an alternative format, such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

Note: This research was carried out in 2022/23 and was based on the market conditions at that time. Policy related to and emphasis on electricity networks has changed significantly since this research was conducted and therefore not all aspects of the report reflect the current landscape.

Solar panels can help decarbonise Scotland’s energy supply and there are plans to reduce barriers to enable greater deployment in Scotland. The Scottish Government recently consulted on the potential for a solar ambition and a Solar Vision is in development.

The solar industry has been calling for a 4-6 GW solar photovoltaic (PV) ambition by 2030, to put Scotland in line with the UK target of 70 GW by 2035. This can be broken down as 2.5 GW rooftop solar (1.5 GW domestic and 1 GW commercial), with the remaining capacity made up of large-scale grounded mounted solar.

This study investigates the benefits and impacts of deploying 2.5 GW of rooftop solar PV installation onto the electricity network in Scotland by 2030. The distribution network operators are forecasting lower levels of solar PV uptake in their future energy scenarios.

The study considers the benefits, high-level estimate of reinforcement investments needed to accommodate it and the potential impact on consumer bills. It also considers wider costs to the transmission network.

For further information on the findings, including potential benefits, impacts, costs and recommendations, please download the report.

If you require the report in an alternative format, such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

Research completed: October 2024

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5354

Executive summary

Scotland has set ambitions in its Hydrogen Action Plan to install at least 5 gigawatts of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen production capacity by 2030, and 25 gigawatts by 2045. Given Scotland’s hydrogen export ambitions, it is critical to understand any barriers to compliance with standards in potential markets, as well as Scotland’s international competitiveness as a hydrogen exporter.

Aims of the project

The main objectives of this study are to compare existing and developing hydrogen sustainability standards globally; and to compare the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of hydrogen and derivatives exported from Scotland to the EU market with those from other regions in meeting EU requirements.

Findings and recommendations

Key hydrogen standards globally already set out different GHG calculation methodologies and compliance requirements for producers. Hydrogen imported to the EU market currently must comply with rules set by the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED) and the EU Gas Directive, if they are to contribute towards targets set under these policies. While an international standard is being developed (ISO 19870), it is unclear if the UK or EU will align with it in the future.

With regard to GHG emissions, electrolytic hydrogen produced in Scotland and exported to the EU market could be one of the most competitive from the countries we studied. Today, electrolytic hydrogen produced from renewable electricity in Scotland can already meet the EU RED GHG emission threshold (Figure 1). We refer to the GHG intensity of electricity used for Scotland pathways as the “Scottish grid” and use the National Grid country GHG intensity for Scotland rather than the GB grid electricity average GHG intensity. Of the other countries we considered, only Norway, with a grid that uses mainly hydro-electric power, can deliver electrolytic hydrogen to the EU with lower GHG emissions than Scotland. Further grid decarbonisation would increase the likelihood of compliance for hydrogen made from grid power, known as grid-connected electrolysis, by 2030. This would be the case even if, under EU rules, the Great Britain (GB) grid average factor has to be used instead of the (much lower) Scottish grid average.

When transported over short distances as compressed hydrogen via pipelines or ships, electrolytic hydrogen produced using low-carbon electricity is expected to meet the EU GHG threshold. This is applicable in both 2023 and 2030 to renewable hydrogen produced in Scotland, Norway and Morocco, and to hydrogen produced from nuclear power in France (Figure 1).

Transporting hydrogen as ammonia leads to significantly higher GHG emissions. Producers who rely on ammonia for long-distance transport from countries such as Chile and the USA may need to reduce emissions further to comply with EU policies, particularly if ammonia is reconverted to hydrogen for final use. Over shorter distances, hydrogen produced in Scotland or Norway using renewable electricity and transported as ammonia is likely to comply with the EU GHG emission threshold by 2030 (Figure 1). France will only meet the EU threshold if ammonia is used as the end-product in 2030 due to additional emissions from nuclear electricity inputs. Meeting the threshold requires further emission reduction measures such as using renewable electricity for hydrogen distribution.

Only countries with a high share of low-carbon electricity on their grid can meet the EU GHG emission threshold for hydrogen produced from grid electricity. In 2023, hydrogen produced from grid electricity in Norway could already meet the EU threshold when transported as compressed hydrogen. This could also be achieved in Scotland if compressed hydrogen is transported via pipelines. In 2030, all production pathways in Scotland can meet the EU threshold if the GHG emission intensity of grid electricity (emissions per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated) specific to Scotland decreases in line with policy aspirations. If using the GB grid emission intensity, only the pipeline transport pathway could meet the threshold by 2030, with grid decarbonisation in line with policy ambitions. Hydrogen produced from grids heavily reliant on fossil fuels such as those in Morocco, Chile and the USA will not be compliant (Figure 2).

Many natural gas pathways modelled will not comply with the EU Gas Directive threshold. These pathways are highly sensitive to the GHG intensity of upstream natural gas production, which is uncertain and can be highly variable depending on the source (e.g. imported LNG with high intensities). Based on the default upstream natural gas intensity published in the EU RED Delegated Act 2023/1185 (as the EU Gas Directive Delegated Act is not yet finalised), hydrogen produced from natural gas in the UK could be compliant when piped or shipped as compressed hydrogen (Figure 3). This would give it an emissions advantage over US natural gas-derived hydrogen, which is transported via ammonia.

GB’s electricity grid as a whole has a significantly higher GHG intensity than Scotland, so further clarity on the definition of bidding zones in the EU RED Delegated Act is critical. Using the GB grid GHG intensity average for grid-electrolysis projects in Scotland results in high risk of non-compliance with the EU GHG threshold whereas using data specific to Scotland would confer significant advantages on grid electrolysis projects, including exemptions from some EU requirements.

This GHG emission analysis could be combined with the previous ClimateXChange cost analysis to evaluate the overall competitiveness of these hydrogen pathways. Further work could provide a view on the costs of adopting renewable electricity across all the post-production supply chain steps, alternative renewable heat for the ammonia cracking step of relevant pathways and/or switching in 2030 to using only zero emission marine fuels for shipping pathways. Implementing the hydrogen and ammonia pathways modelled in this study may require significant investment in new infrastructure for some countries, and these infrastructure needs and any first-mover advantages could be investigated further.

Figure 1: Renewable electrolysis hydrogen GHG emission breakdown including distribution to the EU and refinery boiler use

Figure 2: Grid electrolysis hydrogen GHG emission breakdown including distribution to the EU and refinery boiler use

Figure 3: Hydrogen produced using natural gas (autothermal reforming with carbon capture and storage of emissions) – GHG emission breakdown including distribution to the EU and refinery boiler use

 

Abbreviations table

ATR

Autothermal Reforming

CCR

Carbon Capture and Replacement

CCS

Carbon Capture and Storage

CCU

Carbon Capture and Utilisation

CfD

Contract for Difference

CO2

Carbon Dioxide

DA

Delegated Act

DESNZ

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero

EU RED

European Union Renewable Energy Directive

H2

Hydrogen

GB

Great Britain

GH2

Green Hydrogen Standard

GHG

Greenhouse Gas

GO

Guarantee of Origin

GREET

Greenhouse gases, Regulated Emissions and Energy use in Transportation model

GTP

Global Temperature Potential

GWP

Global Warming Potential

IPHE

International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy

IRA

Inflation Reduction Act

ISO

International Organization for Standardization

LCHS

Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard

LHV

Lower Heating Value

MJ

Megajoule

MPa

Megapascal

PPA

Power Purchase Agreement

PTC

Production Tax Credit

RCF

Recycled Carbon Fuel

REC

Renewable Energy Certificate

RES

Renewable Energy Source

RFNBO

Renewable Fuel of Non-Biological Origin

 

Introduction

In the 2022 Hydrogen Action Plan, Scotland set ambitions to install at least 5 gigawatts of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen production capacity by 2030, and 25 gigawatts by 2045 (Scottish Government, 2022). Given Scotland’s significant potential for hydrogen production using renewable electricity, the government has also published its Hydrogen Sector Export Plan (HSEP).

Low-carbon hydrogen is a nascent market, as most hydrogen used today is derived from fossil sources. As such, regulations, standards and schemes are being put in place globally to promote the use of low-carbon hydrogen, as well as to ensure that its production and use are sustainable. For example, in the UK, the Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard (DESNZ, 2023) has been established and continues to evolve. EU rules exist for renewable hydrogen pathways and are being developed for non-renewable pathways. Additionally, a global standard for hydrogen lifecycle GHG emissions is under development.

The main objective of this study is to compare existing and developing hydrogen lifecycle GHG standards globally and quantify how the GHG emissions (including not only carbon dioxide but other GHGs such as methane and nitrous oxide) of Scottish exports to the EU, in various forms, would compare against those from other regions in meeting EU requirements. Results from this report supported the development of the Hydrogen Sector Export Plan (HSEP) by identifying potential barriers to compliance with standards in potential markets, as well as Scotland’s international competitiveness as a hydrogen exporting country.

This report is a follow-up to a previous CXC project: “Cost reduction pathways of green hydrogen production in Scotland – total costs and international comparisons” (Arup, 2024).

International hydrogen standards

Several hydrogen standards, sustainability schemes and policies have recently been developed to support the implementation of national hydrogen strategies around the world. These standards typically set out a GHG emission calculation methodology and (where applicable) a maximum GHG emission intensity, as well as broader sustainability criteria and evidence requirements for eligible hydrogen pathways to comply with.

This section provides summary tables of those standards/schemes/relevant policies (referred to as standards thereafter when referenced collectively) listed in Table 1 and provides a snapshot of the key criteria. A detailed review of each standard can be found in Appendix B which focuses the discussion on key differences, along with key uncertainties and potential changes. The UK Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard (LCHS) is used as a benchmark for this comparison, as it sets the requirements for producers in Scotland receiving UK Government support. This review includes:

The scope of each standard, including:

  • The type of standard (mandatory, voluntary), and who it was developed by.
  • Geographies covered.
  • Implementation status.

Eligibility criteria:

  • Conversion technology or feedstock restrictions, including any biomass feedstock sustainability rules.
  • Any GHG emission intensity thresholds.
  • Any categories of hydrogen labelled by the standard.

GHG calculation methodology, including:

  • System boundary – which parts of the supply chain are in or out of scope of the GHG emissions calculations. This can vary between standards, thereby potentially omitting or including significant emissions, and making comparison of results challenging between different standards.
  • Splitting of emissions across co-products. When systems produce multiple outputs (product, co-products, wastes, residues, etc.), GHG emissions must be assigned between them. This can be done through various approaches, including through an allocation of emissions based on the relative masses, energy contents or economic value of the (co-)products. This can also be done by looking at the products these co-products would replace in the market (via system expansion) to assign substitution credits. Typically, wastes and residues are not assigned emissions. A full discussion of the various methods is provided in Appendix A.
  • Reference flow – a set pressure and/or purity for the hydrogen product. Hydrogen produced at a lower pressure or purity may be required to account for the emissions for theoretical compression and/or purification to reach the reference flow, and in some standards, hydrogen produced at a higher pressure and/or purity than the reference may be given an emissions credit.

Other relevant requirements, such as:

  • Chain of custody. This is the process of following and evidencing materials through steps of the supply chain, which provides insights into the product’s origin, components, processes, and handlers. As illustrated in Appendix A, there are different chain of custody models, and while some standards are explicit and prescriptive in their requirements on how to trace feedstocks and hydrogen products, others are not; and
  • Renewable electricity sourcing. Some standards may impose requirements to ensure the use of renewable electricity for hydrogen production does not negatively impact the wider grid. These can include temporal correlation (matching generation with consumption over defined time periods), geographical correlation (rules about locations and grid connections) and “additionality” (hydrogen production contracting with new, rather than existing, renewable electricity generation).

In addition to national or regional standards and policies, and several voluntary schemes[1], a global hydrogen lifecycle GHG standard is also currently being developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). This could enable greater harmonisation of GHG emission calculation methodologies across the globe. The implications of this scenario will be explored further in Chapter 3.

Region

Relevant hydrogen standards[2]

UK

  • Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard

EU

  • Renewable Energy Directive (RED)
  • Common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen (Gas Directive)
  • CertifHy (non-government certificate scheme)
  • France Energy Code

US

  • Inflation Reduction Act 45V (Clean Hydrogen Production Tax Credit)

International

  • International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy (IPHE)
  • ISO 19870 (under development)
  • TÜV SÜD
  • TÜV Rheinland
  • GH2 Green Hydrogen Standard
Table 1: Hydrogen standards reviewed in this study

 

Summary of hydrogen standards

Standard

Geographic scope

Type of standard

Status

System boundary

UK LCHS

UK producers

Mandatory government standard for accessing subsidy schemes

Implemented. V3 is live (Dec 2023)
V4+ under development

Cradle to production gate

EU RED

Hydrogen consumed in the EU

Directive (with Delegated Acts)

REDII (Dec 2018) is fully transposed into Member State legislation and Delegated Acts (Feb 2023) are live. REDIII implemented (Oct 2023) but still being transposed

Cradle to use

EU Gas Directive

Hydrogen consumed in the EU

Directive (with draft Delegated Act)

Implemented (July 2024), but still being transposed into Member State legislation. Delegated Act is pending, due by July 2025

Cradle to use

CertifHy

Hydrogen producers in EU, EEA and CH

Voluntary standard, industry developed

Implemented. V2 is live (April 2022)

Cradle to production gate

France Energy Code L. 811-1

Hydrogen consumed in France

Mandatory standard for accessing subsidies, Government developed

Implemented. V1 is live (July 2024)

Cradle to use

US IRA 45V

US producers

Tax credit

Implemented. March 2024 revision is live

Cradle to production gate

IPHE

Global producers and consumers

Voluntary transnational effort on GHG methodology harmonisation

Implemented. V3 is live (July 2023)

Cradle to use

ISO 19870

Global producers

Voluntary standard, ISO developed

Technical Specification published in Dec 2023, full standard 19870-1 under revision during 2024, due to be finalised in 2025

Cradle to production gate. ISO 19870 series will next look at downstream hydrogen vectors

TÜV SÜD

Global producers

Voluntary standard, industry developed

Implemented. V 11/2021 is live (Nov 2021)

Cradle to production gate (GreenHydrogen), or to point of use (GreenHydrogen+)

TÜV Rheinland

Global producers

Voluntary standard, industry developed

Implemented. V2.1 is live (March 2023)

Cradle to production gate or to point of use

GH2

Global producers

Voluntary standard, industry developed

Implemented. V2 is live (Dec 2023)

Cradle to production gate

Table 2: Scope of reviewed Hydrogen Standards

Scheme

GHG threshold

Category

Eligible pathways

Eligible main inputs

Biomass sustainability

UK LCHS

20 gCO₂e/MJLHV

“Low carbon”

Electrolysis, Fossil/Biogenic gas reforming with CCS, Biomass/Waste gasification, Gas splitting producing Solid Carbon. Pathways can be added

Electricity (all types), Fossil fuels, Biomass, Bio/fossil wastes & residues

Biomass inputs must meet relevant Forestry, Land and/or Soil Carbon criteria, and report indirect land use change GHGs

EU RED

28.2 gCO₂e/MJLHV

“Biofuel”, “RFNBO”, “RCF”

All production pathways eligible but feedstock dependent

Renewable electricity, Biomass & Fossil wastes

Biomass feedstocks must meet relevant Forestry, Land and/or Soil Carbon criteria

EU Gas Directive

28.2 gCO₂e/MJLHV

“Low carbon fuel”

All pathways eligible

Non-renewable energy sources

Follows RED, where applicable

CertifHy

36.4 gCO₂e/MJLHV

“Green”

All pathways eligible

Renewable energy sources

Not specified

“Low-carbon”

Non-renewable sources

France Energy Code L. 811-1

28.2 gCO₂e/MJLHV

“Renewable”,
“Low-carbon”

RFNBOs, RCF, nuclear-based

Follows EU RED and adds nuclear electricity

Follows EU RED

US IRA 45V

Increasing tax credits at 33.3, 20.6, 12.5 or 3.75 gCO₂e/MJLHV

“Clean”

All pathways eligible. Those not in 45V-GREET can apply for a “provisional emissions rate”

Electricity (all types), Fossil fuels, Biomass

None

IPHE

None, only a method

No categories

Electrolysis, steam cracking, fossil gas reforming + CCS, coal or biomass gasification + CCS, biomass digestion + CCS. More will be added

Fossil fuel, Biomass, Bio/fossil wastes & residues

Not specified

ISO 19870

None, only a method

No categories

All pathways eligible

Feedstock neutral

None

TÜV SÜD

28.2 gCO₂e/MJLHV

“Green”

Electrolysis, Biomethane steam reforming, Glycerine pyro-reforming

Renewable electricity, Bio waste/residue, Biomass

Biomass feedstocks must meet EU RED criteria

TÜV Rheinland

28.2 gCO₂e/MJLHV

“Renewable”

Renewable electrolysis

Renewable electricity

Not specified

“Low-carbon”

All production pathways

Feedstock neutral

GH2

8.33 gCO₂e/MJLHV

“Green”

Electrolysis

Renewable electricity
Biomass to power

Low iLUC risk, non-biodiverse land

Table 3: Eligibility criteria for reviewed Hydrogen Standards

Scheme

Chain of Custody

Co-product allocation

Reference flow

Renewable power evidence

UK LCHS

Mass balance used, but cannot blend biomethane with nat gas (upstream)

LHV energy allocation (Carnot efficiency for heat), plus system expansion for waste fossil feedstock counterfactual

3 MPa, 99.9 vol% purity. If below, adjustment required

Additionality not required. PPA with 30-minute temporal correlation from UK generator needed, or avoided curtailment proof

EU RED

Mass balance (H2 + upstream)

LHV energy allocation (Carnot efficiency for heat). If co-product ratio can change, physical causality used. If co-product has zero LHV, economic allocation used

None

Renewable PPAs complying with additionality, temporal and geographic correlation rules

EU Gas Directive

Mass balance (H2 + upstream)

Assumed to follow EU RED

None

In line with EU RED Delegated Act for RFNBOs

CertifHy

Book & Claim as GOs allowed (upstream)

Defined approach for each pathway broadly follows EU RED. O2 method TBC

Same as UK LCHS

GOs are allowed. No additional requirements.

France

Follows EU RED

Follows EU RED

None

Follows EU RED

US IRA 45V

None specified, but proposed mass balance for biomethane (upstream)

System expansion. Restrictions placed on the size of steam co-product credit

2 MPa, 100% purity. Adjustment required for higher/lower

PPAs complying with additionality, temporal and geographic correlation

IPHE

None specified but GOs allowed (upstream)

Follows hierarchy but recommended approach for each pathway differs

Not specified

GOs are allowed. Additionality not required.

ISO 19870

None specified but GOs allowed (upstream)

Can be system expansion or attributional. Approach defined for pathways differ

None. GHG increase to reflect impurities and their release

Grid GOs are allowed if ISO 14064-1 “proper quality criteria” are met

TÜV SÜD

Mass balance (H2 + upstream)

Follows EU RED, but chlor-alkali has choice of energy allocation, economic allocation or system expansion

Same as UK LCHS

GreenHydrogen must follow EU RED. GreenHydrogen + must meet more stringent additionality rules.

TÜV Rheinland

None specified but assumed to follow EU RED & Gas Directive

Assumed to follow EU RED & Gas Directive

None

PPAs to have temporal correlation (up to yearly) and geographic correlation within the same country. Additionality not required.

GH2

Follows IPHE

System expansion recommended, as oxygen nil LHV

Same as UK LCHS

Additionality, temporal and geographical correlations are allowed but not required

Table 4: GHG calculation methodology and key evidence for reviewed Hydrogen Standards

Lifecycle GHG emission intensity of hydrogen pathways for import to the EU market

The GHG emission intensity of various hydrogen pathways from Scotland and other exporting countries were calculated using ERM’s in-house GHG assessment model. The hydrogen pathways modelled used a combination of the production, distribution, and use steps, set out in Table 5 below. For a comprehensive list of the GHG pathways modelled, refer to Appendix D, and see Table 8 for the assumptions and references used in the modelling process.

Production location

Hydrogen production types

Hydrogen transport

Final use

Scotland

Norway

France

Morocco

USA

Chile

UK

Electrolysis using grid electricity

Electrolysis using renewable electricity (excluding France)

Electrolysis using nuclear electricity (only in France)

Natural gas autothermal reforming with carbon capture & sequestration (ATR + CCS)

Ammonia shipping

Ammonia shipping with reconversion to hydrogen

Compressed hydrogen shipping

Compressed hydrogen pipeline

Hydrogen in refinery boiler

Ammonia in marine vessel

Table 5: Summary of hydrogen pathways

Methodologies used to model lifecycle GHG emission intensity of imported hydrogen pathways

Section 2 detailed the various GHG calculation methodologies and compliance requirements set by key hydrogen standards that are currently active globally. In the EU market, EU RED and the EU Gas Directive currently set the eligibility criteria and the methodology for calculating the GHG emission intensity for imported hydrogen. As the hydrogen market becomes more established and globalised, there could be growing interest globally in harmonising approaches for GHG accounting (e.g. through alignment with ISO 19870). However, the EU has not yet expressed any intentions to do so. As such, two scenarios can be envisioned regarding possible evolutions of the EU’s approach for calculating life-cycle GHG emissions of hydrogen:

  • Business-as-usual: The EU RED and EU Gas Directive will continue to apply for hydrogen imported in the EU, regardless of global methodologies such as ISO 19870.
  • International alignment: The EU aligns with ISO 19870 at some future point in time, after publication.

The components of calculating the GHG emissions under these scenarios can be found in Appendix C. The key methodological differences considered during modelling include:

  • System boundary: The system boundary for EU policies is ‘cradle-to-use’, whereas ISO/TS 19870 uses ‘cradle-to-production gate’. Results under scenario 2 therefore exclude potentially significant emissions from distribution of hydrogen to the EU.
  • GHG threshold: EU sets a GHG threshold of 28.2 gCO2eq/MJLHV hydrogen, whereas ISO does not set a GHG threshold. As such, compliance with GHG thresholds were only carried out for results using the EU methodology.
  • Reference flow: EU RED and the EU Gas Directive do not set a reference flow. The reference flow under ISO 19870 is set by the end-user but the GHG intensity is adjusted upwards for (project specific) impurities and their release.
  • Co-product emission assignment: For electrolysis with co-product oxygen sales, economic allocation is required by EU RED, whereas ISO/TS 19870 currently recommends economic allocation or system expansion. For fossil gas reforming, the EU Gas Directive DA currently uses LHV energy allocation (with steam Carnot efficiencies), whereas ISO/TS 19870 has sub-division then LHV energy allocation (using steam enthalpy changes) or else system expansion. However, as no co-products are modelled for either electrolysis or reforming pathways in this study (it is assumed for simplicity there are no oxygen or steam customers), 100% of emissions in both scenarios are assigned to the hydrogen product.

At the time of writing this report, a draft version of the EU Gas Directive DA had been released for consultation and is still therefore subject to revision. This report follows the draft DA methodology to assess the GHG emissions of fossil natural gas hydrogen pathways under the BAU scenario (as outlined in Appendix C). However, due to uncertainty about the timings of reporting under the EU Methane Regulations, this report does not apply conservative default values for upstream natural gas emissions from the draft DA, and instead relies on the upstream natural gas GHG intensity given in the final published RED DA.

GHG emission intensity results

This section presents GHG emission results for various hydrogen production pathways under EU and ISO methodologies, including hydrogen used in refinery boilers and ammonia for marine vessels. Modelling have been carried out for production in 2023 and 2030 to reflect potential impacts from decarbonisation projections (e.g. grid decarbonisation, increased use of renewable fuels in transport), and technology improvements.

Specifically for the modelling of hydrogen production in Scotland, the National Grid country GHG intensity for Scotland is used, rather than the GB grid electricity average GHG intensity. From this point forward, the GHG intensity of electricity used for Scotland pathways is referred to as the “Scottish grid”.

In addition, a sensitivity analysis was conducted on the following parameters:

  • Using renewable electricity across the entire pathway
  • Using renewable heat for the ammonia cracking step of relevant pathways
  • Using low-carbon marine fuel for shipping pathways
  • Using the UK vs Scottish grid average intensity

Further details and results of this sensitivity analysis are given in Appendix F. These results are used in the GHG emission compliance scoring matrix to assess whether a previously non-compliant production pathway can adopt mitigation measures to meet the EU GHG threshold. This matrix can be found in Appendix G.

GHG emission results for pathways producing hydrogen for use in a refinery boiler under EU methodologies

A breakdown of the GHG emissions at each stage of the hydrogen production life-cycle is provided in Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 4. The value chain steps included in each stage include:

Feedstock emissions: this is only relevant to natural gas pathways (Figure 3), and accounts for the upstream emissions of natural gas inputs (e.g. extraction, transport, pre-processing, including methane leakage).

Hydrogen production emissions: these arise from the electrolysis or natural gas autothermal reforming with carbon capture (ATR+CCS) processes. Sources of emissions include electricity consumption, uncaptured fossil CO2 and chemical inputs.

Distribution emissions: these include compression, transport, storage, reconversion and downstream emissions. The emissions depend significantly on the hydrogen transport pathways.

  • Ammonia pathways include conversion of hydrogen to ammonia, transport via truck to a port, port storage, shipping to Rotterdam, port storage, reconversion/cracking ammonia to hydrogen (requiring heating and catalysts), transport via pipeline to a refinery, and end use of hydrogen in a refinery combustion boiler.
  • A separate end use case is modelled where instead of cracking and hydrogen transport, ammonia stored in Rotterdam is loaded onto a maritime vessel for combustion in the propulsion engines.
  • The compressed hydrogen shipping pathways include compression of hydrogen for trucking, transport of hydrogen via truck to a port, port storage, shipping to Rotterdam, port storage, transport via pipeline to a refinery, and use of hydrogen in refinery combustion boiler.
  • The compressed hydrogen pipeline pathways include compression of hydrogen, piping to Rotterdam, transport via pipeline to a refinery, and end use of hydrogen in a refinery combustion boiler.
  • Transport to the EU via pipeline or via compressed hydrogen shipping were not modelled for the USA and Chile due to the long transport distance making these options unviable, following the previous ClimateXChange report.

The input values and assumptions used in the GHG modelling are detailed in Appendix E.

Figure 1 represents the GHG intensity of pathways that use renewable electricity for electrolytic hydrogen production, followed by distribution to the EU (using grid electricity and gas), before use of gaseous hydrogen in a refinery boiler. The exception is nuclear electricity with an emission factor of 3.64 gCO2e/MJ elec[3] being assumed to be used for electrolysis in France, which leads to higher production emissions compared to other regions using renewable electrolysis (0 gCO2e/MJ elec).

These results show that hydrogen produced from renewable electricity-based electrolysis is likely to meet the EU GHG threshold when transported as compressed hydrogen. However, transporting compressed hydrogen via ships generates higher emissions compared to transport via pipeline due to the fuel used for trucking and shipping, plus additional electricity requirements for storage at the shipping ports.

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Figure 1: Renewable electrolysis hydrogen GHG emission breakdown including distribution to the EU and refinery boiler use

Emission intensities of hydrogen using ammonia as an intermediary vector are significantly higher than those of gaseous hydrogen pathways and may not meet the EU threshold in 2030. This is primarily due to the use of grid electricity in distribution steps, the efficiency losses in the (re)-conversion steps, and the release of nitrous oxide during ammonia production. Only Norway and Scotland might comply by 2030, due to low enough emission grid electricity in these countries. Emissions from the conversion step (ammonia production) remain significant in 2030 due to the release of nitrous oxide emissions, and the ammonia cracking step uses Netherlands grid electricity which has a high GHG intensity (although this improves significantly by 2030).

Figure 2 below shows the GHG intensity results if grid electricity is used for electrolysis instead of renewable electricity. Note the change in x-axis scale between the two graphs.

In these pathways, the emissions factor of the grid is the most important contributor to overall GHG emissions intensity of delivered hydrogen. Decarbonisation of electricity grids in some countries (i.e. Scotland and France) may enable some of the pathways to achieve the EU GHG threshold in 2030. However, gaseous pathways from Norway are expected to already comply.

For Scottish pathways, the average grid factor for Scotland was used in the GHG modelling (see Appendix E for details). This assumes that the Scottish grid intensity could be used under EU rules instead of the GB grid average, however, it remains unclear how EU rules on bidding zones apply to Scotland. A sensitivity analysis in Appendix F explores the GHG impact of using the GB grid average compared to the Scottish grid average. The results in Figure 2 show that using the Scottish grid factor in electrolysis results in the GHG emission intensity of piped and shipped compressed hydrogen pathways close to the EU GHG threshold in 2023 but easily achieving it by 2030 as the Scottish grid decarbonises. Ammonia pathways from Scotland may just meet the threshold in 2030 as electricity grids in Scotland and the Netherlands decarbonise.

Pipeline hydrogen pathways are all expected to fall below the EU GHG threshold in 2030 as electricity grids decarbonise, except for Morocco, which has a significantly higher grid GHG intensity compared with other countries. Hydrogen production in countries with high shares of fossil fuel power generation in their grid mix will have to rely on renewable electricity (Figure 1 results) to export to EU markets. For example, neither of the grid electrolysis pathways from Chile or the USA are expected to be able to meet the EU threshold, due to both high grid GHG intensities and additional emission arising from ammonia supply chains.

It is important to note that hydrogen produced from grid electricity is likely to have both renewable and non-renewable consignments. Both consignments will have the same GHG intensity under EU rules, and if this is low enough to meet the EU GHG threshold, the renewable fraction may be eligible as a RFNBO under EU RED, and the non-renewable fraction may be eligible under the EU Gas Directive.

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Figure 2: Grid electrolysis hydrogen GHG emission breakdown including distribution to the EU and refinery boiler use

As shown in Figure 3, natural gas reforming with CCS pathways may struggle to meet the EU Gas Directive’s GHG emission threshold (same as the EU RED threshold). The emissions of hydrogen produced from these pathways are very sensitive to upstream natural gas intensities, which are highly uncertain and can be highly variable depending on the source of natural gas (e.g. imported LNG can have much higher intensities than domestic gas supplies used for hydrogen production).

The European Commission is expected to establish a methodology for calculating the methane emissions of fossil feedstocks (including natural gas) at a producer level by 2027. In the absence of this more accurate data, an upstream natural gas intensity of 12.7 gCO2e/MJLHV natural gas was used to model both USA and UK reforming pathways, based on the published generic value in the EU RED DA. However, individual producers or countries could have intensities significantly above this value. This value will likely need to be updated as more accurate, audited data is reported by the fossil gas industry.

In the UK, pathways with compressed shipping or pipeline could meet the EU GHG emission threshold. In contrast, long transport distances from the USA to the EU means that it is not feasible to transport hydrogen via compressed shipping or pipeline (requiring large additional emissions from ammonia distribution), leading to the UK natural gas pathways via compressed hydrogen distribution having a significant GHG advantage compared with ammonia pathways from the USA.

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Figure 3: Hydrogen produced using natural gas (autothermal reforming with carbon capture and storage of emissions) – GHG emission breakdown including distribution to the EU and refinery boiler use

GHG emission results for pathways producing ammonia for use in a marine vessel under EU methodologies

Ammonia was also modelled as the end-product for use in a marine vessel in Rotterdam. As shown below in Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6, GHG emissions of these ammonia use pathways are lower than pathways with hydrogen as the end-product because ammonia reconversion back to hydrogen is not required. As in the previous analysis, grid electricity is assumed to be used for ammonia distribution (conversion, storage, reconversion) in both grid and renewable electricity-based electrolysis pathways.

Ammonia produced using renewable electricity (Figure 4) is likely to comply with the EU GHG threshold in 2023 and 2030 in both Scotland and Norway, and may just comply in France by 2030. Similar to the earlier analysis, production in the US and Chile may still struggle to comply, as the conversion step (ammonia production) accounts for a significant portion of the total pathway emissions. This is due to the release of nitrous oxide emissions, the use of grid electricity in distribution and losses in conversion efficiency.

Grid electricity-based ammonia produced in all countries modelled in this study (Figure 5) is unlikely to meet the threshold, except for Norway in both years and for Scotland in 2030. As discussed in the previous section, only the renewable portion of the ammonia would likely qualify under EU RED, the remaining portion would need to qualify under the EU Gas Directive. As shown in Figure 6, even avoiding emissions from reconversion of ammonia to gaseous hydrogen does not sufficiently reduce the emissions of natural gas reforming pathways via ammonia to comply with the EU GHG threshold.

Figure 4: Renewable electrolysis hydrogen GHG emission breakdown including ammonia distribution to the EU and direct use in a marine vessel

Figure 5: Grid electrolysis hydrogen GHG emission breakdown including ammonia distribution to the EU and direct use in a marine vessel

gCO2e/MJ (LHV)

Processing

Conversion

Compression

Transport

Storage

Reconversion

Downstream

Figure 6: Hydrogen produced using natural gas (autothermal reforming with carbon capture and storage of emissions) – GHG emission breakdown including ammonia distribution to the EU and direct use in a marine vessel

GHG emission results for hydrogen production pathways under ISO 19870 methodology

The GHG emission intensities of pathways modelled under the ISO methodology are shown below in Figure 7. Only emissions from feedstock and hydrogen production are modelled given the current ISO 19870 system boundary is “cradle to production gate” and does not include any downstream steps. There is also no GHG emissions threshold under ISO 19870, so compliance is not assessed.

Emissions for renewable electrolysis pathways are close to zero because there are only very small emissions for consumed water and minor chemicals. Emissions for delivered wind, hydro and solar electricity are considered to be zero, as in EU RED. Once again, grid electricity intensities dominate the grid electrolysis results.

For the natural gas reforming pathways, the difference in emissions between the UK and USA is mainly due to differences in upstream natural gas emissions intensities and grid electricity intensities. Under the ISO methodology, which allows producer, region or country-specific data to be used, the upstream natural gas intensities in the ISO analysis are assumed to be 8.7 and 9.2 gCO2e/MJLHV natural gas for the UK and USA respectively, based on current published UK and US government data.

These values could be significantly underestimating true upstream emissions, including the impact of LNG imports and methane leakage rates, and are lower than the generic single value the EU RED DA applies to all natural gas supplies (12.7 gCO2e/MJLHV natural gas). However, UK and US government data is likely to be updated more frequently (e.g. annually) in light of new evidence or updated gas source mixes compared to the single value published in the EU RED DA (which is based on the JEC WTT v5 study from 2020).

Those applying the ISO methodology are not required to use government estimates and could use other credible sources, including producer-specific data. This means that natural gas intensities under the ISO method are likely to vary significantly between projects, although where several credible options exist, there may be pressure from projects to choose lower values. In contrast, the EU Gas Directive requires the phasing in of producer-specific methane intensity data and does not give a choice as to which dataset to use.

The ISO 19870 method requires adjustments upwards for impurities by mass, and applies GWPs assuming the impurities are released. This may slightly affect the results, depending on the project-specific impurities. The engineering design data used assumes high purities (>99.9% by volume), so hydrogen product compositions were not modelled. However, for hydrogen production facilities that generate hydrogen at lower purities (e.g. 95-99% by volume), these impurity adjustments have a more significant impact, as hydrogen purity by mass is significantly lower than purity by volume.

Figure 7: Hydrogen GHG emission breakdown under ISO methodology (to production gate only)[4]

Conclusions and recommendations

Key hydrogen standards globally already set out different GHG calculation methodologies and compliance requirements for producers. Hydrogen imported to the EU market must comply with rules set by the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED) and the EU Gas Directive, if they are to contribute towards targets set under these policies. While an international standard is being developed (ISO 19870), it is unclear if the UK or EU will align with it in the future.

With regard to GHG emissions, electrolytic hydrogen produced in Scotland and exported to the EU market could be one of the most competitive among the countries we studied. Today, electrolytic hydrogen produced from renewable electricity in Scotland can already meet the EU RED GHG emission threshold. Further grid decarbonisation would increase the likelihood of compliance for grid connected electrolysis by 2030, even if the GB grid average factor has to be used under EU rules instead of the (much lower) Scottish grid average. Of the other countries considered in this study, only Norway with its hydro-electric dominated grid can deliver electrolytic hydrogen to the EU with lower GHG emissions than Scotland.

When transported over short distances as compressed hydrogen via pipelines or ships, electrolytic hydrogen produced using low-carbon electricity is expected to meet the EU GHG threshold. This applies in both 2023 and 2030 to renewable hydrogen produced in Scotland (930 km), Norway (1,312 km) and Morocco (2,747 km by ship, 1,930 km by pipeline), as well as nuclear electricity-derived hydrogen from France (261 km by ship, 435 km by pipeline).

Transporting hydrogen as ammonia leads to significantly higher GHG emissions. Producers relying on ammonia for long-distance transport from countries such Chile and the USA may need to adopt additional emission reduction measures to comply with EU policies, particularly if ammonia is reconverted to hydrogen for final use. Over shorter distances, hydrogen produced in Scotland or Norway using renewable electricity and transported as ammonia is likely to comply with the EU GHG emission threshold by 2030. However, in France, ammonia pathways will only meet the EU threshold if ammonia is used as the end-product in 2030 due to additional emissions from nuclear electricity inputs. Meeting the threshold requires further emission reduction measures such as using renewable electricity for hydrogen distribution.

Only countries with a high share of low-carbon electricity on their grid can produce grid-based electrolytic hydrogen meeting the EU GHG threshold. In 2023, grid electricity-based hydrogen from Norway can already meet the EU threshold when transported as compressed hydrogen. Scotland could also achieve compliance if compressed hydrogen is transported via pipelines. By 2030, all production pathways in Scotland can meet the EU threshold if the GHG intensity of grid electricity specific to Scotland decarbonises in line with policy aspirations. However, if GB’s grid emission intensity is used, only the hydrogen pipeline transport pathway could meet the threshold by 2030, assuming the grid decarbonises as planned. Hydrogen produced from fossil heavy electricity grid mixes such as those in Morocco, Chile and the USA will not be compliant.

Many natural gas pathways modelled will not comply with the EU Gas Directive threshold. These pathways are highly sensitive to the upstream GHG intensity of natural gas, which is uncertain and can be highly variable depending on the natural gas source (e.g. imported LNG with high intensities). Based on the default upstream natural gas intensity published in the EU RED Delegated Act 2023/1185 (as the EU Gas Directive Delegated Act is not yet finalised), natural-gas derived hydrogen produced in the UK could be compliant when piped or shipped as compressed hydrogen, giving it an emissions advantage over US natural gas-derived hydrogen (transported via ammonia).

GB’s electricity grid has a significantly higher GHG intensity than Scotland, so further clarity on the definition of bidding zones in the EU RED Delegated Act is critical. Using the GB grid average for grid-electrolysis projects in Scotland results in high risk of non-compliance with the EU GHG threshold (see Appendix F for results of this analysis), whereas use of grid GHG intensity data specific to Scotland would confer significant advantages on grid electrolysis projects, including exemptions from some EU requirements.

This GHG emission analysis could be combined with the previous CXC cost analysis to evaluate the overall competitiveness of these hydrogen pathways. Further work could also provide a view on the costs of adopting the different emission reduction measures discussed in the sensitivity analysis section of this report. Appendix H provides an abatement cost methodology, to calculate the minimum cost of compliance for those pathways above the EU GHG threshold but where emissions reduction measures could lead to compliance. We also note that implementation of the hydrogen and ammonia pathways modelled in this study may require significant investment in new infrastructure for some countries, and these infrastructure needs and any first-mover advantages could be investigated further.

Recommended next steps

The following recommendations could be considered for follow-on work:

  • Expand the sensitivity analysis to cover additional sensitivities:
  • Low-emission trucking
  • Nitrous oxide mitigation
  • Sensitivities in 2023, given several grid-electrolysis pathways do not consider any sensitivities in 2023
  • Expand the analysis to include:
  • Other distribution options e.g. methanol, liquid organic hydrogen carriers (LOHC)
  • Additional time periods e.g. 2040 and 2050
  • Additional emerging export regions e.g. Oman, Egypt, Australia, Namibia
  • Combine the previous CXC cost analysis with the GHG emission analysis in this study to evaluate the overall competitiveness of the hydrogen and ammonia pathways
  • Integrate upstream fossil fuel emissions intensity data once more reliable data is available e.g. EU methane regulations, any UK studies

We also suggest engagement with policymakers on the following aspects:

  • Confirm with the European Commission whether Scotland counts as a country with its own GHG intensity or whether the GB grid bidding zone takes priority
  • The EU Gas Directive Delegated Act as it is finalised and published, as interpretation of these rules could significantly impact fossil pathways
  • The potential impacts of ISO 19870 once published, including the level of EU engagement or willingness to align with the standard, and when downstream hydrogen vectors e.g. ammonia will be included in future iterations of ISO 19870.

References

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Ding, Y., Baldino, C. and Zhou, Y. (2024). Understanding the proposed guidance for the Inflation Reduction Act’s Section 45V Clean Hydrogen Production Tax Credit. Available at: https://theicct.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/ID-132-%E2%80%93-45V-hydrogen_final2.pdf

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European Union. (2023b). Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1184 of 10 February 2023 supplementing Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing a Union methodology setting out detailed rules for the production of renewable liquid and gaseous transport fuels of non-biological origin. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2023.157.01.0011.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A157%3ATOC

European Union. (2024a). Directive – EU – 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202302413

European Union. (2024b). Texts adopted – Common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen (recast) – Thursday, 11 April 2024. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0283_EN.html  

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European Union. (2024d). Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401787

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International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy (IPHE). (2023). Methodology for Determining the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Associated with the Production of Hydrogen. Available at: https://www.iphe.net/_files/ugd/45185a_8f9608847cbe46c88c319a75bb85f436.pdf

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International Organization for Standardization (ISO). (2023). ISO/TS 19870:2023. Hydrogen technologies — Methodology for determining the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production, conditioning and transport of hydrogen to consumption gate. Available at: https://www.iso.org/standard/65628.html

Martin, P. (2023). France to launch €4bn contracts-for-difference programme to support clean hydrogen production | Hydrogen Insight. Available at: https://www.hydrogeninsight.com/policy/france-to-launch-4bn-contracts-for-difference-programme-to-support-clean-hydrogen-production-reports/2-1-1508431

République Francaise. (2024). Decree of 1 July 2024 specifying the greenhouse gas emissions threshold and the methodology for qualifying hydrogen as renewable or low-carbon. Available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000049870616

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Scottish Renewables. (2021). Renewable Energy Facts & Statistics | Scottish Renewables. www.scottishrenewables.com. Available at: https://www.scottishrenewables.com/our-industry/statistics

TÜV Rheinland. (2023). Standard H2.21 Renewable and Low-Carbon Hydrogen Fuels. Available at: https://www.tuv.com/content-media-files/master-content/global-landingpages/images/hydrogen/tuv-rheinland-hydrogen-standard-h2.21-v2.1-2023-en.pdf

TÜV SÜD. (2021). Standard CMS 70 Production of green hydrogen (GreenHydrogen). Available at: https://www.tuvsud.com/en-gb/-/media/global/pdf-files/brochures-and-infosheets/tuvsud-cms70-standard-greenhydrogen-certification.pdf

US Department of Energy (DOE). (2024). Guidelines to Determine Well-to-Gate Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions of Hydrogen Production Pathways using 45VH2-GREET Rev. March 2024. Available at: https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/45vh2-greet-user-manual_may-2024.pdf

Appendices

Appendix A Definitions

Chain of custody

There are 4 types of chain of custody models to trace sustainability throughout supply chains. They are listed below in order of high to low level of physical connection required (Circularise, 2022).

Identify preservation – this model does not allow the certified product from a certified site to mix with other certified sources. It requires tracking the actual molecule of the material as they move through the supply chain.

Identity preservation model

Segregation – this model requires the certified product from a certified site to be kept separately from non-certified sources. However, it allows different certified sources to be mixed if they share the same defined standard.

Segregation model

Mass balance – this model tracks the total amount of sustainable content through virtual balancing of physical allocation. It allows the mixing of sustainable and non-sustainable materials producers and end-users must operate within the same ecosystem (e.g. gas grid).

Mass Balance model

Book-and-claim – the sustainable attributes are tracked virtually where sustainable and non-sustainable materials flow freely through the supply chain without the requirement of them being supplied and used in the same ecosystem.

Book and claim model

In addition to the 4 types of chain of custody models, some hydrogen standards also use Environmental Attribute Certificates (EAC). This is a mechanism to demonstrate to end-users that a product (e.g. hydrogen, electricity, biogas) is produced from renewable sources. EACs enable the decoupling of physical goods from their environmental attributes, and can take the form of guarantees of original (GOs), renewable electricity certificates (RECs), etc. EACs could adopt either a mass balance or book-and-claim chain of custody model, or a combination of both. As such and where possible, the report uses terms referenced directly in the hydrogen standards.

Emission allocation methods

Hydrogen production pathways can generate co-products. Consequently, the total emissions resulting from the hydrogen production (and its upstream emissions) should be divided between the hydrogen and its co-products where these co-products are valorised. Outputs that would normally be discarded or that do not carry any economic value are considered as wastes or residues and do not receive any emissions burden. There are multiple methods of assigning emissions to the co-products, as described below.

System expansion – In this method, co-products are considered alternatives to other products on the market. The emissions avoided as a result of this replacement is subtracted from the product system, whereby the remaining net emissions are assigned to the main product (e.g. hydrogen). This requires understanding of the counterfactuals (i.e. the GHG emission of the products being replaced).

Energy allocation – Emissions are assigned to each co-product based on their energy content (generally on the basis of lower heating values). This can also include application of Carnot efficiencies or enthalpy changes to only account for the useful heat contained within any steam/heat co-products.

Physical causality – This allocation method is specifically mentioned in EU RED for processes where the ratio of the co-products produced can be changed. In these processes, the allocation should be determined based on physical changes in emissions, by incrementing the output of just one co-product whilst keeping the other outputs constant.

Economic allocation – Emissions are allocated in proportion to the (co-)product economic values based on total revenues obtained for each.

Mass allocation – Rarely used, but emissions would be allocated in proportion to the (co-)product mass flows.

Appendix B Detailed review of international hydrogen standards

UK Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard (LCHS)

The UK’s Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard (LCHS) was published in 2022 to support the implementation of the UK Hydrogen Strategy, setting requirements that UK hydrogen projects must meet to access revenue support under the Hydrogen Production Business Model and/or the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund (DESNZ, 2023).

Eligibility

The LCHS is feedstock neutral, but hydrogen must be produced via an eligible pathway as shown in the summary table in Table 3. New pathways can apply to be added to this list.

The LCHS sets a maximum GHG emission threshold of 20 gCO2e/MJLHV of hydrogen product (DESNZ, 2023). This threshold is applicable to a ‘cradle-to-production gate’ system boundary, which includes emissions from feedstock production up to and including hydrogen production.

Hydrogen derived from biogenic inputs is required to satisfy biomass feedstock Sustainability Criteria (Land, Soil Carbon and/or Forest Criteria, following those established in EU RED), and >50% of any biogenic hydrogen must be derived from waste or residue feedstocks. Indirect land use change emissions are also required to be reported separately.

GHG calculation methodology principles

Under the LCHS, hydrogen producers using electricity must demonstrate one of the following electricity supply configurations:

  • Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with a specific generator or private network. Here, physical delivery including losses and 30 minute temporal correlation (showing delivered volumes of electricity at least match the electricity consumption) is required for producers to use the GHG intensity of that generator or private network; or
  • Grid electricity supply, where the GHG intensity is determined by the 30 minute average grid factor (GB or Northern Ireland, as applicable); or
  • Grid electricity that would otherwise have been curtailed, which is permitted to use nil GHG intensity.

Proof of renewable electricity additionality is not a requirement of the UK LCHS (e.g. new windfarms do not have to be built to supply a hydrogen production facility). The LCHS requires that the contracted electricity generator must be located within the UK but does not impose further geographical correlation rules.

The LCHS uses energy allocation to assign GHG emissions based on (co-)products’ lower heating value energy contents. When heat or steam are produced as co-products, Carnot efficiencies[5] are applied for the energy allocation. However, the LCHS also requires that pathways using waste fossil feedstocks account for their displaced counterfactual emissions (i.e. the emissions that would have occurred if the feedstock had not been diverted to hydrogen production), which is a partial inclusion of a system expansion method.

A pressure of 3MPa and purity of 99.9% by volume is used as a reference flow under the LCHS. If the hydrogen produced is below these values, the theoretical emissions from compression and/or purification required to reach the reference flow need to be added. No adjustment is made if hydrogen is produced above the reference flow values.

Other requirements

Under the UK LCHS, mass balance chain of custody is generally used for upstream supply chains. However, the LCHS also currently states that biomethane cannot be mixed with fossil natural gas at any point, i.e. imposing an identity preserved chain of custody for biomethane feedstocks.

Uncertainties and future direction

Uncertainties in the LCHS include if/when downstream emissions from producer to user might be included within the system boundary, if/when hydrogen producers will be able to report producer-specific upstream natural gas GHG intensities (given the current lack of methodology and paucity of fossil industry data), plus when fugitive hydrogen emissions might be accounted for (and at what Global Warming Potential). It is also unclear how the UK LCHS will interact with ISO-19870 once published.

EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED)

Under EU law, regulations are directly applicable and binding in all Member States without the need for national implementation. Directives, on the other hand, set goals that Member States must achieve, and require Member States to first transpose them into national law, which allows for differences in policy mechanisms to arise in how these goals are met.

The Renewable Energy Directive (RED) is the legal framework for the development of clean energy across all sectors of the EU economy which Member States must transpose into national law (European Union, 2023a). Unlike the UK LCHS which currently only determines the eligibility for domestic UK hydrogen production to receive financial support, the RED mandates renewable energy consumption more broadly. Under EU RED, both domestically produced and imported hydrogen can contribute towards Member States’ compliance with renewable energy targets (European Union, 2023a).

Eligibility

EU RED does not prescribe a list of eligible technology pathways but evaluates eligibility based on fuel type, which is defined by the feedstock used to produce hydrogen.

  • Biofuel – hydrogen produced from biomass that meets RED sustainability criteria;
  • Recycled carbon fuels (RCF) – hydrogen produced from waste streams of non-renewable origin (European Union, 2023a);
  • Renewable fuel of non-biological origin (RFNBO) – hydrogen derived from renewable energy sources other than biomass.

When used in transport, biofuels, RCFs and RFNBOs must achieve at least 70% GHG emissions savings (variable depending on year of commissioning) compared to the fossil fuel comparator of 94 gCO2eq/MJ. This means that lifecycle GHG emissions must be below 28.2 gCO2eq/MJLHV hydrogen. This threshold is measured on a ‘cradle-to-use’ system boundary, which goes beyond the UK LCHS’s ‘cradle-to-production gate’ system boundary.

GHG calculation methodology principles

In the EU, rules determining the GHG emission intensity of electricity inputs are set by the Delegated Act (DA) on renewable electricity under EU RED (European Union, 2023b). This states that renewable electricity from direct connections and PPAs need to meet additionality requirements to be considered to have nil GHG impact. Grid connected facilities with PPAs must also fulfil temporal and geographical correlation requirements, with some exceptions.

  • Additionality: Requires that hydrogen production is connected to new (i.e. less than 36 months before the electrolyser starts operation), rather than existing, renewable energy generation assets. Additionality is not required before 2028, and for plants built before 2028, it is only required starting in 2038. This is different to the UK LCHS, which does not have additionality requirements.
  • Temporal correlation: Until 2030, this rule requires that hydrogen must be produced within the same calendar month as the renewable electricity used to produce it, and hourly thereafter (European Union, 2023b). This is more relaxed than the 30-minute requirement in the UK LCHS.
  • Geographical correlation: Requires that the hydrogen producer must be in the same bidding zone as the renewable energy installation or in an interconnected bidding zone with day ahead prices higher than that of the renewable generation asset.
  • Exceptions: Additionality is not required for renewable PPAs with temporal and geographical correlation where the emission intensity of the bidding zone is <18gCO2/MJe. Bidding zones with >90% renewables do not have to meet any of these three criteria provided that the load hours of the hydrogen production plant are lower than the grid’s renewability share.

Similar to the UK LCHS, the default allocation method for hydrogen production pathways under EU RED is based on lower heating value (LHV) energy content for any co-product fuel, electricity or heat/steam (applying Carnot efficiencies). However, EU RED states that if the plant can change the ratio of the co-products produced, physical causality allocation is used (see definition in Appendix A). If co-products are produced that have no LHV energy content (e.g. oxygen, chlorine), GHG emissions are shared among co-products through economic allocation, based on the average factory-gate values of the (co-)products over the last three years. As with the UK LCHS, waste fossil feedstocks used for RCF production account for their displaced counterfactual emissions. EU RED sets no reference flow, with purity and pressure requirements only determined by the end user.

Uncertainties and future direction

According to the DA on renewable electricity (European Union, 2023b), the GHG emission intensity of grid electricity is determined at the level of countries or at the level of bidding zones. Different bidding zones do not currently exist in the GB power grid, but it is unclear how the DA defines a country. If Scotland is defined as a country under the DA, grid electrolysis projects could claim nil emissions for their input electricity without having to meet rules on additionality, temporal and geographical correlation, as Scotland’s grid has more than 90% renewables (Scottish Renewables, 2021). This would be a significant advantage and allow these projects to reduce their input electricity costs due to the lower regulatory burden. But if not defined as a country under the DA, these projects would have to take the GHG intensity of the GB grid, which only had an approximately 50% renewable share in 2023 (Ember, n.d.), requiring producers to instead procure renewable electricity PPAs that meet additionality, temporal and geographical correlation rules to claim nil emissions for the input electricity.

There are also uncertainties as to how individual Member States will implement the latest revised version of the RED, given that there is a May 2025 deadline for RED III to be transposed into national laws. Even within the confines of RED III, the policy mechanisms created and pathways deemed eligible by Member States can vary across the EU.

EU Gas Directive

The EU Gas Directive (formally called the Directive on common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen) was published in July 2024 as part of the Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas Market Package, it established a framework for the development of the future gas market in the EU, and its scope includes renewable and low-carbon hydrogen. Renewable hydrogen is defined as bio-hydrogen and RFNBO hydrogen, which must follow RED requirements (European Union, 2024a), whereby the EU Gas Directive sets requirements for low-carbon nuclear and fossil-fuel based pathways (outside of fossil waste derived RCFs) that are not currently covered by RED. This policy shares many similarities with the methodology set under RED, including a GHG emission threshold of 28.2 gCO2e/MJLHV and a ‘cradle-to-use’ system boundary.

The European Commission has until July 2025 to adopt a Delegated Act (DA) specifying the GHG methodology for low-carbon fuels (other than RCFs) (European Union, 2024b). On September 27, 2024, a draft version of this DA was released for public consultation (European Union, 2024c).

This draft version sticks to the same RED renewable power sourcing rules (and does not expand them to nuclear or fossil + CCS generator PPAs), but also appears to have several differences to the RED methodology for RFNBOs. For example, carbon capture and utilisation (CCU) in permanently chemically bound products is currently permitted in the draft DA, and there are also more detailed CCS requirements including allowing solid carbon sequestration, but ruling out enhanced oil & gas recovery (European Union, 2024c). Upstream natural gas emissions are to be based on reported producer values under EU methane regulations (European Union, 2024d), but before these are available, a conservative value from the DA is to be used. However, it is unclear how the existing use/fate of fossil fuel feedstocks is to be interpreted, and whether this counterfactual term is to be ignored or would generate a large emissions penalty or a large credit – both latter options would be a major departure from the attributional GHG methodology used in the RED and other EU legislation. Given the current consultation stage, other significant changes to the DA before final publication are possible, which also adds uncertainty.

CertifHy

CertifHy is an industry developed voluntary Guarantee of Origin (GO) certificate scheme within the EU, the European Economic Area and Switzerland. The CertifHy GO scheme verifies the origin (e.g. production location, production technology, feedstocks etc.) and GHG emissions of hydrogen products (CertifHy, n.d.). Rather than a set of legislative requirements, it is a scheme that producers can choose to participate in to demonstrate sustainability to their end-users.

Eligibility

CertifHy hydrogen can be labelled “green hydrogen” which covers renewable pathways, or “low-carbon hydrogen” which covers low-carbon fossil and nuclear pathways. For both, a GHG emissions threshold of 36.4gCO2e/MJ LHV hydrogen applies, which is measured on the same ‘cradle-to-production gate’ system boundary as the UK LCHS. This represents a reduction of 60% compared to the benchmark fossil process of 91gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen product (via steam reforming of natural gas) (CertifHy, 2022).

GHG calculation methodology principles

When producing hydrogen from the electricity grid, the renewable origin can be established by cancelling of GOs[6]. Unlike the UK LCHS and EU RED, CertifHy does not specify further requirements such as additionality, temporal or geographical correlation.

Under CertifHy, co-products are dealt in different ways and are defined based on the production pathways. For pathways producing steam as a co-product, CertifHy requires its producers and consumers to use the same allocation method. Economic allocation is applied for hydrogen produced from chlor-alkali processes and its co-products. However, the method for allocating emissions to any co-produced oxygen from electrolysis is yet to be adopted (CertifHy, 2023).

Other requirements

The CertifHy GO scheme allows for the decoupling of physical hydrogen supply and its environmental attributes, via a book & claim system.

Uncertainties and future direction

The future use of this voluntary scheme and others such as TÜV SÜD and TÜV Rheinland could be impacted by the potential future alignment with ISO 19870.

France Energy Code L. 811-1

In July 2024, France transposed the definition of renewable hydrogen in alignment with EU RED under L. 811-1 of the Energy Code (République Francaise, 2024). It is a government developed standard and mandatory for accessing subsidy schemes.

Eligibility

As it is a transposition of EU RED, requirements for renewable hydrogen follow EU RED. The Energy Code also specifies the GHG methodology for low-carbon hydrogen, which is based on EU RED rules, but allows electricity from nuclear power generation.

Uncertainties

Recent Government changes in France resulted in a pause in publishing the new hydrogen strategy and subsequent Government funding in the form of a CfD for hydrogen developers producing renewable or low-carbon hydrogen. It is also currently unclear if France permits RCFs to count towards the REDIII renewable energy target (Martin, P., 2023).

United States Inflation Reduction Act 45V Tax Credit

The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) introduced the Clean Hydrogen Production Tax Credit (PTC) (45V) to promote the production of low-carbon hydrogen in the US. This tax credit can be claimed by producers for every kilogram of eligible hydrogen they produce in the US. The value of the tax credit is determined by a tiered approach based on the GHG emissions intensity of the hydrogen with significant multipliers also available if the production facility meets the labour requirements set out under the tax credit.

Eligibility

Eligibility for 45V is determined by whether the produced hydrogen meets GHG emission thresholds, which is measured on a ‘cradle-to-production gate’ system boundary. The maximum GHG threshold is defined at 4 kgCO2e/kg H2. Hydrogen produced with lower GHG emissions is eligible for higher support, which is determined by a percentage of the maximum credit value[7] as seen in table below.

kgCO2e/kg hydrogen

gCO2e/MJLHV

% of Production Tax Credit value

>4

>33.3

0%

2.4 to 4

20 to 33.3

20%

1.5 to 2.5

12.5 to 20

25%

0.45 to 1.5

3.8 to 12.5

33.4%

<0.45

<3.8

100%

Table 6: Hydrogen GHG emissions intensity bands and their respective incentives under 45V

GHG calculation methodology principles

For electricity input for electrolytic hydrogen, rules to demonstrate renewability are similar to requirements set under EU RED’s DA. Producers must procure PPAs for renewable electricity that demonstrate incrementality (new generation capacity must begin operations within 3 years of hydrogen facility being placed into service, this is similar to the additionality concept in the EU), deliverability (clean power must be sourced from the same region), and temporal correlation (annual matching is until 2028, with hourly matching thereafter).

The reference flow is set at 2MPa at 100% purity, rather than 3MPa and purity of 99.9% under the UK LCHS. Producing hydrogen below/above this reference flow means the GHG intensity is adjusted higher/lower. By contrast, only upwards adjustments are required for the UK LCHS.

Further differences include the allocation approach. In the US, a system expansion (displacement) approach is generally used for co-product allocation, instead of energy allocation as in the UK LHCS. The US method can therefore give significantly negative GHG intensities for hydrogen produced from organic waste based biomethane[8]. Additionally, 45V places a cap on the amount of steam that can claimed as co-product from natural gas reforming to avoid incentivising over-production of steam to lower hydrogen GHG emissions (US DOE, 2024).

Uncertainties and future direction

45V is currently undergoing consultation to seek industry opinion on methods to enable a virtual tracking system for both direct connection and mass balancing for biomethane and fugitive methane. This includes counterfactual assumptions for biomethane feedstocks, treatment of fugitive emissions, and how to track and verify biomethane through virtual systems. It appears likely that 45V will impose “incrementality” (additionality), temporal matching and deliverability requirements for biomethane but details are unknown at present (Ding et al., 2024). More broadly, while the IRA has been signed into law, a change in US administration could create instability regarding the future of this tax credit.

International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy (IPHE)

IPHE is an international inter-governmental partnership, which aims to develop a set of mutually agreed methodologies and an analytical framework to determine the GHG emissions of hydrogen production. Use of this methodology is voluntary and differs from other standards reviewed as it serves as a framework for determining GHG emissions of hydrogen production only and does not set any eligibility criteria.

Version 3 of IPHE defines GHG methodologies for electrolysis, steam cracking, fossil gas reforming with CCS, fossil (coal) gasification with CCS, biomass biodigestion (anaerobic digestion to biomethane) with CCS, and biomass gasification with CCS. The methodologies for other pathways will be developed in the future. Unlike other standards, IPHE does not provide guidance on any categories (e.g., “renewable” or “low-carbon”), and it does not stipulate any GHG emission intensity threshold. (IPHE, 2023). This is expected to be done by individual countries participating in IPHE, if they wish to do so.

GHG calculation methodology principles

The current IPHE guidance covers a ‘cradle-to-point of use’ system boundary, which includes supply chain steps to transport hydrogen from the producer to the end user, but not the final use of the hydrogen. This goes beyond the UK LCHS system boundary, but not quite as far as EU RED.

Market-based emissions accounting approach such as renewable energy certificates (RECs) can be used to substantiate electrolytic hydrogen production from renewable electricity. There are no requirements on additionality, temporal correlation and geographic correlation criteria.

IPHE provides pathway-specific recommendations for splitting GHG emissions between co-products, following a hierarchy of options (i.e. allocation based on LHV energy content, followed by system expansion, then economic value). However, certain allocation methods are deemed not appropriate for certain pathways (e.g. energy allocation is not recommended for electrolysis and chloralkali pathways.

Key uncertainties and future direction

The latest IPHE Working Paper (Version 3) was released in July 2023. It is unclear if additional versions will be published, or whether future IPHE developments will be incorporated within the ISO 19870 process, since ISO is developing a global standard starting from the IPHE V3 methodology.

ISO 19870

The IPHE methodology V3 was used as the basis of a draft ISO Technical Specification (ISO/TS 19870) published in late 2023 (ISO, 2023). This is now being further developed into an ISO International Standard on the “Methodology for determining the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production, conditioning and transport of hydrogen to consumption gate”. This standard is due to be published in 2025. This first ISO hydrogen standard (ISO 19870-1) will cover cradle to production gate, but future standards in the series may cover downstream steps including hydrogen conversion and distribution.

Similar to IPHE, ISO 19870-1 will not provide any threshold values or define any hydrogen categories, labels or colours. All pathways are eligible, but detailed guidance will be provided for a number of pathways. Given the focus is purely on GHG emissions, sustainability requirements are not currently set for biomass feedstocks.

GHG calculation methodology principles

Onsite/direct connection to renewable generators are allowed provided no contracts are sold to a third party. Alternatively, power may be purchased from the grid with a contract and energy attribute certificates (e.g. RECs, GOs) provided ISO 14064-1 (part E.2.2) quality criteria are met (ISO, 2018).

No reference flow is set in ISO/TS 19870, with pressure and purity only set by the next user in the supply chain. However, the GHG emissions intensity shall be adjusted upwards to reflect the presence of impurities in the hydrogen product (e.g. water, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, methane etc), and their release to atmosphere.

Other requirements

Chain of custody requirements are not specified, but energy sourcing allows grid purchase with Guarantees of Origin (GOs). Production batches can be any length of time chosen by the operator. GHG emissions of capital equipment are to be reported separately.

Uncertainties

ISO 19870-1 is still under development, therefore significant uncertainties exist, particularly around the (multiple) allocation methodologies that will be recommended for each individual pathway, and the level of detail required for evidence. Whilst ISO standards flow into national standards, Governments are not required to adopt or use a national standard. As a result, how countries/regions choose to align their policies with the new ISO standard once published is unclear (International PtX Hub, 2023). This may depend on whether ISO 19870-1 remains broad in simultaneously accommodating different methodology choices (e.g. consequential or attributional allocation) or becomes more prescriptive with a single methodology and more detailed evidence requirements.

TÜV SÜD

TÜV SÜD is an industry developed, voluntary standard which provides a guaranteed proof of origin alongside certification for renewable hydrogen. The present standard is based on European legislation but is in principle applicable worldwide. A certificate for the production of hydrogen from renewable energy sources labelled “GreenHydrogen” can be issued if all requirements are met (TÜV SÜD, 2021).

Eligibility

The GHG emission threshold follows EU RED, though it accepts two system boundaries which are ‘cradle-to-point of use’ (GreenHydrogen+) or ‘cradle-to-production gate’ (GreenHydrogen) if delivered at the plant gate or injected in a transmission grid. TÜV SÜD also requires that during periods when hydrogen production is not certified as “GreenHydrogen”, emissions still remain below 91 gCO₂e/MJLHV. The scheme currently covers four production pathways, all of which are renewable. Biomass feedstocks used for hydrogen production must meet relevant RED sustainability criteria.

GHG calculation methodology principles

Proof of renewable electricity for electrolysis hydrogen production can be provided by purchasing and retiring GOs or comparable certificates (RECs) which follow EU RED rules though it is unclear if this refers to the renewable electricity DA. GreenHydrogen+ imposes further requirements which includes additionality (new power production must have commissioned no later/earlier than 11 months following the hydrogen production facility installation), temporal correlation (every 15 minutes) and geographical correlation. These rules are more stringent than the UK LCHS and EU RED. The approach to allocating emissions between co-products follows EU RED, although where hydrogen is produced as a by-product such as in chlor-alkali electrolysis, it is possible to allocate emissions using energy allocation, economic allocation or system expansion.

Uncertainties and future direction

The future use of this voluntary scheme and others such as CertifHy and TÜV Rheinland could be impacted by the potential future alignment with ISO 19870.

TÜV Rheinland

TÜV Rheinland is an industry developed, voluntary standard similar to TÜV SÜD, but has an expanded scope which covers both “Renewable Hydrogen” and “Low Carbon Hydrogen”. The present standard is based on European legislation but is in principle applicable worldwide (TÜV Rheinland, 2023).

Eligibility

The GHG emission threshold follows EU RED for both hydrogen categories. Though the system boundary is defined by the user (e.g., cradle to production gate or to point of use). “Renewable hydrogen” has two sub-categories, “Green Hydrogen” and “RFNBO (RED II)”. Eligible pathways for both are electrolytic hydrogen produced from renewable (non-biogenic) electricity and water or aqueous solutions (e.g. chlor-alkali electrolysis) but have different renewable power purchasing requirements. For low-carbon hydrogen, all pathways are eligible e.g., steam reforming, electrolysis, pyrolysis etc.

GHG calculation methodology principles

To be certified as “Green Hydrogen”, renewable electricity can be supplied via a direct connection or the electricity grid (with PPA). The renewable electricity is not required to be additional, but if sourcing via the grid, must have temporal matching on an annual basis and located within the same country. “RFNBO (RED II)” certification requires RED II renewable electricity rules are met.

Green Hydrogen Standard (GH2)

The Green Hydrogen Organisation (GH2) is an industry developed voluntary standard (non-profit foundation) based in Switzerland. Green hydrogen projects that meet the requirements will be licensed to use the label “GH2 Green Hydrogen” and will be eligible to generate and trade GH2 certificates of origin (GH2 Standard, 2023).

Eligibility

GH2 only allows electrolytic hydrogen produced from 100% renewable energy supplied via a direct connection or the electricity grid (with PPA). It sets a significantly lower GHG emissions threshold than the UK LCHS, of 8.33 gCO2e/MJ LHV hydrogen product on a ‘cradle-to-production gate’ basis. Hydrogen developers have the option to calculate and report on embodied emissions including construction emissions.

Where biomass is used in electricity generation, hydrogen developers are required to demonstrate a low risk of indirect land use change, including verifying that production of feedstock does not take place on land with high biodiversity, that land with a high amount of carbon has not been converted for feedstock production. Additionally, hydrogen developers are required to address any risks relating to the displacement of crops for food and feed. Adherence to the EU Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/807 (criteria for determining the high ILUC-risk feedstock) or an equivalent national standard will satisfy this requirement.

GHG calculation methodology principles

Under GH2 the same ‘cradle-to-production gate’ system boundary as the UK LCHS is used. Renewable electricity through RECs are allowed but not required to meet additionality, temporal and geographical correlation. Co-product allocation is not specifically mentioned but given GH2 applies the methodology for the electrolysis production pathway as per IPHE, it is assumed that this will also follow IPHE. For electrolysis, the use of system expansion is recommended for co-product allocation between hydrogen and oxygen products as energy allocation is not appropriate for this co-product.

Uncertainties and future direction

The scheme may expand to include nuclear and other forms of energy production with low emissions but the timeframe for this is currently unknown.

Appendix C GHG calculation methodology

EU RED

Biofuel: E = eec + el + ep + etd + eu – esca – eccs – eccr

Where,

E

=

total emissions from the use of the fuel;

eec

=

emissions from the extraction or cultivation of raw materials;

el

=

annualised emissions from carbon stock changes caused by land-use change;

ep

=

emissions from processing;

etd

=

emissions from transport and distribution;

eu

=

emissions from the fuel in use;

esca

=

emission savings from soil carbon accumulation via improved agricultural management;

eccs

=

emission savings from CO2 capture and geological storage; and

eccr

=

emission savings from CO2 capture and replacement.

RFNBO and RCF: E = ei + ep + etd + eu – eccs

Where,

E

=

total emissions from the use of the fuel;

ei

=

emissions from supply of inputs = ei elastic + ei rigid – e ex-use;

ei elastic

=

emissions from elastic inputs;

ei rigid

=

emissions from rigid inputs;

e ex-use

=

emissions from inputs’ existing use or fate;

ep

=

emissions from processing;

etd

=

emissions from transport and distribution;

eu

=

emissions from the fuel in use;

eccs

=

emission savings from CO2 capture and geological storage

EU Gas Directive

E = ei + ep + etd + eu – eccs – eccu

Where,

E

=

total emissions from the use of the fuel;

ei

=

emissions from supply of inputs = ei elastic + ei rigid – e ex-use;

ei elastic

=

emissions from elastic inputs;

ei rigid

=

emissions from rigid inputs;

e ex-use

=

emissions from inputs’ existing use or fate;

ep

=

emissions from processing (including captured carbon);

etd

=

emissions from transport and distribution;

eu

=

emissions from the fuel in use;

eccs

=

net emission savings from CO2 capture and geological storage;

eccu

=

net emission savings from CO2 captured and permanently chemically bound in long-lasting products.

ISO/TS 19870

E = ecombustion emissions + efugitive emissions + eindustrial process emissions + eenergy supply emissions + eupstream emissions

Where,

ecombustion emissions

=

combustion of relevant solid, liquid and/or gaseous fuels

efugitive emissions

=

leakages and accidental losses, as well as other losses due to incorrect management of plant operations

eindustrial process emissions

=

specific GHG gases used across a number of industry activities (e.g., hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) used in industrial refrigeration and/or cooling systems, and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) used in electrical switchgear).

eenergy supply emissions

=

emissions associated with the supply of energy

eupstream emissions

=

emissions relating to the upstream extraction of resources

 

Appendix D Hydrogen pathways modelled

Hydrogen production pathway

Hydrogen production country

Distribution pathway to Rotterdam

End product

Electrolysis using renewable electricity

Scotland, Norway, Morocco, Chile, USA

Ammonia shipping with reconversion to hydrogen

Hydrogen

Electrolysis using renewable electricity

Scotland, Norway, Morocco, Chile, USA

Ammonia shipping

Ammonia

Electrolysis using renewable electricity

Scotland, Norway, Morocco

Compressed hydrogen shipping

Hydrogen

Electrolysis using renewable electricity

Scotland, Norway, Morocco

Compressed hydrogen pipeline

Hydrogen

Electrolysis using nuclear electricity

France

Ammonia shipping with reconversion to hydrogen

Hydrogen

Electrolysis using nuclear electricity

France

Ammonia shipping

Ammonia

Electrolysis using nuclear electricity

France

Compressed hydrogen shipping

Hydrogen

Electrolysis using nuclear electricity

France

Compressed hydrogen pipeline

Hydrogen

Electrolysis using grid electricity

Scotland, Norway, France, Morocco, Chile, USA

Ammonia shipping with reconversion to hydrogen

Hydrogen

Electrolysis using grid electricity

Scotland, Norway, France, Morocco, Chile, USA

Ammonia shipping

Ammonia

Electrolysis using grid electricity

Scotland, Norway, France, Morocco

Compressed hydrogen shipping

Hydrogen

Electrolysis using grid electricity

Scotland, Norway, France, Morocco

Compressed hydrogen pipeline

Hydrogen

Natural gas ATR+CCS

UK, USA

Ammonia shipping with reconversion to hydrogen

Hydrogen

Natural gas ATR+CCS

UK, USA

Ammonia shipping

Ammonia

Natural gas ATR+CCS

UK

Compressed hydrogen shipping

Hydrogen

Natural gas ATR+CCS

UK

Compressed hydrogen pipeline

Hydrogen

Table 7: Summary of the hydrogen production, distribution and use pathways modelled.

*In the case of France, electrolytic hydrogen production was modelled using electricity from nuclear sources instead of renewable sources

Appendix E Modelling assumptions

Parameter

Location

Assumption

2023

2030

References

Hydrogen production location

USA

The Northeast region of the US was used in the 2023 CXC report but no specific location was stated. To align with the CXC report and based on likely shipping ports, New Jersey has been assumed for the production location (and electricity grid factor), and Port Newark for the export location.

CXC, 2023

Shipping distances/days

All

The shipping distances from Scotland, Norway, Morocco and Chile to Rotterdam, were taken from the 2023 CXC report. A shipping distance for the US was not given, so has been calculated from Port Newark to Rotterdam. The shipping time (days) has been calculated based on a ship speed of 29.6 km/hr (JRC, 2024) and calculated using Sea-Distances, 2024. The shipping distance for France was 38.2 km in the CXC report – assumed this is a typo given the shortest shipping distance between France and Rotterdam is from Port of Dunkirk (261 km).

Scotland: 930 km / 1.3 days

Norway: 1,312 km / 1.8 days

France (Port of Dunkirk): 261 km / 0.4 days

Morocco: 2,747 km / 3.9 days

USA (Port Newark): 6,265 km / 14 days

Chile: 17,970 km / 25.3 days

Scotland: 930 km / 1.3 days

Norway: 1,312 km / 1.8 days

France (Port of Dunkirk): 261 km / 0.4 days

Morocco: 2,747 km / 3.9 days

USA (Port Newark): 6,265 km / 14 days

Chile: 17,970 km / 25.3 days

CXC, 2023, pg41

JRC, 2024, Environmental life cycle assessment (LCA) comparison of hydrogen delivery options within Europe

Sea-Distances, 2024

Pipeline distances

All except USA & Chile

The pipeline distances from Scotland, Norway, France and Morocco to Rotterdam, were taken from the 2023 CXC report.

Scotland: 930 km

Norway: 1,312 km

France: 435 km

Morocco: 1,930 km

Scotland: 930 km

Norway: 1,312 km

France: 435 km

Morocco: 1,930 km

CXC, 2023, pg41

Electricity grid GHG intensity

Scotland

Average annual grid generation intensity recorded for 2023 taken as current value (45.9 gCO2/kWh) (National Grid ESO, 2024). gCO2/kWh value increased by 1% to derive gCO2e/kWh value based on the difference between gCO2 and gCO2e intensities reported in UK Gov Conversion Factors, 2024. Given EU RED and ISO/TS 19870 requirements, upstream emissions were added for Scottish generators, calculated (as 3.61 gCO2e/MJ elec currently) using the electricity generation mix from DESNZ, 2023 and applying the fuel emission factors in Table 3 of the RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs. Imports of electricity into Scotland were ignored in the upstream calculations.

Scottish electricity grid in 2030 is estimated to reach 120 TWh/yr generation and emit 1025 ktCO2e/yr (Scottish Government, 2024). Upstream emissions were estimated for 2030 by applying the same ratio as the generation emissions for 2023 compared to 2030.

16.5 gCO2e/MJ elec

3.0 gCO2e/MJ elec

National Grid ESO, 2024, Country Carbon Intensity Forecast

UK Gov, 2024, Greenhouse gas reporting: conversion factors 2024

DESNZ, 2023, Energy Trends https://www.gov.scot/policies/renewable-and-low-carbon-energy

Scottish Government, 2024, Greenhouse gas emissions projections

Electricity grid GHG intensity

Norway

2023 grid mix taken from Ember (Ember, 2024). Generation and upstream emissions were calculated using the fuel combustion and upstream emission factors in Table 1 and Table 3 of the RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs and generator efficiencies from JRC (2020). Norway renewables capacity is expected to increase by 40 TWh in Norway in 2030 (DLA Piper, 2023).

2.46 gCO2e/MJ elec

1.95 gCO2e/MJ elec

Ember, 2024, World

European Commission, 2023, Delegated Act 2023/1185.

JRC, 2020, JEC-Well-to-Tank report v5

DLA Piper, 2023, The Norwegian Energy Commission’s report

Electricity grid GHG intensity

France

2023 grid mix taken from Ember (Ember, 2024). Generation and upstream emissions were calculated using the fuel combustion and upstream emission factors in Table 1 and Table 3 of the RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs and generator efficiencies from JRC (2020). France aims for 34% renewable electricity in 2030 compared to currently 24.7% (IEA, 2024).

17.3 gCO2e/MJ elec

15.7 gCO2e/MJ elec

Ember, 2024, World

European Commission, 2023, Delegated Act 2023/1185.

JRC, 2020, JEC-Well-to-Tank report v5

IEA, 2024, France

Electricity grid GHG intensity

Morocco

2023 grid mix taken from Ember (Ember, 2024). Generation and upstream emissions were calculated using the fuel combustion and upstream emission factors in Table 1 and Table 3 of the RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs and generator efficiencies from JRC (2020). Current renewables capacity is ~38%, aiming to increase to 52% by 2030 (International Trade Administration, 2024). This anticipated percentage increase in renewables capacity was used to estimate the grid emission factor for 2030.

188.4 gCO2e/MJ elec

162.1 gCO2e/MJ elec

Ember, 2024, World

European Commission, 2023, Delegated Act 2023/1185.

JRC, 2020, JEC-Well-to-Tank report v5

International Trade Administration, 2024, Morocco

Electricity grid GHG intensity

USA (New Jersey)

Latest year grid mix for the RFC East subregion in which New Jersey is in (EPA, 2022). Generation and upstream emissions were calculated using the fuel combustion and upstream emission factors in Table 1 and Table 3 of the RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs and generator efficiencies from JRC (2020). New Jersey is targeting 50% reduction in electricity generation emissions by 2030 compared to 2005 (climate-Xchange.org, 2024, NJ DEP, 2024). This emissions reduction was applied to the 2023 generation emissions to calculate the 2030 generation emissions. To estimate the 2030 upstream emissions, the 2023 upstream to generation emissions ratio was applied.

68.2 gCO2e/MJ elec

34.1 gCO2e/MJ elec

EPA, 2022, eGRID.

European Commission, 2023, Delegated Act 2023/1185.

JRC, 2020, JEC-Well-to-Tank report v5

climate-Xchange.org, 2024, New Jersey

NJ DEP, 2024, NJ Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory Report Years 1990-2021

Electricity grid GHG intensity

Chile

2023 grid mix taken from Ember (Ember, 2024). Generation and upstream emissions were calculated using the fuel combustion and upstream emission factors in Table 1 and Table 3 of the RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs and generator efficiencies from JRC (2020). By 2030, Chile aims to reduce emissions by 84% compared to 2021 (Wartsila, 2022) – 2021 grid mix used to estimate 2030 grid emission factor (Ember, 2024).

72.7 gCO2e/MJ elec

19.1 gCO2e/MJ elec

Ember, 2024, World

European Commission, 2023, Delegated Act 2023/1185.

JRC, 2020, JEC-Well-to-Tank report v5

Wartsila, 2022, Chile

Electricity grid GHG intensity

UK

2023 factor calculated based on the GB generation intensity data from National Grid ESO (2024). Given EU RED and ISO/TS 19870 requirements, upstream emissions were added, calculated using the GB electricity generation mix (DESNZ, 2023) and applying the fuel upstream emission factors from UK Gov (2024), and generator efficiencies from JRC (2020). Upstream emissions of imported electricity were calculated using the same approach, using country electricity grid generation mixes (IEA, 2023) for France, Belgium, Netherlands and Norway, weighted by the proportion of imported electricity from UK Gov Energy Trends (2024).

2030 generation factor calculated based National Grid Future Energy Scenarios (FES) following the Holistic Transition scenario. The upstream emissions factors from GB generation were calculated using the 2030 GB electricity generation mix (National Grid ESO, 2024).

Transmission and distribution losses (7.5%) were included for all upstream emissions calculations (National Grid ESO, 2024), to give consistent gCO2e/kWh delivered values. For simplicity, GB factors taken for UK.

53.8 gCO2e/MJ elec delivered

(11.4 upstream + 42.4 generation)

16.7 gCO2e/MJ elec delivered

(5.0 upstream + 11.6 generation)

National grid ESO, 2024, ESO’s Carbon Intensity Dashboard.

European Commission, 2023, Delegated Act 2023/1185.

UK Gov, 2024, Greenhouse gas reporting: conversion factors 2024

UK Gov, 2024, Energy Trends: UK electricity

IEA, 2023, Energy Statistics Data Browser

JRC, 2020, JEC-Well-to-Tank report v5

National Grid ESO, 2024, Future Energy Scenarios: Pathways to Net Zero.

Electricity grid GHG intensity

Netherlands

2023 grid mix taken from Ember (Ember, 2024). Generation and upstream emissions were calculated using the fuel combustion and upstream emission factors in Table 1 and Table 3 of the RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs and generator efficiencies from JRC (2020). The 2030 Netherlands grid mix is taken from the JRC and upstream and combustion emission factors from the RED were applied to estimate the 2030 grid emission factor (JRC, 2024).

81.2 gCO2e/MJ elec

31.6 gCO2e/MJ elec

Ember, 2024, World

JRC, 2020, JEC-Well-to-Tank report v5

JRC, 2024, Environmental life cycle assessment (LCA) comparison of hydrogen delivery options within Europe

Renewable electricity GHG intensity

All

Generation and upstream emissions for wind, hydro and solar electricity are considered as zero, as per EU RED and ISO/TS 19870.

0 gCO2e/MJ elec

0 gCO2e/MJ elec

European Commission, 2023, Delegated Act 2023/1185.

Nuclear electricity GHG intensity

France

Emission factor for nuclear fuel is taken from Table 3 from RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs (1.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV fuel) (European Commission, 2023). Nuclear power plant LHV efficiency of 33% then applied (JRC, 2020).

3.64 gCO2e/MJ elec

3.64 gCO2e/MJ elec

European Commission, 2023, Delegated Act 2023/1185.

JRC, 2020, JEC WTT v5 – NUEL chain (Pathways 6 Electricity workbook)

Natural gas grid GHG intensity

Netherlands, UK & USA (following EU RED DA methodology)

Natural gas supply and combustion emissions are taken from RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs (European Commission, 2023), given the factors in the Delegated Act do not distinguish between different countries (including those outside of the EU). In the absence of 2030 intensity projections by country, assumed the same GHG intensity for 2030.

Upstream: 12.7 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Combustion: 56.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Upstream: 12.7 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Combustion: 56.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV

European Commission, 2023, Delegated Act 2023/1185.

Natural gas grid GHG intensity

Netherlands (following ISO/TS 19870 methodology)

Natural gas supply and combustion emissions are taken from RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs (European Commission, 2023). In the absence of 2030 intensity projections by country, assumed the same GHG intensity for 2030.

Upstream: 12.7 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Combustion: 56.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Upstream: 12.7 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Combustion: 56.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV

European Commission, 2023, Delegated Act 2023/1185.

Natural gas grid GHG intensity

UK (following ISO/TS 19870 methodology)

Upstream natural gas emissions taken from the UK Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard V3 (DESNZ, 2023). In the absence of 2030 intensity projections by country, assumed the same GHG intensity for 2030.

Upstream: 8.7 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Combustion: 56.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Upstream: 8.7 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Combustion: 56.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV

DESNZ, 2023, Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard – Data Annex

Natural gas grid GHG intensity

USA (following ISO/TS 19870 methodology)

Upstream natural gas CO2 emissions taken from GREET (16.52 gCO2/kWh natural gas). The methane leakage rate (7.5 gCH4/kg natural gas) is based on the Pennsylvania region in Sherwin et al. (2024) given this is the closest region to New Jersey. The natural gas LHV applied to convert units is from UK Gov Conversion Factors (2024). Combustion emissions were based on RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs. In the absence of 2030 intensity projections by country, assumed the same GHG intensity for 2030.

Upstream: 9.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Combustion: 56.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Upstream: 9.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV

Combustion: 56.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV

R&D GREET, 2023, NA NG from Shale and Conventional Recovery

Sherwin et al, 2024

UK Gov, 2024, Greenhouse gas reporting: conversion factors 2024

European Commission, 2023, Delegated Act 2023/1185.

Electrolyser inputs

All

Assume PEM electrolyser with current LHV efficiency 61% and output pressure at 30 bar (CXC, 2022 – aligns with DESNZ, 2023; IEA, 2019; Element Energy, 2019). 2030 value assumed to reach 66% efficiency (CXC, 2022) – this aligns with other sources (IEA, 2019).

CXC assume 25 kg H2O/kg H2 in water consumption for current year (CXC, 2023) and assumed remains constant to 2030.

Chemical inputs (hydrochloric acid and sodium hydroxide) required to deionise water are based on industry data. The emissions associated with these chemical inputs are very small.

Electrolyser efficiency: 61%

Water consumption: 25 kg H2O/kg H2

Chemical inputs:

1.8 x10-6 kg NaOH/MJ H2

1.6 x10-6 kg HCl/MJ H2

Electrolyser efficiency: 66%

Water consumption: 25 kg H2O/kg H2

Chemical inputs:

1.8 x10-6 kg NaOH/MJ H2

1.6 x10-6 kg HCl/MJ H2

CXC, 2023, pg37

CXC, 2022, Table 13, pg 42

IEA, 2019, The Future of Hydrogen

DESNZ, 2023, Data Annex

Element Energy, 2018, Hydrogen supply chain evidence base prepared for BEIS

CXC, 2023, pg37

ATR + CCS inputs

UK, USA

ATR+CCS plant LHV efficiency from Environment Agency (2023) and electricity input and water consumption from the same reference. These values align with other sources (Element Energy, 2018).

Included grid electricity for ATR+CCS operations (JRC, 2020). Hydrogen output from ATR assumed to be at 20 bar (Element Energy, 2018) – hence included electricity for additional hydrogen compression to 30 bar (DESNZ, 2023).

Emissions of fugitive methane and N2O, and consumption of MEA catalyst are from industry data.

CO2 capture rate of 95% (Environmental Agency, 2023; Element Energy, 2018).

All inputs assume to remain constant to 2030. Assume same inputs for US and UK.

LHV efficiency: 80.6%

ATR electricity: 8.8 MJ elec/kg H2

Electricity for nat gas compression: 0.0059 MJ elec/MJLHV nat gas

Additional electricity for hydrogen compression: 0.0068 MJ elec/MJLHV H2

Water consumption: 3.8 kg H2O/kg H­2

Catalyst consumption: 0.000081 kg MEA/MJLHV H2

CO2 capture rate: 95%

Fugitive emissions:

0.00071 gCH4/MJLHV H2

0.0028 gN2O/MJLHV H2

LHV efficiency: 80.6%

ATR electricity: 8.8 MJ elec/kg H2

Electricity for nat gas compression: 0.0059 MJ elec/MJLHV nat gas

Additional electricity for hydrogen compression: 0.0068 MJ elec/MJLHV H2

Water consumption: 3.8 kg H2O/kg H­2

Catalyst consumption: 0.000081 kg MEA/MJLHV H2

CO2 capture rate: 95%

Fugitive emissions:

0.00071 gCH4/MJLHV H2

0.0028 gN2O/MJLHV H2

JRC, 2020, JEC-Well-to-Tank report v5

Element Energy, 2018, Hydrogen supply chain evidence base prepared for BEIS

DESNZ, 2023, Data Annex

Environment Agency, 2023, Review of emerging techniques for hydrogen production from methane and refinery fuel gas with carbon capture

Hydrogen compression before pipeline transport

Scotland, Morocco, Norway, France, UK

Hydrogen assumed to be produced at 30 bar. Compression required to reach 100 bar for injecting in transmission pipeline network (Element Energy, 2018). Electricity required for compressing hydrogen from 30 bar to 100 bar calculated using formula in DESNZ, 2023.

0.78 kWh/kg H2

0.78 kWh/kg H2

Element Energy, 2018, Hydrogen supply chain evidence base prepared for BEIS

DESNZ, 2023, Data Annex

Pipeline transport

Scotland, Morocco, Norway, France, UK

Offshore subsea pipelines assumed for Scotland, and Norway; onshore pipelines will be used for France; and both onshore and offshore pipelines will be used for Morocco. Pipelines have been excluded for Chile and the USA due to the distances required.

Dedicated pipeline compressor ratings in the CXC report were used and pipeline throughput from European Hydrogen Backbone report for 36-inch pipeline at 75% capacity. Assume losses in pipeline transport of 1% (JRC, 2024).

Scotland: 36 MWe/1000 km

Norway: 60 MWe/1000 km

France: 45 MWe/1000 km

Morocco: 40 MWe/1000 km

Pipeline losses: 1%

36-inch pipeline throughput at 75% capacity: 3600 MWLHV H2

Scotland: 36 MWe/1000 km

Norway: 60 MWe/1000 km

France: 45 MWe/1000 km

Morocco: 40 MWe/1000 km

Pipeline losses: 1%

36-inch pipeline throughput at 75% capacity: 3600 MWLHV H2

CXC, 2023, pg38

European Hydrogen Backbone 2021.

JRC, 2024, Environmental life cycle assessment (LCA) comparison of hydrogen delivery options within Europe

Hydrogen compression before trucking

All (expect USA and Chile)

Hydrogen assumed to be produced at 30 bar. Compression required to reach 500 bar (JRC, 2020) for trucking of hydrogen and storage of hydrogen (Element Energy, 2018) at either side of the shipping port. Electricity required for compressing hydrogen from 30 bar to 500 bar calculated using formula in DESNZ, 2023.

2.34 kWh/kg H2

2.34 kWh/kg H2

JRC, 2020, JEC-Well-to-Tank report v5

Element Energy, 2018, Hydrogen supply chain evidence base prepared for BEIS

DESNZ, 2023, Data Annex

Compressed hydrogen trucking

All (expect USA and Chile)

Hydrogen trucked at 500 bar, from hydrogen plant to port. Trucks are assumed to use diesel with biofuel blend in the current year based on UK Gov conversion factors (2024). By 2030, assume trucks use a 12% biofuel blend (LHV basis) in 2030 based on DfT targets (2021), and for simplicity, this applies to all regions. For all pathways, assume a trucking distance of 50 km between hydrogen production site and port (JRC, 2020). Standard truck fuel use was taken from JEC (2020) and an adjustment factor was applied to account for trucking hydrogen. The leakage rate for compressed hydrogen trucking is assumed to be the same as for storage (Frazer-Nash, 2022) therefore assumed 0.24% leakage per day during trucking.

Distance: 50 km

Payload: 0.955 tonne H2 payload

Capacity: 28 tonne tank mass

Losses: 0.24%/day

Fuel use: 0.81 MJ diesel/tonne.km

Distance: 50 km

Payload: 0.955 tonne H2 payload

Capacity: 28 tonne tank mass

Losses: 0.24%/day

Fuel use: 0.81 MJ diesel/tonne.km

UK Gov, 2024, Greenhouse gas reporting: conversion factors 2024

DfT, 2021, Targeting net zero

JRC, 2020, JEC-Well-to-Tank report v5

Frazer-Nash Consulting, 2022, Fugitive Hydrogen Emissions in a Future Hydrogen Economy

Compressed hydrogen storage

All (expect USA and Chile)

Hydrogen stored in gaseous form at 500 bar. The leakage rate ranges from 0.12% – 0.24% per day depending on the storage pressure, cylinder and valve material, and the size of the cylinder. Assume a smaller cylinder is required due to hydrogen being stored at high pressure therefore expect the leakage rate to be at the top end of this range (0.24%). Average duration of compressed hydrogen delivery is 2 – 30 days (Frazer-Nash, 2022). Here assume 20 days storage.

Losses: 0.24%/day

Storage time: 20 days

Losses: 0.24%/day

Storage time: 20 days

Frazer-Nash Consulting, 2022, Fugitive Hydrogen Emissions in a Future Hydrogen Economy

Hydrogen decompression

All (expect USA and Chile)

Assumed no heat required for decompression of gaseous hydrogen from high pressure.

 

Compressed hydrogen shipping

All (expect USA and Chile)

Hydrogen shipped at 250 bar on ship with capacity (1370 t H2) and fuel usage (534 kt diesel/Mt H2) taken from JRC (2024). Fuel usage converted to MJ diesel/km assuming 29.1 ships deliver 1 Mt H2/yr over distance of 2,500 km (JRC, 2024). Assumed current shipping runs on fossil marine diesel oil (not biodiesel as in JRC source), and by 2030, 25% of hydrogen carrying vessels are assumed to be running on external sources of zero carbon hydrogen (so effectively 25% lower fossil marine diesel oil use by 2030).

Ship speed (29.6 km/hr) taken from JRC (2024).

The leakage rate for compressed hydrogen shipping is assumed to be the same as for storage (Frazer-Nash, 2022) therefore assumed 0.24% leakage per day during shipping.

Return ship journeys always assumed to be empty (IEA, 2019).

Ships: 100% fossil marine diesel oil

Fuel usage: 437 MJ diesel/km

Ships: 75% fossil marine diesel oil, 25% zero carbon hydrogen

Fuel usage: 328 MJ diesel/km

JRC, 2024, Environmental life cycle assessment (LCA) comparison of hydrogen delivery options within Europe

Capacity: 1370 tonne H2

Vessel speed: 29.6 km/hr

Losses: 0.24%/day

Capacity: 1370 tonne H2

Vessel speed: 29.6 km/hr

Losses: 0.24%/day

Frazer-Nash Consulting, 2022, Fugitive Hydrogen Emissions in a Future Hydrogen Economy

IEA, 2019, The Future of Hydrogen

Ammonia production

All

Data for ammonia production taken from JRC, 2024. Includes inputs of electricity, iron-based catalyst, and water consumption (150 L/kg ammonia used for cooling where 9% is consumed and the rest is recycled in the process; 1.9 L/kg ammonia used for water deionisation). Also, ammonia emissions and nitrous oxide emissions are included.

Electricity requirement: 0.81 kWh/kg NH3

Catalyst: 0.055 g catalyst/kg NH3

Water consumption: 15.4 L H­2O/kg NH3

Fugitive emissions:

1.63 gNH3/kgNH3

1.0 gN2O/kgNH3

Electricity requirement: 0.81 kWh/kg NH3

Catalyst: 0.055 g catalyst/kg NH3

Water consumption: 15.4 L H­2O/kg NH3

Fugitive emissions:

1.63 gNH3/kgNH3

1.0 gN2O/kgNH3

JRC, 2024, Environmental life cycle assessment (LCA) comparison of hydrogen delivery options within Europe

Ammonia trucking

All

Trucks are assumed to use diesel with biofuel blend in the current year based on UK Gov conversion factors (2024). By 2030, assume trucks use a 12% biofuel blend (energy basis) in 2030 based on UK targets (DfT, 2021). No boil-off assumed (IEA, 2020). For all pathways a trucking distance of 50 km has been assumed from ammonia plant to port (JRC, 2020). Standard truck fuel use taken from JEC (2020) and an adjustment factor was applied to account for trucking ammonia, with the truck payload calculated based on an equivalent 2.6 tonne H2 capacity per ammonia truck (IEA, 2020) converted to 14.7 tonnes of ammonia using molar masses (JRC, 2020).

Distance: 50 km

Payload: 14.7 tonne NH3 payload

Capacity: 28 tonne tank mass

Losses: 0%/day

Fuel use: 0.81 MJ diesel/tonne.km

Distance: 50 km

Payload: 14.7 tonne NH3 payload

Capacity: 28 tonne tank mass

Losses: 0%/day

Fuel use: 0.81 MJ diesel/tonne.km

UK Gov, 2024, Greenhouse gas reporting: conversion factors 2024

DfT, 2021, Targeting net zero

JRC, 2020, JEC-Well-to-Tank report v5

IEA, 2020, The Future of Hydrogen assumptions annex

Ammonia storage

All

0.005 kWh/kg ammonia electricity required for storage at export terminal and 0.02 kWh/kg ammonia required for storage at import terminal. Assume 0%/day boil-off rate and 20 days storage time (IEA, 2020).

Electricity for export terminal: 0.005 kWh/kg NH3

Electricity for import terminal: 0.02 kWh/kg NH3

Losses: 0%/day

Storage time: 20 days

Electricity for export terminal: 0.005 kWh/kg NH3

Electricity for import terminal: 0.02 kWh/kg NH3

Losses: 0%/day

Storage time: 20 days

IEA, 2020, The Future of Hydrogen assumptions annex

Ammonia shipping

All

Ammonia ship capacity and fuel use are calculated using the JRC, 2024 report. The ship capacity is based on compressed hydrogen ship capacity, applying the ratio of ships required to deliver 1 Mt H2/yr using compressed hydrogen (29.1 ships) compared to ammonia (4.5 ships). Fuel usage (57 kt diesel/Mt H2) assumed over shipping distance of 2,500 km. Assumed current shipping runs on fossil marine diesel oil, and by 2030, 25% of ammonia carrying vessels are assumed to be running on external sources of zero carbon ammonia (so effectively 25% lower fossil marine diesel oil use by 2030). Boil off rate assumed to be 0.02%/day (JRC, 2024). Ship speed (29.6 km/hr) taken from JRC, 2024. Return ship journeys always assumed to be empty (IEA, 2019).

Fuel use: 100% fossil marine diesel oil,

302 MJ diesel/km

Capacity: 8,859 tonne NH3

Vessel speed: 29.6 km/hr

Losses: 0.02%/day

Fuel use: 75% fossil marine diesel oil, 25% zero carbon ammonia, so 226.5 MJ diesel/km

Capacity: 8,859 tonne NH3

Vessel speed: 29.6 km/hr

Losses: 0.02%/day

JRC, 2024, Environmental life cycle assessment (LCA) comparison of hydrogen delivery options within Europe

IEA, 2019, The Future of Hydrogen

Ammonia cracking

All

Data for ammonia cracking is based on JRC, 2024. Assume part of ammonia delivered to the cracker is used for heating (1.63 kg ammonia/kg H2), in addition to 5.67 kg ammonia/kg H2 feedstock use, used to calculate LHV efficiency of this step, given ammonia LHV = 18.6 MJ/kg. Hydrogen produced from ammonia cracking is assumed to be at 99.97% purity and 240 bar. No additional electricity required to compress hydrogen further for downstream usage.

Ammonia input: 7.3 kg ammonia/kg H2

Electricity: 4.86 kWh/kg H2

Nickel-based catalyst: 1.46 g catalyst/kg H2

Zeolite powder: 0.88 g zeolite/kg H2

Fugitive emissions:

Ammonia: 7.05 mg/kg H2

N2O: 4.89 mg N2O/kg H2

Ammonia input: 7.3 kg ammonia/kg H2

Electricity: 4.86 kWh/kg H2

Nickel-based catalyst: 1.46 g catalyst/kg H2

Zeolite powder: 0.88 g zeolite/kg H2

Fugitive emissions:

Ammonia: 7.05 mg/kg H2

N2O: 4.89 mg N2O/kg H2

CXC, 2023, pg38

JRC, 2024, Environmental life cycle assessment (LCA) comparison of hydrogen delivery options within Europe

Piping of hydrogen to hydrogen user

Netherlands

Transport of hydrogen via pipeline from port storage to the refinery was assumed to be 50 km. Hydrogen transferred from storage to pipeline assumed to be at sufficient pressure, so no additional compression electricity required (Element Energy, 2018). Pipeline compressor rating and throughput from European Hydrogen Backbone report for 36-inch pipeline at 75% capacity (similar to country specific ratings in the CXC 2023 report). Assume some losses in pipeline transport (JRC, 2024) with fugitive losses 1%

Pipeline distance: 50 km

Pipeline losses: 1%

Pipeline distance: 50 km

Pipeline losses: 1%

Element Energy, 2018, Hydrogen supply chain evidence base prepared for BEIS

JRC, 2024, Environmental life cycle assessment (LCA) comparison of hydrogen delivery options within Europe

European Hydrogen Backbone 2021.

Element Energy, 2021, Zemo WTT pathways study

Hydrogen user

Netherlands

In Rotterdam, there is a large focus on using hydrogen in industry, including petrochemical terminals and refineries. To align with a hydrogen application in Rotterdam, usage of gaseous hydrogen in a refinery was selected as the downstream application.

For hydrogen use in a refinery boiler, N2O emissions have been included (0.272 mgN2O/kWh) (Scottish Government, 2023) with hydrogen losses of 0.5% (JRC, 2024). The input hydrogen pressure was assumed to be 10 bar (HyNet, 2022).

N2O emissions: 0.272 mgN2O/kWh H2

Hydrogen losses: 0.5%

N2O emissions: 0.272 mgN2O/kWh H2

Hydrogen losses: 0.5%

Rotterdam Maritime Capital, Europe’s Hydrogen Hub

Scottish Government, 2023, Nitrous Oxide emissions associated with 100% hydrogen boilers: research

JRC, 2024, Environmental life cycle assessment (LCA) comparison of hydrogen delivery options within Europe

HyNet, 2022, HyNet Industrial Fuel Switching

Ammonia user

Netherlands

Main uses of ammonia are in fertilisers, with shipping proposed as a major future market. Given the significance of the maritime sector in Rotterdam, usage of ammonia in shipping was selected as the downstream application. No further transport of ammonia before the final user Accounted for nitrous oxide emissions (0.061 gN2O/kWh) releasing during shipping (Maersk Mc-Kinney Moller Center, 2023).

N2O emissions: 0.061 gN2O/kWh NH3

N2O emissions: 0.061 gN2O/kWh NH3

Rotterdam Maritime Capital, Europe’s Hydrogen Hub

Maersk Mc-Kinney Moller Center, 2023, Managing Emissions from Ammonia-Fueled Vessels

Table 8: Modelling assumptions

Appendix F Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity 1: All renewable electricity

The baseline results shown in Section 3.2 assume grid electricity in the relevant country is used whenever electricity is consumed in any of the steps downstream of hydrogen production, and that grid electricity is also used during hydrogen production via natural gas ATR+CCS.

This sensitivity tests the impact of using renewable electricity for all steps of the value chain, including hydrogen distribution (e.g. compression, ammonia production, cracking, storage etc) as well as for hydrogen production via ATRCCS. However, no change was made to the electrolysis input electricity source, and this sensitivity was not applied to grid electrolysis pathways as these pathways are unlikely to adopt fully renewable electricity for downstream steps outside of their control when the electrolysis is using grid average electricity.

Results in Figure 8 and Figure 9 below show that all renewable electrolysis pathways could fall even further below the GHG emission threshold in 2023 and 2030 when this sensitivity is applied. Compared to the baseline renewable electrolysis pathways (without the sensitivity applied), the emission intensity reduces by up to 46 gCO2e/MJLHV when utilising renewable electricity – this largest reduction is achieved for renewable electrolytic hydrogen produced in Morocco and transported as ammonia.

After application of this sensitivity, the main remaining emissions for the renewable electrolysis pathways will be the release of nitrous oxide in ammonia pathways, and the shipping fuels used for transporting ammonia or compressed hydrogen. The difference between 2023 and 2030 results is due to the decarbonisation of trucks and ships using cleaner fuels.

All renewable ammonia pathways are also expected to meet the EU GHG threshold. However, these pathways will still have significantly higher emissions compared to the gaseous hydrogen shipping pathways due to efficiency losses in the (re-)conversion steps and release of nitrous oxide.

Compared to the baseline, hydrogen produced in the UK or USA via natural gas pathways and transported as ammonia still exceeds the EU GHG threshold due to the upstream emissions and emissions associated with ammonia (re-)conversion. However, the emissions from producing hydrogen in the UK via natural gas ATR+CCS and transported via compressed shipping or pipeline could just meet the GHG threshold in 2023. The UK could therefore have an emissions advantage over the USA if comparing natural gas reforming pathways.

Figure 8: Renewable electrolysis hydrogen GHG intensity using renewable electricity for hydrogen production and during distribution steps to EU, and refinery boiler use of gaseous hydrogen

Figure 9: Natural gas ATR+CCS hydrogen GHG intensity using renewable electricity for hydrogen production and during distribution steps to EU, and refinery boiler use of gaseous hydrogen

Sensitivity 2: GB vs Scotland grid electricity

In the baseline, Scottish grid electricity GHG intensities are modelled for Scottish production, although under EU RED or the EU Gas Directive, the European Commission are yet to confirm whether the Scottish or GB (or even average UK) grid intensity should be used. The GB grid electricity GHG intensity is significantly higher than that of Scotland’s due to the GB grid electricity mix consisting of a higher contribution from natural gas (~40% compared to ~10% in Scotland’s grid mix) and a lower contribution from renewable sources (~40% compared to ~70% in Scotland’s grid). Scotland is expected to have a much lower grid GHG intensity compared to GB until full decarbonisation of the GB grid is achieved. The UK Government have set a target to decarbonise the electricity grid by 2030 but for modelling purposes, the projected GHG intensity of the UK electricity grid is based on the grid mix data in the National Grid’s Future Energy Scenarios (~70% reduction in the electricity grid GHG intensity in 2030 compared to today). The GHG intensities modelled for the GB and Scottish grids include upstream emissions in line with EU RED requirements. As shown in Figure 10, all Scottish electrolysis and distribution pathway combinations using GB grid electricity intensities are expected to be above the EU GHG threshold in 2023, and only the compressed pipeline pathway may just comply in 2030.

The added emissions from the higher GB grid intensity are particularly significant for pathways transporting hydrogen via ammonia, increasing by over 100% compared to the same pathway using the Scottish grid factor.

Scottish producers would therefore gain a significant advantage if the Commission were to allow a Scottish grid factor to be used (and under EU RED rules, this decision would also become more likely if zonal pricing across GB is introduced, provided there are one or more zones in Scotland).

Figure 10: Hydrogen GHG emission from Scottish or GB grid electrolytic hydrogen pathways including distribution to EU and refinery boiler use of gaseous hydrogen

Sensitivity 3: Low-carbon shipping fuel

In the baseline, ships are assumed to use fossil marine diesel fuel exclusively in 2023, but in 2030, 25% of the fleet is assumed to be fuelled by zero emission hydrogen or ammonia. As a sensitivity, we explored switching to 100% zero emission shipping fuel (such as renewable ammonia) in 2030, when supply is expected to be more readily available. For simplicity, this zero emission fuel is assumed to be sourced from supplies other than the shipping cargo, so as to not impact the chain efficiencies. The resulting sensitivity results show a modest reduction in emissions across all shipping pathways but is more noticeable in pathways with high shipping distances such as from Chile.

Compared to the baseline, using 100% zero emissions shipping fuel to transport renewable or grid electricity based ammonia from Chile to Rotterdam could reduce the total pathway emissions by 18% or 8% respectively in 2030, or by 6% for US renewable ammonia pathways in 2030. This sensitivity for the Chile and USA renewable electrolysis pathways would enable compliance with the EU GHG threshold in 2030.

However, for hydrogen production in countries other than Chile and USA (using renewable electricity and ammonia distribution), decarbonising shipping fuel in 2030 is unlikely to be significant enough to enable previously non-compliant pathways to fall below the GHG threshold.

Figure 11: Renewable electrolysis hydrogen production in 2030, using zero emissions shipping fuel during shipping to the EU, and refinery boiler use of gaseous hydrogen

Figure 12: Grid electrolysis hydrogen production in 2030, using zero emissions shipping fuel during shipping to the EU, and refinery boiler use of gaseous hydrogen

Figure 13: Natural gas ATR+CCS hydrogen production in 2030, using zero emissions shipping fuel during shipping to the EU, and refinery boiler use of gaseous hydrogen

Sensitivity 4: Renewable heat

In the baseline, the ammonia pathways that require reconversion to gaseous hydrogen are assumed to consume some of the shipped ammonia to provide heat for the cracking process. For this sensitivity, utilisation of renewable industrial heat (from an alternative source with zero emissions) instead of self-consumption of ammonia was modelled.

Figure 14 shows that using alternative renewable heat for renewable ammonia cracking could enable production in Norway to achieve compliance with the threshold in 2023, but not other countries. However, as shown in Figure 15, this sensitivity does not sufficiently reduce the GHG intensity to achieve compliance with the EU GHG threshold for any grid-based ammonia pathways in 2023. But by 2030, decarbonisation of Scotland’s grid may be enough to enable the Scottish grid-based ammonia pathway to comply.

Figure 14: Renewable electrolysis hydrogen GHG intensity using (alternative) renewable heat for ammonia cracking, and including refinery boiler use of gaseous hydrogen

Figure 15: Grid electrolysis hydrogen GHG intensity using (alternative) renewable heat for ammonia cracking, and including refinery boiler use of gaseous hydrogen

Figure 16: Natural gas ATR+CCS hydrogen GHG intensity using (alternative) renewable heat for ammonia cracking, and including refinery boiler use of gaseous hydrogen

Appendix G GHG Emission Compliance Scoring Matrix

The GHG intensity calculated for each pathway in 2023 and in 2030 were compared against the EU GHG emissions threshold of 28.2 gCO2e/MJLHV to evaluate the risk of non-compliance for each potential hydrogen exporting country. The table below summarises the results from the GHG intensity scoring including justification for the scores. A selection of GHG reduction measures were modelled in the sensitivity analysis to evaluate the impact of using renewable electricity across all the post-production supply chain steps, using (alternative) renewable heat for the ammonia cracking step of relevant pathways, and/or switching in 2030 to using only zero emission marine fuels for shipping pathways. See Appendix F for further details. Scottish vs GB grid results are given below as separate pathways scores. Those scores marked with a * do not have any relevant sensitivities modelled that reduce their emissions, so cannot be medium risk. The following scoring was used:

L

Low risk: Likely to comply with GHG threshold set under EU RED and EU Gas Directive

M

Medium risk: Could comply if relevant GHG reduction measures modelled in the sensitivity analysis are applied

H

High risk: Likely to not comply, even with relevant GHG reduction measures modelled in the sensitivity analysis

Country

Hydrogen Value Chain

2023

2030

Reasoning

Scotland

Ammonia (Scottish grid factor), shipping, cracking, H2 use

M

L

2023 can comply if renewable electricity is used throughout the chain. In 2030, Dutch electricity grid decarbonisation reduces cracking impact allowing compliance.

Scotland

Ammonia (Scottish grid factor), shipping, Ammonia use

L

L

Below the threshold, despite emissions arising from conversion steps.

Scotland

Compression (Scottish grid factor), shipping, H2 use

L

L

Well below the threshold

Scotland

Compression (Scottish grid factor), shipping, H2 use

L

L

Well below the threshold

Scotland

Ammonia (GB grid factor), shipping, cracking, H2 use

M

L

2023 can comply if renewable electricity is used throughout the chain. In 2030, Dutch electricity grid decarbonisation reduces cracking impact allowing compliance.

Scotland

Ammonia (GB grid factor), shipping, ammonia use

L

L

Below the threshold, despite conversion emissions.

Scotland

Compression (GB grid factor), H2 use

L

L

Well below the threshold

Scotland

Compression (GB grid factor), pipeline, H2 use

L

L

Well below the threshold

Norway

Ammonia, shipping, cracking, H2 use

M

L

Using renewable heat or renewable electricity in 2023 can enable compliance.

Norway

Ammonia, shipping, ammonia use

L

L

Below the threshold, despite conversion emissions.

Norway

Compression, shipping, H2 use

L

L

Well below the threshold

Norway

Compression, pipeline, H2 use

L

L

Well below the threshold

France (nuclear)

Ammonia, shipping, cracking, H2 use

M

M

Threshold can be met in 2023 and 2030 by using renewable electricity for ammonia cracking.

France (nuclear)

Ammonia, shipping, ammonia use

M

L

Using renewable electricity throughout chain enables compliance in 2023. 2030 is just compliant due to decarbonisation of the Dutch electricity grid.

France (nuclear)

Compression, shipping, H2 use

L

L

Well below the threshold, even with some nuclear electricity emissions.

France (nuclear)

Compression, pipeline, H2 use

L

L

Well below the threshold, even with some nuclear electricity emissions.

Morocco

Ammonia, shipping, cracking, H2 use

M

M

Morocco’s grid leads to high ammonia conversion emissions, but if renewable electricity was used instead, could comply.

Morocco

Ammonia, shipping, ammonia use

M

M

Morocco’s grid leads to high ammonia conversion emissions, but if renewable electricity was used instead, could comply.

Morocco

Compression, shipping, H2 use

L

L

Below the threshold, despite Moroccan grid input for compression.

Morocco

Compression, pipeline, H2 use

L

L

Below the threshold, despite Moroccan grid input for compression.

USA

Ammonia, shipping, cracking, H2 use

M

M

Using renewable electricity can enable compliance.

USA

Ammonia, shipping, ammonia use

M

L

2030 just below threshold, but using renewable electricity throughout chain, rather than New Jersey’s high intensity grid, can enable compliance in 2023.

Chile

Ammonia, shipping, cracking, H2 use

M

M

Using renewable electricity throughout chain can enable compliance.

Chile

Ammonia, shipping, ammonia use

M

L

2030 just below threshold, but using renewable electricity throughout chain, rather than Chile’s high intensity grid, can enable compliance in 2023.

Table 9: GHG intensity Compliance Scoring Matrix for Renewable Electricity Electrolysis Pathways

Country

Hydrogen Value Chain

2023

2030

Reasoning

Scotland (Scottish grid factor)

Ammonia (Scottish grid factor), shipping, cracking, H2 end use

H

L

Electricity grid decarbonisation enables this pathway to just fall below the threshold in 2030, but not in 2023.

Scotland (Scottish grid factor)

Ammonia (Scottish grid factor), shipping, ammonia end use

H*

L

Electricity grid decarbonisation enables this pathway to just fall below the threshold in 2030, but not in 2023.

Scotland (Scottish grid factor)

(Scottish grid factor) compressed H2, shipping, H2 end use

H*

L

Just above the threshold in 2023, but electricity grid decarbonisation enables this pathway to fall well below the threshold in 2030.

Scotland (Scottish grid factor)

(Scottish grid factor) compressed H2, pipeline, H2 end use

L*

L*

Just below the threshold in 2023, and electricity grid decarbonisation enables this pathway to fall well below the threshold in 2030

Scotland (GB grid factor)

Ammonia (GB grid factor), shipping, cracking, H2 end use

H

H

GB electricity grid ~3 times more GHG intensive than Scotland’s, leading to emissions well above the threshold, even with projected grid decarbonisation.

Scotland (GB grid factor)

Ammonia (GB grid factor), shipping, ammonia end use

H*

H

GB grid ~3 times more GHG intensive than Scotland’s, leading to emissions well above the threshold, even with projected grid decarbonisation.

Scotland (GB grid factor)

(GB grid factor) compressed H2 shipping, H2 end use

H*

H

GB electricity grid decarbonisation not quite enough to meet threshold by 2030.

Scotland (GB grid factor)

(GB grid factor) compressed H2 pipeline, H2 end use

H*

L

GB electricity grid decarbonisation not quite enough to meet threshold by 2030.

Norway

Ammonia, shipping, cracking, H2 end use

H

L

Decarbonisation of Norway and Netherlands electricity grids enables compliance in 2030.

Norway

Ammonia, shipping, ammonia end use

L*

L

Below threshold, despite conversion emissions.

Norway

Compressed H2 shipping, H2 end use

L*

L

Well below the threshold.

Norway

Compressed H2 pipeline, H2 end use

L*

L*

Well below the threshold.

France

Ammonia, shipping, cracking, H2 end use

H

H

France’s electricity grid decarbonisation is not enough to comply in 2030.

France

Ammonia, shipping, ammonia end use

H*

H

France’s electricity grid decarbonisation is not enough to comply in 2030.

France

Compressed H2 shipping, H2 end use

H*

H

France’s and Netherland’s electricity grid decarbonisation is not enough to comply.

France

Compressed H2 pipeline, H2 end use

H*

L*

France’s electricity grid decarbonisation combined with low emissions from distribution allows compliance in 2030.

Morocco

Ammonia, shipping, cracking, H2 end use

H

H

Morocco’s grid has a very high GHG intensity, significantly exceeding the threshold.

Morocco

Ammonia, shipping, ammonia end use

H*

H

Morocco’s grid has a very high GHG intensity, significantly exceeding the threshold.

Morocco

Compressed H2 shipping, H2 end use

H*

H

Morocco’s grid has a very high GHG intensity, significantly exceeding the threshold.

Morocco

Compressed H2 pipeline, H2 end use

H*

H*

Morocco’s grid has a very high GHG intensity, significantly exceeding the threshold.

USA

Ammonia, shipping, cracking, H2 end use

H

H

New Jersey’s grid has a high GHG intensity, significantly exceeding the threshold, even with expected decarbonisation by 2030.

USA

Ammonia, shipping, ammonia end use

H*

H

New Jersey’s grid has a high GHG intensity, significantly exceeding the threshold, even with expected decarbonisation by 2030.

Chile

Ammonia, shipping, cracking, H2 end use

H

H

Chile’s grid has a high GHG intensity, significantly exceeding the threshold, even with expected decarbonisation by 2030.

Chile

Ammonia, shipping, ammonia end use

H*

H

Chile’s grid has a high GHG intensity, significantly exceeding the threshold, even with expected decarbonisation by 2030.

Table 10: GHG intensity Compliance Scoring Matrix for Grid Electricity Electrolysis Pathways

Country

Hydrogen Value Chain

2023

2030

Reasoning

USA

Ammonia, shipping, cracking, H2 end use

H

H

Natural gas upstream emissions combined with N2O emissions, chain efficiency losses and the New Jersey electricity grid means emissions significantly above the threshold.

USA

Ammonia, shipping, ammonia end use

H

H

Natural gas upstream emissions combined with N2O emissions, chain efficiency losses and the New Jersey electricity grid means emissions significantly above the threshold.

UK

Ammonia (GB grid factor), shipping, H2 end use

H

H

Natural gas upstream emissions combined with N2O emissions, chain efficiency losses, and GB electricity grid means emissions significantly above the threshold.

UK

Ammonia (GB grid factor), shipping, Ammonia end use

H

H

Natural gas upstream emissions combined with N2O emissions, chain efficiency losses, and GB electricity grid means emissions significantly above the threshold.

UK

Compression (GB grid factor), shipping, H2 end use

M

L

Using renewable electricity for ATR+CCS hydrogen production and distribution could enable compliance in 2023. GB electricity grid and shipping decarbonisation could just lead to compliance in 2030 (but still sensitive to upstream natural gas emissions).

UK

Compression (GB grid factor), pipeline, H2 end use

L

L

Low distribution emissions may just allow compliance in 2023 (but still sensitive to upstream natural gas emissions).

Table 11: GHG Intensity Compliance Scoring Matrix for Natural Gas ATR+CCS Pathways

Appendix H Methodology for calculating the cost of compliance

For those pathways identified with an amber rating, ClimateXChange requested a methodology for calculating the costs (in £/kg) of meeting EU GHG intensity requirements if the GHG intensity of a delivered hydrogen pathway is too high but could be made compliant via implementing various GHG emission reduction measures.

This methodology will allow ClimateXChange to combine energy and fuels unit cost data (for 2023 and 2030) from their previous report with the usage rates and relative GHG emission intensities from this project, to calculate the added costs of compliance, potentially as a weighted average cost across multiple mitigation options.

Table 12 outlines the steps that can be taken to calculate the minimum cost of compliance for the “amber rating” hydrogen pathways. This approach relies on the user selecting mitigation measures that are independent of each other[9] and does not take into account any variation in cost within a mitigation measure, nor how these abatement costs compare to other options outside of the supply chain sensitivities explored (or other decarbonisation options for the end user outside of these hydrogen pathways).

Step

Methodology

Example (purely illustrative)

1

Model the GHG intensity of the delivered hydrogen without any measures applied

48.2 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen

2

Model the cost of the delivered hydrogen without any measures applied

£19.2/kg ÷ 120 MJLHV/kg = £0.16/MJLHV hydrogen

3

Calculate the reduction in GHG intensity required to achieve the EU GHG emission threshold (step 1 – 28.2 gCO2e/MJLHV)

48.2 – 28.2 = 20.0 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen abatement required

4

Identify an emission reduction measure

Wind electricity replacing grid electricity across the whole pathway (at the same availability as grid)

5

Model the delivered hydrogen GHG intensity with the new measure applied

15.2 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen

6

Calculate the maximum abatement potential of the new measure (step 1 – step 7)

48.2 – 15.2 = 33.0 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen abated

7

Model the delivered hydrogen cost with the new measure applied

£21.6/kg ÷ 120 MJLHV/kg = £0.18/MJLHV hydrogen

8

Calculate the added cost of the new measure (step 7 – step 2)

0.18 – 0.16 = 0.02 £/MJLHV hydrogen

9

Calculate the abatement cost of the new measure, by dividing step 8 by step 6 then multiplying by 1,000,000

(0.02 £/MJLHV hydrogen ÷ 33.0 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen) x 1,000,000 g/t = £606/tCO2e abated

10

Repeat steps 4 – 9 for each individual mitigation measure, and rank the mitigation measure abatement potentials by their abatement costs (step 9 results)

Max 2.0 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen abated @£300/tCO2e for renewable shipping fuel replacing fossil marine diesel

Max 33.0 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen abated @£606/tCO2e for renewable power replacing Scottish grid

Max 12.0 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen abated @£700/tCO2e for (alternative) renewable heating replacing ammonia cracking self-heating

11

Repeat steps 4-10 as many times as there are measures, but instead of assessing measures individually, start with the lowest abatement cost measure, then cumulatively include each extra measure on top of the others (following the step 10 ranking), to output a new list of abatement potentials ranked by their new abatement costs. At the end of each new step 10, overwrite step 1 with the latest step 5 result, and overwrite step 2 with the latest step 7 result, before adding the next measure in step 4 again.

2.0 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen abated @£300/tCO2e for renewable shipping fuel replacing fossil marine diesel

33.0 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen abated @£606/tCO2e for renewable power replacing Scottish grid

3.0 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen abated @£2,800/tCO2e for (alternative) renewable heating replacing ammonia cracking self-heating

12

Select enough measures in ranked order (cheapest first) from step 11 to achieve the step 3 requirement, noting that the whole abatement potential of each measure may not be needed

2.0 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen abated @£300/tCO2e for renewable shipping fuel replacing fossil marine diesel

18.0 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen abated @£606/tCO2e for renewable power replacing Scottish grid

No (alternative) renewable heating needed

13

Calculate a weighted average of the selected step 12 abatements and abatement costs to calculate the overall minimum cost of compliance

(2 x 300 + 18 x 606 + 0 x 2,800) / (2 + 18 + 0) = £575/tCO2e abated

14

Finally, convert step 13 into £/kg by dividing by 1,000,000 then multiplying by step 3 and multiplying by the LHV energy content of the delivered hydrogen

(£575/tCO2e abated ÷ 1,000,000 g/t) x 20 gCO2e/MJLHV hydrogen x 120 MJLHV/kg = £1.38/kg extra required to comply with EU GHG threshold

Table 12: Methodology for calculating the cost of compliance

© The University of Edinburgh, 2024
Prepared by ERM on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.


  1. The rationale for a voluntary standard is that it builds consumer trust and encourages participation through market-driven benefits like increased demand and price advantages, without imposing penalties. It supports self-regulation and is easier to implement internationally, avoiding the need for legislative enforcement.



  2. Other standards that could incentivise the uptake of low-carbon hydrogen are also available in some regions (e.g. UK’s Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation, or California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard). They have been excluded from this analysis because they are targeted at non-EU consumption, which is unlikely to affect hydrogen exports to the EU market. No further relevant standards were identified within those countries (Norway, Morocco, Chile) in scope of this study.



  3. Upstream emission factor for nuclear fuel is taken from Table 3 from RED Delegated Act on GHG methodology for RCFs and RFNBOs (1.2 gCO2e/MJ LHV fuel) (European Commission, 2023). Nuclear power plant LHV efficiency of 33% then applied (JRC, 2020).



  4. Feedstock emissions are only relevant to natural gas pathways and includes the upstream emissions for e.g. natural gas extraction, pre-processing and transport, including methane leakages.



  5. The maximum theoretical efficiency that a heat engine may have operating between two given temperatures. It is used in the LHV energy allocation methodology when heat or steam is a co-product.



  6. GOs is an assurance scheme to demonstrate to end-users that a product (e.g. hydrogen, electricity, biogas) are produced from renewable sources. In electricity, this can take the form of Renewable Electricity Certificates (RECs) or Power Purchasing Agreements (PPAs). More information on this in Appendix A.



  7. The maximum credit value is $0.60/kg hydrogen. This amount is multiplied by 5 (i.e. maximum credit value of $3.0/kg hydrogen) if the production facility meets prevailing wage requirements and apprenticeship requirements defined under the IRA.



  8. This is due to avoided methane emissions.



  9. If any of the measures are not independent of each other (e.g. if one measure impacts the efficiency of the supply chain), these non-independent measures may change the maximum abatement potential of other measures, and the abatement costs of some measures may also be impacted by the costs and order/combinations of other measures applied (or not applied). This process to find a minimum compliance cost may be iterative and will rely on cost & GHG modelling of the whole supply chain exploring combinations of measures.


Work completed: December 2023

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/3666

This research was carried out in 2022/23 and was based on the market conditions at that time. Policy related to and emphasis on electricity networks has changed significantly since this research was conducted and therefore not all aspects of the report reflect the current landscape.

Executive summary

Solar panels can help decarbonise Scotland’s energy supply and there are plans to reduce barriers to enable greater deployment in Scotland. The Scottish Government recently consulted on the potential for a solar ambition and a Solar Vision is in development.

The solar industry has been calling for a 4-6 GW solar photovoltaic (PV) ambition by 2030, to put Scotland in line with the UK target of 70 GW by 2035. This can be broken down as 2.5 GW rooftop solar (1.5 GW domestic and 1 GW commercial), with the remaining capacity made up of large-scale grounded mounted solar.

Our work investigates the benefits and impacts of deploying 2.5 GW of rooftop solar PV installation onto the electricity network in Scotland by 2030. The distribution network operators are forecasting lower levels of solar PV uptake in their future energy scenarios.

We consider the benefits, high-level estimate of reinforcement investments needed to accommodate it and the potential impact on consumer bills. We also consider wider costs to the transmission network.

Benefits and opportunities

The rise of electricity generation connected to a distribution network, known as embedded generation, offers new opportunities to the distribution network for managing the future growth of demand. Potential network benefits include:

  • Reduction in electricity infrastructure investments due to generation meeting demand
  • Reduced line losses from transmitting electricity across the transmission network due to more demand being met by onsite generation.
  • Supporting demand in other areas by selling excess power

Financial benefits for consumers adopting solar PV arise from lower electricity bills. Benefits could be increased if demand could be shifted to times of excess generation. Stakeholders from the distribution networks considered that increased solar PV deployment would provide greatest opportunities for commercial consumers whose peak demand during the day would be most likely to match peak solar generation.

We also found that the co-location of commercial or domestic scale battery storage alongside solar PV would provide the greatest economic opportunities by extending the duration throughout the day when demand is met by on-site generation. This could also reduce network impacts by delaying the need for network upgrades.

Impacts and costs

We estimate that 27% (209) primary substations in Scotland might become overloaded with an increased deployment of rooftop solar. The impact is additional to that from other low-carbon technologies (e.g. wind, ground mounted solar, battery storage) as forecast by Distribution Network Operators. The majority (84%) of these substations are located in Scottish Power Energy Networks region, with 16% in Scottish & Southern Electricity Networks region.

Our high-level estimates of total costs for all forecasted network interventions are:

  • Scottish Power Energy Networks (SPEN): £130 million worth of work to upgrade high-voltage substations and low-voltage networks and £120 million to upgrade transmission infrastructure.
  • Scottish & Southern Electricity Networks (SSEN): £20 million worth of work to upgrade high-voltage substations and low-voltage networks, and £30 million to upgrade transmission infrastructure.

These are based on network reinforcement costs for a mix of areas representative of Scotland and key information on network location and capacity, and magnitude of solar PV in the area, with the results scaled up to represent all of Scotland. The cost of traditional network reinforcement involves replacing substations and overloaded equipment with that of a higher capacity rated equipment.

The distribution costs will be paid by all consumers in Scotland through their energy bills. The estimated average annual increase in domestic consumer energy bills is £0.53 in the SSEN area and £1.81 in the SPEN area. The estimated average annual increase in non-domestic consumer energy bills is £7.17 in SSEN’s area and £24.46 in SPEN’s area.

Alternative ways to release additional capacity from existing assets that could reduce costs include:

  • Flexibility services, which contracts consumers/aggregators to generate power or shift load at times of congestion to support constraint management.
  • Reconfiguring networks to release capacity from feeders that are close to operational limits.
  • Smart solutions and approaches to release capacity, for instance low-voltage monitoring for better informed design and operation, dynamic variable ratings to factor in seasonality and electronic control of power flows.

These have the potential of decreasing or delaying the need for reinforcement but will not entirely negate this need.

Overall, it is difficult to quantify whether the benefits outweigh the impacts on the grid and on consumer bills, but steps can be taken to reduce the potential impacts and enable greater benefits to be realised. Examples include investing in on-site battery storage and continued deployment of network flexibility and innovation solutions.

Recommendations

  • Network interventions are triggered because Distribution Network Operators are required to use a conservative assumption that less generation will be consumed onsite with more exported to the network. This could be an area to explore.
  • Incentivising the requirement to have domestic and non-domestic battery storage in conjunction with solar PV to absorb any excess solar, thus preventing exports, may reduce the scale of network interventions needed. Battery storage can provide greater network flexibility by charging and discharging as required.
  • A co-ordinated approach is needed between key stakeholders including the Distribution Network Operators, transmission operators, local authorities and the solar industry to ensure that a significant increase in solar PV can be accommodated. Improved evidence of large quantities of solar being proposed is needed to allow the network operators to plan accordingly and justify their decisions to Ofgem.

 

Glossary of terms

AC

Alternating current

ANM

Active network management

BSPs

Bulk supply points

DC

Direct current

DFES

Distribution future energy scenarios

FIT

Feed in Tariff

DGCG

The distributed generation connection guides

DNOs

Distribution network operators

DUoS

Distribution Use of System

EHV

Extra high voltage

EREC

Engineering recommendation

EV

Electric vehicle

GSPs

Grid supply points

GW

Giga watt

GB

Great Britain

G98

Distributed Generation Connection Guides: G98

G99

Distributed Generation Connection Guides: G99

HV

High voltage

kW

kilo Watt

LCTs

Low-carbon technologies

LV

Low voltage

MW

Mega watt

Ofgem

Office of Gas and Electricity Markets

PS

Primary substation

PV

Photovoltaic

RIIO-ED2

RIIO’ stands for ‘Revenue = Innovation + Incentives + Outputs’ and ‘ED’ stands for Electricity Distribution

SEG

Smart export guarantee

SPEN

Scottish Power Electricity Network

SPT

Scottish Power Transmission

SS

Secondary substation

SSEN

Scottish & Southern Electricity Networks

SSET

Scottish & Southern Electricity Transmission

T&D

Transmission and distribution

TOs

Transmission operators

UoS

Use of System

 

Introduction

Background

Scotland has made significant progress in decarbonising its energy sector through the growth of renewable electricity generation technology. The Scottish Government has a statutory target legislated in the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2019 to reach net zero emissions by 2045. This will require further decarbonisation across the entire energy sector in Scotland. The draft Energy Strategy and Just Transition Plan and the Climate Change Monitoring report set out targets for the transformation of Scotland’s energy sector from 2030 and beyond. There is an ambition to deliver at least 20 GW of additional low-cost renewable capacity by 2030, and for at least the equivalent of 50% of Scotland’s energy across heat, transport, and electricity demand to come from renewable sources.

Over recent years, domestic, non-domestic and commercial buildings have been encouraged to become more energy efficient and reduce electricity consumption from the grid. As well as the use of energy efficiency measures, there has been an increase in the adoption of low carbon technologies (LCT), such as rooftop solar PV. Schemes such as Feed in Tariff (FIT) and Smart Export Guarantee (SEG) have further contributed to the rise in solar PV installations. The SEG scheme provides a payment to renewable energy generators for every kilowatt-hour (kWh) of energy that is exported to the grid via a p/kWh tariff agreement.

The Scottish Government recently consulted on the potential for a solar ambition. The solar industry has been calling for a 4-6 GW solar photovoltaic (PV) ambition by 2030, which would align Scotland with the UK Governments target for solar [1]. This can be broken down into the following:

  • 1.5 GW domestic rooftop solar
  • 1 GW commercial rooftop solar
  • Remaining capacity made up of large-scale grounded mounted solar

This level of solar ambition will require additional electricity network capacity, with cost implications in the form of necessary distribution and transmission network interventions. The distribution network costs will, in part, be passed onto electricity consumers across Scotland while transmission costs are levied on consumers at GB level. If distribution network intervention costs are higher in specific network regions, then consumers who sit in this region will pay more towards distribution costs through their energy bills than those in other network regions.

Aims and approach

This report focuses on 2.5 GW of rooftop solar PV installations, spread across domestic and non-domestic premises, and provides an assessment into the impacts on the electricity network and the resulting costs and benefits of greater solar PV deployment in Scotland.

The level of investment needed to accommodate the additional solar installations and potential impact on consumers energy bills is estimated using credible assumptions but is not definitive. The assessment also considers wider costs to the transmission network. Our work was informed through desktop research, stakeholder engagement and analysis using data obtained from DNOs and reports in the public domain.

Electricity network overview

The electrical infrastructure in Scotland is made of two key parts: the transmission network and the distribution network. The transmission network includes the 400 kV, 275 kV and 132 kV network and operated by Transmission Owners (TOs), and the distribution network which includes lower voltage networks and is operated by the Distribution Network Operators (DNOs).

The transmission and distribution networks in Scotland are operated by the following organisations (see Figure 1):

  • Scottish Power Energy Networks (SPEN), made up of 2 key parts:
    • Scottish Power (SP) Distribution are the DNO of the distribution network in Central & Southern Scotland
    • SP Transmission are the TO for Central & Southern Scotland
  • Scottish & Southern Electricity Networks (SSEN), made up of 2 key parts:
    • SSEN Distribution, who are the DNO for the North of Scotland
    • SSEN Transmission are the TO for the North of Scotland
A map of scotland and scotland network

Description automatically generated

Figure 1 Electricity network operator map for Scotland

At the distribution level, there are four types of electrical substations used to distribute electrical power from the transmission network to consumers:

  • Grid Supply Points (GSPs): Provide the connection between the transmission system and the distribution network. GSPs step the voltage down from the transmission network voltage of either 400 kV, 275 kV or 132 kV to the highest distribution network voltage known as the sub-transmission network or EHV network.
  • Bulk Supply Points (BSPs): Step the incoming 132 kV voltage down to 33 kV, which is then distributed to different primary substations in the region. Some very large industrial and commercial loads may be directly fed at this level.
  • Primary Substations: Take the incoming 33 kV feeder and steps the voltage down to 11 kV which directly supplies some larger commercial loads, as well as the secondary substations.
  • Secondary Substations: Take the incoming 11 kV feeder and steps the voltage down to Low Voltage (LV), which will typically supply residential areas.

Solar PV connection types

All solar PV installations (and other generation types) connecting to the distribution network must comply with the Distribution Code and either Engineering Recommendation (EREC) G98 or G99 as applicable [2] [3]. The Distributed Generation Connection Guides (DGCG) outline the steps to be carried out to obtain a connection agreement and gain approval to connect solar PV assets to the network [4].

The DGCG considers both EREC G98 and EREC G99:

  • G98 for small-scale installations: This is applicable for small-scale installations with a total capacity of no more than 16 amps per phase connected at low voltage (230 V). This equates to a maximum peak power of 3.68 kW single phase or 11.04 kW three-phase. An example of a G98 application is domestic rooftop solar PV.
  • G99 for large-scale installations: This is applicable for installations with a total installed capacity greater than 16 amps per phase connected at either low voltage (Type A only) or high voltage levels. G99 includes four types:
    • Type A: From 0.8 MW to < 1 MW
    • Type B: From 1 MW to < 10 MW
    • Type C: From 10 MW to < 50 MW
    • Type D: greater than or equal to 50 MW

Depending on available roof space, a commercial rooftop solar installation may fall into the G99 Type A category. Larger G99 types are likely to be ground-mounted.

 

Project findings

Potential opportunities for distribution networks from increased solar PV deployment

Distribution network equipment has traditionally been sized to supply the peak load, which is the maximum demand that an area is expected to draw from the wider electricity network. This is to ensure that consumers do not pay for network infrastructure that is not used, known as stranded assets. The electrification of heat and transport through the introduction of heat pumps and electric vehicle charging points will add to the peak demand, potentially resulting in greater network constraints and triggering necessary interventions as a result. There are new ways to manage the impacts, including using the techniques described in Section 4.3.3. The rise of embedded connected generation will offer new opportunities to the distribution network when it comes to managing the future growth of demand.

Benefits include the following:

  • Reduction in electricity infrastructure: Connecting distributed generation close to the point of use (e.g., rooftop solar PV behind the meter) could result in a reduced need for distribution infrastructure as the demand is being offset by generation. Increased distributed generation can reduce the average load on network assets and can defer the immediate need for asset replacement and when replacement is required. For example, charging of EVs could be timed to match the generation profile of the solar, reducing the need to supply power from elsewhere in the grid. However, the scale of 2.5 GW of additional solar will need to be investigated further to understand this opportunity in more detail.
  • Reduced line losses: Generation can supply loads within the distribution network, reducing the distance between where supply and demand are located, which reduces energy losses.
  • Supporting demand in other areas: Generators can sell excess power that cannot be consumed locally to the network to support other demand users. This can have the benefit of reducing network demand during periods of high demand, thus enabling more capacity to be made available for supporting more connections in wider network.

Leveraging these benefits requires active support for flexibility technologies and accounting for these benefits in network design.

Due to its inherent nature, solar PV generates in a finite window which is not generally at times of peak demand. This makes solar less directly beneficial than other renewable energy technologies that have some part of their energy generation window overlapping with the peak demand window. Engagement with DNO stakeholders resulted in the following conclusions on solar opportunities to the network:

  • A greater deployment of solar PV in the future will provide only small opportunities to reduce peak demand on the wider network. This is because solar generation is greatest in the summer on sunny days, and the demand peaks in the winter evenings when solar generation is usually at its lowest.
  • Domestic consumers who deploy rooftop solar PV are unlikely to present opportunities to the network as it is unlikely that generation will coincide with peak domestic demand.
  • There may be greater opportunities to the network from commercial consumers whose demand will peak during the day with a greater chance of matching the peak in solar PV generation. This would especially be the case for commercial buildings with flexible demand, or who provide EV charging points to their employees.

However, it is the view of the stakeholders that co-locating domestic and commercial scale battery storage within the premise along with solar PV can provide greater economic opportunities. It will enable greater benefits to the distribution network to be realised as it will allow consumers to offset their peak demand and extend the duration during which electricity stored from solar PV can meet their own energy requirements [5]. This could provide a valuable flexibility service to the network and delay the need for expensive network upgrades, which can reduce network costs and consumers’ energy bills. Overall, battery storage should be encouraged alongside solar to enable greater opportunities for both the network and technology to be realised going forward.

Potential benefits to consumers from increased solar PV deployment in Scotland

Connecting solar consumers

For an individual connecting solar consumer, the main benefits of installing solar PV include a reduction in electricity costs and direct access to zero carbon renewable electricity.

The Carbon Trust publishes information online to advise businesses on the potential of renewable energy and to assess whether using renewable technologies is a viable option for a business [6]. According to the Carbon Trust, typical small-scale installations are around 15 to 25 square metres, with a 3 kW system comprising of around 15 panels taking up an area of 20 square meters and can generate roughly 2,500 kWh per annum [7]. Maintenance costs are low and estimated payback time varies significantly and will depend on the circumstances of each site. Some domestic installations report a payback period of just 4 years, reduced from previous years due to higher electricity prices in the UK [8].

The potential benefit to individual connecting solar consumers will be on a case-by-case basis and depends on how much solar can be generated and the times of day the consumer is at home to maximise the benefits. For example, an average assumption for domestic solar panels is that 30% of generation is consumed at home and 70% is exported when the owners are out at work from 9-5pm [9]. If the consumer is at home during the day, then self-consumption will increase, while a commercial building is likely to use over 80% onsite. In summer, this offset might be significant, though this will be lower in winter when generation will be lower, and demand is often higher. Installing solar PV can bring financial incentives where a payment can be received from a supplier for a proportion of solar that is sold directly to the grid through securing Smart Export Guarantees [10].

Stakeholders agreed that installing energy storage alongside solar PV can be used to extend the duration when power from solar can offset consumer demand, enabling further reduction in energy bills. Using energy storage can provide benefits by storing the excess solar energy that cannot be consumed at the time of generation, which reduces the level of exports onto the distribution network. This could help to reduce the need for network interventions if the design methods adopted by the DNOs allow for this.

All consumers across Scotland

The scale of solar PV installations in a 2.5 GW ambition will trigger network interventions because the DNOs are required to make conservative assumptions that less generation will be consumed onsite with more exported onto the network. This will have an impact on all consumers electricity bills in Scotland (not only those consumers with solar PV); however, consumers with solar installations will be less impacted compared to consumers without solar installations. Adopting flexibility measures such as domestic and commercial scale battery storage to absorb and reduce the excess solar generation exporting onto the grid will reduce network interventions, and thus reduce overall consumer costs. This should be encouraged alongside the installation of solar PV to maximise the potential of the technology and extend the duration at which demand can be met by on-site generation.

Potential for distribution connected solar PV deployment in Scotland’s energy network

DNO forecasts of rooftop solar PV connections

The decarbonisation of a wide range of economic sectors, including the electrification of transport and heating, is expected to result in high adoption of low-carbon technologies (such as heat pumps and EV chargers) on the electricity distribution grid. As a result, greater network capacity will be required to facilitate supplying these additional loads, and the network load profiles will become less predictable. This could raise new operational and management challenges to the DNOs. In order to plan in advance of future network pinch points, the DNOs carry out studies to identify where network intervention is required between now and 2050 to enable informed investment priority decisions to be made.

As part of their licence, DNOs are responsible for facilitating and creating the network infrastructure to meet electricity demand. To accomplish this, the DNOs forecast and understand consumers changing electricity needs under varying levels of consumer ambition, government policy support, economic growth, and technological development. The DNOs present these results in form of their DFES data, which provide a breakdown of different demand and generation technologies across each scenario up to 2050 and is updated every year after the DNOs have revised their modelling data. Both SP Distribution [11] and SSEN Distributions latest DFES data was assessed as part of this project. SSEN Distribution DFES results is not published in the public domain, this information was obtained directly.

Using the latest DFES data on Scotland’s energy network, the Figure 2 shows both SP Distribution and SSEN Distributions forecasts of new small-scale solar installation until 2030 using 2020 as the baseline.

Figure 2: Estimated new solar rooftop installations across Scotland in 2030 (2020 base year) Source: DFES forecasted generation capacity scenarios

Figure 2 shows that projected small-scale solar PV uptake in 2030 is significantly less than the 2.5 GW number suggested by the solar industry. Even the scenario with the highest projected numbers (Leading the Way) forecasts only 13% (c.325 MW) of the 2.5 GW solar industry ambition. This indicates that the evidence collected by DNOs from stakeholder meetings with Local Authorities (LA) and generation developers is for a lower level of solar deployment.

Accommodating a significant number of small-scale solar installations

From our engagement with DNO stakeholders, we understand that individual small-scale (G98) applications are of less concern due to their small export capacity; however, a large cluster within a specific network area will pose greater network challenges. The impact will be location dependent as network topology and capacity will vary. In some cases, depending on the makeup of the LV feeder, the cross-sectional area of the cable, the number of consumers supplied on that feeder and the size of the houses, there may be no problems connecting a significant amount of PV in an area. However, in other cases, network reinforcement may be required with the addition of even a modest amount of PV generation.

DNO stakeholders informed us that major network interventions needed to accommodate a significant amount of G98 applications are designed based on ‘worst case’ principles, where minimum consumer demand and maximum generation output are witnessed on the DNOs network. This approach has been used by DNOs over many years to establish if the network can still operate safely and reliably when there is an excess of generation exports due to low consumer site demand.

Network impact assessments allow the DNO to understand the impacts as a result of accommodating more generation connections. Areas of investigation for the DNOs include:

  • Thermal overload
  • Voltage rises
  • Increased harmonic and fault level contributions

If EREC standards of compliance are not meet through utilisation of the existing network, network interventions are required, and the scale of the work needed is proportional to the resulting network impact.

Larger rooftop solar PV installations (G99 connections) require approval from the DNO before connection is granted. In contrast, G98 connections are ‘fit and inform’, where the connection can proceed without DNO approval. The connections are managed by the DNOs on a first come first serve basis by placing G99 applicants into a managed queue. A network impact assessment is carried out and any reinforcement costs incurred by the DNO are included in the final connection offer. The timescales for accommodating G99 solar PV connections (mainly commercial buildings) depends on the scale of the upgrades needed; however, DNOs are licenced by Ofgem and are obligated to make a final connection offer within the set timescales.

Innovative methods of accommodating new connections

Historically, the connection agreements for generators and load connected at low voltage allowed import or export of the full rated power with no restriction to time or duration. Connections and the network had to be reinforced to allow this. This would involve replacing cables, overhead wires, transformers, and switchgears. Broadly speaking, the more reinforcement works needed at high voltage levels results in greater the reinforcement costs.

However, in recent years DNOs have introduced new methods that enable smarter use of the network equipment and reduce the amount of traditional reinforcement that is needed to accommodate the significant uptake of generation.

The type of interventions used by DNOs include:

  • Network flexibility though flexible connection agreements: Flexible connection agreements allow the DNO to manage the load and generation connected to the network to some extent, providing a lever to alleviate overload on equipment or voltage issues. Examples include requiring the generation or load to operate differently if there is an outage of equipment on the network, at certain times during the year, or in response to signals from the DNO. This means that less reinforcement is needed to connect the new load or generation, potentially reducing the cost and time to connection. This does mean though that some developments would not be able to export power at certain times if they signed up to flexible connection agreement.
  • Network reconfiguration: This involves using remote controlled switches (mostly manual switching is done at LV level) to reconfigure the network and shift generation output from network equipment that is heavily loaded to another area of the network that is lightly loaded. This helps to release capacity on the network, reduce network constraints and avoid network upgrade investment.
  • Other innovative solutions: Both SP Distribution and SSEN Distribution are actively deploying new smart network management tools to manage the network more efficiently to allow a transition away from traditional ways of operating. For example, collection of network data to make more informed decisions on network operation or control systems to manage the network better during peak operation periods which will help reduce network constraints and maintain voltage tolerance limits.

It is important to note that innovative solutions will not alleviate all traditional reinforcement requirements. If the options above fail to provide the necessary network capacity needed to accommodate more generation then infrastructure will need to be upgraded.

Connecting a significant volume of rooftop solar generation

A significant rise in solar PV connections could be accommodated in an efficient manner if the DNOs and policymakers work in collaboration to understand the policy signals, increase data transparency, understand the role different parties need to play and investment required to make this happen in a timely manner.

In order to maintain a smooth transition to greater solar PV uptake, improved intelligence is needed, particularly at LA level, to understand where solar PV is likely to be located. More local information could provide more accurate data to update DNO modelling tools. This will give the DNOs a better picture of where networks will likely require intervention and inform their investment priority decisions ahead of time. This will also provide evidence to justify DNO decisions to Ofgem.

DNOs have an obligation to provide an option to connect, but the timescales for making connections will vary depending on how much network intervention is needed. The cost of providing such interventions is, in part (depending on the particular situation) borne by the developer seeking the ability to export. The scale of investment needed in specific locations could affect connection timescales.

Innovative approaches should continue to be used where possible to reduce the cost and time to connect. This will minimise the barriers to develop new renewable generation projects while maintaining a secure and reliable power supply. Innovative approaches are also a more efficient and cost-effective approach to asset management.

Impacts of increased solar PV deployment on electricity networks

Potential network challenges of increased rooftop PV

The changing nature of the electricity distribution network as a result of dynamic power flows and increased unpredictability in load profile behaviour requires a transition away from traditional ways of operating. For example, electricity networks in Scotland are traditionally managed to meet the maximum demand throughout the day and year by sizing assets accordingly. However, the rise of generation at distribution level creates new challenges, such as demand reduction, increased thermal constraints, reverse power flows, greater voltage constraints, greater fault level contributions and harmonic contributions. These are detailed in Section 7.1.

The impacts depend greatly on the size, design and local network condition of each individual connection. Additional PV generation would also be connected within the context of other LCTs such as heat pumps, batteries, electric vehicles, wind and larger solar generation. It is difficult to predict the specific challenges and impacts which will be experienced with accuracy.

DNO stakeholders informed us that they are most concerned about voltage rises which must be maintained within the correct limits. This will be a big challenge in summer when there is excess generation flowing in the opposite direction onto the network, which increases network voltages. The exact scale is unknown and even a small deviation from voltage limits can damage network infrastructure and appliances because all electrical equipment is designed to handle voltages within specified tolerances.

Estimated scale of network impact

We conducted an analysis to determine how many primary substations are likely to require intervention in 2030 as a result of greater solar PV deployment in Scotland. The analysis used 1.5 GW domestic rooftop solar and 1 GW commercial rooftop solar by 2030, information provided by the DNOs and data from the DNOs DFES. The DFES provides generation forecasts up to 2050, including the distribution of that forecast across primary transformers. It was assumed that the additional solar generation was spread across the network in accordance with the forecasted distribution pattern. The uplifted generation forecast numbers for rooftop solar PV were then used to understand where substations were likely to be overloaded and may require interventions in 2030 by using the DNO headroom report on capacity availability [12] [13]. The methodology behind the analysis is discussed further in the Appendix Section 7.2.

The projected percentage of primary substations that may require intervention in 2030 due to the 2.5 GW solar rooftop are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Primary substations that may require interventions by network area (Source: DFES data)

 

Scottish Power Energy Networks

Scottish & Southern Electricity Networks

Total

Number of substations that may require intervention in 2030 due to greater rooftop solar PV deployment

176

33

209

Total number of primary substations (down to 11 kV level)

385

384

769

% of primary substations that may require intervention

46%

9%

27%

We found that 46% of total primary substation equipment in SP Distribution and approximately 9% of total primary substation in SSEN Distribution could be overloaded as a result of increased solar PV generation. This represents 176 primaries out of 385 in SP Distribution’s area and 33 out of 384 in SSEN Distributions area. The analysis can be broken down further into low, medium and highly constrained sites:

Table 2: Extent of site constraints for overloaded sites

Lightly constrained

(less than 10% overloaded)

98% of sites

Moderately constrained

(10-20% overloaded)

approximately 1% of sites

Highly constrained

(more than 20% overloaded)

approximately 1% of sites

The majority of these network interventions are projected to take place in SPENs distribution network area, which is likely to be linked to the fact that it is located in busier urban areas, whereas SSEN Distribution area is more rural.

We carried out a high-level analysis to estimate the cost of interventions for upgrading distribution network infrastructure to accommodate the 2.5GW solar rooftop in 2030. The estimated cost of reinforcement provided by DNOs for selected study areas was scaled up to estimate the reinforcement cost for the entire network.

The methodology used to estimate this cost is described in Section 7.3.

Figure 3: Estimated cost of interventions in 2030 in both SPEN and SSENs distribution boundaries (£ millions)

It can be seen that the cost of intervention is higher in the SP Distribution area (£134m compared to £17m in SSEN Distribution area). This can be attributed to a greater number of interventions being forecast as required in the SP Distribution area.

Impacts on consumers’ bills and potential mitigations

Rules for connection charges and Use of System charges

The DNOs are licenced by the energy regulator, Ofgem, who sets rules regarding the amount of revenue DNOs can recover from consumers, this includes connection charges.

Connection charges for rooftop solar covers the cost of replacing or upgrading equipment to facilitate new generation connections. The DNO determines the extent of network reinforcement required, and the subsequent cost, by studying the impact of the additional generation on the network.

G98 connections, which are likely to include all domestic-scale and smaller commercial rooftops, do not incur connection charge. Larger generation installations under G99 may trigger an upfront connection charge depending on the capacity of the local network. Multiple generation installations in close proximity installed by the same party, for example a housing association fitting solar panels across many properties in one area, may also result in a connection charge.

For all cases, additional costs not covered by the connection charge are recovered through Use of System (UoS) charges. UoS charges are charged to all consumers through their electricity bills. The DNOs are required to calculate these UoS charges annually utilising the Common Distribution Charging Methodology (CDCM) [14]. Each DNO is required to publish their statement of charges in advance of application [15]. These statements provide detail of how the charges are determined for demand or generation customers, and these are further split by domestic and non-domestic categories. The charging statements also contain worked examples of how any reinforcement costs are calculated.

There are a number of steps used to calculate the Distribution Use of System (DUoS) charges which will be impacted by increased solar PV installation. For example, for each category of demand users the DNO estimates the following load characteristics:

  • A load factor, defined as the average load of a user group over the year, relative to the maximum load level of that user group; and
  • A coincidence factor, defined as the expectation value of the load of a user group at the time of system simultaneous maximum load, relative to the maximum load level of that user group.

In determining the load characteristics of each category of demand user, the DNO will analyse meter and profiling data for the most recent 3 year period for use in the calculation of charges. Load factors and coincidence factors are calculated individually for each of the 3 years and a simple arithmetic average is then used in tariff setting. Large scale PV deployment would impact these calculations but without detailed data it is not possible to accurately determine what the resultant potential impact might be.

The DNO determines a set of different distribution time bands, based on the underlying demand profiles and associated costs – these could be expected to change given large scale PV deployment in some areas. These time bands can only be revised annually on 1 April. It is likely that the large-scale rollout of solar PV for domestic customers will reduce their consumption during daylight hours (co-incident with system peak times) thus leading to a lower DUoS cost over those periods.

The DNO also forecasts the volume chargeable to each tariff component under each tariff for the charging year, which are separately determined for the Domestic Aggregated and Non-Domestic Aggregated tariffs. These volumes would be impacted by PV deployment relating to the two different categories, thus impacting the relevant tariffs differently.

The Significant Code review undertaken by Ofgem “Network Access and Forward-Looking Charges” [16] came into effect from 1 April 2023. This resulted in a reduction in the contribution to network reinforcement made by G99 connections. This improves the business model for many generators, who would otherwise have had to pay larger upfront costs. A summary of the previous and new rules for connection charging is provided below with some key terms.

  • Onsite works: This is works needed onsite to accommodate the installation and includes facilitating a connection to the distribution network.
  • Reinforcement works: This involves replacing equipment on the existing network to accommodate new connections. This usually involves replacing cables, transformers and switchgears etc.
  • Connecting solar consumers: This refers to domestic and commercial entities who have rooftop solar installations. A G98 installation is typically relevant to connecting consumers who are domestic, while G99 is more relevant to connecting consumers who are commercial entities.

Table 3: The new Ofgem Significant Code Review rules for recovering network upgrade costs from generation connections that trigger the need for reinforcement (Source: Ofgem [16])

 

Onsite works

Reinforcement at connection voltage

Reinforcement at one voltage level above the connection voltage

G98 single installation

Likely to include all domestic and smaller commercial properties

Unlikely to be needed, as the property should already be connected to the grid

Fully funded by the DNO via UoS charges

Fully funded by the DNO via UoS charges

Multiple G98 or G99 installations

Connecting solar consumers pay 100%. Bigger installation would likely trigger the needed more bigger fuses onsite.

Connecting solar consumers pay a proportion of the reinforcement costs (likely to be a small fee or nothing)

Old arrangement

Connecting solar consumer pays a proportion of the reinforcement costs

New arrangement

Fully funded by the DNO via UoS charges, up to a High Cost Cap

Potential impact on consumer bills

Large-scale solar PV adoption will impact the DUoS calculations for consumers. In order to assess the cost impact of the large scale roll out of rooftop solar on all consumer bills (not only consumers with solar installations) we assumed that all network interventions required to accommodate 2.5 GW of solar would be socialised. This is a simplified assumption that provides an estimate of the maximum impact UoS charges has as a result of the modelled interventions. A more accurate assessment would require more data regarding locations of commercial and domestic properties and the scale of solar to be adopted at the premises. This is because larger commercial buildings adopting solar PV will likely make a direct contribution to network intervention costs, thus reducing the UoS spread across all remaining consumers.

According to Scottish Government energy data, non-domestic consumers account for 60% of Scotland’s total electricity consumption. As a result, non-domestic consumers will pay more towards DUoS directly due to their higher energy consumption [17]. We applied a non-domestic to domestic electricity consumption ratio of 60:40 in both DNO licence areas in Scotland. This allocated 60% of the intervention costs in each DNO area to non-domestic, with the remaining 40% of the costs going to domestic consumers.

We then spread the costs using the ratio of number of non-domestic to domestic premises to obtain an indication of the increase in non-domestic and domestic energy bills which could be realised following large-scale solar deployment. SSEN provided this split, where out of total consumers in their licenced area that have electricity meters, 90% are non-domestic premises while 10% are domestic. The Department of Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) has published information on GB electricity meters, and a similar ratio was observed [18]. SPEN did not provide the split in their region, so we have assumed the same ratio will apply.

Table 4 shows the annual impact of socialising the reinforcement investment required at distribution level to accommodate 2.5 GW rooftop solar. Costs per consumer bill split between domestic and non-domestic consumers in Scotland irrespective if they have solar or not have been estimated. Section 7.4 explains the methodology used to calculate this estimate.

Table 4: Annual impact of socialising the reinforcement cost at distribution level on consumers in Scotland (£/year/customer bill)

DNO

Estimated annual impact per domestic customer bill (£) for reinforcement costs in 2030

Estimated annual impact per non-domestic customer bill (£) for reinforcement costs in 2030

SSEN

£0.53 per year for 45 years

£7.17 per year for 45 years

SPEN

£1.81 per year for 45 years

£24.46 per year for 45 years

Non-domestic consumers will pay a bigger contribution towards reinforcements triggered by solar PV uptake due to their higher energy consumptions, while domestic consumers pay less towards DUoS. These costs are based on assumptions applied due to lack of available data during the research and should therefore be treated as indicators of what the additional costs over and above baseline energy bills could be but they are not definitive.

The DNOs did not validate or confirm the methodology we used to derive these numbers. These provide a highest cost estimate due to the assumption that all Scottish consumers will pay 100% of reinforcement costs through their electricity bills. However, it is likely that some commercial solar connecting consumers will pay a proportion of the reinforcement costs they triggered upfront directly. This would reduce the impact on all consumer bills but is unlikely to have a large impact. It was not possible to separate the reinforcement cost triggered by commercial consumers due to data limitations.

Potential impacts on the transmission network

A proposed ambition 2.5 GW of small-scale rooftop solar PV by 2030 is likely to trigger the need for network reinforcement across the transmission network in Scotland and the rest of GB. The exact nature and scale of the upgrades required is difficult to predict as there is uncertainty as to where the clusters of solar will be located and the nature of impacts are locationally dependent. Different areas of the transmission network have varying levels of headroom and different amounts of generation could be accepted before voltage and fault levels are triggered.

The nature of transmission network impacts and the intervention design works needed to accommodate future connections (including solar PV and other generation technologies) are determined from the Security and Quality of Supply Standard (SQSS) [19]. This sets the criteria for electricity transmission network planning.

  • Network Assessment Approach: The TOs take a deterministic snapshot methodology approach to reduce the risk of transmission assets being overloaded and generators being constrained on their respective networks. In this deterministic methodology, the TOs study the summer minimum demand against the maximum generation output on a given local area network for the assessment of any new generation connecting.
  • The results of network impact assessments: The TOs assess thermal, voltage and fault level constraints on the network and conclude if greater solar PV embedded in the distribution network could trigger non-compliance with grid code procedures if reverse power was realised.

The timelines to resolve transmission constraint issues can be significant and are longer than the timescales needed for distribution upgrades.

A high-level analysis was carried out to estimate the transmission network costs incurred by the TOs to upgrade the network. Figure 4 shows the estimated cost on the transmission network in Scotland is over £150 million with £122 million (81%) of this in the SPEN transmission network and £30 million (19%) in the SSEN transmission network.

Section 7.3 explains the methodology used to estimate these costs in more detail. In brief, the estimated cost of reinforcement provided by TOs for our selected study areas was scaled up to estimate the reinforcement cost for the entire network. SPEN transmission reinforcement costs were estimated using cost of reinforcement shared by SSEN transmission for the study area.

There will also be an incremental impact on the transmission network in England which will trigger additional transmission costs due to greater transmission capacity required to accommodate greater solar exports. These have not been considered in this study and the numbers provided below are for transmission assets that are located only in Scotland.

Figure 4: Estimated cost of interventions in 2030 in both SP and SSENs transmission boundaries (£ millions)

The investments made by the TO will be recovered through the price control mechanism with the cost being socialised across all GB energy consumers. Our estimated costs are provided to give insight into the scale of the challenge to reinforce the transmission network but are not definitive. Further, more detailed analysis would be required to reliably quantify the estimated costs associated with interventions in the transmission network.

Conclusions

We assessed the likely benefits and impacts of a proposed ambition for an additional 2.5 GW solar PV at distribution level in Scotland by 2030. In conclusion:

  • An additional 2.5 GW solar ambition would enable progress towards net zero targets. The Scottish Government has set a target to reach net zero carbon emission by 2045 and increased rooftop solar could contribute to the ambition to deliver at least 20 GW of additional low-cost renewable capacity by 2030.
  • Individual financial benefits are based on the reduction in electricity bills for consumers adopting solar PV. Benefits could be increased if demand could be shifted to times of excess generation.
  • Network benefits could be realised by pairing solar PV with battery storage as this will improve flexibility. Solar PV is an intermittent energy source and unlikely to reduce peak demand significantly.
  • DNOs would be obliged to make a firm or flexible connection offer to facilitate the extra solar PV in a cost-effective manner. Advance visibility of where large quantities or clusters of rooftop solar PV connections would be located would help DNOs understand the scale of intervention needed and in what timescale it can be delivered.
  • We estimate that 30% of primary transformers will require intervention to accommodate a 2.5 GW solar ambition. Most of these will be lightly constrained sites that are less than 10% overloaded. The impact is highly uncertain and depends on specific location of large quantities of solar PV and the status of the local electricity network.
  • The cost of this impact is uncertain; we estimate £150m in the distribution networks, and over £150m in transmission networks. These are based on highest-cost assumptions that traditional methods are used for capacity release eg that overloaded equipment is replaced with higher rated equipment.
  • The required intervention will be largely paid for by consumers. The network intervention costs associated with implementing the additional rooftop PV will be socialised to all consumers through electricity bills. A proportion of larger installations may be payable through connection charges by the connecting consumer.
  • The estimated average annual increase in energy bills for domestic consumers is £0.53 and £1.81 in SSEN and SPEN areas respectively. The average annual increase in non-domestic consumers energy bills is estimated at £7.17 in SSENs area and £24.46 in SPENs area. These are indicators based on assumptions but are not definitive, and the approach has not been validated or confirmed by the DNOs.
  • Adopting flexibility measures such as domestic and commercial scale battery storage will reduce the excess solar generation exporting onto the grid. This will reduce network interventions and thus reduce consumer costs. This should be encouraged alongside the installation of solar PV to maximise the potential of the technology and extend the duration at which demand can be met by on-site generation.
  • Network interventions are triggered in part because DNOs are required to use the conservative assumption that less generation will be consumed onsite with more exported onto the network.
  • Incentivising the requirement to have domestic and non-domestic battery storage in conjunction with solar PV to absorb any excess solar, thus preventing exports, may reduce the scale of network interventions needed. Battery storage can provide greater network flexibility by charging and discharging as required.
  • Network operators are developing innovative ways of managing networks which could reduce the costs. Solutions including flexibility, reconfiguring the network, improved network visibility and active network approaches are increasingly being used. These approaches could also speed up the time taken to offer new connections. While these approaches could decrease the need for reinforcement, they are unlikely to entirely mitigate the need to be consistent with relevant technical requirements.
  • A co-ordinated approach is needed between key stakeholders including the DNOs, TOs, LAs and the solar industry to ensure that a significant increase in solar PV can be accommodated. Improved evidence of large quantities of solar being proposed is needed to allow the DNOs to plan accordingly and justify their decisions to Ofgem.
  • Overall, it is difficult to quantity whether the benefits outweigh the impacts on the grid and on consumer bills, but steps can be taken to reduce the impact and enable greater benefits to be realised. Examples include investing in on-site battery storage and continued deployment of network flexibility and innovation solutions.

 

 

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Appendices

Network challenges

Demand Reduction through the use of onsite generation will change the daily domestic and commercial load profiles and make them more unpredictable and more difficult to plan the network. Network operators strive to balance demand and generation in order to maintain grid stability and reliability. An increase in solar PV connections will lead to greater network challenges around grid stability. As distributed generation grows it will remove a significant portion of demand from the network during certain time periods, while higher up in the grid, greater numbers of renewable energy plants (offshore and onshore wind) will be connected leading to greater network imbalance. This will exacerbate the situation and pose additional challenges to grid operation. The National Grid may seek to reduce the imbalance by asking large-scale wind operators to reduce energy output or switch off which leads to constraint payments being made. The deployment of greater network demand through large-scale battery storage and hydrogen production is being actively encouraged to reduce the network imbalances.

Examples of network challenges are as follows:

Increased thermal constraints, where significant generated power is fed into the network, for example if there are clusters of PV generation in one area, and there is a mismatch between onsite solar generation and demand on a sunny day. This can overload equipment causing them to heat up beyond their rated temperatures, causing damage or aging. This will be common in summer where there is mismatch between solar generation and onsite demand.

Reverse power flows, where power is fed into the network from generation resulting in power flowing in the opposite direction than designed. Some substations with new equipment will be able to handle greater reverse power flows, however, older equipment or that with a particular design may have less or no reverse power capability and may require maintenance or replacement.

Greater voltage constraints, where voltage rises due to the reduction in load or the increase in generation across an area of network. All networks are designed to operate at voltages within acceptable tolerances and DNOs have a frequent task to maintain voltages within the correct limits. If voltages go outside their limits, this poses risk to asset health which could be damaged as a result. Greater solar connections runs the risk of exceeding voltage limits as laid out in the DNO licences. Voltage constraints are the biggest concern to the DNOs as they have the biggest impact.

Greater fault level contributions, where the solar PV installations contribute towards greater network fault currents, which are triggered due to disturbances on the network. Faults on the network can cause inrushes of current which can damage critical infrastructure. The network and its protection equipment must be designed to accommodate the fault level for a short time in order to keep equipment and people safe. PV generation contributes to fault level (large inrush of current when there is a fault on the network), and so connection designs must accommodate it. If the fault level rating of equipment is exceeded the DNO will replace the assets. As a result, a significant cluster of generation will increase fault level contributions right up to transmission level.

Harmonic contribution, where PV generation creates distortions in the Alternating Current (AC) signal resulting in a reduction in power quality being delivered to consumers and some consumer equipment might flicker or not operate properly. PV generation contributes to harmonic issues as a result of the inverter equipment, but this contribution is limited by regulation.

Methodology for estimating proportion of interventions needed

The DNOs forecast and understand consumers changing electricity needs under varying levels of consumer ambition, government policy support, economic growth, and technological development. The DNOs create forecasts for multiple scenarios through their DFES data (Leading the Way, Consumer Transformation, System Transformation, Steady Progression) [11] [20]. DFES data from both SPEN and SSEN using the Consumer Transformation Scenario was used in our analysis. This scenario assumes greater consumer engagement, which leads to greater deployment of low-carbon technologies, such as solar PV, to offset network demand. We consider that this assumption would be consistent with increased solar deployment.

Primary substations which are likely to require intervention in 2030 were determined by spreading the 2.5 GW of solar PV across all primary substation assets in Scotland. We used the DNOs modelling assumptions to determine where they believe the high clusters of future solar installations will be located and spread the extra the 2.5 GW using the same pattern of distribution. The detailed approach is described below:

  1. We used DNOs DFES modelling tools to determine how much rooftop solar PV is estimated between now and 2030 across all primary substation assets. This was clear from SPEN modelling, but SSEN did not provide a degree of granularity and we estimated as the solar PV numbers.
  2. The DNOs own estimates of rooftop solar PV were removed from the analysis to leave an indication into forecast individual large-scale solar PV (ground-mounted). This was to avoid including the 2.5 GW over and above the DNOs rooftop solar PV forecast as this would duplicate the number of households that has solar PV.
    • We calculated the proportion of rooftop solar to total solar using DFES data. The DFES data only provided total rooftop solar numbers across each year rather than across each individual substation per year which reduces the level of granularity. However, the combined solar PV numbers (rooftop + ground mounted) was provided for each substation across every year. We expressed the total rooftop solar PV numbers to the combined solar PV numbers in 2030 as a percentage. This allowed us to estimate the proportion ratio of rooftop solar in 2030, which was then used to separate the rooftop component from the overall total solar PV numbers across all primary substation data. This provided an estimate of rooftop solar PV across each primary substation.
  3. 2.5 GW of solar capacity was then spread in a similar proportion to the original DNO forecast of rooftop solar across all primary substations to provide an uplifted forecast. For example, if the DNO was estimating that 2 MW of rooftop solar PV would be located in an area in Glasgow, we estimated that 15 MW would be realised in that area in 2030 using the following calculation:
    • Uplifted forecast = (2MW / total forecasted rooftop solar PV in 2030 from DNOs modelling tools) * 2.5GW
  4. The proportion of primary substations that will require interventions was estimated by subtracting the uplifted forecast from the DNOs published headroom report figures.

Methodology for estimating cost of intervention

We used four study areas in order to assess the cost of interventions needed. The study areas covered four categories:

  • Rural
  • Domestic properties in urban areas
  • Mixed domestic & commercial in urban areas
  • Commercial properties in urban areas

A primary substation was selected for each study area that was close to being overloaded by using the DNOs published heat map data.

Table 5 Study areas used to assess cost of intervention

 

Rural

Domestic properties in urban areas

Mixed domestic & commercial in urban areas

Commercial properties in urban areas

DNO

SSEN Distribution

SP Distribution

SP Distribution

SP Distribution

Location

Aberdeenshire

Larbert, Falkirk

Livingston

Edinburgh

Primary Substation

FYVIE

LARBERT

DEANS

KINGS BUILDINGS

Primary S/S generation capacity

Red (heavily constrained)

Amber (approaching operational limits)

Amber (approaching operational limits)

Amber (approaching operational limits)

GSP

KINTORE

Bonnybridge

DRUMCROSS

KAIMES

GSP generation capacity

Red (heavily constrained)

Red (heavily constrained)

Red (heavily constrained)

Red (heavily constrained)

Headroom after adding in 2.5 GW target (MW)

-2.95

-4.74

-1.51

-3.50

Uplifted forecast (MW)

4.51

5.47

1.73

4.03

The study areas were submitted to both the DNOs and TOs to gain high level estimates of the type of interventions deployed and the cost of interventions.

Due to time constraints, the DNOs and TOs could not commit to undertaking a detailed analysis, which involves undertaking detailed power flow analysis. The results provided are estimates of interventions from previous assessments carried out by the DNOs. The results of the DNOs and TOs analysis are detailed below.

Table 6 Cost of interventions and assumptions provided by the DNOs for each study area

Study area type

DNO

Cost of interventions

Assumptions

Rural

SSEN Distribution

£844k for replacing primary substation

Replacing a 33/11 kV primary substation.

The rules used to estimate costs in other parts of the network are for every £1 spent reinforcing the primary network, SSEN will spend:

  • £0.04 to upgrade 11 kV network
  • £0.11 to upgrade secondary substations
  • £0.11 to upgrade LV network

Domestic Properties in Urban areas

SP Distribution

£0.5m – £1.25m

This takes into account all reinforcement work from primary down to LV level.

Mixed domestic & commercial properties in urban areas

SP Distribution

£0.1m – £0.25m

This takes into account all reinforcement work from primary down to LV level.

Commercial properties in urban areas

SP Distribution

£0.5m – £1.0m

This takes into account all reinforcement work from primary down to LV level.

The estimated cost of reinforcement provided by DNOs for the selected study areas was scaled up to estimate the reinforcement cost for the entire network. The headroom capacity numbers across all primary substations that may require intervention was used to scale up the costs.

The results of the investigation with the TOs are provided in Table 7.

Table 7 Cost of interventions and assumptions provided by TO for study area

Study area type

TO

Cost of interventions

Assumptions

Rural

SSEN Transmission

£5 to £6 million

  • Connection Date: 2030+
  • Transmission Reinforcement Works: New Kintore 2 GSP required
  • Network Limitation: Thermal rating of grid transformers

SPEN transmission reinforcement costs were estimated using the cost of reinforcement shared by SSEN transmission for the study area.

Methodology for estimating the impact on consumer bills

The steps below explain the methodology to estimate the impact of socialised costs on consumer bills split between domestic and non-domestic.

  1. Allocated 60% of the estimated interventions costs directly to non-domestic consumers with the remaining 40% going to domestic through the DUoS mechanism, which allocates socialised costs to the higher energy consumer. 60% of Scotland’s total electricity consumptions comes from non-domestic.
  2. Socialised costs were treated as standard network capex and so were added to the DNOs Regulatory Asset Base (RAB).
  3. The total socialised cost to be recovered through deprecation over a period of 45 years (assumption shared by SSEN DNO).
  4. The DNOs regulated rate of return was applied to the investment.
  5. SSENs split of non-domestic and domestic consumers in their licences area (90:10) was provided for the investigation. SPEN did not provide a similar split; however, it is assumed that the same ratio split applies.
  6. Using the total costs allocated to non-domestic and domestic based on their energy consumptions, and using the quantity of customers split between domestic and non-domestic, an annual impact per customer split between domestic and non-domestic could be obtained.

The numbers are reflective of 2030 prices as this is when 2.5 GW could be realised. The year 2030 was used in isolation throughout this analysis rather than assessing the impact each year up to 2030 as we could not be sure how much solar would be added each year. It was therefore assumed that the grid would see 2.5GW in 2030.

Stakeholder engagement findings

This section presents areas of discussion in a series of stakeholder engagement meetings with DNOs and TOs. The meetings aimed to understand the following:

  • The potential for greater solar PV deployment in Scotland and how existing distribution and transmission networks will accommodate them in additional to other generation technologies
  • The impacts on the networks as a result of greater solar PV connections and the resulting interventions deployed by the network operators to manage the increase in connection requests
  • Establish the intervention assumptions and resulting cost to deploy these interventions when solar PV connections trigger the need when capacity headroom is no longer available
  • Explore the opportunities that solar PV can bring to future distribution network
  • Explore gathering data on the cost of interventions to support with the analysis

SSEN Transmission

A meeting was held between Ricardo and SSEN Transmission on 20 February 2023 to establish the implications on the North of Scotland transmission network because of greater solar PV connections and how this would be accommodated. A summary of the meeting with the questions relevant for the discussion are summarised below.

Area of discussion: The process that transmission networks use to accommodate a significant increase in PV connections across Scotland’s energy network

The meeting focused on the following topics:

  • SSEN TOs view of the 2.5 GW solar PV target by 2030.
  • How transmission network impacts are assessed, and the rules adopted for network reinforcement designs.
  • The ability of the transmission network to accommodate 100% reverse power flow and identify what needs to happen to accommodate this in the future.
  • Establish the impacts on the network from greater generation connections that are off most concern to the transmission network.
  • What type of interventions are being deployed to mitigate the impact on consumers.

 

SSEN DNO

Two meetings were held between Ricardo and SSEN Distribution on 24 January and 10 February 2023 to establish the implications on the North of Scotland distribution network because of greater solar PV connections and how this would be accommodated. A summary of the meeting with the questions relevant for the discussion are summarised below.

Area of discussion: How will existing networks will accommodate a significant increase in solar PV connections across Scotland’s energy network?

Areas explored:

  • How are G98 (‘fit and inform’) connections accommodated? How can this be done at a large-scale?
  • How are G99 (large-scale) connections accommodated, and how can they be accommodated at large-scale?
  • What is the timeframe for a G99 application to be granted approval by SSEN? How is this impacted by a large proportion of consumers requesting connections to the same part of the network?
  • What type of interventions are being considered? Any smart grid solutions?
  • Do you think it will be technically feasible to accommodate 2.5GW of additional small-scale rooftop solar across Scotland’s energy network by 2030?

SPEN DNO

A meeting was held between Ricardo and SPEN Distribution on 15 February 2023 to establish the implications on the Central and Southern distribution network in Scotland because of greater solar PV connections and how this would be accommodated.

Area of discussion: How will existing networks accommodate a significant increase in solar PV installations between now and 2030?

Areas explored:

  • How are G98 (‘fit and inform’) connections accommodated? How can this be done at a large-scale?
  • How are G99 (large-scale) connections accommodated, and how can they be accommodated at large-scale?
  • What is the timeframe for a G99 application to be granted approval by SPEN? How is this impacted by a large proportion of consumers requesting connections to the same part of the network?
  • What type of interventions are being considered? Any smart grid solutions?
  • Do you think it will be technically feasible to accommodate 2.5GW of additional small-scale rooftop solar across Scotland’s energy network by 2030?

Solar Energy Scotland

A meeting was held between Ricardo and Solar Energy Scotland (SES) on 28 July 2023 to discuss the solar industry view on the solar ambition, benefits of solar and areas of concern for how new connections are currently assessed by DNOs.

© The University of Edinburgh, 2024
Prepared by Ricardo Energy & Environment on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

This study reviews the use of fiscal levers to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions across the world. These levers include taxes, levies, duties or charges applied by governments on major sources of emissions.

The study focuses mainly on direct carbon taxes which are applied to specific goods – typically fuels – based on the amount or intensity of greenhouse gases they produce. We also consider indirect taxes, which place a price on other forms of pollution, such as air or water, but often target GHGs as well. Grants and subsidies are not in scope.

The study examines whether these levers have been effective in decreasing GHG emissions, the revenue that has been raised and how governments have used that revenue. It looks at six international case studies in more detail. It also examines relevant fiscal levers currently applied in the UK and Scotland, and the possible implications for Scotland of adopting any new lever, based on the case studies. This study does not make policy recommendations, nor does it consider the costs and benefits if they were adopted.

Summary findings

The study focused mainly on the use of direct carbon taxes both nationally and sub-nationally (in specific regions or provinces within a country) around the world. Key findings are:

  • The use of carbon taxes is increasingly common. Sub-national carbon taxes have also been applied by Canada and Mexico.
  • The balance of evidence suggests carbon taxes have reduced GHG emissions.
  • Carbon taxes have generated government revenue.
  • Implementation has been politically challenging.

For further details on the findings and case studies, please download the report.

If you require the report in an alternative format, such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

Research completed: January 2024

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/4033

Executive summary

This study reviewed the use of fiscal levers to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions across the world. These levers include taxes, levies, duties or charges applied by governments on major sources of emissions.

It focused mainly on direct carbon taxes which are applied to specific goods – typically fuels – based on the amount or intensity of greenhouse gases they produce. It also considered indirect taxes, which place a price on other forms of pollution, such as air or water, but often target GHGs as well. Grants and subsidies are not in scope.

The study examined whether these levers have been effective in decreasing GHG emissions, the revenue that has been raised, and how governments have used that revenue. It looked at six international case studies in more detail. It also examined relevant fiscal levers currently applied in the UK and Scotland, and the possible implications for Scotland of adopting any new lever, based on the case studies. This study does not make policy recommendations, nor does it consider the costs and benefits if they were adopted.

Findings

The study focused mainly on the use of direct carbon taxes both nationally and sub-nationally (in specific regions or provinces within a country) around the world. Key findings are:

  • The use of carbon taxes is increasingly common. There are 37 direct carbon taxes in 27 jurisdictions globally, most of them in Europe. Several jurisdictions outside Europe have adopted taxes and more are considering them. About 6% of global GHG emissions are taxed by carbon taxes and this share has increased over the past 15 years. Sub-national carbon taxes have also been applied by Canada and Mexico.
  • Taxes differ in terms of GHG coverage and carbon price: We identified three broad categories:
  • ‘High ambition’ instruments with both a relatively high price and coverage of GHGs;
  • A mixed level of ambition, with either high prices and low coverage; or a high share but low prices;
  • Relatively low prices and coverage.
  • The balance of evidence suggests carbon taxes have reduced GHG emissions where adopted, but the data is limited, uncertain and rarely quantifies carbon leakage – when businesses transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints. Other regulatory measures are likely to be required alongside them to meet wider climate policy goals. There is limited detailed evidence on how affected businesses and households adjust behaviour in response to taxes.
  • Carbon taxes have generated government revenue; between several billion dollars in Sweden to tens of million in Iceland. The potential for revenue generation depends on the prevailing carbon price and coverage of the tax, as well as the size of the economy, its carbon intensity and energy mix. They have been relatively straightforward and inexpensive to administer for governments. Some direct carbon taxes have been used to raise revenues for specific purposes. These have typically been channelled towards green technology and specific rebates or tax cuts for affected groups, including low-income households.
  • Implementation has been politically challenging. Carbon taxes have been repealed in Australia, delayed in New Zealand and a planned acceleration of the carbon price was suspended in France. A legal challenge was brought in Mexico over whether the regional government had legal authority to implement a proposed tax.

Current fiscal levers in the UK and Scotland

Fiscal levers that target or address GHG emissions focus on energy and energy intensive industries, transportation and resource use. Examples include Fuel Duty, the Climate Change Levy, the Renewable Energy Obligation and the UK Emission Trading System, as well as Air Passenger Duty and vehicle excise duty. A devolved tax, the Air Departure Tax (Scotland) Act 2017, is being progressed, but needs to address the Highland and Islands exemption and safeguard connectivity. The Scottish Landfill Tax applies to waste disposed to landfill.

The introduction of new national devolved taxes can only be delivered by agreement of the Scottish and UK Parliaments or through a change to the devolution settlement. Four of the six case studies have similarities to UK levies, which would need amending, but two would be entirely new. We consider how elements of the case studies could be applied in Scotland but make no recommendations on whether this would be advisable.

Principles for implementation

Any financial lever would be designed based on the six principles in Scotland’s Framework for Tax: proportionality, efficiency, certainty, convenience, engagement and effectiveness. As such, the precise design of any lever would need to be subject to careful consideration and clear communication in terms of its scope, phase-in, price (including future price escalation), sectors and activities on which it is levied and any relevant exemptions. Distributional effects would have to be carefully considered, including if and how revenue should be reallocated, to whom and under what conditions.

Successful fiscal levers have been based on transparent design, regular monitoring and communication of revenues, costs and benefits, with rapid adjustments if unexpected adverse effects occur. They have formed part of wider fiscal reforms, with a clear strategic objective. Any potential options would be required to undergo extensive further consultation and robust impact assessment to fully understand the costs and benefits.

 

Glossary

1tCO2e

One tonne CO2 equivalent. A metric that allows like for like comparison of carbon intensity

Abatement technologies

A technological mechanism or process that has the potential to reduce emissions or pollution

Bonus Malus

Latin for “good-bad”, used to describe an arrangement – or fiscal lever in this case – which alternatively rewards (bonus) and penalises (malus) specific purchasing behaviour.

Carbon leakage

A potential situation whereby carbon emissions were displaced, in whole or in part, from one jurisdiction to another, as a result of business production relocation in response to specific policies, for example.

CBAM

Carbon border adjustment mechanism. A fiscal lever which applies a carbo price to certain products imported into a jurisdiction

CCC

The Climate Change Committee. A statutory body established to advise the UK government and devolved administrations on emission targets, progress made in reducing GHG emissions and preparing for and adapting to the impacts of climate change.

Counterfactual scenario

Estimates or analysis of what would have occurred without the policy being adopted. It is used widely used in public policy analysis.

Earmarking or hypothecation (of revenues)

Commitments – whether set out in legislation, policy documents or via political statements – on specific uses of revenue from taxation (for example on tax rebates for low-income groups, of investment in green technologies)

Ex-ante

Translates from Latin as “before the event”. It refers to evidence based on prediction or forecast.

Ex-post

Translates from Latin as “after the fact”. It refers to evidence based on what actually occurred.

ETS

Emission trading scheme or emission trading system

Fiscal levers

An intervention or policy used by governments to affect financial revenue generated via taxes, duties, levies, charges (or fees). In this study the scope of the term excludes grants and subsidies.

GHG

Greenhouse gases, i.e., gases present in the earth’s atmosphere that trap heat. Examples include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane and industrial fluorinated gases hydro fluorocarbons (HFC, perfluorocarbons (PFC).

IPCC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The United Nations expert body for assessing the science related to climate change.

Negative externalities

Where the social costs of a market transaction are greater than the private costs (for example air passengers may not pay the full costs of the damage from the carbon emission associated with their flight).

Price elasticity of demand and supply

An economic concept concerned with if, and to what extent, demand or supply of a good or service changes when its price does. It is calculated by observing changes in quantity of a good or service demanded (supplied), divided by the change in its price. Inelastic in this context means that demand (supply) does not change when prices do.

Progressive and regressive taxation

Terms which refer to the effects of specific taxes based on a person’s or a household’s income. Progressive refers to taxes which increase as a person’s income increases, for example income tax. Regressive taxes are applied uniformly, irrespective of income. The tax would then take a larger share of income from lower earners than from higher. For example, VAT is applied uniformly.

Introduction

Scotland has a legally binding target to reach “net zero” by 2045, as well as annual climate targets. “Net zero” means reducing carbon emissions to almost zero, with any remaining emissions absorbed by nature (such as via forests) or by technologies (such as carbon capture and storage). Rapid transformation across Scotland’s economy and society is required to meet this goal and the Climate Change Plan sets out a pathway and policies to deliver the targets. The Scottish Government has also committed to a just transition, which endeavours to make rapid decarbonisation beneficial and positive for society. There is currently a gap in our evidence base on the potential role for fiscal levers to deliver reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. For the purposes of this study, we define fiscal levers as taxes, levies, duties, or charges. The use of subsidies, grants and loans are not in scope of this work.

We summarise the results of a targeted evidence review on the international use of fiscal levers seeking to reduce GHG emissions, which have either been considered or adopted by national or sub-national governments. We examine the evidence for how well certain fiscal levers have worked internationally, both in terms of reducing emissions of GHGs and in raising government revenue. We analyse six case studies in detail. After reviewing existing fiscal levers in Scotland, we also assess the potential implications for Scotland.

This report should not be interpreted to mean the Scottish Government intends to adopt the examples analysed in this report, nor any fiscal lever. The purpose is to provide an evidence base for the Scottish Government in their consideration of policy action as part of a strategic approach to climate change mitigation.

Overview of methodology

We conducted a targeted literature review of the global use of fiscal levers currently in place – or being considered – that seek to reduce GHG emissions, either directly or indirectly. We then selected six case study examples that were judged to be relevant to Scotland for further exploration. We conducted semi-structured interviews with academics and technical specialists and with experts in the case study jurisdictions to obtain greater insights. We also conducted a high-level review of existing environmental fiscal levers in the UK (including energy, transport and pollution or resources taxes), focusing the analysis on those that deliver reductions in GHG emissions. This was to help understand whether the six case study examples could be implemented by the Scottish Government under current devolved competencies, or whether their adoption would require joint action with the UK Government. More detail on the methodology we used is in Appendix A.

This approach has limitations. The project was undertaken over a short period, between July and October 2023. As such, the report presents selected results of a targeted search of a large secondary literature supplemented by the interviews referred to above, and it has not been possible to examine all issues in detail. No economic modelling has been undertaken on the potential scope or effects of the levers identified.

The use of fiscal levers for GHG emission reductions

Given the size of the literature and the complexity of the issues involved, we have simplified the review into a smaller number of lever typologies and identified lessons learned via successes and challenges encountered. The information in this chapter is drawn from secondary literature and a small number of targeted interviews with subject matter experts.

We have defined fiscal levers as a tax, duty, levy or charge. Typically enacted by a national or sub-national government, they seek to induce changes in behaviour of companies and consumers via changes in the prices of goods and services. This is sometimes referred to as ‘carbon pricing’, which means levers which apply a price to GHG emissions with the intention of reducing them. Carbon pricing can provide an effective and cost-efficient approach to reducing GHG emissions in multiple economic sectors. They do so by incentivising changes in behaviour, via changes in prices, on both the supply side (i.e., amongst the suppliers of goods and services to invest in new abatement technologies or more efficient processes or products) as well as the demand side (i.e., among consumers in their purchasing choices). They also have the potential to raise government revenue.

Economists often refer to GHGs (and other forms of pollution) as negative externalities. This is a type of market failure where the social costs (in this case the damages caused by climate change to current and future generations) are greater than the private costs from specific transactions (i.e., one only pays for the fuel, not the harm from emissions when filling a tank of petrol). A carbon price is a way of correcting the market failure by ensuring those wider costs are captured or ‘internalised’ in transactions (Coyle, 2020).

The scope of this study does not extend to any assessment of the use of grants and subsidies, including so called “environmentally harmful subsidies” (World Bank, 2023a). These have been considered in Scotland in separate work (Blackburn, 2022).

Typologies of fiscal levers

We developed a list of typologies of fiscal levers to enable their effectiveness to be assessed. We have taken a simple approach to aid clarity, and therefore define five broad types of fiscal lever for this study. These are broadly in line with the categories used by the World Bank (2023b). The types of lever are:

Direct taxation schemes

These are taxes which provide a direct price signal and have the explicit aim to reduce GHG emissions, often referred to in the literature as ‘carbon taxes’. They are levied on emissions, for example £ per tonne of CO2 equivalent (tCO₂e), or on £ on emissions per litre of fuel. Costs incurred increase in direct proportion to emissions, but costs may be reduced or avoided by changes to production processes or purchasing decisions, where feasible. In practice all such direct taxes are applied only to certain sectors or economic activities, with various exemptions. Given that the focus of the work are levers to reduce GHG emissions, we have focused our research on direct taxes, where the link to GHG reduction is clearest.

Indirect taxation schemes

These are taxes which provide an indirect price signal and may have multiple aims, which include addressing GHGs as well as other forms of pollution, such as air or water pollution. The tax may be applied on a range of activities but are not directly proportionate to embodied GHGs.As such there is a much wider range of such taxes in operation.We summarise such schemes at a high-level.

Carbon credit schemes

These are systems where tradable carbon credits (again typically representing 1tCO2e) can be generated via voluntary emission reduction activities. Such activities are varied and can include emission avoidance as well as removal, for example tree planting, or carbon capture and storage activities. These credits can be sold (either by businesses achieving the credits or the organisation that administers the scheme). Demand for such credits (and hence value) are generated via the requirements of other carbon pricing or climate change mitigation policies. These are discussed further below, but our research indicates they offer limited potential for revenue raising by a host government, so are not prioritised in this study.

Emission Trading Scheme (ETS)

A Government places a limit on the mass of GHG emissions from the affected entity (usually businesses within a defined economic sector, or undertaking specific economic activities, e.g. agriculture, or aviation) defined in the legislation. Emissions units or allowances, typically representing one tonne of CO2 equivalent (1tCO2e), are typically auctioned to businesses. These can be traded to enable them to emit GHGs, within a given period. The price from the auction and/or a traded second market represents the price of carbon. There are two main types of ETS:

  • Cap and trade ETS: Governments set a cap on total GHG emissions from one or more economic sectors (or specific entities). They then sell allowances, typically in auctions, or distribute them for free (or a combination of both) up to the level of the cap. The cap (or the number of free allowances) may be progressively reduced. The European Union (EU) and UK ETSs are examples.
  • Rate based ETS: Here the total emissions are not fixed, but entities are allocated a performance benchmark (typically based on the emission intensity of their output). This then serves as a limit on net emissions. Emission allowances can be earned where entities’ emissions are lower than the benchmark and these can then be traded with those who exceed it. The China national ETS system is an example.

The UK ETS replaced the UK’s participation in the EU ETS on 1 January 2021. The UK ETS applies in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, whose governments comprise the UK ETS Authority. In Scotland, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) administer the scheme (UK Gov, 2023a). The UK ETS was originally based on the EU ETS but has since diverged in structure and operation. Given that Scotland currently has an ETS system, further research on such schemes have not been prioritised in the current research. However, in some jurisdictions, national governments have applied domestic ETS to additional sectors not covered by, for the example, the EU scheme. We refer to these as ‘national ETS’. These are included in the research as they could potentially be applied in Scotland.

Carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)

These are policy mechanisms which impose a carbon price at the border on embodied emissions in specific goods imported from elsewhere. These seek to ensure a level playing field between the carbon price imposed via domestic legislation (such as via an ETS) and goods produced outside that jurisdiction as well as mitigate the risk of carbon leakage (i.e., displacement of carbon intensive activities outside of regulated jurisdiction) which may lead to a lower level of emission reduction overall.

The EU CBAM entered a transitional phase in October 2023. This is aligned with the phase-out of the allocation of free allowances under the EU ETS. The first reporting period ends on the 31st January 2024 (European Commission, 2023).

The UK Government is considering a range of further potential policy measures to mitigate the risk of carbon leakage in future. One such policy being considered is a UK CBAM. A consultation on these options was conducted jointly by HM Treasury and the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero between the 30th March and 22nd June 2023. The UK Government is currently considering these responses (UK Gov, 2023b). As such, this review does not focus on CBAM measures in other jurisdictions.

Direct taxation schemes

We used data from the World Bank carbon pricing dashboard (World Bank 2023c) to provide an overview of the characteristics of direct carbon pricing instruments as of March 2023. This dashboard identifies a total of 73 such instruments implemented in 39 national jurisdictions across the world. Together, these cover 11.6 gigatonnes CO2e (GtCO2e) of emissions (23% of global GHG emissions). Of these, 37 instruments are direct carbon tax instruments, the remainder are ETS instruments. These carbon taxes have been implemented in 27 national jurisdictions and they cover 2.7 GtCO2e about 5.6% of global GHG emissions. Several trends are evident from these data.

The vast majority of direct carbon tax instruments in operation are in high-income countries, particularly Europe. In terms of timescales for adoption the earliest adopters of national carbon tax instruments in the 1990s are in Northern Europe (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark) but also Poland. The 2000s saw modest further adoption, with only Estonia, Latvia, Switzerland, Ireland and Iceland adopting national carbon tax instruments by 2010. Thereafter, several further European and Non-European countries adopted instruments (the UK Carbon Price Support and carbon taxes in France, Portugal, Spain, Ukraine, Japan and Mexico). These were followed relatively quickly by carbon taxes in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, then Canada, Singapore and South Africa.

In several jurisdictions, carbon taxes have been applied alongside national (or supranational) ETS instruments. These include several in EU Member States (including the UK at the time), as well as Mexico and Canada.

There are only two jurisdictions where sub-national carbon taxes are in operation. There are a total of five in Canada: British Columbia (BC) which was the first subnational carbon tax anywhere in the world; Northwest Territories; Newfoundland and Labrador; New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. Mexico has several such instruments, the Zacatecas carbon tax, and instruments in Queretaro and Yucatan, for example. In both cases, these are applied alongside a national carbon pricing mechanism; the Canadian federal fuel charge and the Mexican carbon tax, respectively. As would be the case in Scotland, they are also applied alongside an ETS instrument (the Canadian Federal Output based Pricing System (OBPS) and the Mexican pilot ETS, respectively.

Recently, several further jurisdictions are considering instruments. These include the New Zealand agricultural carbon tax, and taxes in Indonesia and three African states: Botswana, Senegal and Morocco. Manitoba in Canada, Mexico (Jalisco), Catalonia and Hawaii are considering new subnational instruments.

Figure 3.1 provides a visual overview of carbon taxes that are either implemented (in operation), scheduled for implementation (adopted in legislation with an official start date) or under consideration (the relevant government has announced its intention to work toward an initiative). Those that are implemented or scheduled are in blue; those under consideration – four subnational taxes and five national – are in yellow.

Figure 3.1: Carbon tax instruments as of March 2023 (World Bank 2023c)

Figure 8.1 (Appendix C) provides time series data on the share of global GHGs covered in the various carbon tax instruments between 1990 and 2023. This provides an indication of the overall significance of their use globally. Note, due to data limitations the share of emissions shown in the figure from 2015 onwards is based on 2015 global emissions data. Several trends are evident, based on these data:

  • As of March 2023, carbon tax instruments covered 5.4% of global GHG emissions. This was slightly down from a peak in 2019 of 5.7%. This is likely to reflect reductions in GHG emissions associated with mandatory lockdowns during the Covid-19 pandemic, alongside some emission reductions in at least some jurisdictions.
  • Increases in coverage are evident in the last 15 years, arising from the introduction of new instruments in 2011 (Ukraine), 2012 (Japan), 2014 (France and Mexico), and 2019 (South Africa).
  • Over the same period however, total global GHG emissions increased by around 50%, from about 31 million kilotonnes of CO₂e (ktCO₂e) in 1990 to over 46 million in 2020 (latest data). Whilst there are some uncertainties in the data, the overall rate of increase in global GHG does appear to have slowed after 2013 (World Bank 2023d).[1]

In terms of overall ambition for the carbon tax instrument, Figure 8.2 (Appendix C) presents data from March 2023 which compares the carbon price (in US Dollars per tCO₂e) with the share of GHG emissions that are covered by the relevant tax. The figure also shows ETSs for comparison. These data highlight that existing instruments vary in both price and coverage. Overall, we can identify three broad groupings based on the overall level of ambition of existing instruments:

  • High ambition: those with relatively high carbon prices and relatively broad coverage as a proportion of total GHG emissions in that jurisdiction. The carbon taxes in Liechtenstein, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway and Finland are such examples.
  • Mixed ambition: this is a larger group with some trade-offs apparent between share or price. For example, Uruguay’s carbon tax, levied on gasoline, provides the highest carbon price but only covers a small share (less than 20% of relevant GHGs). Conversely, Singapore and Japan have wider coverage but a lower price. Others have middling coverage and price, for example France, Canada’s federal fuel charge, Iceland, Denmark and Portugal.
  • Low ambition: a smaller group with relatively low prices and coverage. For example, Poland, Estonia, Argentina, Chile and Colombia.

Indirect taxation schemes

The World Bank (2023) defines indirect carbon pricing as other policies which might change the price of products associated with GHG emissions, but they do so in ways not directly proportional to the emissions associated with those products. So these levers do not tax carbon or tax at a rate proportionate to carbon content. Rather, they tax carbon intensive activities or services (or focus on other forms of pollution, such as air pollution, which also has the benefit of producing GHG reductions alongside), hence indirectly create a carbon price signal and encouraging the reduction of GHG emissions. Indirect taxation schemes are therefore very broad. As such, the World Bank (2023c) note that indirect carbon pricing policies are far more common and wide-ranging than direct pricing. This diversity and the weaker causal link with reductions in GHG emissions present a challenge for assessing their effectiveness in this study. As a result, we have given them a lower priority than direct taxation schemes for the purposes of the evidence review.

Examples of indirect taxes exist across many different sectors. They include landfill taxes, such as those in place in Bulgaria (EEA 2022a) and Austria (IEEP, 2016a) or ‘pay as you throw’, schemes for example in Lithuania (EEA 2022b). Pay as you throw schemes are designed to incentivise citizens to separate their waste at source and charge a fee for the collection of residual waste from households.

France has a ‘General Tax on polluting activities’ which applies to companies which are engaged in the storage, thermal treatment or transfer of non-hazardous and hazardous waste (French Ministry of Finance 2023). Latvia employs a National Resources Tax (Latvian Ministry of Finance, 2020), which applies to the extraction of natural resources, environmental pollution, disposal and use of hazardous goods as well as the packaging used in business activities.

In the field of air quality, levers include the Bonus Malus Scheme in France (see Section 8.9 for further detail), air pollution load charge in Hungary, which applies to emissions of nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxides and non-toxic dust (IEEP 2016b) and a tax on emissions of SO2 and NO2 in Galicia, Spain (Xunta de Galacia, nd). Other levers include an incentive fee on volatile organic compounds as is in place in Switzerland, and a Pesticide Tax (Sweden and Denmark).

Finland also employs a tax on peat use for energy. However, this represents a unique situation as peat is in fact subsidised in comparison to the tax rates of other fuels, and peat makes up a significant part of Finland’s energy mix.

Carbon credit schemes

We have used data from the World Bank carbon pricing dashboard (World Bank 2023c) to provide an overview of carbon credit schemes, their use, prominence in global trading, and role in international climate agreements.

Carbon credits are units that represent emission reduction activities that include either avoiding the carbon being produced (e.g., capturing methane from landfills), or removing carbon from atmosphere (e.g., sequestering carbon through planting trees or directly capturing carbon from the air and storing it). One credit is typically equivalent to one metric tonne of a carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO₂e) reduced or removed.

Carbon credit schemes create opportunities for investors and corporations to trade carbon credits. The carbon credit market has grown significantly since the concept was establish alongside the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. It experienced a further surge in interest following the Paris Agreement of 2015, more than doubling in size over five years (Dyck, 2022), though the sector grew less between 2021 and 2022, reflecting challenging economic conditions and criticism of the integrity of some schemes (World Bank 2023c). Carbon credits are supplied via regional, sub-national and national governments (such as the California Compliance Offset Program), at international scale through international treaties (such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement), and independently, via non-governmental entities (such as Gold Standard). The largest share of carbon credits is issued via independent non-governmental mechanisms, which had driven much of the overall growth seen between 2018 and 202.1 Figure 8.3 in Appendix C provides more detail.

The biggest driver for demand on carbon credits is companies purchasing credits, usually from independent suppliers, to compensate for emissions-heavy activities, either voluntarily or in response to regulation. However, carbon credits can be controversial because it is not always clear that carbon has in fact been saved or stored, and there are concerns with the ways in which schemes are set up, managed and promoted. The carbon credit market is currently evolving to respond to these concerns (Donaho, 2023).

Effectiveness of fiscal levers

We interpret effectiveness as the extent to which the policy has achieved its desired objectives and reached the affected group(s) (Scot Gov, 2018), compared to the starting (or baseline) position (i.e. has the instrument led to decreases in GHG emissions in the sector or activities targeted). We have also considered the extent to which impacts can be attributed to the policy in question, compared to other factors. We focus on the available secondary evidence and on direct tax examples. We have sought evidence on policy objectives of interest to the Scottish Government; namely the extent to which the instruments have resulted in GHG emission reductions, preferably where these have been quantified and attributed to the tax, and the extent to which they have generated revenues for the host government. Where possible, we consider whether the policy has brought about behaviour change in response to the tax. We have also considered data on the revenues that the tax has created, as well as how that revenue has been used by the host government. Other unintended impacts are noted, where evidence allows.

Before we consider data from specific instruments, a key broader conclusion is that several sources do not consider that existing carbon tax instruments are sufficient to address climate change goals. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated that to meet global GHG reduction requirements the average G20 economy needs to reduce its GHG emissions by over 10% every year (Green, 2021). The sources above suggests that the price and scope of existing instruments are not sufficient to deliver this kind of reduction.

Evidence on effectiveness – GHG emissions and behaviour change

In analysing the literature, we looked for secondary evidence on the overall effectiveness of different fiscal levers. Our assessment was limited by two key factors. First, it is not always possible to attribute GHG reductions to one policy instrument, compared to the various other factors influencing GHG emissions and all such estimates are subject to uncertainty. Possible other factors include rates of overall economic growth, growth within sectors, economic structure (i.e., size of emission intensive sectors and trends within these), imports and exports, as well as economic shocks such as recessions, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Similarly, there are several policies that may affect GHG emissions, so it can be difficult to ascribe GHG reduction to one climate-related policy over another. Second, there is a time lag between policy implementation and observed changes which, in this case, limits the available evidence.

Overall, the balance of evidence suggests that the fiscal levers reviewed have reduced GHG emissions in the relevant jurisdictions, but the precise reduction is unclear. A 2021 review (Green, 2021) collated available quantitative ex post evidence on GHG emissions reductions attributed to either ETSs or carbon taxes.[2] Key findings are below (note further detail is provided in Table 8.1 in Appendix C, which contains discussion on the findings of several specific studies, including quantitative GHG emission reduction estimates).

  • Although carbon pricing has dominated many political discussions of climate change, only 37 studies assess the actual effects of the policy on emission reductions. Of these, the vast majority are focused on European examples. In turn, most of these examples focus on ETSs, rather than carbon taxes, per se. Similarly, there are few studies which compare either carbon taxes or ETSs to other climate change mitigation policies to establish the relative effectiveness and efficiency of policy measure or packages.
  • Most studies suggest that the aggregate reductions from carbon pricing (note this refers to both ETSs and carbon taxes) on emissions are generally limited. The overall reductions observed were on average up to 2% per year (again this refers to both ETSs and carbon taxes). However, there is considerable variation in the GHG reductions seen between sectors.
  • In general, the review concluded that the existing evidence suggested carbon taxes may have performed better than ETSs in producing emission reductions. Note this conclusion should be interpreted with caution; it may reflect the prevailing carbon price, rather than the mechanism itself and much of the evidence on emission reductions from ETSs discussed in the review focussed on the EU ETS. Some of the studies on which this conclusion is drawn are based on the pilot phase of the EU ETS, which involved free allocations to several sectors, a higher emissions cap and a relatively low carbon price. Future evidence should be monitored to examine whether that conclusion remains valid.
  • However, there is more evidence that other regulatory instruments beyond either ETSs or carbon pricing probably have a greater effect than either measure acting alone. A 2020 study concluded that “the real work of emission control is done through regulatory instruments” (Cullenward and Victor, cited in Green 2021). A 2018 review provides some evidence that nations which are part of the EU ETS and are without a carbon tax experienced emission reduction in those sectors not covered by the ETS at a slightly faster rate than those that applied a domestic carbon tax, alongside the EU ETS (Haites, 2018, cited in Green 2021). There are clearly several factors at play.
  • Experience to date indicates that in comparison with ETSs, establishing and administering carbon taxes in the host government are comparatively straightforward and inexpensive.

We have identified limited evidence on the behavioural effects of the taxes. Two studies (Tvinnereim and Mehling 2018, Rosenbloom et al 2020, cited in Green, 2021) consider this. They conclude that there is little evidence that the taxes directly result in wider decarbonisation. The studies suggest a more common response is to mitigate the flow of emissions, via fuel switching or efficiency improvements, rather than more significant changes in manufacturing process or technologies. This may be a product of the nature of the instrument, the activities on which the taxes are targeted or current relatively low prices. It may also reflect a lack of coordination of wider climate mitigation policy, which as we have seen above, is likely to be necessary to sustain wider emission reductions.

Evidence on effectiveness – Revenue generation and ‘hypothecation or earmarking’

We reviewed evidence on both the revenue generated by carbon taxes as well as how these revenues have been used. The available data reflects different time periods and there are some methodological inconsistencies. Two overall conclusions are apparent. First, that carbon taxes have generated substantial income for the host government. Second, that a key characteristic of carbon taxes in operation to date is that a substantial proportion of that revenue is often allocated (or ‘earmarked’ or ‘hypothecated’) for specific purposes. Occasionally this hypothecation is explicit in the legislation, hence legally binding, while in other cases this allocation is via a political commitment, hence potentially subject to change with associated changes in Government.

A 2016 review (Carl and Fedor, 2016) of 56 national or subnational instruments found revenues from carbon pricing (i.e., taxes and ETSs) amounted to $28.3 billion in 2013. Of this, well over $20 billion was raised from carbon taxes.[3] Of this only a small proportion of this revenue overall (about 15% was allocated to ‘green spending’. The review concluded that it was much more common for carbon tax revenues to be reallocated in the form of tax cuts and rebates and this accounted for about 44% of revenues at the time. About 28% were not allocated for a specific purpose, referred to as ‘unconstrained’. The same review indicates indirect taxes are often not reallocated for specific purposes (Carl and Fedor, 2016). Analysis of specific carbon tax instruments were also included, with results shown in Table 8.2 in Appendix C. These data indicate that taxes accounted for revenues between $30 million per year (Iceland) to $1 billion or more (Denmark, British Columbia and Norway). Sweden’s is by far the largest at $3.5 billion and it also has the largest per capita cost and share of GDP. These data indicate – at the time – that the most ambitious schemes constitute well under 1% of GDP. Further quantitative data is set out in Table 8.2 in Appendix C.

More recent data show that by 2022 (World Bank 2023), revenues from carbon pricing had increased significantly to $95 billion, of which carbon taxes generated 31% (just under $30 billion).[4] Although revenues from carbon taxes had increased, this had been driven by rising revenues from ETSs. The overall tax revenue is not just a by-product of prices, but of the share of GHG emission covered, exemptions, the carbon intensity of sectors, and carbon leakage. For example, South Africa’s carbon tax covers nearly 10 times more emissions than Colombia’s and at a higher rate but was delivering a similar amount of revenues (World Bank 2023).

For comparison, a more recent study based on 40 countries also examined the level and use of revenue (OECD, 2019). This source examines whether the revenue reallocations were legally binding (i.e., set out in the relevant legislative act) or based on a political commitment (i.e., via ministerial or policy statement). The review also provides further detail on precisely how the revenues have been used. These full data are produced in Table 8.3 in Appendix C.

Again, the data show that a consistent feature of carbon taxes is the extent to which the revenues are used for specific purposes; around two thirds of total revenues have some form of hypothecation or constraint. They have been particularly directed toward reducing the taxation burden in other spheres, such as associated with employment or in provision of direct financial relief or subsidy to specific groups. Moreover, the review found that introduction of carbon taxes has frequently been part of broader tax reforms and that it has been more common for carbon tax revenue to be allocated based on political, rather than legal commitments. The authors indicate that the tax reform potential of carbon taxes (i.e., reducing the tax liabilities from labour and capital) may form part of the motivation for adoption, alongside the climate mitigation potential in at least some jurisdictions (OECD, (2019).

Lessons learned

We reviewed evidence on where carbon taxes have been effective, as well as where setbacks have occurred and why. We highlight data gaps and conclude with recommendations identified in the literature on how a hypothetical UK carbon tax might be applied.

Are carbon taxes regressive?

A small number of studies have explicitly reviewed the evidence on distributional effects from carbon taxes (i.e., to whom the costs are incurred, with a particular focus on different impacts based on income) and whether carbon pricing results in generally progressive or regressive effects. For example, Ohlendorf et al (2018) provide a meta-review, but the information identified has generally focussed on low and middle-income countries and shown different results. The review notes that literature reviews have shown mostly regressive impacts in developed countries, but that this is not necessarily the case in developing countries. More progressive outcomes were observed for reforms that remove fossil fuel subsidies as well as some transportation policy. Overall, the review is inconclusive and provides limited lessons for Scotland. The tax itself is likely to be regressive, where additional costs incurred via carbon taxes are passed through supply chains to end users or consumers. Without the revenue recycling/rebate measures described above this may disproportionately affect those on the lowest incomes (Ohlendorf et al 2018, LSE, 2019). The UK Government Net Zero Review examines household exposure to the costs associated with the net zero transition. The review concludes that forecasting household costs in detail is not possible, but costs may fall on households via a number of routes. These include via Government decisions on tax and expenditure, via businesses and reflected in prices, wages and consumer choices (HM Treasury, 2021).

What has worked in the application of carbon taxes?

Overall, we found several examples where carbon taxes have been applied, maintained, contributed to emission reduction and generated revenue for the host government, whilst maintaining popular support. However, in every case, the design of the tax has considered the unique context in each jurisdiction.

A significant element of revenue recycling is a characteristic of most instruments adopted to date. An OECD review notes it has been possible, “in most circumstances”, to strike a balance between using the revenue in ways that are socially useful and that contribute to public support for carbon pricing. Such revenue recycling should not be seen as a panacea for public support, however. Introducing carbon pricing instruments generally is seen as more challenging when general public confidence in government is low (note this is not defined and is clearly relative). Such lack of confidence further limits the options for revenue use, by reducing the space for more significant tax reforms and increasing the political appeal for lump sum transfers of revenue (OECD, 2019).

Others have seen the degree of hypothecation of revenues as a way of ensuring ‘lock in’ of the front-end prices and increasing the overall longevity and stability of the instrument. For instance, by ensuring the back-end uses of the proceeds are visible, it is harder to change prices or exempt certain sectors for reasons of political expediency (Carl and Fedor, 2016).

A further balance must be struck between rigid hypothecation of the revenues, which may constrain flexibility, and the benefits of clearly communicating what revenues are being generated and how they are to be used. This communication is considered to be key for creating public support and any policy should be developed in conjunction with stakeholders and be subject to a detailed cost-benefit analysis (OECD, 2019).

Sweden’s carbon tax, for example, may be seen as an exception to this. Some analysis suggests that it has been subject to so many changes that the ultimate effect of the carbon tax is not clearly distinct from effects of other measures e.g., value added tax, excise duties, etc. (Carl and Fedor, 2016). However, what is clear from the Swedish example is that the tax was part of a wider reform which itself had a clear objective (Section 8.6). This may explain at least some of the public support, even with a relatively high carbon price.

The justification made at the time for the introduction of carbon taxes vary and are not confined to emission reduction objectives. For example, reducing taxation in other areas, such as on labour (British Columbia, Sweden) as well as using them for wider fiscal recovery after financial crisis (Ireland, Iceland). Other rationale includes the relative simplicity and stability relative to ETS instruments (Carl and Fedor, 2016).

In the past, carbon taxes have provided a degree of price predictability and of revenue certainty for the host government. For instance, the British Columbia government has been able to predict revenues at least a year ahead within a 5% margin for error (Carl and Fedor, 2016). This would seem to be a feature of the design of the tax (i.e., the sectors at which it is targeted and the overall share of GHG affected).

Gradual introduction of the tax was seen as a positive feature (for example British Columbia), avoiding a sudden increase in the cost base for affected sectors and mitigating unintended consequences. However, they are also seen as visible, tangible and “politically immediate” ways of demonstrating progress toward climate mitigation (Carl and Fedor, 2016, LSE, 2019).

What lessons have been observed in the application of carbon taxes?

It is equally important to draw lessons on where they have not worked or have encountered problems. Reflecting on implementation, we find that existing carbon taxes are generally not sufficient, either in price or scope, to meet existing climate policy goals.

Carbon taxes have also been politically difficult to implement. They have proved controversial in many jurisdictions, including several with similarities to Scotland. Green (2021) suggests this opposition comes from two sources. The first source is the emitting industries themselves. Second, some evidence is presented by Green (2022) that the public tend to prefer other policies to carbon pricing. Use of dividends (i.e., rebates) may mitigate this risk, but only as part of a wider climate change mitigation package of policy.

The review has identified several jurisdictions where significant setbacks have been observed. The clearest case is in Australia where an existing carbon tax policy was cancelled. The tax generated what were at the time the largest overall revenues and per capita costs in the world. This was despite having a carbon price ($30 per tonne as of 2016) which was comparable with other jurisdictions. The revenues were a product of the relative carbon intensity of the country’s – largely coal fired – energy generation infrastructure. Repealing the tax became a key element of the opposition party’s ultimately successful political campaign (Carl and Fedor, 2016).

Mexico is the first Latin American country which has introduced sub-national carbon taxes. Durango is the most recent State to enact one, in January 2023 and others are considering implementing them. Baja California (a Mexican State) introduced a carbon tax as of 2022 as a part of broader fiscal reforms. The tax was levied on emissions from gasoline and diesels. A legal challenge was subsequently brought in Baja California, by the Mexican Federal Government and a group of regulated entities. This argued that under the Mexican Constitution, only the federal government could implement a tax on fuels. The Mexican Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Federal Government (World Bank 2023c).

In France a planned acceleration of the carbon price increase was suspended in 2018. At that point the price was around $50 per tonne. This was in response to a public backlash on the perceived unfairness of the tax, which was introduced at the same time as broader reforms which were perceived as benefiting the wealthy (IMF, 2019). The wider backlash was epitomised by the ‘gilets jaunes’ or ‘yellow vests’ protests about fuel prices.

There are other examples where the instruments have been adjusted, paused, amended or the price escalator has been delayed or otherwise changed. For example, British Columbia and particularly New Zealand, where a proposed ‘fart tax’ was cancelled and an agricultural tax has been delayed (see Section 3.7.4).

A specific challenge is that the UK – and by implication, Scotland – has one of the most complex tax systems in the world. Some experts have consistently criticised a lack of an overall coherent tax strategy for the UK, particularly considering the implications of demographic changes for future taxation targeted at the economically active working age population (Johnson, 2023).

What are the data gaps?

Our review and the interviews have generated limited specific detail on impacts within affected sectors, as well as details on the behavioural response of those sectors. This reflects methodological challenges as well as time lags between policy action and observed effects. It has also identified limited quantitative information on carbon leakage. The emission reduction estimates are likely to be somewhat overstated, given that this has not been quantified.

Recommendations for the UK in the literature

A 2019 policy brief from the Grantham Institute reviewed the global evidence and provided a series of explicit recommendations for the UK if it were to implement a carbon tax (LSE, 2019). The recommendations were:

  • The tax rate should be high enough to be consistent with net zero policy objectives. This implied a starting rate somewhere around £40 per tonne (as of 2020) (note this also depends on the scope of the tax, which is not specified in detail in the paper, but would need to be applied “in most sectors”). It should complement and be carefully designed alongside other climate change mitigation policies.
  • Credibility requires clear rules, a design that is not susceptible to political pressure and visibility on how the trajectory of prices or scope may change over time (i.e., annually, based on factors like investment cycles or emission performance).
  • The price should start low and rise over time. This doesn’t only allow affected industries time to respond but allows evidence on effectiveness and any unintended effects to be observed in practice.
  • The use of the proceeds should be carefully and regularly explained alongside information on the economic, social and environmental costs and benefits (via a published, independent cost-benefit analysis, for example).

Case studies

To gain further depth on specific international examples of fiscal levers, we assessed six case studies in further detail. Their selection was based on six predetermined criteria (see Section 8.1.2 in Appendix A on the methodology for the overall study for more detail). An overview of the selected case studies, and the accompanying rationale for their selection against these criteria is in Table 3.1, below. Each criterion has been assigned a red [R], amber [A] or green [G] (RAG) rating. This is based on a judgement of the researchers on the overall similarities between the case study jurisdiction and the Scottish context. For comparison, the Scottish population was some 5.4 million (in 2022), whilst GDP per capita was $42,362 (in 2021).[5] Given Scotland’s devolved powers to create taxes with consent of UK Parliament, we include examples where instruments have been applied sub-nationally (for example Canada, Wallonia). There are cases which include rural and island communities or significant renewable energy generation potential (for example New Zealand). Scotland’s ambition is for Net Zero by 2045 and 75% reduction in emission by 2030, so we have selected jurisdictions with similarly ambitious targets (for example Sweden and Austria).

We discuss key features and potential lessons for Scotland in Sections 3.7.1 to 3.7.4 below the table. Full details of the case studies are in Appendix D.

 

British Columbia

Sweden

Austria

New Zealand

France

Wallonia

Overview of instrument

Direct carbon tax, applied to fuels based on their CO2 content

Direct carbon tax, applied to fuels based on a CO2 price per tonne

National ETS scheme which augments the EU ETS and applies to sectors excluded from it

Agricultural tax, applying a farm-level levy on GHG emissions

Bonus Malus scheme with fees on purchase of new emission intensive vehicles and rebates for electric vehicles

Indirect tax on environmental impacts from farming, focussed on water resources

Population and GDP per capita

5 million (2021) and $59,962 [G]

10.5 million (2022) and $65,157 (2021) [A]

9 million (2022) and $59,991 (2021) [A]

5.1 million (2022) and $47,982 (2021) [G]

68 million (2022) $55,064 (2022) [A]

3.6 million (2022) and €31,568 (2021) [A]

Administrative and legal arrangements/ competencies

Sub-national tax, with separate federal tax system [G]

National level tax, alongside EU ETS [A]

National ETS designed around EU ETS [G]

A proposed national-level tax [A]

National level indirect tax [A]

Indirect tax at sub-national level [G]

Shared challenges

Significant renewable energy use (largely hydropower), rural communities [G]

Rapidly growing renewable energy potential, Rural and Island communities [G]

Rapidly growing renewable energy potential, rural communities [A]

Significant renewable energy potential, Peatland[G]

Increasing renewable energy potential, rural communities [G]

Increasing renewable energy use [G]

Climate ambition

Net Zero by 2050 [A]

Net Zero by 2045 [G]

Net Zero by 2040 [G]

Net Zero by 2050 [A]

Net Zero by 2050 [A]

80-95% reduction in emissions by 2050 [A]

Data and Evidence

Good level of evidence [G]

Good level of evidence [G]

No ex-post evidence, but detail on design/expected impacts [G]

Implementation lessons only [R]

Good level of evidence [G]

Good detail on lever design, limited evidence on effectiveness [A]

Diversity of Approaches

Sub-national direct carbon tax [G]

Longstanding and highest priced direct carbon tax [G]

National level ETS [G]

Novel concept [G]

Indirect tax, administered nationally [G]

Indirect tax, administered at sub-nationally [G]

Table 3.1: Overview of the case studies (RAG status indicating similarities with Scotland denoted by [R] red; [A] amber or [G] green)

Impact on GHG emissions

The available evidence linking each fiscal lever with GHG emission reduction varies significantly. The case studies include two direct taxes – both of which are applied to various fuels based on their CO2 content – in Sweden and British Columbia (BC), Canada. These levers have been in place for a relatively long period, so have generally good ex-post evidence available. Bernard and Kichian (2019) have calculated that the British Columbia carbon tax, once reaching the rate of $30/ton of CO2, achieved an estimated 1.13-million-ton reduction in CO2 emissions. This equates to an average annual reduction of 1.3% relative to British Columbia’s 2008 diesel emissions and 0.2% relative to all BC CO2 emissions in 2008. However, they do not think it is a viable strategy for achieving net zero goals in isolation. With regards to the Swedish carbon tax, a review of ex-post analyses of carbon taxes by Green (2021) reveals different results around Sweden’s emission reductions. For example, research by Andersson (2019) found an average emission reduction of 6.3% per year between 1990 and 2005, Fernando (2019) found an annual average reduction of 17.2% and research by Shmelev and Speck (2018) found no effect on emissions. A study conducted by Jonsson, Ydstedt, & Asen (2022) state that GHG emissions have declined by 27% between 1990 and 2018. This highlights various methodological differences in conducting these ex-post analyses, and the difficulty in establishing the baseline of what emissions reductions would have occurred even in the absence of the lever.

The Austrian national ETS (nETS) – which extends the EU ETS, of which Austria is a part, to other sectors – is still in a phased implementation stage and will establish a set price which increases each year, reaching a market phase in 2026. Ex-ante modelling conducted by the Austrian government expects the scheme to reduce GHG emissions 800,000 tonnes by 2025. The proposed tax on agricultural emissions in New Zealand has not yet been finalised.

The evidence suggests the French Bonus Malus scheme – which incentivises uptake of low emission vehicles with a combination of fees and rebates – has been effective in shifting vehicle sales toward more environmentally friendly vehicles. Even though progress has slowed in recent years, average emissions have reduced significantly from 149 gCO2/km in 2010 to 111 gCO2/km in 2017. The relationship between the agricultural tax in Wallonia – which is applied at a farm level on the effects on water resources from livestock and land cultivation – and GHG emissions is much less clear.

Revenue generation and use

Data availability on revenue generated by these schemes varies. In all cases, a key element has been that revenues are either directly recycled back to citizens or are offset in other parts of the budget. This has occurred via direct payments/rebates to households or implementing other tax cuts alongside the lever.

The British Columbia carbon tax was designed to be revenue neutral and so was implemented alongside a wider scheme of tax cuts, and is now part of the Canadian Federal approach, which gives direct payments back to households. In 2019, SEK 22.2 billion was generated via the Swedish carbon tax, which is approximately 1% of Sweden’s total tax revenue. The carbon tax revenue goes into the overall government budget, and is not hypothecated, thus it is unclear where the revenue generated is distributed (Jonsson, Ydstedt, & Asen, 2022). The Austrian nETS was implemented as part of a wider policy package. Although revenue for the emissions allowances goes directly into the main budget and there is no hypothecation, ‘climate bonus’ payments are given directly back to households. Revenue in 2022 was approximately €800 million and the government have reallocated around €1 billion.

Since 2014, the Bonus Malus scheme has generated surplus revenue for the French general budget. For 2018, the malus was set at a level that covered the costs of the bonus payments (EUR 261 million) and the additional bonus for scrapped vehicles (EUR 127 million). The agricultural tax in Wallonia generates an annual revenue of around €1.2 million, however, it is unclear how this is subsequently used.

Behaviour change

There is some evidence on how the case study examples influence behaviour change. The carbon tax in British Columbia has been shown to have had a role in decreasing consumer demand for fossil fuels and natural gas (Pretis, 2022). Additional studies from Xiang and Lawley (2018) and Antweiler and Gulati (2016) also draw correlations between the implementation of the tax and a decrease in fuel demand.

The carbon tax in Sweden has shown to be effective in shifting market investment into low-carbon technology, specifically in renewable energy sources such as hydro and wind (Hildingsson and Knaggård, 2022). Levying the carbon tax at different rates on fuels has also resulted in behaviour changes in companies. Between 1993 and 1997, the higher tax rate on fuels used within domestic heating systems compared to fuels used within industry resulted in industries selling their by-products to domestic heating companies, while continuing to burn fossil fuels themselves (Johansson, 2000).

One interviewee suggested that the Austrian nETS, whilst in its fixed price stage, is not expected to generate a strong enough price signal to result in a clear and significant change in behaviour. However, other parts of the policy package have been designed to specifically change behaviour (such as subsidies for changing heating systems in households). The Bonus Malus scheme has had a clear impact on shifting vehicle sales in France towards less CO2 intensive vehicles. However, the scheme may have a rebound effect, as the lower fuel expenditure for consumers due to more efficient vehicles may lead to an increase in vehicle use and thus in fuel consumed (and thus on emissions). There is no evidence regarding the behavioural effects of the agricultural tax in Wallonia.

Unexpected challenges

In British Columbia, the tax was initially designed without exemptions and applied universally. However, after competitiveness concerns were raised, the government introduced a one-time exemption worth $7.6 million in 2012, followed by an ongoing exemption in 2013 to greenhouse growers and an exemption for gasoline and diesel used in agriculture in 2014.

When implementing their nETS, the Austrian government experienced challenges designing the scheme around the existing EU ETS. To ensure that emissions were not double counted, exemptions from the national ETS were given to installations already regulated under the EU ETS. This proved a challenging exercise for the Austrian government.

Challenges have been observed for the proposed agricultural tax in New Zealand. Whilst these are political in nature, they have presented challenges for the implementing government. The original proposal for a split-gas, farm-level levy was revoked after a consultation highlighted public concerns about the impact on the cost and potential implications on availability of produce. A series of media outlets reported tensions between the agricultural sector in New Zealand and the government. Farmers expressed concerns regarding both the profitability and competitiveness of their business, with some expecting to have to reduce their herd size (Pannett, 2023). After revoking the original planned tax, the NZ government are now implementing mandatory monitoring and reporting of emissions from agriculture, to eventually transition into pricing of emissions.

Overview of fiscal levers in the UK

We investigated existing UK environmental fiscal levers, including taxes in the energy intensive industries, the power generation, transport, and pollution and resource sectors in Appendix B. We focused analysis on those that deliver reductions in GHG emissions. These include:

  • Fiscal levers specifically targeted to reduce GHG emissions.
  • Fiscal levers specifically targeted to address environmental impacts and affecting GHG emissions.

These were classified using the typologies developed in Section 3.1. Fiscal levers that do not contribute to reducing GHG emissions have not been considered. A complete list of environmental taxes in the UK (at time of writing) is in Section 8.1.4.

Existing fiscal levers which target or address GHG emissions focus on energy and energy intensive industries, transportation (road and air transport) and resource use. Examples include Fuel Duty, the Climate Change Levy (CCL), the Renewables Obligation (RO), the UK ETS, the UK Air Passenger Duty (APD), and the Vehicle Excise Duty (VED).

Under the current devolution settlement, most tax powers remain reserved to the UK Government and Parliament. However, any existing national tax can potentially be devolved to the Scottish Parliament. New national taxes can be created through a mechanism allowing the UK Parliament, with the consent of the Scottish Parliament, to grant powers for new national devolved taxes to be created in Scotland (Scottish Parliament, 2021).

Overview of fiscal levers in Scotland and implications of the case studies

Devolution is the statutory delegation of powers from the central government of a sovereign state to govern at a subnational level. It is a form of administrative decentralisation. Devolved territories have the power to make legislation relevant to the area, thus granting them higher levels of autonomy. In the UK, devolution is the term used to describe the process of transferring power from the centre (Westminster) to the nations and regions of the United Kingdom (Torrance, 2022). Devolution provides Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland with forms of self-government within the UK. In the case of Scotland, this includes the transfer of legislative powers to the Scottish Parliament and the granting of powers to the Scottish Government. While the UK Parliament still legislates for Scotland, it does not do so for devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.

The devolution process has led to calls for the Scottish Parliament to be given more responsibility over revenue raised and spent in Scotland. There are existing devolved environmental taxes under the Scottish Government’s remit that contribute to reducing GHG emissions. We have also considered implications of the case studies from a legal and regulatory perspective. No assessment is made of the potential costs and benefits of adoption nor of the practical challenges associated with them.

Legal and regulatory fiscal system in Scotland

The legislative framework for devolution to Scotland was originally set out in the Scotland Act 1998. The Scotland Act 1998 established the Scottish Parliament and set out the matters on which the Scottish Parliament cannot legislate and make laws, known as general and specific reservations. Everything not listed as a reserved matter is assumed to be devolved. Reserved taxation matters include VAT rates, Fuel Duty, and Corporation Tax. The Scottish Parliament currently has devolved responsibilities in relation to five taxes (Scottish Government (2021), as follows:

  • Scottish Income Tax, which is partially devolved. It is collected and administered by HMRC on behalf of the Scottish Government.
  • Land and Buildings Transaction Tax, a tax paid in relation to land and property transactions in Scotland, and Scottish Landfill Tax, a tax on the disposal of waste to landfill, are fully devolved national taxes and are managed and collected by Revenue Scotland.
  • The Scottish Parliament also has powers over local taxes for local expenditure. Currently, the two main local taxes are Council Tax and Non-Domestic Rates (also known as business rates), which are collected by local authorities. Note that a review of local taxes is not covered in this study.

In addition, powers in relation to two further taxes have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament, but these have not yet been implemented and the relevant reserved taxes therefore continue to apply. These taxes are Air Departure Tax, a tax on all eligible passengers flying from Scottish airports, which will replace Air Passenger Duty when introduced, and a devolved tax on the commercial exploitation of crushed rock, gravel, or sand, which will replace the Aggregates Levy when introduced.

The Scottish Parliament has the power to create new local taxes (i.e. local taxes to fund local authority expenditure). There is also a mechanism allowing the UK Parliament, with the consent of the Scottish Parliament, to devolve powers for new national devolved taxes to be created in Scotland. This is unlikely to be a swift process and would likely depend on the complexity of the new national tax and negotiation over devolution of the requisite powers.

The UK Internal Market Act 2020 (IMA) seeks to prevent internal trade barriers among the four countries of the United Kingdom. Schedule 1, paragraph 11 of the IMA specifically exempts taxes (Legislation.gov.uk, 2020a). However, new regulatory acts considered to create additional administrative burdens which may affect intra UK trade may be challenged under the IMA.

Devolved fiscal levers to deliver reductions in GHG emissions in Scotland

The Commission on Scottish Devolution (also referred to as the Calman Commission), established in 2007, identified some taxes (including the Landfill Tax and the Air Passenger Duty) where devolved powers could be applied. Following this, the Scotland Act 2012 devolved powers for a Landfill Tax to the Scottish Parliament to cover landfills and transactions taking place in Scotland, which led to the Landfill Tax (Scotland) Act 2014. At the time of writing, this is the only fully devolved fiscal lever delivering reductions in GHG emissions that currently applies in Scotland.[6] Although the Scotland Act 2016 included the power to introduce a devolved tax on the carriage of passengers by air from airports in Scotland (i.e. to replace the present, UK-wide Air Passenger Duty). The Air Departure Tax (Scotland) Act 2017 was passed by the Scottish Parliament 2017, however the introduction of the tax has been deferred due to state aid (and now subsidy control) issues. The Scotland Act 2016 Act also made provisions for the creation of a devolved tax on extraction of aggregates, which is currently being legislated for in the Scottish Parliament, although this does not specifically look to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Indirect Taxation Schemes

The Scottish Landfill Tax (SLfT) replaced the UK Landfill Tax in Scotland from 1 April 2015 under the Landfill Tax (Scotland) Act 2012. The SLfT is part of Scotland’s Zero Waste Scheme and aims to encourage the prevention, reuse and recycling of waste in the country. It is administered by Revenue Scotland with support from the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA). SLfT is a tax on the disposal of waste to an authorised or non-authorised landfill in Scotland. The taxation of disposals to unauthorised sites (that is illegal dumping) is a key difference between SLfT and UK Landfill tax.

The Scottish Government is responsible for setting the rates of the tax as part of the annual Scottish Budget and determining which waste is subject to it. The tax is paid on the disposal or unauthorised disposal of waste to landfill and is calculated based on the weight and type of the waste material. A standard rate of £102.10 per tonne is applied, while a lower rate of £3.25 per tonne is paid on less polluting (referred to as ‘inert’)[7] materials. Tax revenues have decreased from £149 million in 2015-2016 to £125 million in 2021-2022. The SLfT has been a major part of the success in driving change in Scotland’s waste performance (Revenue Scotland, 2021).

Air Departure Tax (ADT). The Scotland Act 2016 included the power to introduce a devolved tax on the carriage of passengers by air from airports in Scotland. This allows Scotland to design a replacement for APD. The Air Departure Tax (Scotland) Act 2017 made provision for such a tax, which will be managed and collected by Revenue Scotland. However, the tax has not yet been introduced and UK APD continues to apply.

The Scottish ADT will tax flights departing from an airport in Scotland (this includes airports in the Highlands and Islands regions). As with the UK APD, the amount of tax payable depends on the destination of the passenger and the characteristics of the aircraft (take-off weight,[8] flight distance seat pitch and seating capacity). Depending on the aircraft, the passenger will pay either the standard, premium or special rate.[9] Certain flights and passengers are exempt from ADT. Exemptions apply to flights operated under a public service obligation, which may include many flights to/from small islands, although the Air Departure Tax (Scotland) Act 2017 making provision for such a tax does not mention any exemptions for passengers on flights leaving from airports in the Scottish Highlands and Islands. There are also exemptions for emergency medical service flights, military, training or research flights. Passenger exemptions apply to persons that are working during the flight, such as flight crew, cabin attendants, persons undertaking repair, maintenance, safety or security work, persons not carried for reward, such as Civil Aviation Authority flight operations inspectors, or children under the age of 16 (FCC Aviation, 2023).

ADT was originally expected to come into force on 1 April 2018. However, on April 2019 the Scottish Government deferred the introduction of ADT beyond April 2020 until issues have been resolved regarding the tax exemption for flights departing from airports in the Highlands and Islands regions. The devolution process is, thus, on hold. In the meantime, UK APD (and the rates and bands that currently exist) and the current Highlands and Islands exemption continues to apply.

Implications of the case studies for Scotland

We assessed whether the six case study examples (Section 3.7) could hypothetically be implemented by the Scottish Government under current devolved competencies. We also provide a high-level explanation of practical issues (e.g., target of the lever and groups affected). No assessment is made of the costs and benefits of adoption.

Case study

Description

Exists in the UK?

Exists in Scotland?

Can be devolved to or created in Scotland?

Direct Carbon Tax: British Columbia, Canada

Tax applied to fuels based on their CO₂ content, covering all liquid transportation fuels such as gasoline and diesel, as well as natural gas or coal used to power electric plants.

Yes. Similar to Climate Change Levy (CCL)

No

Yes. Hypothetically the CCL could be devolved to Scotland. A new Scottish CCL, with additions/adjustments to incorporate the carbon tax could then replace the UK CCL in Scotland. This would be subject to UK Parliament consent and Scottish Parliament agreement. A Scotland Act including the power to introduce a devolved CCL in Scotland and a new specific CCL (Scotland) Act applying the legislation to Scotland would be required.

Direct Carbon Tax: Sweden

Tax applied on fossil fuels used for motor fuels and heating purposes including gas oil, heavy fuel oil, coal, natural gas, petrol, gas oil, heavy fuel oil, coal and natural gas.

Yes. Similar to Climate Change Levy

No

National ETS: Austria

The national ETS was designed to complement and exist alongside the EU ETS. It covers CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels including transport fuels (petrol and diesel), fuel and heating oil, natural gas/liquified gas, coal and kerosene used in sectors which are not regulated under the EU ETS.

Yes. Similar to UK ETS

No

Yes. A new Scottish ETS (with adjustments in scope to incorporate additional sectors, for example) could hypothetically replace the UK ETS in Scotland. This would be subject to UK Parliament, Welsh Parliament, Northern Ireland Assembly consent and Scottish Parliament agreement.

A new specific ETS (Scotland) Act applying the legislation to Scotland would be required.

Proposed tax on agricultural emissions: New Zealand

A proposed farm-level levy that would require farms to calculate and pay for their emissions through a central calculator. It was set to use a split-gas approach by applying unique levy rates to short-and long-lived gases.

No

No

Yes. Hypothetically a new national tax on agricultural emissions could be introduced in Scotland by the Scottish Government

with the consent of the UK Government.

A new specific Tax on Agricultural Emissions (Scotland) Act would be required.

Tax on environmental impacts from farming: Wallonia, Belgium

The tax is intended to address the environmental costs associated with the impact of agricultural activities on water resources, in particular livestock manure and the use of fertilisers and phytosanitary on crops.

No

No

Bonus Malus Scheme: France

This system combines fees and rebates for the purchase of new vehicles: vehicles purchased or leased whose emissions exceed certain limits pay a fee, while vehicles that do not exceed these limits are entitled to a bonus or rebate.

Yes. Similar to Vehicle Excise Duty (VED)

No

Yes. Hypothetically, the VED could be devolved to Scotland; thus, a new Scottish VED (with adjustments as per the Bonus-Malus scheme) could replace the UK VED in Scotland. This would be subject to UK Parliament consent and Scotland Parliament agreement. A Scotland Act including the power to introduce a devolved VED in Scotland and a new specific VED (Scotland) Act applying the legislation to Scotland would be required.

Table 5.1: Potential of case studies in Scotland

While the balance of evidence suggests that similar taxes have reduced GHG emissions where they have been applied elsewhere, the net effect on GHG emissions in the host jurisdiction is uncertain. Challenges in implementation have also been observed and there is limited detailed evidence on behavioural effects. These issues will need to be further investigated before any such tax could be considered for Scotland. If the Scottish Government were to consider exploring any of the examples we have looked at, it would be necessary to undertake thorough policy scoping, analysis and consultation, in addition to the agreement of both the UK and Scottish Parliaments. The Scottish Government could also consider these points in the context of its wider discussions with the UK Government on the direction of climate and fiscal policies as part of a collaborative approach.

Direct Carbon Tax

The UK CCL (which is in practice similar to direct carbon taxes in place in several countries or regions, including Sweden and British Columbia) could be devolved to the Scottish Parliament through an agreement between the Scottish and UK governments and parliaments on the transfer of powers.

A new Scottish carbon tax could then in theory replace the UK CCL in Scotland. This could be broadly similar to the UK CCL, although the Scottish Government could also make its own decisions on issues such as scope and rates to better align it with Scotland’s socioeconomic conditions and emissions reduction targets. Were the Scottish Government to consider such a measure, it would require significant exploration of options and detailed analysis to ensure it achieved these objectives, including consultation and engagement with stakeholders.

Emissions Trading System

The UK ETS is jointly operated by the Scottish Government, UK Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive through the UK ETS Authority. It relies primarily on legislation that is devolved (the Climate Change Act), although parts of the ETS relating to auction processes are based on legislation that is more often considered reserved and, thus, relies on UK parliament.

A new ‘Scotland ETS’ could hypothetically replace the UK ETS. This would require prior consent of the UK Parliament, Welsh Parliament, and Northern Ireland Assembly to have effect, as well as the agreement of the Scottish Parliament. The agreement of the Scottish Parliament could be sought through new specific legislation (either primary or secondary). Thus, an Act of the Scottish Parliament to make provision about the functioning of the ETS in Scotland would be required. This could in theory cover additional sectors not covered by the UK ETS, similar to the Austrian nETS operating alongside the EU ETS. However, any such proposal would require comprehensive policy scoping and consultation, in addition to the need for agreement from each legislative body, as detailed above.

Bonus Malus Scheme for Vehicles

The UK VED (similar to the bonus malus scheme explained in Appendix D) paid by businesses and households could in theory be devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Thus the new Scotland VED would replace the UK VED through an agreement between the Scottish and UK governments and parliaments on the transfer of powers.

This could potentially allow for innovation, as differences are in principle permitted, as happened with landfill tax (the SLfT applies on the disposal of waste to both authorised and non-authorised landfills, whereas the UK landfill tax only applies to disposals to authorised sites). It could therefore be feasible to create bonuses to incentivise buyers to purchase low or zero emission vehicles (along the lines of the Bonus-Malus in France), which UK VED does not currently offer. However, this would require detailed policy scoping and consultation to ensure any potential measure operates fairly and effectively, as well as having the consent of both the UK and Scottish Parliaments.

Tax on agricultural emissions

Under Section 80B of the Scotland Act 1998 (as amended), a new tax on agricultural emissions similar to the tax on agricultural emissions proposed in New Zealand (for further details, see Appendix D) could in theory be created in Scotland as the UK Parliament can, with the consent of the Scottish Parliament, devolve powers for new national devolved taxes to be created in Scotland.

This tax might operate by putting a price on agricultural GHG emissions, for example, and could include farmers and growers who operate on Scottish territory, depending on their GHG emissions. The lessons learned from the example in New Zealand clearly demonstrate that consideration of any such measures would require rigorous policy design, consultation and close collaboration with stakeholders in the sector. Whilst new taxes can be effective in changing behaviours and reducing GHG emissions, there is an important and challenging balance to strike between protecting jobs and the viability of industries such as agriculture whilst also meeting net zero targets.

Conclusions

Of the various policies to mitigate the effects of climate change, the use of fiscal levers (taxes, levies, duties or charges) to reduce GHG emissions has gained increased attention and wider adoption by policymakers around the world. Different types of fiscal levers include emission trading schemes; carbon credit schemes; carbon border adjustment mechanisms; and carbon taxes. We focused on direct carbon taxes. Subsidies, grants and loans by the UK or Scottish Governments were not in scope.

International review of fiscal levers for GHG emissions

Use of carbon taxes is increasingly common. 37 direct carbon taxes are in operation in 27 jurisdictions globally. The majority are applied in high-income countries, particularly Europe. Scandinavian countries were among the earliest adopters. Many of these taxes have been applied alongside an ETS. There has been less use outside Europe to date. However, several jurisdictions are currently considering them.

Sub-national carbon taxes have been applied successfully: Of particular relevance to Scotland, two jurisdictions have applied carbon taxes sub-nationally: Canada, which has five, and Mexico, which currently has two with further instruments planned.

Existing instruments differ in terms of GHG coverage and carbon price: about 6% of global GHG emissions are taxed by carbon taxes. This share has increased significantly over the past 15 years. Existing instruments differ in scope, price and coverage. For example, Sweden has a ‘high ambition’ instrument and was one of the earliest adopters with the highest carbon tax globally. Other instruments have a mixed level of ambition e.g. high prices and low share (Uruguay) or high share but low prices (Singapore). Relatively low prices and shares include some Eastern European and South American states.

The balance of evidence suggests carbon taxes have reduced GHG emissions, with caveats. Despite the extensive literature on the merits of carbon taxation, actual data on their impact on GHG emissions is limited. Any assessment of impact is methodologically challenging, particularly in attributing GHG reductions to the specific tax. Effects of carbon leakage are rarely quantified, so estimates may overstate reductions in GHG emissions when taking a global view. Despite these challenges, the evidence indicates that carbon taxes have generally reduced GHG emissions in the relevant sector or jurisdiction. There is some limited evidence that carbon taxes perform better than ETSs in terms of GHG reduction, but both are likely to need additional regulatory measures to deliver the scale of decarbonisation necessary. The extent of reductions attributed to the taxes to date are not considered sufficient to meet broader climate goals.

Evidence on behavioural effects within affected sectors is more limited. The available evidence indicates that fuel switching or efficiency improvements may be more common responses than significant changes to manufacturing processes or technologies. Analysis of the Swedish carbon tax suggests some decreased demand for petrol was offset by increases for diesel but it was considered to have supported a shift in investment toward low-carbon technologies. It is not clear if responses were a result of the design of the tax or a reflection of prevailing prices and/or coverage.

Carbon taxes have generated government revenue but their magnitude depends on the design of the tax. The data contain some methodological and reporting inconsistencies, but 2013 information suggested revenues differed between some $3.5 billion (Sweden) and tens of million (Iceland). Data from 2019 show similar orders of magnitude, but the values for specific jurisdictions differ. The share of GDP represented by the taxes were all under 1% of national GDP at that time. By 2022 carbon tax revenues were upwards of $30 billion globally. Overall, revenues reflect the carbon price, as well as factors including the size of the economy, the coverage of the tax, exemptions, the carbon intensity of the jurisdiction and energy mix. The available evidence suggests that direct carbon taxes are relatively straightforward and inexpensive to administer for the host government.

Direct carbon taxes have involved extensive allocations of revenues for specific purposes. Many of the instruments for which data are available contained extensive allocations, as a percentage of revenue. These were often legally binding or via political commitment. Specific allocations include for green spending and particularly on specific rebates or tax cuts to affected groups, including low-income households and some businesses. British Columbia’s carbon tax was designed to be revenue neutral. In Sweden and Iceland, revenues are unconstrained and used to finance general government expenditure.

Implementation has been politically challenging. Australia is the only jurisdiction identified where an existing carbon tax was repealed. Repealing the tax became a central element of a successful opposition election campaign. Similarly, a planned acceleration of the carbon price was suspended in France as a result of widespread civil unrest, citing the perceived unfairness of the tax, having been introduced alongside tax cuts for the wealthy. A successful legal challenge was brought in Mexico over whether the regional government had legal authority to implement a subnational tax.

Potential implications for Scotland

Our high-level review of existing fiscal levers in the UK identified several existing taxes in the energy, transport and resource sectors which specifically target or address GHG emissions.

The Scotland Act 2012 (Section 80B) provides the Scottish Parliament with the power to devolve any existing national tax of any description to Scotland and create new national taxes such as on activities currently not taxed under the UK tax code. Any changes to existing taxes or the introduction of new taxes will require the agreement of the Scottish Parliament and the prior consent of the UK Parliament to have effect. Several of the case studies contain elements that are in practice similar to existing UK levies, but which would need amending if they were to be considered for Scotland.

Any new carbon tax could hypothetically be applied in Scotland, potentially as part of a devolved Scottish Climate Change levy. Similarly, a new ‘Scotland ETS’ could hypothetically replace the UK ETS, with adjustments in scope to incorporate additional sectors. This would require prior consent of the UK Parliament, Welsh Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly, as well as the agreement of the Scottish Parliament. A devolved VED could theoretically replace the UK VED in Scotland. New national taxes could also be created in Scotland, requiring consent of both the UK and Scottish Parliaments. In each case, new Scottish legislation would be required.

Principles for implementation

This review has highlighted several fiscal levers used in other countries to reduce GHG emissions. Should any of these be explored further, Scotland’s Framework for Tax sets out the principles and strategic objectives that underpin the Scottish approach to taxation and any new measures (Scottish Government, 2021). These principles are:

  • Proportionality: Taxes should be levied in proportion to taxpayers’ ability to pay and a fair system should reflect relative income or wealth of the taxpayer.
  • Efficiency: Prospects for revenue should be balanced against the potential for unintended behavioural responses.
  • Certainty: So that businesses and individuals can plan and invest with confidence, taxpayers must know what is to be paid, by whom and when.
  • Convenience: Taxes should be collected in a way that maximises convenience for taxpayers. Policy should be simple, clear and straightforward and opportunities to streamline the tax system taken.
  • Engagement: To ensure accountability and maintain trust, governments should consult as widely as possible on tax design.
  • Effectiveness: Taxes should raise the expected revenues and achieve their intended aims. Opportunities for tax avoidance should be minimised.

As such, the effectiveness of any fiscal lever depends on the precise design of the lever and should be subject to careful consideration and clear communication in terms of its scope, phase-in, price (including future price escalation), sectors and activities on which it is levied and any relevant exemptions. Distributional effects should be carefully considered, including if and how revenue should be reallocated, to whom and under what conditions. challenges in implementation have been observed. Successful fiscal lever examples have been based on transparent design, regular monitoring and communication of revenues, costs and benefits, with rapid adjustments if unexpected adverse effects occur. Successful examples have also formed part of wider fiscal reforms, with a clear strategic objective.

Any potential instrument should be subject to detailed economic modelling, including testing different price rates and trajectories, an assessment of the risk of carbon leakage (with or without a UK CBAM), economic competitiveness and innovation effects, distributional effects (and potential mitigation via revenue reallocation), and any impacts on small and medium sizes businesses. This should be published in a robust Regulatory Impact Assessment to provide a comprehensive evaluation of any prospective measures, and ensure they adhere to the principles of the Framework for Tax while achieving GHG reductions through behavioural change.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Methodology

This section provides a more detailed overview of the methodology we used.

Literature review

First, we conducted a targeted literature review on fiscal levers used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We focussed on academic and grey literature sources using agreed search terms. These were: ‘fiscal levers’, ‘tax’, ‘levy’, ‘duties’, ‘charges’, ‘carbon tax’, ‘environmental tax’ ‘carbon pricing’, ‘carbon credits’ ‘greenhouse gas emissions’, ‘Net Zero’, ‘climate change’, ‘fiscal measures’, ‘environmental behaviours’, ‘behaviour change’, ‘dis/incentive’, ‘rural” & “island’, ‘revenues’, and ‘devolved’. We used Boolean operators e.g., AND/OR etc to create relevant search strings from these key words and to refine the search results. We used additional terms including ‘effectiveness of’, ‘review of’, ‘evaluation of’, ‘impact assessment of’ and ‘meta-review of’ to identify additional evidence for specific schemes once they had been identified.

We searched databases including PubMed, Web of Science All Databases and Scopus to identify relevant academic literature sources. We also looked for legislation as well as publications from national Governments, supranational organisations such as the European Commission or OECD as well as non-governmental organisations. The grey literature was identified via Google searches and searches of relevant government/organisation websites.

As we identified sources, we screened them using executive summaries or abstracts to ascertain their relevance and quality. If we decided the source was relevant and of sufficient quality, we logged them in a data source register, which was a live Excel document (stored on the project SharePoint site) that was available to all team members. We recorded the source details (title, author, year, source) and information on the contents of the publication, such as the type(s) of lever it discusses, geographical scope, relevance for GHG emissions as well as an indication of the methodological rigour, accuracy and robustness of the source. This ensured that we clearly documented the evidence, and that we could share resources efficiently across the project team. As part of this exercise, 36 sources were logged, informing the beginning of the more in-depth research undertaken for each individual case study.

As we logged the sources in the register, we undertook a secondary screening exercise of the lever examples – where specific examples were discussed – categorising them into an initial list of typologies. This also identified a ‘longlist’ of potential case studies of specific lever examples for more detailed analysis.

Case study selection

We shortlisted six case studies to be analysed in greater detail, from a long list of 12. The case study selection process was twofold. First, initial assessment during literature review stage of the project. While logging the data in the live excel sheet, we conducted a high-level assessment of the relevance of the identified fiscal levers to the Scottish context. Each case study was assigned a RAG rating based on an assessment against six criteria agreed with CxC and the Scottish Government. These criteria were:

  • Population, economic structure and GDP: Countries/regions that with comparable population, GDP/GDP per capita and economic structure (i.e., size of manufacturing sectors, predominance of service sectors) were prioritised. This may include certain EU Member States, for example.
  • Administrative and legal arrangements and competencies: Countries/regions with similar administrative arrangements (i.e., devolved competencies or instruments applied sub-nationally) were prioritised. Examples may include U.S. States, Australian territories or Belgian Regions.
  • Shared challenges: Countries/regions with similar characteristics to Scotland, such as extensive peatland, rural/island communities or extensive renewable energy resources may provide valuable insight. This may include Ireland, Canada, Estonia, Sweden, Finland and Germany, for example.
  • Climate ambition: Countries/regions with similar levels of ambition in terms of climate change mitigation should be prioritised. For example, those with net zero targets set out in national legislation.
  • Diversity of approaches: Different levers and typologies should be covered in the case studies to allow for a comprehensive analysis.
  • Data and evidence: Sufficient data and evidence on the lever and its effectiveness must be available to support case study analysis.

We then used this RAG rating to select the most relevant case studies, which were presented to the project steering group for agreement. The project steering group selected the final six case studies for the project. These case studies are contained in Appendix C.

Semi-structured interviews

To supplement the literature review, we conducted 7 semi-structured interviews of c.45 minutes via MS teams. In two cases, the interviewees requested to respond in writing. Two rounds of interviews were conducted.

We conducted the first round of interviews with experts who could offer an international perspective on the use of fiscal levers for greenhouse gas emission reductions. The purpose of these interviews was to gain expert input on the global picture, to ensure that sound case study options had been selected and to ensure that the project team was aware of all available evidence. We held interviews with Stefano Carattini, an academic specialising in carbon taxation worldwide, Ian Parry an expert from the IMF and Professor Lorraine Whitmarsh, an academic specialising in behavioural change in the face of environmental legislation and carbon taxation.

The second round of interviews aimed to gain more targeted information about specific case studies in the relevant jurisdictions. We aimed to obtain evidence on the effectiveness of the fiscal levers and fill in any data gaps that had persisted after the literature review. These interviews included civil servants working on the policy in the relevant governments where these could be identified, as well as academics with the required expertise working in the relevant countries. We were able to arrange interviews with experts from four out of the six case studies analysed in this study. Experts in British Columbia, Austria, Wallonia and Sweden were consulted. Difficulties related to recent elections, and the early nature of the implementation of the tax in New Zealand meant that no civil servants were available to contribute to our study in this jurisdiction. In France, the expert we contacted rejected our interview request, based on the time which had elapsed since the individual was involved with that instrument. We were satisfied with the amount of information publicly available regarding the Bonus Malus scheme, however.

We provided each interviewee with an interview guide in advance of the interview. The guide included a letter of introduction on the project and a short project briefing note, an interview consent form, detailing how the information would be used and stored (in accordance with GDPR). We requested that each interviewee signed and returned the form in advance of the interview. We recorded the interviews, subject to interviewee consent, and stored their data securely. The recordings were used to create meeting notes which were agreed by both the interviewee and the interviewer.

Fiscal levers in the UK and Scotland

We first identified existing environmental fiscal levers in the UK (including taxes in the energy, transport and pollution/resource sectors). The main source of information was the Office of National Statistics (ONS). The UK environmental taxes annual bulletin from the ONS shows the value and composition of UK environmental taxes, by type of tax and economic activity. These levers were:

  • Environmental taxes in the energy sector include the following: Tax on Hydrocarbon oil; Climate Change Levy; Fossil Fuel Levy; Gas Levy; Hydro-Benefit; Renewable Energy Obligations; Contracts for Difference;) UK Emissions Trading Scheme; Carbon Reduction Commitment
  • Environmental taxes in the transport sector include the following: Air Passenger Duty; Rail Franchise Premia; Vehicle Registration Tax; Northern Ireland Driver Vehicle Agency; Fuel Duty; Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) paid by businesses; VED paid by households; Boat Licenses; Air Travel Operators Tax; Dartford Toll
  • Pollution Resources taxes include the following: Landfill Tax; Fishing Licenses; Aggregates Levy; Plastic Packaging Tax.

As the focus of our assignment is on fiscal levers to deliver reductions in GHG emissions, we focused our analysis on those that deliver reductions in GHG emissions. These include:

  1. Fiscal levers specifically targeted to address environmental impacts and affecting GHG emissions.
  2. Fiscal levers specifically targeted to reduce GHG emissions.

The Rail Franchise Premia (premium paid by train companies to UK government to provide specified train services), the Boat Licenses (annual charge required by owners of boats who use or keep their boats on inland waterways in the UK), the Air Travel Operators Tax (an insurance scheme ran by the UK Civil Aviation Authority), the Dartford Toll (toll for motorists to use the Dartford Crossing), the Fishing Licenses (required to fish for certain species of fish in various locations across the UK), the Aggregates Levy (a tax on sand, gravel or rock that has been dug from the ground, dredged from the sea or imported into the UK), and the Plastic Packaging Tax (on finished plastic packaging components containing less than 30% recycled plastic) have not been considered in our analysis. These taxes do not contribute to reducing GHG emissions, either directly or indirectly. The Contracts for Difference and the Vehicle Registration Tax have not been considered either. The Contracts for Difference offers generators a contract with a known strike price for renewable electricity sold and, thus, it is considered a subsidy and not a tax. The Vehicle Registration Tax is a tax on vehicle registration in the UK.

For taxes covered in our assessment (Tax on Hydrocarbon oil (Fuel Duty); Climate Change Levy[10]; Gas Levy; Hydro-Benefit; Renewable Energy Obligations; UK Emissions Trading Scheme[11]; Carbon Reduction Commitment; Air Passenger Duty; VED paid by businesses; VED paid by households and the Landfill Tax), we conducted a literature review of several academic and grey literature sources that reported information. This related to the following issues: objective of the tax, revenue generated, year of introduction, what is taxed and how tax is collected. This provided a good background overview.

Within the UK, the devolution process has led to calls for the Scottish Parliament to be given more responsibility over revenue raised and spent in Scotland. Following the review of existing UK taxes, the next step has been to look at the environmental taxes under the Scottish Government’s remit that contribute to reducing GHG emissions.

The devolution process was examined. This includes Section 80B of the Scotland Act 1998 (as amended), which devolves powers to add new national taxes in Scotland with the agreement of the Scottish Parliament. It also includes the Calman Commission, which supported the principle of devolution and identified some taxes (Stamp Duty Land Tax, Landfill Tax, the Aggregates Levy and Air Passenger Duty, and elements of Income Tax) where devolved powers could be applied. We reviewed the current legal framework and identified existing environmental fiscal levers in Scotland with an impact on GHG emissions where this devolution process has been applied. This only includes the Scottish Landfill Tax, which was devolved to the Scottish Parliament following the Scotland Act 2012 and replaced Landfill Tax on transactions taking place in Scotland. The Air Departure Tax (Scotland) has also been reviewed following the Scotland Act 2016. According to this Act, Air Passenger Duty is due to be fully devolved to Scotland and to be replaced by Air Departure Tax. However, this devolution process is currently on hold until a solution can be identified that protects Highland and Island connectivity and complies with UK subsidy controls.

For the devolved taxes (this includes the Scottish Landfill Tax and the (Scottish) Air Departure Tax, even though the latter is still on hold) we conducted a literature review of academic and grey literature sources that reported information related to the following issues: objective of the tax, revenue generated, year of introduction, what is taxed and how tax is collected. A brief description of the levy/tax is presented, including, depending on the availability of official data, the rates applied, the taxable event, the taxable person and other additional considerations.

Finally, we examined whether the six case study examples could be implemented by the Scottish Government under current devolved competencies, or whether their adoption would require joint action by the UK Government. This was carried out with reference to two key legislative acts. First, the Scotland Act 1998 that established the Scottish Parliament and gave it the power to legislate on certain matters, including certain elements of taxation. Second, Scotland Act 2012 (which amends the Scotland Act 1998) and gives the Scottish Parliament the power to (a) create new taxes in Scotland (such as on activities currently not taxed under the UK tax code) and (b) devolve any tax of any description with the prior consent of the UK Parliament (in addition to fully devolve the power to raise taxes on waste disposal to landfill).

Appendix B. Fiscal levers to deliver reductions in GHG in the UK

Direct taxation schemes

Tax on Hydrocarbon oil (or Fuel Duty)

Fuel Duty is charged on the purchase of petrol, diesel and a variety of other fuels. It is levied per unit of fuel purchased and is included in the price paid for petrol, diesel and other fuels used in vehicles or for heating. The rate depends on the type of fuel, as follows (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2023):

  • The headline rate on standard petrol, diesel, biodiesel and bioethanol is 52.95 pence per litre.
  • The rate on liquefied petroleum gas is 28.88 pence per kilogram.
  • The rate on natural gas used as fuel in vehicles is 22.57 pence per kilogram.
  • The rate on fuel oil burned in a furnace or used for heating is 9.78 pence per litre.

In 2022, Fuel Duty revenue was £24.8 billion. It is the largest environmental tax, comprising 52.5% of environmental taxes and 70.2% of energy taxes in 2022 (Office for National Statistics 2023). Data for Scotland is not reported.

Climate Change Levy (CCL)

This levy was introduced by the UK Government in April 2001. It is an environmental tax charged on the energy used by businesses to encourage them to become more energy efficient, while helping to reduce their overall emissions. By 2022, the tax generated revenues of more than £2 billion in the UK (Office for National Statistics, 2023). Data for Scotland indicates that the share collected in Scotland was between 8 and 9% from 2001 to 2019. Revenues collected in Scotland reached £158 million in 2018-2019.

Specifically, the tax applies to four groups of energy products: electricity; coal and lignite products; liquid petroleum (LPG); and natural gas when supplied by a gas utility. The CCL is paid via two rates: the main levy rate (for energy suppliers) and the carbon price support rate (for electricity producers). The CCL must be declared (via submission of a Climate Change Levy return to HMRC) and paid every three months, although small businesses can apply to make annual returns instead of quarterly returns.

Main levy rate

The main levy rate is applied to companies in the industrial, public services, commercial and agricultural sectors, and according to their consumption of electricity, gas and solid fuels (e.g., coal, coke, lignite or petroleum coke). Energy suppliers are responsible for charging the correct levy to their customers (SEFE Energy, 2023).

The levy rate varies for each category of taxable commodity, according to energy content: kilowatt-hours (kWh) for gas and electricity; and kilograms for all other taxable commodities. The rates do not apply to domestic consumers and charities for non-business use. There are also reduced rates for energy consumers that hold a climate change agreement (United Nations, 2012). Climate change agreements (CCA) are voluntary agreements made between UK industry and the relevant Environment Agency to reduce energy use and CO₂ emissions. CCAs are available for a wide range of industry sectors from major energy-intensive processes such as chemicals and paper to supermarkets and agricultural businesses such as intensive pig and poultry farming.

Carbon price support rate

Carbon price support rates apply to owners of electricity generating stations and operators of combined heat and power stations. They become liable for the carbon price support rate when (a) gas passes through the meter at the registration station and or (b) LPG, coal and other solid fossil fuels are delivered through the entrance gate at the generation station. Electricity generators are responsible for measuring, declaring and paying the correct carbon price support rate.

Renewable Energy Obligations

The Renewables Obligations (RO) were introduced in April 2002 in Great Britain, and in 2005 in Northern Ireland, with the aim of increasing the use of renewable energy to help reduce GHG emissions. Revenue from the tax has increased since its introduction, reaching £6.6 billion in 2022 (Office for National Statistics, 2023). Disaggregated data for Scotland is not reported.

This scheme requires electricity suppliers to generate a certain proportion of electricity from renewable sources. It imposes an annual obligation to present to the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) a specified number of Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs) per megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity supplied to their customers during each obligation period. Suppliers can therefore comply with their obligation in two ways: buying and then redeeming ROCs or paying a buy-out price to OFGEM. The energy must be generated in the UK to qualify for ROCs and the eligible renewable sources include landfill gas, sewage gas, hydro (20MW or less), onshore wind, offshore wind, biomass (agricultural and forestry residues), energy crops, wave power and photovoltaics.

The government sets the RO obligation each year based on predictions of the amount of electricity that will be generated in the UK and the number of ROCs that OFGEM will issue to eligible renewable generators. This obligation level is published at least six months before the start of each obligation period, which runs from April 1 through March 31 (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 2023).

Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC)

The CRC was introduced in 2010 to improve energy efficiency and reduce carbon dioxide emissions in private and public sector organisations that are high energy users, although it was closed in 2019. In the years that the tax was in force, the revenue collected ranged from £0.2 billion to £0.7 billion (Office for National Statistics, 2023).

Organisations that met the qualification criteria were required to participate and purchase allowances for every tonne of carbon emitted. For example, the scheme included supermarkets, water companies, banks, local authorities and all central government departments. Participating organisations were required to monitor their energy use and report annually on their energy supply. The Environment Agency’s reporting system then applied emission factors to calculate participants’ CO₂ emissions based on this information. Participants were then required to purchase and surrender allowances for their emissions (UK Government, 2023d).

Emission trading schemes

UK ETS

The UK ETS was established on 1 January 2021. It replaced the EU ETS following the UK’s exit from the EU. The scheme revenue was £4.3 billion in 2022 (Office for National Statistics, 2023).

The UK ETS covers energy-intensive industries, power generation and aviation. For aviation, the routes covered by this scheme include UK domestic flights, flights between UK and Gibraltar, flights between Great Britain and Switzerland, and flights departing the UK to European Economic Area states, conducted by all aircraft operators, regardless of nationality. For installations, the UK ETS applies to regulated activities that result in GHG emissions (except installations whose primary purpose is the incineration of hazardous or municipal waste). Activities in scope are listed in Schedule One (aviation) and Schedule Two (installations) of the in the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Order 2020 (Legislation.gov.uk, 2020). The scope of the scheme is set to expand to include more high-emitting areas. It will be applicable to large maritime vessels of 5,000 gross tonnage and above from 2026. From 2028, it will also include waste incineration and energy generated from waste.

Installations with combustion activity below 35MW rated thermal capacity (small emitters), installations with emissions of less than 2.500t CO₂e per year (ultra-small emitters) and operators that provide services to hospitals can opt out of the UK ETS. Instead of having to obtain allowances and thus having allowance surrender obligations, these installations will be subject to emissions targets. However, they will be required to monitor their emissions and notify the regulator if they exceed the threshold.

Free allocation of allowances to eligible installation operators and aircraft operators is maintained to reduce the risk of carbon leakage for UK businesses (UK Government, 2023c). The maximum number of free allowances was set at around 58 million in 2021 (approximately 37% of the 2021 cap) and will decline by 1.6 million allowances per year (ICAP, 2022). Eligible installations must submit a verified Activity Level Report. If the data in the Activity Level Report shows an increase or decrease in activity of 15% or more from historical activity levels, their free allocation will be recalculated. Specific data for Scotland has not been reported.

Free allocations will be made available for operators of eligible installations who applied for a free allocation of allowances for the 2021 to 2025 allocation period and for new entrants to the UK ETS. The free allocation will also apply to the allocation period 2026 to 2030, although free allocations are intended to reduce over time. From 2026, flight operators and aviation businesses will need to buy allowances for every tonne of carbon they emit.

Indirect taxation schemes

Air Passenger Duty (APD)

UK APD is a tax levied on airlines based on the number of passengers carried when departing from a UK airport. It was introduced in 1994 to raise funds for the government and to regulate larger aircraft, but over the years it has become an important environmental tax. The amount of APD is based on the distance travelled and the class of service. There are four different pricing bands. Pricing as of April 2023[12] is:

  • For domestic flights (only within England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), the APD is £6.50 in economy, and £13 in a premium cabin.
  • For international flights of up to 2,000 miles (short haul), the APD is £13 in economy, and £26 in a premium cabin.
  • For international flights of 2,001 to 5,500 miles (long haul), the APD is £87 in economy, and £191 in a premium cabin.
  • For international flights of more than 5,500 miles (ultra long haul), the APD is £91 in economy, and £200 in a premium cabin.

This tax does not apply to flights to the UK, as it is a departure tax only, nor to children under the age of 16 (OMAAT, 2023). Passengers carried on flights leaving from airports in the Scottish Highlands and Islands region are exempt, but passengers on flights from other areas of the UK to airports in Scotland are not. As with other environmental taxes, the government’s revenue from the APD has increased over time. Although it declined between 2020 and 2021 due to restrictions placed on air travel during the COVID-19 pandemic, it reached £2.9 billion in 2022 (Office for National Statistics, 2023). According to HM Revenue & Customs, UK APD collections from Scotland have been over 9% since 1999 and over 10% since 2018, amounting to over £380 million in 2022.

Vehicle Excise Duty (VED)

This is paid by businesses and households as a tax levied on vehicles using public roads in the UK. It is payable annually by owners of most types of vehicles, collected by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. The amount of VED depends on the year of registration of the vehicle: before or after 1 April 2017, or before 1 March 2001. Further changes will come into effect in April 2025, affecting new and existing electric vehicles.

For cars registered before 1 March 2001 the excise duty is based on engine size. Vehicles with an engine size < 1549 cc pay £180 (single annual payment), while vehicles with an engine size > 1549 cc pay £295 (single annual payment). For vehicles registered between 1 March 2001 and 31 March 2017 a standard rate between £0 (up to 100 g/CO₂/km, which includes hybrid vehicles) and £630 (Over 255 g/CO₂/km) is charged based on theoretical CO₂ emission rates per kilometre. The standard rate is only paid in the year the vehicle is first registered.

For vehicles registered from April 2017 onwards, VED are paid every year. First-year VED payments are based on theoretical CO₂ emission rates per kilometre and are in the range between £0 (up to 0 g/CO₂/km, which does not include hybrid vehicles) and £2000 (Over 255 g/CO₂/km). Drivers of Ultra Low Emission Vehicles (ULEVs) are particularly incentivised as they pay zero VED. Drivers of relatively fuel-efficient petrol or diesel cars (up to 10g/km CO₂) pay up to £10 for the year of initial registration (depending on the car’s official CO₂ emissions), while drivers of less fuel-efficient cars pay up to a maximum of £2,000. For the second year and beyond, most drivers pay a fixed flat rate of £140 regardless of their vehicle’s CO₂ emissions (except for zero-emission cars which pay zero). Apart from the payment period, the biggest changes from April 2017 are that hybrid vehicles are no longer rated at £0 and that cars with a retail price above £40,000 will pay a £310 supplement for years 2 to 6. The reformed VED system retains and strengthens the CO₂-based first year rates to incentivise uptake of the very cleanest cars whilst moving to a flat standard rate.

Electric vehicles (EVs) are currently exempt and drivers of EVs pay no VED. However, from 2025 EVs first registered on or after 1 April 2017 will be liable to pay the lower rate in the first year and the standard rate from the second year of registration onwards. This also applies to zero emission vans and motorcycles (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2023).

Landfill tax

The landfill tax was introduced in the UK in October 1996 to encourage recycling and increase the use of reusable materials. Since its introduction, the amount of waste sent to landfill has fallen by 60%. The tax applies to all waste disposed at a licensed landfill site unless the waste is exempt. It is charged by weight and there are two charge rates: a lower rate for ‘inactive waste’, such as rocks or soil, currently £3.25 per tonne, and a standard rate for all other waste, currently £102.10 per tonne. Rates are updated by the UK Government annually and come into effect on 1 April each year.

The landfill tax is paid by the operators or owners of landfill sites, who often pass on the costs to waste producers such as companies or local authority. Households are not required to pay landfill tax directly as local councils and authorities are responsible for the disposal of household waste. However, the cost may be further passed on to households that end up paying it indirectly via their council tax bill.

In 2022, the UK government raised £0.8 billion from the landfill tax (Office for National Statistics, 2023). The revenue is used for a variety of purposes, including supporting environmental projects and programs (Business Waste, 2023). According to HM Revenue & Customs, Scotland’s share of the total collected by the UK Landfill Tax was 13% in 2014-2015 (the tax was devolved to Scotland in 2015), amounting to a collection of £0.15 billion.

Appendix C. Supplementary data

A graph with colorful bars

Description automatically generated with medium confidence Figure 8.1: Share of GHG emissions covered, as of March 2023 (World Bank 2023c)

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Description automatically generated with medium confidence
Figure 8.2: Comparing coverage and prices (CTs and ETS instruments, 2023 (World Bank 2023c))

A graph of blue and green bars

Description automatically generated Figure 8.3: An overview of global carbon credit issuance (World Bank 2023c)

Instrument

Quantified GHG emission reductions

Notes

“Carbon taxes in European nations”

Reduction in GHG emissions “by up to 6.5% over several years”.

Evidence taken from a 2018 review, drawing on data up to the end of 2015 from 35 carbon taxes (cited in Green 2021). The instruments and period are not specified further.

Carbon tax in British Columbia

Reductions over 2008 – 2014 (with some variation in dates among studies) range between 5% and 15% below a counterfactual reference level, or around 2% per year. Note it is not clear in the source if this figure relates to total emissions in the jurisdiction or in affected sectors; it is assumed to be the latter.

A 2015 study noted it reduced CO2 emissions from gasoline consumption by more than 2.4 million tonnes in the first four years of operation. And a 2020 study over the period 1990-2014 noted the tax had reduced transport sector emissions by 5%.

Evidence based on a meta-review of various (number not given) of studies on the BC tax. Note this estimate does not include a quantitative estimate of carbon leakage associated with the tax to other jurisdictions. The net reduction is therefore highly likely to be less (cited in Green, 2021).

UK carbon price support (UKCPS)

A 2019 study concludes the UKCPS reduced emissions in the power sector between 41% and 49% over 4 years (2013–17). Another that it reduced emissions “overall” by 6.2% (2013-2016(2.1% per year)), based on a price of €18 per ton.

All three studies are cited in Green, 2021. It is not always clear if these studies referred to reductions within the sectors affected by the instrument or overall aggregate reduction. Again, it is assumed to be the former. As above, the treatment of carbon leakage is not specified, hence the emission reduction estimates may be overstated.

UK Climate Change Levy (CCL)

A third study noted the CCL reduced emissions amongst power plants paying the full levy rate by “between 8.4% and 22.6% compared to plants paying the reduced rate”. The study refers to between 2000 and 2004.

Sweden Carbon Tax

Overall, the findings differ. A 2019 study estimated emission reductions of 6.3% in an average year, between 1990 and 2005. Other studies identify emission reductions only in certain sectors (district heating emissions, in a 1998 study and emissions from petrol in a 2018 study).

The review notes “Nordic taxes tend to do better on emission reductions, although the wide variation in fundings make it hard to conclude this definitively”. The source is not clear on the precise period in question for each statistic, but the overall period assessed was 1960-2010. Other studies suggest the tax had “little or no effect on emissions”. This is an important finding, given the relatively high carbon price in Sweden as well as the length it has been in operation. Note: No estimates have been identified for Liechtenstein and Switzerland, the other jurisdictions with the highest carbon prices.

Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden.

A 2011 study identified no effect on per capita growth rate of emissions between 1990 and 2008 in any jurisdiction, except Finland (which saw a reduction of 1.7%).

The study applied a “difference in difference” analysis (a type of economic modelling approach). The time period this refers to is not clear.

Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland.

A 2019 study identifies annual reductions in Sweden of 17.2% and 19.4% in Norway, but “no statistically significant effects in Denmark or Finland, over the period 1990-2004.

Based on a synthetic control study (a statistical approach which compares effects based on case studies). Results considered “an outlier” in the Green 2021 review.

Norway

A 1997 study identifies a reduction of between 3% to 4% between 1991 and 1993 (1-1.3% per year).

Based on a hypothetical counterfactual scenario.

Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Slovenia

An increase in price of €1 per ton in CO2 tax results in an annual 11.58 kg per capita decrease in emissions.

Based on panel data.

France

Carbon tax reduced emissions in manufacturing sectors by between 1% and 5% between 2014 and 2018.

A 2019 study, using a counterfactual based on historical data.

“Tipping points”

A 2018 study, based on analysis between 1995 and 2013 suggests that CO2 taxes reduce emission if they surpass 2.2% of GDP.

Based on economic modelling based on panel data.

Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, UK, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.

Average reduction of 3.1% compared to a historical baseline (for 6 of the 7 countries).

Based on historical data for the baseline and a counterfactual using country specific data. The “7th country” is not specified.

Table 8.1: Quantitative impacts from selected instruments

Instrument

Annual revenue (million)

Per capita revenue

Share of GDP

Earmarking/hypothecation

Sweden carbon dioxide tax

$3,680

$381

0.67%

General funds (50%) and revenue recycling (50%)

Norway carbon dioxide tax

$1,580

$307

0.31%

Green spending (30%); general funding (40%) revenue recycling (30%)

British Columbia carbon tax shift

$1,100

$239

0.49%

Revenue recycling (102%)

Denmark carbon tax act (2010)

$1,000

$177

0.29%

Green spending (8%); general funding (47%) revenue recycling (45%)

Switzerland carbon dioxide levy

$875

$107

0.13%

Green spending (33%); revenue recycling (67%)

Mexico special tax on production and services (2014)

$870

$7

0.06%

General funding (100%)

Finland carbon dioxide tax

$800

$146

0.29%

General funding (50%); revenue recycling (50%)

Ireland [1}

$510

$111

0.03%

Green spending (13%); general funds (88%)

Japan tax for climate mitigation (2012)

$490

$4

0.01%

Green spending (100%)

France [2]

$452

$7

0.02%

Green spending (100%)

Iceland [3]

$30

$92

0.22%

General funds (100%)

Table 8.2: Carbon tax revenue characteristics (based on 2013 data, unless specified) Carl and Fedor, 2016

Notes:

  1. natural gas carbon tax, mineral oil tax and solid fuel carbon tax, data from 2012
  2. domestic consumption tax on energy products (carbon dioxide), data for 2014 and reflects a partial year
  3. Carbon tax on carbon of fossil fuel origin

Instrument

Annual revenue (EUR Million)

Earmarking/

hypothecation commitment

Notes on revenue use

Canada (Alberta and BC)

1,520

Legally binding

Overall spending measures exceed revenues, via tax cuts, rebates and direct compensation. Revenues are distributed to households – targeted to low-income households – as well as business (including small businesses). Since 2018 a “clean growth incentive programme has been supported which focuses on research on fugitive emissions in the oil and gas sector and on slash burning.

Chile

233 (2018)

None

Unconstrained (used for general funds). Tax introduced in 2014 as part of a broader reform, to help fund educational reform policy.

Denmark

480

Political commitment

No data.

Finland

1,402

All revenues distributed as tax cuts or rebates.

France

3,800

79% legally binding, remainder unconstrained

The legally hypothecated 79% is distributed via tax cuts and rebates. Up to 2016 this funded a tax credit for business. Since 2017 revenues are allocated to a dedicated “energy transition account” which compensates affected industries of a proportion of the costs associated with use of renewable energy sources.

Iceland

26

None

Revenues are unconstrained.

Ireland

434

12% legally binding, reminder via political commitment

The majority of revenues are distributed via tax cuts and rebates, including reductions in payroll taxes. A small proportion is allocated to energy efficiency measures, particularly household retrofits to help households at risk of fuel poverty and to provide support for rural public transport.

Japan

No data

100% legally binding.

Revenue data is not publicly available but used for energy efficiency and renewable energy support programmes.

Norway

1,246

44% legally binding, reminder via political commitment

Revenues are distributed via tax cuts and rebates. A proportion of the revenue flows to the Government Pension fund, the returns from which (expected to equate to the real rate of return (3%)) are then allocated to general government funds.

Portugal

134

11% legally binding

Reallocated to tax cuts and rebates particularly income tax reductions for households with larger families. A proportion of the revenue are allocated to green and environmental spending, including infrastructure for electric vehicles, public transport, conversation and climate change mitigation policy.

Slovenia

132

All revenues are unconstrained

From 2005 to 2008 some revenues were used to finance carbon reduction projects and environmental subsidies for industries.

Sweden

2,549

Introduced in the early 1990s as part of a broader fiscal reform package. The revenues were used to finance labour tax reductions as well as fund Sweden’s 1996 application to the EU. Revenues from 2016 flow directly to central government budget.

Switzerland

985

100% of revenues legally binding

One third of revenues fund energy efficiency in buildings, including geothermal heating as well as a technology fund. The remainder fund social security contributions for businesses as well as subsidies on health care premiums.

Table 8.3: Revenues and allocations, based on 2016 data (OECD 2019)

Appendix D. Case studies

For all case studies, RAG rating for similarities to Scotland denoted red [R], amber [A] and green [G].

Case study 1

Lever type: Direct Carbon TaxJurisdiction: British Columbia, Canada

Context

Population and GDP

[G]

Like Scotland, Canada is a high-income country, it comprises ten provinces and three territories. The British Columbia (BC) economy is similar in size to Scotland’s. For comparison, BC’s GDP was $265.8 billion (around £154 billion)[13] in 2020; Scotland’s was £148 billion. GDP per Capita in BC is $59,962 (Government of Canada, 2023a); in Scotland it was $42,632 in 2021 (Scottish Government, 2023a)[14] BC’s population is also comparable; BC’s population was 5 million in 2021 (Government of Canada, 2023b), compared to 5.4 million in Scotland in 2022 (Scottish Government, 2023c).

Administrative and legal arrangement/ competencies

[G]

The carbon tax in BC was designed, applied, enforced, and administered at province level. This makes it of particular interest to Scotland, given devolution. Since its implementation however, it was frozen and then re-introduced when the Federal carbon tax was implemented at national scale by the Canadian Government. This tax is administered by the Canadian Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Environment and Climate Change is responsible for the inventory and allocating funding.

Shared challenges

[A]

Canada relies heavily on fossil fuel consumption for both domestic use and net exports of carbon-intensive manufactured goods and fossil fuels. It is also among some of the most intensive emitters of CO2 in the OECD, with per capita emissions for 2010 being recording at 15.5 tonnes per capita of CO₂. This compares to 9.6 tonnes per capita of CO₂ the OECD average and 7.6 tonnes per capita in the UK in the same year (OECD, 2023).[15] BC sources a very high proportion (93% of its electricity in 2008) from renewable energy, specifically hydropower (Harrison, 2013).

Climate ambition

[A]

Canada is committed to achieving Net Zero by 2050. Scotland has committed to reducing emissions by 75% by 2030 and achieving Net Zero by 2045.

Data and evidence

[G]

There is significant information available.

Diversity of approaches

[G]

The approach taken in BC is a direct carbon tax that is administered at sub-national level. It is the only sub-national direct carbon tax selected as a case study.

Lever design

The BC Government introduced the first carbon tax in North America in 2008 (Pretis, 2022). It was introduced at a time when other North American governments were embracing cap and trade over taxation (Harrison, 2013). It is a direct carbon tax applied to fuels based on their CO₂ content, covering all liquid transportation fuels such as gasoline and diesel, as well as natural gas or coal used to power electric plants. The tax is applicable to 70-75% of the province’s GHG emissions, with the remainder of GHG emissions coming from non-combustion CO2 in industrial processes, methane emissions, from natural gas extraction and transmission, nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture and CO₂ emissions from forestry (Murray and Rivers, 2015, p.676). The rate of the tax at implementation was $10 CAD per tonne emitted. Initially, this was set to rise by $5 CAD per year until it reached $30 CAD per tonne in 2012. The tax increase was frozen however in 2012 by the British Columbia Government.

In 2018, a change in government and the implementation of a federal carbon tax in Canada resulted in the BC carbon tax being unfrozen and the price increased. However, the legislation surrounding the tax was altered to no longer require revenue neutrality. We understand, following a stakeholder interview, that the British Columbian Government have mirrored the rates set by the federal government at national scale by following the federal government’s schedule for carbon tax increases[16].

The British Columbian government initially committed to the tax being revenue neutral. It operated as a tax shift wherein carbon tax revenues were countered by cuts in other taxes (such as business taxes, personal income tax, low-income tax credits and direct grants to rural households) or direct transfers to households. Between the tax’s implementation in 2008 and 2015, the tax generated C$6.1 billion (Murray and Rivers, 2015). Since 2018, the revenue generated is now allocated centrally by the federal government. The revenues are then redistributed through dedicated tax rebates for low-income households or for public purposes, including climate action.[17] The administration of the tax is via the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Environment and Climate Change is responsible for the inventory and fund allocation.[18]

When introduced, the tax did not include exemptions for particular sectors, it was applied universally. Concerns were raised, however, by greenhouse plant/vegetable growers (Seed your future, 2023)[19] regarding the competitiveness of their operations in comparison with California and Mexico. This led the Government in BC to introduce a one-time exemption (worth $7.6 million) from the Carbon tax in 2012, an ongoing 80% exemption from the carbon tax for greenhouse growers from 2013, and an exemption for gasoline and diesel used in agriculture from 2014.

Lever effectiveness

Public perception of the carbon tax in BC, almost 15 years on from its implementation, is seen as generally positive. The tax is considered a success in terms of its role in promoting behavioural change and decreasing consumer demand for fossil fuels and natural gas (Pretis, 2022). The Pretis paper outlines a series of studies, including Xiang and Lawley (2018) and Antweiler and Gulati (2016) that drew correlations between the implementation of the tax and a decrease in fuel demand. Furthermore, evidence shows that the tax has had a low per capita cost, aiding further public acceptance.

Bernard and Kichian (2019) assess the extent to which the tax reduces British Columbia’s CO2 emissions. They state that once reaching the rate of $30/ton of CO2, it achieved an estimated 1.13-million-ton reduction in CO2 emissions, amounting to an average annual reduction of 1.3% relative to BC 2008 diesel emissions and to 0.2% relative to all BC CO2 emissions in 2008. Bernard and Kichian (2019) argue however, that whilst the tax can be considered politically successful, the reductions seen are not significant enough for it to be considered a viable strategy, in isolation, for the Canadian government to meet its carbon-related commitments.

Pretis (2022) conducted a study on the effectiveness of the tax at reducing aggregate CO₂ emissions in order to determine economy-wide CO2 emission reductions. It was concluded that there is a lack of statistically significant proof of economy-wide effectiveness. The carbon tax was considered too low to result in rapid cross-sectoral changes. Pretis (2022) did outline that the tax has had significant impact on emissions from transport as BC relies heavily on individual motor vehicles due to the long driving distances and limited public transport. It also showed little impact on emissions from electricity production. This is explained by the high reliance on hydropower for electricity generation.

The revenue-neutral commitment made by the government upon implementation of the carbon tax has been criticised by some analysts for not fully compensating low-income households for the additional burden due to higher energy prices (Beck et al., 2014). Beck et al. (2014) argues however, that criticisms such as that are unfounded, stating that the government have made every effort to ensure that the policy is equitable. It is important to note however, that this study was published before the revenue-neutrality element of the tax was changed, no later assessments of the equitability of the tax were found.

Key lessons learned

Pretis (2022) argues that the BC carbon tax is a good example for the introduction of carbon taxes in comparable jurisdictions. It confirms that carbon tax policies with high public support and acceptance are possible. It is also a positive example for how a carbon tax, with targeted sectoral exemptions, can reduce aggregate emissions. Pretis (2022) notes however, that the predominant role that hydropower plays in BC electricity generation potentially limits its applicability where reliance on fossil fuels is higher.

Moreover, Harrison (2013) argued that the introduction of a carbon tax in BC resulted from a “perfect storm” of factors that enabled its implementation. These factors included the prominence of the hydropower, an increase in public concern for climate change, a government with the trust of the business community and a political leader (at province level) with the ability and determination to implement his ambitions. It is important to consider therefore, that whilst it worked in the context of BC, other nations considering the implementation of a carbon tax with a similar ethos, will still need a combination of factors related to political, economic and social context which ultimately determine its success.

But several elements of the BC context are applicable to Scotland. First, there are lessons to be learnt from the progression of the tax, transitioning from sub-national instrument to later alignment with federal standards. It is an example of how sub-national taxation can be successful at reducing GHG emissions at sectoral level. It also shows that subnational carbon taxation can generate significant revenue for Governments to spend as they deem fit. As in Scotland there is high reliance on private vehicle use in BC, given low population density, extent of rural areas and low reliability of public transport connections in rural areas. Bernard and Kichian (2019) also noted that whilst the carbon tax in BC is generally publicly accepted, it has not been shown to have influenced significant reductions in overall emissions of CO2. They conclude therefore that it should not be considered a viable sole strategy for the Canadian government to meet its carbon-related commitments.

Case study 2

Lever type: Direct Carbon TaxJurisdiction: Sweden

Context

Population and GDP

[A]

Like Scotland, Sweden is a high-income country. Sweden has a larger economy and double the population. For example, GDP per Capita in Sweden was $65,157 in 2021 and in Scotland was $42,362 (Scottish Government, 2023a).[20] Sweden’s GDP was $683 billion in 2021 compared to Scotland’s £148 billion. Sweden has a population of 10.5 million (2022), approximately double that of Scotland (5.4 million in the same year (Scottish Government, 2023c)).

Administrative and legal arrangement/ competencies

[A]

Sweden provides an example of a nationally administered carbon tax.

The carbon tax is levied on transport fuels and is designed to work alongside Sweden’s energy tax and the EU ETS. Sweden’s energy tax is levied on diesel, coal, oil, and electricity used for heating purposes. This could give valuable lessons for Scotland in terms of designing a similar carbon tax to function alongside the UK ETS and the UK climate change levy.

Shared challenges

[G]

Both Sweden and Scotland are increasing their renewable energy potential, in 2021 around 60% of Sweden’s energy production came from renewable sources compared to Scotland at around 57% (Swedish Institute, 2022) (BBC, 2021). In addition, both Sweden and Scotland have rural and rural-island communities which create a unique set of challenges and opportunities in delivering equitable national climate action.

Climate ambition

[G]

Sweden is legally bound to achieving Net Zero by 2045. They are on track with this target and have managed to meet one of their renewable energy targets already. Scotland has similarly committed to achieving Net Zero by 2045 and reducing emissions by 75% by 2030.

Data and evidence

[G]

There is significant information available for this case study as the carbon tax was implemented in the early 1990s, however there are contesting views on the effectiveness of the tax in reducing greenhouse gas.

Diversity of approaches

[G]

This is an example of a direct carbon tax, administered at national level. The tax is one of the oldest and currently the highest priced carbon tax in the world.

Lever Design

Due to growing environmental concerns and building on Sweden’s history of levying taxes on energy products, the government introduced their first carbon tax in 1991 (Andersson, 2019). The carbon tax was levied on gas oil, heavy fuel oil, coal, natural gas, petrol, gas oil, heavy fuel oil, coal and natural gas (Johansson, 2000). To ensure Sweden’s existing energy tax – levied on diesel, coal, oil, and electricity for heating purposes – would work alongside the newly introduced carbon tax, fuels used for power generation were exempt from the carbon tax (Johansson, 2000). As such the fuels targeted by the carbon tax were mainly used within the transport sector, which in the early 1990s was Sweden’s largest emitting sector.

In 1991, the carbon tax was introduced at a price of US$30 per tonne of CO₂ however tax rates were lowered by 50% for the agricultural and industrial sector to avoid carbon leakage and ensure international competitiveness. Furthermore, full exemptions were made for fuels used within electricity production as these were covered by Sweden’s energy tax (Jonsson, Ydstedt, & Asen, 2022). The Carbon tax introduction in 1991, was part of a wider tax reform by the Swedish Government, referred to as the “green tax switch”. Here, environmental taxes were increased while taxes such as marginal income tax, corporate tax and the capital income tax were lowered. The revenue generated by the carbon tax was 26 billion SEK in 2004 (Government Offices of Sweden, 2021).

More recently, the carbon tax covers the direct (Scope 1) CO₂ emissions from all fossil fuels except peat, with 90% of the tax revenue coming from gasoline and motor diesel alone (Andersson, 2019) (World Bank, 2023b). As there are still numerous fuel exemptions from the tax, for example those used for commercial aviation and maritime, only around 40% of Sweden’s greenhouse gas emissions are covered by the tax. Some of the exempted industries are covered by the EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) however levies within this scheme currently price carbon lower than the carbon tax (Jonsson, Ydstedt, & Asen, 2022). Note limited data was identified regarding the administration and enforcement of the tax.

Lever effectiveness

Public perception of the tax is generally positive, and Sweden is acknowledged as a pioneer in environmental governance at an at an international level (Hildingsson and Knaggård, 2022). The tax is considered to be a success as Sweden has been able to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions while maintaining a growing GDP (Government Offices of Sweden, 2021).

Published research has attempted to quantify the effectiveness of the tax in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Research by Sumner, Bird & Smith (2009) evaluates the carbon tax by comparing its implementation period to national greenhouse gas reduction trends. The results state that emissions were reduced by approximately 15% from 1990 to 1996, by 9% from 1990 to 2006 and decreased by 40% from the mid-1970s to 2008. There is some methodological disagreement on what reduction can be attributed to the carbon tax, in isolation. A review of ex-post analyses of carbon taxes by Green (2021) reveals contesting results around Sweden’s emission reductions. For example, research by Andersson (2019) found an average emission reduction of 6.3% per year between 1990 and 2005, Fernando (2019) found an annual average reduction of 17.2% and research by Shmelev and Speck (2018) found no effect on emissions. A study conducted by Jonsson, Ydstedt, & Asen (2022) state that GHG emissions have declined by 27% between 1990 and 2018.

In terms of revenue generated by the tax, by 1994 the carbon tax generated 7 billion SEK. From 1994 revenue rapidly increased to 26 billion SEK in 2004 (Government Offices of Sweden, 2021). During this time the carbon tax rate increased from 23 EUR/tonne CO₂ to 84 EUR/tonne CO₂. Fluctuations in revenue generated by the tax have been caused by an increasing tax rate and decreasing tax base (greenhouse gas emissions overall are declining).

From 2004, the revenue generated stabilised until 2010 and since then it has gradually declined over the last decade (Jonsson, Ydstedt, & Asen, 2022). In 2019, SEK 22.2 billion was generated which is approximately 1% of Sweden’s total tax revenue. The carbon tax revenue goes into the overall government budget, and is not hypothecated, thus it is unclear where revenue generated is distributed (Jonsson, Ydstedt, & Asen, 2022).

The carbon tax has shown to be effective in shifting market investment into low-carbon technology, specifically in renewable energy sources such as hydro and wind (Hildingsson and Knaggård, 2022). In 2019, 59% of Sweden’s energy mix was generated by renewable energy sources (Hildingsson and Knaggård, 2022). Levying the carbon tax at different rates on fuels has also resulted in behaviour changes in companies. Between 1993 and 1997, the higher tax rate on fuels used within domestic heating systems compared to fuels used within industry resulted in industries selling their byproducts to domestic heating companies, while continuing to burn fossil fuels themselves (Johansson, 2000). Our understanding, following a stakeholder interview, is that the carbon tax increased the price of gasoline and diesel for consumers at the fuel pump and in response there was a substitution away from gasoline toward diesel. This interviewee referred to data showing road sector fuel consumption of gasoline decreasing while diesel consumption increased after the carbon tax was implemented.

Key lessons learned

Sweden’s experience with the world’s longest standing carbon tax makes it a valuable case study for Scotland. Sweden’s carbon tax is described as a ‘resilient success’ by the policy assessment called the “PPPE framework” (programmatic, process, political and endurance) and the tax has formed the backbone of environmental policy in Sweden to date (Hildingsson and Knaggård, 2022).

The tax has been continuously redesigned over the past 30 years by the Swedish Government to reflect Sweden’s political, social, and economic situation. For example, the tax rate has incrementally increased over the last 30 years and the tax rate has been lowered by 50% on fossil fuels used by industry. These measures have ensured Sweden’s international competitiveness in energy exports have not been negatively impacted by the tax (Hildingsson and Knaggård, 2022).

Sweden’s carbon tax was introduced at a time in which the country was undergoing a wider fiscal reform referred to as the ‘green tax shift’ where energy and CO2 taxes were introduced while labour taxes were reduced. Research by Shmelev and Speck (2018) suggests that in isolation the carbon tax would have been insufficient at reducing emissions and emission reductions were only achieved by a collective effort of the carbon tax, energy tax and investment into low carbon technology such as nuclear and hydro power. As evidence suggests, a carbon tax alone may not be effective enough in reducing Scotland’s emissions.

Research by Carattini, Carvalho and Fankhauser (2018) reveals that the public’s support in increasing the Swedish carbon tax was strengthened by findings which demonstrated the effectiveness of the tax in reducing national emissions. Therefore, Scotland would need to consider the benefits of public awareness and information sources in incentivising support around any potential future carbon tax, should it be considered. Tax revenue recycling can be implemented to reduce potential distributional effects of carbon taxes. Thus, Scotland could explore revenue recycling options if it were to consider implementing a carbon tax to reduce any distributional effects such as income inequality.

Case study 3

Lever type: National ETS (nETS)Jurisdiction: Austria

Context

Population and GDP

[A]

Austria is a high-income country, however, there are differences in GDP. Austria’s was 537 billion USD in 2021, whereas Scotland was 181 billion in 2021). In per capita terms, this equates to $59,991 per capita for Austria in 2021 in comparison to Scotland’s $42,361 in the same year.[21].Austria also has almost double the population of Scotland – 9 million vs 5.4 million in 2022 (OECD, 2023a; OECD 2023b; Scottish Government, 2023a).

Administrative and legal arrangement/ competencies

[G]

The Austrian nETS is administered at national level. However, it has been specifically designed to fit around and complement the EU ETS, a supranational cap and trade system. This could give valuable lessons for Scotland in terms of designing a similar scheme around the UK ETS.

Shared challenges

[A]

Both Austria and Scotland are rapidly growing their renewable energy potential, although their situations are not necessarily comparable – Scotland had a target of 100% renewable electricity generation by 2020, however, the equivalent of 85% of gross energy consumption was from renewable sources in 2021. (Scottish Government, 2023b).

Austria aims to reach 100% renewable electricity generation by 2030, and in 2021 Austria’s electricity mix was 71% renewable energy (Eurostat, 2023). Austria’s renewable energy is largely supplied by hydropower as a result of the many rivers and high rainfall, whereas Scotland’s is largely driven by onshore and offshore wind (Scottish Renewables, 2023). Austria has no island communities but does contain large rural population which could provide useful insights and comparators, in particular for the transport sector covered by the nETS.

Climate ambition

[G]

The Austrian government has pledged to achieve Net Zero by 2040, however this has not been enshrined into national legislation and the IEA state that achieving this would require Austria to substantially enhance decarbonisation efforts across all energy sectors (IEA, 2023). Despite this, they have demonstrated climate ambition by implementing a novel fiscal lever to reduce GHG emissions in non-EU ETS sectors. Although Germany also has a nETS in place, neither have been in place long enough to generate significant evidence on effectiveness.

Data and evidence

[G]

A lot of information is available on the lever design; however, the scheme is still in its initial implementation phase. An overall cap on emissions and trading of allowances, which will create a “market” price, will be initiated in 2026. Therefore, no ex-post evidence is available on effectiveness of the lever in practice as it has not yet reached the final stage of implementation.

Diversity of approaches

[G]

This is the only national level ETS considered as a case study. Germany also operates a similar national level ETS but these are novel approaches.

Lever design


Austria launched its nETS as part of the Ecological Tax Reform Act on 1 October 2022 (Parliament Österreich, 2022). The reforms included many other pricing instruments, so was implemented as part of a wider policy package. The scheme was initially intended to be in place from 1 July 2022, but was postponed as part of an energy relief package intended to relieve cost of living pressures from increased energy prices resulting from the war in Ukraine.


The nETS was designed to complement and exist alongside the EU ETS. It covers CO2 emissions from fossil fuels including transport fuels (petrol and diesel), fuel and heating oil, natural gas/liquified gas, coal and kerosene used in sectors which are not regulated under the EU ETS. The sectors in scope are small, non-EU ETS industry, transport, buildings, waste and agriculture. No data has been identified which set out the differences between the EU ETS and nETS in terms of GHG coverage. Designing the nETS to fit around the EU ETS, namely ensuring that EU ETS installations are not exposed to double counting, was one of the biggest challenges the Austrian government experienced when implementing this lever.[22]


The ETS has a fixed price, which is designed to steadily increase from 2022-2025, before transitioning to a market price after that, which will operate as a standard cap and trade scheme. The scheme was designed to increase as a fixed price in this way to ensure there is security for market participants to plan ahead. The pricing scheme is as follows, for allowance which covers one tonne of CO₂e:



  • 2022 – 30 EUR

  • 2023 – 35 EUR

  • 2024 – 45 EUR

  • 2025 – 55 EUR


For comparison, the price under the EU ETS in September 2023 was ~85 EUR per tonne. Therefore, the price under the nETS is much lower than under the EU ETS, however, at the end of the transitional phase it will be closer. However, by nature of the market phase it is uncertain what the price will be after the fixed allowance prices cease.


Phased implementation


In the early phase of the scheme (2022-2023), there is a fixed price and a simplified procedure for registration and reporting – registered entities (the company/person liable for paying the tax) are not required to conduct monitoring and reporting at this stage, and the National Emissions Trading Information System is being established. Emission allowances do not need to be formally purchased or surrenders, so the scheme is more like a tax, although companies are preparing for full implementation.


In the transitional phase (2024-2025), allowances will start being issued and surrendered and obligatory monitoring and reporting will be phased in. This will include independent verification of emission allowances. In 2026, an overall cap on emissions will be in place and allowances will shift to a market price. The scheme will eventually align with the EU ETS 2, which from 2027 will eventually price emissions in the same sectors at European level.


Compliance, MRV and Enforcement (ICAP, 2023)


The Austrian Federal Ministry for Finance (BMF) and its excess duty administration is responsible for the implementation of the scheme in Austria, which has eased administration burdens for implementing the scheme due to similarities with existing excise duties, although the process of surrendering allowances is new and has been a learning process (other departments handle this for EU ETS).[23]


The compliance period runs per calendar year, and registered entities must submit an emissions report at the end of June for the previous year’s emissions, and then have until the end of July in the following year to surrender allowances to cover the reported emissions. Emissions reporting must be independently verified and be based on a pre-approved monitoring plan. Exemptions are in place for installations subject to the EU ETS to avoid double burdens, negligible cases (emitting less than one tonne CO₂e) or exemptions under energy taxes.


Entities must pay an increased certificate price (at two times the fixed emissions price) for each tonne of CO₂e for which no allowance has been surrendered. Once the market phase has been reached, entities must pay an increased certificate price of EUR 125 per tonne CO2e. Fines can be issued for other instances of non-compliance, apart from those exempted outlined above.


The Austrian Federal Ministry for Finance (BMF) is the authority responsible for establishing the regulatory framework of the nETS, and the Office for National Emissions Allowance Trading at the Austria Customs Office is the implementing authority, responsible for receiving emissions reports.


Revenue


The nETS was implemented as part of a wider policy package. Although revenue for the emissions allowances goes directly into the main budget and there is no hypothecation, ‘climate bonus’ payments are given directly back to households. This is paid as a set price per person, which means that relatively poorer households (who typically live a less carbon intensive lifestyle, hence pay less of the costs) gain relatively more back than richer households. Currently, in the fixed price phase, more money is given back to households and companies in ‘climate bonus’ payments than is received by the Austrian government in revenue. Revenue in 2022 was approximately €800 million and the government have provided rebates of around €1 billion.[24]


Lever effectiveness

There are no ex-post studies or evaluations available as the lever has not yet reached its full implementation stage. Emissions data for 2022 (although implementation only started in October 2022) will be available in due course. However, 2022 was an unusual year as energy prices were very high, affecting behaviour. The CO2 price was still relatively low in 2022 – a carbon price of €30 leads to no more than €0.08 per litre of diesel or gasoline). Therefore, the Austrian government do not think that this will be representative of a typical year.

Ex ante modelling studies conducted by the Austrian government showed that the scheme was expected to reduce CO2 emissions from the sectors affected of around 800,000 tonnes by 2025.[25] During the fixed price scheme the price signal is not expected to result in a clear and significant change in behaviour, however, other parts of the policy package are designed to specifically change behaviour (such as subsidies for changing heating systems in households).

Key lessons learned

The case of the nETS in Austria could yield important lessons for any potential similar system in Scotland. The Austrian scheme is specifically designed to be complementary to the existing EU ETS and covers emissions from non-EU ETS sectors. A similar scheme in Scotland could be designed to complement and exist alongside the UK ETS, which currently has the same coverage as the EU ETS. This would be crucial to ensure there is no double counting, and this was a key area highlighted by interviewees. The sectors covered by the Austrian nETS are small industry, transport, agriculture and buildings, which are not covered by the EU ETS.

Many effects of the scheme are yet to be realised as the scheme is still under phased implementation. This phased implementation has been crucial to give businesses certainty about the future. However, from experience, the Austrian government suggest that a period of mandatory monitoring and reporting, without implementing a carbon charge, would be a useful place to start.[26]

Case study 4

Lever type: Proposed tax on agricultural emissionsJurisdiction: New Zealand

Context

Population and GDP

[G]

Like Scotland, New Zealand is a high-income country. New Zealand’s economy is larger than Scotland ($231.7 billion in 2020, compared to £148 billion and GDP per capita is slightly higher ($47,982 in NZ and $42,362 in Scotland in 2021 (Scottish Government, 2023a))[27]. New Zealand is of comparable size to Scotland in terms of population (NZ 5.1 million in 2022 (OECD, 2023b) compared to 5.4 million in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2023c)).

Administrative and legal arrangement/ competencies

[A]

The proposed tax on agricultural emissions in New Zealand would apply at a national level.

Shared challenges

[G]

The agricultural sector plays a key role in New Zealand’s economy, being a net exporter of farm commodities. In 2020, the crop and livestock exported was worth $25 billion (Ministry for Primary Industries, New Zealand Government, 2022). Similarly, approximately 80% of Scotland’s land mass is currently being under agricultural production (National Farmers Union Scotland, 2023). Like Scotland, New Zealand has a high potential for transitioning its energy sector towards renewable sources. This is due to the high potential of its wind, solar and hydro energy sectors (Anon, 2021).

Climate ambition

[A]

New Zealand is committed to achieving Net Zero by 2050. Scotland has committed to more ambitious targets of achieving a 75% reduction in its CO₂ emissions by 2030 and Net Zero by 2045.

Data and evidence

[R]

There is limited evidence available on the tax and its exact design is still uncertain as the original design was revoked and is yet to be applied. However, it is the first tax which explicitly focusses on agricultural emissions. Lessons may be learned in terms of design, political acceptance and implementation.

Diversity of approaches

[G]

Despite the exact format of the tax remaining uncertain, it is a novel concept that could provide valuable insight for Scotland.

Lever design

A government announcement in December 2020 declared a climate emergency that “demands a sufficiently ambitious, urgent, and coordinated response across government to meet the scale and complexity of the challenge”. Following this, an emissions reduction plan for the Agricultural sector was announced in May 2022. The aim was to meet emissions reduction targets set in New Zealand’s Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement, and the domestic emission reduction targets laid out in the Climate Change Response Act 2002 (CCRA). Targets were set at both national and at sectoral scale. Particular attention was paid to the agricultural sector given it accounts for half of New Zealand’s total greenhouse gas emissions (New Zealand Government, 2023).

Almost 20 years ago, the New Zealand government announced a ‘fart tax’, which taxed GHG emissions deriving from livestock and agricultural sources. The announcement resulted in protest amongst the farming community. The Government then retracted the proposal, demonstrating the strong political influence the agricultural industry holds (Pannett, 2023). More recently, in 2022, the government founded a partnership with the Māori government and primary industry. The partnership was known as the He Waka Eke Noa – the Primary Sector Climate Action Partnership.

It proposed a ‘farm-level levy’ that would require farms to calculate their emissions and pay for them. The emissions pricing was set to use a split-gas approach by applying unique levy rates to long-lived gases, i.e., carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide. Note this would be alongside an ETS also introduced in New Zealand. In response to the proposal for a farm-level levy, the Government launched a consultation to gain feedback from a series of stakeholders on options to price agricultural emissions (New Zealand Government, 2022b). The results of the consultation highlighted public concerns for the impact of the levy on the cost and availability of agricultural produce to consumers as farmers, growers and the wider agricultural sector adjust to internalising the new cost on emissions (Ministry for the Environment and Ministry for Primary Industries, 2022). A series of media outlets, including the Washington Post, have reported on tensions between the agricultural sector in New Zealand and the government. Farmers expressed concerns regarding both the profitability and competitiveness of their business, with some expecting to have to reduce their herd size (Pannett, 2023).

The concerns of the agricultural sector have been attributed to the government altering their proposal. A new, temporarily less-stringent proposal was made that shifted the Government’s focus from farm-level taxation towards tightening monitoring and permitting requirements. Instead of outlining farm-level emission pricing, this shifted the focus – at least in the short term – toward a phased approach to mandatory monitoring and reporting requirements, to be implemented by 2025. The proposal delays the implementation of a farm-level levy therefore, until 2027. This new proposed legislation has been better received by the agricultural sector, although some have suggested the involvement of farming lobby groups in the development process (Corlett, 2022).

The first stage of the revised proposal outlines a standardised approach to measuring and reporting of on-farm emissions which would eventually transition into the mandatory reporting of all farm-related emissions. The second area involved the recognition and reward of scientifically valid forms of on-farm sequestration (New Zealand Government, 2023). The policy would require that all producers in the agricultural sector collate emission reports by the end of 2022 and develop a farm plan to be implemented by 2025 (New Zealand Government, 2022a). These requirements seek to ensure farmers are aware of their own on-farm emissions and can provide the government with detail on their practices and technologies, providing it with further detail into how best to reduce emissions borne from agricultural sources and how emission levels vary between farms (New Zealand Government, 2023). It is proposed that the mandatory requirements for reporting and monitoring would apply to Inland Revenue registered farms.

The proposal also outlines financial incentives for farmers to use technologies recommended by the Government that reduce sheep and cow burps. It also commits to reinvest the revenue generated from the tax into the sector (Craymer, 2022).

Lever effectiveness

The lever is yet to be implemented; therefore, assessments of effectiveness or behavioural impacts are not available. The tax is thought to offer potential to reduce New Zealand’s emissions due to the contribution of the agriculture sector to New Zealand’s total GHG emissions (Craymer, 2022). The agricultural sector accounts for nearly half of New Zealand’s total GHG emissions, the majority of which are emissions of methane. These emissions are not covered in New Zealand’s ETS (Craymer, 2022).

Key lessons learned

The New Zealand Government’s transition from a policy which placed direct pricing on emissions at farm-level towards one that implemented monitoring and reporting requirements demonstrates the importance of introducing change in a staggered, cooperative manner. Whilst the initial proposal from 2002 was widely contested, the involvement of farming groups in the development of the policy has enabled the Government to implement measures that are a step towards the pricing mechanism they have committed to in 2027 (Corlett, 2022).

The New Zealand case has demonstrated the importance of stakeholder engagement in the successful implementation of contentious policies. One of our interviewees Professor Lorraine Whitmarsh who specialises in behavioural change and public policy acceptance, highlighted the importance of stakeholder engagement in policy development to gain public acceptance more generally. She noted the Scottish Government had made progress in implementing these methods in its policymaking process.

Case study 5

Lever type: Indirect tax (Bonus Malus scheme)

Jurisdiction: France

Context

Population and GDP

[A]

France is a high-income country. According to WorId Bank estimates, it is the world’s seventh largest economy by nominal GDP. If this is calculated per inhabitant, France is 19th. GDP per capita was 55,064 US dollars in 2022,[28] higher than Scotland (42,362 US dollars in 2021 (Scottish Government, 2023a))[29]. The 2022 population of France was 68 million, based on OECD data. This is much larger than Scotland (5.4 million (Scottish Government, 2023c)).

Administrative and legal arrangement/ competencies

[A]

The scheme is administered at national level.

Shared challenges

[G]

To achieve its 2050 carbon neutrality objective, France has committed to reducing the use of fossil fuels in energy production (almost two-thirds of the French heating and cooling systems are powered by fossil fuels) while increasing the use of renewable energy. In addition to accelerated phase-out of coal, the government will ban the sale of petrol and diesel vehicles from 2040 onwards. French diesel taxes are also increasing to further incentivise diesel drivers to switch to petrol, hybrid, or electric cars (Monschauer et al. 2018). Note, a carbon tax is also in place in France (not the focus of the current case study). The country’s carbon tax is among the highest in the world and was scheduled to increase steeply in the coming years. It covers the transport, industry and buildings sectors.

Climate ambition

[A]

In 2019, France passed the Law on Energy and Climate to introduce the objective of carbon neutrality by 2050 as part of its commitment to the 2015 Paris Agreement. The National Low-Carbon Strategy was updated in 2020 to reflect this objective.

Data and evidence

[G]

A significant amount of information is available for the case study.

Diversity of approaches

[A]

An “indirect” taxation instrument, administered at national level.

Lever design

The Bonus Malus system is one of the main instruments of climate policy in the French transport sector. It was introduced on January 1, 2008, by the Finance Law as amended for 2007 and Decree No. 2007-1873. This system combines fees and rebates for the purchase of new vehicles: vehicles purchased or leased whose emissions exceed certain limits pay a fee, whilst vehicles that do not exceed these limits are entitled to a bonus or rebate. Revenues from emission-intensive vehicle fees are used to finance these bonus payments for low-emission vehicles to incentivise car purchasing decisions. Since its inception in 2008, the French government has adjusted the system several times. Since 2017, only electric and hybrid vehicles have been eligible for bonuses.

Since 2018, the fee must be paid for vehicles with CO₂ emissions equal to or greater than 120 g/km. For that threshold, the fee started at €50, but the fee function increases considerably (EUR 1,050 for 140 g/km and EUR 4050 for 160 g/km). For vehicles with CO₂ emissions equal to or above 185 g/km, car buyers must pay EUR 10,500. In parallel, vehicles specially equipped to run on E85 super ethanol can benefit from a 40% reduction in carbon dioxide emission levels if their CO₂ emissions are less than 250 g/km.

In addition to the existing tax (’malus’), a ’super malus’ targeting luxury cars was introduced in January 2018. Car buyers must pay EUR 500 per “fiscal horsepower” for powerful vehicles with more than 35 fiscal horsepower and the tax is capped at EUR 8,000[30].

On the ’bonus ’ side, since January 2018, the bonus of up to EUR 6,000 (27% of the acquisition cost) is only granted for electric vehicles emitting less than 20 gCO₂/km. Vehicles with emissions between 20 and 120 gCO₂/km are not affected by the Bonus Malus System, i.e. hybrid vehicles with emissions between 20 and 60 gCO₂/km are no longer eligible for a EUR 1,000 bonus payment. The bonus is granted directly to the buyer by means of an application form or is deducted from the price of the vehicle, when agreements are in place with dealers.

At the same time, an additional bonus of EUR 1,000 (EUR 2,000 for non-taxable households) is granted when an old diesel or gasoline vehicle is scrapped and a used electric vehicle or a vehicle with a more efficient internal combustion engine is purchased (CEDEF, 2018). In the case of new electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles, the bonus is EUR 2,500. Two and three-wheeled vehicles, as well as electric quads, are eligible for a 20% or 27% subsidy of their acquisition cost (EUR 100 or EUR 900 maximum), depending on their power. In addition, non-taxable households can receive a subsidy of 20% of the cost when purchasing electrically assisted bicycles.

Lever effectiveness

In terms of GHG emissions effectiveness, the scheme has successfully contributed to reducing average passenger car emissions since its implementation. The scheme has been very effective in shifting vehicle sales towards more environmentally friendly vehicles, thereby removing old vehicles from French roads (according to plans, the scrappage bonus is likely to remove around 100,000 old vehicles) and lowering average emissions. Though progress has slowed in recent years, average emissions have reduced significantly from 149 gCO₂/km in 2010 to 111 gCO₂/km in 2017. The current European target for emissions levels of new cars sold is set at 95 gCO₂/km by 2024. For 2025 onwards, the EU feet-wide CO₂ emission targets are defined as a percentage reduction from a 2021 starting point.

 

By promoting electric vehicles, the Bonus Malus scheme also contributes to improve local air quality in urban areas.

Although it seems clear that the scheme has proven to be effective in reducing GHG emissions in France and local air conditions, the impact of this measure on GHG emissions is difficult to isolate. The scheme may have a rebound effect, as the lower fuel expenditure for consumers due to more efficient vehicles may lead to an increase in vehicle use and thus in petrol/diesel consumed (and thus on emissions).

Based on projections of average annual vehicle kilometres and the number of new registrations, the French Ministry of Ecology estimates that measures to improve the performance of new passenger vehicles, including for example a CO₂ label for passenger cars, could lead to GHG emission savings of 5.4 million tonnes CO₂e (MtCO₂e) in 2020, 8.0 MtCO₂e in 2025 and 9.8 MtCO₂e in 2030. Compared to emissions from private cars, which in 2015 were around 66 MtCO₂e, the impact of the scheme could be substantial considering that the Bonus Malus system is likely to be the dominant driver of reductions. However, these figures also imply that additional measures would be necessary to significantly reduce emissions from the transport sector in the future.

In terms of revenues generated, since 2014 the Bonus Malus scheme has generated surplus revenue for the French general budget. For 2018, the malus was set at a level that cover the costs of the bonus payments (EUR 261 million) and the additional bonus for scrapped vehicles (EUR 127 million).

Note all data in this section taken from Monschauer, Y & Kotin-Förster, S 2018.

Key lessons learned

An important lesson was that incentives for new registrations were initially underestimated, leading to an overall increase in car sales and high costs for the bonuses paid at the beginning of the scheme. For example, during the first three years of implementation, the French state lost EUR 300 million (on average) per year because car manufacturers took advantage of the large steps between bonus payment categories in previous years. The instrument has been continuously adapted to meet efficiency and effectiveness criteria.

It is also difficult to forecast the evolution of supply and demand. However, the establishment of a modelling function as a basis for malus rates has made it easier to predict the market reaction as a function of vehicle purchase cost elasticity. Consumers do not always understand how the system works and how it relates to air quality measures for passenger cars. Combining the Bonus Malus system with air quality criteria also remains a challenge, as the system is designed to be technologically neutral and it does not explicitly differentiate between petrol and diesel vehicles. Although diesel cars benefit slightly more from the system due to their lower average GHG emissions, they cause more particulate emissions than petrol cars. One success factor is the support of the French car industry, which has welcomed the bonus payments and acknowledges that they are financed by the malus charges.

Case study 6

Lever type: Indirect tax (Environmental impacts of farming)Jurisdiction: Wallonia, Belgium

Context

Population and GDP

[A]

Wallonia is a high-income region. According to the National Bank of Belgium, in 2021, the region’s GDP per capita was EUR 31,568, somewhat lower than Scotland (42,362 US dollars (Scottish Government, 2023a).[31]

The 2022 population of Wallonia was 3.6 million, based on Iweps (Institute Walloon of L’évaluation, De La Prospective Et De La Statistique) data. This is slightly lower than in Scotland (5.4 million in 2022 (Scottish Government, 2023c)).

Administrative and legal arrangement/ competencies

[G]

Administered at sub-national level

Shared challenges

[G]

Wallonia is committed to transitioning towards a low carbon and environmentally friendly economy. It is also committed to increasing the use of renewable energy. For example, the region has decided to use Sustainable Capital Markets as a means of financing green projects and has created a Sustainability Bond Framework. One aim of the Bond is to help the region achieve its objectives in energy efficiency and low carbon buildings, sustainable mobility, resources/land use, and affordable housing.

For the period 2019-2024, Wallonia has established an investment plan (in French PWI – Plan Wallon d’Investissement), which involves an investment budget of more than €5 billion to channel investments in social and environmental assets in several pillar sectors. The region has also established low emission zones to limit the most polluting vehicles and improve air quality. However, Wallonia must respond to several energy-related challenges, such as the planned closure of nuclear power plants and an ageing and energy inefficient residential building stock (Coppens et al., 2022). About 80% of Scotland`s total land area is under agricultural production, it is useful to focus a case study on this sector.

Climate ambition

[A]

The Walloon Region has made an ambitious commitment to reduce its GHG emissions by up to 55% by 2030 and by 80% to 95% by 2050 (compared to 1990). Moreover, on 4 February 2021, Wallonia adopted its first strategy for the Circular Economy, which shows ambitions for 2025, such as: (i) 50% of relevant public procurement contracts will integrate circular economy principles or circular criteria; (ii) 75% of public information and communications technology (ICT) contracts will be circular and ethical; (iii) All public demolition/deconstruction contracts and subsidised contracts will include a materials inventory and selective deconstruction; and (iv) Reuse materials will be used in all public works contracts and progressively in works subsidised by the Walloon Region (European Commission, 2022).

Data and evidence

[R]

There is limited data beyond the number of people affected and the annual revenue. However, there is detailed information on the coefficients applied by type of animal and crop.

Diversity of approaches

[G]

Indirect tax, administered at sub-national level

Lever design

In Wallonia, agriculture represents about 40% of the total surface water abstractions. The main pressures on water resources are non-point source pollutions by nutrients and pesticides. Key pollutants from the agricultural sector are nutrients and pesticides as well as sediments from erosion.

With the decrees of 12 December 2014 and 23 June 2016, the regional Parliament adopted measures aimed at financing water policy by optimising mechanisms for recovering the costs of services linked to water use, including costs for the environment and water resources, in application of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy. Thus, the tax on environmental impacts from farming, in force since 2015, is intended to address the environmental costs associated with the impact of agricultural activities on water resources, in particular livestock manure and the use of fertilizers and phytosanitary on crops. In particular, the tax is based on the environmental charge, a tax base that considers not only the retained livestock, the “livestock” environmental charge, but also cultivation activities, the “land” environmental charge. Through the spreading of nitrogenous fertilisers and the use of plant protection products, these activities have a significant impact on water resources.

The tax on environmental charges generated by farms in the Walloon Region is one of the key incentives in Wallonia’s environmental policy. The aim of the tax is to meet the requirements of the Water Framework Directive 2000/60 of 23 October 2000, the ultimate objective of which is to achieve good ecological and chemical status of all Community waters. As such, it is not directly related with GHG although it is useful as it encourages farmers to use water more efficiently.

 

Principles: This system is based on the environmental load generated by the farm and it takes into account: (i) retained livestock or environmental loads generated by run-off from livestock manure storage infrastructures on the farm reaching groundwater or surface water, as well as pollution due to effluent storage infrastructures that do not allow storage for at least 6 months; and (ii) cultivation activities that generate, through the application of nitrogen fertilisers and the use of plant protection products, damage to aquatic resources.

Farmers concerned: Farmers who meet at least one of the following three conditions are subject to the tax: (1) Keep live more than three head of livestock stock with an environmental load of more than three units (this unit is not defined in the literature identified, but is assumed to relate to/the same as head of cattle); (2) Have an area of crops, other than grassland, of at least half hectare; and (3) Hold an area of grassland of at least 30 hectares.

Calculation of environmental load (taxation formula): N = 2 + N1 + N2 where N is the number of environmental load units, N1 is the “livestock” environmental charge. The load is determined by summing the products resulting from multiplying the number of animals in each category by its nitrogen coefficient (shown in the table below). This coefficient reflects the value of annual nitrogen production per type of animal.

N2 is the “land” environmental load. The charge is determined by summing the products resulting from multiplying the areas under crops and grassland by the following coefficients:

– 1) crop coefficient: 0.3

– 2) organic farming coefficient: 0.15

– 3) “Grassland” coefficient: 0.06

– 4) “Organic grassland” coefficient: 0.03

These coefficients reflect the average nitrogen residue in the soil, the average use of pesticides and the erosive potential of crops and meadows.

The Government may assimilate certain agricultural practices that preserve the quality and condition of groundwater and surface water to organic crops within the meaning of the coefficients.

N2 = area per category x coefficient for the corresponding category.

Cattle

Dairy cow

0.5538

Suckler cow

0.4062

Cull cow

0.4062

Other cattle over 2 years old

0.4062

Cattle less than 6 months old

0.0615

Heifer 6 to 12 months old

0,1723

Heifer 1 to 2 years old

0.2954

Bull from 6 to 12 months

0.1538

Bull from 1 to 2 years old

0.2462

Sheep and goats

Sheep and goats under 1 year old

0.0203

Sheep and goats over 1 year old

0.0406

Equines

Equine

0.3446

Pigs

Sow

0.0923

Boar

0.0923

Fattening pigs and gilts

0.0480

Fattening pigs and gilts on biolitter

0.0277

Piglets (4 to 10 weeks old)

0.0117

Rabbits

Mother rabbits

0.0222

Fattening rabbits

0.0020

Poultry

Broilers (40 days)

0.0017

Laying or breeding hens (343 days)

0.0037

Pullets (127 days)

0.0017

Breeding cocks

0.0026

Ducks (75 days)

0.0026

Geese (150 days)

0.0026

Turkeys (85 days)

0.0050

Guinea fowl (79 days)

0.0017

Quails

0.0002

Ostriches and emus

0.0185

Tax exemptions or reductions: The tax includes two exemptions: (1) “Livestock” environmental charge (N1): is zero when the farm holds a certificate of compliance for livestock effluent storage facilities or when this certificate is in the process of being used; and (2) “Land” environmental charge (N2): the first thirty hectares of a farm are exempt from the tax. This exemption is calculated by multiplying the farm’s average “land” environmental load unit by 30. The average “land” environmental charge unit for the farm is obtained by dividing the “land” environmental charge (N2) by the total surface area of the farm.

Applicable rate: The basic rate of the tax per environmental load unit linked to the farm is set at €10 from 1 January 2015. This basic rate will be indexed based on the consumer price index in force six weeks before the indexation date.

Taxation data: The data integrated into SIGEC (detailed agricultural data filled by each farmer for the purpose of compliance with EU Common Agricultural Policy) as part of the Wallonia Agriculture Code are used to establish the tax on environmental charges.

Source for information in this section: Portail de wallonne, 2023; Interview.

Lever effectiveness

The tax concerns some 13,500 taxpayers and generates annual revenue of around €1.2 million. The view from an interviewee indicates the tax may not be as effective as it could be, as the rate of taxation is low and the polluting nature of certain types of crops is not considered in the tax calculation formula. Only the state of cultivation or grassland and whether it is organic are currently considered in the formula for determining the amount of tax.

Key lessons learned

This instrument is simple to apply and generate revenues. It sends a signal to the market that an increasingly scarce resource such as water needs to be better managed, otherwise a tax will have to be paid. This tax is applied in what is a key sector for Scotland and covers a large part of its territory, so it could feasibly have a significant effect. Moreover, it could potentially be applied without major legal/administrative complications.

© The University of Edinburgh, 2024
Prepared by Logika Group and Metroeconomica on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.


  1. Official data indicate that between 2013 and 2020, the increase was less than 1%, but 2020 emissions were affected by the restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. A more accurate comparison of underlying trends may be between 2013 and 2018, where global GHG emission increased by just under 5%.



  2. Note the evidence in this paper was drawn from peer reviewed academic research and grey literature published since 2000. The review focussed on emission reduction evidence, it did not consider the balance of costs and benefits, technological innovation or issues associated with equity, for example. It excluded national evaluation reports, reflecting the diversity in methodological approaches and a potential lack of independence in these sources. The latter critique is questionable, as third parties often conduct them. Our secondary review has also not identified such evaluations, which is an acknowledged limitation of the review.



  3. Defined as levies applied downstream to the emission of carbon dioxide and other GHGs or upstream to the sale of carbon intensive fuels.



  4. Note the two figures are not directly comparable, the 2016 review is based on a selection rather than an overall estimate of total revenues. Moreover, the two studies appear to use different definitions of “carbon taxes” and for example do not appear to treat e.g., fuel/excise taxes in the same way.



  5. £30,793 in 2021, converted to US dollars for consistency in jurisdictions, using the average exchange rate for 2021 of 1.3757. Source: https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2021.html



  6. i.e., it is managed, and revenues are collected by Revenue Scotland. In this context, partially devolved, is where instruments are managed and revenues collected by HMRC on behalf of the Scottish Government.



  7. Defined by the European Environment Agency as wastes that do not undergo any significant physical, chemical, or biological transformations when deposited in a landfill.



  8. The maximum mass at which the aircraft is certified for take-off due to structural or other limits



  9. The special rate applies to business jets with a take-off distance weight (MTOW) of more than 20 tons and a maximum seating capacity of less than 19 passengers. The Scottish standard rate applies if the aircraft does not qualify for the special rate and the seat pitch does not exceed 1,016 meters. Otherwise, passengers will be charged the premium rate.



  10. Prior to the introduction of the Climate Change Levy, a Fossil Fuel Levy introduced in 1990 existed. The tax was paid by suppliers of electricity from non-renewable energy sources and ended following the introduction of the Climate Change Levy.



  11. The United Kingdom Emissions Trading Scheme replaced the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in 2021 following the UK’s exit from the EU.



  12. Up to 31 March 2023, there were 2 destination rate bands



  13. Based on the 2020 annual average exchange rate of CAD 1.7202 to 1 GBP. https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-CAD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2020.html



  14. £30,793 in 2021, converted to US dollars for consistency in jurisdictions, using the average exchange rate for 2021 of 1.3757. Source: https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2021.html



  15. Air and climate – Air and GHG emissions – OECD Data



  16. Information obtained during the case study expert interview phase of the stakeholder consultation



  17. Information obtained during the case study expert interview phase of the stakeholder consultation



  18. Information obtained during the case study expert interview phase of the stakeholder consultation



  19. https://www.seedyourfuture.org/greenhousegrower#:~:text=A%20greenhouse%20grower%20specializes%20in%20growing%20plants%20in%20a%20greenhouse%20environment



  20. £30,793 in 2021, converted to US dollars for consistency in jurisdictions, using the average exchange rate for 2021 of 1.3757. Source: https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2021.html



  21. £30,793 in 2021, converted to US dollars for consistency in jurisdictions, using the average exchange rate for 2021 of 1.3757. Source: https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2021.html



  22. Information obtained during the case study expert interview phase of the stakeholder consultation



  23. Information obtained during the case study expert interview phase of the stakeholder consultation



  24. Information obtained during the case study expert interview phase of the stakeholder consultation



  25. Information obtained during the case study expert interview phase of the stakeholder consultation



  26. Information obtained during the case study expert interview phase of the stakeholder consultation



  27. £30,793 in 2021, converted to US dollars for consistency in jurisdictions, using the average exchange rate for 2021 of 1.3757. Source: https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2021.html



  28. Provisional data



  29. £30,793 in 2021, converted to US dollars for consistency in jurisdictions, using the average exchange rate for 2021 of 1.3757. Source: https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2021.html



  30. Fiscal horsepower is a unit indicating the tax burden on a vehicle. In the past it was related to engine power, hence this measure is also referred to as “fiscal power”. In Spain, for example, it is usually obtained from the engine capacity. In France, the calculation is different: since July 1998 (Article 62 of Law n°98-546 of 2 July 1998), the fiscal power depends on the standardised CO₂ emission value in g/km and the maximum engine power in kW.



  31. £30,793 in 2021, converted to US dollars for consistency in jurisdictions, using the average exchange rate for 2021 of 1.3757. Source: https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/GBP-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2021.html


Why it is important

Scotland’s buildings account for approximately a fifth of the nation’s emissions. Decarbonising homes and buildings will play a significant part in achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions.

The Heat in Building Strategy, published in 2021, commits to regulating energy efficiency and reducing emissions from heating in existing homes from 2025. The New Build Heat Standard prohibits polluting oil and gas boilers in new buildings from April 2024.

Given this urgency, the Scottish Government asked ClimateXChange (CXC) to gather evidence on how other countries are approaching the challenge of decarbonising heating and improving energy efficiency in homes. The goal was to draw lessons for policy and implementation in Scotland. 

How ClimateXChange supported policymakers

A study investigated regulations on home energy efficiency and heat decarbonisation from other countries, regions and cities. It aimed to understand what worked or failed and why.

Given the devolved legal powers of the Scottish Government, it was important to primarily focus on the effectiveness of policies that could be replicated in Scotland. This focus helped inform how regulations might best work in Scotland. We also asked for the research to be structured around the Heat in Buildings Strategy.

The findings opened the way to further research that provided policymakers with a comprehensive body of evidence. Follow-up CXC studies investigated personal circumstances that may make it more challenging for people to meet the requirements proposed; explored the practicality and cost of clean heating in challenging home types; and identified how compliance can be monitored. Researchers reviewed international regulations and case studies, and conducted surveys and expert interviews.

Impact

The lessons drawn from the international review have been so useful to the Scottish Government that they plan to connect with some of the countries identified in the research. One of those countries is Italy, where the mandatory share of renewable energy for domestic hot water and electricity has increased.

“For us at the Scottish Government, this was the first time we’ve had a comprehensive comparison with other countries on home energy efficiency and heat decarbonisation regulation. That is a key interest for ministers and often a focal point in policy briefings. The findings from the study provided us with a robust framework for identifying relevant international schemes.”

– Antonia Georgieva, Head of Heat in Buildings: Domestic regulations and clean heat in new buildings, Scottish Government

Furthermore, the Clean Heat Forum, an international collaboration between national governments, NGOs and companies to discuss confidence in emerging policies, is considering creating a live tracker or dashboard version of the project.

The tracker will show updated information on international regulations and policies relevant to heat and energy efficiency and their effectiveness. The Scottish Government is keen to support this given the value of understanding how clean heat interventions have helped other countries decarbonise. This value was demonstrated by the CxC project.

Fostering collaboration

Speaking about her experience of working with ClimateXChange on several projects, Antonia Georgieva said: “Our projects with ClimateXChange have been very well managed. Their process sets clear expectations and fosters an environment conducive to collaboration, serving as a link between us and the researchers.”

Related reports

International heat and energy efficiency policy review

Providing flexibility in heat and energy efficiency regulations – personal circumstances

The suitability of clean heating options for challenging dwelling types

An evidence review of data associated with non-domestic buildings

Costs of zero emissions heating in new buildings 

Direct greenhouse gas emissions from low and zero carbon heating systems 

Zero emissions heating in new buildings across Scottish Islands 

Heat in buildings data for digital compliance

Related links

Heat in Buildings Strategy

New Build Heat Standard

Clean Heat Forum