Research completed March 2025

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/6008

Executive summary

This project was commissioned to inform the Scottish Government on the potential for an interactive Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) in Scotland. It is proposed that interactivity could allow householders to better assess potential retrofit measures. This, in turn, may prompt households to undertake energy efficiency measures and switch to clean heat systems. This report will help inform whether it would be beneficial to incorporate data or functionality into the national EPC register to support potential EPC interactivity.

Key findings

Three levels of potential interactivity have been identified for the Scottish Government to consider implementing in relation to EPCs:

  1. Simple interaction, where both (i) no new user data and (ii) no integration with a calculation engine are required. Users could choose between customised or simplified views of EPC data. Click-through links signposting to further information could also be included (e.g. about measures, funding, further advice services).
  2. Medium interaction, where (i) no new user data is required, but (ii) integration with a calculation engine is required. Users could see updated calculations based on already-completed as well as potential retrofit measures. Fuel costs could be updated in line with recent trends.
  3. Detailed interaction, where customised user behaviour and occupancy inputs could update outputs via integration with an enhanced calculation engine (medium interaction functions also included). Users could personalise a range of inputs for which default values are normally applied in an EPC calculation.

The EPC outputs likely to be most useful to households are costs: household energy running costs, running cost savings, and the capital cost of various retrofit measures. The extent to which these outputs may be customised varies, as does the complexity of implementation. For example, household energy running costs could be updated by simply considering the latest fuel prices. Or, it could be tailored by updating one or more of the following variables: fuel prices, occupancy, heating temperature set point, heating patterns, or the number of baths or showers taken per day.

However, customising more variables may not necessarily make the outputs more representative, since the reliability of obtaining some of those inputs may be quite low. At any level of customisation, it will be necessary to inform tool users that outputs are ultimately estimates. Actual energy use and costs will inevitably be influenced by annual climate severity, changing fuel prices, and changes in household circumstances.

There are a number of existing tools that already deliver energy advice to households. These have varying levels of interactivity and customisation. In response to user testing and feedback, many offer relatively limited customisation. Circumstantially, this supports the reasoning that a modest spectrum of customisation may be the limit to which users are prepared to use such tools.

Limited evidence was identified of a direct link between the provision of customised information and households being prompted to retrofit. However, various literature sources quoting both professionals and typical consumers call for interactivity and customisation of EPCs. There is also relatable evidence that the provision of tailored information to households can prompt behavioural change. Offering households some level of interactivity alongside a traditional ‘static’ EPC could therefore be beneficial. Unfortunately, no direct evidence was found to support whether simpler or more detailed interaction is more likely to prompt households to retrofit.

Considerations for implementation

If the Scottish Government is minded to pursue an interactive tool, there are various options. It may commission its own interactive tool, or alternatively, it may look to use or adapt an existing tool to deliver a similar service.

The Scottish Government will also need to consider how best to integrate net zero policy ambitions in the implementation of any tool outputs or recommendations.

Providing sufficient interaction/ customisation for end users to feel that outputs are relevant to them is likely to be most important. The ability to update information from a ‘static’ EPC to reflect changes that have already taken place will likely be key. Furthermore, the ability to toggle retrofit measures will give users a sense of choice and control.

While a relatively simple implementation may suit the majority of potential users, a minority of users may see particular benefit in tailoring a wider range of input variables. If ‘detailed interactivity’ were implemented (as defined above), then customised views/ functions for different user groups may help simplify the user experience.

Glossary / Abbreviations table

EER

Energy Efficiency Rating (from EPC certificates)

EIR

Environmental Impact Rating (from EPC certificates)

EPC

Energy Performance Certificate

GDOA

Green Deal Occupancy Assessment

PCDB

Product Characteristics Database

RdSAP

Reduced Data Standard Assessment Procedure. The Government tool for assessing the energy performance of existing homes for regulatory requirements.

Introduction

This project considers how an interactive Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) user interface may help to increase public uptake of energy efficiency and clean heating options in homes.

There could be an opportunity to integrate data that would support the development of an interactive EPC user interface when assessing the future needs of the national EPC register in Scotland. A system that enables the public to better assess energy efficiency and clean heat options may be expected to increase uptake of these measures. However, the Scottish Government needs to understand the likely benefits and limitations of such an interactive user interface before it makes decisions on changes to the EPC register.

Background and research scope

The focus of this report is on domestic EPCs. An EPC assessment combines findings from a physical survey of a building with standardised assumptions on how it is used. EPCs therefore provide an ‘asset performance assessment’ that allows homes to be compared to others elsewhere in the country. This is regardless of whether they are different sizes, specifications, or have different systems and/or use patterns. They are accompanied by a Recommendations Report. This provides examples of measures that may improve the efficiency of the home and make savings, intended to encourage homeowners to take action. Recommendations are presented in a set sequence that follows a fabric-first approach, with renewable energy sources considered last. EPCs are therefore an important source of information for homeowners and buyers to inform decision making.

However, the presentation of recommendations and savings means users are not aware of the impacts of implementing measures out of sequence. Also, EPCs do not provide information regarding potential options for switching to cleaner heat systems where properties are currently served by another fuel type. EPCs as therefore not necessarily aligned with the aims of the Scottish Government Heat in Buildings Strategy with regard to clean heat systems. Savings predictions reflect the standardised assumptions made in the EPC calculation in relation to occupancy and heating patterns. This makes the EPC less helpful when a homeowner wants to understand the benefits and savings they may experience according to their own circumstances. Offering users a level of interactivity may allow benefits of different potential improvement measures to be expressed. This can lead to more tailored recommendations and thus may better support users to act on them. There could therefore be value in a traditional ‘static’ public EPC for regulatory compliance, and an interactive interface to provide customisation for homeowners.

The scope of the research was therefore to identify the data inputs and outputs that may be relevant to an interactive EPC and consider how data inputs may be sourced.

The focus was on interactivity that would allow homeowners to input contextual information about how they use their home; essentially customising aspects of the EPC calculation that would otherwise use standardised assumptions, e.g. occupancy, heating patterns and temperatures. It was assumed that data obtained from an original EPC building survey would not fundamentally be challenged, e.g. floor areas, construction types. However, it is acknowledged that homeowners may wish to update information where retrofit works had already taken place since the EPC was carried out. For example, when new insulation has been installed or when energy systems have been upgraded or changed. Note that implications of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on interactive EPCs were deemed beyond the scope of this study.

Further, we sought evidence to understand the benefits and limitations that an interactive EPC interface may provide, to demonstrate whether user interactivity has led to increased uptake of retrofit measures. Our research explored a number of existing tools that offer a level of interactivity with EPC-like outputs. These were primarily targeted at homeowners (i.e. covering domestic/ residential properties), although portfolio-level tools were also briefly considered. The research also involved a desk-based literature review.

Data inputs and outputs for potential EPC interactivity

EPC review

Domestic EPCs for Scotland are produced using the UK Government’s Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) implemented in approved software tools. For existing dwellings, it is recognised that detailed construction information is unlikely to be available. A ‘reduced data’ version of SAP (RdSAP) is therefore used, which makes assumptions about the construction based on age, etc. A selection of the inputs and outputs of the resulting calculation are held centrally in the Scottish Government’s EPC Register. Note, however, that not all intermediary outputs from the RdSAP calculation steps are held on the Register.

EPC outputs

We reviewed the outputs reported on a current Scottish domestic EPC (as at 2024). Those that may be relevant to end users making decisions on energy efficiency and clean heat measures were identified, as noted below. Further metrics proposed in the Scottish Government consultation on EPC reform were also considered for insight into potential future changes.

  • Energy Efficiency Rating (EER) (also known as the ‘SAP score’; Proposed to be called ‘Energy Cost Rating’ following EPC reform)
  • Environmental Impact Rating (EIR)
  • Primary energy indicator (kWh/m2year)
  • Running costs (£ for 3 years)
  • Savings (from potential recommended measures) (£ for 3 years)
  • Savings per recommended measure (£ for 3 years)
  • Recommended measures capital cost (£)
  • Emissions from the home (kgCO2/m2/year)
  • Space heating demand (kWh/year)
  • Water heating demand (kWh/year)
  • Heat Retention Rating (proposed for EPC reform; expected to be similar to Space heating demand metric)
  • Total energy use (proposed for EPC reform; expected to be similar to the calculation for primary energy indicator, but for delivered energy, i.e. without primary energy multiplier)

Dependent inputs

We then interrogated the underlying RdSAP calculation methodology[1] to identify the key inputs used to calculate the identified outputs. All outputs are derived from numerous inputs and calculation steps, with the exception of ‘Recommended measures capital costs’, which are simply quoted reference values. Inputs that offer the potential for contextual customisation relevant to particular occupant behaviour/use are noted below.

  • Fuel prices and standing charges
  • Capital costs for retrofit measures
  • Number of occupants
  • Number of baths or showers taken per day
  • Living room comfort temperature set point
  • Heating pattern on/off times (for a normal day and an alternative day, e.g. weekend)
  • External temperature (from regional climate information)

Ease of implementation

We made a qualitative assessment of the ease with which the above EPC outputs may be customised via calculation. Extensive customisation of an RdSAP calculation using occupancy parameters was implemented in the Green Deal Occupancy Assessment (GDOA) tool[2]. Since the GDOA tool functionality already exists[3], customisation of a number of contextual/ user inputs could be relatively easily facilitated in an RdSAP 2012 calculation. The following ‘ease of implementation’ ranking was therefore applied to the EPC outputs identified above:

  • High ease: Where an output already held on the Scottish EPC register could be adapted via a straightforward side calculation (i.e. where no RdSAP calculation engine would be required to re-model the impact).
  • Medium ease: Where the output could be updated by implementing aspects of the GDOA as part of a new RdSAP calculation, using data held on the EPC register.
  • Low ease: Where customisation of metrics has not previously been implemented in an RdSAP calculation, and therefore more work would be required to implement.

Note: In assigning this ‘ease’ hierarchy, it is assumed that the data held in the non-public version of the Scottish EPC register aligns with the import requirements of an RdSAP 2012 calculation. This appears likely to be the case based on summary information provided by the Scottish Government for this study. However, this would need to be verified in order to validate the recommendations of this study.

Table 1 shows the qualitative ‘ease of implementation’ ranking for customised EPC outputs.

The table refers to the SAP Product Characteristics Database (PCDB). The PCDB holds reference data for mechanical systems, which is used in SAP and RdSAP calculations. It also holds fuel prices and estimates for the capital costs of measures that are used in RdSAP calculations. Fuel prices are updated in the PCDB every 6 months but they are fixed in an EPC at the time of its issue. Capital cost of measures are only updated when a new version of the RdSAP methodology is released.

Currently, the EPC register does not store fuel use totals from the RdSAP calculation, although it is an intermediary calculated value that underpins many subsequent metrics. It is understood that this data is absent from both the public and non-public versions of the register held by the Scottish Government. It follows that even relatively simple-seeming amendments to EPC outputs, e.g. updating fuel prices, would require an RdSAP calculation to be re-run. Two scenarios have been presented in Table 1 for ‘Recommended measures capital cost’. Scenario A is assigned a ‘high’ ease of implementation, while Scenario B is assigned a ‘low’ ease of implementation. The measures costs applied to an EPC are generic and not tailored to the property (e.g. according to property dimensions, or similar). Scenario A assumes this is still the case but an alternative, updated source for measures costs could be referenced by an interactive tool. Customised retrofit measures costs were not a function that was implemented in the GDOA. Therefore, if such a customisation function were desired, this scenario would have a low ease of implementation.

EPC output

Ease of customisation ranking

Notes

Energy Efficiency Rating (EER) (Energy Cost Rating)

N/A

A regulatory metric fundamentally based on standardised assumptions for comparability. We therefore suggest that this metric should not be customised.

Environmental Impact Rating (EIR)

N/A

As with EER, a regulatory metric fundamentally based on standardised assumptions for comparability. We therefore suggest that this metric should not be customised.

Primary energy indicator

Medium

Calculation re-run with inputs customised.

Running costs

Medium

Calculation re-run with custom fuel prices, updated costs from PCDB and/or with other inputs customised.

Savings (from potential retrofit measures)

(also ‘per measure’)

Medium

Calculation re-run with custom fuel prices, updated costs from PCDB and/or with other inputs customised.

Recommended measures capital cost

Scenario A: High

Scenario B: Low

Scenario A: Values are not used in any output calculations. Updated typical/ generic values from an external source could therefore be presented to users relatively easily.

Scenario B: Currently no function exists to ‘customise’ costs via an RdSAP calculation (e.g. according to property dimensions, or similar).

Emissions from the home

Medium

Calculation re-run with inputs customised.

Space heating demand

Medium

Calculation re-run with inputs customised.

Water heating demand

Medium

Calculation re-run with inputs customised.

Heat Retention Rating (proposed)

N/A

Proposed to be a regulatory metric fundamentally based on standard assumptions for comparability. We therefore suggest that this metric should not be customised.

Total energy use (proposed)

Medium

Calculation re-run with inputs customised.

Table 1: Ranking of current and proposed EPC outputs according to their anticipated
ease of customisation

End user value of existing EPC outputs

The EPC outputs identified in 5.1.1 were qualitatively assessed for their likely importance to end users in retrofit decision making. Discussions were held with Retrofit Coordinators at the National Energy Foundation, who directly engage with households on energy retrofit. Their feedback is supported in various studies (including National Retrofit Hub (NRH), (2024), Which? (2024), Jones (2022), and Bančič, Vetršek and Podjed (2021)) that have examined which metrics different end users find or would find valuable when considering home upgrades. In Table 2, the EPC outputs have again been assigned a ranking, this time indicating their expected usefulness to end users. Notes provide supporting rationale for each ranking.

EPC output

Likely importance to end users

Notes

Energy Efficiency Rating (EER) (Energy Cost Rating)

Medium

As a relative metric intended to enable comparison between dwellings, it is somewhat conceptual for consumers. However, it does show a relative point on a sliding scale of ‘good’ and ‘poor’ energy efficiency performance.

Environmental Impact Rating (EIR)

Low

Most consumers do not have a tangible concept of carbon emissions, although the rating does show a relative point on a sliding scale of ‘good’ and ‘poor’ environmental performance.

Primary energy indicator

Low

Primary energy is likely to be an unfamiliar concept for most consumers. It does not correspond directly to people’s actual energy bills despite incorporating ‘kWh’, which could cause confusion.

Running costs

High

Likely to be one of the most important, and tangible, indicators for consumers.

Savings (from recommended measures)

High

Likely to be one of the most important, and tangible, indicators for consumers.

Recommended measures capital cost

High

Consumers may not otherwise have an idea of relative costs of improvement measures prior to seeking their own quotes for work.

Emissions from the home

Low

Most consumers do not have a tangible concept of carbon emissions.

Space heating demand (Heat Retention Metric)

Medium

Allows users to see a breakdown of energy by end use (i.e. space heating). Some people may not readily relate to it being expressed in ‘kWh’.

Water heating demand

Medium

Allows users to see a breakdown of energy by end use (i.e. water heating). Some people may not readily relate to it being expressed in ‘kWh’.

Table 2: Ranking of EPC outputs according to their likely importance to end users
in retrofit decision making

Simple cost-based metrics are more likely to be easily understood by consumers and are therefore more likely to contribute to retrofit decision making. This includes running costs and cost savings from potential retrofit measures. Energy assessors, consultants or other professionals in the sector may see value in the other metrics, but feedback suggests these are of less use to households. Furthermore, the concept of carbon emissions is identified in the above reference sources as not being tangible for most consumers, despite national policy striving for ‘net zero’.

Review of existing interactive home energy advice tools

Numerous tools are available, beyond a traditional RdSAP calculation, that offer EPC-type outputs to users with a level of interactivity/customisation. A selection of these tools were reviewed for this study to consider the possible forms a Scottish EPC user interface could take. Tools were identified using web searches and the knowledge of the research team. Criteria for inclusion included:

  • A domestic/ housing focus
  • An aspect of interactivity/customisation
  • Outputs similar in nature to those on an EPC (e.g. energy use, cost, retrofit recommendations)

Six tools were then selected for more detailed investigation. Selection criteria included:

  • Sufficient information available so they could be assessed for this research
  • Tools offering differing levels of interactivity/customisation
  • Limiting duplication of tools created by a single organisation, unless they offered something distinctly different from one another
  • Inclusion of a commercial/ portfolio assessment tool

We assessed outputs provided by each tool and the customisable inputs they request from users. These are summarised in Table 5 and Table 6 respectively, in Appendix A, alongside the outputs and inputs discussed earlier for EPCs. For the latter, the potential inputs are those of the RdSAP Green Deal Occupancy Assessment, which is taken as a baseline for calculation customisation potential.

It is apparent that many consumer-facing tools are based on a limited number of calculation engines. The Energy Saving Trust (EST) engine and the Parity Projects/ Core Logic engine appear to be popular options underpinning branded tools. These front-end tools may offer slight variations in presentation or user functionality, but they draw on the same foundational data and calculation approach. All tools rely on an underlying RdSAP calculation engine to generate outputs. However, they do not offer the full functionality of RdSAP to be customised, instead utilising many assumptions and generalisations. Most tools use at least some EPC data (from the EPC register) to pre-populate information for calculations.

Tools typically offer one or more of the following levels of interactivity/customisation:

  • Ability to toggle potential retrofit measures on or off and assess impacts/ benefits
  • Ability to make simple updates to property data (compared to that held on EPC), e.g. if insulation or new windows have been installed. Some also ask if there is space to facilitate renewable energy systems
  • Ability to provide basic contextual or occupancy information (some tools will typically progress with assumptions if users do not wish to provide customised information e.g., number of occupants, typical living room set point temperature, when people are typically at home)
  • Ability to provide more detailed contextual or occupancy information (again, some tools will typically progress with assumptions if users do not wish to provide customise information e.g., number of baths and showers taken per week, actual energy use totals from bills)

Many tools also offer further interactivity that does not relate to the calculations process but provides users with additional information. Examples include click-through links providing:

  • Specific information about retrofit measures
  • Information about potential funding or finance options
  • Links to trusted trades or advisory services (e.g., TrustMark, one-stop-shops)
  • Links to professional whole house retrofit plan or Retrofit Coordination services

It was noted in discussions with NEF that consumers often feedback that they are not confident translating a retrofit plan into action. There is apparently often distrust of trades/ contractors. Qualitative information such as that above may help households build confidence to take plans forward.

None of the consumer-facing tools reviewed allows for customisation to the same extent as the GDOA tool. The EST/ Home Energy Scotland tool provided the widest range of user customisation options. From discussions with a selection of tool owners, their user testing and feedback has identified a need for relative simplicity. It is assumed that this reasoning has also been applied to other tools, as they often offer similar functionality.

All the reviewed tools focus on the outputs expected to be of most value to consumers, as noted in section 5.1.4. These include running costs, cost savings from measures and the expected capital cost of retrofit measures. Most tools also report associated carbon emissions. However, despite this alignment in key outputs, the extent to which inputs can be customised varies across tools. It may be expected that outputs based on more extensive customisation will be more representative of a user’s actual circumstances. It is relatively unlikely that users will have an appreciation of this though, since they may only ever interact with one tool. All tools evidently have their place in the market, though it is very difficult to accurately assess their respective ‘success’ (i.e. the extent to which they encourage homeowners to undertake retrofit). Some commentary is offered in relation to specific tools below.

A consistent aspect of functionality offered across all tools is the ability to update whether some building elements have already been enhanced. They all also offer the option to select different potential retrofit measures to form a tailored retrofit plan. It should be noted however, that these outputs are not equivalent to a ‘whole house retrofit plan’ as defined by the PAS 2035 framework (BSI, 2023). These aspects of interactivity can help consumers consider the impacts of certain retrofit options and thus they can provide a useful step beyond a traditional ‘static’ EPC. It may be inferred that these are the aspects of most value to consumers, and there is perhaps less focus on perceived ‘accuracy’ of further customisation. Some aspects of the reviewed tools are discussed in more detail below.

UK Government ‘Find ways to save energy’ tool

This tool is owned by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ). It uses an RdSAP engine hosted by BRE that implements selected parts of the GDOA. It includes default assumptions being made for parts of the GDOA that users are not asked to customise. DESNZ have indicated in discussions that user testing and consumer feedback has shaped the current functionality of the tool. For example, an earlier release of the tool included more customisation questions. However, these were removed as they led to high levels of user ‘drop out’ associated with those questions (i.e. users exited the online tool without completing beyond certain questions). Additional feedback suggests that a minority of users (estimated ~10%) would like more detail than the tool currently offers. DESNZ are exploring options for potential future updates.

EST engine backed tools

Three different tools were reviewed that utilise EST’s calculation engine:

  • Home energy check (branded as Home Energy Scotland)
  • Go renewable tool, developed with the Microgeneration Certification Scheme (MCS)
  • The Snugg Plan Builder (an example with a custom branded front end)

Each offers slightly different functionality and very different user interfaces. For example, the Home Energy Scotland tool does not directly link with the EPC register. However, users are encouraged to obtain their EPC information (from the register if not readily available) to aid answering questions. The Go renewable tool, as the name suggests, focusses on advising on renewable energy systems. It also gives recommendations on basic fabric efficiency measures that should ideally be carried out in conjunction with certain renewables.

Go Renewable and the Snugg Plan Builder each introduce some novel output metrics. Go Renewable offers a ‘heating system running cost metric’, which allows different heating system options to be directly compared. The Snugg tool features a metric on the potential income from a PV system (based on the Smart Export Guarantee). It also estimates a potential increase in property value increase resulting from installing retrofit measures. ‘Savings’ metrics may not motivate landlords or people that do not expect to stay in a home that long. However, metrics linked to property value may be an alternative motivator for such users.

Parity Project/ Core Logic ‘EcoRefurb’ tool

EcoRefurb is part of the Core Logic ‘Plan Builder’ suite of tools. It is an example of a branded front-end tool that uses the underlying Core Logic engine. According to the developers, user testing shaped the development of both inputs and outputs within the tool. One key aspect they identified as important was the provision more customised measure recommendation costs for users. Very few users apparently fed back that they would like to get into more detail in the initial assessment. More detail may be customised in the Plan Builder tool Core Logic provide to Retrofit Coordinators (similar to that in the GDOA) however, this was not reviewed during this study.

IRT ‘DREam’ stock assessment tool

Stock-level assessment tools were also considered during this study, although it is acknowledged that householders are not their target end users. The IRT tool is one such example intended for housing providers[4] (e.g. social landlords) to assess potential retrofit options at a stock level. Customisation typically focuses on filling data gaps where individual property surveys or EPCs have not been conducted. They also allow updated information to be input, based on maintenance records for example, to provide updated energy data for properties. A key feature of the DREam tool is that it integrates a map function and can overlay areas by index of multiple deprivation for example. It also provides comparisons of funding options that may support housing providers to deliver area based retrofit schemes. Understandably, occupancy-based customisation is not a focus of tools such as this. However, the property information updating and measures toggling functions are evidently important interactive outputs for the tool’s target audience.

 

Discussion: Levels of interactivity

Three broad levels of interactivity (simple, medium and detailed) are identified here for potential application to the existing EPC, for consideration by the Scottish Government. These levels reflect the functionality of the calculation tools that underpin an EPC and the capabilities of other existing interactive ‘energy advice’ tools that have been reviewed. This also assumes that data from the non-public version of the Scottish EPC register is sufficient to recreate a new RdSAP 2012 calculation for a dwelling.

Simple interaction

This is characterised as interaction that requires no new user data to be input and no calculation engine. Examples of potential functionality could include:

  • The ability to provide switchable, customised or simplified views for data for different types of user via an online interface. For example, more detailed EPC information could be accessible by professionals, while only key outputs may be required by households, with options to switch between views.
  • Click-through links signposting users to further information – such as details about measures or funding, links to trusted tradespeople or advisory services, etc.

Medium interaction

At this level, no new data inputs are required from users, but an RdSAP calculation engine would be needed to support provision of increased interactivity. Examples of potential functionality could include:

  • Allowing users to select their own potential retrofit measures, providing tailored cost savings for different retrofit approaches or combinations of measures (rather than a fixed sequence as per the current EPC methodology).
  • Enabling potential updates to property information where retrofit measures have already been installed.
  • Incorporating updated fuel costs sourced from the latest version of the PCDB.

Detailed interaction

Here it is assumed that a calculation engine is capable of incorporating customised user inputs to inform updated outputs. (All of the medium interaction functions above should also be possible at this level.) Examples of potential customisation could include updating with:

  • Actual household fuel costs and standing charges.
  • Actual number of occupants.
  • Actual living room temperature set points, heating schedules.
  • Actual number of baths or showers taken per day by household.

Section 6 discusses the ease with which data inputs may be sourced. It highlights that there may be a sliding scale of complexity of customisation at the ‘detailed’ level.

Implications related to RdSAP 10 and the Home Energy Model (HEM)

Data currently held on the Scottish EPC Register will have been created using the RdSAP 2012 software version. Reusing this data to re-run a new RdSAP calculation will therefore be more straightforward with an RdSAP 2012 engine. This is subject to confirmation that data held in the non-public version of the register is an appropriate format.

An updated version of the software, RdSAP 10, is currently in development. The ‘full’ version of SAP 10 has been in use since 2022 for newly built homes. It introduces several updates, related to heat pumps and introduces battery storage into calculations.

Translation of existing EPC Register data (created under RdSAP 2012) for use with a newer SAP engine such as the proposed RdSAP 10 would be more complex. Additional assumptions would need to be added alongside the original data from the EPC register. Furthermore, there is also no GDOA implementation in RdSAP 10 (i.e. customisation of occupancy parameters), so a further exercise would be required to replicate this functionality. However, moving to an RdSAP 10 engine would bring any new tool in line with the most current calculations, based on updated research.

The Home Energy Model (HEM) is a new calculation methodology that will eventually replace SAP and RdSAP. A key change in this approach is that calculations will be performed with much finer time resolution. While existing SAP and RdSAP calculations consider a monthly timestep, HEM utilises a 30-minute resolution. This is expected to better-represent heating demands, energy storage and demand flexibility potential for example.

HEM is based on a fundamentally different underpinning architecture compared to SAP. It will use ‘wrappers’ to assess different use cases, with each wrapper defining inputs and outputs that are processed by the core HEM model. One such wrapper will support the Future Homes Standard (FHS). In this context, key changes to modelling assumptions are expected compared to SAP. For example, assumptions about occupancy being linked to floor area (as in SAP) to being based on the number of bedrooms in a property. These changes reflect evolving consumer behaviours and systems operation patterns, highlighting further divergence from the assumptions used in SAP 10.

HEM will undoubtedly offer additional functionality compared to SAP, along with the ability to assess certain technologies more effectively due to its increased granularity. Some innovators, such as City Science and Furbnow, are already attempting to link existing home energy assessments to HEM. Both have undertaken projects in this space with the support of Innovate UK. However, during presentations at the Innovate UK ‘Net Zero Heat Open Day’ both organisations reported that additional input data, gathered from surveys and/or monitoring, is needed to achieve this (UKRI, 2024). That being the case, it seems unlikely that data from the existing EPC register could readily be aligned with HEM. Exploring the effort likely required in achieving this was beyond the scope of this study.

 

Data collection/ input methods and limitations

Review of potential data sources

A number of potentially customisable data inputs were identified in section 5.1.2.[5] This section explores ways such data may be sourced and/ or physically input into a tool (e.g., automated versus manual methods). While several theoretical options have been explored, the likelihood of some such information being available/ usable short term is low.

Table 7 in Appendix A gives an overview of relevant data input options that were identified during this study. Each input method was qualitatively assessed, based on the research team’s judgement, on a ‘high, medium, or low’ scale against the following parameters:

  • The ease of data input for the user
  • Likely reliability of the information
  • Likelihood of an information source to be available in the short-to-medium term

The rankings were assigned a score (High = 3, Medium = 2, Low = 1). These were summed to provide an overall current ‘readiness’ metric (scored out of 9).

Manual data entry approaches

Manual approaches rely on households obtaining data from existing sources (such as energy bills) or simply recalling their comfort/ heating preferences (e.g. temperature set points and heating patterns). Users will also readily know how many occupants are typically in the house.

The current readiness score of some manual inputs reflects the potential risk of reduced reliability when households need to consider typical conditions over a whole year. For example, if users never adjust temperature set points on their thermostats, reliability of temperature inputs may be high. This may also be the case if they never adjust programmed heating patterns. However, users are unlikely to take account of incidental day-to-day or seasonal adjustments made outside the normal programming. It is also unlikely that households would consistently track their average number of baths and showers per day for a whole year. A best estimate based on typical patterns seems far more likely. Reliability of some inputs may therefore be low when it depends on household recollection rather than on actual recorded data.

Automated data entry approaches

Automated methods range from updating information from the PCDB through to potentially obtaining data from internet of things smart devices. Fuel prices and standing charges could be taken from the most recent version of the PCDB. There are artificial intelligence (AI) tools that exist (generally intended for businesses) that can extract information from digital energy bills. However, for individual households, such tools are unlikely to be warranted since the information could manually be obtained relatively easily. Smart sensors include motion detectors (inferring occupancy), shower sensors, thermostats and programmers. All of these devices may theoretically be able to track and log conditions and output household data.

Note that there is currently no function or API (Application Programming Interface) to import external data sources into an RdSAP calculation. SAP calculations call on data held in the PCDB, but this database is updated periodically and not accessed ‘live’. The automated transfer of data is therefore an aspect that would need to be developed, if such functionality were desired. Subsequently, any proprietary sources of data (e.g. from consumer apps) would need to be collated and formatted accordingly to feed into SAP. It is assumed that users would be unlikely to manually process such data themselves if it were not automatically formatted and exported.

Automated methods therefore tend to score less highly than equivalent manual methods in the combined readiness metric. They score highly with respect to the ease of data input for the user and many provide inherently reliable data. However, they score low on the short-term likelihood for such automated functionality to be available. Fuel prices updated automatically from the PCDB are assumed to be less reliable than actual data from household bills due to averaging. However, the relative ease of implementing such an update still gives a high overall readiness score (8 out of 9).

Discussion of external temperature data

The RdSAP calculation utilises climate data broken down into 21 UK regions. These include assumptions for monthly average external temperatures. It is possible that some users may question whether the granularity of these climate zones is representative of their local conditions. However, it is quite likely that most users would not have the necessary awareness to challenge the relative accuracy of the climate data used.

Monthly temperature data is available from the MET office (the source of the current RdSAP climate data) at a resolution of 2km. This is a far higher resolution than the 21 UK regions. The format is essentially the same as is used in an RdSAP calculation. However, it would require reasonable effort (and signposting) for users to obtain this data manually and enter it into a user interface. As discussed above for automated methods, there is currently no function for new data to be imported into RdSAP. This would need to be specifically developed to automate the input of new, more granular external temperature data.

Something of potential interest to users and the Scottish Government is that the MET Office also provide ‘future climate scenario’ data sets. If incorporated into an RdSAP calculation, it would be possible to see the impact of changing climate conditions on key outputs and recommendations. Granularity varies depending on the type of climate predictions offered. For example, monthly average temperature predictions against the highest emission scenario (RCP8.5) are projected at a 12km scale. Import of such data to RdSAP would face the same challenges as other updated MET Office data noted above.

Varying interactivity options for outputs

Table 3 shows the outputs assessed as being of highest importance to consumers[6] alongside the relevant potentially customisable inputs. ‘Emissions from the home’ is also included, since the policy focus of retrofit is ultimately on achieving net zero emissions. Both a ‘medium interaction’ and ‘detailed interaction’ version (as per section 5.3) is included where such options exist. Note the medium interaction would require a SAP calculation engine but no new user input, instead using updated information from the PCDB or elsewhere. The highest ‘readiness’ levels determined for each of the data inputs is presented in the table.

EPC output

Fuel prices

Fuel standing charge

Capital cost of retrofit measure

Number of occupants

Main temp set point

Heating pattern timings

Partially heated rooms

Number of baths & showers per day

External temp

Running costs (medium interaction)

8

8

       

Running cost (detailed interaction)

9

9

 

9

7

7

7

6

7

Running cost savings (medium interaction)

8

        

Running cost savings (detailed interaction)

9

  

9

7

7

7

6

7

Measures capital cost (medium or detailed)

  

7

      

Emissions from the home (detailed interaction)

   

9

7

7

7

6

7

Table 3: Highest ‘readiness level’ of data inputs that may be customised for
EPC outputs (at varying levels of interaction)

While some outputs in Table 3 have several potentially customisable inputs, not all may necessarily be customised. The example tools reviewed in section 5.2 implement different customisable inputs yet deliver essentially equivalent outputs. The inputs therefore represent a sliding scale of potential customisation.

Users may find it quite easy to customise one or two inputs with a high-scoring readiness indicator. Meanwhile, a more bespoke version of the same outputs may be possible, but the ease with which the data may be reliably obtained may be lower. This creates a potential risk of dubious accuracy; an output may seem to be accurate since it is based on multiple user customised variables. However, those variable values themselves may be inaccurate or unreliable, thus reducing the overall representativeness of the output. A sensitivity analysis on this phenomenon is unfortunately beyond the scope of this present study.

Absolute accuracy may not in fact be so relevant for an interactive tool intended to aid retrofit decision making. Pre- and post- retrofit energy performance of homes is relative; after all, many variables out of a user’s control influence energy consumption and cost over a given year. (e.g. external climate, energy price changes, varying household needs.) Providing sufficient interaction/ customisation for end users to feel that outputs are relevant to them is likely to be most important. The ability to update information from a ‘static’ EPC to reflect changes that have already taken place will likely be key. The ability to toggle retrofit measures selection will give users a sense of choice and control. Other input variables may be of more or less interest to users depending on how far they feel their behaviours are from ‘typical’. Households that align with these national trends may see little variation in customised calculations compared to default calculations. It is only when household characteristics are quite different from national trends that it may make notable differences to retrofit recommendations.

Evidence of intended outcomes

We looked for evidence that directly linked the use of interactive tools to the initiation of retrofit measures. Information was also sought on whether different types of interaction or customisation were more likely to prompt household decision making. A desk-based evidence review sought information from academic articles and grey literature. A selection of search terms were initially used, as detailed in Appendix B. These were expanded upon as other terms and concepts were identified in the reviewed sources.

In addition, advisors from NEF provided general feedback based on their experiences of directly supporting consumers with retrofit projects and administering grants.

Feedback related to the use of existing interactive energy advice tools, such as those discussed earlier, was also explored. This was primarily via online sources, though interviews were conducted with tool developers where possible. DESNZ (as owners of the UK Government ‘Find ways to save energy’ tool) and Core Logic (EcoRefurb tool) provided direct feedback on their respective tools.

The evidence review was widened to ‘relatable activities’ when it became clear that limited information was available on interactive tools and retrofit. Relatable activities were defined as those in which the provision of some form of customised information prompted behavioural change. The scope was limited to households and housing, and to at least energy-related behaviours, if not retrofit specifically. This broader search was not exhaustive but was intended to provide indicative context relevant to the primary concept.

Review of literature

Many sources suggest there is a need for interactivity and customisation of EPCs, with inference that this could promote the uptake of retrofit measures. However, no evidence was identified in the literature review to confirm that interactive tools would, or have directly, prompted retrofit actions. Nor did the literature review indicate what level of interaction or customisation might be more likely to prompt households to undertake retrofit.

Several EU research projects have explored ways that EPCs could be improved to better-serve various end uses (e.g. U-CERT, D2EPC, X-Tendo, CHRONICLE, EDYCE, Smart living EPC). U-CERT produced an extensive series of recommendations for EPCs (Bančič, Vetršek, and Podjed, 2021). This followed interviews and focus groups with different types of potential EPC users across 11 participating EU countries. Some recommendations related to improved granularity of calculations and reducing the ‘performance gap’ by using dynamic simulation and the use of measured data. However, many specifically focus on helping users better understanding energy use and prompting retrofit action. Several of these are also recognised in other sources (discussed below).

Example recommendations include:

  • Focus on cost-based metrics, as these are most tangible for users
  • Offer interactivity to make the information relevant to a user’s own circumstances and context
  • Provide different views tailored to the needs and knowledge levels of various users:
  • (a) non-professional users, for buying and selling properties, for energy management, and for retrofit recommendations.
  • (b) Professionals and more advanced users with more detail and technically specific data.
  • Digitalisation offers the potential for a ‘modular’ approach from basic to expert with options according to user interests
  • Explain the context of assumptions, so users understand if their patterns are likely to be different to what is assumed

Various studies have investigated the extent to which current static EPCs motivate users to retrofit. A recent study by Which? (2024) indicated that EPCs are rarely used to inform renovation decisions. Users instead rely on advice from builders or their intuition. The study suggests that the current format of EPCs does not effectively encourage homeowners carry out energy efficient home improvements, nor does it meaningfully guide their choice of measures.

The D2EPC research study found that less than 5% of end users were motivated to retrofit because of their EPC (Panteli and Duri, 2021). At least half of those surveyed were also not convinced that their EPC accurately represented their building’s energy efficiency. A Barclays/ Ipsos survey (Barclays, 2023) suggests that over half of homeowners do not feel confident making homes more energy efficient. A further study (Hiscox, 2018) indicates that a third of those surveyed renovated to keep up with current trends rather than for functional reasons.

The U-CERT and Which? studies indicate there is a need to update an EPC so they can still be relevant if some changes/ improvements are made. Otherwise they are readily obsolete (Bančič, Vetršek, and Podjed, 2021; Which?, 2024). The Which? study also states that EPC recommendations are too rigid, presented in a specific order rather than tailored to household priorities and budgets. This need for greater flexibility was echoed in discussions with Retrofit Coordinators at NEF who work directly with consumers. They observe that many households are favouring less disruptive, less risky technologies, rather than deep energy efficiency retrofit measures. App-linked technologies also gaining popularity, raising people’s interest in things like heat pumps, PV and battery storage.

This supports a case for savings forecasting across a flexible sequence of measures, rather than the pre-defined order used in EPCs. However, NEF note the importance of linked guidance (i.e. simple interactivity) on risks and implications of implementing measures outside a validated sequence. They advocate the role of Retrofit Coordinators in developing whole house retrofit plans to help households avoid unintended consequences. The U-CERT recommendations similarly stress the value of contextual information and guidance alongside an EPC (Bančič, Vetršek, and Podjed, 2021).

The majority of reviewed literature generally supported the concept of interactivity for EPCs. However, in the experience of innovators ‘Furbnow’ (UKRI, 2024), some users were not confident in entering property data in EPC tools. For this study, we recognise that there is a risk that too much complexity could deter users. Simpler interactivity may therefore be preferable.

Review of relatable activities

The literature review was widened to ‘relatable activities’ based on the research team’s experiences in the energy and retrofit sector. This included exploring links between interactive outputs and intended behavioural change on retrofit plans, smart meters and green finance (for retrofit). Reviewing these relatable activities provided some evidence that customised and/ or interactive information can prompt intended behavioural change among households.

Retrofit plans

Retrofit plans are bespoke reports intended to guide owners on how to retrofit their homes. These follow the principle of considering the individual context of a retrofit, (e.g. user influence), i.e. they include customised recommendations. Building Passport trials (including renovation plans) have been in place for a number of years in several countries and have also been the subject of previous ClimateXChange research (Small-Warner & Sinclair, 2022). Despite this, no quantitative evidence was found that their implementation increases retrofit uptake. Only circumstantial evidence of ‘intent’ from end users was given, suggesting likely future uptake of measures. In other words, it is not currently possible to directly link the implementation of renovation plans in Building Passports to a measurable increase in retrofit.

In the iBroad project trial, the majority of respondents agreed that a renovation roadmap enables and motivates them to undertake retrofit measures (Irish Green Building Council (IGBC), 2020). Similarly, 63% of experts surveyed for the follow-up iBroad2EPC project believed that tool would motivate homeowners to renovate (Mellwig, Maiwald, and Pehnt, 2024).

It was observed that renovation plans implemented in EU countries generally follow national policy by prioritising energy efficiency recommendations before renewable energy measures (Enefirst, no date). This is similar to the current approach taken in UK EPCs. As implemented, these plans do not necessarily provide the flexibility called for in many discussions of EPC reform. They are however, tailored to personal circumstances based on assessor expertise.

Smart meters

Smart meters serve multiple purposes. These include accurate billing, supporting the use of flexible tariffs, and improving visibility of the granularity of energy use at a local and national level. Alongside in-home displays, smart meters provide information that can help households to understand and potentially reduce their energy use.

A study for Smart Energy GB (Populus, 2019) found that consumers with smart meters report a higher number of energy saving activities than non-users. These activities increased over time with continued active smart meter use. There were also increased levels of behavioural change, such as buying more efficient appliances and implementing energy saving habits. Smart meters also enabled people to take part in flexibility and Time of Use activities to save money. These benefits are attributed to the in-home display showing energy use in near real time. This tailored, real-time information was reported to aid users in identifying energy usage and making more informed decisions to reduce usage.

These findings are supported by several other studies, some of which highlight the importance of displaying data in terms of cost to make it more relatable to users. (Darby et al, 2015, National Centre for Social Research (NatCen), 2022, Marshall Cross et al, 2019).

Detailed data (i.e., at appliance level information) was found to be most useful and persuasive for end users. For example, Scottish Power data analysis of interactive app users suggests a 5% energy saving compared to non-users. This is attributed to the more detailed breakdown of energy use, which raises awareness among householders and prompts action (Scottish Power, no date).

These findings support the concept that the provision of bespoke, time-relevant and cost-based data can encourage behavioural change. This may be likened to the customisation of an EPC providing up to date cost saving measures recommendations. Similar behavioural motivations may therefore be experienced as has been seen with smart meters.

Green finance mechanisms

Green finance (i.e., lending that supports environmentally-friendly activities) has been briefly explored as a behavioural incentive for retrofit. Data from Knight Frank for example supports the view that users value properties with higher EPC ratings (Knight, 2022). As such, retrofit measures that improve an EPC could increase property value. While this does not directly relate to interactivity, introducing interactivity or customised elements to EPCs that link recommendations to potential increases in property value could help promote behavioural change towards retrofit. This may be particularly motivating for landlords or individuals that do not expect to stay in a property long term, for whom typical ‘savings’-based motivators may be of little interest. The Snugg/ EST tool mentioned in section 5.2.2 includes an assessment on post retrofit property value.

Review of existing tools

No direct evidence was found to indicate whether simpler versus more detailed interaction and customisation is more likely to prompt households to undertake retrofit. As discussed earlier, many of the existing advice tools reviewed for this study offer limited level of customisation features. Circumstantially, this supports the idea that a modest spectrum of interactivity and customisation may be sufficient to motivate consumers. It is noteworthy that many consumer-targeted energy advice tools ultimately refer users to a professional service, where more detail can be explored. Such tools therefore appear to be primarily intended as a mechanism to motivate households onto the next step on a retrofit journey.

Direct feedback was obtained via interview by DESNZ regarding the UK Government’s ‘Find ways to save energy’ tool. This is only an advice tool and is not formal linked to any retrofit delivery schemes. As such, DESNZ are unable to track a ‘success rate’ for how many users of the tool convert to actually implementing a retrofit.

Additional feedback was gathered by interview with product developers Core Logic regarding their EcoRefurb tool. Core Logic advise that it is a free online tool to give consumers an idea of the retrofit options that may be suitable for their home. Users are then encouraged to develop a more detailed Whole House Plan with a Retrofit Coordinator. The developer reports that around 50% of users that submit a plan via the free tool go on to obtain a Whole House Plan. They consider this a good uptake rate.

By the time that consumers engage with professionals, they are reportedly well-informed and have a clear idea of the improvements they wish to pursue. However, from this point, it can sometimes take a year or more for households to instigate measures. A similar observation was also shared by NEF, who noted that households may need to save up for works or may choose to align with wider home renovation activities.

Conclusions and recommendations

Our research finds that cost-based metrics are most tangible and motivating to end users. The following EPC outputs are likely to be the most worthwhile focus for any proposed interactivity or customisation:

  • Running costs
  • Running cost savings
  • Retrofit measures capital costs

We identified three potential levels of interactivity (Table 4) for the Scottish Government to consider implementing in relation to EPCs.

Level of interaction

New user data required?

Integration with calculation engine required?

Example functionality provided

Simple

No

No

  • Customised/ simplified views
  • Click-through signposting to further information

Medium

No

Yes

  • Update with already-completed retrofit measures
  • Select own retrofit measures and sequence
  • Running costs updated by calling on updated cost information from the PCDB

Detailed

Yes

Yes

As per Medium interaction, plus:

  • Manual user inputs. (Automated inputs currently limited by a lack of import functionality into RdSAP)
  • More tailored versions of outputs by allowing more customisable inputs

Table 4: Potential levels of interactivity for EPCs

We did not find direct evidence to support whether simpler versus more detailed interaction or customisation is more likely to prompt households to retrofit. However, there appears to be significant demand from professionals and consumers for interactivity and customisation of EPCs. Additionally, there is relatable evidence from the use of smart meters, retrofit plans and from green lending that the provision of tailored information to households can prompt behavioural change. Offering households some level of interactivity alongside a traditional ‘static’ EPC could be beneficial.

All pf the tools reviewed in this study include the ability to update and toggle retrofit measures, addressing the call for increased flexibility in EPCs identified in the literature review. User testing and feedback from energy advice tool providers suggest that most existing tools offer a relatively limited degree of customisation. Circumstantially, this supports the notion that a modest level of customisation may represent the upper limit to what users are willing to engage with.

Many existing energy advice tools operate at the medium interaction level. There can be a sliding scale of complexity of customisation at the ‘detailed’ level. Importantly, greater customisation of inputs does not necessarily make the outputs more accurate, since confidence in various data inputs may be variable. The option to offer various customised or switchable views or functions for different users may help simplify an interactive EPC experience if necessary. For example, users could switch between ‘simple’ and ‘medium’ interaction views for users that do not wish to enter detailed personalised inputs.

At any level of customisation, it will be necessary to inform tool users that outputs are ultimately estimates. Actual energy use and costs will inevitably be influenced by a range of other factors e.g. annual climate severity, changing fuel prices, and changes in household circumstances, etc.

The implementation process may be more complicated depending on what version of SAP is targeted for use. RdSAP 2012 is the version used to create the EPCs currently on the register. Translation of existing EPC register data to use the newer RdSAP 10 engine would be more complex. It would also require some assumptions to be added alongside the original data from the EPC register. A move to align to RdSAP 10 would however bring the tool in line with a number of updated calculation assumptions. Moreover, the effort required to align with a HEM calculation has not been explored, though it is noted that the mechanics of HEM fundamentally differ from SAP. Considerable effort would be required by numerous parties to unlock the automated input of data i.e. an RdSAP tool provider (working on behalf of the Scottish Government) and proprietary software or app providers collecting user data.

Existing tools already deliver energy advice to households with varying degrees of interactivity and customisation. Therefore, rather than developing a new tool, the Scottish Government could consider whether a branded or adapted version of an existing tool may deliver a suitable service.

Opportunities and challenges of implementation

Interactive functionality has the potential to support the promotion of both energy efficiency measures and clean heating systems. There is clear scope to improve alignment with current Scottish Government policies on clean heat, particularly when compared to the limitations with existing EPCs. Currently, EPCs do not provide running cost or savings estimates for fuels types other than those currently used in the home. However, this functionality could potentially be introduced.

The Scottish Government will need to consider whether, and, how it wishes to support recommendations that involve the continued use of fossil-based systems. An interface could, in theory, be designed to present recommendations prioritised either for carbon savings or cost savings. Some of the tools reviewed for this study allow users to express their preference, which can subsequently influence the prioritisation of retrofit measures. The Scottish Government could choose to prioritise carbon savings in order to align with its ‘net zero’ policy. However, this may not align with the approach preferred by all households. Consideration of potential fuel poverty risks will also be needed.

Clean heat measures implemented in isolation from wider energy efficiency measures could lead to increased running costs for some users. However, the likelihood of this is reduced where heat pumps are adopted and appropriately installed (EST, no date, National Energy Association (NEA), 2022). Any changes in running costs should be clearly reflected in tool outputs to support informed decision making. However, this would stray from the current approach to retrofit recommendations on an existing EPC. These are prioritised ‘fabric-first’, and only those that would provide running cost savings are included.

Providing flexibility in how retrofit measures are recommended on an interactive EPC would likely be welcomed by users. However, this flexibility also introduces risks if retrofit measures are actioned without due consideration of wider property factors. For example, improving insulation and airtightness without adequate ventilation can lead to moisture build-up, which poses health risks due to damp and mould, and in some cases, structural damage (May and Griffiths, 2015). To mitigate this, linked guidance would be advisable where users have unlimited flexibility when selecting retrofit options. This would help prevent unintended consequences.

It is noted that the Scottish Government’s consultation for the Heat in Buildings Bill proposed a Heat and Energy Efficiency Technical Suitability Assessment (HEETSA) (Scottish Government, 2023). This is expected to offer a more tailored assessment of the suitability of retrofit than a standard EPC. If implemented, a HEETSA could play a role in reducing the risk of adverse outcomes from retrofit measures.

The provision of guidance and signposting (i.e., simple interactivity) may be a more user preferable and transparent alternative to policy-driven functionality. Users may lose trust in a tool if they feel the outputs are not aligned with their personal motivations. Conversely, they may value clear and candid advice, including information about potential risks, to support informed decision making.

Consideration may also need to be given to the skills and capacity of the retrofit delivery sector when designing an interactive tool. If the service proves very successful, an upturn in retrofit measures may be expected, which may outstrip local supply. Anonymously tracking the types of recommendations typically taken through to household retrofit plans could help identify potential capacity gaps within the delivery sector.

References

(All web references last accessed 18 February 2025)

Bančič, D., Vetršek, J. and Podjed, D. (2021) D2.3 Report on users’ perception on EPC scheme in U-CERT partner countries. Available at: https://u-certproject.eu/media/filer_public/
3c/30/3c30cb41-517f-4625-811c-0381eb745caa/u-cert_d23.pdf

Barclays. (2023) Homeowners put off energy efficiency upgrades due to misconceptions about cost and installation time. Available at: https://home.barclays/insights-old/2023/07/homeowners-put-off-energy-efficiency-upgrades-due-to-misconcepti/
#:~:text=Misconceptions%20around%20the%20cost%20and,homes%2C%20according%20to%20new%20research
.

BRE. (2014) The Government’s Standard Assessment Procedure for Energy Rating of Dwellings 2012 edition. RdSAP 2012 version 9.92: Occupancy Assessment version Mar 2014. Published on behalf of DECC by BRE. Available at: https://files.bregroup.com/bre-co-uk-file-library-copy/filelibrary/SAP/2012/OccupancyAssessment2014.pdf

BRE. (2019) The Government’s Standard Assessment Procedure for Energy Rating of Dwellings 2012 edition. RdSAP 2012 version 9.94. Published on behalf of DECC by BRE. Available at: https://bregroup.com/documents/d/bre-group/rdsap_2012_9-94-20-09-2019

BSI. (2023) PAS 2035:2023. Retrofitting dwellings for improved energy efficiency – Specification and guidance. Published on behalf of DESNZ by British Standards Institution.

Darby, S. et al (2015) Smart Metering Early Learning Project: Synthesis report. Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC). Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
media/5a818dd0e5274a2e8ab549c7/8_Synthesis_FINAL_25feb15.pdf

Enefirst. (no date) Building logbook – Woningpas: Exploiting efficiency potential in buildings through a digital building file. Available at: https://enefirst.eu/wp-content/uploads/
12_BUILDING-LOGBOOK-WONINGPAS.pdf

Energy Saving Trust (EST). (no date) Heat pumps: how they work, costs and savings. Available at: https://energysavingtrust.org.uk/advice/in-depth-guide-to-heat-pumps/

Hiscox. (2018) Hiscox Renovations and Extensions Report 2018. Available at: https://www.hiscox.co.uk/sites/uk/files/documents/2018-03/Hiscox_renovations
_extensions_report_2018.pdf

Irish Green Building Council (IGBC). (2020) Introducing building renovation passports in Ireland: Feasibility study. Available at: https://www.igbc.ie/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/
Introducing-BRP-In-Ireland-Feasibility-Study.pdf

Jones, C. (2022) Optimised Retrofit: Engaging with residents; lessons learnt. Available at: https://chcymru.org.uk/cms-assets/documents/ORP_Engaging-with-residents_Lessons-Learnt_Sero_Grasshopper.pdf.

Knight, O. (2022) Improving your EPC rating could increase your home’s value by up to 20%. Available at: https://www.knightfrank.com/research/article/2022-10-11-improving-your-epc-rating-could-increase-your-homes-value-by-up-to-20

Marshall Cross, E. et al (2019) Smart meter benefits. Cost savings households could make within a smart energy future. A Delta-EE Viewpoint, February 2019. Available at: https://press.smartenergygb.org/media/otklgpuf/smart-meter-benefits-cost-savings-for-households-february-2019.pdf

Mellwig, P., Maiwald, F. and Pehnt, M. (2024) iBRoad2EPC field test results. Available at: https://ibroad2epc.eu/?sdm_process_download=1&download_id=13627

National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) (2022) Research into maximising the benefits of smart metering for consumers. Qualitative research with smart meter consumers. Available at: https://natcen.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2023-02/Research-into-maximising-the-benefits-of-smart-metering-for-consumers-Qualitative-research-with-smart-meter-consumers.pdf

National Energy Action (NEA). (2022) Making heat pumps work for fuel-poor households. Common challenges and top tips for overcoming them. Available at: https://www.nea.
org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Installing-heat-pumps-for-fuel-poor-households-landscape.pdf

National Retrofit Hub (2024) The future of energy performance certificates: A roadmap for change. Available at https://nationalretrofithub.org.uk/knowledge-hub/epc-reform/
#headline-531-936

Panteli, C. and Duri, M (2021) D1.2: Next-generation EPC’s user and stakeholder requirements & market needs v1. Available at: https://www.d2epc.eu/en/
Project%20Results%20%20Documents/D1.2.pdf

Populus. (2019) Smart meters and energy usage: a survey of energy behaviour among those who have had a smart meter, and those who have yet to get one. Available at: https://press.
smartenergygb.org/media/s3ujojpg/smart-meters-and-energy-usage-may-2019.pdf

Scottish Government. (2023) Delivering Net Zero for Scotland’s Buildings. A Consultation on proposals for a Heat in Buildings Bill. Available at: https://www.gov.scot/publications/
delivering-net-zero-scotlands-buildings-consultation-proposals-heat-buildings-bill/

Scottish Power. (no date) Energy insights. Available at: https://www.scottishpower.co.uk/
energy-insights

Small-Warner, K. and Sinclair, C. (2022) Green Building Passports: a review for

Scotland. Published by BRE on behalf of ClimateXChange. Available at: https://www.climatexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/cxc-green-building-passports-january-2022.pdf

May, N. and Griffiths. N. (2015) Planning responsible retrofit of traditional buildings. Sustainable Traditional Buildings Alliance (STBA). Available at: https://stbauk.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/STBA-planning_responsible_retrofit.pdf

UKRI. (2024) Net Zero Heat Open Day. Session 1: Rapid Assessment of Building Fabric Performance. Recordings available at: https://iuk-business-connect.org.uk/events/net-zero-heat-open-day/

Which? (2024) Transforming EPCs: Consumer Research Insights and Recommendations. Available at https://www.which.co.uk/policy-and-insight/article/transforming-epcs-consumer-research-insights-and-recommendations-a7mQM8Z6Pnpj

Appendices

  1. : Supporting data

Outputs

Custom selection of retrofit measures for consideration

Energy Efficiency Rating (EER)/
Energy Cost Rating

Environmental Impact Rating (EIR)

Primary energy indicator

Running costs

Total running cost savings

Cost savings per retrofit measure

Recommended measures capital cost

Emissions from the home

Space heating demand/
Heat retention metric

Water heating demand

Total energy use

Heating system running costs

PV generation potential

Income from PV

Property value increase

EPC

 

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

 

 

 

 

Find ways to save energy (UK Gov)

X

 

 

 

 

X

X

X

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Go Renewable (EST/MCS)

X

 

 

 

 

X

X

X

X

 

 

 

X

X

 

 

Home Energy Check (EST)

X

X

 

 

X

X

X

X

X

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Snugg Plan Builder (EST)

X

 

 

 

 

X

 

X

X

 

 

 

 

 

X

X

EcoRefurb (CoreLogic)

X

 

 

 

 

X

X

X

X

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DREam (IRT)

X

X

X

 

 

X

X

 

X

X

X

 

 

 

 

 

Table 5: Summary of outputs of existing interactive home energy advice tools, compared to EPCs

Inputs

Update property info, including completed retrofit measures

Number of occupants

Living room temperature set point

Heating pattern on/off times

Fuel prices & standing charges

Number of baths or showers taken per day

Any unheated or partially heated rooms

Types of appliances present

Fuel bill reconciliation function

Space around home for renewables

RdSAP GDOA

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Find ways to save energy (UK Gov)

X

X

X

X

 

 

 

 

 

X

Go Renewables (EST/MCS)

X

X

X

X

 

 

 

 

 

 

Home Energy Check (EST)

X

X

X

X

 

X

 

 

X

 

Snugg Plan Builder (EST)

X

X

X

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

EcoRefurb (CoreLogic)

X

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

X

DREam (IRT)

X

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 6: Summary of customisable inputs of existing interactive home energy advice tools, compared with GDOA

Data input

Potential data collection/ input methods

Manual or automated?

Already on EPC register or PCDB? Y/N

Ease of data input for user HML

Likely reliability of data HML

Likelihood of availability (short-mid term) HML

Overall ‘readiness’ score

Notes

Fuel prices and standing charges

Actuals from recent fuel bills

Manual

No

High

High

High

9

Actual fuel price information should be easy for households to extract from energy bills.

Fuel prices and standing charges

PCDB updated prices (compared to original EPC)

Automated

Yes

High

Medium

High

8

Medium reliability as will be averages (updated 6 monthly) and not necessarily reflect local actuals.

Fuel prices and standing charges

Automated data extraction from fuel bills/ meters

Automated

No

High

High

Low

7

Current Optical Character Recognition (OCR)/ Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools exist to extract data from (pdf) energy bills. (Generally used by businesses with multiple sites/ fuels). Fuel prices theoretically available from smart meter data.

Capital costs

Actuals from user quotes

Manual

Yes

Low

High

Medium

6

Households could seek their own quotes for various works. However, the EPC does not calculate payback, so there is limited incentive for users to do this until they are relatively committed to pursuing the upgrade measure.

Capital costs

From a national average source

Automated

Yes

High

Medium

Medium

7

Industry/ government sourced data. Medium reliability, since it would give national averages and may not reflect local variations.

Number of occupants

Household knowledge

Manual

No

High

High

High

9

Based on household knowledge.

Number of occupants

Sensor data, IoT

Automated

No

High

Low

Low

5

It is technically possible to infer occupancy from motion sensors. Reliability depends on type of sensors/ mode of operation. Such sensors are not common in homes. It is also likely to be unnecessarily complex for a householder-owned dwelling and too intrusive for a let property. There may be push-back from users for such sensors to be used in this way from a privacy perspective.

Number of baths or showers per day

Household tracking

Manual

No

Medium

Medium

Medium

6

Households are likely to estimate typical number of showers or baths, rather than actually log it (particularly if averaged over a year). Such data may therefore not be entirely accurate, but if (estimated) pattern differs from default assumptions, could be an improvement.

Number of baths or showers per day

Sensor data, IoT

Automated

No

High

Medium

Low

6

Shower sensors exist that extract data on number of showers and duration. However, not common technology in homes. (Note this does not cover baths, so an incomplete picture if a mix of showers and baths used in household, hence Medium ease.)

External temperature

More localised weather file (for average monthly temp)

Manual

No

Medium

High

Medium

7

Data exists, format likely to be appropriate. Medium ease and likelihood for users to go to effort to obtain it and transpose it accurately.

External temperature

More localised weather file (for average monthly temp)

Automated

No

High

High

Low

7

Data exists, format likely to be appropriate. But would need to be linked to SAP (hence Low likelihood currently).

Main temperature set point

Household input (e.g. from programmed set points)

Manual

No

High

Medium

Medium

7

Ease to input a single average value, if one were available, would be high. If users vary their set points from time to time, the input may not be entirely reliable (medium). Users are unlikely to record historic set point information (so medium availability of information).

Main temperature set point

Extracted from home automation/ smart thermostat or similar

Automated

No

High

Medium

Low

6

Smart thermostats may log temperature setpoints. Not widespread in homes, and data not standardised. Would be based on real data, but may only be from a sample period that might not represent typical seasons.

Heating pattern/ on/off times, normal day and alternative day

Household input (e.g. from programmed set points)

Manual

No

High

Medium

Medium

7

Ease to input values, if patterns can be discerned, would be high. If users vary their heating patterns from time to time, the input may not be entirely reliable (medium). Users are unlikely to record historic patterns (so medium availability of information).

Heating pattern/ on/off times, normal day and alternative day

Extracted from home automation/ smart thermostat or similar

Automated

No

High

Medium

Low

6

Data availability from sensors/ programmers varies. Not widespread in homes, and data not standardised. Would be based on real data, but may only be from a sample period that might not represent typical seasons.

Any non-heated or partial heated rooms

Household knowledge

Manual

No

High

Medium

Medium

7

Determining a typical profile if rooms are occasionally heated may be complex. Recollection of such instances over a typical year could be unreliable. Households unlikely to record this. However, if rooms are consistently unheated, it may be relatively easy to report.

Any non-heated or partial heated rooms

Extracted from home automation/ smart thermostat or similar

Automated

No

High

Medium

Low

6

Same issues as extracting heating patterns from sensors, plus would require a room-by-room assessment.

Table 7: Qualitative assessment matrix for data inputs

  1. : Methodology

Review of existing EPCs to identify data inputs and outputs for potential interactivity

An example of the current Scottish EPC format was reviewed. Outputs relevant to end users making decisions for energy efficiency and clean heat measures were identified. The Scottish Government consultation on EPC reform was also reviewed to give insight on future changes/ additional outputs.

The SAP calculation methodology used to create EPCs (RdSAP 2012 v9.94) was interrogated to extract the input data that could be customised to create the identified outputs. This focussed on metrics for which standardised assumptions are used by default in the calculation (e.g. occupancy). The Green Deal Occupancy Assessment, as set out in Appendix V of RdSAP 2012 v9.92, was referenced to help identify contextual parameters. The ease of implementation to make each output interactive was assessed qualitatively with developers in BRE’s SAP team. This followed a ‘high, medium, low’ rating based on the following criteria:

  • High ease: Where an output already held on the Scottish EPC register could be adapted via a straightforward calculation (i.e. no SAP calculation engine required).
  • Medium ease: Where the output could be updated by implementing aspects of the GDOA as part of a new RdSAP calculation, using data held on the EPC register.
  • Low ease: Where customisation of metrics has not previously been implemented in an RdSAP calculation, hence more work would be required to implement.

The likely importance/ value of each output, from an end user perspective, was qualitatively assessed, again on a ‘high, medium, low’ scale. This synthesised information from several sources:

  • Information from literature sources (identified in subsequent tasks)
  • Expertise of BRE staff that work in the retrofit sector
  • Discussions with customer-facing practitioners from NEF

Review of existing consumer energy advice tools

Existing consumer-facing energy advice tools were identified using web searches and the knowledge of the research team. CXC had additionally cited the UK Government household energy tool and EST Renewables selector for consideration. Criteria for identifying tools included:

  • A domestic/ housing focus
  • An aspect of interactivity/ customisation
  • Outputs similar in nature to those shown on EPCs (i.e. energy use, cost, recommendations)

A representative selection of tools were shortlisted for more detailed investigation. Criteria for shortlisting included:

  • Limited duplication of tools created by a single organisation, unless they offered something distinctly different from one another (e.g. there are many tools created with the same underpinning architecture/ calculation engine by EST)
  • Tools offering different levels of interactivity/ customisation
  • Inclusion of a commercial/ portfolio assessment tool (e.g. for social landlords)
  • Sufficient information available on tools to allow them to be tested and explored as part of the research

Interviews were held with DESNZ and Core Logic as product owners of the ‘Find ways to save energy’ and ‘EcoRefurb’ shortlisted tools, respectively.

Relevant EU research projects (into enhanced or dynamic EPCs) were also explored. However, since the resulting tools were generally intended for use by professionals supporting households, they were not comparable to the other user-centric tools explored. They were therefore not reported alongside the other existing tools but instead informed the wider evidence review on intended outcomes.

Assessment of data collection/ sourcing methods

Methods of data collection/ input were identified using web searches. This used key words on data input sources (taken from the task described above) linked to concepts of ‘collection, data entry, data history, automation, smart’. Further methods were populated based on the research team’s own experiences and expertise in data entry and surveying for SAP/ EPCs. Novel approaches being explored by Innovate UK projects were publicised during the ‘Net Zero Heat Open Day’[7]. These were also reviewed for relevance.

Approaches were assigned as ‘manual’ versus ‘automated’ methods. It was also flagged if the data was already held on the EPC register or elsewhere linked to the creation of EPCs (e.g. the PCDB). The potential data sources/ collection methods were qualitatively appraised, based on the research team’s judgement, on a ‘high, medium, low’ scale against the following parameters:

  • The ease of data input for the user
  • Likely reliability of the information
  • Likelihood of an information source to be available short-mid term

Table 8 gives a practical illustration of the criteria for assigning the qualitative rating. The rankings were then assigned a score (High = 3, Medium = 2, Low = 1). These were summed to provide an overall current ‘readiness’ metric for each approach (scored out of 9).

Assessment parameter

High ease assessment criteria

Medium ease assessment criteria

Low ease
assessment criteria

Ease of data input for user

Either automated, so minimal effort for user, or based on a few input parameters users are likely to readily understand.

Some tracking of household behaviours required, or users will need to seek out relatively simple data.

Difficult to identify or extract data correctly, or laborious to obtain.

Likely reliability of information

Based on real, household-specific data.

Based on real data but averaged or normalised in some way, or some other risk of error being introduced.

Accuracy of automated determination likely to be low.

Likelihood of availability short-mid term

Data currently readily available. Manual or PCDB input into (SAP) tool.

Data source exists in appropriate format, but collation effort/ processing will be required, which is likely to deter users.

Data would need to be appropriately formatted from source, SAP tools not currently capable of accepting import.

Table 8: Example criteria for assigning ‘high, medium, low’ qualitative ratings to
data collection/ sourcing methods.

Identifying evidence of intended outcomes

A desk-based evidence review sought information from academic articles and grey literature. A selection of search terms used are given in Table 9. These were expanded upon as other terms and concepts were identified in the reviewed sources. Feedback linked to the example energy advice tools identified in an earlier task was also sought. This was from online sources, though additional discussions were also held with tool developers where possible. DESNZ (as owners of the UK Government ‘Find ways to save energy’ tool) and Core Logic (EcoRefurb tool) provided direct feedback on their respective tools. Additionally, advisors from NEF provided general feedback from their experiences of directly supporting consumers with retrofit projects and from administering grants.

Research was widened to ‘relatable activities’ based on the research team’s experiences in the energy and retrofit sector. The scope for this was limited to households and housing, and at least energy-related behaviours, if not retrofit. This included researching linkages between interactive outputs and intended behavioural change on smart meters, retrofit plans and green finance (for retrofit).

Energy Performance Certificate

Interactive

Building passport

EPC

User experience

(Retrofit/ Renovation) plan

Retrofit

Personal(ised)

Roadmap

(Retrofit) support

Dynamic

Behaviour change

Renovation

Customised

Consumer attitude

Smart meter

Success

Tailored advice

Table 9: Initial search terms used for evidence review (not exhaustive)

How to cite this publication:

Weeks, C. and Sinclair, C. (2025) ‘Potential for interactive EPCs for Scotland’, ClimateXChange. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/6008

© The University of Edinburgh, 2025
Prepared by BRE on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate as at the date of the report, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

This work was supported by the Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division of the Scottish Government (CoE–CXC).

ClimateXChange

Edinburgh Climate Change Institute

High School Yards

Edinburgh EH1 1LZ

+44 (0) 131 651 4783

info@climatexchange.org.uk

www.climatexchange.org.uk

If you require the report in an alternative format such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.


  1. As set out in the SAP Technical Appendix document RdSAP 2012 v9.94 (BRE, 2019)



  2. RdSAP 2012 version 9.92: Occupancy Assessment version Mar 2014. (BRE, 2014) This supported the Green Deal funding initiative (2012-2015) to ensure the cost of retrofit repayments would not exceed energy bill savings.



  3. The GDOA tool underpins the UK Government Find Ways to Save Energy tool discussed in section 5.2.1.



  4. Note that others including EST, Core Logic and BRE also provide tools for this market.



  5. Note that much innovation and research is underway into obtaining ‘real’ data for fabric performance metrics for use in SAP. For example, there are projects funded by Innovate UK exploring monitoring solutions, U-value measurement and automated thermography for fabric elements. However, inputs relating to building fabric performance and dimensioning were beyond the scope for this study.



  6. Virtually all outputs were identified as having the same ease of customisation in section 5.1.3. Therefore, outputs with highest perceived importance to consumers have instead been selected as the focus here.



  7. UKRI Innovate UK Net Zero Heat Open Day – Innovate UK Business Connect. Held online 03/10/24. Recordings available.


Research completed March 2025

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5940

Executive Summary

Overview

The Scottish Government’s Climate Change Plan update recognised the role that emissions removals will need to play in reaching net zero. Direct air capture (DAC) technologies extract CO2 directly from the atmosphere at any location rather than at the point of emissions. CO2 can then either be stored or used for a variety of applications, such as producing more sustainable fuels.

This study explores the costs and profitability of DAC and conducts an international comparison, through an evidence review, stakeholder engagement and modelling. We based the modelling on a 0.5 Mt DAC plant in Scotland operating in 2040, based on a Negative Emissions Technologies study by the Scottish Government. We modelled the two leading technologies, solid DAC and liquid DAC.

Key findings

Our modelling shows that demand for DAC CO2 in Scotland by 2040 will be approximately 0.1-0.15 Mt, rising to 0.2-0.24 Mt in 2050. This is far below the demand levels needed to make a 0.5 Mt DAC plant profitable. Much of this projected demand is driven by the UK sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) mandate that sets out targets for synthetic aviation fuel (e-SAF) – see figure 1.1. This highlights the importance of government policy for creating a sustainable market. To create demand for a 0.5 Mt DAC plant in Scotland, either Scotland would need to provide a disproportionate amount (~40%) of the UK’s synthetic fuels (particularly e-SAF), DAC would need to supply the vast majority of the CO2 used to make e-fuels, or much of the captured CO2 would need to be sent to storage as CO2 offsets. Please note that in this study, we assumed that only 50% of CO2 for e-SAF would come from DAC. However, the Committee on Climate Change 7th Carbon Budget (published after we conducted the study) assumed that all CO2 required for e-SAF comes from DAC. Therefore, the projected DAC demands for e-fuels are roughly double the values shown here.

Figure 1.1: Projected CO2 demands for e-SAF until 2050 in the UK (left) and Scotland (right). This demand would be met by a mixture of CO2 sources, not solely DAC.

Experts highlighted market demand for CO₂ as a key limiting factor with the sector currently relying on voluntary carbon markets, which are volatile. Government policy will be central to setting out a market, or markets, for DAC CO2 but is not yet fully developed. Planning restrictions, including timelines for approvals, land use concerns and uncertainties around final project specifications, create further hurdles. Other constraints include supply chain bottlenecks, though none of these are viewed as critical, and the immature state of CO₂ transport and storage infrastructure.

The cost of DAC is expected to drop by 30%-60% by 2040, depending on the technology. This will be driven by improved processes and materials, economies of scale and learning by doing. High gas prices in the UK mean that Scotland is not a particularly attractive location for liquid DAC, so advances in solid DAC will most likely be of greatest relevance. Industry experts highlighted the value of learning from current deployments such as understanding the impact of climate conditions, and how carbon capture materials perform and can be produced on an industrial scale. Integration with waste heat could have a significant impact on the cost of solid DAC to below £400/tCO2. Both the e-fuels and green hydrogen production industries could be expected to grow on a similar timescale to DAC and would be obvious industries to co-locate with DAC due to their production of waste heat.

By 2040, the cost of solid DAC is projected to be around £560/tCO2 and that of liquid DAC £340/tCO2. The starting point for the liquid DAC cost ranges are much more uncertain as the technology has fewer deployments than solid DAC. If the UK Government Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) price was set in order to be a penalty for exceeding emission allowances, the cost of DAC plus CO2 storage could be used effectively to set the ETS price. To be compatible with the e-SAF buyout price set in the UK SAF Mandate, DAC CO2 would need to cost below £400/tCO2. Our modelling suggests liquid DAC could reach this cost by 2040. Solid DAC has the potential to reach these costs if the plant has access to low-cost electricity (in the region of 6p/kWh), potentially aided by waste heat from other process such as green hydrogen or e-fuel production.

Despite the potential for DAC in Scotland to reach the costs compatible with profitable e-SAF production, e-SAF from DAC CO2 is still projected to be one of the most expensive forms of e-SAF compared to e-SAF synthesised from other CO2 sources. It would also be multiple times more expensive than current aviation fuels. The e-SAF buyout price in the SAF mandate has been set accounting for the cost of DAC CO2. The analysis in this study indicates that DAC CO2 would need to be in the region of £400/tCO2 to be compatible with the buyout price in the SAF mandate. This is compatible with projected liquid DAC costs in 2040 or solid DAC when using a mixture of low-cost electricity and waste heat. The buyout price is set to ensure that it is more economical to buy DAC e-SAF than to not meet the e-SAF mandate requirements. However, if other forms of e-SAF can meet the demand, the market for DAC e-SAF could be much smaller than projected here.

This is amplified when considering DAC as a CO2 feedstock for shipping e-fuels, where there are more options for decarbonised fuels and current fuel costs are lower than for aviation fuel. Even by 2050, shipping fuels are still projected to be up to 3 times more expensive than current shipping fuels (UMAS, 2023). A key future consideration with shipping e-fuels is whether ammonia comes through as a major fuel, which does not require a carbon feedstock such as DAC. If it does, ammonia could take up a lot of the shipping fuel market. However, significant safety concerns remain. If ammonia’s role is smaller than current projections, then the role of carbon-based e-fuels for shipping and of DAC would be larger.

Solid DAC would not be profitable for usage with the projected ETS price of £142/tCO2 in 2040, but would require an ETS price of £250-£350 /tCO2. To make DAC competitive with other sources of CO2, the ETS price would need to make up the difference between DAC and CO2 from other sources, currently around £100-£300/tCO2 depending on the use case and market fluctuations. The ETS scheme is still considering how DAC CO2 that is re-released is to be treated. DAC CO2 may not earn credits, but for instance if fuels made from DAC were carbon neutral, that fuel would not use any carbon credits.

Energy prices account for up to 80% of the cost of DAC. Countries or regions with low and stable energy prices, such as Iceland and Texas, are generally more favourable for DAC deployment compared to regions like the UK, where energy costs remain relatively high. The most competitive locations for solid DAC are those with both low-cost and low-carbon electricity, especially when considering the levelised cost of removal (LCOR), as shown in Figure 1.3. The LCOR is the cost of removing 1 tonne of CO2 from the atmosphere, accounting for any CO2 released in the process of capturing the CO2 e.g. CO2 emissions from energy used for the process.

Low-carbon electricity from renewable energy (especially wind) is an advantage for Scotland. However, given the higher cost of electricity in the UK, Scotland and wider UK are less attractive locations for DAC than other countries with a similar portion of low-carbon energy, as illustrated in Figure 1.3. For liquid DAC, gas prices are a key influence as gas is used to generate the high temperatures needed for the liquid DAC process. However, gas prices in the UK are high, meaning that Scotland is not an attractive location for liquid DAC compared to other international locations.

International comparison of LCOR per electricity price. LCOR is lowest in countries with cheaper and greener electricity than the UK such as Iceland, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Brazil and France. Price is also lower but more carbon intense in Oman and Texas.

Figure 1.2: The influence of electricity price on the LCOR of solid DAC across international locations.

Using green hydrogen for liquid DAC increases costs by 33%. These costs are comparable to solid DAC when solid DAC is paired with low-cost electricity or waste heat (i.e. the lower cost solid DAC scenarios).

Abbreviations Table & Glossary

CCC

Committee on Climate Change

CO2

Carbon dioxide

CXC

ClimateXChange

BEIS

UK Government Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (now DESNZ)

DAC

Direct air capture

DACCS

Direct air carbon capture and storage

DESNZ

UK Government Department for Energy Security and Net Zero

EMEC

European Marine Energy Centre

e-SAF

Synthetic sustainable aviation fuel

FOAK

First of a kind, in reference to DAC plants

LCOD

Levelised cost of DAC

LCOR

Levelised cost of removal

KOH

Potassium hydroxide

Mtoe

Megatonne oil equivalent

NET

Negative emissions technologies

NOAK

Nth of a kind, in reference to DAC plants

ONS

Office for National Statistics

PtL

Power to liquid fuels

SAF

Sustainable aviation fuel

s-DAC, l-DAC

Solid DAC, liquid DAC

tCO2

Tonnes of CO2

Absorption

The dissolution of atoms, ions or molecules into another material. In liquid DAC, the CO2 from air is absorbed into a carbon capture liquid.

Absorbent

The substance which has absorbed the atoms, ions or molecules. The carbon-capture liquid used in liquid DAC is an absorbent.

Adsorption

The adhesion of atoms, ions or molecules from a gas or liquid onto the surface of a solid material (as opposed to being absorbed into the material). In solid DAC, the CO2 from the air is adsorbed onto the surface of a solid carbon-capture material.

Adsorbate

The substance which has adsorbed the atoms, ions or molecules onto the surface. The solid carbon-capture material used in solid DAC is an adsorbate.

Contactor

The element of machinery in a DAC plant that brings the air containing CO2 in contact with the carbon-capture material.

Load profile

The variation in energy demand over time. A flat load profile would indicate a consistent demand across all hours of the year; load profiles tend to fluctuate with periods of higher and lower demand.

LCOD

The cost of capturing one tonne of CO2 a DAC system. The LCOD reflects the cost of capturing one tonne of CO2 irrespective of any CO2 generated to facilitate the process e.g. for energy use.

LCOR

The cost of removing one tonne of CO2 from the atmosphere accounting for any CO2 released in the process, e.g. from energy use. If all the energy used is zero-carbon, the LCOD and LCOR will be the same.

Introduction

This study explores the cost and profitability of direct air capture (DAC) technology in Scotland. The findings from this report will feed into the evidence base for the Scottish Government on DAC technology. The focus of this study is on the capture and utilisation of CO2, as opposed to CO2 storage.

Aims

The key aims of this project were to:

  • Review the main research and development (R&D) trends in DAC: high activity research areas, the likelihood of success and the impact if successful
  • Understand key limiting factors in DAC deployment and scale up
  • Provide projections for the likely cost of DAC in Scotland and the key sensitivities
  • Understand how various scenarios, such as low-cost electricity and waste heat, would influence DAC costs
  • Understand how Scotland compares to other countries as a location for DAC
  • Quantify potential markets for DAC, both established and emerging, the size of those markets and potential for profitability.

Overview

The modelling in this study is based on a 0.5 Mt DAC plant, with both solid DAC and liquid DAC studied at this capacity. This 0.5 Mt capacity has come from the Negative Emissions Technologies study by the Scottish Government based on the Storegga and Carbon Engineering project, which was proposed to be built in the late 2020s with assumed minimum capture rate of 0.5 MtCO2 (Scottish Government, 2023).

The information in this study brings together academic literature with cost modelling alongside insight from interviews with DAC experts in industry and academia. It is important to note that the values in this study are projections based on best available data for a developing technology so are subject to significant uncertainty. Where possible, indications are given as to the main factors impacting the values provided and how changes to some of the assumptions would affect them.

Throughout this study, two key terms are used: levelised cost of DAC (LCOD) and levelised cost of removal (LCOR). The LCOD is the cost of capturing one tonne of CO2 from the air, quoted in terms of £/tCO2; the LCOR is the cost of removing one tonne of CO2 from the atmosphere, accounting for any CO2 released in the process of capturing the CO2 e.g. CO2 emissions from energy used for the process. If zero carbon energy were used, the LCOD and the LCOR would be equal. LCOD is the important metric for comparing DAC costs from a purely economical point of view, however, carbon credits will be assigned based on the carbon removed such that LCOR is still a key economic metric as well being important from a carbon reduction perspective.

 

Overview of DAC Technology

The carbon capture process

The process of capturing CO2 directly from the air has three generic phases (Third Derivative, 2021):

  • Drawing air containing CO2 at atmospheric concentration of around 400 ppm into the system and bringing it into contact with a carbon-capture material
  • Reaction of CO2 with the carbon-capture material, usually either a liquid absorbent or a solid adsorbent
  • Releasing the CO2 from the capture material to be used or stored, and regenerating the capture material to begin the cycle again

DAC technology

DAC technology has two main types: solid DAC and liquid DAC. The solid and liquid refers to the materials that are used to capture the carbon. In liquid DAC, the CO2 is absorbed into a liquid solution of potassium hydroxide or another base; this is the method used by the DAC plant developer Carbon Engineering, a partner in the planned Acorn DAC facility at Peterhead. In solid DAC, the method used by the businesses Climeworks and Global Thermostat, solid materials are used with the CO2 adsorbed (binding) to the material surface.

Both processes use heat to release the CO2 and regenerate the capture material, but liquid DAC needs much higher temperatures to do so, in the region of 900°C compared to solid DAC around 100°C (Sodiq, 2022). The high temperatures needed for liquid DAC means natural gas is currently used as part of the process, with the CO2 from the gas burned being captured in the process. This is the method used by Carbon Engineering.

More detail is provided on each of these methods in Appendix A.

 

Research and Development Trends

DAC is an active area of research both in industry and in academia. Academic research is largely focussed on materials and process improvement, such as sorbents and solvents that capture CO2 more quickly, more effectively and more selectively than those currently used, as well as materials that can last longer through more cycles. R&D in industry works on these same problems but also has a major focus on learning from current deployments, improving the quality of materials, and understanding the impacts of local conditions on processes and equipment. Several DAC companies are working on new processes. One process of particular interest in the UK would be electrochemical DAC that runs purely off electricity (as opposed to requiring heat), advantageous for the ability to run directly on renewable electricity. An overview of the main R&D trends in DAC is provided in Table 5.1 with a mapping of innovation areas shown in Figure 5.1. This overview is based on an initial literature review of DAC research that was then discussed with industry experts to capture their opinions and insights. A more detailed version of Figure 5.1 and more detail on each of the research areas in DAC is provided in Appendix B.

Table 5.1: Overview of research and development trends in DAC.

Area

 

Level of research activity

Impact on cost successful

Likelihood of success

Air contactors

Geometry

Medium

Medium

High

Air contactors

Passive air contactors

High

High

Low

Solid DAC sorbents

Amine-functionalised sorbents

High

Medium to low

Medium to low

Solid DAC sorbents

Zeolites

Medium

Medium to low

Medium to low

Solid DAC sorbents

MOFs

High

Medium to low

Medium to low

Solid DAC sorbents

Solid alkali carbonates

High

Medium to low

Medium to low

Solid DAC sorbents

Silica gel

High

Medium to low

Medium to low

Solid DAC sorbents

Calcium ambient weathering

High

Medium to low

Medium to low

Solid DAC sorbents

AI and machine learning for better sorbent designs

High

Medium to high

High

Liquid DAC sorbents

Alternative liquid sorbents: alkoamines, alkylamines, and ionic liquids

Medium

Medium to low

Medium to low

Regeneration process

Crystallisation

Low

Difficult to determine

Difficult to determine

Regeneration process

Electrochemical

High

High

Low

Regeneration process

Thermal regeneration

Medium

High

Medium

Regeneration process

Calcination

Medium

High

Medium

Integration with waste heat

Sources

Medium but increasing

Medium

Medium

Process optimisation

Medium

Low

Low

Integration with renewable energy

Grid carbon factors, curtailment and grid balancing

High

Medium

High

Integration with renewable energy

Tidal power

Low

Difficult to determine

Difficult to determine

Integration with renewable energy

Energy storage

Medium

Medium

High

Scaling up

Manufacturability

Low

High

High

Scaling up

Scalability

Low

High

High

Scaling up

Constructability

Low

High

High

Learning from deployment

Impact of climate and local conditions

High

High

High

Learning from deployment

Impact of climate

High

Difficult to determine

Difficult to determine

Learning from deployment

Co-benefits, reducing particulate matter, reducing other local pollutants

Medium, but increasing

Difficult to determine

Difficult to determine

This graphic shows the different areas of research and development in the field of direct air capture, split into different processes for liquid and solid DAC. Each of the different processes is colour coded to indicate the level of development: an established method, an active area of research, whether there is company involvement, or it has been found not to be suitable for DAC. 
Figure 5.1: Research and development areas in DAC.

Limiting factors for DAC deployment

The key limiting factors that came out in discussion with expert interviewees were cost and supply of green energy, plus demand for DAC through a stable, long-term market. Requirements on industries to use captured carbon, such as the UK SAF mandate, would provide market confidence, encouraging investment and enabling scale up. An overview of limiting factors is provided in the sections below with more detailed information provided in Appendix C.

Energy demand and cost

The high energy demands for DAC are expected to limit scale up, due to high energy costs and associated infrastructure constraints, such as a large connection to the electricity grid. A 0.5 Mt DAC plant would require around 1 TWh of energy, 20% electricity and 80% thermal energy. If the heat was supplied by heat pumps, that value could be brought to around 0.6 TWh of electricity per year. Assuming a flat load profile (i.e. the electricity demand is flat instead of varying across the day, 0.6 TWh would be around 68 MW in terms of connection capacity, in line with other large industrial sites or data centres.

Carbon intensity of electricity and fuel

The carbon intensity of electricity has a significant impact on the levelised cost of removal (LCOR) as the more carbon intense the electricity is, the more of the captured carbon is assigned to offsetting the source electricity. The grid carbon intensity does not directly affect the cost of capturing CO2, the levelised cost of DAC (LCOD), but does affect the net CO2 removal and the LCOR. The distinction between these two becomes important if DAC is being considered from a CO2 removal point of view or simply as COas a product.

The carbon intensity of the UK electricity grid is expected to fall from 213 kgCO2/MWhe in 2019 to 6 kgCO2/MWhe in 2040. This has the effect of decreasing the LCOR by 28%.

Demand for CO2

The main market for DAC is currently voluntary carbon offsetting, which is a purely voluntary market without security of demand.[1]

The EU and UK SAF mandates offer major long-term markets for DAC, with both mandates stating an intention for a portion of SAF to come from DAC over time. These potential markets are explored in detail in section 9. Beyond e-fuels, other major emerging markets are construction materials and CO2 as a chemical feedstock. Existing CO2 markets such as the food and drinks industry are also of interest but would largely rely on companies looking to advertise their green credentials to offer a market for DAC.

Policy and government procurement were seen as major drivers here. Current carbon price forecast and emission penalties are not currently high enough to drive demand for DAC.

Planning restrictions

A 0.5 Mt DAC plant would be considered a major development under Scottish planning law, the average planning time for major development projects in Scotland in 2023/24 ranged widely from 22 weeks for projects with processing agreements compared to 53 weeks for those without (Scottish Government, 2024). Very roughly, delays impact project costs by 1%-2% per month, but the Scottish Government was praised in some of the engagements within this study for being dynamic and working with organisations to progress projects.

Geographical requirements

The main geographical requirements for DAC are to be near or connected to low cost, low carbon electricity with a high load factor and near transport, storage or usage of CO2.

The impact of climate on DAC is still not fully understood. Modelling indicates that cooler, drier climates could be techno-economically favourable for solid DAC, while warm and humid climates could be favourable for liquid DAC (Sendi, 2022). The UK is considered a cool and humid climate, which slightly reduces the productivity (i.e. how effectively the CO2 is captured) due to competition with water for adsorption to the surface. This increases energy requirements, but the overall impact is less than 10% in terms of levelised cost of DAC compared to a cold and dry climate. This is a much smaller impact than many other factors and technologies/materials could be optimised for different climates.

Transport and storage

The availability of CO2 transport and storage facilities is expected to be a major limiting factor, especially in the short term. The Storegga facility under the North Sea, planned as the first major CO2 storage site in Scotland, was due to be operational mid-2020s but progress appears to be stalled. Placing DAC sites near utilisation sites will minimise transport and storage requirements, the location flexibility of DAC is considered a major advantage.

Supply chain requirements

The supply chain will need to scale up. There are no major blockers foreseen but a bottleneck in the supply chain can be a risk to scale up. The only material that DAC could use a significant portion of supply and therefore the most likely to cause a bottleneck in the system are amine-based sorbents for solid DAC, currently mainly used in smaller quantities in the pharmaceutical industry.

Commercial sensitivity and maturity

Commercial sensitivity was seen to be a limiting factor in the scale up phase and optimising DAC processes, especially when optimising alongside other technologies like green hydrogen and e-fuel production. The European Marine Energy Centre (EMEC) was noted as an advantage in Scotland as they are very open to partnerships, knowledge sharing and demonstration projects.

 

Cost of DAC

Reference scenario

This study developed a reference scenario which aligns with ‘Pathway 3’ of the Scottish Government’s ‘Negative emissions technologies (NETS): Feasibility Study’ (Scottish Government, 2023). This pathway assumes that policies and mechanisms are implemented by the UK and Scottish Government which result in high carbon capture and NETS deployment. The 0.5 Mt capacity for the reference scenario has come from the NETs study based on the Storegga and Carbon Engineering project, which was proposed to be built in the late 2020s with assumed minimum capture rate of 0.5 MtCO2. This project was intended to be operational by the mid-2020s but is currently stalled.

Reflecting that current DAC deployment plans in Scotland are behind what was set out in the NETs study, the reference scenario in this study has been run for year 2040, in recognition that we are unlikely to see substantial deployment of DAC in Scotland in the short term. Our model accounts for reducing costs of DAC over time, incorporating the impacts of ‘learning by deployment’ by assuming a ‘learning rate’ on CAPEX, energy requirements and solid adsorbent cost.

Our modelling approach follows that of Young et al. (Young, 2023) with costs converted from USD to GBP using a ratio of 0.8 with key values set out in Table 7.1 and more detail given in Appendix D. A key assumption for year 2040 is the level of global deployment assumed for this year. This, along with the learning rate, determines the level of cost reduction from the ‘First-of-a-Kind’ (FOAK) plant. The 2040 deployment assumption is 15 Mt combined for both solid DAC and liquid DAC which is based on a global technology diffusion rate (i.e. how quickly the deployment capacity increases each year) of 25%. This value is high, above the average technology diffusions rates but still results in DAC deployment values below those projected elsewhere, reflecting an ambitious but realistic scenario.

The modelling of process energy requirements assumes the cumulative capacity of DAC deployed up to 2040 has improved process efficiency, reducing the energy requirements from a first-of-a-kind (FOAK) plant to an Nth-of-a-kind (NOAK) plant. The FOAK energy estimates for solid DAC are based on operational data from the Climeworks Orca plant (4 kt), while liquid DAC is based on academic literature and modelling (Keith, 2018).

Table 7.1 summarises the energy requirements of the solid and liquid DAC processes. The magnitude and split of electricity vs thermal energy across the two technologies is similar, but the liquid technology requires high-grade heat (circa 900oC), whereas the solid technology requires lower grade heat (circa 100oC) and therefore could be supplied by a heat pump rather than combustion of a gas. Assuming a COP of 2, the heat pump would use 0.75 MWh of electricity to produce the required 1.5 MWhth of thermal energy.

While a heat pump was chosen as the solid DAC heat source other sources of heat such as natural gas or hydrogen may also be used. Likewise for liquid DAC process natural gas was selected as the heating fuel with electricity supplied by the national grid but the process could be configured to generate electricity from natural gas in a combined-cycle-gas-turbine or substitute natural gas entirely for hydrogen or electricity. Alternative heat sources are explored further in section 7.2.4.

Table 7.1: Key inputs for the solid and liquid DAC processes built in 2040

Process

Solid DAC

Liquid DAC

Electricity use, MWh/tCO2

0.27

0.37

Thermal energy use, MWh/tCO2

1.5 (0.75 MWh electricity assuming COP = 2)

1.46

Thermal energy source

Heat Pump

Natural Gas

Electricity price, £/MWh

187 (Climatescope, 2024)

Natural gas price, £/MWh

49 (DESNZ, 2024)

CAPEX, £/tCO2 capacity

109

65

Lifetime of plant, years

20

25

Capacity factor

88%

90%

Estimating the cost of DAC

The values in the cost modelling and associated sensitivities are presented as two different metrics: the levelised cost of DAC (LCOD) and the levelised cost of removal (LCOR). The LCOD is the cost to remove a certain amount of CO2 from the air, the LCOR takes account of the emissions associated with the energy used to power the DAC plant e.g. from electricity generation or the burning of natural gas. The figures presented in this section primarily show the LCOD as this is the most relevant metric when considering costs and markets of DAC CO2; the LCOR is also marked on the figures to provide additional insight.

A breakdown of the contributing costs to the overall LCOD of solid and liquid DAC is shown in Figure 7.1. The effect of ‘learning rate’ and decarbonisation of the electricity grid is highlighted, with significant cost reductions from the estimated costs of a FOAK plant and a plant built in 2040. In 2040, this model assumes a combined global deployment of solid and liquid DAC of 15 Mt, split evenly between solid DAC and liquid DAC; this means that the learning rates applied to each technology are equivalent to 7.5 Mt of global deployment.

For solid DAC, the levelised cost is estimated to decrease by 75% from £2,253/tCO2 to £557/tCO2, while liquid DAC decreases by 25% from £453/tCO2 to £337/tCO2. The LCOR (shown as diamonds in Figure 7.1) is especially high for a solid DAC FOAK plant and changes significantly by 2040 as the UK electricity grid decarbonises from 213 gCO2/kWh to 6 gCO2/kWh.

The largest contributor to overall cost is variable OPEX, consisting of energy, water and sorbent replacement costs. Variable OPEX is significantly higher for solid DAC due to the use of electricity to supply process heat. Electricity is 3.8 times more expensive than natural gas producing heat and 1.8 times more expensive than via a heat pump (COP = 2) than a calciner used in the liquid DAC process. However, using a heat pump enables the use of zero/low carbon electricity. If natural gas were to be used instead in the solid-DAC process the combustion of the fuel would release CO2 and increase the cost of DAC per tonne of CO2 captured.

Natural gas is required in the liquid DAC process due to the high temperature requirements, in this case the emissions from natural gas emissions are captured within the DAC process. The use of alternative sources of heat is discussed further in section 7.2.4.

CAPEX costs were also higher for the solid DAC process (£109/tCO2) compared to liquid DAC (£65/tCO2). Since financing and fixed OPEX are fixed percentages of the CAPEX cost, these two are higher in the solid process.

Figure 7.1: Levelised cost for solid DAC and liquid DAC, showing breakdown by cost component.

Sensitivity analysis

A one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis was completed for the reference scenario, where a 20% increase or reduction was applied to a variable, holding all others constant, to see the impact on LCOR. Additional sensitivities were completed to assess the impact of changing energy price and waste heat usage by 50% and 100%. The results are shown in Figure 7.2, with negative values representing a reduction in cost. Waste heat costs are difficult to estimate and are usually process specific; for this analysis waste heat is assumed to be zero cost to represent the maximum potential benefit. The analysis highlighted that solid DAC was most affected by the operational capacity factor, see Figure 7.2 below.

Changes in the price of electricity and the proportion of heat from waste sources had a larger impact on the LCOD of solid DAC than liquid DAC, as solid DAC has nearly double the energy cost than liquid DAC per tonne. A 100% change in the price of electricity (zero cost or doubling the cost) impacts the overall cost of solid DAC by 46% and liquid DAC by 23%. The use of waste heat is also more impactful in the solid process, a similar 100% change reduces the overall cost of solid DAC by 32% and liquid DAC by 23%. It is also unlikely waste heat will be able to replace a significant proportion of liquid DAC heating simply due to the very high temperatures required for the liquid DAC regeneration process. A change in capex cost was slightly more significant in liquid DAC since capex made up a higher proportion of the total cost; changing the CAPEX cost by 20% impacts the solid DAC process by 7% and the liquid DAC process 8%.

Both electricity costs and waste heat utilisation were selected for a further, more detailed sensitivity analysis not only because they are major influencing factors, but because accessing those savings is realistic for a DAC plant in Scotland.

Figure 7.2: The sensitivity of levelised cost of DAC to changes in variables

Electricity price

In section 7.2.1 the price of electricity has been highlighted as the most significant factor affecting the cost of both solid and liquid DAC. A number of possible scenarios were modelled to assess the effect of electricity price on LCOD. These scenarios include:

  • Reference scenario price of grid electricity £187/MWh (Climatescope, 2024)
  • 2040 Green Book estimate for electricity price £111/MWh (DESNZ, 2024)
  • Price of electricity from onshore wind under a contract for difference tariff of £73/MWh (DESNZ, 2023)
  • No cost renewables £0/MWh

As shown in Figure 7.3, because the solid DAC process uses electricity for heating, changes in electricity prices have a significant impact on the cost of solid DAC. The maximum achievable reduction in LCOD is 46% for solid DAC to £304/tCO2 and 23% for liquid DAC to £260/tCO2, however this relies on zero-cost electricity from a renewable energy source such as wind or solar.

More plausible electricity pricing scenarios such as private wire wind or the 2040 Green Book also significantly improve the LCOD of solid DAC and reduce the cost difference between solid and liquid DAC. By using electricity from onshore wind with a typical feed-in-tariff cost of £73/MWh there is the potential to reduce the overall cost of DAC by 28% and 14% for the solid and liquid processes respectively. However, this may result in longer periods of downtime due to low wind speeds. As shown in Figure 7.2, the LCOD is highly sensitive to the capacity factor and periods of downtime should be avoided.

Using the Green Book estimate for the price of electricity in 2040 has a smaller impact on the overall LCOD, reducing the solid and liquid process costs by 19% and 9%, respectively.[2]

Figure 7.3: The effect of electricity price on the LCOD of solid and liquid DAC.

Carbon intensity of electricity

The carbon intensity of the fuel used for DAC has no direct impact on the cost of DAC and therefore has no direct impact on the LCOD; however, it does impact the LCOR, i.e. the net cost of removing one tonne of CO2 from the atmosphere. The LCOR calculation includes the carbon emissions associated with energy use, the impact of which is shown in Figure 7.4. Using a 2024 grid carbon intensity which averaged 213 gCO2/kWh has an estimated cost of £775/tCO2. If the carbon intensity of the electricity grid follows DESNZ green book projections and falls to 6 gCO2/kWh in 2040 (DESNZ, 2024), this would reduce the cost of solid DAC by 28% and liquid DAC by 8%. The decarbonisation of the electricity grid can therefore be considered a necessity for Scotland to be a suitable location for solid DAC when compared to other global locations. Liquid DAC is less sensitive to the carbon intensity of electricity as it uses natural gas for heat process requirements. However, the associated combustion emissions must be successfully captured in the process and the upstream fugitive emissions of natural gas extraction must be considered.[3]

Figure 7.4: The effect of electricity grid carbon emissions on the LCOR of solid and liquid DAC.

Heat source and integration of waste heat

The LCOR can be significantly impacted by the energy vector used to provide process heating, shown in Figure 7.5 . Electricity, natural gas and hydrogen were considered for each process as well as the utilisation of waste heat.

In the reference scenario, the solid DAC process uses a heat pump to provide the target temperature of around 100°C. Using natural gas for solid DAC heating instead of electricity increases LCOR because of the emission released during combustion. While using green hydrogen does not release any further emissions during combustion, the higher cost of hydrogen compared to natural gas increases the LCOR.

In the liquid DAC process, emissions released from natural gas combustion are captured as part of the process. Natural gas may be replaced with hydrogen as a low-carbon alternative, although the higher cost of hydrogen outweighs the lower carbon emissions and increases LCOR overall.

The utilisation of waste heat is beneficial for both the producer and user of the heat. Waste heat can often be purchased at low cost and is considered as low or zero carbon. Using waste heat would reduce the amount of electricity or natural gas needed for heating, lowering fuel costs and avoid emissions from fuel combustion or electricity generation. However, the extent waste heat can be utilised is limited by the temperature of the source. Since Liquid DAC requires high temperature heating, the proportion of heat that can be supplied from waste heat is significantly lower than solid DAC. For each waste heat source discussed, further details related to calculations and size of plant needed to provide the waste heat are provided in Appendix H.

The viability of using waste heat from sources such as manufacturing processes, energy facilities, or data centres depends on the individual site and process. Both the cost and temperature of heat available influence the potential benefit of reducing the LCOR. The price of heat is subject to commercial negotiations and difficult to estimate. A no-cost waste heat source which can provide 100% of process heat has been modelled to show the maximum theoretical benefit to the solid DAC and liquid DAC processes.

One potential supplier of waste heat is the production of hydrogen via electrolysis. This is most impactful in solid DAC since the 80°C heat from hydrogen production can provide a significant proportion of the process’ thermal energy requirements, reducing the overall LCOD by 26%. There is limited impact on the liquid DAC process due to the high-temperature requirements of around 850°C (Sodiq, 2022). Using waste heat to provide heating up to 70°C and natural gas up to the final temperature of 850°C has a limited impact, only reducing LCOR by 2%.

E-fuel production is another potential source of waste heat. The E-fuel process has an operating temperature ranging from 200°C-240°C (Speight, 2016). This could provide the entire thermal requirement of the solid DAC process, reducing LCOR by 32% (Speight, 2016). As with waste heat from hydrogen, waste heat from e-fuel production can only supply a small proportion of the overall thermal energy of liquid DAC, reducing overall LCOR by 6%.

Figure 7.5: The effect of fuel type on the cost of solid and liquid DAC

Financing costs

An additional sensitivity was performed to understand the impact of financing costs on the cost of DAC. The reference scenario in this study uses financing costs of 3.5%, in line with social discounting rates (DESNZ, 2024).The values in Figure 7.6 show the impact of financing rates at more commercial levels of 10% referred to as the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) (UK Government, 2021). In this sensitivity, the cost of both solid and liquid DAC is increased significantly by the increase in required rates of return on capex investments. The cost of solid DAC is affected more than liquid DAC, with the LCOD of solid DAC increasing from £557/tCO2 to £642/tCO2, an increase of 15%; liquid DAC increases from £337/tCO2 to £404/tCO2, an increase of 20%. This sensitivity illustrates how the cost of DAC will depend heavily on how the initial capex is funded.

Figure 7.6: The effect of financing rates on the cost of solid and liquid DAC.

Additional costs

Purification

The DAC techniques detailed in this report have been developed with storage as a key market, which requires high levels of purity to minimise how much non-CO2 is stored. Climeworks reports minimum CO2 concentrations of 95% although concentrations of 99.9% are discussed in literature (Climeworks, 2022; Ozkan, 2021). These very high concentrations may require additional purification steps but for the purposes of this study, purification costs are assumed to be within the overall DAC costs presented here and additional costs are not added in.

For CO2 markets, the type of impurities will be important especially for applications within the food and drinks industry. Most of the ‘impurities’ in DAC CO2 are nitrogen and oxygen left over from the air; more problematic impurities would be from the DAC process such as amines from the sorbents. These impurities would have an impact on the markets for DAC, most notably for food and drink.

Transport

A recent CXC report “Onshore and inshore storage of carbon dioxide” discussed CO2 transport costs based on literature and discussion with industry, coming to a value of £20-£24/tCO2 for a 100-mile round trip (ClimateXChange, 2024). These values would be a significant portion of CO2 costs when CO2 costs are in the region of £50-£100/tCO2. Estimated DAC costs are in the region of hundreds of pounds per tonne, so transport costs are less influential. Transport costs would become significant again if carbon pricing was used to bring DAC costs down.

Profit

Profitability information for UK companies is published by the Office for National Statistics with an average for private, non-financial companies consistently around 10% (Office for National Statistics, 2024). It could be argued that DAC would need a higher profit margin as it is a new technology and carries a higher risk, or that finance may be offered to ‘green’ projects at a lower rate by investors seeking environmentally friendly investments. The UK SAF mandate buyout price includes a 20% price premium above expected e-SAF production costs, reflecting that the market is early-stage.

The average UK value of 10% is used to assess profitability in this study. With the cost of capture for DAC in 2040 projected to be in the region of £550/tCO2, the profit margin would be around £55/tCO2 bringing the cost of DAC in the market just over £600/tCO2.

International Comparison

To understand Scotland’s potential for large-scale DAC deployment, the cost to capture carbon in Scotland has been compared against the other countries. Electricity costs, natural gas costs and labour costs have been changed for each country to reflect building DAC plants internationally. Further details are provided in Appendix F.

It is difficult to estimate the future cost of DAC in other countries due to the limited amount of data publicly available on future costs and carbon emissions i.e. there is not a UK Green Book equivalent for all countries. However, current values for energy costs and carbon intensities are available therefore the cost of DAC in different countries in this section has been compared using the same inputs as in the reference scenario (e.g. learning rates have been applied out to 2040, 15 Mt of global DAC deployment is assumed) but the electricity cost and carbon scenarios are from 2024 data. This mix of projected and current data means that the values themselves are likely to change over time but we would expect the trends to remain similar, i.e. countries that countries with very low carbon electricity now will continue to do so, countries with high carbon electricity will take longer to decarbonise their electricity systems.

International comparison for solid DAC

Figure 8.1 presents an estimation of the LCOR for solid DAC in 2024 for various countries. Two points are shown for the UK as a whole: one showing where the UK would sit in 2024 as a comparison against other countries 2024 data, and one showing where the UK would sit in 2040 when the electricity grid has largely decarbonised.

The most competitive locations for solid DAC are those with both low-cost and low-carbon electricity. Iceland and Canada have either significant geothermal or hydro-electric resources, producing electricity with a cost below £100/MWh and carbon intensity below 80 gCO2/kWh. As a result, these locations have the lowest estimated LCOR ranging between £381/tCO2 and £434/tCO2. Whereas locations with high electricity grid carbon intensity like Oman and Texas have some of the lowest electricity costs but the highest LCORs. In terms of DAC capturing and using CO2, it can be argued that it is the LCOD that is important, purely the cost of capturing the CO2; however, where DAC is being used for a climate benefit (even if the CO2 is to be used), it is the LCOR that is relevant.

Scotland has a lower LCOR than five of the thirteen locations assessed. With a relatively high electricity price, the UK is generally only competitive against locations with significantly higher carbon intensity. The focus on LCOR means that Scotland would be a more attractive location for solid DAC than Oman or Australia, despite higher electricity costs. This picture could change over time, for example if the grid in Australia rapidly decarbonised.

The dashed lines in Figure 8.1 show the impact of the cost of electricity in the UK on the LCOR to illustrate how changes in electricity costs would affect the relative competitiveness of DAC in the UK. These lines show that in order for Scotland to become competitive with Iceland, electricity prices would need to be around a quarter of what they are now, more in the region of £40/MWh, a relatively similar picture for the UK as a whole in 2050 once the grid has largely decarbonised.

Figure 8.1: The influence of electricity price on the LCOR of solid DAC across international locations.

International comparison for liquid DAC

The cost of liquid DAC for the same selected locations is shown in Figure 8.2. This analysis shows that countries that are net exporters of gas e.g. Norway, Oman and Texas are estimated to have the lowest LCORs. The UK’s high gas prices result in the highest LCOR out of the locations assessed at £368/tCO2. The reliance on gas to supply heat for the regeneration process means that the carbon intensity of the electricity supply is far less influential for liquid DAC than it was for solid DAC, such that energy costs (particularly gas costs) dominate the trends more than carbon intensities.

Varying electricity prices, as shown in Figure 8.2, has less impact on the LCOR of liquid DAC in the UK than it did on solid DAC as electricity prices make up a smaller portion of the total cost of liquid DAC. As a result, Scotland is not as cost effective as other locations for the deployment of liquid DAC as described in the reference scenario. This is in line with the rule of thumb from Carbon Engineering that the most attractive countries for liquid DAC are those counties that are net exporters of gas.

Figure 8.2: The influence of electricity price on the LCOR of liquid DAC across international locations.

Market opportunities and potential profitability

To understand how profitable DAC could be in Scotland, various potential markets have been assessed. This section focuses on industrial utilisation of CO2 that might be scalable and viable in Scotland: what the major demand markets are, potential growth in those markets and the potential role for DAC.

This section examines the potential markets for DAC CO2 within Scotland and the UK. A number of markets are considered, each considered in terms of:

  • the size of the current market
  • potential growth in demand
  • potential competitiveness of DAC CO2 in the market
  • potential market size for DAC CO2
  • potential for DAC CO2 to be profitable in the market.

The analysis in each section is put in context of demand relative to a 0.5 Mt DAC plant where all of the captured CO2 is utilised as opposed to stored. In reality, a DAC plant may supply CO2 for both use and storage. The costs discussed in this section are based on the reference scenario and the sensitivity analysis in 7.1.

Overview of CO2 markets

The CO2 market is split into direct uses of CO2 (e.g. carbonating drinks) and indirect uses (e.g. as a chemical feedstock). The UK consumes around 0.6 Mt of CO2 per year (Food & Drink Federation, 2019). The key markets for CO2 in the UK are:

  • Food & drink industry
  • Fire suppression and extinguishers
  • Medical uses
  • Industrial and other uses.

Additionally, horticulture uses a significant amount of CO2 to boost crop yield within greenhouses, but this CO2 is generally produced as a by-product of gas-powered heating systems onsite. The annual horticultural CO2 demand in the UK in 2030 is estimated to range from 108–218 ktCO2, around 20%-35% of current UK demand but this will be very much dominated by demand in England (Ecofys, 2017).[4] As heat production is moved from natural gas to electrification, alternative sources of CO2 will be needed, offering an additional CO2 market. In terms of DAC, Climeworks have previously reported sales to greenhouses but it is difficult to see a major CO2 market here due the current CO2 used being a by-product of onsite heat generation and horticulture is not a sector with large profit margins that could absorb significant additional costs (Climeworks, 2015).

The indirect CO2 market is more difficult find information on, and therefore to quantify, but CO2 is used as a chemical feedstock for:

  • Fertiliser industry
  • Polymers and resins
  • Synthetic hydrocarbons
  • Other chemical intermediates.

The chemical market was not studied in this report due to this lack of information but recent reports have indicated that there could be demand for CO2 in the UK chemical industry of 0.45 Mt by 2040, increasing to 2.3 Mt by 2050 (Innovate UK, 2024).

The current cost of CO2

The cost of CO2 has been very volatile in recent years largely due to major fluctuations in global fossil fuel prices. During the peak high of energy prices in 2022, CO2 prices reached £2,000/tCO2 even £3,000/tCO2. These prices had a major impact on availability and production of products like meat and carbonated drinks in the UK (Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit, 2022). In conversations with expert interviewees as part of this study, current costs in 2024 between £100/tCO2 – £900/tCO2 were discussed. These costs still represent a broad range but were generally concentrated at the low end, in the region of £100-£300/tCO2. The cost of CO2 depends heavily on the requirements of the use case: the purity level both in terms of CO2 concentration and the type and concentration of impurities. However, these values provide a comparison range for CO2 from DAC.

Biogenic CO2 is seen as a key future source of CO2 and is generally currently sold for around £100/tCO2 or a little lower. However, there is a limited supply of biogenic CO2, which is a key issue for scaling up applications like e-fuels. The NETs study states that the total biogenic CO2 currently available from existing sites in Scotland is around 3.3 MtCO2/year with a future maximum of 5.2 MtCO2/year by 2032 (Scottish Government, 2023).

Food and beverage industries

CO2 is widely used in food and beverage industries, the primary uses are carbonated drinks, chilling and packaging, transporting food and stunning animals. As other CO2 sources are reduced, all these markets will need alternative sources of CO2 but some are more suited to DAC than others. DAC CO2 is cleaner than combustion sources, making it more attractive for packaging and carbonated drinks. Additionally, products using DAC CO2 could carry a green premium in the market.

The beverage industry is of particular interest for DAC because of the size of the market and it is possible to see how a product could benefit from being marketed as lower carbon. Packaging and stunning of animals is likely to move to green sources of CO2 only as required to by law, via organisational targets or due to lack of supply; a green premium for DAC CO2 is hard to envisage for these sectors. The food and beverage industry is by far the largest user of CO2 in the UK, accounting for around 60% of the UK’s CO2 demand, roughly 360 ktCO2/year (Food & Drink Federation, 2019). The growing focus on sustainable CO2 sources has brought DAC into consideration, with Coca Cola already investing in UK DAC company Airhive to supply CO2 to one of its drinks production sites via an on-site DAC plant (AP Ventures, 2024).

Future CO2 markets in the UK for DAC

The consensus within literature on future markets for CO2-derived products is that the market size is difficult to predict. However, three key factors were identified for assessing future markets:

  • Scalability
  • Competitiveness
  • Climate benefit.

The climate benefit of a market influences the degree of interest to governments and other organisations seeking to reduce climate impacts.

There are also a number of market segments that consistently appear in literature on using and sequestering CO2 from DAC in the future:

  • E-fuels (see section 9.2)
  • Construction materials (see section 9.6)
  • Chemicals / plastics.

The 2019 International Energy Agency (IEA) report ‘Putting CO2 to Use’ highlighted the potential future global markets for CO2 (IEA, 2019); Figure 9.1 shows their analysis of the key markets set out by future global market size and by potential climate benefit. The largest market is e-fuels, with demand driven in the early stages by SAF via government mandates. As SAF production scales up and carbon prices on fossil fuels rise, e-fuels will have an increasing share of the fuel market. Construction materials are considered to be the CO2 use with the greatest climate benefits as CO2 is stored within the materials and not immediately released upon use, as happens with fuels or utilisation in greenhouses.

A key unknown in the projections of future CO2 demand is how much CO2 is being recycled and reused onsite, as happens in the horticulture industry, and therefore how much CO2 may be required in future that is not currently being noted within the CO2 market. One example is the chemical industry, where CO2 is reused as a feedstock (Huo, 2022). These uses should be monitored and reviewed over time to understand how they could contribute to demand for DAC CO2.

A diagram of a graph

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

Figure 9.1: Figure taken from an IEA report detailing the potential global market size and climate benefits of CO2 derived products. (IEA, 2019)

E-fuels

Carbon-based (IEA, 2019) e-fuels are considered a major future market for DAC CO2. Beyond CO2 storage, e-fuels were the most discussed market for DAC CO2 during the expert interviews within this project. The term e-fuels (also called synthetic fuels or power-to-liquid fuels, PtL) refers to molecular fuels made using electricity; these could be green hydrogen, ammonia or carbon-based e-fuels that can directly replace fossil-based fuels. These carbon-based fuels use CO2 as a feedstock for the process and are expected to be major market for DAC CO2.

Overview

The process for making carbon-based synthetic fuels depends on the type of fuel being made:

  • Fischer–Tropsch (FT) process is used to make long-chain hydrocarbons for synthetic aviation fuel, petrol, diesel etc.
  • Sabatier process is used for making synthetic methane
  • Synthetic methanol synthesis (not generally given another name).

This study largely focusses on outputs from the FT process, that creates a mixture of hydrocarbons of different lengths via a highly energy-intense process (more detail provided in Appendix I). The exact make-up of the outputs can be adjusted to favour certain chemical fractions, for example, if the process is optimised for synthetic sustainable aviation fuel (e-SAF), the kerosene portion can be in the region of 60% of the output. (Wentrup, 2022)

E-fuels can be considered carbon neutral if:

  • The H2 has come from a carbon-neutral source[5]
  • The CO2 has been captured either directly from the air or from biogenic sources
  • The energy used is zero-carbon, e.g. renewable energy sources.

The requirements on the CO2 source vary between definitions, with some (including the UK SAF mandate) allowing COto be supplied from processes where the CO2 would otherwise have been emitted into the atmosphere (i.e. CO2 could come from fossil-fuel exhaust systems) and some having a stricter requirement where the CO2 must come from DAC or biogenic sources. The modelling within this study focusses on e-fuels produced from CO2 captured via DAC.

Market for FT chemical byproducts

The FT process makes a mixture of hydrocarbons. When the process is optimised, 60%-75% of the FT output can be used directly for liquid hydrocarbon fuels such as e-SAF or e-diesel (Wentrup, 2022; Mazurova, 2023). The other products created in the FT process are generally shorter, lighter hydrocarbons such a naphtha. These byproducts are useful chemicals with their own markets but are not particularly high-value products making it unlikely that a market for the FT side products will have a significant impact on the cost of e-fuels. This picture would change if there was a shortage of such chemicals from current sources or if there was a distinct drive from the chemical industry to move away from fossil-fuel feedstocks.

Aviation, e-SAF

Aviation fuel is a key market for DAC in the form of SAF for three key reasons:

  • The aviation sector will struggle to electrify and will still rely heavily on fuels in a net-zero future
  • There are already targets for e-fuels in the UK SAF mandate (Department for Transport, 2024a)
  • The aviation industry is relatively high value compared to some other markets and has the potential to absorb higher costs where other markets do not.

This section details potential demand for DAC CO2 based on e-SAF targets and the buyout price set out in the UK SAF mandate (Department for Transport, 2024a). This e-SAF section is the most detailed of the sections on potential CO2 markets due to the clear targets for e-SAF and a clearer role for DAC. A short sensitivity analysis is included based on academic research. The key assumptions underpinning this section are detailed in Appendix I.

The UK SAF mandate

The UK’s Jet Zero strategy sets out the UK Government’s strategy to decarbonise air travel, to be introduced from 1 January 2025, sets out targets for requirements for the use of SAF and e-SAF for the UK aviation sector (Department for Transport, 2024a).

In 2025, 2% of UK jet fuel demand will be required to come from sustainable sources, increasing linearly to 10% in 2030, then to 22% in 2040.[6] The mandate for e-SAF starts in 2028, reaching 0.5% in 2030 and 3.5% in 2040. For context, the last reported UK energy demands were 2022, when UK aviation fuel demands were around 12 Mtoe, though expected to increase in the short term in the rebound from the pandemic (Office for National Statistics, 2024). The mandate sets out intended CO2 sources for e-SAF but does not currently set targets. The SAF mandate states there is potential to increase the target percentages for e-SAF if market conditions allow.

More information and a comparison with the EU SAF mandate is provided in 12.1.23.

Demand for e-SAF

The UK SAF mandate allows us to project demand for e-SAF and consequently for DAC CO2. Figure 9.2 shows the projected e-SAF demand for the UK (left) and Scotland (right) based on the targets set out in the UK SAF mandate. These demands shown in Figure 9.2 are calculated using projections for the aviation sector from the UK Committee on Climate Change’s 6th Carbon budget based on analysis carried out in 2019 (Committee on Climate Change, 2020). The figures show that demand for e-SAF in Scotland reaches above 0.04 Mtoe by 2040, around 7% of the equivalent values for the wider UK at 0.55 Mtoe by 2040.

Figure 9.2: Projected e-SAF demand for UK (left) and Scotland (right) broken down by aviation sector i.e. domestic, international and military.

Figure 9.2 shows the split of demands by domestic, international and military according to the splits from the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) 6th Carbon Budget. The splits show Scotland has a much higher demand for fuel for domestic flights than the rest of the UK and that military demand is only a small portion. The Royal Air Force has been involved in the development and testing of synthetic fuels in the UK and could be a leader in future demand for e-SAF. However, with military demand being such a small portion of demand, the portion of e-SAF used by the military would have to be many times higher than the SAF mandate to add significant demand to the market. There is currently no indication that the military has such plans, though it could continue to be of notable benefit in supporting demonstrators and initial deployments.

Demand for CO2 for e-SAF

The demand for e-SAF will create a new market for CO2 but the portion of that CO2 that will come from DAC is not yet clear. Figure 9.3 show the expected CO2 requirements for e-SAF production based on the assumptions in Table 12.7 in Appendix I. By 2040, the demand for CO2 for SAF in the UK would reach around 2.6 MtCO2, with demand in Scotland around 0.2 MtCO2. By 2050, this value would increase to around 4.4 MtCO2 for the UK and 0.3 MtCO2 for Scotland. These values seem small compared to the potential CO2 from existing biogenic sources in Scotland (potential estimated at 3.3 Mt), but that biogenic resource is restricted in quantity and location (Scottish Government, 2023; Food & Drink Federation, 2019).

The UK SAF mandate does not state requirements for DAC CO2 but a 2022 briefing by Transport & Environment noted sub-targets from the EU SAF mandate that gave a target portion of CO2 from DAC (Transport & Environment, 2022). [7] Transport & Environment projected DAC demand based on demand and availability of other sources, “DAC will start to supply CO2 in 2030 and overtake other carbon sources as the main source by 2035-2040(page 1). Taking a simple 50% of e-SAF CO2 demand being met by DAC in 2040 would equate to 1.3 Mt CO2 demand across the UK and 0.09 Mt CO2 demand in Scotland, around 20% of the output of a 0.5 Mt DAC plant. However, the high cost of DAC CO2 makes a 50% target ambitious in terms of supply; the values based on this 50% figure could therefore be seen as an ambitious value or upper limit for DAC demand. Even considering these values as an upper limit, the values demonstrate that demand for e-SAF within Scotland alone will not support a 0.5 Mt DAC plant, but if Scotland was leading UK green hydrogen and e-fuel production then demand for DAC would be higher than demand calculated for Scotland alone.

While this study has assumed that only 50% of CO2 for e-SAF would come from DAC, the Committee on Climate Change 7th Carbon Budget (published at the end of this study) appears to have assumed that all CO2 required for e-SAF comes from DAC, therefore the projected DAC demands for e-fuels are roughly double the values shown here (Committee on Climate Change, 2025).

Something that could significantly affect demand, especially Scottish demand, would be reduction in demand for domestic flights. As we see in Figure 9.2, nearly half of the Scottish e-SAF demand comes from domestic flights, around a quarter of which alone were to London Heathrow, with Belfast, Bristol and other London airports other main destinations (Transport Scotland, 2023). If train and ferry services were improved and made more cost-effective, this domestic portion of demand could reduce.

Figure 9.3: Demand for CO2 for e-SAF for the UK (left) and for Scotland (right).

Buyout price

The SAF mandate sets targets for SAF and e-SAF as a portion of UK aviation fuel demand but also sets a buyout price for these fuels: the price to be paid by the fuel supplier for failing to meet the SAF and e-SAF percentage requirements. To be competitive, the maximum price for SAF and e-SAF effectively becomes the buyout price + the cost of conventional fuel.

The buyout price in the UK SAF mandate is (Department for Transport, 2024a, p. 46):

  • £4.70 per litre, £5,875 per tonne for SAF
  • £5.00 per litre, £6,250 per tonne for e-SAF

Potential profitability of e-SAF

The buyout price in the UK SAF mandate effectively sets a cap on the potential profitability of DAC and allows us to understand the range of DAC costs that are compatible with future e-SAF markets. The buyout price set for e-SAF is designed based on modelled costs for e-fuels using DAC and with a price premium of 20% applied to SAF production costs (Department for Transport, 2024b, p. 83).[8] By design, the e-SAF buyout price should allow for DAC to be profitable, but it does rely on DAC achieving projected cost reductions (though it is not explicit about projected DAC costs). E-SAF made using DAC CO2 is still expected to be among the most expensive sources of e-SAF (though one of the most scalable) therefore the size of the market for DAC e-SAF beyond mandated amounts will depend on whether other sources can meet demand.

To examine DAC costs compatible with the e-SAF buyout price, Figure 9.4 shows the resultant e-SAF price per tonne for a range of DAC CO2 values (y-axis, £0 – £1,000) with other costs (e.g. facilities, capex, green hydrogen, energy) aggregated into non-CO2 costs (x-axis, £1,500/t to £6,500/t). Two dashed lines are shown on the figure marking the buyout price of £6,250/t and the buyout price minus the assumed 20% premium on e-SAF, reflecting the potential margin that SAF producers would add to production costs. Removing the 20% premium from the buyout price of £6,250/tonne gives a production value of £5,100/tCO2. Conventional jet fuel in the UK costs broadly in the region of £1,000/t, making the maximum compatible e-SAF price in the region of £6,100/t, very close to the buyout price (Jet A1 Fuel, 2024).

A technoeconomic assessment of SAF through PtL estimated DAC CO2 as around 40% of the total cost of £5/litre e-fuel production (Rojas-Michaga, 2023). This set the non-CO2 cost around £3/litre, £3,750/t. Using Figure 9.4, we can see that with non-CO2 costs at £3,750/tonne, DAC CO2 could be around £400/tCO2 while being compatible with the e-SAF buyout price. This value of £400/tCO2 is well below the DAC costs of capture of solid DAC of £550/tCO2 in the central case discussed in section 0. Additionally, this value is the cost of sale and would therefore need to include the cost of transport, storage and profit. The central ETS price of £142/tCO2 forecast for 2040 would bring DAC costs into the compatible range but still without a profit margin. For liquid DAC, the central case has DAC costs around £340/tCO2, below this target compatible value of £400/tCO2 and therefore with potential for a profit margin. However, it should be noted again that the liquid DAC costs are more uncertain than the solid DAC costs and other international locations are more attractive than Scotland to liquid DAC developers.

In terms of potentially profitable solid DAC scenarios, low-cost electricity would bring the cost of solid DAC down into the £400 region prior to the ETS (Figure 7.3), and waste heat from co-located e-fuel production could bring it lower still (Figure 7.5). Co-location would also remove transport costs. A major advantage of DAC is that it can be flexible with respect to location (access to energy infrastructure will remain a constraint) though transport costs are only expected to be in the region of £20/tCO2 (value sensitive to distance) (ClimateXChange, 2024). The main location requirements are around space, grid capacity and access to green, low-cost electricity. These are all the same requirements as for e-fuel production so co-location would be a sensible option.

In terms of profit, it could be assumed that DAC was subsumed into the e-fuel production costs, therefore the 20% premium applied to the buyout price would effectively include the profit on DAC. If the DAC was a separately supplied feedstock, an additional 10% profit on top of the DAC costs would be in the region of £40-£55/tCO2. These numbers are of course highly uncertain and dependent on many factors but they do show a potential for DAC to be profitable as a source of CO2 for e-SAF.

Figure 9.4: Comparison of e-SAF costs (values shown in bands) depending on the cost of DAC CO2 (y-axis) and all other costs in e-fuel production (x-axis). Dashed lines are shown for the buyout price listed for e-SAF in the UK SAF mandate and for the buyout price minus an assumed 20% premium placed on production costs by suppliers.

Other impacts on DAC cost, market and potential profitability

The comparison between DAC costs (i.e. LCOD) and the buyout price shows that DAC costs modelled for Scotland could be compatible with e-SAF production. However, there are three key factors that would have a major impact on potential DAC profitability:

  • Competition in the market and profit margins, including the cost of conventional fuel
  • Cost of H2
  • Cost of energy

Firstly, as discussed above, to be compatible with an e-SAF cost of £6,100/t, DAC costs would need to come down to around £400/tCO2. From the projections in section 0, liquid DAC could be compatible with these values or solid DAC using either low-cost electricity (Figure 7.3) or waste heat from co-located e-fuel production (Figure 7.5). The projected central ETS price of £142 for 2040 would bring DAC CO2 costs down into the £100-£300/tCO2 region. However, e-SAF from DAC CO2 is still estimated to be one of the most expensive forms of e-SAF. The market will rely on there not being enough e-SAF from other sources, such as e-SAF generated from biogenic CO2 for DAC CO2 to be competitive, which the analysis for the UK SAF mandate projects to be around 2-4 times cheaper than PtL from DAC (Department for Transport, 2024b).

Secondly, the cost of H2 assumed in the central case of the Rojas-Michaga et. al paper is £3.59/kg H2 (Rojas-Michaga, 2023).The most recent ClimateXChange report looking into green hydrogen production in Scotland, titled ‘Cost reduction pathways of green hydrogen production in Scotland’, estimated green hydrogen production costs in the region of £3.4/kg H2 by 2045 (£4.1/kg H2 including transport). (ClimateXChange, 2023) The sensitivity analysis in the ClimateXChange work put 2045 values between £2.8/kg H2 and £5.9/kg H2 such that green hydrogen costs remain a major source of uncertainty in costs with the potential to limit the viability of the industry.

Thirdly, changes in the cost of energy would have major impacts on both DAC costs and e-fuel production costs. The Rojas-Michaga et al. study uses central costs of 6p/kWh based on the cost of electricity from wind, around half the projected cost of electricity in the Green Book but in line with the reduced cost electricity values used in Figure 7.3. (Rojas-Michaga, 2023). This low-cost electricity scenario would result in costs for solid DAC in the region of £400-£430/tCO2, and bring hydrogen costs to the low end of projected costs from the ClimateXChange report (ClimateXChange, 2023, p. 42). The triple impact of low-cost electricity on e-fuel production, DAC CO2 and green H2 production makes it a major lever in whether DAC and e-fuel production could be profitable within Scotland.

Shipping

Within the industry interviews conducted as part of this study and within literature, shipping was viewed as a second major market within the UK for e-fuels (International Energy Agency, IEA, 2024). Maritime transport has more options for fossil-free fuels than aviation due to weight and volume of fuel being less of an issue. The fuels discussed in relation to maritime decarbonisation are methane, methanol, hydrogen, ammonia and gas oil/diesel (Lloyd’s Register, UMAS, 2021). These fuels currently come from fossil fuels either directly using fossil feedstock or using fossil fuel energy, but they can be made sustainably, using clean energy and clean feedstocks (i.e. feedstocks obtained with clean energy).

Although there is an understanding that the shipping industry must decarbonise, there is no equivalent to the UK and EU SAF mandates that proscribe the percentage of sustainable fuels or e-fuels. The FuelEU Maritime mandate sets targets for reducing emissions from shipping but not to the level of detail of the SAF mandates (European Union, 2024). This section uses estimations from industry reports to understand the potential market for shipping e-fuels and the potential for DAC CO2 to be competitive in that market.

Demand for sustainable shipping fuels

Potential demand for shipping e-fuels was modelled based on projected demand for shipping fuels from current UK fuel demand data (Office for National Statistics, 2024), shipping projections from the CCC’s Sixth Carbon Budget (Committe on Climate Change, 2020) and industry projections on future fuel mixes (Lloyd’s Register, UMAS, 2021; Transport & Environment, 2024) . Demand within the UK fuel demand data is broken down into international, coastal and naval. Within this study, it is assumed that domestic shipping will largely electrify, with sustainable fuels prioritised for international shipping. Office for Nationals Statistics (ONS) data gives 2022 values of 8.3 Mtoe of fuel for shipping, split 75% fuel oil and 25% gas oil. Of the total demand, 81% is international, 16% coastal and 2% naval. This 81% demand for international shipping, 6.8 Mtoe, is the focus of the modelling for potential e-fuel demand in this study.

A 2019 report by Lloyd’s Register and UMAS set out a number of scenarios of the potential future mix of low-carbon shipping fuels: a renewable energy dominated pathway; a bioenergy dominated pathway, and a mixed pathway (Lloyd’s Register, UMAS, 2021). The central, mixed pathway (figure shown in Figure 12.812 in Appendix I) shows e-fuels reaching around 20% of demand by 2040 and 30% by 2050 but this covers all e-fuels including hydrogen and ammonia that are not carbon-based. A more recent publication from European Federation for Transport and Environment projects that e-ammonia will be the dominant e-fuel for shipping, covering around 80% of e-fuel demand with carbon-based fuels covering the remaining 20% (shown in Figure 12.13 in Appendix I) The projected mix from the Transport & Environment report suggests only a relatively brief 10-year role for e-diesel with a more permanent transition to e-methanol and e-LNG but with demand for any carbon-based e-fuels not picking up until 2040.

With carbon-based e-fuels not expected to come into the mix of shipping e-fuels until 2040, this would mean demand for carbon-based e-fuels for shipping across the UK would reach about 0.35 Mtoe by 2045, 0.5 Mtoe by 2050. With Scotland representing around 4% of international shipping in the UK, Scottish demand would be in the region of 14 ktoe in 2045, 20 ktoe in 2050. These values are lower than the values projected for e-SAF but ramp much more steeply between 2040 and 2045. Although fuel demand for shipping and aviation is similar, the fact that such a small portion of international UK shipping comes via Scotland (~4%) means that the shipping e-fuel market would be heavily driven by UK demand.

Demand for DAC CO2 for shipping

Of the potential future fuels for shipping, e-methanol, e-LNG plus e-gas oil and e-fuel oil are the carbon-based molecules that would lead to demand for DAC CO2. E-gas oil and e-fuel oil production is very similar to that for e-SAF discussed in section 0. The FT process could be optimised for shipping fuels such that a larger fraction of FT output was suitable, potentially up to 75% (Bezergianni, 2013). Synthetic forms of methane (e-LNG) and e-methanol can be produced via similar processes (i.e. combining hydrogen and CO2). E-methanol and e-LNG are not ‘drop-in’ fuels so would require new ships or retrofitting of propulsion system, although there are some ships that already use LNG.

Figure 9.5 shows projected demand for CO2 for shipping e-fuels for the UK (left) and Scotland (right). The ranges reflect the high and low renewable energy fuel pathways in the Lloyd’s & UMAS report and the split of e-fuels (i.e. ammonia, hydrogen, carbon-based fuels) projected in the 2024 Transport Environment report “E-fuels observatory for shipping” (Lloyd’s Register, UMAS, 2021; Transport & Environment, 2024).[9]

The central values in Figure 9.5 show CO2 demand in Scotland reaching towards 0.1 MtCO2 by 2050, around 2 MtCO2 in the UK as a whole. The values shown in these figures are based on CO2 demand from creating e-fuels in the form of e-gas oil and e-fuel oil via the FT process. E-LNG and e-methanol would require similar amounts of CO2 as they require less COper tonne but have a lower energy density, meaning more fuel is needed.

As with CO2 demand for e-SAF, not all the CO2 for these fuels would come from DAC. Taking the same assumption as for e-SAF of 50% of CO2 demand coming from DAC, DAC demand would reach in Scotland 0.05 MtCO2 by 2050, around 1 MtCO2 in the UK as a whole. The Scottish demand would account for around 10% of the output from a 0.5 Mt plant, adding to the 20% demand from e-SAF. Scottish e-fuel demands for aviation and shipping would be projected to support a 0.15 Mt DAC plant by around 2040, but again if Scotland was supplying e-fuels to meet wider UK demands, DAC CO2 demand would be far above 0.5 Mt CO2.

Figure 9.5: Projected demand range for COfor e-fuel for shipping in the UK (left) and Scotland (right). The central line corresponds to the central ‘Equal mix’ scenario in the Lloyd’s & UMAS report with the coloured areas showing the range from the other scenarios (Lloyd’s Register, UMAS, 2021).

Potential profitability

The analysis above indicates that the market for DAC for carbon-based shipping e-fuels is a broadly around half the size of the market for e-SAF. However, with more options for net-zero compatible fuels there is more potential competition in the market and a lower cost ceiling than for e-SAF. Projections for shipping e-fuel costs are in the region of £1,500-£2,500/t, multiple times higher than current cost for shipping fuel but far below the costs for e-SAF discussed in section 9.3.5 (UMAS, 2023). This difference between projected shipping fuel purchase costs and projected production costs for e-fuels via the FT process presents a major challenge when considering e-fuels from DAC for shipping.

Despite this cost difference, the 2024 Transport & Environment report projects that around 20% of shipping e-fuels will be carbon based, initially mostly e-diesel then shifting to e-LNG with an ongoing role for e-methanol (Transport & Environment, 2024). A similar cost analysis to that carried out for e-SAF is shown in Figure 9.5, showing the resultant price per tonne for e-fuel oil produced via the FT process. The values are shown for a range of DAC CO2 values (y-axis, £0 – £700) with other contributing costs aggregated (e.g. facilities capex, green hydrogen, energy) into non-CO2 costs (x-axis, £0 to £3,000). From Figure 9.6 it is clear that e-fuel oil made from DAC via the FT process is highly unlikely to come into the region of £1,500-£2,500/t.

For DAC-based e-gas oil and e-fuel oil to reach these values, not only would DAC costs have to be substantially lower than the central projections in this study, but green hydrogen and e-fuel production costs would also need to be much lower than current estimates. Much lower electricity costs would result in green hydrogen and e-fuel production costs being greatly reduced; zero-cost energy (likely using waste heat and zero-cost electricity) would bring DAC costs into the region of £300/tCO2, costs that are still far above being compatible with the £1,500-£2,000/t.

The ETS price would have a potential impact on whether shipping e-fuels were a potential market for DAC. In 2040, the central price is projected to be £142/tCO2e, with the high price at £169/tCO2e. If the other costs associated with e-fuel production could be brought into the region of £1,500-£2,000/tonne, DAC costs would need to be in the region of £100-£200/tCO2. These DAC values are still well below the most ambitious estimates for DAC costs presented in section 0, which reach as low as around £300/tCO2 but with a carbon price of £142/t, fuels produced from DAC CO2 could potentially enter the market.

In conclusion, shipping e-fuels being a market for DAC CO2 is likely to rely on a combination of the following:

  • Costs of e-fuel production being at the lowest end of current estimates, which would include the cost of DAC CO2 and green hydrogen being at the lowest end of current estimates
  • ETS prices being in the central or high range, or being greatly increased so that it effectively covers the cost of DAC
  • If an e-fuel production plant does not have access to biogenic or fossil CO2, the flexibility of DAC could make DAC CO2 the most economic (or only) option
  • sites were located near renewable energy sources but away from other CO2 sources such as industrial sites
  • Demand for sustainable fuels being high and driving up market prices.

Figure 9.6: Comparison of e-fuel oil costs for shipping (values shown in bands) depending on the cost of DAC CO2 (y-axis) and all other costs in e-fuel production (x-axis).

Drinks industry

The food and drink industry, and particularly the carbonated drink industry is of interest for DAC for several reasons:

  • The food and drink industry is a major UK consumer of CO2 in the UK
  • DAC can produce very pure CO2 meaning it is suitable for food and drink grade CO2
  • The carbonated drinks industry (e.g. soft drinks and beer) has a high mark up on products, especially compared to an industry like horticulture or construction materials
  • There is a market for premium products within the industry.

The market for premium products within the drinks industry is of particular interest as there is potentially a market for products that are greener or more ethical, a ‘green premium’. Typical examples that are already active in the market are organic or fair-trade products. We have used this idea of a green premium to understand how the higher cost of CO2 from DAC might be absorbed into product costs.

Additionally, there is already proven interest in DAC within the drinks industry with Coca Cola partnering with Climeworks and more recently investing in UK DAC company Airhive to supply DAC CO2 to replace fossil-derived CO2 at a production site (AP Ventures, 2024; The Chemical Engineer, 2018).

Current demands for CO2 and potential demand for DAC

Industry reports suggest the UK food and drink industry consumes in the region of 300-360 ktCOannually (Food & Drink Federation, 2019). As this demand is UK-wide, demand will not be spatially concentrated enough to support a 0.5 Mt DAC plant in Scotland. However, the potential size of the market is still considered and the potential for profitability as it is a market area where DAC CO2 is of interest.

The primary uses of CO2 in the food and drinks industry are carbonating drinks, chilling and packaging, transporting food and stunning animals. As discussion in section 9.1.2, as other CO2 sources are reduced, all these markets will need alternative sources of CO2 but the carbonated drinks industry is the most interesting for DAC. In Table 9.1, estimations are shown for the demand for CO2 within the soft drinks industry across the UK. These values add up to only 46-77 ktCO2 across the UK, information on the portion of this that is attributable to Scotland is not easily available so an assumption of 10% is made, broadly in line with population. A Scottish demand of 4.6-7.7 ktCO2 would only account for 1-2% of annual CO2 generation from a 0.5 Mt DAC plant and would therefore not be a major market.

Table 9.1: Calculation of CO2 requirement for UK soft drink and beer industries.

Metric

Soft drinks

Beer

Annual UK production

5,923 million litres (British Soft Drinks Association, 2024)

3,420 million litres (Statista, 2024)

CO2 required per litre

6-8 g/litre

4-10 g/litre (The Beer Store, 2024)

CO2 required for annual UK production

36-47 ktCO2

14-34 ktCO2

Potential profitability

The price of CO2 for utilisation discussed in interviews within this study were in the region of £100-£300/tCO2 though a broader range of up to £900 over recent years was discussed, with higher values again reported in the media (Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit, 2022). Food-grade CO2 commands a higher price than industrial CO2 due to its higher purity requirements.

To understand potential profitability of DAC in this market, we have considered the impact of changes in the cost of CO2 on the overall cost of the product. The cost of CO2 is estimated to be around 0.5%-1.5% of total production cost based on the costs in Table 9.1; much smaller than the portion of costs for e-fuels. Figure 9.7 shows the CO2 costs that would be compatible with 2% and 5% increases in production costs; the values are shown as ranges to reflect fluctuations in current costs, estimated to be £200-£300/tCO2. The 2% increase could be considered a green premium or simply a change in production costs, a 5% increase is more representative of a green premium that would to be passed on to customers by marketing the product as a green product.

The value of this green premium depends heavily on the product and the price of the product and varies country to country (Boston Consulting Group, 2023). PwC research giving a value of 9.7% for a green premium was focused shopping habits and is therefore more appropriate for the drinks market (PwC, 2024). Consumer research into green premiums gives values around 10% are but the full 10% has not been applied in the analysis here as other aspects of the production would presumably need to be ‘greened’ and the associated costs for those would also need to be included (PwC, 2024).

The most obvious insight from Figure 9.7 is that the projected DAC CO2 costs in section 0 are comfortably in the ranges shown. This contrast with e-fuels is because CO2 makes up a much smaller portion of the total cost than it does for e-fuels; drinks products that use less CO2 can naturally accommodate higher costs. When CO2 costs spiked, media reported that costs reached £2,000-£3,000t/CO2, easily increasing production costs by 10% for drinks and understandably causing issues in supply chains (Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit, 2022).

Figure 9.7: Range of DAC costs compatible with the carbonated drinks industry

The scenarios along the x-axis show various combinations of green premiums on drinks from using DAC depending on the percentage production costs CO2 currently makes up. The range in each scenario reflects uncertainty and fluctuations in current costs, assumed to be in the region of £200-£300/tCO2.

The values presented in Figure 9.7 demonstrate that the carbonated drinks industry is highly compatible with the cost of CO2 from DAC and could likely be profitable. However, the market size means that this would only be on the scale of a few kilo tonnes.

Construction materials

Construction materials come up consistently in discussions about carbon storage and utilisation because it is large-volume market and offers multi-decade storage potential. Additionally, construction materials offer an early market for CO2 while other markets, like e-fuels, are still developing. However, a market size or understanding the role of DAC is difficult to quantify. Additionally, construction materials are a low-value industry, making absorbing additional costs very difficult.

A key niche for ‘green’ construction materials is turning waste products into useful materials. Carbon8 make use of reactive residues come from processes like energy from waste, biomass, and the steel and paper industries, reacting them with CO2 captured from the same process to form aggregates that can be used in construction (Carbon8, 2024). A major financial value in this process comes from savings in waste disposal. These savings, combined with a market for the product and a carbon price, create a market for the CO2-storing product.[10] Currently, the CO2 used is collected onsite via CCS, limiting the role of DAC. However, as the market grows, so would the demand for CO2; not all sites may be suitable for CCS and a portion may choose to bring in CO2 from elsewhere, creating a role for DAC.

For cement and concrete, CO2 can be stored when the material is cast or when a structure is demolished and the concrete is reused. Quantification of the CO2 stored in concrete needs to be carefully considered: standard concrete contains some carbon and naturally reacts with CO2 in the air. For carbon capture and storage, the material has to store additional carbon to the amount that it would in standard use. Adding CO2 to cement has been advertised as enhancing the strength of the concrete but this depends heavily on the production process to ensure the concrete is not weakened instead (Fu, 2024).

Potential role for DAC CO2

There are currently no figures for projected CO2 demand in the construction industry and even Scotland-specific demand for construction materials is difficult to find data on. The UK datasets on demand for building and construction materials aggregates demand for Scotland and Wales, ranging from 6%-9% of UK demand (Department for Business and Trade, 2024). The IEA’s 2019 report ‘Putting CO2 to Use’ stated that companies creating products from industrial waste and CO2 were consuming around 75 kt/year globally, with UK-based Carbon8 storing 5 ktCO2/year in 2019 (IEA, 2019). By 2021, Carbon8 was producing 300 kt/year of aggregates, which would capture around 10%-20% CO2 per weight, therefore storing in the region of 10-20 ktCO2/year (University of Greenwich, 2021). However, this CO2 demand is largely met by the processes that produce the industrial waste and additional demand for CO2 may be limited.

The role for DAC in this process would be where there is not sufficient local CO2 demand or where onsite capture is not practical, for example it is too expensive and disruptive to install carbon capture, or space is limited. In these cases, DAC CO2 could be transported, but costs would need to be competitive.

Potential market size

Aggregates

Scotland produces around 21 Mt of aggregates per year, mainly from quarries but also from construction and demolition waste. The Carbon8 project generates aggregates from waste materials, with a market size more likely to be dictated by the availability of reactive waste materials than driven by the overall size of the aggregates market.

If we take energy from waste (EfW) as an example: 1.62 Mt of waste was incinerated in Scotland in 2023, a four-fold increase since 2011 (Scottish Government, 2024). The waste output from EfW is 20%-30% of the input by weight, therefore around 0.3-0.5 Mt of EfW waste outputs is generated annually in Scotland. If we again apply a 15% CO2 uptake to this waste output, we have a CO2 demand in the region of 0.05-0.07 Mt of CO2. Most of the CO2 needed for this process would be expected to come from the EfW process itself, even if 10% of this demand came from DAC to top up local supply, which would only generate a few kilo tonnes of DAC demand annually. Therefore, demand from processes industrial waste is not likely to contribute significantly to DAC demand in Scotland and would not be a driver for a 0.5 Mt DAC plant.

Cement

The UK consumes in the region of 15 Mt/year of cement, with Scottish and Welsh demand together accounting for 6%-9% annually (Statista, 2024). If we take Scottish consumption to be around 4% of the UK’s, we have a value for Scottish cement demand of 0.6 Mt/year. The potential CO2 uptake of cements depends on the chemical make-up, ranging between 8% and 25%, here we take 15% as a central value. (Hanifa, 2023) The theoretical maximum CO2 demand for Scottish cement would therefore be around 90 ktCO2/year. The portion of cement that is treated to store CO2 will depend on a market for green products, driven somewhat by consumer choice but most likely by legislative requirements to use lower-carbon building products.

As with aggregates, most CO2 for this process would be expected to come from carbon capture on local process, rather than DAC, and even then, local DAC with minimal transport may be preferable. As such, cement will not be a major driver for a DAC plant in the region of 0.5 Mt but could contribute early demand or drive demand for smaller, dispersed DAC plants.

Cost compatibility and potential profitability

Industry discussion within this project indicated that current CO2 prices in the region of £100-£300 were compatible with the market for incorporating into construction materials. The high end of this compatible range is at the very low end for projected solid DAC costs in the UK.

As with the shipping e-fuels industry, cost compatibility of DAC is likely to rely on either or both of a high ETS price or legislation. The ETS price would need to make up the difference between the £100-£300 range and the solid DAC price, projected to be in the region of £550, potentially higher if this demand is coming earlier than 2040. The current projected ETS of £142 in 2040 would not bring the solid DAC CO2 price in line with this range; an ETS price in the region of £250-£350 would be needed to bring DAC prices into this compatible range.

 

Conclusions

Scaling DAC requires overcoming technical, economic and logistical challenges. Key advances in air contactor design, sorbent efficiency and integration with renewable and waste heat are driving progress. However, high energy demands, market uncertainty and supply chain constraints remain significant barriers. For DAC to fulfil its potential, policy intervention, infrastructure development and a stable CO₂ market will be essential. With continued research and real-world deployment, DAC can play a pivotal role in meeting net zero goals.

The key aim of this study was to understand whether a DAC plant would be profitable in Scotland and under what conditions, and to understand the likelihood of those conditions where possible.

Research and development trends in DAC

DAC technology is advancing rapidly, with research focused on enhancing efficiency, reducing costs and improving integration with renewable energy and waste heat. Innovations in air contactor designs aim to optimise geometries and reduce capital costs, while ongoing work on sorbents and solvents targets scalable, cost-effective materials that maximise capture rates and minimise regeneration energy demands. New approaches to regeneration processes are exploring modular, low-energy solutions that can be optimised for climates and operational scales.

Integration with other energy systems is an area of future focus but research so far has been limited, partially by commercially sensitivity around sharing details of processes. Leveraging waste heat from processes like green hydrogen and e-fuel production could significantly offset DAC’s substantial thermal energy requirements but these technologies are also not yet developed at scale.

Limiting factors in DAC deployment

High energy demands and costs remain primary obstacles, with regions offering stable, low-cost energy (e.g., Iceland and Texas) better positioned for deployment than those with higher energy prices, such as the UK. The current reliance on volatile voluntary carbon markets adds further uncertainty, underscoring the need for government policy to provide confidence in a long-term market.

Additional hurdles include planning delays, including the fear of delays and difficulties, and the immature state of CO₂ transport and storage infrastructure. While cooler, drier climates provide marginal advantages, they are secondary to the broader economic and logistical barriers.

Cost of DAC deployment

The most obvious insight from the modelling in this study on the cost of DAC is that liquid DAC is projected to be cheaper than solid DAC in terms of costs per tonne of CO2 captured because of lower capex costs and lower energy costs. The central scenario in this study projects costs of capture (i.e. not including transport, storage or profit) in the region of £550/tCO2 for solid DAC and £340/tCO2 for liquid DAC. This is focussed on Scotland in 2040, assuming a global deployment level of 15 Mt. These central values carry significant uncertainty, particularly to overall learning rates, but also to the cost of key elements such as materials capex and energy costs.

Energy costs are the biggest contributor to the cost of DAC as modelled in this study, accounting for around half of the total costs. Although energy costs are higher for solid DAC than liquid DAC, there is more scope for reducing energy costs in solid DAC through the use of low-cost electricity and waste heat due the fact that solid DAC relies more on electricity and operates at a much lower temperature than liquid DAC allowing a bigger role for waste heat.

The waste heat sources considered specifically in this study were green hydrogen production and e-fuel production via the Fischer-Tropsch process, the process used to make e-fuels such as synthetic aviation fuel from CO2 and hydrogen. With e-fuels considered a major future market for DAC CO2, and Scotland considered an attractive location for these industries (especially within the UK), co-location of these three industries is very plausible, especially due to the major impact on the cost of DAC.

The option to use hydrogen instead of natural gas to provide the high temperatures needed for liquid DAC was also investigated. Using hydrogen pushes up the cost of liquid DAC by around 30% but even with this increase it is still cheaper than solid DAC, if that solid DAC is relying on grid-cost electricity.

An additional sensitivity was performed to understand the impact of financing costs on the cost of DAC by increasing the financing rates from 3.5%, in line with social discounting rates (DESNZ, 2024) to more commercial levels of 10% (UK Government, 2021). In this sensitivity, the cost of both solid and liquid DAC is increased significantly by the increase in required rates of return on capex investments highlighting that the cost of DAC will depend heavily on how the initial capex is funded.

International comparison

The cost of solid and liquid DAC in Scotland is compared to other potentially suitable, international locations. While liquid DAC is estimated to be cheaper than solid DAC per tonne of CO2 removed, the findings of the international comparison showed that Scotland was the most expensive of the regions investigated for liquid DAC, while Scotland was more favourable than many countries for solid DAC. This insight was in line with discussions within expert interviews in this study that indicated that Scotland and wider UK were not target locations for deploying liquid DAC, though this picture could change over time. Additionally, whilst liquid DAC has been estimated to be cheaper, the use of natural gas for its heat requirements may encounter challenges due to societal acceptance and political opposition to the continued use of fossil fuels.

Market opportunities and potential profitability

The conclusions from this study highlighted that there is a future market for DAC in Scotland broadly in the region of 0.15 Mt by 2040, not enough to make a 0.5 Mt DAC plant profitable for utilisation alone. Two key factors could make a plant of that scale profitable: demand for e-fuels from the rest of the UK or generating revenue from sending most of the captured CO2 to storage. Scotland’s clean energy resources, most notably offshore wind, offer key advantages for allowing DAC to be profitable especially when placed alongside other technologies such as green hydrogen and e-fuel production that could offer waste heat.

Synthetic fuels, especially sustainable aviation fuels (e-SAF), offer the most obvious market for DAC CO2 in Scotland, though it does not currently have specific requirements for DAC. In this study, we estimate that by 2040, DAC CO2 demand for e-SAF would be around 0.09 MtCO2 in Scotland and 1.3 MtCO2 for the wider UK but these values are ambitious based on DAC supplying a large share of the CO2 used. The projected cost of liquid DAC would be compatible with the buyout price for e-SAF, with the compatibility of solid DAC relying on the ETS price and potentially lower fuel costs or waste heat to be profitable

DAC demand from shipping fuels was projected to be lower than for e-SAF (~0.05 Mt for Scotland, 1 Mt for UK) due to there being more options for net-zero compatible fuels, with a knock-on effect on the price that would be paid for fuels. Consequently, not only would DAC costs need to be much lower but so would the other costs for e-fuel production, i.e. energy costs and green hydrogen production.

Carbonation for the drinks is a small but potentially highly profitable market for DAC and could support early development. However, the market is small, only a few kilo tonnes in Scotland, so it would not drive demand for a large-scale plant.

Construction materials come up consistently in discussion, but the potential market is hard to quantify, especially in a large-volume but low-margin industry. The demand for CO2 could be in the region of tens of kilo tonnes but much of this is expected to be generated and reused on-site rather than bought in from DAC. DAC could play a role in topping up on-site supply, but this demand is not likely to drive DAC demand on a large scale.

Future considerations for DAC in Scotland

Below are a set of future considerations for each of the sections within this study, highlighting areas that are likely to evolve over coming years or that could have a major impact on the potential profitability of DAC in Scotland.

Future considerations for R&D:

  • Monitor key developments in DAC that would lead to major changes in technology, the most obvious examples being:
  • Economies of scale balance against reduced storage and transport costs by building smaller plants locally to CO2 demand
  • Energy demand reductions that could address the high energy costs associated with DAC
  • Alternative regeneration technologies where that required less energy or allowed lower regeneration temperature for liquid DAC, eliminating the need for gas and the resultant carbon emissions
  • Monitor the insights gained from deployments and whether they affect any key assumptions in DAC cost calculations and market assumptions
  • Encouraging and facilitating co-operation between industries such as DAC companies, e-fuel companies and those developing green hydrogen facilities to understand the potential to use waste heat in DAC.

Future considerations for limiting factors:

  • Continue to engage with DAC providers, especially with regards to the planning process
  • Communicate where there is an expected market for DAC (both geographically and in which markets) and engage with suppliers to understand key limiting factors for that site.

Future considerations for the cost of DAC:

  • Monitor global deployment levels and learning rates, two of the major contributors to DAC cost reductions; R&D will feed strongly into learning rates
  • Ongoing consideration of energy prices on DAC, and how changes such as zonal pricing would affect DAC costs
  • Opportunities to co-locate DAC plants with waste heat sources, particularly green hydrogen and e-fuel production.

Future considerations for the market for DAC CO2:

  • Monitor relevant details within policies, such as the target for DAC CO2 in the UK SAF mandate
  • Seek to understand how DAC demand and generation will be spread across the UK. For example, if e-SAF production using DAC will be focused on a small number of sites, such that a DAC plant in Scotland would a meet a significant portion of UK demand.
  • Monitor signalling from maritime agencies and governments on the predicted role of e-fuels in shipping. For example, if ammonia began to be viewed less favourably, the role of sustainable carbon-based shipping fuels would increase
  • Engage with the chemical industry to understand the role of externally generated CO2 in future processes.

 

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Appendices

  1. Additional information on DAC technology

This appendix provides additional information on DAC technologies, focussed on established methods.

Within both solid and liquid DAC, the process itself (solvent/sorbent, regeneration process, mechanical design etc.) varies and is an active topic of research and development. Three methods developed by leading companies Climeworks, Global Thermostat, Carbon Engineering are currently at the furthest stages of development and scalability (IEA, 2024). An overview of the most active areas of research and development are provided and assessed for their potential to improve upon these established methods.

Liquid DAC – Aqueous Hydroxides

The liquid DAC capture process used by Carbon Engineering captures CO2 from ambient air using aqueous solution of KOH to form potassium carbonate (Sodiq, 2022). The carbonate is subsequently fed into a calciner where KOH is regenerated and CO2 released in a high temperature, high energy calcination process. The temperatures needed for this regeneration process are around 900°C and above; these temperatures are typically achieved by burning gas, with the released CO2 captured within the process. These high temperatures are an issue for liquid DAC technologies as heat pumps cannot reach this temperature meaning liquid DAC cannot run solely on renewable electricity.

Solid DAC – Solid Amines

Climeworks and Global Thermostat use a solid amine to capture CO2 from ambient air. Once the adsorption beds reach the desired capacity, a temperature-vacuum regeneration system (TVSA) heats the beds between 80 – 100°C which regenerates the sorbent and releases CO2 and water (McQueen et al., 2021). Heat pumps can provide the temperatures needed for solid DAC but not for liquid DAC.

Solid DAC – Solid Alkali Carbonates

This method developed by Heirloom uses a calcium looping method, similar to the liquid DAC method used by Carbon Engineering. Instead of an aqueous hydroxide, solid calcium carbonate (limestone) is heated in a calciner, producing pure CO2 and calcium oxide. The calcium oxide is arranged in a bed and captures CO2 passively from the air. Initially this capture stage required up to four weeks to reach the desired carbon uptake but recent innovation and developments has reduced this time to several days (Heirloom, 2022).

Table 12.1: Summary of established DAC technologies.

Method

Example Company

Energy requirements

Data Type / Source

Aqueous hydroxide solvent and calcium based kraft regeneration process

Carbon Engineering

High temperature heat

2450 kWhth

1460 kWhth and 370 kWhe

2420-2530 kWhth

1480-1520 kWh­th and 370 kWhe (Keith, 2018)

Modelling (Keith, 2018)

Modelling (An, 2022)

  

Solid amine sorbent and temperature-vacuum (TVSA) regeneration process

Climeworks

+

Global Thermostat

Low temperature heat

Current: 3310 kWhth and 700 kWh­e

Target: 1500 kWhth and 500 kWhe

3190-3530 kWhth and 290 kWhe

Plant Data (Duetz, 2021)

Modelling (Sendi, 2022)

  

Solid Alkali Carbonate and calcium based kraft regeneration process

Heirloom (not fully established yet)

High temperature heat

2210-1640 kWh­th and 220 kWhe

Modelling (McQueen, 2020)

  1. Main R&D trends in DAC

This appendix gives an overview of key current research and development trends in DAC.

Innovation Map

A variety of sources including publications in journals and industry consultations were used to develop a map of trends in research and development in the DAC space. These emerging technologies and methods are presented in the subsequent sections. An overview of the key R&D areas for processes and materials is provided at the start in Figure 12.1, mapping the R&D sectors to technologies and companies.

A screenshot of a diagram

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Figure 12.1: Trends in DAC Research and Development

Air contactors

Air contactors are the section of the system where air is passed through or across the liquid or solid sorbent capture material. Around 20% of the energy demand for DAC is used in this phase, largely as electrical energy for fans and pumps. (McQueen et al., 2021). The main energy demand is overcoming the pressure drop resulting from the input air meeting resistance from components of the system such as the filters. The air pressure needs to be kept high to maintain the concentration of CO2 and therefore the efficiency of the carbon capture.

Cost contribution to DAC

Air contactor’s contribution to the system capex and overall cost depends on the type of DAC. The Hanson et al. report from 2021 gives the cost of an air contactor for solid DAC of $13 million to $84 million ($1–$8 per tonne of CO2 removed), for liquid DAC the numbers are less clear but with projected capex values post innovation in the region of $200-$400 million and an ambitious minimum of $30-$60 per tCO2, a clear issue when trying to get to total costs of $100/tCO2 (Ozkan, 2022) (Hanson et al., 2021)

Air contactors

With air contactors being such a large cost in liquid DAC, it makes sense that air contactors are a key R&D area for Carbon Engineering. Carbon Engineering highlighted two main areas of development for contactors: reducing capex costs of the contactors and adapting the geometry of the contactors to increase the contact area between the incoming air and the capture agent, thereby increasing capture efficiency. Much of this contactor optimisation work has been done through computational modelling, with a move away from conventional packed columns where the air had to be forced through, resulting in large pressure drops, to structures that better accommodate air flow minimising resistance while providing a large surface area for CO2 capture e.g. thin, flat sorbent sheets, monoliths, or cooling towers-like scrubbers (Climeworks, 2023). These approaches are being developed in both liquid DAC and solid DAC, reducing electricity demand and increasing capture efficiency.

Passive air contactors

Another area of research is having passive air contactors, where wind or natural airflow drive the interaction between the air and capture material. There is a trade-off here with the capex reduction (up to 25% of the cost of capture) and energy demand reduction versus the reduced capture efficiency and increased capture time (Third Derivative, 2021). There are a number process-based or place-based factors that would make passive air contactors more attractive:

  • Sorbents with a high capture efficiency and low cost
  • Locations with lots of space and naturally strong airflow/windspeeds
  • Locations where airflow is already accelerated, e.g. cooling towers (Noya, 2024)
  • Locations with high electricity prices.

A number of startups are investigating this option including Heirloom, Carbon Collect, Infinitree, and Noya. Heirloom have reported that they have reduced the time taken for carbonation of their material from an industry standard of 2 weeks down to 2.5 days. It is not entirely clear how the acceleration was achieved but they are using thin layers spread over multiple levels to maximise contact area while minimising land use. The passive approach means that the air contactors need only <0.05 GJ/tCO2 (~14 kWh/tCO2), compared to upwards of 0.5-1 GJ/tCO2 for other approaches (around 140-280 kWh/tCO2). (Heirloom, 2022; Third Derivative, 2021)

In 2022, BEIS awarded the Dutch start-up CO2CirculAir B.V. £3 million for their SMART-DAC project, which utilises wind circulation to drive the CO2 capturing process, as opposed to relying on fans, thereby eliminating energy costs associated with forced air movement (Anon., 2022) The funding was allocated towards the construction of a pilot plant in Larne, Northern Ireland, at the B9 Energy Storage offices. Testing was set to begin in spring 2023, with the facility expected to capture at least 100 tonnes of CO₂ per year, however as of March 2025, according to the company’s website, the project is still under construction (Anon., n.d.).

Sorbents and solvents

Sorbents and solvents are the materials that capture the CO2, either by being absorbed into the solvent in liquid DAC or adsorbing onto the material surface in solid DAC. Solvents and sorbents are a major area of research in DAC, the ideal capture material would be highly efficient at capturing CO2, doing so quickly and selectively but also giving up the CO2 readily with a small change in temperature or pressure, therefore reducing the energy requirements for generation. For the DAC industry, the ideal capture material would also be low cost, easy to produce at scale and be stable throughout thousands of cycles. There is an additional consideration that some materials work better in humid conditions, while some are much worse in humid conditions; this will affect which materials are best suited to which countries/climates and use cases. A summary of potential improvements is given in Table 12.2 with more detail below with the filled cells indicating the advantages of each material.

Table 12.2: Summary of potential improvements in DAC solvents and sorbents, the filled cells highlight the advantages of each material for DAC.

Topic area

Improvement

Capture efficiency

Capture selectivity

Regeneration temperature/energy

Longevity

Scalable

Cost

Climate optimisation

Solid DAC

Amine-functionalised sorbents

       
 

Zeolites

       
 

MOFs

       
 

Solid alkali carbonates

       
 

Silica gel

       
 

Calcium ambient weathering

       

Liquid DAC

Alternative liquid sorbents: alkanolamine, alkylamines, and ionic liquids

       

New Amine Functionalised Adsorbents

The development of new amine functionalised sorbents used in solid DAC methods such as the ones used by Climeworks and Global Thermostat have the potential to reduce the energy demand of regeneration and to improve the number of cycles the sorbent can undergo before degeneration (Wang, 2024). Sorbent lifetime ranges in estimates from 0.25 – 5 years (McQueen et al., 2021).The Climeworks process uses 7.5 kg of sorbent per tonne of CO2 captured with the target of reducing this to 3 kg (Duetz, 2021).

Metal-Organic Frameworks

These physisorbent materials have a porous structure with a high surface area and tuneable properties (Wang, 2024). Tunability means that the material can be more selective to capturing CO2, as opposed to capturing other molecules like water, an issue particularly in more humid climates (Sodiq, 2022). Climeworks are working with co-producer Svante to create novel air contactors containing MOFs with very high surface areas and lower operational costs. In a recent development, a team at Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne, Switzerland (EPFL) have developed a new MOF which prevents the CO2/water competition, selectively capturing CO2 in wet environments (Sodiq, 2022). In one experiment the energy required for regeneration was comparable to established approaches, using 1,600 kWhth­ for MOF regeneration.

Zeolites

Zeolites have a similar structure to metal organic frameworks and when tuned appropriately, provide efficient and selective adsorption/desorption of CO2 in low concentrations due to a number of zeolite intrinsic properties; pore architecture, low price, crystal size and chemical composition (Sodiq, 2022; Siriwardane, 2001; Zukal, 2010). However, selectivity of CO2 is poor in humid air and the materials degrade through the cycles meaning more research is needed before moving from laboratory scale to industrial scale (Mukherjee, 2019).

Silica Gel

Silica gel materials are also of interest to overcome the issue of absorbing water rather than CO2. Recently, commercially available silica gels of different pore sizes were grafted onto a triamine to investigate the CO2 capture performance (Anyanwu, 2020). The grafting process was completed in both dry and wet conditions to assess the effects of moisture on the sorbent’s CO2 uptake capacity. The capacity of silica gel to capture CO2 improved by 40% indicating the potential suitability of Silica Gel-based DAC methods for humid climates (Kwon, 2019).

Regeneration Process

Crystallisation

Crystallisation is a potential alternative DAC method that offers low-cost CO2 separation from sorbents with minimal chemical and energy inputs. This method has been the subject of several research papers, one example uses aqueous guanidine sorbent (PyBIG) to capture CO2 from the atmosphere, binding it as crystalline carbonate salts which are subsequently separated by filtration and heated to 80-120°C to release the bound CO2 and regenerate the sorbent, requiring 1410 kWhth­ (Seipp, 2017). Other studies have used the same method and alternative sorbents with similar results (Brethomé, 2018). Research is currently limited to laboratory scale with overall energy requirements still higher than the optimised Carbon Engineering method (Sodiq, 2022).

Electrochemical methods

These methods are an active area of research and being developed by companies such as Verdox and Mission Zero Technologies (Voskian, 2019) The key advantage of electrochemical methods is that they use only electrical energy, there is no heat requirement. The electrical-only method is appealing for places where the greenest and cheapest energy sources are electric, as opposed to somewhere like Iceland that has cheap geothermal heat.

Electrochemical methods could offer highly efficient and modular solutions for DAC, suitable for various scales of deployment. An electro-swing method being developed at the Massachusetts institute of Technology (MIT) uses specially designed electrodes to capture CO2 through CO2’s electrochemistry (Advanced Science News, 2021). The method has shown promising results, working at ambient conditions with low energy requirements of 570 kWhe per tonne of CO2 captured. However, the process required CO2 concentrations higher than the 400ppm found in atmosphere (6,000 – 100,000) as well as reporting a capacity loss of 30% after 7,000 cycles. Both of these factors have currently limited deployment to laboratory scale (Advanced Science News, 2021).

Moisture Swing

Another active area of research companies such as Carbon Collect and Avnos are exploring moisture-swing adsorption processes using ion exchange resins. These systems capture CO2 efficiently in dry conditions and avoid the need for high energy consumption or a vacuum (Wang, 2024) (Xie, 2024). One recent study estimated a regeneration energy requirement of 377 kWhth per tonne of CO2 captured, but acknowledged this did not take into account the precooling process or differences in efficiency at scale (Xie, 2024). The method is suitable for low-purity CO2 applications like agricultural greenhouses. The method performs poorly in humid conditions and is limited to deployment in arid environments; research is ongoing to improve efficiency.

Integration with waste heat

Solid DAC and liquid DAC both use heat to remove the CO2 and regenerate the capture material. Approximately 80% of the overall energy demand for both types of DAC is thermal energy, which offers opportunities for using waste heat from other sources (Ge, 2024). The opportunity to use waste heat for DAC was discussed in some of the interviews with industry experts in this study. EMEC highlighted that green hydrogen production and e-fuel production both generate waste heat and are technologies that would make sense to develop alongside and co-locate with DAC.

There are a number of considerations for waste heat incorporation with DAC:

  • Amount of waste heat, e.g. in GWh
  • Temperature of waste heat
  • Concentration, e.g. at a single location or dispersed
  • Cost, including the cost of transporting or concentrating the heat
  • Accessibility, also linked to cost
  • Consistency of supply, within a day or year but also over the lifetime of the plant
  • Competing demands for the heat
  • Carbon intensity of the heat

A 2020 report by BRE for CXC considered sources of waste heat in Scotland, split by low-grade and medium-grade sources as summarised in Figure 12.2. These medium-grade sources would be suitable for solid DAC and low-grade sources could be upgraded via heat pumps. Dispersed sources such as supermarkets and bakeries are unlikely to be attractive for DAC due to size and are more likely to be attractive for district heating systems. Instead, waste heat sources that are more isolated and that DAC could be incorporated with from the start or the project (as opposed to retrofitted on to) would be attractive, examples being nuclear energy, green hydrogen electrolysis and e-fuel production.

A diagram of different types of heat

Description automatically generated

Figure 12.2: Examples of waste heat sources in Scotland identified in report for ClimateXChange looking into waste heat sources in Scotland (Building Research Establishment, 2020).

Research trends

Research trends relevant to integration with waste heat:

  • Lower temperature sorbent materials: if the temperatures required for regeneration can be reduced, then waste heat can supply a larger portion of the thermal energy demand
  • Modular units: while not the key driver for making DAC modular, making units small, scalable and easy to integrate with other processes would allow DAC units to take advantage of dispersed sources of waste heat

Integration with renewable energy

DAC needs clean, low-cost energy with a high load factor. Climeworks has largely deployed in Iceland due to the cheap heat and electricity provided by geothermal energy. Carbon Engineering are deploying in Texas, where there is inexpensive and plentiful renewable energy plus cheap natural gas. Locations with continuous sources of renewable energy, such as geothermal or hydro are particularly appealing, but integration with wind energy is likely to be more relevant for Scotland.

As a rule of thumb, DAC only has ‘relevant’ amounts of negative emissions if renewable energy provides 80% of the energy supplied through the grid (AGU, 2018). Scotland’s electricity grid is around 60% renewables in terms of energy used but with a lot of renewable energy being distributed to other parts of the UK (Scottish Energy Statistics Hub, 2024). Using curtailed energy is attractive for many purposes, but it is hard to make DAC economical with current capex costs if the system is only used part of the time. A 2018 report stated that either DAC capex costs would have to come down 10-fold or carbon prices go up 10-fold to make running DAC on curtailed energy viable (AGU, 2018). While running purely on curtailed energy is never likely to be economically appealing, running only when the grid is at above 80% renewables could be. This sensitivity will be investigated in the modelling phase of this study.

Research trends

Research trends relevant to integration with renewable energy:

  • Lower temperature sorbent materials: if the temperatures required for regeneration can be reduced, then heat pumps are able to supply the energy more efficiently making integration with renewable energy more efficient
  • Electrochemical DAC: requires only electrical energy rather than thermal energy
  • Understanding local environmental impacts: maritime environments are hard on components, understanding which components are most affected and limit the life of the system is a part of the ongoing learnings from current deployments
  • Energy storage: incorporating energy storage would allow for higher load factors and better use of cheaper renewable energy but would also increase the capex costs
  • Tidal energy: EMEC brought forward the idea of pairing DAC with tidal energy, due to the periodic nature of tidal energy generation and the cycling nature of solid DAC, especially interesting as EMEC and Orkney are a key centre for tidal energy.

Learnings from deployment

Both Climeworks and Carbon Engineering stated that learning from deployments was their main focus for R&D and where they see the most progress coming from. Climeworks said they are adapting their testing facilities to be more ‘real-life’ and saw the main improvements coming from “better sorbents, better structuring better design of the plant”.

Climeworks posted a very open article on their website titled “The reality of deploying carbon removal via direct air capture in the field” that described and quantified many of the issues they had encountered in the first two years that the Orca plant was operating. (Climeworks, 2024) Many of these learnings were issues that caused the plant to underperform (e.g. 20% quality fluctuations in the sorbent material, recovery losses of 30% of the captured CO2) but saw the main cost reductions being in applying lessons learned from current deployments such as adaption for local weather conditions.

Understudied areas for R&D in DAC

Three key areas of that emerged as understudied areas for DAC are

  • Integration with waste heat: currently limited to an extent by a lack of information sharing between commercial parties but the opportunities may become more obvious as the technology matures and progress becomes steadier
  • Impact of local conditions: with relatively few deployments in place already, the impact of local conditions is not yet fully understood. Elements of local conditions could be climatic (largely temperature and humidity) and impacts of pollution (contamination of filters, degradation of components). These will affect costs and efficiencies, but also which technologies are best suited to which environments. For example, electrochemical DAC is less mature than other DAC technologies but is attractive in Scotland because it runs purely off electricity rather than heat. Different DAC technologies will be better suited to different locations and sensitive to different parameters, research will be needed for optimisation, aided by modelling.
  1. Limiting factors in DAC deployments

This section gives more detail on the key limiting factors in DAC technology and projects. Limiting factors that affect the cost and profitability of a plant but also the rate at which a DAC plant or plants could be deployed beyond purely financial limitations.

Energy demand and cost

From discussion with industry, the key limiting factor for deployment and the key factor in deciding location was cost of energy. The UK is seen as an expensive place for energy compared to the likes of Iceland or Texas where DAC is being deployed. The impact of energy costs will be a key part of the scenarios investigated in the modelling phase. The UK Green Book projects industrial electricity costs in the central scenario to go from 18 p/kWh down to 11 p/kWh over the next decade,[11] electricity prices in Iceland are not only lower, in the region of 5­6 p/kWh but also much more consistent (Statistics Iceland, 2022; DESNZ, 2024).

In terms of the scale of the energy demand, a 0.5 Mt plant would require around 1 TWh of energy per year, based on a value of 2 MWh/tCO2 (IEA, 2024). For context, in 2023, Scotland generated just over 33 TWh of renewable electricity; 1 TWh is roughly equivalent to energy demand of homes in Dundee (Scottish Government, 2024). The energy demand for DAC is around 20% electrical energy and 80% thermal energy. With solid DAC, that 80% thermal energy can be provided by heat pumps, bringing the overall energy demand down. Assuming a heat pump COP of 2, considering the high temperatures needed, the overall energy demand could be brought down to 0.6 TWh. If that 0.6 TWh of energy demand is assumed to be spread evenly across the year (i.e. a load factor of 1), then the connection size required for a 0.5 Mt DAC plant would be in the region of 68 MW. This 68 MW value is equivalent to other large industrial connections or a data centre.

Demand for CO2

Interviewees generally noted that the other key factor holding back DAC deployment was a lack of long-term demand or a clear carbon market. This market can be either:

  • Carbon removals/storage
  • Using non-fossil carbon for application or manufacture of existing products or services, e.g. food and drinks, fertiliser
  • Using non-fossil carbon for new products or services such as e-fuels or low-carbon chemicals

DAC projects selling CO2 removals (carbon offset credits) are reliant on government policy incentives (e.g. USA’s Inflation Reduction Act), or via off-take agreements on the Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM). The VCM is composed of organisations or individuals buying carbon credits for the purposes of offsetting their emissions, this market can be volatile and is unlikely to scale to size that is meaningful in reducing global emissions due to its voluntary nature. Government mandates and regulation on removals could provide the long-term security for investors in DAC that is not offered by the VCM. The UK Government announced in its 2021 Net Zero Strategy an ambition for 5 MtCO2 of removals by 2030 and 23 MtCO2 by 2035, but this is not yet been backed by a mandate, and this could be met by other removal technologies than DAC (e.g. BECCS) (BEIS, 2021).

It was also noted that in jurisdictions where there are helpful policies in place, those policies often come with restrictions that all activities have to take place within the boundary of that jurisdiction. Large scale deployment will need policies that generate demand across a lot of jurisdictions and allow providers to function in an open market.

The market for captured CO2 as a feedstock in the chemical industry appears to be very immature, with very little information available.

SAF Mandates

SAF mandates were discussed widely in the interviews with attention drawn to differences between the UK and EU SAF (ReFuelEU) mandates where the EU mandate is explicit about where the CO2 in SAF comes from, whereas the UK mandate does not make a distinction. The expectation is that the EU mandate will phase out fossil-based CO2 over time, for other jurisdictions there is lower confidence about if and when fossil CO2 will be phased out. The UK has announced an intention to bring in a specific requirement for DAC within the SAF mandate in future.

Emissions Trading Scheme

The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) offers a mechanism for DAC to become financially attractive, especially in terms of capture and storage but only if DAC is recognised within the ETS system or the penalty price becomes comparable to the cost of DAC. The question of how greenhouse gas removal (GGR) systems should be integrated into the UK ETS system is currently being consulted on (closed 15th August 2024). There is concern that integration of removals in the ETS scheme could reduce efforts to reduce emissions (Department for Energy Security & Net Zero, 2023). The carbon price in 2025 is around £90 (~$120), with gradual but uneven increase out to 2050. These carbon values are at the low end of projections for the cost of capture for DAC, as the carbon price increases towards a maximum of £170, (~$220), it gets closer to the potential range of DAC costs.

To incentivise emitters to pay for DAC or DACCS, the more appropriate price comparison would be the buyout price: how much organisations are charged for every tonne of carbon they emit that they do not have carbon credits for. Currently, the buyout price for CO2 in the UK is £100/tCO2, not much above the carbon price and far below the price that would incentivise DAC use to offset emissions (ICAP, 2022). The names of companies that exceed their emissions allowance are also published, an incentive to comply for companies with a public profile.

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Figure 12.3: Projected values for the UK carbon prices used for modelling purposes (Department for Energy Security & Net Zero, 2023).

Planning restrictions

Planning restrictions relevant to DAC are largely around land use and visual impact but the time taken to get planning permission was viewed as an obstacle for DAC projects, mostly because of how long the process can take. A 0.5 Mt DAC plant would be considered a major development; the average planning time for major development projects in Scotland in 2023/24 ranged widely from 22 weeks for projects with processing agreements compared to 53 weeks for those without (Scottish Government, 2024). This difference highlights the advantage of planning agreements and working with the Scottish Government and local authorities. These planning times have been gradually coming down over the last few years and the Scottish Government was praised in some of the engagements within this study for being more dynamic and working with companies to progress projects.

Impact of delays

The cost of delays depends heavily on what stage of the project the delay occurs: a delay at the start of the project has a smaller impact than at the end of the project where there are higher running costs, e.g. staff hired, money borrowed. A very rough rule of thumb is that delays cost 1-2% of the project costs per month. Planning delays can easily run into months, even years. Taking the lower end of those delay costs, 1% per month, is 12% additional costs for a year delay.

Perhaps the most impactful element of planning restrictions is confidence: a country or region known to have a very strict, complex or slow planning process is not attractive for DAC deployment where R&D is still happening at pace, and it may be difficult to give full details of what a plant will look like at the start of the process. Focusing early DAC deployment at existing industrial sites may be helpful in terms of space, grid capacity and minimising visual impacts, as would a flexible planning process with open dialogue with decision makers.

Geographical requirements

Location

The main geographical requirements for DAC are:

  • Near or connected to low cost, low carbon electricity with a high load factor
  • Near transport, storage or usage of CO2

During our expert interviews, a rule of thumb was discussed for liquid DAC that if a country was a net importer of natural gas, it is unlikely to be good candidate for liquid DAC. The UK has been a net importer of gas since 2004, indicating that Scotland could be more suitable for solid DAC (Lennon, 2024). Green hydrogen could be used instead of natural gas, but it is unlikely that this would be economical or the best use of green hydrogen. These costs can be investigated in the modelling phase.

Climate

An additional geographical consideration is climate. Most deployments so far have been in Europe or North America, Climeworks have currently deployed in Iceland and Switzerland and are learning how climate impacts their process. Based on learning from those locations, Scotland becomes a more attractive location than places like the Middle East or North Africa where the processes would need to be re-optimised for the climate, especially while deployments are being developed and scaled up.

Model-based research has indicated that cold (<18°C average temperature) and dry (<65% relative humidity) climates are most ideal for DAC. The UK is classified is cold and humid, along with much of Europe and parts of North America. Cold climates, dry or humid, were found to be most favourable climate-wise for DAC but lower energy prices in hotter places (e.g. Middle East, North Africa) compensate for this. This research is based on current, or at least recent, data published on the processes and materials used for DAC and adaption of materials and processes would allow optimisation for different climates, e.g. favouring more selective sorbents in humid regions to avoid capturing water instead of CO2 (Sendi, 2022).

Land area

The land use requirements for solid DAC plants and liquid DAC plants are very similar, 0.4 km2 and 0.5 km2 at a million tonne scale plant respectively (World Resources Institute, n.d.). For comparison, the land area needed for a forest to capture a megaton of CO2 is 860 km2. These values for the land use of DAC plants do not account for land area required for energy generation.

Transport and storage

Transport and storage of CO2 has been highlighted as a limiting factor both interviews, particularly in the short term. As the DAC industry matures, transport and storage is expected to become less of an issue as transport is optimised and large-scale storage infrastructure is established. Carbon Engineering noted that a key advantage of their site in Texas is that it is placed directly above large CO2 storage reserves. Pipelines and plans for CO2 storage are already in development.

Currently, CO2 is transported mainly by lorries, a limiting factor both in terms of reducing cost and achieving scale of transport and storage. This limiting factor is mirrored on the demand side for the likes of e-fuel manufacturers who will likely need onsite generation to meet CO2 demands as they scale up.

Ambitions for CO2 storage

The UK Government announced two sets of projects, Track-1 and Track-2 clusters, with an ambition to capture 20-30 Mt CO2 per year (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2023). The Acorn project in the North Sea is within Track-2 and is part of an ambition to capture 5­10 Mtpa CO2 (Acorn, 2024). The Acorn project will repurpose existing gas processing and transporting facilities to permanently store CO2 under the North Sea (Scottish Government, n.d.). The Acorn project initially had an ambition to be delivering CCS by the mid-2020s, and storing 5­6 Mtpa by 2030, but a more recent press report from mid-2024 refers to support from the Scottish Government to “make the Scottish Cluster a reality” indicating a much lower confidence level on the timeline of delivery (Acorn, 2021; Acorn, 2024).

Supply-chain requirements

Supply chain requirements and limitations were discussed with stakeholders and investigated in previous work by City Science. The most likely material to cause a potential bottleneck in the DAC supply chain is amine sorbents, the carbon capturing material in solid DAC technology (McQueen et al., 2021). The bottleneck would occur due to DAC requiring large volumes compared to current production levels as opposed to any issue with a particular material or feedstock, although there are some processing issues as exposure to the precursor chemicals is harmful. These amine-based sorbents are currently produced in small volumes mainly for pharmaceutical applications, there may need to be development of a large-scale synthesis process that could take time to optimise (Coherent Market Insight , 2023). Part of the issue with sorbents such as PEI is that it degrades through the cycles and needs to be replaced or topped up, meaning the demand is ongoing rather than just when the plant is being set up. Improvements to the longevity and alternative materials are active areas of research (Sodiq, 2022). Early engagement with the industry to understand the scale of demand could mitigate some of these issues.

Previous work City Science has carried out has highlighted that material supply of generic materials was not likely to be a limiting factor in DAC supply. The three materials main materials considered were steel, concrete and aluminium. Within the stakeholder engagements as part of this study, no organisation has specifically stated material availability as a key limiting factor in their scale up although materials were mentioned as generic issues encountered during scale up.

In terms of equipment, many components already have very mature supply chains, especially from the oil and gas industry. Some interviewees said that the small size of the DAC industry compared to these suppliers’ usual industries has taken some getting used to for supply chains. Interviewees also discussed learning from deployments where compromises could be made with respect to supply chains and materials e.g. cost versus quality and longevity.

Commercial sensitivity and maturity

A limiting factor that came out of our discussions with industry experts was commercial sensitivity and maturity. One aspect is that there are so many DAC start-ups, each with a slightly different approach or process and each protecting their own commercial interests. The variety of processes and the lack of detailed process information makes it hard for potential backers or partners to pick a technology or company. EMEC was highlighted as a major draw in Scotland and a mechanism for overcoming some of these commercial sensitivity issues due to the expertise, potential for partnerships and involvement in demonstration activities.

  1. Additional details on DAC cost modelling

The cost model used in this study is based on method used by Young et al. (Young, 2023). This approach uses cost data from early-stage DAC plants and applies then projects cost reductions based on learning rates as global deployment increases. The cost model uses an initial plant, the FOAK, then applies learning rates at each doubling of global capacity.[12]

The FOAK size used for the solid technology was 4 ktCO2, based on the Climeworks Orca plant. The FOAK size used for the liquid technology was 500 ktCO2 capacity, based on the STRATOS plant under construction, using Carbon Engineering technology. The FOAK cost is then projected over a level of deployment (i.e. over a number of doublings of capacity) to produce the NOAK cost.

The cost components of the ‘FOAK Outputs’ and ‘NOAK Outputs’ are then used to determine a cost of DAC, which is a levelised cost per tonne of CO2 evaluated over the lifetime of the plant. Equation 1 below demonstrates how the NUAC is calculated.

Equation 1

The CRF is the capital recovery factor, used to calculate the payback on financing required for the plant capex. Annual capex payments are calculated by multiplying the capex by the CRF. The CRF is based on both the cost of capital (i) and the plant lifetime (n) as shown in Equation 2. The cost of capital was set at 3.5% in the central case, consistent with a social discounting rate, and a value of 10% used in the sensitivity analysis to represent a more commercial weighted average cost of capital (WACC) (UK Government, 2021; DESNZ, 2024).

Equation 2

Three types of cost of DAC can been calculated, depending on the scope of emissions accounted for, and whether costs of transportation and storage are included:

  • Levelised cost of DAC (LCOD) (gross captured): NPV of abatement determined on the amount of CO2 physically captured by the DAC plant.
  • Levelised cost of removal (LCOR)NUAC (net captured): NPV of abatement determined on the amount of CO2 physically captured by the DAC plant, minus any Scope 1 and 2 emissions, to derive a net abatement.
  • Levelised cost of storage (net stored): Uses the net captured abatement. Includes the costs of transport and storage of CO2.

It is the NUAC net captured value that has been used in this study, also called the levelised cost of removal (LCOR). This definition accounts for the CO2 produced via scope 1 and scope 2 emissions, i.e. the emissions associated with the energy used to run the DAC plant.

A 2-year build period has been assumed for the costing (for both technologies), with the CAPEX spread equally across the first two years. There is no CO2 capture in these first two years as the plant is not yet operational; after the two-year build period, the annual costs (energy and non-energy OPEX) are modelled for each year, as well as the CO2 capture. The total length of the analysis period is therefore plant lifetime plus two years.

  1. Range of projected SAF values

There is significant uncertainty in the projected cost of e-SAF driven by large uncertainty in several key contributing factors to the overall cost such as energy prices, the cost of green hydrogen and the cost of DAC. The Sustainable Aviation Fuel Mandate Final Stage Cost Benefit Analysis presents a range of SAF costs illustrating this uncertainty that had to be considered in setting the buyout price for SAF and e-SAF, shown in Figure 12.4 (Department for Transport, 2024b). The projected ranges for PTL, that we have referred to as e-SAF in this report, span a range of thousands of pounds, hence the focus in this study on understanding what the key factors are that will dictate where costs lie within this range.

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Figure 12.4: Range of costs for various sustainable aviation fuel types presented as part of the analysis for the UK SAF mandate (Department for Transport, 2024b).

  1. International Energy Data

A summary of the energy data used in the international comparison is provided in Table 12.3. The number of sources used has been minimised where possible to avoid differences in the assumptions and methods used to derive these figures. To account for the recent increase in energy prices due to a rise in global conflict, energy data from 2021 was used as this represents the most recent data unaffected by this increase.

Table 12.3: A summary of the cost and carbon of fuels used in the international comparison

Location

Natural Gas Cost £/MWh

Electricity Cost £/MWh (Climatescope, 2024)

Carbon Intensity of Electricity gCO2/kWh (Electricity Map, 2024)

Scotland (United Kingdom) (2024)

49 (DESNZ, 2024)

187

213

Scotland (United Kingdom) (2040)

49 (DESNZ, 2024)

187

6

Texas

13 (U.S EIA, 2024)

57

389

Canada

15 (Statistica, 2024)

60

72

Australia

30 (Australian Energy Regulator, 20224)

148

428

Germany

28 (Statistica, 2024)

187

372

Iceland

(No imports)

49

28

Chile

17 (LPG Price monitoring agency, 2024)

139

272

Brazil

32 (Argus, 2023)

110

90

Oman

10 (indexmundi, 2024)

51

471

Denmark

25 (Statistica, 2024)

257

132

Sweden

41 (Statistica, 2024)

88

25

Norway

(Negligible use)

105

30

Netherlands

29 (Statistica, 2024)

73

284

France

34 (Statistica, 2024)

176

53

  1. Comparison to IEA

The International Energy Agency report on DAC provides in-depth analysis, including operating conditions and cost estimates, the LCOD is shown alongside cost estimates from our modelling in Figure 12.5. Using IEA energy prices, estimates of the cost of DAC are similar between the model used in this study and the values reported by the IEA. The IEA report does not include the deployment year within the modelling assumptions however the IEA cost of DAC falls within the range of 2040 to 2050 cost estimates.

Figure 12.5: Comparison to IEA estimates of the cost of solid and liquid DAC

  1. Waste Heat

Hydrogen Production via Electrolysis

Hydrogen production operates at temperatures ranging from 60°C-80°C (Koumparakis, 2025) Assuming a heat exchanger with an approach temperature of 10°C is used, the waste heat can provide heating up to 70°C.

The solid DAC reference scenario used heat pump with a coefficient of performance (COP) of 2 to provide heating up to 100°C. With the hydrogen electrolysis process providing heating up to 70°C, manufacturing tables for heat pumps estimate a heat pump operating between 70°C – 90°C (i.e. a delta T of 20°C) would perform with a COP of 4.4 (Sabroe, 2023). A conservative COP of 4 has been used for the purposes of this modelling. The use of waste heat and a high performing heat pump has significantly reduced the LCOD by 26%.

The liquid DAC reference scenario used natural gas as the heating fuel. Using waste heat supplied at 70°C, natural gas would still need to be used to provide heating from 70°C – 850°C. As a result, the benefits are small, only reducing the LCOD by 2%. It is also unclear how the waste heat could be provided in practice for a liquid DAC system.

The supply the waste heat demand for a 0.5 Mt DAC plant, the scale of the hydrogen electrolysis plant needed was estimated at 34 kt/year for solid DAC and 3 kt/year for liquid DAC, with calculations shown in Table 12.4. This assumes a heat loss from the hydrogen electrolysis process of 26% (Mostafa El-Shafie, 2023) and an electricity use of 54 kWh/kg hydrogen. The scale of the hydrogen plant is small relative to the energy demands of Scotland, 34kt of hydrogen capacity could supply 1% of Scotland’s total energy demand, or 3% of the transport sector’s energy demand (Scottish Government, 2024).

Table 12.4: Estimating the size of hydrogen electrolysis plant needed to provide the thermal energy of the DAC process.

 

Solid

Liquid

DAC Capacity, Mt CO2

0.5

0.5

Thermal Energy Use, MWh/tCO2

1.5

1.46

% of Energy Supplied by Waste Heat

63%

6%

Waste Heat Supplied, MWh/tCO2

1.5

0.09

Electrical Energy Used, GWh

33.8

3.2

Hydrogen Production Capacity, kt

34

3

Energy from Waste

Energy from waste (EfW) incinerators burn waste at high temperatures, generating electricity from the exhaust gases produced, a simple process flow diagram is shown in Figure 12.6. Integrating the EfW process with either solid or liquid DAC requires the diversion of heat from electricity production to the DAC process, the simplest configuration of which is also shown in Figure 12.6. Using heat directly rather than for electricity is significantly more efficient, ranging from 500 – 800% (Z factor 5 – 8). (Triple Point Heat Networks, 2024)

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Figure 12.6: An example configuration of how a DAC process may utilise heat from an energy from waste process.

An energy balance of the thermal energy required from the EfW process, and the corresponding loss of power production is shown in Table 12.5. Across Scotland municipal waste EfW facilities range from 10 – 45 MW but are typically 10-15 MW. If a 0.5 Mt DAC process were to have all thermal energy requirements supplied by an EfW this would significantly reduce power production. However, this would not be viable as part of a typical EfW commercial model and has not been included as a potential waste heat source.

Table 12.5: Estimating the size of EfW plant needed to provide the thermal energy of the DAC process.

 

Solid

Liquid

DAC Capacity, Mt

0.5

0.5

Thermal Energy Use, MWh/tCO2

1.46

1.50

Total Thermal Energy Use, MWh

750,000

730,000

Energy supplied by EfW, MWh

750,000

730,000

Thermal Power Supplied, MW

85.6

83.3

Reduction in Electrical Output, MW

12.2

11.9

  1. E-fuel production

Further detail on e-fuel production

E-fuel production via the Fisher-Tropsch (FT) Process

This section provides some additional insight into the products from the FT process and the relative amounts of each produced. The reaction typically operates at temperatures ranging from 200-240°C, and requires a metal catalyst (Speight, 2016). The type of catalyst used will lead to selectivity towards different products. This means that the reaction can be tuned to favour specific hydrocarbon fractions, i.e. short chain hydrocarbons C1 to C5 through to much longer oils and waxes, C25+, as demonstrated in Figure 12.8. When optimised for synthetic sustainable aviation fuel (e-SAF), the kerosene portion can account for 60% of the output as demonstrated in Figure 12.7 (Wentrup, 2022). Figure 12.8 shows some percentage breakdowns for reported processes.

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Figure 12.67: Illustrative figure of outputs from the Fischer-Tropsch process, showing the relative amounts of different lengths of hydrocarbons created. (Bharti, 2021)

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Figure 12.812.7: Percentage outputs of hydrocarbons for various FT processes (Fasihi, 2016).

The FT process is energy-intensive, with significant heat generation. The waste heat from FT synthesis can be utilised to support DAC operations. Assuming a heat exchanger with an approach temperature of 10°C, the available heat can provide heating up to 230°C, meeting 100% of the thermal energy requirements for solid DAC and 25% for liquid DAC. Table 12.6 shows that the estimated e-fuel production scale required to satisfy this waste heat demand is 583 kt for solid DAC and 144 kt for liquid DAC, assuming a heat loss of 1.29 MWh per tonne of e-fuel (Marchese, 2020).

Table 12.6: Estimating the size of E-fuel plant needed to provide the thermal energy of the DAC process.

 

Solid

Liquid

DAC Capacity, Mt

0.5

0.5

Thermal Energy Use, MWh/tCO2

1.50

1.46

% of Energy Supplied by Waste Heat

100%

25%

Waste Heat Supplied, MWh/tCO2

1.50

0.37

E-fuel Production Capacity, kt

583

144

Key assumptions for the Fisher-Tropsch process within this study are given in Table 12.7.

Table 12.7: Key assumptions for e-fuel production in this study.

Metric

Value

Source(s)

CO2 per tonne e-fuel

3.2

Industry discussion, consistent with literature sources (Rojas-Michaga, 2023; Delgado, 2023).

Portion of FT output that is e-fuel

60%-75%

Industry discussion, consistent with literature sources (Wentrup, 2022; Mazurova, 2023).

Uncertainty in e-fuel production costs

This section gives an overview of some of the uncertainties in e-fuel production costs from key sources for this report.

The cost of e-fuel production is dependent on four key variables:

  • Cost of electricity
  • Cost of green hydrogen
  • Cost of CO2
  • Cost of e-fuel equipment capex

The future cost of all four of these key variables are highly uncertain. Research by Rojas-Michaga et al. models the contributing factors to e-fuel production cost and the associated uncertainties. Figure 12.9 shows the results of a simulation investigating the potential combinations of factors illustrating the range of potential costs. The modelling outputs form a bell curve showing the likely range of fuel costs in £/kg; the 95% confidence range is between £2.44/kg and £12.91/kg range. The buyout price for PtL in the UK SAF mandate is set at £5/litre, £6.25/kg which is just to the low side of the peak in Figure 12.9. This buyout price will need to be reviewed over time alongside the required percentage of PtL fuel in UK demand.

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Figure 12.9: Uncertainty analysis of e-fuel costs showing the potential range of e-fuel costs in £/kg (Rojas-Michaga, 2023).

Impact of CO2 costs

The biggest contribution to uncertainty in e-fuel costs is expected to be the cost of hydrogen, both because hydrogen is one of the biggest contributions to the overall cost and because the future cost of hydrogen is very uncertain (ClimateXChange, 2023; Rojas-Michaga, 2023). The two other biggest sensitivities are the cost of electricity and the cost of CO2 in the form of DAC. Figure 12.10 (from the same paper as Figure 12.9) shows a sensitivity analysis of key metrics on the cost of a tonne of e-fuel.

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Figure 12.10 : Sensitivity of e-fuel price to changes in costs of key variables (MJSP = minimum jet fuel selling price) (Rojas-Michaga, 2023).

The values used in the sensitivity analysis are given in Table 12.85 (Rojas-Michaga, 2023) Their analysis gives a cost breakdown of around 30% CO2, 60% H2 and 10% for the remaining costs. This CO2 contribution is much higher than some others due to the assumption that the CO2 is from DAC. In a fuel cost of £5/litre, non-CO2 costs are around £3.5/litre, equivalent to £4,375/tonne of e-fuel. These values were used investigate the likely range of e-fuel prices in section 12.1.22 below.

Table 12.85: Values used in sensitivity analysis in research by Rojas-Michaga et. al (Rojas-Michaga, 2023).

Parameter

Low value

Nominal

High value

Unit

CO2 cost

50

359

1000

£/tonneCO2

H2 cost

1

3.09

8

£/kg H2

Cost of electricity

0.03

0.06

0.09

£/kWh

UK SAF mandate buyout price

Figure 12.11 shows the projected costs for different fuels including PtL from DAC (Department for Transport, 2024b). The calculations project values for e-SAF made using DAC in the central case to be around £4k/t but with best and worst case scenarios of £2.2k/t to £9.1k/t.

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Figure 12.11 : Table brought in from analysis as part of developing the UK SAF mandate showing the projected costs for different fuels including PtL from DAC (Department for Transport, 2024b).

UK and EU SAF Mandates

The UK’s Jet Zero strategy sets out the UK Government’s strategy to decarbonise air travel, to be introduced from 1 January 2025, sets out targets for requirements for the use of SAF and e-SAF for the UK aviation sector. (Department for Transport, 2024a) In 2025, 2% of UK jet fuel demand will be required to come from sustainable sources, increasing linearly to 10% in 2030, then to 22% in 2040.[13] The mandate for e-SAF starts in 2028, reaching 0.5% in 2030 and 3.5% in 2040. For context, the last reported UK energy demands were 2022, when UK aviation fuel demands were around 12 Mtoe, though expected to increase in the short term in the rebound from the pandemic. (Office for National Statistics, 2024) The SAF mandate states there is potential to increase these target percentages if market conditions allow.

The equivalent mandate for the EU, ReFuelEU Aviation, has a less ambitious early timeline, but the ramping of targets is steeper and the EU mandate is more specific about CO2 sources. The EU mandate targets 2% SAF by 2025 and only 6% by 2030 but the ramping is steeper with a 20% target by 2035 and a 70% target by 2050. (European Commission, 2023; International Trade Administration, 2024) For synthetic fuels, the EU mandate aims for 1.2% in all EU airports from 2030 (equivalent to around 0.7-0.9 Mt), more than double the UK percentage for the same year, and 35% synthetic fuels in all EU airports from 2050. (Green Air, 2025) The EU mandate is also explicit about the source of CO2 for synthetic fuels removing the option to use fossil-generated CO2 to make e-fuels from 2041, allowing only biogenic and DAC CO2, accepting these are the only sources compatible with future climate neutrality.

The UK SAF mandate states that the feedstock for PtL fuels will be DAC or point source carbon (biogenic or fossil fuel) but it is not clear if there are restrictions to be placed on what point sources would be allowed. The mandate does state that waste fossil CO2 is considered to “have zero lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions up to the point of collection”. (Department for Transport, 2024b, p. 86) The UK mandate recognises that DAC will be the main CO2 source in the long term but that it is expensive in the short term and they do not want to hinder early development. Recognition that DAC will need to be the main source of CO2 for PtLs in the long-term is reflected in the buyout price, which has been set based on projected DAC-based PtL costs.

E-fuels for shipping

A 2019 report by Lloyd’s Register and UMAS set out a number of scenarios of the potential future mix of low-carbon shipping fuels: a renewables dominated pathway; a bioenergy dominated pathway, and a mixed pathway. The mixed pathway, shown in Figure 12.812, has been used in the modelling in this study as a central scenario for potential e-fuel demands. Figure 12.13 shows the projected mix of e-fuel for shipping from Transport & Environment’ briefing used to estimate the proportion of carbon-based shipping fuels in future years. (Transport & Environment, 2024)

A graph showing different colors of different shades of blue green and purple

Description automatically generated

Figure 12.812: Figure taken from Lloyd’s Register and UMAS report showing projected fuel mix for shipping each decade to 2050 in the equal mix pathway. (Lloyd’s Register, UMAS, 2021)

A graph with different colored lines

Description automatically generated

Figure 12.13: Projected mix of e-fuel for shipping from Transport & Environment’ briefing “E-Fuels observatory for shipping” 2024. (Transport & Environment, 2024)

How to cite this publication:

McQuillen, J., Goodwin, H., Kennedy, E., Li, L. (2025) ‘Cost and profitability of direct air capture in Scotland’, ClimateXChange. http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5940

© The University of Edinburgh, 2025
Prepared by City Science on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate as at the date of the report, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

This work was supported by the Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division of the Scottish Government (CoE – CXC).

ClimateXChange

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If you require the report in an alternative format such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.


  1. For context, the total carbon removal market (carbon removals, as opposed to generic carbon offsets) totalled around 13 MtCO2 globally by the end of 2024 (cdr.fyi, 2024).



  2. Green Book values for future energy costs are generally used for modelling exercises in studies such as this but there is a lack of confidence in projected energy costs, particularly given volatility in recent years. Therefore, Green Book costs were used as a sensitivity rather than as the central case.



  3. Upstream gas emissions are very difficult to accurate quantify, this uncertainty around quantification limits the confidence in the LCOR of liquid DAC(Cooper, et al., 2022).



  4. This estimation is based on the assumption that 10% of the total planted area utilises enriched CO2 with a rate of 5-10% across the industry (Ecofys, 2017).



  5. In terms of hydrogen production, only green hydrogen makes sense for the production of e-fuels as blue hydrogen would involve splitting methane for the chemical constituents only to recombine them to remake hydrocarbons.



  6. Currently, eligible SAF must be produced from sustainable waste or residue feedstocks, such as used cooking oil, forestry residues, unrecyclable plastics, or derived from renewable or nuclear power. Fuels produced from food, feed, or energy crops are not eligible. Over time, the portion of SAF that can come from certain sources (such as cooking oil) will be reduced.



  7. The targets within the EU SAF mandate for CO2 from DAC are 10% of the carbon feedstock in 2030, 20% in 2035, 40% in 2040, 80% in 2045 and 100% by 2050.



  8. This 20% premium on production costs would presumably cover interest on financing used plus profit for DAC, e-fuel production and green hydrogen production.



  9. The relevant figures from the Lloyds Register & UMAS report and the Transport & Environment report are shown in Appendix I section 12.1.23 (Figure 12.812 and Figure 12.13) (Lloyd’s Register, UMAS, 2021).



  10. In discussion with industry experts, the issue of regulation around repurposing waste products was raised. Recycling products assigned as waste into marketable products creates issues around certification. Making this process of waste to product easier would require the reduction of regulatory barriers across the recycled aggregates industry.



  11. In the high scenario, costs reach up to 40 p/kWh before coming down to 13 p/kWh over the next decade to 2034; in the low scenario drop down much more quickly and are in the range 10-13 p/kWh to 2034.



  12. This application of learning rates to every doubling of technology is an observed trend of developing technologies, sometimes referred to as Wright’s Law.



  13. Currently, eligible SAF must be produced from sustainable waste or residue feedstocks, such as used cooking oil, forestry residues, unrecyclable plastics, or derived from renewable or nuclear power. Fuels produced from food, feed, or energy crops are not eligible. Over time, the portion of SAF that can come from certain sources (such as cooking oil) will be reduced.


Research completed October 2024

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5798

Executive summary

Aims

Scotland has abundant renewable energy resources that could supply significantly more energy than it consumes. This presents a substantial opportunity for Scotland to become a net exporter of low-carbon energy, boosting employment, supporting economic growth and helping to deliver international decarbonisation.

In our research, we review, assess, and rank the potential of technologies that could enable cost-efficient domestic and international trade of hydrogen, as well its derivatives and products. Hydrogen derivatives are substances that contain hydrogen, manufactured for the purposes of transporting energy and converted back to hydrogen before use (e.g. ammonia). Hydrogen products are anticipated to be used directly, with no need for reconversion (e.g. sustainable aviation fuel). Further, we identify offtake sectors and countries, assess the scale of demand in potential markets, and identify gaps and opportunities in domestic and international policy.

We carried out desk-based research and targeted stakeholder interviews to gather data and review a range of hydrogen derivatives and products.

Findings

Hydrogen and derivative offtake markets

  • Scotland’s hydrogen potential poses an unprecedented opportunity to strengthen domestic industrial capabilities and cut greenhouse gas emissions. Hydrogen production capacity is anticipated to exceed Scottish demand in the future.
  • Industrial clusters in Scotland, England and Wales all provide a large local market for hydrogen and its derivatives and products. Existing industrial demand, proximity, and a similar regulatory framework offer key advantages over mainland Europe.
  • The European Union and its member states are unlikely to meet their low-carbon hydrogen demand on their own, creating an export opportunity for Scotland. Germany and the Netherlands are likely to become the dominant hydrogen offtakers in Europe. But because international trade requires extensive infrastructure and harmonised low-carbon certification frameworks, we identify domestic hydrogen offtake markets as having greater potential.

Hydrogen derivatives

  • Subsea hydrogen pipelines are critical to enhancing the competitiveness of Scottish hydrogen for trade within Europe. Alternative delivery methods and hydrogen derivatives have substantially higher costs.
  • Ammonia is expected to be the dominant hydrogen derivative in the medium to long term for global trade. This is due to high technical maturity, relatively high roundtrip efficiency, low production and transport costs, and established global market.

Hydrogen products and end use cases

  • Industry – including oil and biofuel refining, ammonia, and synthetic fuel production – will be the biggest driver of hydrogen demand in 2030 in both the EU and the UK. By 2045, other sectors like aviation, shipping, power generation are also expected to be major players in the hydrogen economy.
  • Some end-use sectors, such as chemicals and aviation, will be able to use hydrogen derivatives and products directly, avoiding substantial costs on reconversion. Emerging policies in the UK and in the EU make the market highly attractive to potential hydrogen exporters.
  • Synthetic methanol will be key to decarbonising existing industrial uses of methanol and in initial low-carbon maritime projects. However, uncertainty around maritime policy and the future availability and cost of biogenic CO2 remains.
  • In the long term, hydrogen is also expected to play a significant role in power generation, where it could replace natural gas and other fossil fuels in peaking plants.
  • Hydrogen-based Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) are well-placed to decarbonise the aviation sector due to compatibility with existing infrastructure, policy support in the UK and Europe, and no commercially viable low-carbon alternatives.
  • The main low-carbon alternatives to hydrogen include Carbon Capture, Utilisation, and Storage (CCUS) and bio-based technologies.

Recommendations

  1. Stimulate demand by improving alignment – Align the UK and EU Emissions Trading Systems to avoid potential carbon taxes on UK products including maritime fuels. The timely launch of the UK Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is also critical.
  2. Stimulate demand by supporting trials and demonstration projects – Subsidy schemes, such as the Hydrogen Innovation Scheme, trials and demonstration projects help to create learnings, improve investor certainty and get initial projects off the ground.
  3. Support infrastructure – Support key new-built and repurposed infrastructure projects including a core UK hydrogen network, ports, terminals, hydrogen boilers, refuelling stations and salt cavern storage.
  4. Enhance competitiveness of Scottish hydrogen – To effectively compete with renewable rich regions, Scotland needs to meet a lower levelised cost of hydrogen. High electricity prices are one of the biggest weaknesses in Scotland’s hydrogen ambitions.
  5. Reform the planning and permitting regime – Streamline complex processes where possible to avoid unneeded congestion and accelerate decarbonisation. Work with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to develop the safety case for hydrogen.
  6. Optimise low-carbon policy frameworks – The Hydrogen Production Business Model needs to be optimised to interact with other low-carbon policy frameworks, such as the Contracts for Difference Scheme, Hydrogen T&S Business Models and the H2P Business Model.
  7. Co-ordinate with the EU – Infrastructure projects have long associated lead times and limited flexibility once approved. Therefore, coordinating infrastructure deployment with the European Hydrogen Backbone and port infrastructure is essential.
  8. Continue progress on low-carbon certification – A mutually recognised low-carbon hydrogen standard is critical to the success of hydrogen trade.
  9. Engage local communities – Continue to engage with local communities and improve public understanding of hydrogen’s role in a net zero energy system.
  10. Set out strategy on hydrogen trade – The Scottish Government could work with the UK Government on a clear strategy for how to develop hydrogen export capacity.

 

Glossary and abbreviations

Glossary

Dehydrogenation

The process of removing hydrogen from a chemical or organic compound.

Electrolytic (also known as green) hydrogen

Hydrogen produced by splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen molecules using electricity.

Gravimetric energy density

The amount of energy per unit mass of substance, usually expressed in terms of Watt-hours per kilogram (Wh/kg) or megajoules per kilogram (MJ/kg).

Hydrogen

Hydrogen is the most abundant and smallest molecule in the universe, made up of two hydrogen atoms.

Hydrogenation

The chemical process of bonding hydrogen and another compound.

Hydrogen derivatives

Substances that contain hydrogen and at least one other element. They are manufactured for the purposes of transporting energy and are converted back into hydrogen before use.

Hydrogen products

Substances that contain hydrogen and at least one other element, but which are intended to be used directly, with no need for reconversion to hydrogen.

Low-carbon alternative

In this report, low-carbon alternatives include all technologies that are economically viable substitutes to hydrogen solutions, such as electric, CCUS and biomass technologies.

Method of transport

Compressed hydrogen molecules can be transported in many ways, including through pipelines, ships and tube trailers.

Technology Readiness Level (TRL)

TRL is a scale used to identify, rate and compare the technical maturity of different technologies, with 1 being the least mature and 9 being the most mature and widely deployed technology.

Volumetric energy density

The amount of available energy per unit volume of substance. Often shown in terms of Watt-hour per litre (Wh/L) or Megajoules per cubic meter (MJ/m3).

Abbreviations

BEIS

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy

BECCS

Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage

CAPEX

Capital expenditure or capital cost

CBAM

Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

CCGT

Combined Cycle Gas Turbine

CCS

Carbon Capture and Storage

CCUS

Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage

CO2

Carbon dioxide

DESNZ

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (formerly known as BEIS)

ETS

Emission Trading Scheme

FCV

Fuel Cell Vehicle

GHG

Greenhouse gas

HEFA

Hydro Processed Esters and Fatty Acids

HPBM

Hydrogen Production Business Model

HVDC

High Voltage Direct Current

LH2

Liquified hydrogen

LOHC

Liquid Organic Hydrogen Carrier

LPG

Liquified Petroleum Gas

MCH

Methylcyclohexane

MgH2

Magnesium Hydride

NH3

Ammonia

RFNBO

Renewable Fuels of Non-Biological Origin

TRL

Technology Readiness Level

 

Introduction

Context

Scotland has abundant renewable energy resources which could supply significantly more energy than is consumed nationally. This presents an opportunity for Scotland to become a net exporter of low-carbon energy, potentially boosting employment and economic growth, and helping to deliver international decarbonisation.

In addition to electricity interconnectors, low-carbon energy is expected to be exported via mediums including low-carbon gases such as hydrogen. Scotland has ambitions to produce 5 GW of low-carbon hydrogen by 2030, rising to 25 GW by 2045 [1]. As emphasised by the Scottish Hydrogen Assessment, Scotland has the potential to grow a strong hydrogen economy [2]. The Scottish Government signalled its ambition for Scotland to ‘become a leading producer and exporter of hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives for use in the UK and in Europe’ [3]. Projections estimate that 75% of this production (by volume) could be exported to UK and European markets [3] [4]. This rise in production is expected to coincide with hydrogen demand growth in the rest of the UK and the European Union (EU), with the EU targeting 20 Mt of hydrogen per annum by 2030, half of which is expected to come from imports [5]. European industrial clusters are likely to be major offtakers and importers of hydrogen and derivatives due to high industrial demand, ambitious decarbonisation targets and limited renewable resources.

The movement of hydrogen over longer distances is not yet well proven. While existing research has confirmed the cost efficiency of future hydrogen pipelines linking the UK and mainland Europe [6], subsea hydrogen pipeline interconnectors are capital cost-intensive and have long lead times [7], making the Scottish Government’s ambition to export hydrogen in the 2020s [3] challenging without alternative options. Due to the low volumetric density of gaseous hydrogen, hydrogen-carrying derivatives are likely to be used in the absence of a centralised hydrogen pipeline network.

Hydrogen derivatives are substances that are manufactured using hydrogen and are generally capable of transporting hydrogen with higher volumetric energy density. Hydrogen products are also made with hydrogen, but are anticipated to be used directly, with no need for reconversion.

A range of technologies are available to increase the volumetric energy density of hydrogen for easier long-distance transport and storage. At a low temperature, gaseous hydrogen can be turned into liquid hydrogen. Liquefaction can help with storing hydrogen in smaller spaces for longer periods of time, transporting it and using it as aviation or shipping fuel. Hydrogen can also be reacted with nitrogen at high temperature and pressure to produce ammonia. Liquid ammonia can be stored more readily than liquified hydrogen due to it having a higher volumetric energy density. When transported to its destination, ammonia can be cracked back into hydrogen and nitrogen or used directly as ammonia in industrial applications. Liquid Organic Hydrogen Carriers (LOHCs) absorb hydrogen in an organic compound. This work focuses on the most advanced organic carrier, methylcyclohexane, which can be easily broken down to hydrogen and toluene. Lastly, metal hydrides, such as magnesium hydride, can carry hydrogen in a solid state, making international trade safer and simpler.

Methodology

We carried out desk-based research and targeted stakeholder interviews simultaneously to gather data and review a range of hydrogen derivatives and products. This dual approach was key to ensuring the interdisciplinarity of the research and bringing together technical, economic and policy aspects. More details can be found in the appendices (section 10).

To assess hydrogen derivatives and products and produce a clear, non-technical output, we assigned Red-Amber-Green (RAG) ratings to each hydrogen derivative and product. Clarification of these RAG categories is provided in Table 1.

RAG rating

Classification

GREEN

Low technical risks, high suitability, or high economic attractiveness.

AMBER

Moderate level of technical risk or suitability.

RED

High levels of risks, limited suitability or no economic attractiveness.

Table 1: Red-Amber-Green rating classification

Hydrogen Product and end use case mapping

Hydrogen is already used in a wide range of sectors, with 2022 consumption in the UK reaching more than 568,000 tonnes (22.3 TWhHHV) [8]. Most existing hydrogen demand is taken up by oil refining. While hydrogen today is mainly used for oil desulphurisation, its use in biorefineries for hydrogenation is anticipated to grow in the future as demand for biofuels increases [9]. Hydrogen is critical for ammonia and fertiliser manufacturing, making it the second largest end use case in the UK in 2022 [8]. It is also used as a feedstock in the chemical sector, most importantly, for methanol production. While the methanol industry is limited in the UK, low-carbon methanol production is an area of emerging interest domestically. Furthermore, demonstration projects are underway to investigate the use of hydrogen in steel manufacturing. Hydrogen is not currently used in steel making, but directly reduced iron may become the dominant technology by 2050 (see section4.2).

In addition to existing end use cases in industry, we also reviewed end use cases in three sectors: high-temperature heat, transport, and power generation (see Table 2). UK research suggests that hydrogen can be used in most industrial equipment for heat generation, reducing capital costs (CAPEX) in the manufacturing sector as compared to installing new industrial equipment [10]. Low-carbon alternatives include carbon capture and storage (CCS) and biomass technologies. Hydrogen and its derivatives are also well placed to decarbonise some hard-to-electrify transport applications. While hydrogen can be used directly in fuel cell vehicles, the low volumetric density of gaseous hydrogen or high storage costs associated with liquified hydrogen could require it to be converted into derivatives such as methanol, ammonia or other synthetic fuels. This is particularly the case for long-distance and heavy transport. Lastly, our literature review and stakeholder engagement suggested that hydrogen technologies have a high potential to decarbonise dispatchable power production. Existing power plants can be run on hydrogen, ammonia, biomass or retrofitted with CCS technologies. Technologies shown in Table 2 are assessed in section 4.2.

 

Industrial feedstock

Industrial heat

Transport

Power

Hydrogen based technologies

  • Hydrogen for ammonia and methanol production, refining and as a reducing agent
  • Hydrogen for high temperature heat
  • Hydrogen (fuel cell)
  • SAF, ammonia and methanol (maritime)
  • Hydrogen turbines
  • Ammonia turbines

Alternatives

  • None or very limited alternatives
  • CCUS-enabled heat generation
  • Biomass
  • Battery electric vehicles
  • Biofuels
  • CCUS and biomass turbines

Table 2: Hydrogen products and end use case mapping from our research

Hydrogen Derivative and Product Assessment

Hydrogen, derivatives and low-carbon alternatives

A range of hydrogen and alternative low-carbon technologies are available to export surplus renewable energy from Scotland to domestic and international demand centres. Table 3 summarises RAG ratings for hydrogen, derivatives and interconnectors. Further discussion on the economic case, technical feasibility and sustainability can be found in Appendix A.

 
Electric Tower outline

H2

H2

NH3

C21H20

MgH2

 

High voltage inter-connectors

Gaseous H2 pipelines

Liquid hydrogen

Ammonia

LOHC

Metal hydrides

Economic case

(short distance[1])

AMBER

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

AMBER

AMBER

Economic case (long distance[2])

RED

RED

RED

GREEN

AMBER

AMBER

Technical feasibility

GREEN

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

AMBER

AMBER

Scottish capabilities

GREEN

AMBER

AMBER

RED

RED

RED

Sustainability

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

AMBER

AMBER

GREEN

Table 3: RAG ratings for hydrogen, derivatives and interconnectors

High voltage direct current (HVDC) interconnectors already connect the UK with neighbouring countries, allowing the energy system to manage electricity peaks and enhance energy security. To increase export capacities and achieve higher system benefits, HVDC interconnectors can be complemented with hydrogen production, using excess renewable energy and exporting it to UK and European demand centres.

Hydrogen pipelines are the most mature and cost-efficient way to transport hydrogen over short and medium distances. However, due to long lead times and high capital costs they are not expected to be available at larger scale in the short term. Like other gases, hydrogen can be shipped in liquid form, which requires an extremely low temperature of −253°C. Hydrogen derivatives are simpler to transport due to their higher energy density and higher transport and storage temperature.

The most widely used hydrogen derivative is ammonia (NH3), which is produced by reacting hydrogen with nitrogen at high temperatures and pressures. Ammonia has an established global market and is simpler to handle than liquid hydrogen as the boiling point of liquified ammonia is more than 219°C higher than that of liquefied hydrogen.

Organic compounds can also absorb hydrogen into their structure, forming LOHCs. These compounds remain stable as a liquid during transport even at ambient temperature and pressure, making them highly compatible with existing oil assets.

Although metal hydride technologies are relatively new, their simplicity and safety case could make them competitive with other hydrogen technologies. We took magnesium hydride as a case study as it can be easily shipped in a solvent slurry. Methanol is unlikely to be reconverted back to hydrogen at the point of destination. This is due to the economic case and carbon emissions associated with the methanol steam reforming reconversion process.

Hydrogen products

In some cases, hydrogen and its products can be used directly without the need to reconvert derivatives back to hydrogen or low-carbon power. This direct use can significantly improve overall round-trip efficiency, making the trade of hydrogen products an area of emerging interest. The availability of low-carbon alternatives is introduced as an additional factor in the analysis. A green rating is assigned to end-use cases with no or limited availability of alternatives, supporting the case for hydrogen use. A red RAG rating indicates widespread availability of low-carbon alternatives.

Industrial feedstock 

The four main non-energy applications of hydrogen in industrial feedstock are ammonia for fertiliser, methanol production, oil refining and green steel production [11]. Table 4 summarises RAG ratings for selected end-use cases for hydrogen products. Further discussion on the economic case, technical feasibility and sustainability can be found in Appendix A.

 

NH3

CH3OH

Fuel outline

Gold bars outline

 

Ammonia

Methanol

Refining

Green steel

Economic case

N/A

AMBER

N/A

GREEN/AMBER*

Technical feasibility

GREEN

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

Scottish capabilities

RED

RED

GREEN

AMBER

Sustainability

AMBER

GREEN

GREEN

GREEN

Low-carbon alternative

GREEN

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

Table 4: RAG ratings of selected end use cases for hydrogen products

(* – depending on whether hydrogen is used as a reducing agent or in blast furnaces)

Hydrogen is critical for oil refining and the production of ammonia, a key chemical used for fertiliser, plastic or synthetic fibre fabrication. In oil refining, hydrogen is primarily used in hydrocracking and hydrotreating processes. Hydrocracking uses hydrogen and a catalyst to break down heavy hydrocarbons into lighter fractions like jet fuel, petrol and diesel. Hydrotreating removes impurities from hydrocarbon streams with desulphurisation being a key process to improve petrochemical quality and reduce sulphur oxide emissions at the point of use, thereby preventing acid rain.

While its role in fossil fuel refining may decline, low-carbon hydrogen will remain crucial in biorefineries for producing synthetic and biofuels like hydro-processed esters and fatty acids (HEFA), hydrotreated vegetable oils (HVO) and biodiesel.

Hydrogen is essential for both conventional and synthetic methanol production. Although methanol can be produced using bioresources [12], bio-based methanol alone is unlikely to meet global demand [13]. This makes synthetic methanol crucial for timely and large-scale industrial decarbonisation. Syngas, a mixture of hydrogen, CO and CO2 molecule can be produced through natural gas reforming or by combining low-carbon hydrogen with sustainably sourced CO2. This mixture undergoes methanol synthesis, a process where it reacts at high pressure and moderate temperatures to produce methanol (CH3OH).

In contrast to the end use cases mentioned above, producing green steel requires new steel making equipment. Hydrogen, as an effective reducing agent for iron ore, holds significant potential to decarbonise steel and iron production. While some low-carbon alternatives exist, the IEA anticipates hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (DRI) technology coupled with electric arc furnace will dominate, contributing 44% of all emission reductions in the iron sector [14].

High temperature heat 

High temperature heat is essential for various industrial processes including cement, ceramic and glass manufacturing. However, decarbonising high-temperature industrial heat is among the most challenging tasks due to technical difficulties and cost inefficiencies associated with generating such heat (>1000 °C) using existing electric technologies [15].

The need for low-carbon technologies is becoming more urgent as approximately 4,300 industrial heating units in the UK rely on gas, representing 70% of the country’s industrial gas consumption [10]. Existing equipment can be retrofitted to use hydrogen, generating direct and indirect heat up to 1000 °C.

Low-carbon alternatives including biofuels such as biomass or biomethane, and CCUS technologies are also viable. With CCUS, industrial plants are upgraded with post-combustion carbon capture systems, which store the resulting greenhouse gases in underground reservoirs.

Table 5 summarises RAG ratings for high temperature heat use. Further discussion on the economic case, technical feasibility and sustainability can be found in Appendix A.

 

H2

Power Plant outline

Deciduous tree outline

 

Hydrogen

CCUS-enabled gas

Bio-based products

Economic case

AMBER

AMBER

GREEN

Technical feasibility

GREEN

AMBER

GREEN

Scottish capabilities

AMBER

AMBER

GREEN

Sustainability

GREEN

AMBER

GREEN

Low-carbon alternative

AMBER

N/A

N/A

Table 5: The RAG ratings of selected high temperature heat use

Transport

Hydrogen can be used in fuel cell vehicles and has been shown to be able to be cost competitive with other fuels with government subsidies [16]. While the economic case for fuel cell heavy good vehicles (HGVs) is fairly well established [17], there is more uncertainty around lighter vehicles [18]. Battery-electric passenger vehicles and light duty vehicles (LDV) are likely to be more cost competitive compared to their fuel cell equivalents.

Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) is currently used in aviation to reduce carbon emissions, and the similar composition as current options allows for storage for long periods of time in the same infrastructure [19]. While the industry continues to explore alternatives to SAF, there is a wide consensus that aviation is a hard-to-electrify sector. Both the EU and the UK have mandated the use of SAF from 2025 (see Figure 1). SAF is anticipated to be the dominant decarbonisation pathway, with other low-carbon fuels such as hydrogen taking up very small shares of the market [20].

Synthetic methanol and ammonia will increasingly be used as fuels in the maritime industry, as there are not many other alternatives. In case of shorter distances, some ships and ferries may be powered electrically with batteries or fuel cells [21]. A Norwegian ferry currently powered by hydrogen fuel cells can reduce yearly emissions by 95% [22].

Table 6 summarises RAG ratings for transport uses. Further discussion on the economic case, technical feasibility and sustainability can be found in Appendix A.

 
Car outline

Airplane outline

CH3OH

NH3

 

Hydrogen (fuel cell)

SAF

Methanol (maritime)

Ammonia (maritime)

Economic case

AMBER

AMBER

AMBER

GREEN

Technical feasibility

GREEN

AMBER

GREEN

RED

Scottish capabilities

AMBER

AMBER

RED

RED

Sustainability

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

AMBER

Low-carbon alternative

RED

GREEN

AMBER

AMBER

Table 6: The RAG ratings of selected transport uses

Power generation

Renewables are well placed to decarbonise a large share of the electricity supply. However, due to intermittency challenges, electricity generation cannot always meet electricity demand. Hydrogen, ammonia and biomass are all low-carbon fuels that can be used in turbines to meet electricity demand when required. Alternatively, CCUS enabled gas turbines are an alternative that do not require major alterations of existing fossil fuel infrastructure, with the CO2 captured stored underground.

While all technologies reviewed in this section can generate power, they are not necessarily perfect substitutes (see Figure 1). Our stakeholder engagement confirmed that the main role of hydrogen is expected to be in peaking generation, with bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) running at baseload due to high capital costs and substantial carbon benefits [23].

Power generation in Great Britain is dispatched in the order of merit or cost. Baseload units, for example nuclear power plants, run throughout the year. Mid-merit units, for example combined-cycle gas plants operate up to thousands of hours per year. Power plants that operate no more than 5% of the year are generally referred to as ‘peaking plants’ [24].

Table 7 shows the RAG ratings of selected power generation methods, with the ‘low-carbon alternative’ factor not being applicable to non-hydrogen technologies, such as gas CCUS, biomass and ammonia.Further discussion on the economic case, technical feasibility and sustainability can be found in Appendix A.

 

H2

Power Plant outline

Deciduous tree outline

NH3

 

Hydrogen

CCUS-enabled gas

Biomass

Ammonia

Economic case

GREEN

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

Technical feasibility

AMBER

AMBER

GREEN

RED

Scottish capabilities

AMBER

GREEN

GREEN

RED

Sustainability

GREEN

AMBER

GREEN

AMBER

Low-carbon alternative

AMBER

N/A

N/A

AMBER

Table 7: The RAG ratings of selected power generation methods

E-METHANOL IN MARITIME

FEWER ALTERNATIVES

MORE ALTERNATIVES

LOW TECHNOLOGY READINESS

HIGH TECHNOLOGY READINESS

REFINING

CHEMICALS

HYDROGEN
INTERCONNECTORS

STEEL

HIGH-TEMPERATURE
HYDROGEN HEAT

AMMONIA
IN MARITIME

AMMONIA
POWER GENERATION

SMALL-SCALE
HYDROGEN
POWER AND CHP

HYDROGEN IN
LIGHT VEHICLES

HYDROGEN IN
HGVs

SUSTAINABLE

AVIATION FUEL

SMALL MARITIME
APPLICATIONS

LOW-TEMPERATURE
HYDROGEN HEAT

LARGE-SCALE HYDROGEN
POWER

Figure 1: Technical and alternative technology assessment of selected hydrogen products and end use cases

ENERGY CARRIER

POWER GENERATION

TRANSPORT

INDUSTRIAL HEAT

INDUSTRIAL FEEDSTOCK

Offtaker Market Assessment

We assessed potential offtake markets for hydrogen derivative and products, covering Scotland, the rest of the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and the European Union as a whole. Our findings are summarised in Table 8.

 
A Scottish Flag. A diagonal white cross on a circular blue background.

A flag with a cross with Great Britain in the background

Description automatically generated

A red yellow and black flag

Description automatically generated

A red white and blue flag

Description automatically generated

A red yellow and black flag

Description automatically generated

A blue circle with yellow stars in it

Description automatically generated

 

SCOTLAND

REST OF THE UK

GERMANY

NETHERLANDS

BELGIUM

WIDER EU

DISTANCE

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

AMBER

AMBER

AMBER

INFRASTRUCTURE

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

GREEN

AMBER

GREEN

EXISTING DEMAND

AMBER

AMBER

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

GREEN

PROJECTED DEMAND

AMBER

GREEN

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

GREEN

POLICY LANDSCAPE

GREEN

GREEN

GREEN

GREEN

AMBER

GREEN

Table 8: The RAG ratings of selected offtaker markets

Distance from Scotland and rest of UK 

Our stakeholder engagement confirmed that distance is a key factor determining the price of both domestic and international hydrogen transport. The cost associated with all methods of hydrogen transportation increases linearly with the distance. Shorter distances between hydrogen production sites and demand centres result in lower capital costs for pipelines or tube trailers, compared to long-distance shipping. This means that the lowest associated costs are found within Scotland. Multiple stakeholders highlighted the potential benefits of co-locating hydrogen production and end-user project, substantially reducing the cost of hydrogen transport.

The nearest potential demand hotspots to Scotland are in the rest of the UK, with the closest being the industrial clusters in the North of England and Wales. Internationally, the closest industrial offtake markets are in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, in order of proximity. While distance to the nearest hydrogen terminal is highly relevant in the short term, its importance is expected to decrease as the intra-European hydrogen infrastructure, the European Hydrogen Backbone, becomes available. Once a centralised hydrogen market is in place, Central or Eastern European markets are anticipated to be accessible from Western Europe.

Infrastructure gap and opportunity

Hydrogen trade infrastructure, including ports, terminals, onshore and offshore pipelines, is key to removing barriers to trade. In contrast to the UK’s limited hydrogen infrastructure, Europe has around 2,000 km of hydrogen pipelines [25], with further extensions needed to avoid market inefficiencies. Existing infrastructure, for example gas interconnectors, can be leveraged and repurposed to bring down CAPEX costs. Subsea natural gas interconnectors already link Great Britain with Northern Ireland, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium. While IEA analysis suggests that the cost of hydrogen transport can be significantly reduced using repurposed pipelines [26], our stakeholder engagement suggests that the majority of the natural gas assets are unlikely to be altered, to maintain energy security.

While some of the fossil fuel infrastructure is required to stay in place, it is critical to develop purpose-built hydrogen assets, especially given the long lead times associated with new developments. To supplement and link up regional pipelines, the European Hydrogen Backbone project aims to develop 53,000 km of hydrogen pipelines by 2040. The REPowerEU Plan set out three major import corridors via the Mediterranean, the North Sea area and Ukraine. Germany and the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2023 strengthening collaboration on energy and climate, including security of energy infrastructure [27]. Research conducted by the Net Zero Technology Centre is ongoing to explore the feasibility of a subsea hydrogen pipeline between Scotland and mainland Europe [28]. Stakeholders suggested that further coordination with the European Union is key to ensure alignment between infrastructure.

All selected European countries have strategy on domestic pipeline infrastructure roll-out. Germany has a well-established network of pipelines especially in the north-west and is aiming to add 4,500 km of hydrogen pipeline using Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) funding [29]. The Netherlands is also aiming to link industrial clusters with a national hydrogen network by 2030 [30].

European ports and terminals, critical for long-distance import and export, are developing similar strategies. The Port of Rotterdam aims to supply 4.6 million tonnes of hydrogen per year by 2030 (181.2 TWhHHV) [31], with projections suggesting a capacity of 20 million tonnes per year by 2050 (788 TWhHHV ) [32] become major renewable energy hubs. More detail on infrastructure projects can be found in Table 11 (Appendix B).

As well as infrastructure to support the supply and trade of hydrogen, there is also a need for demand-side infrastructure to complete the value chain with offtake. This includes hydrogen refuelling stations, hydrogen boilers, salt caverns for storage and hydrogen-powered furnaces etc. For example, the EU’s Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation includes a required number of hydrogens refuelling stations along it’s TEN-T core network, a road network that includes the most important connections between major cities and nodes, planned for completion by 2030. The regulation states that a hydrogen fuelling station with a cumulative daily capacity of one tonne, dispensed at least a 700bar, is required every 200km to “ensure a sufficiently dense network to allow hydrogen vehicles to travel across the EU.”

Meanwhile, many European countries are targeting a phase out of fossil-fuel powered household boilers by 2035, with clean hydrogen boilers seen as a key alternative. Development of demand infrastructure currently requires support from similar policies across the value chain, with several EU policy schemes such as the Emission Trading Scheme, SAF Mandates and Road Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO). With the policy and investment progressing, demand-side infrastructure will follow. This presents an opportunity for Scotland to partner with the EU to shape and support these supply chains as they develop and provide the necessary hydrogen supply.

Existing demand for hydrogen and hydrogen products 

While existing demand is mainly met by fossil fuel derived hydrogen and derivatives, the share of low-carbon hydrogen is expected to increase given emerging mandates, policy frameworks and increasing carbon prices. The Netherlands and Germany were the leading hydrogen trading countries in 2023, with a total import of 194,096,000 m³ and 6,322,280 m³ of overwhelmingly fossil-based hydrogen, respectively [33] (see Figure 15 in Appendix B).

Figure 2, below, shows the consumption of hydrogen in the UK, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the whole of EU for the year 2022. In the EU, Germany is the largest consumer of hydrogen followed by the Netherlands, whereas Belgium is the 9th largest consumer. Together, these three countries account for roughly 41% of the total consumption of hydrogen in EU [8].

Figure 2: Total hydrogen consumption in the EU, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK and Germany in 2022

Projected demand for hydrogen derivatives and products 

As countries progress toward net zero targets, demand for hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives and products is expected to rise. On a European scale, the UK and Germany have the most ambitious short-term demand for hydrogen. The UK Government has estimated between 80 and 140 TWh in demand by the end of 2035 [34] [35]. For Scotland, as shown in section 7.3, analysis by Gemserv projects hydrogen demand to range from 0.6 TWh to 2.8 TWh by 2030, and from 2.9 to25 TWh by 2045.

Germany set a target of 95 – 130 TWh by 2030 [29] with independent projections in line with this range (42 – 72 TWh of demand by 2030) [4]. By 2045, forecasts range from 184 to 694 TWh depending on assumptions. Belgium anticipates a demand of 20 TWh by 2030 but expects a sharp increase to 200-230 TWh by 2050 [36]. The Netherlands has projected demands of 120 TWh (2050) [37]. Demand scenarios developed as part of this research are discussed in Appendix E.

Policy landscape and net zero ambitions 

Scotland has an ambitious net zero target for 2045. This is five years ahead of the UK’s net zero target. Both Governments have published strategies and action plans on hydrogen production. However, stakeholders highlighted the lack of clarity on regional and hydrogen trade strategy. This perceived lack of clarity and of commitment to specific targets and routes could be a competitive disadvantage compared to other European countries.

In the UK, hydrogen production projects will be subsidised under the Hydrogen Production Business Model (HPBM). The HPBM will ensure it only stimulates production of hydrogen that is low-carbon by requiring volumes to comply with the Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard (LCHS) which sets a maximum emissions limit of 20 gCO2e/MJ [38]. While hydrogen production using imported natural gas is eligible for support under the Cluster Sequencing programme, the HPBM is not expected to support any form of hydrogen or hydrogen derivative import [38] and export [39].

In the absence of UK-wide policies supporting hydrogen trade, its main driver is expected to be international hydrogen import subsidies, mandates and targets. While the UK has committed to designing generous hydrogen business models, our stakeholder engagement suggests that regulatory bottlenecks remain, particularly around electricity market and the planning and permitting frameworks. According to stakeholders, the Review of Electricity Market Arrangements (REMA) is critical to cut the currently ‘very high’ grid electricity prices in the UK, particularly in Scotland. With hydrogen costs highly sensitive to electricity prices, reducing these will be essential to improving Scottish hydrogen competitiveness.

Stakeholders also reported that hydrogen regulation is fragmented and dated, with the planning and permitting process being more complex and lengthier compared to ‘other industrial countries’. These findings are in line with a 2023 research paper commissioned by DESNZ [40]. Scotland and UK specific regulatory bottlenecks are detailed in Table 18 (Appendix D).

The EU aims to be carbon neutral by 2050 [41]. It adopted a strategy on hydrogen in 2020 which focussed on 5 key areas: investment aid, production and demand, creating a hydrogen market (including infrastructure), research and international co-operation [42]. In the 2022 REPowerEU Plan, the European Commission set an ambitious 20 million tonne (equivalent to approximately 330 TWh) hydrogen target for 2030, with the EU aiming to import half of this [43]. Ambitious European import targets could offer potential opportunities to Scottish hydrogen exporters.

The German Federal Government established H2Global in 2021, a double auction model designed to facilitate inter-continental hydrogen trade [44]. In 2023, the European Commission decided to link the European Hydrogen Bank with H2Global to allow all EU member states access to the funding mechanism and agreed to jointly develop a European auction for international hydrogen imports [45]. Germany laid out an ambitious net zero target for 2045 [46] and their national hydrogen strategy states both a domestic hydrogen production target of 10GW alongside an import target of 90 TWh, potentially above 90% of the total demand forecast for 2030 [29]. They anticipate 2030 hydrogen demand to reach 95-130 TWh, around 50-70% (45 to 90 TWh) of which is forecasted be imported [29]. According to the National Hydrogen Strategy, pre-2030 imports are anticipated to be delivered by ships, with imports gradually expanding to pipeline-based solutions after 2030 [47].

Both the Netherlands and Belgium have net zero targets for 2050 and published national hydrogen strategies [48] [49]. The Netherlands has announced hydrogen import targets for 2030 for the Port of Rotterdam, 4.6Mtpa in 2030 increasing to 18Mtpa by 2050, and the Port of Amsterdam, 1Mtpa by 2030 [50]. Belgium has also set an import target of 0.6Mtpa, meaning that 62% of the continent’s 10Mtpa target could be met by these three ports [50].

The EU, along with member states are working towards a harmonised certification framework for low-carbon hydrogen to remove trade barriers [29] [51] [52]. Our stakeholder engagement suggests that misalignment between certification frameworks is expected to be the main bottleneck for international trade. UK and international hydrogen-related policies are further detailed in Table 19 (Appendix D).

 

SWOT Analysis

To shortlist high-potential hydrogen derivatives, products and end use cases, we considered the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats associated with hydrogen derivatives and the trade of these products from a Scottish perspective.

Strengths

Strengths focus on the competitive advantages of Scotland.

As highlighted by a number of stakeholders, Scotland’s main competitive advantage in the hydrogen sector is access to abundant renewable generation capacity. As future renewable capacity is likely to exceed future electricity demand, Scotland is well placed to transition into an international hydrogen hub. Existing jobs, skills, and infrastructure, especially in the oil and gas and offshore wind sectors, could also confer a competitive advantage. Existing oil and gas infrastructure, such as gas interconnectors, ports, terminals and vessels, can be repurposed, resulting in savings in CAPEX. For example, due to the similarity of LPG and liquified ammonia, existing LPG terminals can be repurposed to import and export ammonia.

While Scotland does not have direct access to geological salt formations required for salt cavern hydrogen storage, depleted and partially depleted gas and oil reservoirs off the coast of Scotland could be suitable for large-scale hydrogen and CO2 storage. Existing feasibility studies, demonstration projects, and trials funded by the Scottish and UK Governments are critical to get initial commercial projects off the ground.

Weaknesses

Weaknesses focus on the competitive disadvantages of Scotland.

Our research identified high grid electricity prices as the main competitive disadvantage of Scotland. Despite abundant renewables potential, high prices and network charges seem to prevent Scottish industry and consumers to capitalise on this advantage. Additionally, compared to other regions aiming to export surplus low-carbon hydrogen to European demand hotspots, Scotland’s relative disadvantage in solar generation could lead to greater intermittency, translating into higher hydrogen production costs.

In terms of infrastructure, electricity network constraints and limited energy storage capacity could prevent the energy system from mitigating temporal and geographic electricity imbalances. Lack of geological salt formations beneath Scotland will also amplify the challenge of storing large volumes of hydrogen in the absence of a UK-wide centralised hydrogen network.

Other weaknesses include limited experience in the production of ammonia, methanol, LOHC, and other derivative, as well as the lack of low-carbon hydrogen production on a commercial scale.

Opportunities

Opportunities focus on the future potential of Scotland as well as Scotland’s environment, offtake markets and competitors.

Hydrogen presents the opportunity to cut carbon emissions, reduce wind curtailment costs, boost economic growth and enhance energy security and resilience. In trade terms, stakeholders highlighted the opportunity for Scotland to strengthen existing industrial clusters and focus on high value-added industries instead of exporting low value-added fuels.

Although electricity prices are currently high, reforms under REMA could reduce costs for consumers. From an offtake market perspective, the main opportunity is to export hydrogen to industrial clusters in England and Wales. Once online, a core network connecting demand and supply hotspots can transport gaseous hydrogen in a cost-efficient manner. The North of England has the added benefit of large potential hydrogen storage capacities. By transporting hydrogen to Cheshire, Teesside or the Humber, Scottish producers could utilise large-scale storage facilities, enhancing flexibility and hedging against supply and demand-side shocks.

Regulatory misalignment—particularly around certification—is less of a barrier within the UK, as the Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard is expected to be applied nationally. Internationally, the increasing willingness of the EU, Germany and the Netherlands to import and subsidise low carbon hydrogen is a significant opportunity. Partially driven by the RED III directive, industry in the EU will have to meet a substantial share of their hydrogen demand from low-carbon by 2030.

Threats

Threats focus on the future risks in Scotland as well as risk associated with Scotland’s environment, offtake markets and competitors.

As our research identified hydrogen export to England as a high-potential opportunity, any delay in building out a core network connecting UK supply and demand hotpots is a threat to the growth of the hydrogen economy. In terms of international transport, lack of progress with hydrogen interconnectors, ports, terminals and vessels could further delay hydrogen derivative and product trade.

While Scotland is well-placed to supply hydrogen molecules through high-pressure pipelines, it may be outcompeted in the European market by lower cost, low-carbon hydrogen from renewable rich countries particularly in the form of ammonia, methanol and other hydrogen derivatives. This is because of high electricity prices, intermittency challenges and high hydrogen transport costs in the absence of subsea hydrogen interconnectors. However, the main threat on an international scale is the lack of a harmonised certification framework. As emphasised by the IEA, inconsistencies in low-carbon hydrogen standards risk becoming the main barrier for the development of international hydrogen and derivative trade [53].

Hydrogen Derivative and Product Demand

This section discusses the findings of the analysis, with the methodology used to develop these estimates shown in Appendix E. The analysis estimates the annual demand for hydrogen in the EU, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and England and Wales. Annual demand scenarios were developed for the years 2030 and 2045, and the demand was divided into various sectors and hydrogen products. The years 2030 and 2045 are selected due to their significance to policy targets for both the EU and Scotland. The RED III targets set out by the EU focus on accelerating the demand for hydrogen, among other fuels, by the year 2030 [54] and Scotland has a target of achieving net zero by the year 2045. Finally, in our analysis, hydrogen demand is modelled under three scenarios: High, Central, and Low in 2030 and 2045. The full demand mapping results can be seen in Appendix E.

Sectoral Demand

Figure 3 shows the modelled annual demand, by sector, for the whole of the EU for the years 2030 and 2045. Hydrogen demand is expected to be significantly higher in 2045, compared to 2030. The industrial demand[3] shown in Figure 3 captures all industrial demand for hydrogen including demand for methanol and ammonia. The subsequent graphs in Figure 4 break down the industrial demand by product type.

Figure 3: Modelled annual demand for hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives in the EU

Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the expectation that demand for hydrogen use directly will be greater than demand for ammonia or methanol in both the 2030 and 2045 timeframe for the EU and nations considered. Demand for ammonia and methanol using low-carbon hydrogen will be driven by the RED III mandate which specifies that 42% of industrial hydrogen use (except refining) must utilise renewable fuels of non-biological origin (RFNBOs) by 2030. By 2045, it is expected that almost all ammonia and methanol will rely on low-carbon hydrogen.

Figure 4: Central Scenario EU Industrial Hydrogen Demand by Product in 2030 and 2045

Figure 5: Central Scenario National Industrial Hydrogen Demand by Product in 2030 and 2045

In all modelled scenarios for 2030 and 2045, the industrial sector is expected to remain the dominant driver of hydrogen demand in the EU. However, demand is likely to diversify between 2030 and 2045 largely because of increasing forecast contributions from the power generation sector – where hydrogen is expected to serve an important role in balancing the power system during times of low renewable generation.

For example, in 2030 the share of the industrial sector in the mix of total hydrogen demand ranges from 88% to 96% (Figure 6) but is expected to fall to within a range of 28% to 59% by 2045. Hydrogen demand in the transport sector is estimated to grow rapidly between 2030 and 2045 – largely driven by growth in demand for hydrogen as a low-carbon fuel for heavy transport, including maritime transport, aviation and HGV transport. In some scenarios, hydrogen consumption is further diversified between 2030 and 2045 by an increasingly large demand from the heating sector – which comprises as much as 14% of total hydrogen demand in the EU in the high scenario for 2045.

Figure 6: Share of different sectors and hydrogen derivatives of total hydrogen demand in the EU

Figure 7 and Figure 8 depict the modelled annual demand for hydrogen for Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and England and Wales for different sectors in the years 2030 and 2045.

Figure 7 indicates that, consistent with the EU wide hydrogen demand, the industrial sector is anticipated to comprise most hydrogen demand in all countries by 2030. Similarly, reflecting EU-wide trends, hydrogen demand is expected to become increasingly diverse by 2045, when power generation, road transport and aviation will all likely also contribute to hydrogen demand in each of these markets. Hydrogen demand in the heating industry could also grow significantly in these markets; however, this is entirely dependent on the national policy landscape. For both 2030 and 2045, Germany and England and Wales are anticipated to drive most of the hydrogen demand.

Figure 7: Hydrogen demand for countries across all scenarios and sectors for the year 2030

 

Figure 8: Hydrogen demand for countries across all scenarios and sectors for the year 2045

Demand by Hydrogen Product

The total final demand for hydrogen, ammonia, methanol and sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) in the EU is shown in Figure 9. It is expected that hydrogen demand will be greater than any of the products assessed for both 2030 and 2045 making up 68% and 78% of demand, respectively. Of the products assessed, final demand for ammonia is likely to be greatest, estimated at 42 TWh in 2030. This is driven by low-carbon ammonia demand for use in fertilisers. It is expected that ammonia demand will rise to 206 TWh, with demand for maritime fuel making up over half of this total. Final demand for methanol derived from low-carbon hydrogen is expected to increase from 15 TWh to 20 TWh between 2030 and 2045. SAF demand from power to liquids in the EU is projected to increase from 4 TWh to 59 TWh between 2030 and 2045, due to the emerging SAF mandates.

 

Figure 9: Central EU Final Demand for Hydrogen and Products in 2030 and 2045

Figure 10 shows the central annual final demand for hydrogen and products by country. Similar to the EU as a whole, it is estimated that hydrogen has the highest demand for each region in both time periods. However, demand for ammonia could be significant, particularly in regions with significant maritime activity such as the Netherlands, where ammonia is estimated to form 44% of final demand in 2045. SAF demand is expected to be more evenly distributed across regions due to greater distribution of aviation activity. Methanol demand is relatively low across all regions ranging between 1 and 7 TWh per year by 2045.

Figure 10: Central National Final Demand for Hydrogen and Products in 2030 and 2045

Demand Scenarios for Scotland

As Figure 11 shows, the projected demand in Scotland is likely to be limited for the year 2030, ranging from just 0.6 TWh to 2.8 TWh from the Low to the High scenarios. The demand jumps up for the year 2045, ranging from 2.9 TWh in the Low scenario to 25 TWh in the High scenario[4].

Figure 11 shows that for the year 2030, industry is the main driver for demand in Scotland. However, for the year 2045, other sectors like Road Transport and Power Generation play significant roles as drivers of demand.

These results reaffirm the export potential for Scotland as the hydrogen production capacity of Scotland is expected to be larger than the demand for hydrogen.

Figure 11: Annual demand for hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives for Scotland for 2030 and 2045

Figure 12 shows the range of demand for hydrogen and its derivatives for Scotland. The graph shows that the demand for all sectors, other than industry, is limited in all scenarios for the year 2030, with demand varying by sector significantly in 2045. For example, in the transport sector, the Low and High scenarios estimate a demand of 0.6 TWh and 7 TWh, respectively. This wide range is the result of high uncertainty of demand for hydrogen in the maritime and road transport sectors of Scotland for 2045.

Figure 12: Range for hydrogen & hydrogen derivatives across all sectors for Scotland

Comparison to Literature

A European Commission [55] (JRC) study reviewed a diverse range of literature and used the projections from different studies to determine average annual demand for hydrogen in the EU. According to the JRC study, the total projected annual demand for hydrogen in 2030 is 230 TWh [55], which lies towards the upper bound of this report’s estimate of 108-236 TWh. Similarly, the EU Commission’s study projects the annual demand to be 900 TWh in 2040 and 1,270 TWh in 2050. Whereas this report’s analysis projects the demand for hydrogen for 2045 to be within the range of 733 TWh to 1852 TWh.

A 2021 study conducted by European Hydrogen Backbone [56] estimates that the annual demand for green and blue hydrogen in Industry (for both the EU and the UK) will reach 692 TWh in 2040 and 983 TWh by 2050 [56]. Whereas this report projects the demand in industry in both EU and UK to range from 534 TWh to 711 TWh in 2045.

Figure 13 provides a full comparison between the results of this study and those of two external studies. The results estimated for this report are shown as a range of total projected annual demand of hydrogen for EU, for the years 2030 and 2045. The results of the other two studies are not shown as ranges; and the years for these studies are 2030, 2040 and 2050. It is also worth noting that this study includes demand for the heating sector, which is not accounted for in the other two.

Figure 13: Comparison of this study’s results with the literature

The comparison of these estimates is challenging as their geographical scope and timelines vary, with a number further differences in modelling methodologies.

 

Policy Gap Analysis

Our stakeholder engagement and desk-based research highlighted the following policy gaps. Further regulatory gaps can be found in Table 18.

In the United Kingdom, reserved matters are decisions taken by the UK Parliament, as opposed to devolved matters where devolved institutions, including the Scottish Parliament, hold decision making authority. As such, we have split our policy gap analysis into Scotland based, UK based and international policy gaps.

Policy Gaps in Scotland

Scottish policy gaps are set out below.

Lack of clarity on hydrogen trade strategy

Clear signals from the Scottish Government are required for the Scottish industry to prepare and make strategic decisions to enable successful trade.

Planning and permitting

Planning and permitting processes need to be faster and streamlined. Hydrogen projects typically require long lead times, due to infrastructure requirements as well as typical barriers to the implementation of innovative technology. This finding is in line with our stakeholder engagement and 2023 report commissioned by DESNZ [57]. Streamlining and accelerating the planning processes is key to alleviating investment barriers.

While our stakeholder engagement and desk-based research was conducted prior to the announcement of ‘the Planning Hub’ [58], this new body is anticipated to improve consenting speed and make the planning system more efficient for hydrogen projects.

Regional Strategic Planning

Stakeholder engagement highlighted that Scotland is home to diverse regions, with varied geographical environments. Blanket, national strategic planning risks overlooking localised requirements and optimal use cases =. Scotland needs regional hydrogen strategies that are integrated with a cohesive national strategy.

Increasing need for trials and demonstration projects

The hydrogen industry, especially the trade sector, will utilise new technologies, which still need to be proven and developed. Trials and demonstration projects are increasingly needed to build the case for these technologies.

Policy Gaps in the UK

As outlined above, some policy gaps relate to the UK Government as a reserved power, as opposed to the Scottish Government, as a devolved power. The policy gaps for the reserved power, in this case the UK government, are detailed below.

Hydrogen Trade Strategy

The UK is currently lacking a clear strategy on hydrogen trade as well as a holistic strategy incorporating natural gas, electricity and hydrogen. This is urgently required to provide clarity, allow for strategic decisions to be taken and stimulate investment.

The establishment of National Electricity System Operator (NESO) is a positive step towards solving this issue. NESO is expected to address issues regarding whole system strategy by integrating electricity, gas and hydrogen infrastructure into one energy system plan. NESO has developed whole energy system models, titled Future Energy Scenarios, which support planning and identify the opportunity for Scotland to be an energy exporter. This work should be expanded to include economic modelling on trade, culminating in a developed and full strategy.

Infrastructure

A clear commitment to a core hydrogen network, linking industrial clusters in Scotland, England and Wales is needed. More clarity on the timeline is key to improving investor certainty and get initial projects off the ground.

Dated and fragmented hydrogen regulation

Onshore hydrogen projects are currently regulated under the Gas Act 1986 and Planning Act 2008, with hydrogen generally being defined as a ‘gas’. Our stakeholder engagement suggested that current regulation is fragmented, with more concise and ‘net-zero-aligned’ regulation increasingly needed in the UK.

Hydrogen Production Business Model

Risk-taking intermediaries (RTI), market players who take ownership of the hydrogen molecules before selling it on to transporters or end users, need to be recognised as an eligible offtake option. Stakeholders warned that without the recognition of RTIs, large-scale and efficient hydrogen trade, transport and storage may not materialise. Additionally, the current allocation round set up of the HPBM has also raised a competitive element between projects. This reduces collaboration between key stakeholders. The UK Government should assess how they can reduce this competition driven fragmentation within current funding mechanisms.

Misalignment between UK and EU ETS

The UK and EU ETS need to be aligned to successfully foster low-carbon trade of goods. Clarity is urgently needed around the scope of inclusion for the maritime sector.

Review of Electricity Market Arrangements (REMA)

The current electricity market pricing structure needs reforming to help bring down prices. As electricity prices are a major driver of hydrogen production costs, reforms are critical to increasing uptake and improving competitiveness of UK hydrogen.

Wider and international policy gaps

Alignment between international policy is critical to facilitating successful trade between nations. International policy gaps are shown below.

Lack of clarity on emission factors

Standardised emission factors for alternative fuels (e.g. methanol) are needed. This is highly relevant to sectors such as maritime and aviation where synthetic fuels may play a major role. Standard values are needed for carbon accounting, from accredited sources, to ensure reporting consistency.

Misalignment between certification frameworks

Differences in low-carbon hydrogen certification frameworks create complexity in international trade. The development of mutually recognised standardised certification frameworks is essential to facilitate cross-border trade in hydrogen and its derivatives.

Conclusions

Scotland has significant opportunities in the production, use and export of hydrogen, its derivatives and products, particularly to nearby markets in England, Wales, and the European Union. England and Wales offer a large local market due to existing industrial demand, geographical proximity, and similar regulatory frameworks. The EU is also a potential market because its member states are unlikely to meet their own low-carbon hydrogen demand, creating an opportunity for Scottish exports.

While Germany and the Netherlands are anticipated to import significant amount of hydrogen and derivatives, the extensive infrastructure and harmonised certification frameworks necessary for international trade are not yet in place. Subsea hydrogen interconnectors are crucial for intra-European trade as alternative delivery methods and hydrogen derivatives are associated with substantially higher costs. Without such a pipeline, other renewable resource-rich regions, such as the Middle East, South Africa and South America, may outcompete Scotland in the European market.

For global trade, ammonia is expected to become the dominant hydrogen derivative due to its technical maturity, efficiency, and well-established global market. Other hydrogen transport methods, like liquified hydrogen, LOHCs and metal hydrides, are anticipated have a more minor role. The most suitable hydrogen derivative for export will depend on factors including scale of production, transport distance, infrastructure readiness and end use application.

Key UK and EU industrial sectors such as chemicals, aviation, and steel are well-positioned to use hydrogen and hydrogen products directly, supported by rising carbon prices and emerging policies like the Sustainable Aviation Fuel mandates in the UK and the European Union. Although synthetic methanol will play a key role in decarbonising industrial use and maritime projects, uncertainties remain around maritime policy and biogenic CO2 availability.

As low-carbon ammonia markets and propulsion technologies mature, the maritime sector is projected to transition from ammonia to methanol in the medium to long term. Hydrogen has also been found to be critical for the decarbonisation of the iron and steel industry, with the majority of steel plants expected to use directly reduced iron (DRI) technology.

The success of international hydrogen trade will depend on robust infrastructure, emission trading schemes, and the timely implementation of the CBAM, alongside mutually recognised certification frameworks.

Recommendations

  1. Stimulate demand by improving alignment – With carbon prices being among the strongest demand-side incentives, the Scottish Government could work together with the UK Government and the EU to maximise its benefits. As pointed out by stakeholders, the UK and EU Emissions Trading System need to be aligned to avoid potential carbon taxes on UK products including maritime fuels. The timely launch of the UK Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is also critical to stimulate demand domestically and achieve better alignment and consistency with the EU policy framework. Section 8 of the report discusses these policies, and more, in higher detail.
  2. Stimulate demand by supporting trials and demonstration projects –The Scottish Government is encouraged to continue its approach with supporting hydrogen demand projects through subsidy schemes, such as the Hydrogen Innovation Scheme, helping end users overcome barriers to investment. More trials and demonstration projects are key to create learnings, improve investor certainty and get initial projects off the ground.
  3. Support infrastructure – Scotland should support key new-built and repurposed infrastructure projects including a core UK hydrogen network, ports and terminals (see Section 5.2). This includes working with the UK Government to give developers more clarity on the timeline of a core hydrogen network and how this will link with UK ports and terminals. There should also be an equal amount of focus on developing demand- and storage-based infrastructure, like hydrogen boilers, refuelling stations and salt cavern storage.
  4. Enhance competitiveness of Scottish hydrogen –To effectively compete with renewable rich regions, Scotland needs to meet a lower levelised cost of hydrogen. This is because the main contributor to the levelised cost of hydrogen is electricity price. High electricity prices are identified as one of the biggest weaknesses in Scotland’s hydrogen ambitions, as laid out in section 6.2. While the power of devolved administrations is limited, the Scottish Government is recommended to (1) commission research into alternative electricity market arrangements and (2) work with the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) and the UK Government, representing the Scottish industry from an evidence base position.
  5. Reform the planning and permitting regime and ensure safety case is developed – With Scotland having a longer and more complex planning and permitting framework compared to other industrialised countries, developers need more guidance. The Scottish Government should look to streamline these processes where possible to avoid unneeded congestion and accelerate decarbonisation. Work with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to ensure that the safety case for hydrogen is developed in a timely manner and disseminate the results effectively.
  6. Optimise low-carbon policy frameworks – While current policy is designed to get initial projects off the ground, our research found that the Hydrogen Production Business Model needs to be optimised and designed considering interactions with other low-carbon policy frameworks, such as the Contracts for Difference Scheme, Hydrogen T&S Business Models and the H2P Business Model. The UK Government allowing risk-taking intermediaries in subsequent allocation rounds is critical to strengthen the hydrogen supply chain and unlock domestic hydrogen trade.
  7. Co-ordinate with the EU –Infrastructure projects have long associated lead times and limited flexibility once approved. Therefore, coordinating infrastructure deployment with the European Hydrogen Backbone and port infrastructure is essential. More coordination with the EU, in the form of trade policies, was also one of the key takeaways and a commonly brought up point in the stakeholder engagement that Gemserv conducted. Key findings from the stakeholder engagement are discussed in Appendix G.
  8. Continue progress on low-carbon – A standardised low-carbon hydrogen standard is critical to the success of hydrogen trade. The Scottish Government is recommended to work with the UK Government, European bodies and other international stakeholders to accelerate the harmonisation or the mutual recognition of low-carbon certification frameworks.
  9. Engage local communities – Public perception has been seen to be a critical aspect in the successful implementation of hydrogen as a technology. The Scottish Government should continue to engage with local communities and improve the public understanding hydrogen’s role in a net zero energy system as well as the stringent safety and regulatory measures undertaken in implementation. The Scottish Government could also look at forming a strategy of how best to disseminate the benefits of hydrogen trade to local consumers.
  10. Set out strategy on hydrogen trade – The Scottish Government could work with the UK Government on a clear strategy on how hydrogen export, and potentially import capacities, are planned to be developed.

Appendices

  1. Hydrogen derivative and product assessment

Hydrogen, pipelines, derivatives and low-carbon alternatives

Economic implications

As shown in Figure 14 below, repurposed 48-inch pipelines are likely to have the lowest levelised cost of delivering hydrogen [26]. Since there are no existing pipelines between the Scottish mainland and the proposed hydrogen export markets in Europe, this option would likely involve the construction of a large length of new 48-inch pipeline. The construction of pipelines over long distances, however, would require a significant initial investment of both time and capital. Therefore, conventional tanker transport may provide a short-term solution, especially in cases where scale, distance or the end use case would not justify pipeline construction [59]. From a market perspective, our stakeholder engagement and existing research [60] [61] suggest that compressed pipelines are critical to ensure the competitiveness of Scottish hydrogen in European market. This is because alternative delivery methods and hydrogen derivatives are associated with substantially higher costs. Without a subsea pipeline, other renewable resource-rich regions, such as the Middle East, South Africa and South America, may outcompete Scotland in the European market.

Owing to its higher volumetric energy density of 70.85 kg/m3 [62], it is possible to transport the same amount of liquified hydrogen in a smaller tanker compared to gaseous hydrogen. Compared to compressed hydrogen pipelines, this option is still relatively expensive per volume of hydrogen transported, with the liquefaction process estimated to add up to almost half the total cost of hydrogen transport [63]. Liquified ammonia has been shown to be the lowest cost of selected hydrogen derivatives over long distances [26]. When ammonia is used directly as a feedstock, it is not necessary to reconvert the ammonia to hydrogen upon arrival.

Direct use of hydrogen derivatives is further discussed in section 4.2. Our research used offshore high-voltage direct current interconnectors as a reference point, as they are also suitable to alleviate curtailment issues to some extent. Despite no ‘conversion costs’, transporting renewable electricity through HVDC cables could have higher costs compared to repurposed hydrogen pipelines due to efficiency and flexibility restrictions, described within Section 5.1.1.2.

Figure 14: Levelised cost of delivering hydrogen Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2022)

Technical feasibility

Subsea high voltage cables are highly mature, with a technology readiness level (TRL) of 9 and nine electricity interconnectors already connecting Great Britain to neighbouring countries [64]. However, congestion issues, relatively low efficiency over long distances and the lack of long-term flexibility could make electricity interconnectors less suitable to export larger amounts of renewable energy compared to hydrogen technologies [7] [65] (Table 15)

Transporting hydrogen through new-built pipelines is a mature technology (TRL 9), with more than 2,000 km of pipelines operational in Europe [26]. Given limited commercial deployment, repurposed pipelines have lower technical maturity (TRL 7) [26]. Investigation into the repurposing of networks is ongoing in the UK as part of National Gas Transmission’s FutureGrid project [66]. Scotland has 17,000 miles of gas pipeline [67], with an additional 100% hydrogen North Sea pipeline being considered as part of the Hydrogen Backbone Link. This would enable export of hydrogen from Scotland to Germany through a 10 GW hydrogen pipeline by 2045, transporting 2.4 kt of hydrogen per day [4] [68]. Liquified hydrogen has been used for a long time, with the first liquefaction taking place in 1898 [69]. As liquified hydrogen has not been produced on a commercial scale, it has a TRL level of 8 [70] [63].

Although conversion and reconversion processes are needed, the simpler handling and higher hydrogen density of hydrogen derivatives make them more attractive. While some liquified ammonia could boil off during transport (approximately 0.098 % /day) [63], ammonia loss is less significant compared to liquified hydrogen, given the relatively high boil point of -33 °C. Stakeholders agreed that while low-carbon hydrogen production is in its infancy, ammonia production and shipping has competitive advantage in technical maturity compared to other derivatives. While no ammonia or liquid hydrogen port projects have been announced in Scotland, some of the existing infrastructure, for example LNG and LPG terminals, can also be repurposed to reduce capital costs [71]. Strategically important Scottish ports are discussed in further detail in Table 11. The final step in the value chain is ammonia cracking, splitting ammonia into hydrogen and nitrogen molecules. Ammonia crackers are not as mature as ammonia synthesis plants and have an overall TRL between TRL 4 and 6 [72].

The main technical advantage of LOHCs, for example methylcyclohexane (MCH) and dibenzyl toluene (DBT), is that they are compatible with existing liquid fuel assets, with no boil off during shipping. While interest in LOHCs is limited in Scotland, some UK-based developers are investigating this technology. Magnesium hydride has a volumetric H2 density of 106 kg H2/m3, which makes it a suitable alternative to ammonia in ports that do not allow its import or export, due to stringent safety regulation. Magnesium hydride is easier to handle than ammonia, and magnesium as feedstock is widely available, reducing total costs. Some stakeholders highlighted the increasing need for the HSE’s updated guidance on hydrogen safety, with most stakeholders mentioning the lack of guidance on hydrogen planning and permitting as a significant bottleneck. Several UK-based projects, including, HyDus [73], HEOS [74] and HydroStar [75], are investigating metal hydride technologies. Further research is being undertaken to increase the uptake efficiency and the dehydrogenation process, which does not require high temperatures. Our stakeholder engagement suggests that strategic co-location of hydrogen derivative plants with other heat-intensive processes could offer additional efficiency gains through heat recovery. Strategic planning with holistic and regional approach, however, is critical to unlock these opportunities. Technical advantages and disadvantages are displayed in further detail in Table 12.

Sustainability

Overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with hydrogen and derivative transport are highly sensitive to the fuel and technology used for the conversion, transport and reconversion processes, also known as hydrogenation and dehydrogenation. Among all hydrogen and derivative transport methods, compressed hydrogen pipelines are associated with the lowest greenhouse gas emissions [76], with low energy requirement and compression being easy to decarbonise. Other derivatives, like ammonia and LOHC, require more energy, with some of the processing and transport methods being hard-to-decarbonise [77]. As Haber-Bosch synthesis accounts for approximately one third of all energy consumed in the ammonia production process [78], it is critical that any future ammonia plants are designed to run on low-carbon energy. However, only a limited amount of work has been done on electrifying ammonia synthesis and cracking [79]. A 2022 E4Tech research paper found that low-carbon ammonia would not necessarily meet the UK Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard even if electricity were to be used for ammonia synthesis [76]. Ammonia and most LOHCs are toxic to humans and marine ecosystem, with further sustainability and environmental concerns detailed in the Table 14.

Industrial feedstock

Economic implications

Low-carbon hydrogen can be integrated into ammonia and oil refining processes without significant modifications to existing equipment. This infrastructure readiness may offer cost benefits. As highlighted by stakeholders, there is better economic case for using ammonia directly compared to reconverting it to hydrogen. This is because costs and efficiency losses associated with reconversion, also known as dehydrogenation, can be avoided [80]. In Table 4, ammonia production and refining are not assigned economic RAG ratings due to the lack of a viable low-carbon alternative for reference. The future cost competitiveness of synthetic methanol remains uncertain, given the unknowns surrounding hydrogen and biogenic CO2. Existing research, however, suggests that bio-based methanol could be produced at a cost up to 55% lower than synthetic methanol [13]. Conventional methanol plants can also operate on bio-feedstock. The economic competitiveness of green steel varies, with a RAG rating of green and amber, depending on the chosen technology. Despite high costs, DRI technology is expected to capture a growing share of the green steel market due to its carbon neutrality. As sustainability becomes a priority, hydrogen-based iron reduction will likely become more cost competitive, gradually reducing reliance on highly polluting blast furnaces [81].

Technical feasibility

In contrast to ammonia and refining plants, synthetic methanol production necessitates significant infrastructure investment or substantial upgrades. The process requires the capture and storage of high purity biogenic CO2, with the technology currently at a TRL of 8-9 [13]. These plants operate at high efficiencies, ranging from 89 to 95% [82]. However, multiple stakeholders have emphasised the growing need for strategic planning, especially on regional scale, due to the geographical misalignment between biogenic CO2 and hydrogen supplies which is a challenge to efficient production. For steel production, electrolytic hydrogen has been successfully demonstrated for DRI, but it has not yet reached commercial scale (TRL 7) [83]. Currently, it is estimated that less than 1% of steel in Europe is produced using DRI [84], with the majority of planned DRI projects yet to be operational [85]. Steel production in Scotland has declined in recent years, with annual output falling below 6,000 tonnes of crude steel [86]. Although some plants have outlined their decarbonisation strategies, the path to fully decarbonising Scottish steelmaking remains uncertain. When asked about technical challenges, most stakeholders were not concerned about early-stage technical maturity. Stakeholders suggested that the complexity of the planning and permitting process and the length of consideration are more significant bottlenecks in project development.

The use of low-carbon hydrogen in oil refining and fertiliser production presents minimal technical challenges, as the transition primarily involves fuel switching. INEOS intends to use low-carbon hydrogen, starting as early as 2029 [87]. However, with no ammonia and fertiliser production facilities in Scotland, interest in ammonia production is limited. Meanwhile, plans to establish a renewable methanol plant in Scotland by GEG and Proman are underway [88].

Sustainability

Hydrogen has been used as industrial feedstock for decades, with strict adherence to safety regulations by producers and users. Beyond the environmental benefits associated with fuel switching and decarbonisation, hydrogen also plays a crucial role in desulphurisation which prevents sulphur oxide emissions and reduces the risk of acid rain. While some fugitive emissions may occur (see Table 14), regulations and commercial incentives are in place to minimise these. Further details on environmental impact are detailed in Appendix C.

High temperature heat 

Economic viability

Hydrogen has a high gravimetric energy density of 120 MJ/kg compared to 44 MJ/kg of natural gas [89], making it an attractive option for decarbonising high temperature industrial heat. However, hydrogen’s low volumetric energy density compared to natural gas makes it more expensive to store and transport, due to the increased capacities required. For this reason, among others, transitioning to hydrogen as fuel comes with significant costs. For example, converting a furnace in the basic metals sector to hydrogen would cost approximately £730,000 for 10 MW of capacity [10]. It is estimated that £2.7 billion in capital investment would be required to convert UK industrial sites and equipment. CCUS is also considered relatively high cost even though costs are expected to decline with technology maturity [90]. Our stakeholder engagement confirmed that CCUS technologies will become more cost-effective with scale and concentration of demand. The carbon capture process itself is the most expensive component accounting for 80% of the total costs [90]. On the contrary, bio-based fuels are widely available, scalable and cost-competitive in certain locations. Our stakeholder engagement highlighted that while bio-based fuels are widely available today, feedstocks are limited, preventing larger-scale and widespread adoption in the future.

Technical feasibility

Most industrial equipment, such as boilers, kilns, ovens, furnaces, has been demonstrated to be compatible with hydrogen through the Hy4Heat project [10]. While the technology is available, it has yet to be demonstrated at a commercial scale (TRL 7-8; industrial fuel switching). Minor technical challenges persist, including issues with pipe sizes, flue gas composition and different heat transfer characteristics [91]. Additional details on hydrogen heating technical challenges are in Table 13. Many natural gas-fire gas furnaces can be retrofitted, with only certain components requiring modification [91] [92]. However, retrofit options and associated GHG and cost savings depend on the end use sector and the complexity of the industrial site. Our stakeholder engagement confirmed that more trials and demonstration projects are needed to increase the technical readiness of hydrogen technologies and create learnings in a Scottish context.

CCUS systems can be integrated with existing boilers and heaters [93]. However, carbon capture infrastructure requires large investment. The UK’s geological advantage and access to depleted hydrocarbon fields provide a competitive advantage for carbon storage [94]. As pointed out by stakeholders, scale is critical for operating CCUS systems cost-effectively. Therefore, these systems must be strategically located, near concentrated demand, favourable geology and potential biogenic CO2 offtakers. Although large-scale CCUS projects are not yet operational in Scotland, the Acorn Project has advanced directly to Track 2 of the UK Government’s Cluster Sequencing Programme. By reusing the existing hydrocarbon infrastructure, the Acorn project aims to capture and store between 5 and 10 Mtpa of CO2 under the seabed by 2030 [95].

Hydrogen boiler and indirect dryer

Hydrogen direct dryers and ovens, furnaces

Kilns

Carbon capture (depending on technology)

Biomass technologies

TRL 7 [96]

TRL 4 [96]

TRL 5 [97]

TRL 6-9 [98]

TRL 9[99]

Table 9: Technology Readiness Level of selected high temperature technologies

Solid biomass is a well-established technology, with most biomass boilers, kilns and furnaces achieving a TRL of 9 [99]. While the majority of biomass is currently used to generate electricity, over 37% is utilised to produce heat [100]. Given that CCUS and hydrogen technologies are not yet commercially available, many industrial plants aiming for long term decarbonisation opt for biomass. Unlike hydrogen, biomass can be stored at ambient pressure and temperatures. However, biomass technologies are generally unsuitable for direct heating applications, such as kilns, furnaces and dryers, as they may affect the product quality [99].

Sustainability

Burning hydrogen does not produce CO2, but it can generate increased levels of nitrogen oxides (NOx) compared to natural gas combustion due to the higher temperatures used [101]. Nitrogen oxides are a mixture of gases, worsening air pollution, impacting human health and, reacting with other gases, indirectly contributing to global warming. However, research indicates that the higher stable combustion temperature of hydrogen may offset NOx emissions [102]. This is because the increased air to fuel ratio enabled by hydrogen leads to lower combustion temperatures which in turn reduces NOx emissions [102]. While CCUS technologies cannot capture 100% of CO2 emissions, pairing them with biomass kilns and furnaces may result in negative emissions. Additional details on sustainability benefits and challenges are provided in Table 14.

Transport

Economic implications

For LDVs, Fuel Cell Vehicles (FCVs) achieving cost parity with fossil fuel powered LDVs before 2040 will be challenging, unless the fuel cell costs decrease due to higher volume production. When looking at 5-year total cost of ownership, fuel cell powered and battery electric powered LDVs will likely be close or marginally lower than fossil fuel powered LDVs by 2040 [103]. The Advanced Propulsion Centre conducted a battery and fuel cell vehicle cost comparison for a range of vehicle types. Findings included that fuel cell powered vans will be the preferred technology type by 2030 [104].

Fossil methanol has an established global market, with synthetic methanol production growing each year [105]. Existing ships and vessels that run on liquid fossil fuels, like diesel and kerosene, can be retrofitted to run on low-carbon, synthetic liquid fuels, like methanol, allowing owners to avoid the capital cost of a new ship. Although sales of methanol dual-fuel ships have significantly increased in recent years [106], the high cost of synthetic methanol may change commercial incentives [107]. Our stakeholder engagement also suggests that ammonia will be the dominant maritime fuel in the short and medium-term due to the lower cost of the fuel. This is in line with the analysis of the IEA estimating the cost of synthetic methanol production to be 25 to 100% higher than the production cost of low-carbon ammonia [107]. The difference in fuel costs is partially due to the high cost and limited availability of biogenic CO2, making methanol ships uncompetitive in the long-term, especially once ammonia technologies are mature. This is despite the higher transport and storage cost of ammonia, requiring cooling and compliance with a range of national and international regulations.

According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) the average price of jet fuel in 2022 was roughly £3.18 per gallon, a 149% increase on the previous year, yet comparatively, in 2022, the current average price of SAF within the US was £7 per gallon [108]. While the IATA estimates that all SAF products are 2-4 times more expensive than alternative aviation fuels [108], costs could reduce with the emerging SAF mandate.

Technical feasibility

Hydrogen fuel cells have faster refuelling times than Battery Electric Vehicles (BEVs), making them well suited for long heavy-duty trips [16]. Fuel cells also have other potential applications in maritime, rail and aviation (HyFlyer) sectors. The Scottish Government has funded multiple hydrogen buses in Aberdeen that have been successfully implemented since 2015 [109]. On the whole, fuel cells have a high TRL, however this can vary slightly by use case. For example, the Aerospace Technology Institute label a generic fuel cell as TRL 8, with a fuel cell in aviation use cases at TRL 5 [110].

Ships can be retrofitted for ammonia engines easier than for fuel cells, which need a complete makeover of the engine infrastructure. Ammonia blends of 70% have been successfully implemented [111] in certain engines. The energy transfer chain of ammonia has a number of conversions resulting in efficiency losses. From the initial renewable energy produced, 17% will make it to the ship’s propeller [112]. On the other hand, it is more complicated to produce synthetic fuels in large quantities limiting the long-term applications. Ammonia must be stored at -33◦C. This gives e-fuels a storage advantage, as the conditions are much milder and not different to the current fuels used. The IEA’s report on International Shipping reports that in 2022, 90 (11% by tonnage) new-build orders were for ammonia-ready vessels, 43 (7%) were for methanol vessels and 3 were for hydrogen-ready vessels [113]. SAF encompasses a range of technologies or SAF production pathways, detailed in Table 10.

TECHNOLOGY

TECHNOLOGY READINESS

Hydrogen fuel cell engine in light vehicles

TRL of 9

Hydrogen fuel cell engine in heavy vehicles

TRL of 7-9

Sustainable Aviation Fuel

TRL of 9 (HEFA)

Low-carbon methanol as a maritime fuel

TRL of 9

Low-carbon ammonia as a maritime fuel

TRL of 9

Table 10: Technology readiness of transport technologies

Sustainability

Whilst SAFs release carbon when burned, they could reduce carbon emissions by 80% over the lifecycle compared to traditional jet fuel [114], while having similar combustion characteristics and safety considerations. Ammonia burns less easily and is less flammable than conventional shipping fuels, and therefore is safer from a health and safety perspective [115]. Hydrogen fuel cells do not result in any emissions of greenhouse gases when in use [116]. Further sustainability benefits and challenges are detailed in the Table 14.

Power generation

Economic implications

The capital cost associated with large scale hydrogen peaking plants is estimated to be between £350 and £600 per kW, whereas capital costs associated with fossil fuel based peaking plants is between £300-600 per kW [117] [118]. The overall cost of electricity, however, will depend on several factors, for example, load factor, efficiency of the turbine, heat and water recovery [119]. While large scale hydrogen power plants can technically provide both mid-merit and peaking generation, they are expected to be cost competitive when running as a peaking plant and below a load factor of 20-30% [118] [120]. This is due to higher operating costs compared to low-carbon alternatives. Despite additional costs, there is an economic case for retrofitting existing natural gas power plants with CCS (Table 17). This is because retrofitting is estimated to extend the lifetime of a power plant by 10 years, resulting in substantially lower capital costs [23]. The estimated cost of retrofit is around £110 per kW compared to the new-build gas turbine’s capital cost of £740 per kW [120]. Due to increasing scale and simplification, it is estimated that the cost of CCS-power plants could reduce by 45% after the first three installations, with technical innovation leading to an additional reduction of 5-10% thereafter [121]. With widely available biomass supply and highly mature technology, unabated biomass generation is currently the most prevalent among the selected technologies. However, as CCS technologies become commercially available, unabated biomass generation is anticipated to be phased out. This is due to the relatively high cost of power generation. While retrofitted hydrogen plants could reach a levelised cost as low as £65 per MWh in 2035, the Contract for Difference of biomass plants guarantees £100 per MWh (2012 prices) [23]. The levelized cost for unabated gas plants may reach £170-£180 per MWh while gas CCS plants’ levelized costs are estimated to be £75-£90 per MWh [23]. Despite this challenging economic case, biomass plants coupled with CCS technology are expected to have high potential due to substantial carbon benefits. While the cost of hydrogen-fired turbines could reduce over time, they are expected to be used for low load factor operation, with CCUS-enabled power generation running on higher load factors.

Technical feasibility

While only minor alterations are required to existing gas power plants to reach hydrogen/gas blends around 70% [122], 100% hydrogen power plants have more potential in the long term due to higher carbon benefits. Retrofit to 100% hydrogen plants is also technically feasible, with a few technical challenges including changes to pipes and combustors due to differences in hydrogen’s volumetric density. Ammonia is the least mature power generation technology among the four. A few projects have demonstrated the viability of co-firing up to 20% and 70% with coal and natural gas, respectively [123]. Some technical challenges such as flame stability, and the low combustion speed of ammonia do not only make ammonia-fired power generation less efficient than the baseline but also result in incompatibility with larger gas-turbines [124]. The main technical advantage of biomass power plants is that existing coal power plants can be easily retrofitted to run on biomass. Given high technical maturity, capacity for electrical generation from biomass in the UK reached 12% of all capacity in 2023 [125]. Despite high hydrogen potential, there is limited experience with hydrogen power generation in Scotland. The Peterhead Power Station is planned to be coupled with CCUS technology as part of the Acorn project, positioning the facility as one of the first CCUS-enabled gas power plants. In addition, there are eight major diesel generation sites in Scotland used as backup supply for remote locations [64] [126]. A few hydrogen power projects, like the Kirkwall Airport CHP, are operational in Scotland, but further trials are needed, particularly on remote Scottish Islands, to provide learnings of this sector in a Scottish context, according to our stakeholder engagement. Further technical details can be found in Table 17.

Sustainability

Main sustainability concerns include CO2 leakage rate from underground reservoirs, ammonia’s toxicity and NOx emissions. Due to high carbon benefits, a 2018 CCC Biomass report concluded that available biomass should be used with BECCS applications ‘to the maximum extent possible’ [127]. Further sustainability challenges and benefits are detailed in Table 14.

  1. Offtaker Market Assessment

 

Existing demand

Figure 15: Import of hydrogen in 2023 in selected countries [33]

Figure 16: Value of ammonia trade in EU, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Source: Eurostat

Infrastructure log

Country

Name

Type

Description

Shetland, Scotland, UK

Sullom Voe

Terminal

Shetland has some of the most abundant wind resources in the UK but is somewhat isolated from the mainland grid. This makes development of curtailment options including green hydrogen a top priority. Sullom Voe is a deepwater port that already has three existing tanker jetties designed for ultra-large crude oil tankers and one for medium sized LPG tankers. It is suitable for ammonia export based on similarities to the technology currently in use at the terminal for LPG.

Orkney, Scotland, UK

Flotta Terminal

Terminal

Flotta Terminal has a crude oil import pipeline and a jetty. It has been earmarked as the location for Hydrogen Hub Orkney test facility, owing to its remote location and significant industrial space available in the immediate vicinity for hydrogen production. Approval has been obtained for a 220MW interconnector to the Scottish mainland in order to facilitate future offshore wind generation.

Scotland, UK

Port of Cromarty Firth

Port

Plans to produce, use and export (via LOH and liquefaction) hydrogen are already in development. The port has a depth of up to 14m and is able to provide more than 2000m quayside in an ideal location to serve several of the North East ScotWind option areas. It was awarded Green Freeport status in 2023 and this is expected to attract further investment in a number of offshore wind and hydrogen projects.

Scotland, UK

Outer Hebrides Hydrogen Hub

 

An expansion of the green hydrogen production capacity has been put forward in the updated Energy Strategy for the hub. The Stornoway Port Masterplan included development of a 400m long, 10m deep port, that could accommodate LPG/NH3 gas carrier vessels that are unable to make use of the 6m port currently in operation. It is well placed to serve the northerly ScotWind option areas.

Scotland, UK

St Fergus Gas Terminal

Terminal

It is the central gathering hub for gas production from the Northern North Sea region and contains the SEGAL system and the SAGE gas terminal. Extensive international (Norway) and North Sea gas pipeline infrastructure have made the terminal the primary candidate for any new hydrogen export pipeline. The site is well positioned to receive any hydrogen produced offshore in the North Sea through these existing gas pipelines. The Acorn project intends to enable production of blue hydrogen, for the domestic market, next to the terminal, as a part of the “Hydrogen Coast” initiative.

Scotland, UK

Grangemouth/Hound point

Terminal (+ refinery)

The Hound point marine terminal appears to be the obvious export port suitable for the loading of VLGC. The company LNG9 have allegedly proposed a blue hydrogen/CSS project in the area already.

England, UK

Port of Immingham

Port

ABP and Air Products are collaborating to construct a jetty at the port that is capable of handling green hydrogen.

England, UK

Stanlow Terminals

Terminal

There has been an announcement of an intention to open a major new import terminal for green ammonia in the port of Liverpool. The new terminal is expected to be able to import and store in excess of one million tonnes (39.4 TWhHHV) of green hydrogen per year.

England, UK

Teesport

Port

While plans on low-carbon ammonia imports are unclear, Teesport is the main point for ammonia imports for fertiliser production in Teesside.

Antwerp, Belgium

Antwerp NH3 Import Terminal

Terminal

Aims to become a large hydrogen import hub and has excellent connections to the Shell and Exxon Mobil refineries and three steam crackers. A conceptual ammonia storage facility is planned for completion here in 2027.

Zeebrugge, Belgium

Zeebrugge New Molecules development

Other

Conceptual ammonia cracking facility planned for completion in 2030.

Brunsbüttel, Germany

Ammonia Brunsbüttel

Port

Ammonia cracking facility in the feasibility study stage. It has a projected capacity of 300 kt ammonia and a projected 2026 completion date.

Wilhelmshaven, Germany

Green Wilhelmshaven

Other

Ammonia cracking site with an announced size of 295 kt H2/year).

Hamburg, Germany

Ammonia import at Hamburg

Port

Conceptual ammonia cracking and storage facility at the port of Hamburg – planned for completion in 2026.

Maasvlakte, Netherlands

ACE Terminal

Terminal

Conceptual ammonia cracking and storage facility intended for completion in 2026.

Rotterdam, Netherlands

H2Sines.RDAM

Other

LH2 regassification facility in the feasibility study stage, with an announced size of 100 tpd LH2, with upscaling to 300 tpd and an intended start date of 2028.

Maasvlakte, Netherlands

Global Energy Storage (GES)

Other

Ammonia storage facility in the conceptual stage.

Maasvlakte, Netherlands

OCI Import terminal

Terminal

A terminal that is expected to be expanded to a capacity of 1.8Mt of ammonia

Maasvlakte, Netherlands

Koole & Horisont Energi

Other

Ammonia storage in feasibility study stage.

Table 11: Infrastructure opportunities in Scotland, the rest of the UK and selected European countries

  1. Techno-economic tables

 

 

Round-trip efficiency (%)

Storage temperature (°C)

Gravimetric energy density (MJ/KG)

Volumetric energy density (MJ/L)

TRL

MRL

CRL

Compressed hydrogen pipeline transport

37

Ambient

Depends on pressure

6.456

7-9

N/A

N/A

Liquified hydrogen

9-22

-252.8

120-142

~70.8

6-9

3-6

1-5

Liquified ammonia

22

– 33

21.18- 22.5

107.7-120

7-9;6-7

4-6;3-4

1-5;~1

LOHC

~18

Ambient

7.35

5.66

4-7

1-4

~1

Metal hydrides (magnesium hydride)

N/A

Ambient

26.32

86-109

4-7

1-4

~1

Table 12: Technical table of hydrogen carriers

Sources: [128]; [129]; [130]; [131]; [77]; [132]; [133]

In order to attract investment, hydrogen transport must be financially profitable within a specifically defined niche. A number of methods of hydrogen transport are available, all with differing properties which determine how cheaply and safely the hydrogen can be transported. Although hydrogen is incredibly dense by mass, it takes up a lot of volume, which makes it expensive to transport. It can therefore be compressed or even liquified to decrease the price of transport, or alternatively it can be transported in the form of other substances that contain a large amount of hydrogen but have different properties (for instance density) that make them cheaper to transport. Physical properties such as the volumetric density and storage temperature of each carrier are important factors that would have to be accounted for in the supply chain. On the other hand, technology readiness level (TRL), market readiness level (MRL) and commercial readiness level (CRL) are all technoeconomic properties that reflect how mature each technology is and whether the carrier is likely to be financially viable. Technoeconomic properties are not fixed in the same way as physical properties and so as the technologies develop, certain carriers may become increasingly viable. Ultimately both physical and technoeconomic properties of each transport option must be weighed up and used by decision makers to predict the best course of action.

Hydrogen heat technical challenges

Challenge

Description

Difference in flame speed

The combustion of hydrogen results in a much greater flame speed compared to the combustion of natural gas (1.7 ms-1 compared to 0.4 ms-1). If existing natural gas combustion equipment is used to combust hydrogen, there is a risk that the flame speed will exceed the gas velocity exiting the burner nozzle. This can cause an event called a “flashback” which can damage the nozzle and other components of the burner.

Adiabatic flame temperature

Hydrogen flames are much hotter than natural gas flames. This is referred to as a large difference in “stochiometric adiabatic flame temperature”. The adiabatic flame temperature of hydrogen is 2,182°C, whereas it is 1,937°C for natural gas – a difference of 245 °C. This temperature increase poses a risk to natural gas combustion equipment if operated with a hydrogen fuel source and additionally increases the NOx emissions.

Flame emissivity

Hydrogen flames radiate more UV radiation in comparison to natural gas flames, which makes them paler in colour and more difficult to see.

Safety considerations

Hydrogen has a higher flammability limit than natural gas and due to its molecular size (the smallest of all molecules), hydrogen is more prone to leakage. This is most problematic in poorly ventilated or confined situations where the leaking hydrogen cannot diffuse into the atmosphere and thus poses a risk of explosion.

Table 13: Technical challenges with high temperature heat equipment

Sources: [134]; [135]

Environmental log

Impact Sub-category

Description

Hydrogen derivative

 

Emissions reduction

 

NOx

Nitrogen oxides are a mixture of gases, worsening air pollution, impacting human health and, reacting with other gases, indirectly contributing to global warming. Ammonia typically generates high NOx levels during combustion, however recent research and development suggests that ammonia can be used to reduce NOx emissions at the point of combustion [136].

Hydrogen, ammonia

CO2

Combusting ammonia significantly reduces CO2 emissions, and any CO2 produced can be stored in geological storage in Scotland that have reliable leakage rates below 0.1% [137].

Fugitive hydrogen emissions

Hydrogen leakages in the NH3-H2 conversion process are estimated at 5% but stringent protocols and advanced processes are designed to minimise this risk [138] [139].

CO2

Utilises captured CO2 in production, offsetting any released CO2 and lowering atmospheric concentrations [140].

Synthetic methanol

SOx and NOx

Produces fewer NOx and SOx during combustion compared to fossil fuels [141].

CO2

Use of SAFs reduces lifecycle CO₂ emissions by up to 80% compared to conventional jet fuel [114]

and SAFs made from biomass or waste materials can be carbon neutral [142].

SAF

Indirect emissions

SAF as a drop in solution, is compatible with existing engines, reducing additional emissions by eliminating the need for new infrastructure [143].

 

Air quality

 

Particulate Matter

Upon combustion ammonia produces significantly less particulate matter [144].

Ammonia

Particulate Matter

Burns cleaner than fossil fuels, producing less particulate matter [13].

e-methanol

Particulate Matter

Typically generates fewer particulates and soot due to lower amounts of aromatics and sulphur [145] [146]. Evidence shows a reduction in contrail cloudiness when using SAFs [147].

SAF

 

Resource depletion and land use

 

Resource demand

The ammonia-hydrogen conversion process is energy intensive, requires significant volumes of water and involves extracting critical minerals for catalysts, potentially impacting direct or indirect land use changes [148] [149]/

Ammonia

Land Use Competition

Challenges arise if crops are specifically grown to capture biogenic CO2, leading to land use competition. Thus, other CO2 sources, like concentrated or engineered carbon capture, are preferred [150].

e-methanol

Use of renewable feedstock

SAF can be produced from waste materials or renewable sources like algae or plant oils, reducing the need for virgin resources and minimising land use competition [145], [151]. However, using food crops for SAF production displaces food crops, leading to the expansion of cropland into forests and grasslands, which reduces natural carbon sequestration [151] .

SAF

 

Ecotoxity

 

Environmental contamination

While ammonia is linked to eutrophication and acidification of soil and water bodies which impacts ecosystems [152], the effect is highly dependent on several factors and relatively higher concentration of ammonia [112].

Ammonia

Environmental contamination

Methanol is less toxic to the environment than many conventional fuels. Spills or leaks are less harmful and easier to remediate due to its quick evaporation. In addition, methanol does not dissociate into ions when dissolved in water, avoiding acidification [153].

e-methanol

Environmental contamination

Current reports indicate potential toxicity to aquatic life and suggest that certain SAF production methods may contribute to eutrophication [154].

SAF

 

Human / General toxicity

 

Acute toxicity

Ammonia is highly toxic and corrosive, posing life threatening health risks upon exposure though acute toxicity is usually a result of direct contact with it [155].

Ammonia

Flammability

Ammonia is not highly flammable but can form explosive mixtures with air at certain uncontrolled concentrations [155].

Chemical exposure

Prolonged, direct exposure to methanol via inhalation or ingestion is harmful to human health but small quantities are not [156].

e-methanol

Flammability

Methanol is highly flammable and poses a significant fire hazard [156].

Chemical exposure

Some SAF production pathways may produce volatile organic compounds or harmful substances, though in minimal quantities [157].

SAF

Combustion emissions

Whilst SAFs produce less particulate matter and NOx than conventional aviation fuels, they still emit fine particles and NOx which can cause respiratory issues when inhaled [146].

Table 14: Environmental log

 

HVDC interconnectors

Hydrogen pipelines

Liquified hydrogen

Ammonia

LOHC

Metal hydride

Energy transfer capacity per project (current maximum)

12 GW [65]

20-30 GW [65]

Depends on ships

Depends on ships

Depends on LOHC type and conditions of transport

Example of LOHC type (H-18 DBT): 47 MWh [158]

 

Technical advantage

Technical maturity and experience

Long-duration, inter-seasonal storage. Potential to decarbonise industrial processes directly.

Long-duration, inter-seasonal storage.

Potential to decarbonise industrial processes directly.

Long-duration, inter-seasonal storage.

Potential to decarbonise industrial processes directly.

Long-duration, interseasonal storage.

Potential to decarbonise industrial processes directly.Long-duration, inter-seasonal storage. Potential to decarbonise industrial processes directly.

Long-duration, inter-seasonal storage.

Long-duration, inter-seasonal storage.

High voltage capacity with low energy to heat losses

High power transmission capacity therefore low power losses

Efficiency over long distances [65] [159]

Can transport large volumes of energy over long distances [65]

More efficient for long distance transport.

Space efficiency by allowing more storage by volume relative to gaseous hydrogen [160]

Established global market

High volumetric density thus easier to store and transport

Efficiency over long distances [161]

Hydrogenation is exothermic, therefore, while efficiencies are low, heat recovery can increase overall efficiency. [162]

Operates at near room temperature and atmospheric pressure)

Enhanced safety during operation

No leakage [163]

Technical challenge

Congestion issues

Inefficiency over long distances [65]

Wind pattern correlation across the North Sea

Metal pipelines are susceptible to embrittlement (mainly an issue for distribution pipes) [65]

Requires high energy demand for liquefaction and regasification of hydrogen

Leakage through boil off is common [160]

Intermittent ammonia production is challenging.

Conversion and reconversion process are energy taxing [161]

Needs to be purified

Needs to be returned after dehydrogenation.

Dehydrogenation is endothermic [162]

Tanks can be heavy, due to metal hydrides’ low mass-specific storage density

Dehydrogenation requires high temperatures [163]

Table 15: Technical table of hydrogen derivative technologies

Name

Feedstocks

Notes

HEFA – Hydroprocessed Ester and Fatty Acids

  • Waste and residue fats (vegetable oil)
  • Purposefully grown plants

TRL 8-9. Already used commercially in aviation, as well as in road transport, so pressures on supply exist.

AtJ – Alcohols to Jet

  • Agricultural and forest residues
  • Sugar or starch crops

TRL 7-8. AtJ (and Gas+FT) can are considered advanced biofuels if produced from REDII compliant feedstocks.

Gas + FT – Biomass Gasification + Fischer-Tropsch

  • Same as AtJ (listed above)
  • Municipal solid waste

Gas+FT has significant carbon reduction and supply potential.

PtL – Power to Liquid

  • Hydrogen
  • Carbon dioxide

The CO2 can be sourced from biomass, waste processes (with CCS) or via direct air capture.

Table 16: An overview of SAF production pathways [77]

 

TRL [164]

Efficiency (%)

Levelized cost in 2035

Unabated gas (CCGT)

9

57

170-180

CCUS (CCGT)

8

50

75-90

Retrofit hydrogen

7

55

£65-100/MWh

New-built hydrogen

7

55

£90-125/MWh

Unabated biomass

9

20 [165]

£98 per MWh [166] and existing low-carbon contracts are for £100 per MWh (in 2012£)

BECCS

6-7

31-38 [167]

Approximately $170/MWh [168]

OR

193 per MWh (2018 prices) [166]

Ammonia

4

50 – 60 Ammonia: zero-carbon fertiliser, fuel and energy store (royalsociety.org)

Approximately between $167 and $197 pwe MWh at 25% power plant capacity factor in 2040 [169]

Table 17: Techno-economic table of power generation technologies

  1. Policy tables

 

UK Regulatory Barriers

 

Policy gap

Description

1

HSE

The safety case for hydrogen still needs to be signed off by the HSE in the UK. This will remove uncertainty and confusion about the potential role of hydrogen in decarbonising heat, and other applications. The uncertainty that currently exists stops stakeholders from forward planning and making strategic decisions.

2

ADR regulation

Hydrogen transport is currently prohibited through ten road tunnels in the UK based on its classification under the European ADR rules (carriage of dangerous goods by road). Reviewing hydrogen-specific ADR regulation, along with restrictions for ammonia and LOHCs, transport efficiency could be significantly increased. However, any changes to these regulations should be dependent on safety cases being proven.

3

Offshore licensing

While it is confirmed that the North Sea Transition Authority will be the licensing and decommissioning body for offshore hydrogen projects [170], the industry seeks more clarity on the timeline and details of future hydrogen regime.

4

Gas Safety Management Regulation (GSMR)

GSMR currently prohibits injecting more than 0.1% hydrogen into the networks. This will need to be updated to unlock the UK’s line pack capacity. The UK Government will make a policy decision in 2023 on whether to allow blending of up to 20% hydrogen by volume into the gas distribution networks [16].

5

Planning and consenting

Our research suggests that developers face a number of constraints surrounding the delivery of critical regulatory consents, particularly planning and environmental permitting. Delays around consenting can significantly extend the lead time of hydrogen storage projects. Some stakeholders suggested streamlining the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP) regime in England and accelerating the consenting process through increasing funding to relevant planning offices across the UK.

6

Gas Act 1986

With no comprehensive hydrogen-specific regulation in place, onshore hydrogen is regulated under the Gas Act 1986 and Planning Act 2008. As hydrogen is defined as “gas” under the Gas Act, most transportation, storage, and supply regulatory requirements of natural gas applies to hydrogen as well.

7

Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) regulation

Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) applies to hydrogen and most of its derivatives, such as ammonia, methylcyclohexane and toluene. Magnesium hydride, however, is not considered a dangerous substance under COMAH. In Scotland, COMAH regulations are enforced by the COMAH Competent Authority.

Table 18: Policy gaps in the UK

International Hydrogen Policy Log

Region

Policy name

Description

European Union

Net Zero Target

The European Union aims to meet net zero emissions by 2050.

European Union

Hydrogen Strategy

The hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe was adopted in July 2020.

European Union

RePowerEU

The European Commission implemented the REPowerEU Plan to phase out reliance on Russian fossil fuel imports following the invasion of Ukraine.

European Union

REDIII Targets

Transport: RED III fuel suppliers must achieve a 14.5% reduction in GHG emissions associated with their fuels or achieve at least 29% renewables share in the fuel supply. In addition, at least 5.5% of the fuel mix must be composed of advanced biofuels and RFNBOs (combined binding target).

Industry: The EUs CBAM Regulation (10th May 2023) will be transitioned in during the period of 2023-2026 and then full force from 2026 onwards. The EU’s Fit for 55 proposals include a 50% renewable share for hydrogen used in industry. RED III – Industry must procure at least 42% of its hydrogen from renewable fuels of non-biological origin (RFNBOS) by 2030, though countries that can achieve a fossil-free hydrogen mix of at least 77% by 2030 can see that target reduced by 20%.

European Union

H2Global

H2Global is live (1st auction closed 2023) and formed through H2 purchase and sale agreements through a central body. Managed windows for funding applications through 10-year hydrogen purchase agreements, competition-based procurement process. As of 06/23, H2Global and the Hydrogen Investment Bank have been linked. Working on a European auction open to all EU countries.

European Union

Hydrogen Bank

Acts through an auction system, fixed price payment per kg. Fixed premium per kg hydrogen produced for a maximum of 10 years of operation. Auctions launched under the Innovation Fund in the autumn of 2023.

European Union

Innovation Fund

The innovation fund hydrogen focussed from Nov 2022. Acts through a competitive bidding process – max bid 4 Euro per kg* – and via waves of calls for proposals.

European Union

IPCEI

Important Project of Common European Interest (IPCEI) are live and provided in waves of grant funding. A requirement for projects must be for them to show they are financially viable without subsidies.

European Union

AFIR

AFIR passed March 2023, detailing one HRS to be deployed every 200km along Ten-T core.

European Union

Fitfor55

Fit for 55: 2.6% target for renewable fuels of non-biological origin (RFNBO) in transport by 2030

European Union

EU ETS

The EU Emission Trading Scheme is a “cap and trade” system that limits the amount of greenhouse gases which can be emitted within the EU.

European Union

EU MoUs

The EU has signed MoUs with Japan, Egypt, Mauritania (and others) around hydrogen including export/imports.

European Union

RED Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard

3.38 kg CO2-eq/kg hydrogen (28 gCO2e per MJ) (70% lower compared to emissions from fossil fuels). Two delegated acts under Renewable Energy Directive published by the Commision in Feb-23 – (i) principle of additionality, (ii) methodology for calculating GGG emissions. Rules to apply to imports.

United Kingdom

Net Zero Target

Net zero by 2050. 78% emission reduction by 2035. Mandated in law. Net Zero power system by 2030.

United Kingdom

UK Hydrogen Strategy

Production target of 10 GW by 2030, with at least 6 GW of this coming from electrolytic production.

United Kingdom

HPBM

Hydrogen Production Business Model – a CFD funding mechanism bridging the difference between producing low-carbon hydrogen gas and the price of natural gas. Funding provided through allocation rounds.

United Kingdom

LCHS

The UK Low Carbon Hydrogen Standard sets a carbon intensity threshold for hydrogen production of 20 gCO2e/MJ (2.4 kg CO2-eq/kg hydrogen). If the hydrogen produced meets this standard, it can be deemed low-carbon and is eligible for government subsidy.

United Kingdom

UK ETS

The UK’s own ETS scheme since leaving the EU.

United Kingdom

SAF Mandate

The UK has formed a SAF mandate stipulating set targets for percentage shares of SAF, and specific production pathways (such as PtL). Headline figure is that 10% of UK aviation fuel will be SAF by 2030.

United Kingdom

RTFO

The Renewable Transport Fuels Obligation

Germany

Net Zero Target

Net zero by 2045. Emissions shall move to net negative after 2050. Germany has set the preliminary targets of cutting emissions by at least 65 percent by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, and 88 percent by 2040 Mandated in law.

Germany

National Hydrogen Strategy

The German hydrogen national strategy was released in 2020 before being an update was released in 2023.

Germany

H2 Global

H2 Global – value €4 billion. Initial auction of 900mn euros launched in Dec 2022 for H2 derivatives. Government plans to make a further 3.5 billion euros available for new bidding rounds with durations up to 2036.

Germany

Carbon Tax

CO2 tax (introduced in 2023) for Avgas and Jet A-1.

Germany

Hydrogen Mobility Targets

Targets include fuel cell trucks, 20 HRS’s and passenger cars, fuel cell buses for public transportation, and the operation of the first inland ship operating on hydrogen by 2025.

Germany

National MOUs

Several MoUs signed surrounding imports of hydrogen and ammonia into the country – Mauritania MoU could equate to 8 million tonnes/year.

The Netherlands

Net Zero Target

Net zero by 2050. 55% CO2 reduction by 2030. In law.

The Netherlands

National Hydrogen Strategy

The Netherlands hydrogen strategy was released in 2020.

The Netherlands

National Climate Agreement

The national climate agreement contains set targets for fuel cell HDVs, passenger cars and hydrogen refuelling stations.

The Netherlands

Carbon Levy

In 2021, introduced carbon levy for industry – complementary to EU ETS – road mapped to 2030 currently.

The Netherlands

Guarantees of Origin Scheme

Green hydrogen Guarantees of Origin operational from Oct-22, following a Bill (May-22) and trial (summer-22).

The Netherlands

H2Global

300mn euro specific funding from H2Global, including funding for ammonia.

The Netherlands

National MoUs

In 2020, the US and the Netherlands signed a statement of intent to collaborate on hydrogen. The Minister of Energy of Chile and the State Secretary for Economic Affairs and Climate Policy signed a joint statement on collaboration in the field of green hydrogen import and export (July 2021). The UAE Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure and the Dutch Ministry for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on hydrogen energy. As part of their Joint Economic Committee, the UAE and the Netherlands have been in discussions to identify common interests and create a partnership for decarbonisation of the energy sector and increasing the use of clean hydrogen (March 2022).

Belgium

Net Zero Target

Net Zero by 2050, 55% emissions reductions target in place for 2030.

Belgium

National Hydrogen Strategy

Hydrogen strategy enacted firstly in 2021, with an update in 2022. Both strategies focussed on positioning Belgium as an import and transit location for low-carbon molecules into Europe. The country will remain dependent on energy imports in various forms to cover its domestic demand, estimating between 2 and 6 TWh of renewable hydrogen (or derivatives) in 2030 and between 100 and 165 TWh in 2050

Belgium

Energy Transition Fund

The Energy Transition Fund will fund until 2025, providing 20-30 million euros in support. The federal government has also earmarked 60 million euros (including 50 million euros from the national recovery and resilience plan) to invest and support projects to scale up innovative, low-carbon technologies.

Belgium

Hydrogen Act

The Hydrogen Act establishes a regulatory framework for the transport of hydrogen via pipelines. The act intends to foster the growth of the Belgian hydrogen market and the required hydrogen transport infrastructure. 

Table 19: International Hydrogen Policy Log

  1. Demand mapping methodology

 

Overview of Approach

The demand mapping analysis is carried out for five regions and six sectors for the years 2030 and 2045. The analysis only considers low-carbon hydrogen and derivate demand, and not hydrogen demand that does not meet sustainability criteria in the region. The regions covered are chosen based on the regional mapping carried out earlier in this project and include:

  • The EU
  • Germany
  • Belgium
  • The Netherlands
  • Scotland, England and Wales

The sectors covered are the ones in which hydrogen may play a role, with a focus on sectors where the role of derivatives and products could be greatest. These include:

  • Industry
  • Power Generation
  • Road Transport
  • Aviation (with a focus on power to liquid fuels)
  • International Maritime (with a focus on ammonia and methanol)
  • Heat

The analysis has taken a high-level approach to develop three scenarios (low, central and high) for each region and sector. In general, the approach taken for the EU and EU national geographies aligns due to similar overarching policy and data sources. While the approach for England and Wales often differs due to different policy and assumptions.

The EU and EU National Geographies (Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands) Sectoral Approach

Industry

The demand mapping for industry utilises data from Eurostat Simplified Energy Balances [171] which gives total demand for energy by industrial sector in the EU and the three EU nation states considered. The change in energy demand and suitability for hydrogen in each sector is based three scenarios developed in N-ZIP model produced for the Climate Change Committee (CCC) [172]. While this source does not give data based on EU suitability, it does give broad indications of sectoral suitability for hydrogen compared to alternatives and is therefore used to produce a low, central and high range of suitability.

An alternative approach has been used for sectors that currently use hydrogen (predominantly the chemicals sector and the refining sector). This is partially due to the EU’s target to ensuring 42% of hydrogen use meets RFNBO criteria in 2030 [54], however it is worth noting that refining is excluded from this target. The approach for the chemicals sector is to use a combination of current estimates of hydrogen demand [173], and calculating the proportion of low-carbon hydrogen that is required to meet the RFNBO target, while assuming the CCC’s reduction in energy demand for the sector by 2030.

While the 42% target does not apply to refineries, it is expected that refining will be an early user of low-carbon hydrogen due to current demand, experience in handling hydrogen and RFNBOs used in refining contributing to RFNBO targets in the transport sector. Hydrogen Europe estimate that there are 1.2 Mt/year of clean hydrogen projects announced in the refining sector by 2030, representing 26% of current hydrogen demand [174]. Furthermore, current hydrogen demand makes up approximately 40% of total energy demand in the sector. For this reason, estimates of total energy demand that is clean hydrogen in 2030 of 5, 10 and 15% have been selected for 2030. All scenarios assume refineries operate on clean hydrogen by 2045.

Industrial Sector

(*Different source / approach used for starred sectors)

Reduction in energy use 2022-2030

Proportion of total energy that is clean hydrogen in 2030

Reduction in energy use 2022-2045

Proportion of total energy that is clean hydrogen in 2045

Chemicals*

5-9%

8-9%

4-7%

24-29%

Construction

28-29%

0%

28%

71-80%

Food, beverages & tobacco

17-19%

0-7%

29-32%

15-25%

Iron and steel

0-6%

14-18%

29-36%

29-59%

Other industries

21-25%

0-4%

29-36%

18-37%

Mineral products

18-31%

3-7%

22-40%

25-28%

Non-ferrous metals

32-36%

0%

36-40%

26-28%

Oil and gas extraction

46-49%

4-10%

61-70%

47-50%

Paper, printing & publishing

21-26%

1-5%

44-49%

10-14%

Petroleum refineries*

20-22%

5-15%

29-35%

40%

Vehicles

27-30%

2-8%

29-35%

18-41%

Table 20: Trajectory of proportion of clean hydrogen used energy for the years 2030 and 2045

Industrial demand is broken down by product in 2030 based on applying RED III mandates to historic ammonia and methanol demand by region, developing scenarios based on historic high and low demand levels. Demand for 2045 is estimated, by assuming that all hydrogen demand for these products is low-carbon.

Power Generation

Hydrogen’s role in the power sector is uncertain and depends on policy incentives, infrastructure and technology readiness of turbines. This analysis assumes that total electricity generation in 2030 for the EU, Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands follows the estimates of generation in the MIX-CP scenario developed for European Green Deal Analysis [175]. This scenario was selected as it most closely aligns with policy measures that were agreed upon.

The analysis assumes that total electricity generation in 2045 follows the midpoint of the of the 2040 and 2050 values for the two scenario estimates in a recent European Commission report considering energy infrastructure configurations in Europe [176]. This estimate is used to develop a compound annual growth rate assumption of 4.2% for electricity generation in the EU between the 2030 estimate and 2045 assumption. This compound annual growth rate is applied to regional estimates in the MIX-CP scenario for Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands to estimate annual electricity generation in 2045.

It is broadly accepted that an electricity grid that is dominated by intermittent renewables will require low-carbon dispatchable generation to meet demand at times of low renewable generation. The CCC estimate that in the Balanced Pathway, 13% of electricity demand is met by low-carbon dispatchable power generation in 2045 [177]. However, the split between hydrogen and other options such as gas with CCUS or BECCS is unknown at this stage.

For the purposes of this analysis, the following proportions of electricity generation that are met with hydrogen are assumed. These include no hydrogen to power in 2030 due to the requirement for large scale hydrogen storage to be in place to operate hydrogen power at low load factors, which is its optimal role in the power system [178]. It is unlikely that there will be access to sufficient volumes of hydrogen storage in the 2030 timeframe due to the long lead times for large scale geological hydrogen storage [179]. Hydrogen power generation is assumed to have an efficiency of 48% [180].

Proportion of Total Power Demand that is met by Hydrogen

2030

2045

Low Scenario

0.0%

2.5%

Central Scenario

0.0%

5.0%

High Scenario

0.0%

7.5%

Table 21: Proportion of hydrogen in total power demand

Road Transport

The road transport analysis focuses on vans, buses and HGVs given that heavier vehicles are more suited to hydrogen and lighter vehicles are more suited to battery electric drivetrains. The low and the high scenario are based on the proportion of road transport energy consumption that is hydrogen in 2030 and 2045 in FES 2024 in the highest and lowest hydrogen deployment scenarios. The central scenario is estimated as the midpoint between these upper and lower bounds. The estimated demand for transport by these vehicle segments in 2030 is taken from the MIX-CP Scenario [175], for the EU, Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands.

Scenario

Proportion H2 2030

Reduction in Energy Demand 2030 – 2045

Proportion H2 2045

Low

0.4%

-66%

7.7%

Central

0.5%

-66%

17.7%

High

0.6%

-66%

27.8%

Table 22: Hydrogen Proportions of Energy Demand for Bus and Coach Transport

Scenario

Proportion H2 2030

Reduction in Energy Demand 2030 – 2045

Proportion H2 2045

Low

0.1%

-58%

0.7%

Central

0.1%

-53%

17.3%

High

0.2%

-49%

34.0%

Table 23: Hydrogen Proportions of Energy Demand for Heavy Goods and Light Commercial Vehicles

Aviation

The analysis on aviation focuses on e-fuels which are based on hydrogen combined with captured carbon. The analysis utilises estimates of future aviation fuel demand for the EU and the PtL sub mandate to estimate e-fuel demand in 2030 and 2045, based on a report from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency [181]. The value for total fuel demand in 2045 is estimated by taking the midpoint of the 2040 and 2050 values. This is used to estimate the central demand estimate.

EU Aviation

2030

2040

2045

2050

SAF Mandate (%)

5%

32%

38%

63%

PtL Sub-Mandate (%)

0.70%

8%

11%

28%

Total Fuel Demand (Mt)

46

46

45

44

SAF Supply (Mt)

2.3

14.8

 

27.7

PtL Supply (Mt)

0.3

3.7

5.0

12.3

Table 24: Projections for supply of SAF

The energy content of these e-fuels is then estimated using the value of 43 MJ/kg [182] to develop estimates in TWh. Both low and high scenarios assume the same mandate for PtL, but varying levels of fuel demand based on the EASA’s low and high aviation scenarios [181].

 

2030

2045

Low Scenario Multiplier on Base Case

90%

84%

High Scenario Multiplier on Base Case

115%

124%

Table 25: Multipliers on base case, by scenario

The national estimates for Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands are estimated based on national airport traffic data in 2023 [183]. This assumes that the current mix of air traffic data remains constant over time.

International Maritime

The analysis focuses on international maritime due to its greater suitability for hydrogen, derivatives and products than domestic maritime. This is due to the longer distances travelled in larger ships for international maritime which is less suitable for electrification. The decarbonisation route for ships is uncertain and could be met with biofuels or synthetic fuels. Transport & Environment (T&E) have estimated different routes to decarbonisation that comply with the EU’s FuelEU policy [184]. Note that the analysis carried out for T&E was designed for containerships and different shipping segments may select different decarbonisation routes. However, the authors of the report deemed it to be a good enough proxy to provide a high-level estimate of the entire international shipping sector.

These T&E scenarios are used to estimate the upper and lower bounds of e-fuel deployment in 2030 and 2045. The central scenario is derived as the midpoint of these bounds. The EU’s policy ensures that there is a minimum of 2% RFBNOs from 2034 onwards.

Proportion of International Shipping Demand that is e-fuels

2030

2045

Proportion e-ammonia high (%)

1%

42%

Proportion e-methanol high (%)

4%

4%

Proportion e-ammonia central (%)

0%

21%

Proportion e-methanol central (%)

2%

2%

Proportion e-ammonia low (%)

0%

2%

Proportion e-methanol low (%)

0%

0%

Table 26: Proportion of international shipping demand that is e-fuels

These fuel proportions are applied to the estimated energy demand for international shipping. This is calculated using the CP-MIX scenario as this complies with the fit-for-55 regulation and most closely follows the current policy structure of the energy scenarios produced by the EU Commission [175]. As this scenario only produces estimates to 2030, the growth rate for international shipping energy demand for each region between 2025 and 2030 is applied to the period 2030 to 2045 to estimate international shipping energy demand in 2045. This is deemed appropriate as applying this carbon reduction trajectory from 2025-2030 to the emissions metric results in gross emissions of approximately 14% for the EU in 2050, which should be compatible with achieving net zero provided sufficient greenhouse gas removals are in place.

Heat

The demand for hydrogen in residential heating is highly uncertain and could be significant, or non-existent in 2045. For this reason, and a lack of policy certainty, high level assumptions have been made for hydrogen deployment for heat. It is likely that due to the high efficiency of heat pumps, hydrogen heat would, at most, play a supplementary role in the heating mix. As with other sectors, the residential energy demand is estimated using the MIX-CP scenario and applying the 2025-2030 (negative) growth rate forward to 2045.

Proportion of Residential Energy Demand that is Heat

2030

2045

Low

0.0%

0.0%

Central

0.0%

10.0%

High

0.0%

20.0%

Table 27: Proportion of residential energy demand that is heat

Approach for England and Wales

Industry, Power Generation, Road Transport and Heat

The approach for the industrial, power generation, road transport and heating sectors for England and Wales utilises Future Energy Scenarios (FES) 2024 [185]. This contains three net zero compliant pathways for a decarbonised Great British energy system. In general, Electric Engagement is used for the low scenario, Holistic Transition forms the central scenario and Hydrogen Evolution is used to estimate the high scenario. However, the approach for the power generation sector is different, and the pathway mapping to our scenarios is inverted for Electric Engagement and Holistic Transition to provide consistent results.

The CCC’s Sixth Carbon Budget [177] is used to estimate the proportion of hydrogen demand that occurs in England and Wales for each sector as the FES results estimate demand for Great Britain as a whole. This process is carried out for both 2030 and 2045 periods for the low, central and high scenarios.

Hydrogen Regional Demand Split

Units

2030

2045

Industry England & Wales % of GB

%

88%

89%

Electricity supply England & Wales % of GB

%

97%

94%

Surface transport England & Wales % of GB

%

94%

92%

Non-residential buildings England & Wales % of GB

%

87%

87%

Residential buildings England & Wales % of GB

%

93%

93%

Table 28: Hydrogen regional demand split between England and Wales

The only sector that does not map directly between the Sixth Carbon Budget and FES 2024 is surface transport which includes rail in the Sixth Carbon Budget. The regional split for surface transport is assumed to apply to road transport for this analysis.

To estimate the hydrogen demand reduction from the announcement of the closure of Grangemouth refinery, in September 2024, Gemserv interpreted data and forecasts in NESO’s Future Energy Scenario’s databook [194]. The total demand provided by Grangemouth in each forecast were extracted and multiplied by an assumption on what proportion of this demand was forecasted as being served by hydrogen. This proportion was assumed to follow the forecasted mix between fuels of oil, hydrogen and gas for total Industry and Commercial sector.

 

Scenario

2030

2045

Input Grange-mouth Demand (Twh)

Hydrogen proportion of Industrial fuel mix %

Adjustment (Twh)

Input Grange-mouth Demand (Twh)

Hydrogen proportion of Industrial fuel mix %

Adjustment (Twh)

Low

Electric Engagement

0.19

12%

0.02

0.41

49%

0.20

Mid

Holistic Transition

0.18

33%

0.06

0.33

74%

0.25

High

Hydrogen Evolution

0.19

39%

0.08

0.35

82%

0.28

Table 33: Grangemouth refinery hydrogen demand adjustment.

Aviation

The UK has announced its intentions for a SAF mandate which increases the proportion of SAF in the aviation fuel mix, this policy also includes a PtL sub mandate [186]. For this obligation to be met, PtL derived fuels must meet 0.5% of aviation fuel consumption in 2030, rising to 3.5% by 2040. The PtL sub mandate increases by 0.4% points for the five years between 2036 and 2040 [187]. For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that this trajectory continues and the PtL sub mandate increases to 5.5% by 2045.

Total aviation demand for the UK in the years 2030 and 2045 is based on the CCC’s Sixth Carbon Budget, utilising the Widespread Innovation and Tailwinds scenarios as these are the highest and lowest demand scenarios for aviation fuel. The central scenario is estimated as the midpoint between these. To estimate SAF demand in England and Wales, the regional split from the Balanced Pathway annual SAF demand is applied. England and Wales are estimated to be responsible for 94% and 93% of UK demand respectively for the years 2030 and 2045.

International Maritime

The UK generally does not report on energy consumption in the international maritime sector; however, T&E have developed analysis that estimates over 7 million tonnes of fossil marine fuel oils are used in the total maritime sector [184]. For the purposes of this analysis this is assumed to be exactly 7 million tonnes. The energy content of this fuel is estimated using EU Commission assumption of 40.5 MJ/kg for Marine Gas Oil (MGO) [188]. It is assumed that international maritime makes up 80% of fuel consumption based on the emissions estimates produced by T&E. Major port freight activity is used to estimate the proportion that occurs in England and Wales, estimated to be 81% of the UK total [189]. The proportional change in total energy demand for shipping is assumed to be the same for England and Wales and the assumptions made for the EU as a whole.

Once estimates of fuel demand in 2030 and 2045 are estimated, the proportion of this that is met with hydrogen derivates is applied to estimate derivative demand in the two time periods. The analysis assumes that the UK achieves less in terms of e-fuel deployment than the EU by 2030 due to its less ambitious policy in the sector. However, the UK Government has recognised a requirement to have at least 1% low-carbon shipping fuels by 2030. The analysis assumes that this is entirely met by e-fuels for the high scenario, half met by e-fuels for the central scenario and entirely met by other options such as biofuels for the low scenario. Due to the low technology readiness of ammonia as a shipping fuel, it is assumed that the 2030 demand is met with e-methanol. This is also in line with DNV data on fuel choices for ships on order, where 8% are methanol powered on gross tonnage basis [190]. For 2045 the assumptions for England and Wales follow that of the rest of the EU reflecting the international nature of shipping refuelling requirements.

  1. Additional Tables and Graphs for Projected Demand

 

Figure 17: Mix of different sectors and derivatives in all three scenarios for the years 2030 and 2045

Note: Industrial demand figure is an aggregate of hydrogen, ammonia and methanol demand, with road transport figure showing 100% hydrogen demand. Heat notes domestic heating demand only.

Figure 18: Demand scenarios for the EU for all three scenarios

Figure 19: Hydrogen demand scenarios for 2030 for all the regions

Figure 20: Hydrogen demand scenarios for 2045 for all the regions

High Hydrogen Demand Scenario (TWh)

EU

Germany

Belgium

Netherlands

England and Wales

2030

2045

2030

2045

2030

2045

2030

2045

2030

2045

Industry: Hydrogen

153.6

525.4

37.2

132.2

5.5

18.9

7.5

28.0

14.1

50.6

Industry: e-Ammonia

48.9

116.4

9.1

21.7

4.2

10.1

6.7

15.8

3.0

7.2

Industry: e-Methanol

4.6

11.0

2.9

6.8

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.9

0.0

0.0

Power: Hydrogen

0.0

441.2

0.0

86.4

0.0

13.3

0.0

23.2

3.6

73.1

Road: Hydrogen

0.8

129.0

0.3

21.0

0.1

6.5

0.1

3.9

1.3

35.7

Aviation: e-fuels

4.4

73.4

0.6

10.4

0.1

1.9

0.2

3.3

0.7

6.8

Maritime: Ammonia

3.5

209.2

0.2

13.9

0.6

30.8

1.0

59.5

0.3

20.8

Maritime: Methanol

20.8

18.5

1.2

1.2

3.5

2.7

5.8

5.2

0.3

1.8

Heat: Hydrogen

0.0

327.9

0.0

67.0

0.0

9.8

0.0

13.3

0.5

70.5

Total

236.6

1851.9

51.6

360.7

14.0

93.9

21.5

153.1

23.8

266.5

           

Central Hydrogen Demand Scenario (TWh)

EU

Germany

Belgium

Netherlands

England and Wales

2030

2045

2030

2045

2030

2045

2030

2045

2030

2045

Industry: Hydrogen

129.0

484.6

32.2

122.9

5.1

18.0

7.0

26.0

10.0

31.7

Industry: Ammonia

40.3

96.0

7.5

17.9

3.5

8.3

5.5

13.1

2.5

5.9

Industry: Methanol

4.3

10.3

2.7

6.4

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.9

0.0

0.0

Power: Hydrogen

0.0

294.1

0.0

57.6

0.0

8.8

0.0

15.5

0.9

29.7

Road: Hydrogen

0.6

62.1

0.2

10.1

0.1

3.1

0.0

1.8

1.2

18.9

Aviation: e-fuels

3.8

59.3

0.5

8.4

0.1

1.6

0.2

2.6

0.6

5.4

Maritime: Ammonia

1.7

109.6

0.1

7.3

0.3

16.1

0.5

31.1

0.1

10.9

Maritime: Methanol

10.4

9.2

0.6

0.6

1.8

1.4

2.9

2.6

0.1

0.9

Heat: Hydrogen

0.0

163.9

0.0

33.5

0.0

4.9

0.0

6.6

0.5

13.1

Total

190.2

1289.2

43.9

264.6

10.8

62.2

16.4

100.3

15.9

116.6

           

Low Hydrogen Demand Scenario (TWh)

EU

Germany

Belgium

Netherlands

England and Wales

2030

2045

2030

2045

2030

2045

2030

2045

2030

2045

Industry: Hydrogen

68.8

436.8

19.0

106.8

3.3

16.6

4.5

26.1

1.6

7.5

Industry: Ammonia

31.8

75.7

5.9

14.1

2.8

6.6

4.3

10.3

2.0

4.7

Industry: Methanol

4.0

9.6

2.5

5.9

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.8

0.0

0.0

Power: Hydrogen

0.0

147.1

0.0

28.8

0.0

4.4

0.0

7.7

0.0

9.4

Road: Hydrogen

0.4

4.7

0.1

0.7

0.0

0.2

0.0

0.1

1.0

2.1

Aviation: e-fuels

3.5

49.6

0.5

7.0

0.1

1.3

0.2

2.2

0.6

4.1

Maritime: Ammonia

0.0

9.9

0.0

0.7

0.0

1.5

0.0

1.5

0.0

1.0

Maritime: Methanol

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Heat: Hydrogen

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Total

108.5

733.4

28.0

164.0

6.1

30.6

9.4

48.7

5.2

28.7

 

Summary: Hydrogen Delivery Method

 

H2 pipeline

Liquid H2

Ammonia

LOHC

Metal hydride

Method of usage

High volume gaseous hydrogen delivery.

High volume liquified hydrogen delivery, reconverted back to gaseous form upon delivery.

NH3 delivery, used directly (as a fuel; for chemicals production), or reconverted back to hydrogen.

Reconverted back to hydrogen upon delivery.

Reconverted back to hydrogen upon delivery.

Advantages

High efficiency.

Low cost over long duration

Continuous supply ability.

High volumetric energy density.

Increased efficiency compared to gaseous hydrogen transportation.

Flexibility in transport destination.

High volumetric energy density

Established market.

High efficiency over long distances.

Ambient conditions.

Heat recovery during hydrogenation reaction.

Ambient conditions.

Ambient conditions

No leakage.

Enhanced safety

Disadvantages

High investment cost.

Low flexibility.

Very low temperatures required, leading to high costs.

Reconversion to gaseous hydrogen is also energy intensive.

High boil-off rate reduces efficiency.

High energy requirement of conversion and reconversion.

Safety concerns around the handling of ammonia.

Purification and dehydrogenation are energy intensive.

The LOHC must be returned in a dehydrogenated state to be reused, adding to transportation costs.

High temperatures required for dehydrogenation.

Storage tanks are heavy due to a low mass-specific storage density.

Summary: Industrial Feedstock

 

Ammonia

Methanol

Refining

Green Steel

Method of usage

H2 required for NH3 production. End uses involve fertiliser, plastic or synthetic fibre production.

H2 required for synthetic and conventional methanol production. The methanol is then used within chemicals production for polymers and hydrocarbons.

H2 is needed for hydrocracking and hydrotreating within oil refining, both crucial steps within the refinery process. End uses include fossil fuels and biofuels.

Hydrogen can be used to produce steel, acting as a reducing agent for iron ore, via the hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (DRI) method. End uses include current uses for steel.

Advantages

Mature market.

Well-established technology.

Currently transported in large volumes.

Existing infrastructure available.

Increases efficiency when NH3 is used for chemicals production compared to reconversion back to hydrogen.

Mature market.

High demand for low-carbon methanol, and bio-methanol production alone will be unlikely to fulfil demand.

Large current market via fossil fuel production.

Growing market of biofuels will require hydrogen for refining.

Existing infrastructure available.

A method of reducing emission from the carbon-intensive steel industry.

Mature market with high demand.

Disadvantages

No current ammonia production facilities in Scotland.

The use of low-carbon hydrogen can increase costs.

Infrastructure development required.

The use of low-carbon hydrogen can increase costs. Bio-based methanol likely to be more cost competitive than synthetic methanol.

Scottish methanol production capabilities currently are lacking, although there are plans for a renewable methanol plant underway.

Fossil fuel refining demand expected to decline.

The use of low-carbon hydrogen can increase costs.

New infrastructure required.

Production route is higher cost than current steel production.

No current steel production facilities in Scotland.

Summary: High-Temperature Heat

 

Hydrogen

CCUS-enabled Gas

Bio-based Products

Method of usage

Existing heat equipment can be retrofit to use hydrogen, supplying direct and indirect heat up to 1000°C.

Current industrial heat equipment is fitted with carbon capture technology, and the carbon is stored to reduce emitted emissions.

Biofuels such as biomass or biomethane can be used for high temperature heat, usually up to temperatures of 200°C although higher temperatures could be used, depending on the biomass form.

Advantages

Current gas systems can be retrofit for hydrogen use.

High energy density of hydrogen.

Very high temperatures reached.

Can be low or zero carbon depending on the hydrogen production route.

Current gas systems and feedstocks can be used.

Scotland is geographically favoured for CCUS storage facilities.

Widely available, scalable and can be cost-competitive.

Can be stored under ambient conditions.

Scottish production abilities are promising.

Disadvantages

Retrofitting can be complicated due to the difference in combustion properties between H2 and natural gas.

The cost of low-carbon hydrogen is much larger than current sources of high temperature heat fuels.

Storage requirements of high pressures or low temperatures due to low volumetric density.

Technology not fully mature.

Cost of CCUS integration can be high due to high investment costs.

Cannot capture 100% of carbon emissions.

Feedstocks are limited, slowing further adoption.

Summary: Transport

 

Hydrogen (fuel cell)

SAF

Methanol (maritime)

Ammonia (maritime)

Method of usage

Hydrogen can be used in a fuel cell vehicle, for example in road and rail transport. Heavy good vehicles have been shown to suit fuel cells economically, but lighter vehicles show some uncertainty.

SAFs are a type of liquid biofuel for aviation, produced via feedstocks of synthetically via a process that captures carbon from the air. They are equivalent to Jet A1 aviation fuel and are compatible with modern aircraft.

H2 required for synthetic and conventional methanol production. This methanol can then be used directly as a fuel for maritime application.

H2 required for NH3 production. This ammonia can then be used directly as a fuel for maritime application.

Advantages

Zero emissions

Hydrogen refuelling is similar to current petrol refuelling.

Faster refuelling times and longer ranges than battery counterparts.

Fuel cell buses have been used in Scotland since 2015.

Easily integrated into current operations.

Little alternatives for aviation decarbonisation currently, leading to growing market.

Can reduce carbon emissions by over 80% compared to jet fuel.

Not many alternatives other than ammonia for longer distance maritime travel, leading to a growing market.

Existing infrastructure can be retrofit to run on methanol.

Not many alternatives other than methanol for longer distance maritime travel, leading to a growing market.

Lower cost of ammonia production, compared to synthetic methanol.

Existing infrastructure can be retrofit to run on ammonia.

Disadvantages

High costs of operation due to the high cost of low-carbon hydrogen and expensive equipment required.

When produced from feedstock, can compete with other uses of the feedstock e.g. crops and water supplies.

Not fully mature market.

Higher cost than conventional jet fuels.

Release carbon when burned.

High cost of synthetic methanol.

Relatively high transport and storage cost, due to cooling and compliance.

Efficiency losses due to extensive energy transfer chain.

Summary: Power Generation

 

Hydrogen

CCUS-enabled Gas

Biomass

Ammonia

Method of usage

Hydrogen can be used in turbines to meet electricity demand when electricity generation via renewable is not sufficient.

Natural gas turbines, coupled with CCUS, is a method of providing energy using existing infrastructure and fuel feedstock, while reducing carbon emissions.

Biomass can be used in turbines to meet electricity demand when electricity generation via renewable is not sufficient.

Ammonia can be used in turbines to meet electricity demand when electricity generation via renewable is not sufficient.

Advantages

Suitable for low-load factors.

Hydrogen/gas blends possible.

Retrofit of gas infrastructure available.

Retrofitting extends the life of the power plant, reducing capital costs.

Suitable for high-load factors.

Plans for a CCUS-coupled power plant in Scotland.

Widely supplied and highly mature technology.

Suitable for high-load factors.

Ammonia production is a mature technology.

Disadvantages

High operating costs.

Retrofit to 100% hydrogen requires more significant modifications due to differences in volumetric density.

Limited experience with hydrogen power generation in Scotland.

CO2 leakage from underground storage is a concern.

Can depend on feedstocks which could be required for other purposes, e.g. food and water.

Relatively high cost of power generation.

Least mature power generation technology.

Low efficiency and incompatibility with larger gas-turbines.

High toxicity.

  1. Stakeholder Engagement Approach

 

We interviewed stakeholders for one hour, following a semi-structured format. Interviews began by presenting the scope of the project and gathering high level thoughts on the storage technologies considered as well as identifying any potential gaps in scope. Questions were structured around the seven evaluation criteria in the scope of the project. The topics focused on in interviews are shown with the list of stakeholders below.

List of stakeholders

  • Enquest
  • Net Zero Technology Centre
  • Centrica
  • Hydrogen Europe
  • Air Products
  • DNV
  • Johnson Matthey
  • INEOS
  • Scottish Futures Trust

Broad topics

  • Which hydrogen derivates are likely to dominate the market?
  • Which industries/ sectors are likely to be the main offtakers for HDPs?
  • Which countries or regions would you consider main import/ demand hubs?
  • What are some of the policy gaps and bottlenecks for hydrogen projects?
  • What are the most likely end users for hydrogen products?

Key findings

  • Most stakeholders suggest ammonia to dominate the European market. Some stakeholders also mentioned SAF (in addition to ammonia), green methanol and green diesels.
  • There are several concerns about policy gaps and bottleneck too. Concerns include but are not limited to: concerns about subsidising export, absence of trade policies with other EU nations, lack of uniform approach to global carbon pricing, planning and permitting issues causing complexity.
  • Stakeholders also mentioned some security concerns associated with ammonia like toxicity and difficulty in detecting leaks.
  • Stakeholders expect Southern and Northern Europe to be the new major hubs for hydrogen demand.
  • The most likely end-use sectors for hydrogen are fertilisers, shipping and aviation.
  • Finally, the stakeholders also identified some Scotland specific challenges. Scotland will have to compete with both nearby regions like the EU and faraway regions like the middle east, north America and even Australia.
  1. Table of units

 

Abbreviation

Unit

Quantity

MJ/kg

Megajoules per kilogram

Energy content per unit of mass

MJ/m3

Megajoules per cubic meter

Energy content per unit volume

MW

Megawatt

Power output

GW

Gigawatt

Power output

MWh

Megawatt hour

Energy

TWh

Terawatt hour

Energy

Wh/kg

Watt-hours per kg

Energy stored in one kg

Wh/l

Watt-hour per litre

Energy stored in one litre

gCO2e

Grams of carbon dioxide equivalent

Amount of GHG equivalent to CO2 emitted (in grams)

kgCO2e

Kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent

Amount of GHG equivalent to CO2 emitted (in kilograms)

gCO2e/MJ

Grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per megajoule

Carbon intensity

 

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Acknowledgements

The delivery team extends thanks to Dr Jamie Speirs, Reader and Deputy Director in the Centre for Energy Policy at Strathclyde University, and Dr Edward Brightman, Lecturer at the University of Strathclyde, for their thorough review and helpful and constructive comments throughout the project. Special thanks go to Dr Nicola Dunn, Project Manager at ClimateXChange, for her continuous support and valuable guidance. We also express our appreciation to the Steering Group for their insightful input and feedback and to the industry stakeholders who contributed to our research, providing essential perspectives.

We would also like to recognise the dedication and hard work of the Gemserv team, including analysts and graphic designers Rachael Quintin-Baxendale, Sandile Mtetwa, Dhairya Nagpal, Isaac Guy, and Thomas Gayton, whose efforts were key in bringing this report to its final form.

How to cite this publication:

Csernik-Tihn, S., Mitchell, J., Wilson, J., Morton, H. (2025) Review of demand for hydrogen derivatives and products’, ClimateXChange. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5798

© The University of Edinburgh, 2025
Prepared by Gemserv on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate as at the date of research completion, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

This work was supported by the Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division of the Scottish Government (CoE – CXC).

ClimateXChange

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If you require the report in an alternative format such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.


  1. Distance of less than 2,000 kilometres.



  2. Distance of more than 2,000 kilometres.



  3. Industry includes chemicals and petrochemicals, construction, food, beverages and tobacco, iron and steel, machinery, textile and leather, non-metallic minerals, non-ferrous metals, oil and natural gas extraction, paper, pulp and printing, refineries, and transport equipment.



  4. These demand projections have been revised down to account for the closure of the Grangemouth refinery, announced in September 2024. The demand for the refinery as per NESO’s FES scenarios [194] was reversed, with assumptions according to data availability. The exact methodology used is discussed in Appendix E.


Research completed September 2024

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/6005

Executive summary

Aims

This evidence review addresses: (1) the climate change risks to mental health and wellbeing internationally and in Scotland, (2) the nature and prevalence of eco-distress in Scotland, (3) interventions for mental health and wellbeing in a climate change context from international literature, and (4) the evidence of co-benefits for mental health and wellbeing from climate action.

We undertook the review between February and July 2024 largely drawing on peer-reviewed studies and, where relevant, government strategy documents, risk assessments and evaluations of interventions.

The Scottish National Adaptation Plan (2024-2029) sets out actions to build Scotland’s resilience to climate change, it notes that: ‘Climate change means that Scotland will be wetter in winters, drier in summers, sea level rise will continue, and our weather will become more variable and unpredictable. Extremes will be more common.’ This review explores the possible effects of these changes on mental health and wellbeing in Scotland.

Findings

Climate-related risks and impacts to mental health

We found an increasing quantity of evidence that climate change can have substantial effects on mental health and wellbeing. The review found limited primary evidence of the impact of climate change on mental health and wellbeing for Scotland specifically, so these findings reflect the international evidence relevant to a Scottish context.

  • These effects are the result of key climate change-related hazards: acute weather events such as floods; sub-acute weather events such as longer periods of high temperature; or chronic climate changes, such as sea-level rise.
  • Each hazard can lead to negative mental health outcomes through direct pathways (injury, traumatisation, property loss) and indirect pathways (on livelihoods and social networks). There is also increasing evidence that awareness of climate change can affect mental health and wellbeing.
  • Internationally, the reported mental health and wellbeing effects of climate change can include heightened risk of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), suicide, depression, anxiety and overall poorer mental wellbeing. This varies in type and severity depending on the nature of the hazards.
  • Climate change amplifies existing mental health risks, affecting already vulnerable groups more. It presents particular challenges for coastal and island communities, and workers in agriculture and fisheries.

Definition and prevalence of ‘eco-distress’

Eco-distress (including eco-anxiety) is a psychosocial response to the awareness of climate change. While eco-distress currently lacks a consistent definition in published literature, common themes are (a) its future-oriented nature, (b) association with feelings of uncertainty and being overwhelmed, and (c) its rationality as a response to an existential threat.

  • Early evidence indicates that distress about climate change is widespread. As many as 70 percent of people in Scotland worry about climate change, with 25 percent reporting it affects their mental wellbeing.
  • Eco-distress appears to be more prevalent among young people, those with pre-existing mental health conditions and members of marginalised groups.

Evidence on effective intervention on mental health and wellbeing risks of climate change

The current evidence base for interventions in this field is limited, with few evaluated studies conducted in Scotland. The evidence reviewed in this study comes from a range of international studies and data sources.

Evaluated interventions predominantly focused on building psychological resilience, social connections, nature connection, building capacity of communities and encouraging climate action.

Evaluated interventions measured a wide range of outcomes including improved wellbeing, improved ability to cope and relief from psychological disorders.

Evidence of co-benefits and risks for mental health and wellbeing from climate action

Climate action can lead to improved mental health and wellbeing through addressing some of the social determinants of mental health such as financial security and quality housing. Key areas for action include energy efficiency measures, which can improve financial security and general physical health, active transport measures, which can improve mental health through increased physical activity and greater social participation, and nature-based climate solutions, which can improve mental health and wellbeing through increased physical activity, nature connection and a greater sense of community.

Lessons for policy in Scotland

Our review suggests that action to address the mental health and wellbeing impacts of climate change should focus on lessening the frequency and severity of hazards and managing the severity of their impacts. In general, responses should consider reducing exposure and vulnerability to hazards through adaptation and mitigation, increasing access to resources and support to recover from climate related hazards, and targeting support at the most vulnerable groups.

To reduce eco-distress, the findings support government taking visible action in relation to adaptation and mitigation that is clearly communicated to the public and that seeks to harness public concern about climate change to support climate action.

Finally, monitoring the prevalence and distribution of climate-related mental health and wellbeing effects and evaluating interventions and adaptations to address these, could help better understand the level of need and what best can be done to address this.

Glossary

Biodiversity 

The variety of plant and animal life in a particular habitat. A high level of biodiversity means that there is a wide variety of plant and animal life. 

Causal pathway 

A sequence of events or processes through which an initial cause leads to a given outcome.

Causal relationship 

A connection between two factors or events, where one leads to the occurrence or change of another. 

Climate change related hazard 

Climate-related physical event or trend that is more likely or severe due to the changing climate and may cause damage and loss. These include acute weather events, sub-acute weather events and chronic climate changes. 

Climate Change 

Long-term shifts in temperature, precipitation patterns, and other aspects of Earth’s climate, largely driven by human activities such as burning fossil fuels, deforestation, and industrial processes. 

Climate Crisis 

The urgent threats posed by the irreversible consequences of climate change, whether environmental, social, political, cultural, or environmental in nature. 

Ecological Crisis 

The destabilisation of a species or population owing to changes to the environment in which it lives, which threatens its survival. 

Ecosystem 

A community of living organisms, interacting with one another and their environment to function as an interconnected system. 

Eco-distress

The wide range of emotions and thoughts people may experience when they hear bad news about our planet and the environment (Please see section 4.5.1 for review findings about the definition of eco-distress).

Emotional/Psychological distress 

The unpleasant and difficult emotions or feelings a person experiences when they are overwhelmed.

Evaluation 

A systematic process to judge the merit, worth or significance of an intervention by combining evidence and judgement. 

Evidence/literature review 

A comprehensive and methodical summary of existing research and publications on a specific topic. In most cases it is analytical, and is used to identify trends, gaps, and key findings.

Mental Health 

A part of our overall health, alongside physical health, experienced daily; good mental health means realizing our full potential, feeling safe, secure, and thriving in everyday life. 

Mental illness 

A health condition that affects emotions, thinking, and behaviour, substantially interfering with or limiting life, and if untreated, impacting daily living, work, and relationships (WHO, 2022a). May be referred to the now outdated term, mental ‘disorder’. 

Mental wellbeing 

Our internal positive view that we are coping well psychologically with the everyday stresses of life, working productively, feeling happy, and living our lives as we choose. 

Meta-analysis 

A type of evidence review that carries out statistical analysis about the body of evidence on a given topic, comparing different studies to identify inconsistencies and discrepancies. 

Narrative Review 

A type of evidence review that summarises different primary studies from which conclusions may be drawn in a systematic way and from a holistic point of view. 

Physiological 

Concerning the way in which a living organism or bodily part functions when it is healthy. 

Qualitative 

Research or analysis that focusses on understanding the subjective characteristics, meanings, and experiences of a given subject.

Quantitative 

Research or analysis that focusses on measuring numerical data to identify patterns, relationships, or trends in a subject.

Systematic review 

A type of evidence or literature review using a highly structured methodology, which looks to answer a specific research question, offering an analysis of the existing research and publications. 

Trauma 

A deeply distressing or disturbing experience that overwhelms an individual’s ability to cope, often having lasting emotional, psychological, or physical effects. 

Unvalidated measures/ scales 

Questionnaires that measure specific attitudes, behaviours, or psychological attributes that have not been through the process of validation 

Validated measures/ scales 

Questionnaires that measure specific attitudes, behaviours, or psychological attributes that have been rigorously tested using both qualitative and quantitative methods to demonstrate that they reliably measure the construct they intend to.

Vulnerability

The characteristics of individuals and groups that influence their potential to experience poorer mental health and wellbeing from exposure to a climate change related hazard.

Weather event 

A natural phenomenon that occurs in the Earth’s atmosphere that has significant impacts on the environment and human activities. This can include storms, hurricanes, tornadoes, heatwaves, and droughts. 

Introduction

Context for the study 

Scotland’s climate is already changing. It has become warmer and wetter over the last two decades with changes projected to intensify in the coming years (UK Climate Risk, 2021). As the Scottish National Adaptation Plan 2024-2029 states (Scottish Government, 2004): “Climate change means that Scotland will be wetter in winters, drier in summers, sea level rise will continue, and our weather will become more variable and unpredictable. Extremes will be more common”.

While there is a substantial body of scientific literature on the damaging effects of climate change on physical health (e.g., Costello et al. 2009; Rocque et al. 2021), the mental health and wellbeing effects of climate change remain comparatively under-explored. This is despite the growing recognition that climate change can have a significant impact on mental health and wellbeing (Vigo et al, 2016). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) have both highlighted the risks climate change presents for mental health and wellbeing and have called for greater understanding of these issues and the evidence around the impact of mitigation and adaptation strategies on mental health and wellbeing (Vigo et al, 2016).

Scotland continues to develop a range of responses to the impacts of climate change, built around their national adaptation plan, Climate Ready Scotland 2019-2024, and its successor. This plan already acknowledges the mental health and wellbeing impacts of a changing climate in terms of the risks to the general population and how to support vulnerable groups, as well as the readiness of services to meet the emerging needs. Scotland’s Climate Change Plan 2018 – 2032, which sets out Scotland’s approach to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions and achieving its Net Zero goal, also emphasises the importance of supporting population wellbeing and health throughout the necessary transformations. These strategies are supported by Scotland’s Just Transition plan, which sets out a vision of how the transition to net zero and climate resilience can be done in a fair way that reduces existing health inequalities.

Research aims

Our research has been conducted to support the Scottish Government in developing its adaptation and mitigation plan for climate change. We have done this by reviewing the latest available evidence on how climate change affects mental health and wellbeing, which groups are particularly vulnerable to these effects, and what steps can be taken to mitigate and protect against the worst impacts. Specifically, we answer four research questions:

  1. What is the evidence of climate related risks and impacts to mental health and wellbeing in Scotland, and how these might differentially affect population groups?
  2. How is ‘eco-distress’ (including ‘eco-anxiety’) currently defined, what is the current/potential prevalence in Scotland and how might this differentially affect population groups?
  3. What is the evidence on effective prevention and early intervention, and on responding to mental health and wellbeing risks and impacts in a climate change context in Scotland?
  4. What is the evidence of co-benefits and risks, or unintended consequences, for mental health and wellbeing from climate action (both mitigation and adaptation) relevant in a Scottish context?

Methodology

This rapid evidence review (RER) was conducted between February and July 2024. A rapid evidence review is a type of systematic review which takes place over a relatively short period of time. Rapid reviews are accelerated by focused research questions, scope restrictions, and a narrower search strategy (Smela, 2023; Klerings et al., 2023). Given the research had four broad research questions and a limited time frame, our rapid review systematically focused on the most relevant literature with a narrow focus; for instance, secondary effects of climate change, such as climate migration, were not considered as within scope for this review. This allowed us to explore the research questions in depth, though with the limitation that some possible secondary or tertiary effects of climate change on mental health were not within scope.

This review was conducted in five stages: (1) key informant interviews; (2) refinement and agreement of research design; (3) scoping, collating, and assessment of a longlist of relevant literature as per the research questions in Appendix A; (4) collating and assessing our shortlist; and (5) synthesising the results and reporting on them. Appendix A gives a full overview of the methodology which is represented in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 Process of the Rapid Evidence Review

A close-up of a web page

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Research design

We began the review with a scoping stage which had two objectives: to agree the review procedures and to understand the scope of the research through key informant interviews. In total we undertook four interviews, with two policy staff and two academics. The purpose of these interviews was to understand the scope of literature, relevant national policies, contextual factors, and adaptation/mitigation interventions which were less likely to be identified in databases.

The review procedures were agreed during the scoping phase. These set out the longlisting, shortlisting and analysis processes for the study. For longlisting, this included data sources, search terms, procedures for entering items in extraction spreadsheet, inclusion/exclusion criteria and scoring of items added to the longlist. Whilst the methodology is presented in full in Appendix A, it is worth providing and overview of the principles of the review here to guide the reader. Our team of four researchers were assigned to a research question each. The researchers undertook their reviews in parallel with frequent team meetings. Each researcher used search terms which differed according to the research question. We used four different sources for the search terms: academic search engines, generic search engines for grey literature, Scottish and other government websites, and references of relevant documents including documents referred to by experts. Each relevant item found was input to a shared database, and each item was checked for quality assurance purposes by at least one other researcher. Reviewers also noted which research questions the item was relevant to, since many covered multiple questions.

In terms of the criteria for inclusion, as a Rapid Evidence Review, items were only included if they directly addressed both climate change and mental health/wellbeing. Items were excluded from the long list if they did not fulfil this criterion. Items were scored out of ten on the criteria shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1 Scoring criteria for the evidence review

Criteria

Scoring

Domain relevance

Score 1 if directly addresses both climate change and mental health/wellbeing. Exclude if criterion is not fulfilled

Recency

Score 1 if from 2015 or later

Geographical relevance

Score 2 if study in Scotland, score 1 if in the rest of the UK

Addresses target group

Score 1 if addresses vulnerable groups

Primary evidence

Score 1 if the item included high quality primary evidence

Scoping review

Score 2 if the item was a scoping review, literature review, or systematic review

Research gap

Score 1 if this item addresses emerging research gap

Direct relevance

Score 1 if directly addresses a research question

The longlisting process resulted in 267 items being scored and considered for further analysis. Most items were recent, with 87 percent of items written since 2015. 45 percent of the items were either a systematic or a scoping review. The majority of studies were not Scotland specific, with only 34 items (13 percent) concerning Scotland directly. Items were scored 0-10 according to these criteria and, in total, 55 items scored 7 or above.

Following the scoring process, each researcher filtered the longlist for studies that related to their specific research question and then selected the most relevant items for their purposes. This process led to a total shortlist of 72 items for Research Questions for 1,2 and 4, which can be seen in Appendix C. The unit of analysis for Research Question 3 differed from the rest of the study, being concerned with interventions (programmes, policies, and practices) that have been delivered to support mental health/wellbeing in the context of climate change. Literature from the longlist was extracted to identify relevant interventions, resulting in a list of 60 interventions relevant to Research Question 3, which can be viewed in Appendix D.

In the analysis phase, we conducted a shortlist analysis for each research question. We scanned each item in the shortlist manually, and iteratively developed a classification framework and coding constructs to ensure that each finding was directly derived from the literature and traceable. This helped us to develop themes for each domain to understanding relationship between themes for each research question. Our classification frame and set of constructs were added to and modified as new material came to light. Following synthesis and reporting, the report underwent a series of feedback and revision cycles, to address concerns from multiple stakeholder groups.

Describing the field 

Defining mental health and wellbeing 

In answering the research questions, we have adopted a broad definition of mental health and wellbeing, encompassing a range of concepts, including ‘mental health’, ‘mental wellbeing’, ‘mental disorder,’ and ‘mental illness.’

In its broadest sense, mental health refers to an aspect of overall health that includes our emotional, psychological, and social wellbeing. It describes how we think, feel, and act, how we cope with challenging situations, how we relate to others, and how we generally function in our lives. Good mental health and wellbeing is understood to be more than simply the absence of mental illness. Good mental health is a positive psychological state of functioning well in the world (WHO, 2022b).

We drew on the current Scottish Government definitions as set out in the 2023 Mental Health and Wellbeing Strategy (Scottish Government, 2023). These suggest: 

  • Mental health is a part of our overall health, alongside our physical health. It is what we experience every day, and like physical health, it ebbs and flows daily. Good mental health means we can realise our full potential and feel safe and secure. It also means we thrive in everyday life. 
  • Mental wellbeing is our internal positive view that we are coping well psychologically with the everyday stresses of life and can work productively and fruitfully. We feel happy and live our lives the way we choose. 
  • Mental illness is a health condition that affects emotions, thinking and behaviour. Mental illness substantially interferes with or limits our life. If left untreated, mental illnesses can impact daily living, including our ability to work, care for family, and relate and interact with others (WHO, 2022a).[1]

The impact of climate change on mental health and wellbeing can be seen in several ways: the overall population may have poorer mental health and wellbeing, those with existing mental health conditions may deteriorate, or more people may develop mental illnesses. We have found variation in the literature we reviewed, both in terms of the focus of different studies and the terminology they used to describe mental health. Some studies focused on the impact of climate change on clinical diagnosis such as Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) or PTSD. Others described effects on this wider conception of mental health and wellbeing that encompasses general life satisfaction, and social and emotional functioning. Where we draw on evidence from studies focused on a specific or narrow aspect of mental health, we state this in the text.

Wider determinants of mental health 

An individual’s mental health is shaped by a wide variety of contextual factors. These are often referred to as the ‘social’ or ‘wider determinants’ of mental health (Allen et al, 2014). These are defined as:

“…the set of structural conditions to which people are exposed across the life course, from conception to death, which affect individual mental health outcomes, and contribute to mental health disparities within and between populations.” (Kirkbride at al., 2024)

These determinants operate at individual, social, and societal levels. This includes an individual’s social relationships and networks, their living conditions, income, education, employment status, as well as wider factors such their exposure to inequality or discrimination. These wider determinants can act as risks or protective factors in relation to mental health. For example, mental health is protected by secure housing, stable employment, and supportive social networks. Mental health is put at risk by poverty, unemployment, social isolation, and exposure to trauma. We acknowledge the wider determinants of mental health to help explain why some groups within society are at greater risk of poor mental health than others (WHO and Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 2014.). This report explores these determinants in the context of climate change. 

Climate change related hazards 

When describing the mental health impacts of climate change, the scientific literature tends to distinguish between different types of climate change related hazards. These are the impacts of climate change that people are most likely to encounter and therefore are most likely to have an impact on their mental health. Major reviews in this field (Charlson et al, 2021; Hayes et al. 2018; Manning and Clayton, 2018; Cianconi et al, 2020) demonstrate a high level of consensus on the classification of these phenomena, dividing them into three categories based on their duration in time:

  1. ‘Acute’ (or ‘extreme’) weather events such as floods, wildfires, storms, and hurricanes (lasting days or weeks)
  2. Sub-acute weather events, including droughts and long-periods of high temperatures (lasting months or years)
  3. ‘Chronic’ climate changes such as loss of habitat and biodiversity, sea-level rises, coastal erosion, and permanently higher temperatures (lasting centuries)

Major climate related hazards in Scotland

Of these hazards, the third UK Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA3) highlights flooding, overheating, and coastal change as the most severe climate risks for Scotland. Increased winter rainfall and heavy rainfall events make flooding a major threat, impacting communities and infrastructure, with vulnerable populations at greater risk (UK Climate Risk, 2021). High temperatures pose risks to health and wellbeing due to overheating which are known to disproportionately affect vulnerable groups such as care home residents (UK Climate Risk, 2021). Loss of and change to coastal areas due to rising sea levels threatens 19 percent of Scotland’s coastline within 30 years, posing significant risk to coastal communities and essential infrastructure.

Defining causal pathways between climate change on mental health and wellbeing 

Several evidence reviews in this field highlight that the relationship between climate hazards and mental health and wellbeing outcomes is complex and multi-faceted. These reviews found many pathways through which each hazard disrupts the conditions that support good mental health and wellbeing (Lawrance et al, 2020). These effects occur by disrupting the conditions for positive physical health, for positive social relationships, and for economic and political security.

Most major reviews adopt and build on the conceptual framework for these pathways. This framework, first proposed by Berry, Bowen, and Kjellstrom (2008) and Fritze et al. (2008) aimed to differentiate the causal relationships into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects of climate events through disruption to the determinants of mental health. Subsequent reviews argue for the inclusion of a third pathway that is understood to result from psycho-social and emotional response to climate change awareness rather than experience of events. This third pathway has latterly been described as ‘overarching’ (Hayes et al. 2018) and is commonly described as ‘climate’ or ‘eco-distress’.

More recently, some authors have also argued for the direct/indirect frame to be understood as a continuum, ranging from more direct to more indirect (Lawrance et al. 2022). An explanatory figure for the direct-indirect continuum is provided in Appendix B. For this report, the causal relationship between climate change and mental health includes:

  1. Direct causal pathways:
  • via traumatic events (such as risk to life, injury, or witnessing injury)
  • loss of or damage to property
  • via physical health such as the effects of high temperature
  1. Indirect causal pathways:
  • via effects on food supply and diet, increased risk or spread of infectious diseases
  • via community wellbeing (such as effects on livelihoods, economic and social functioning, service disruption, poverty, isolation, bereavement, and displacement)
  1. Overarching psycho-social response to climate change awareness (climate or eco- distress):
  • A type of indirect pathway related to how people respond psychologically and emotionally to the fact of climate change and news/information about its effects

While conceptualising causal pathways in this way is helpful to demonstrate the full range of possible mental health effects of climate change. In real world scenarios, single events may have both direct and indirect effects on mental health as well as increased eco-distress over time. For example, a flood can cause injury and trauma immediately and lead to longer term economic disruption to local businesses, and increased anxiety about climate change more generally for those caught up in the events.

Given the wide range of factors that influence mental health, and the range of pathways through which climate change interacts with these, many authors stress that the effects of climate change are not distributed equally across populations. Certain groups are especially vulnerable to its mental health impacts. They describe climate change variously as an ‘exacerbator’ (Berry et al, 2010) ‘amplifier’, or ‘multiplier’ (Lawrance et al. 2022) of risk. This means that climate change related hazards interact with existing vulnerabilities to poor mental health such as deprivation, marginalisation, poor health, or existing mental health problems to create greater negative effects for some groups.

Report structure

The report is structured in line with the research questions. Chapter 4 addresses both Research Questions 1 and 2 as these both focus on the impact on climate change on mental health, its prevalence in Scotland, and an analysis of vulnerable populations. Chapter 5 addresses Research Question 3 with an analysis of available evidence on effective measures to mitigate negative mental health outcomes. Chapter 6 addresses Research Question 4 about the co-benefits and unintended mental health effects of climate action more generally. Chapter 7 contains the conclusion of our review including a section on policy implications.

Limitations of the study

We drew on aspects of systematic review methodology in the identification and appraisal of relevant evidence. However, given the breadth of the research questions, the quantity of potentially relevant evidence, and the time available to conduct the review, this paper is not a systematic review. We therefore acknowledge the risk that some key evidence on these topics may have been missed by our search and appraisal procedures.

This report is based predominantly on UK and international literature (rather than being specific to Scotland) that draws its findings from the study of climate change and mental health in different countries and geographies around the world. Inevitably, some of these studies are more relevant than others to a Scottish context. Through our appraisal process we have sought to identify evidence from settings that share similar features to Scotland, in terms of climate, populations demographics, and social and political context, for example particularly drawing on studies based in the UK and Northern Europe. However, it remains a possibility that research evidence quoted in the report from other regions is not fully applicable to Scotland. The literature reviewed is provided in Chapter 12: References.

The researchers note that in the international literature reviewed, the terms such as mental health, mental illness, wellbeing are defined in different ways, with occasional conflation of clinical mental illness and negative impacts on wellbeing. Where possible we refer to the definitions set out in the Scottish Government Mental Health Wellbeing strategy but urge the reader to proceed on the basis of a broader understanding of the range of concepts as set out in 3.4.1.

Climate related risks and impacts to mental health and wellbeing

Summary of findings from Chapter 4

This chapter addresses two research questions:

  1. What is the evidence of climate related risks and impacts to mental health and wellbeing in Scotland, and how these might differentially affect population groups?
  2. How is ‘eco-distress’ (including ‘eco-anxiety’) currently defined, what is the current/potential prevalence in Scotland and how might this differentially affect population groups? 

Evidence of climate-related risks and impacts to mental health:

We found strong evidence that links climate change to increased mental health risks. Scotland specific studies focus on the impacts of flooding.

  • Scotland’s main climate change-related hazards are flooding, higher temperatures, and coastal changes due to sea-level rises.
  • Each of these hazards can lead to various negative mental health outcomes. These can happen through direct pathways (injury, traumatisation, property loss) and indirect pathways (impacts diet, livelihoods, social networks, or displacement).
  • The negative effects on mental health have a wide range in their severity depending on the nature of the hazard and the degree of disruption caused.
  • Vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected by these effects. These include older people, children, women, ethnic minorities, individuals with low-income, those with pre-existing conditions, coastal and island communities, and workers in agriculture and fisheries.

Definition and prevalence of ‘eco-distress’:

Eco-distress (including eco-anxiety) is a psychosocial response to the awareness of climate change.

  • There is currently no consistent definition for eco-distress in published literature. We found definitions ranged from any distressing psychological response to climate change, to a narrow focus on specific severe responses.
  • Common themes in eco-distress are (a) its future-oriented nature, (b) association with feelings of uncertainty and being overwhelmed, and (c) its rationality as a response to an existential threat. Eco-distress can lead to positive, pro-environmental behaviours.
  • Early evidence indicates that distress about climate change is widespread. As many as 70 percent of Scottish people worry about climate change, with 25 percent reporting it affects their mental wellbeing.
  • Eco-distress is associated with certain sub-groups, including youth, people with pre-existing mental health conditions, and being a member of a marginalised group.

Introduction

In this chapter we present the available evidence on links between climate change and mental health. We divide this into two parts: Section 4.2 and 4.3 address Research Question 1 and describe the current evidence about ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ impacts of climate change related hazards on mental health. Section 4.5 addresses Research Question 2 and focuses on the nature of psycho-social responses to an awareness of climate change, what is often described as ‘climate anxiety, ‘climate distress’, or ‘eco-emotions.’ Here we outline the current state of research in relation to these emerging concepts, their definitions, their measurement, and research gaps.

Methodology

We undertook content analysis of the material related to Research Questions 1 and 2 through the ‘inspection’ method. We read the material manually to create a classification framework that logged each item by name, source, and summary of the content. Each item was then analysed across three dimensions: themes, constructs, and codes. We highlighted evidence particularly relevant to Scotland, research examining Scottish or UK populations; relating to common climate change hazards in Scotland (e.g., flooding); or from similar climatic, geographical, or social/governmental contexts.

Our searches in relation to Research Questions 1 and 2 revealed a high number of primary research outputs accompanied by a growing amount of literature and evidence reviews that summarise the overall state of the field. We focused our analysis on the most recent and most highly cited literature and evidence reviews, supplementing review findings with reference to original studies or additional evidence where useful.

The reader should note that the evidence identified for this section is drawn from international and UK literature and therefore caution should be taken in applying directly the lessons from other geographies to a Scottish context. To aid with this we have marked throughout the section where evidence in international or Scottish/ UK based.

Direct effects of climate change on mental health

We found strong evidence[2] of the direct effects of climate change impacts on mental health outcomes drawn from research conducted around the world. These occurred through the increased likelihood of experiencing traumatic events as the result of extreme weather events, or through the direct physiological effects of increased higher temperatures.

As we described in Section 3.4.5, some climate events, including flooding, have both direct and indirect mental health effects (i.e., can cause both injury and loss of property in the short run and impact livelihoods or social networks in the longer-term). The types of events examined in this section are those identified in the literature as causing, as a first step, direct mental health impacts, though in most cases they will have both direct and indirect effects.

Flooding

Flooding is the most common extreme weather event globally, accounting for 47 percent of all weather-related disasters (CRED, 2015; CRED, 2019).

Scottish context

A recent comprehensive review of climate risks in Scotland states that flooding is among the most severe risks (UK Climate Risk, 2021). Winters have been 19 percent wetter in the last decade (2010-2019) compared to 1961-1990 with a rising proportion of rainfall coming from heavy rainfall events (UK Climate Risk, 2021). Flooding poses a risk to people, communities, buildings, infrastructure, and businesses. In the coming decades, flooding in Scotland is likely to be more frequent and more severe (UK Climate Risk, 2021). It is also likely to affect food availability, affect agriculture and food production, cause damage to cultural heritage assets, and impact ecosystems. A study on the public awareness of climate risks in Scotland showed that flooding was also seen as one of the most urgent weather-related problems. In a nationally representative survey of the Scottish public, 51 percent of respondents indicated that flooding is already a serious problem (Millar et al, 2022). We know from the CCRA3 (UK Climate Risk, 2021) that those living in the Glasgow City Region, coastal areas, and rural communities are most likely to be at flood disadvantage. This is the result of a combination of flood risk due to where people live and wider social vulnerabilities.

We found that flooding in the UK has been extensively studied over the last 10 years providing high quality, relevant evidence for a Scottish context. A narrative review and meta-analysis of the effects of flooding in the UK found that flood victims show higher levels of common mental health problems compared with the wider public, displaying higher rates of PTSD and anxiety disorders (Cruz et al, 2020). The meta-analysis found flood victims were up to four times as likely to report long-term mental health problems, including PTSD, and anxiety, compared to the general population. We do not know what the mental health status of individuals was prior to the flooding event or that of other individuals living in a similar area but not exposed to flooding.

Flood victims also reported relationship difficulties, and sadness around ‘a loss of a sense of place and security’ after loss of or damage to possessions (Cruz et al, 2020). These issues often persisted in the long-term (sometimes years after the floods) with flood victims more likely to report anxiety during heavy rain, which was associated with heightened stress, poor sleep, panic attacks, mood swings and increased use of alcohol or prescription drugs. Physical health problems linked with the flooding (such as waterborne diseases) were also associated with psychological distress (Cruz et al, 2020).

A study in Scotland on the floods in Ballater and Garioch in 2016-17 (Margaret, Philip, and Dowds, 2020) supported these findings. This study used a validated measure of wellbeing (Short Warwick and Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale) at two time points to track the wellbeing of those affected by flooding in combination with interviews. This found that those whose homes had been flooded had significantly lower mental wellbeing immediately after the floods than those from the same areas whose homes had not been. While both groups’ wellbeing improved as time went on, those whose homes had been flooded continued to lag at the 18-month follow-up. In this follow-up, the findings showed that that the communities of Ballater and Garioch were still grappling with emotional repercussions following the floods. Residents, even those whose homes were not flooded, continue to experience high levels of anxiety, particularly triggered by rain and flood warnings. Interviewees reported sleep disturbances, increased stress, and worsened health conditions. The stress of dealing with insurance claims, home renovations, and financial burdens compounded these impacts. These findings highlight the long-lasting negative impact of flooding on mental wellbeing.

Vulnerable groups – UK context

We found that several factors worsened the mental health impacts of flooding. These included: the flood water depth; lack of flood warning; repeat flooding; evacuation and/or temporary rehousing, and disruption to domestic utilities. Each of these factors led to higher rates of anxiety, depression, and PTSD. As well as this, issues with home or property insurance were associated with greater stress levels and difficulties recovering from the flood, either from being uninsured or facing difficulties claiming insurance. The review also noted that when little support arrived from relevant authorities, this also led to poor mental health outcomes (Cruz et al, 2020).

In keeping with the factors above, the meta-study found that the severity and duration of the mental health impact of flooding varied between different groups of people (Cruz et al, 2020). This depended on their susceptibility to harm, their (in)ability to prepare, respond, and recover, and their access to resources, services, and support. Women’s mental health was affected more severely than that of men, people under 65 years old experienced greater psychological distress than those over 65, and those from higher income groups reported lower levels of poor mental health in the long run than those from lower income groups. The CCRA3 also highlights the particular risk to those with mobility difficulties, and black and Asian people (UK Climate Risk, 2021).

Temperature – International

In their recent review of evidence quality and gaps, Charlson et al (2021), found that temperature was the most studied climate-change related hazard in international literature, identifying 27 original studies of the relationship between temperature and mental health. These studies focused on hazards of extreme heat (heatwaves) and longer-term increases in ambient temperature. Both higher ambient temperatures and extreme temperatures have been found to impact mental health and wellbeing negatively, showing associations to poorer mental health in the general population (Charlson et al. 2021). These effects occur through physiological impacts, such as overheating and dehydration, leading to cognitive changes, heat stress, sleep disruption, and worsening cardiovascular disease and pre-existing conditions (Berry et al, 2010). This international study also found that rising temperatures can be associated with a general increase in aggression. A recent analysis found “increasing evidence that is suggestive of a relationship between temperature and violence at the population level” which sees increases in the frequency of both interpersonal violence and intergroup conflict as temperature exceeds local seasonal norms (Mahendran et al, 2021). Increased temperatures may also reduce people’s capacity to undertake manual tasks and increase the risk of accidents. This can result in injury or loss of income which both have negative mental health impacts (Berry et al, 2010).

International evidence also suggests that increased ambient temperatures are associated with increased death by suicide. Several recent meta-analyses concluded that each 1°C increase in temperature (above local norms) was significantly associated with a between 1-1.7 percent increase in the incidence of suicide with those living in tropical or temperate zones more vulnerable (Gao et al, 2019; Thompson, et al, 2023). However, caution in interpreting these findings is urged due to the finding that this link was not always linear, varied between countries, and was influenced by factors such as humidity and sunlight (Ngu et al. 2021). Heatwaves have been found to be associated with increased hospital admissions for mental illness. In Thompson et al.’s (2023) meta-analysis, heatwaves (defined as temperatures of at least 35°C lasting for at least 3 days) were correlated with a 9·7 percent increase in hospital attendance for mental illness when compared with periods of non-heatwave in three studies in Australia and Vietnam.

Scottish context

Historically, overheating and rising temperatures have not been perceived to be major threats in Scotland. Ready.scot, informed by the Met Office, defines a heatwave in Scotland as a period of at least three consecutive days in a location with maximum temperatures above 25°C. However, a recent paper on heat-health management in Scotland, argued that while Scotland has historically had low average temperatures, climate change driven increases in temperature still present challenges for the physical and mental health of the nation. The paper noted that Scotland’s low average temperature present “socio-cultural barriers to intervention” including a “perceived lack of heat-health risks and policy priority, as well as unsuitable building stock” (Wan et al, 2023). Indeed, some studies on effects of temperature have used a relative measure of extreme heat that considers the regional temperature norms. For example, heatwaves can be defined as a minimum daily temperature in that exceeds the 99th percentile for the region (Chambers, 2020) meaning that in colder countries a lower temperature may still be considered extreme.

As the CCRA3 demonstrates, along with flooding, rising temperatures are one of the most severe climate change risks for Scotland now and in the future. The ten warmest years on record have all occurred since 1997, with annual temperatures expected to rise by 1.1°C by the 2050s, leading to an increase in average ambient temperature and greater frequency and severity of extreme heatwave events nationally (UK Climate Risk, 2021)..Despite this trend, there is limited evidence of the effects of increased ambient temperature and heatwaves on population mental health in Scotland or in the wider UK. However, as part of the above international study on suicide and temperature, Kim et al (2019) investigated UK records between 1990-2011. They found a near linear increase in suicide rates associated with increases in ambient temperature with the highest risk of suicide recorded when temperature reach the 99th percentile of national norms (Kim et al, 2019). In relation to the effects of heatwaves, a 2018 review of the effects of extreme weather on mental health in the UK identified only one paper specifically addressing heatwaves and was therefore unable to draw comprehensive conclusions.

Vulnerability – UK and international

High temperatures are likely to have an effect on health and social outcomes (UK Climate Risk, 2021). The evidence reviewed for this paper found that the groups most affected by heat are those with ‘impaired thermoregulation’ and those unable to access cooler spaces, such as people in care homes, hospitals, and prisons. This group includes the elderly and those with substance abuse problems, and particularly those with pre-existing mental health problems on certain prescription medications (including hypnotics, anxiolytics, and antipsychotics) that can affect the bodies ability to regulate temperature (Hayes et al, 2018; Liu et al, 2021). Higher temperatures have been found to be associated with worsened mental health for people with existing mental health issues. International studies have shown that, during heatwaves, hospital admissions increase for mental health conditions such as schizophrenia, dementia, mania, so-called ‘neurotic disorders’, and substance misuse (Hayes et al, 2018). Internationally, heatwaves have also been shown to significantly increase mortality risk for individuals with mental illnesses which again appears to be partly due to medications impairing the body’s temperature regulation (Lawrance et al. 2022).

Relevant reviews have concluded that there is limited evidence of the impact on increased temperature and heatwaves on more common mental health issues such as depression and anxiety and have encouraged further investigation (Thompson et al, 2018). The other groups most affected include people of colour, members of deprived and marginalised communities, those living in insecure housing, people experiencing homelessness, and prisoners owing to reduced access to air conditioning, tree cover or green spaces (Lawrance et al, 2022; UK Climate Risk, 2021).

Wildfire – International

In its three-year strategy, the Scottish Wildfire Forum stated that it anticipates a growth in the number and intensity of wildfires year by year (Scottish Wildfire Forum, 2021). While there was no research evidence of the wildfires’ effects in Scotland we found international evidence that wildfires can negatively affect mental health through several pathways. They negatively impact physical health, particularly through prolonged smoke inhalation, which can lead to respiratory problems. This can affect mental health and wellbeing as poorer physical health is known to be strongly associated with poorer mental health (Ohrnberger et al, 2017). Wildfires also disrupt social and community functioning through displacement and evacuation. Wildfires can directly affect psychological health by causing traumatic events, feelings of fear, stress, and anxiety, all of which contribute to severe, long-term negative impacts on mental health (Charlson et al. 2021). For example, a six-month follow-up after a particularly severe wildfire in Canada found those affected had an almost eight times higher rate of Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) than the general population (Agyapong, et al. 2018). These effects are compounded by increased periods of time spent indoors due to smoke, and general disruptions to lives and livelihoods, with a negative impact on earnings associated with greater psychological distress (Agyapong et al, 2018). Caution should be taken in applying these findings directly to Scotland given the magnitude of wildfire events in Canada are much greater than in Scotland.

Indirect effects on mental health

We found that over the past two decades there have been substantial developments in the conceptualisation and evidence of the indirect impacts of climate change on mental health internationally. However, these pathways are still less well understood than the direct effects. This is due to the increasing complexity of the causal pathways in this category. Indirect pathways involve a larger number of steps between cause and effect. Some evidence reviews, when addressing this topic, describe ‘potential’ or ‘likely’ mental health effects of climate change, drawing on illustrative research evidence to build a picture of how these effects operate. For example, Lawrance et al (2022) propose a model whereby climate change is understood to have a destabilising effect on political, governmental, and cultural domains of society. This destabilisation causes ‘cascading effects,’ disrupting living and working conditions, community networks, physical health, and inequalities (Lawrance et al, 2022).

Drought – International

We found no direct evidence of the impacts of drought on mental health in Scotland or the UK. However, drought has been extensively studied in Australia. The key finding from these studies is that drought affects mental health through a range of pathways. By affecting both food and water supplies, it is associated with higher levels of psychological distress in rural communities, with urban areas less affected. Drought is particularly associated with negative mental health effects on farmers due to their reliance on the land for their livelihoods. The economic consequences of land degradation, crop loss, and reduced yield result in high levels of stress and potential increase in risk of suicide among farmers (Hayes et al. 2018). Factors exacerbating psychological distress associated with drought include unemployment and prior exposure to adverse life events. Conversely, negative mental health effects are reduced by factors such as financial security, access to social support (Charlson et al. 2021).

Scottish context

While we cannot directly transfer the findings from an Australian context to a Scottish one given the different geographies, the likely economic and social disruption of increased droughts in Scotland can be predicted to impact the mental health and wellbeing of communities dependant on the land for work. A recent NatureScot analysis projects extreme droughts will become more frequent and prolonged across Scotland in the coming years, increasing from an average of one event every 20 years (in the period 1981-2001) to one every three years by 2021-2040, with typical events each lasting 2-3 months longer (Baird et al, 2021). The authors anticipate the greatest increases in the eastern regions, including the Borders, Grampian, Caithness, Orkney, and Shetland. These areas are home to substantial economic activity vulnerable to drought, including the whisky industry in Speyside, extensive areas of agriculture and forestry and a rural population dependant on wells as water sources (Kirkpatrick et al, 2021).

Biodiversity – International

Climate change is an ongoing driver of biodiversity loss, which is expected to negatively affect mental health (Lawrance et al. 2022). This impacts population groups that depend on biodiversity for their livelihood, such as agricultural workers that rely on the pollination of insects (Vasiliev and Greenwood, 2021) and those who work in fisheries. For example, the North Sea has experienced significant decreases in the maximum sustainable yield of fish populations over the past 25 years, linked to warmer seas and reduced food availability (Pinnegar et al, 2020). Reductions in and uncertainty around yields from agriculture and fisheries can affect those working in these industries both by reducing income, increasing the likelihood of unemployment, and raising stress and anxiety.

More broadly, nature connectedness and time spent in biodiverse environments are both strongly correlated with positive mental health (Lawrance et al. 2022). A key evidence review on the relationship between human health and wellbeing and nature and biodiversity found a number of psychological benefits of access to biodiverse settings, including reduced depression and anxiety, increased vitality, pro-social behaviour and life satisfaction (Sandifer et al, 2015). Therefore, through its negative effect on biodiversity, climate change is likely to have detrimental effect on those for whom contact with nature plays a protective role in their mental health (Sandifer et al, 2015). Conversely, where climate action increases or restores biodiversity there will be a likely positive effect on mental health and wellbeing (discussed in Chapter 6). Again, access to ‘high quality’ green space is not equally distributed, with especially deprived urban communities having less access.

Awareness of biodiversity loss both locally but also further afield, along with other visible climate change impacts such as floods, may also contribute to an experience of eco-distress by making climate change more salient to people. This pathway between the impacts of climate change and mental health and wellbeing is further explored in Section 4.5 of this chapter.

Air quality – International

Some international reviews on the impacts of climate change on mental health identify air quality as a pathway for climate change to affect mental health. Poor air quality has been found to be associated with increased instances of a range of mental health conditions such as anxiety, psychosis, and dementia as well as increased use of mental health services and rates of suicide. (Sandifier et al, 2015; Lawrance et al., 2022). This is thought to result both from the association between exposure to air pollution and wider socio-economic vulnerabilities and the effect pollutants have on brain function: as Lawrence et al. (2022) states “Air pollution, specifically particulate matter (PM), and nitrogen oxides (NOx), increase the risk of mental health problems, potentially via mechanisms of inflammation and neuronal injury”. While the main cause of poor air-quality is the burning of fossil fuels, which is a cause of climate change rather than a consequence of it, increasing global temperatures and wildfires (both climate-change related hazards) can degrade air quality and increase the presence of pollutants and particulate matter in the air (Sandifer et al, 2015, Cianconi et al, 2020).

Scottish context

The CCRA3 ranks poor air quality as a medium risk for health and wellbeing in Scotland. While it states that Scotland faces challenges with poor air quality, despite reductions in emissions and improved pollution control, it acknowledges that the contribution of climate change to these issues is hard to establish and therefore needs further investigation.

Displacement and migration – International

Extended periods of extreme heat, long-term droughts, excessive rain, and loss of coastal land are expected to lead to displacement of populations from their homes and land. Climate change can cause both temporary displacement through evacuations and permanent displacement through physical changes to the environment, such as soil no longer being viable for crops, or loss of coastal land. Estimates of the scale of displacement because of climate change vary widely, with the figure of 200 million people globally being displaced by 2050 most frequently cited (Hayes et al. 2018).

Both temporary and permanent displacement because of extreme weather has been shown to be associated with mental illnesses and poor mental health, including instances of PTSD, depression, anxiety, and stress. (Tunstall et al, 2006; Hayes et al. 2018; Berry et al., 2010).

Scottish context

In Scotland, the most likely cause of temporary displacement is flooding, however the most likely cause of permanent displacement is changes to and loss of coastal land. The CCRA3 states that one of the most severe risks is sea levels rising and the associated coastal change. Erosion, landslips, and permanent inundation threaten the long-term viability of coastal communities. It predicts that within the next 30 years, 19 percent of Scotland’s coastline is at risk of erosion, which has projected knock-on effects for transport, energy, water, and housing infrastructure, and a knock-on effect on livelihoods and community wellbeing (UK Climate Risk, 2021). Scotland is also renowned worldwide for its coast and coastal wildlife which contribute to national identity as well as tourism. Coastal change is likely to have a considerable impact on this, threatening the preservation of Scotland’s cultural heritage. Naturally, coastal communities are most at risk with Falkirk, West Dunbartonshire, Highland and Dumfries and Galloway expected to be most vulnerable to coastal flooding. Moreover, the study on public awareness showed that the increase in concern surrounding climate change was higher than average among respondents in the Highlands and Islands (62 percent). This could be attributed to vulnerability of island communities from extreme weather and coastal erosion (ClimateXChange, 2021).

Vulnerable groups

Climate change related hazards amplify existing risks for individuals and groups, and further compound existing social injustices and inequalities (McMichael, 2017). Watts et al. state that “by undermining the social and environmental determinants that underpin good health, climate change exacerbates social, economic, and demographic inequalities” (Watts et al, 2018). This means that some population groups are more vulnerable to the mental health effects of climate change than others. Some are more vulnerable in general to poor mental health and therefore to all climate related risks. Such groups include older people, children, women, ethnic minorities, people from deprived and marginalised communities, and people with pre-existing health conditions (Hayes et al, 2018). There are also groups that are vulnerable owing to the specific hazards they are exposed to, such as people living in areas subject to flooding; people who work in agriculture and fisheries; and outdoor labourers. In a Scottish context this also includes coastal and island communities who are more likely to face disruption to services and infrastructure due to extreme weather events and face a higher risk of displacement in the long run.

These risks are mediated by the ability of individuals and groups to protect against and recover from the harmful effects of climate change. This is largely determined by access to services, resources, and social support. Different groups have varying access to these resources, further compounding risks for the already vulnerable (Berry et al, 2010; Lawrance et al, 2022; Charlson et al, 2021).

The CCRA3 identifies flooding, high temperatures, air quality and coastal change as the four key climate hazards facing Scotland now and, in the future, (UK Climate Risk, 2021). A study on population groups vulnerable to climate change likewise identifies low-income groups; people with poor health; and people living areas with high levels of social and private rented housing, and people from Black ethnic groups as those most at risk (Sayers et al, 2023). While these reports focused on overall risks, rather than just risk to mental health and wellbeing, their findings align closely with the wider literature on mental health vulnerabilities.

Psycho-social responses to climate change

In addition to the causal pathways described in the previous sections, we found increasing evidence of a pathway which affects the general population’s mental health through awareness of the changing climate. This may occur through learning about the risks of climate change via the media or the response to these risks by state actors. The heightened awareness of climate change and its impacts can result in psychological strain. This section examines definitions of eco-distress, its prevalence in Scotland and how it affects different population groups.

Definitions of eco-distress

We found that the emotional and psychological responses to climate change awareness have generated increasing attention and interest in the media and academia. New terms have recently emerged to describe these responses including ‘climate anxiety,’ ‘eco-anxiety,’ and ‘eco-distress’ (Thoma et al, 2021). These terms are often used inconsistently and usually interchangeably in the literature. For the sake of consistency, this report uses the term ‘eco-distress’ when referring to the broad range of these emotional responses unless otherwise stated.

Eco-distress is a relatively novel term in academic literature. Environmental philosopher Glenn Albrecht (2011) first coined the term “psychoterratic syndromes” in 2011 to describe emergent emotional responses to climate change, including eco-anxiety, eco-grief, and solastalgia. In the past ten years, interest in the topic has grown rapidly. One review found that 80 percent of all published research on eco-anxiety has been published since 2020 (Jarrett et al, 2024). This is prompted by increasing numbers of mental health practitioners, teachers, social workers, and others caring for vulnerable individuals reporting cases of deep concerns about climate change having debilitating effects on people’s daily lives (Charlson et al. 2021).

Despite increasing attention, eco-distress and the range of emotional responses to climate change it refers to are challenging concepts to pin down. There is no clear consensus or set of standard definitions, and the concepts are currently undergoing development (Coffey et al, 2021; Clayton, 2020; Brophy et al, 2022). The scope that different authors cover when using these terms range widely, from a broad concept to more narrow definitions developed for clinical or epidemiological purposes.

In many cases ’eco-distress’ and ‘eco-anxiety’ are used interchangeably to refer to a wide range of difficult emotional and physiological responses that people experience due to their awareness of climate change (Brophy et al, 2022). These include but are not limited to anxiety, grief, anger, despair, depression, hopelessness, and worry (Hickman et al, 2020). This broader use of the term is succinctly captured by the Royal College of Psychiatrists, who synonymously define eco-distress and eco-anxiety as:

“The wide range of emotions and thoughts people may experience when they hear bad news about our planet and the environment” (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2021).

Narrower definitions have been introduced when operationalised for specific research objectives. For example, some authors distinguish between ‘climate’ and ‘eco(logical)’ distress. They reason that ecological change or crises can occur independently of the climate crisis and that therefore the two must not be conflated (Clayton et al, 2017). Some papers make clear delineations between eco-distress, eco-anxiety, and eco-grief in order to study them as distinct objects of research, objecting to the use of ‘eco-anxiety’ as an umbrella term to refer to a broad range of emotional responses (Coffey et al. 2021). Others use terms such as ‘psychoterratic syndromes’ and ‘eco-emotions’ as umbrella concepts, under which eco-anxiety and other such terms fall (Lawrance et al, 2021; Albrecht 2011).

Greater precision in the definitions of eco-distress and eco-anxiety is often seen in papers approaching the topic from a clinical research perspective, such as examining its potential for being a diagnosable pathology or exploring practical implications for healthcare practitioners (Lawrance et al, 2022). Several authors stress that eco-anxiety in these contexts must be defined as being excessive or debilitating distress, underscoring a common theme in the literature that medicalising or pathologizing eco-anxiety should be avoided on the basis that distress is a rational and healthy response to climate change (Searle and Gow, 2010; Gifford and Gifford, 2016). Despite variation in definitions, some authors have attempted to draw out common definitional features from the literature (Helm et al, 2018). For example, Brophy et al. (2022) identified the following broad common features of eco-distress:

  • It is future-oriented and anticipatory, distinguishing it from other forms of environmental distress like solastalgia.
  • It is associated with feelings of uncertainty, unpredictability, uncontrollability, and being overwhelmed, accompanied by a range of emotions such as anger, frustration, despair, guilt, shame, grief.
  • It should not be regarded as pathological because it is a rational and justified response that can also lead to pro-environmental behaviours and thoughts. Difficult feelings can motivate active engagement and mitigation, with some suggesting that eco-anxiety can be seen as “practical anxiety”, highlighting its potentially adaptive nature (Pihkhala, 2020).

Measures of eco-distress

Most of the research papers we reviewed in our study use unvalidated measures to measure the prevalence of eco-distress. Most define and operationalise the concept to meet the needs of their study, particularly when aligning their work with existing measures used in psychology, such as those for anxiety (Lawrance et al. 2022; Clayton, 2020; Laronow, Soltys, and Izdebski et al, 2022). Consequently, researchers must carefully interpret how each study defines eco-distress and the scope of what is being studied.

More recently there have been some notable efforts to develop validated measures for the construct. Early studies include Searle and Gow’s 12 item questionnaire to measure what they describe as climate change distress (Searle and Gow, 2010); while Reser et al (2012) developed a survey to measure climate change distress and psychological coping and adaption responses. These measures only examine the nature and extent of emotional reactions to climate change in individuals, but do not measure the relationship between these reactions and a person’s emotional wellbeing (Reser et al, 2012). This distinction is important because experiencing emotional distress when learning of climate change is not necessarily unhealthy or harmful, given the possible long-term consequences of climate change in people’s lives. Jarret et al. (2024)’s review of empirical research supporting eco-anxiety found a total of nine structurally validated measures that have been developed, of which four have been implemented in an empirical study outside the original work: the Climate Anxiety Scale (CAS), the Hogg Eco-Anxiety Scale (HEAS), the Climate Distress Scale (CDS), and the Climate Change Worry Scale (CCWS) – though, the latter two scales have not to date been implemented widely.

The CAS is the most frequently cited validated measure of eco-anxiety, with 24 papers implementing the scale (e.g., Larionow et al, 2022; Jarrett et al, 2024). It is a 13-item questionnaire used for assessing eco-anxiety as a psychological response to climate change, which draws on a number of existing measures for rumination, environmental identity, and anxiety (Wullenkord et al, 2021; Laronow et al, 2022).

The next most common scale is the HEAS with five studies to date employing this measure. It is similar in its construction to the CAS. However, it has a broader application in that it measures distress about indirect and direct climate change impacts, as well as more localised environmental changes such as habitat change (Hogg et al, 2021). Two additional validated measures have been published in the form of the CCWS, and the CDS, though neither explicitly link the measure of emotional response to a person’s wellbeing, instead mapping responses as ranging in ‘severity’ from low to high (Vercammen and Lawrance, 2023; Leger-Goodes et al, 2023).

While such measures are gaining traction, their application is not widespread. Just as the clarity of definition around the concept of eco-distress can be expected to crystalise as the body of literature expands, so too can the emergent range of measures of eco-distress be expected to gain greater validation and be more rigorously and consistently implemented across a wider range of populations in the future.

Prevalence and vulnerable groups – Scotland and UK

Concern about climate change is widespread in Scotland and the UK, but the prevalence of eco-distress remains unclear owing to the definitional inconsistencies previously discussed. A Scottish survey found 68% of respondents worried about climate change, with 25% reporting negative impacts on mental health (Andrews et al. 2022). A YouGov tracker in March 2024 showed 60% of Scots were concerned about climate change (YouGov, 2024). Data on public attitudes to the environment and the impact of climate change, Great Britain – Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk) reported 75% of UK adults, including 74% in Scotland, were worried. The study found a statistically significant generational difference, with 39 percent of people aged 16-44 feeling this way compared to 12 percent of people aged 45+. Those with existing long term health conditions were also more likely to be affected. Where validated scales are employed the prevalence of eco-distress is relatively lower. For example, a UK study employing the CAS (Whitmarsh et al, 2022) found that only 5% of participants met the threshold for experiencing moderate to high climate anxiety, despite 46.2% being very or extremely worried. Likewise, a UK study using the Climate Distress Scale (Vercammen et al. 2023) found that while 60 percent of respondents experienced eco-distress, only 10 percent experienced it such that it was associated with worse wellbeing outcomes.

Young people – Global

Surveys show that distress about climate change and environmental degradation is highly prevalent among children, adolescents, and young adults globally. Measuring the prevalence of eco-anxiety among young people, as opposed to the general population, was the most common demographic focus of the studies we reviewed (Brophy et al, 2022; Hickman et al. 2021). Key findings of a global survey of young people aged 16-25 carried out by Hickman et al (2021) include that 84 percent of respondents globally reported feelings of sadness, anxiety, anger, powerlessness, helplessness, and guilt, with 59 percent reporting being very or extremely worried.

A key finding from our review is that eco-distress is closely linked to a real or perceived lack of agency to respond to the threat posed by climate change. Notably, Hickman et al. (2021) found that eco-anxiety is closely linked to perceived government inaction on climate change. In other words, the perceived failure of governments to adequately respond to the climate crisis is associated with increased distress among individuals. Lawrance et al’s (2021) study similarly highlights that young people feel powerless to affect change and feel despondent that those with the power to do so are not. Further, young people have higher exposure to information (e.g. via social media and education about climate change in schools) and so are more aware and knowledgeable about climate change and its consequences. Young people inherently have less agency to affect change (e.g. no financial independence, inability to vote in elections), contributing to a sense of hopelessness.

Young people – UK

The UK component of Hickman et al.’s (2021) global survey of people aged 16-25 showed that the climate crisis was a major cause of distress amongst young people, despite it having a relatively small impact on day-to-day functioning and quality of life of respondents. The study found that the global average for eco-distress affecting day-to-day life was 18 percent lower in the UK than the global average (46 percent). However, 28 percent reported that their feelings about climate change negatively affected their daily life and functioning in areas such as eating, concentrating, work, school, sleeping, spending time in nature, playing, having fun, and relationships. Additionally, 73 percent stated that they find the future frightening, and 80 percent believed that people have failed to take care of the planet.

This latter point is further supported by a Savanta-Comres survey commissioned by BBC Newsround that found that 58 percent of the 2000 responding children aged 8-16 were “worried about the impact that climate change will have on their lives”, and that a majority felt that climate change was broadly important to them (Savanta-Comres, 2020). The survey also reported that 64 percent of children felt that people in power were not doing enough to address climate change, and that 41 percent did not trust adults to take action (Savanta-Comres, 2020).

There is limited evidence comparing the prevalence of eco-distress to other major national threats to wellbeing experienced by young people in Scotland. Lawrance et al (2021) conducted a UK study of young people aged 16-24 (N=530) looking at psychological responses to COVID-19 and climate change. Despite COVID-19 having a more pronounced reported effect on the day-to-day functioning of young people’s lives, climate change was found to have a slightly more pronounced impact on their overall distress. The key distinctions were that climate change elicits feelings of guilt, personal responsibility, and a lack of agency to respond to it, whereas COVID-19 warranted a sense of loss and grief over quality of life.

Other groups – international

The body of literature suggests that people in the Global South have a higher prevalence of eco-distress (Hickman et al, 2021). Other groups that have been identified as being vulnerable to eco-distress include racialised communities, immigrants, and people with pre-existing mental health conditions (Cianconi et al, 2023). The evidence base is substantially less robust for these groups, though is concerned with how climate change compounds on existing marginalisation. Vulnerability here does not imply a greater prevalence, rather a higher level of threat posed to such groups as inequalities such as access to healthcare or agency to affect political change diminish these groups’ capacity to respond and adapt to climate change (Ciarconi et al, 2023).

Research and evidence gaps

Research on the relationship between climate change and mental health, while historically understudied, is a rapidly growing field.

Hayes et al. (2017) note a range of methodological challenges in researching this topic. These include the risk of either over or underestimating the mental health impact of climate change. This is due to the wide range of possible climate change related mental health outcomes, the challenges in understanding the effects of climate events over time, and difficulties in understanding the mechanism by which climate events produce mental health outcomes in the complex context of the wider social determinants of health (Hayes et al. 2017).

Two recent scoping reviews designed to evaluate the quality and range of evidence and identify research gaps (Hwong et al, 2022; Charlson et al. 2021) found that most studies available on this topic are survey-based, cross-sectional designs, using self-reported mental health measures to understand the effects of climate events. A smaller number of studies use health records combined with temperature data to understand the effects of temperature mental health.

They identified gaps in relation to research focused on protective factors, coping mechanisms, or resiliency in response to the mental health effects of climate change. Additionally, there is a lack of research that links population mental health outcome databases to weather databases, which they recommend filling through greater collaborations between mental health professional and data scientists to build clinically meaningful research tools that address the challenges of climate change. The reviews also point to the potentially fruitful opportunity to draw on literature from other disciplines that do not explicitly address climate change such as the extensive literature on mental health and natural disasters. While some of the reviews we have analysed attempt to do this, there is greater opportunity for inter-disciplinary collaboration on this topic, particularly in understanding the more indirect causal pathways.

The body of literature specifically discussing eco-distress is nascent, meaning that there are many gaps in the literature. A gap exists in understanding the prevalence of eco-distress in the UK specifically, not least its impacts on mental wellbeing. One study found that, as of 2020, only 11 percent of studies on the mental health impact of climate change focused on psychological responses to climate change awareness (Charlson et al, 2021).

Ambiguity and inconsistency in how eco-distress is defined is partly explained by the absence of qualitative research into eco-anxiety. Approximately 75 percent of studies on eco-anxiety are quantitative, the rest being mixed method or qualitative (Jarrett et al, 2024). Although 2021 saw an increase in the number of qualitative studies published, quantitative research still represented the majority of papers that year (Brophy et al, 2022). This means there is relatively little discussion about the nature of eco-anxiety and a lack of exploration into its qualitative causes. This is particularly important given the lack of clarity in the terms employed and the wide range of terms used.

Evidence on interventions addressing the mental health risks of climate change

Summary of findings from Chapter 5

This chapter addresses Research Question 3:

  1. What is the evidence on effective prevention and early intervention, and on responding to mental health and wellbeing risks and impacts in a climate change context in Scotland?

Key findings:

  • The evidence base for interventions is thin. Only 23 evaluated intervention types were found which address prevention, early intervention, or responses to the mental health risks of climate change. Eight of these were delivered in developing countries, and only two were based in Scotland.
  • Almost half of the evaluated interventions focused on building resilience amongst the participants. The other evaluated interventions focused on capacity building, social connections, nature connection, and encouraging climate action. Capacity building interventions had a high-level of evaluation.
  • Evaluations of interventions measured a wide range of outcomes. These included improved wellbeing (6), improved ability to cope (6), and relief from psychological disorders (4).
  • Four other types of intervention were found. These were a) promoting public participation in decision making, b) supporting mental health practitioner development, c) climate justice and d) public communication. To date, there has been no evaluations of the interventions within these categories.

Introduction

For policymakers, the mental health risks outlined in Chapter 4 imply that actions and programmes should be designed to address the causes of poor mental health and its symptoms. This chapter focuses on public health interventions that directly address poor mental health resulting from the impacts of climate change or wider concerns. In this section we explore the broad topic of evidence on effective prevention and early intervention, and on responding to mental health and wellbeing risks and impacts in a climate change context in Scotland. We have included any intervention or programme which has been designed to help alleviate adverse mental health and wellbeing effects of climate change and have focused on those which may be applicable to Scotland.

Methodology

This chapter analyses mental health interventions. We took interventions to be programmes, policies, and practices aimed at supporting mental health in the context of climate change. We found 60 interventions during the shortlisting process, derived from the longlist of material which answered Research Question 3. The shortlist of 60 was analysed on several grounds including whether the intervention had been evaluated, what the evaluation found, and replicability of the intervention. ‘Evaluation’ here means any systematic process to judge the merit, worth or significance of an intervention by combining evidence and judgement. ‘Replicability’ we take to mean a project has been sufficiently described, evaluated and shown to be effective in meeting its objectives, there is an understanding of why it worked and how it may need to be adapted to be repeated elsewhere. Appendix A describes the analytical procedures in more detail.

This chapter begins with an overview of the different types of programmes that have been delivered to support mental health in a climate context and their levels of evidence. The remainder of the chapter explores the nine different types of intervention, describing how they may lead to mental health benefits, and what these interventions look like in terms of their target groups, outcomes, and how they were delivered.

Overview of types of interventions and evidence

We found a growing number of international studies of wellbeing interventions in the context of climate change. These studies broadly agree on how to categorise mental health interventions. From reviewing their frameworks, we identified nine exclusive intervention categories which were potentially relevant to a Scottish context. These were: psychological resilience and coping; capacity building; social connection; nature connection; encouraging action; democratic participation; practitioner development; public communication, and; climate justice.

In practice, these categories were not exclusive. Ninety three percent of interventions crossed multiple categories. For example, a group therapy intervention might focus on primarily on building psychological resilience but also have a secondary focus on building social connections between participants. Encouraging action was notable in this regard. No mental health intervention had a primary purpose of encouraging action. Yet many interventions encouraged participants to take climate action through other means such as mental health toolkits, discussion club, or community gardening.

Our review identified 60 interventions. Most have been recently designed and delivered. Only 36 percent of interventions found had been evaluated. However, interventions building psychological resilience and coping skills have been delivered more than other and have and relatively frequently evaluated (9). Capacity building interventions have been delivered less frequently but the evaluations that have taken place are of higher quality than for some of the other interventions. For four intervention categories, there were no evaluations of interventions identified. Table 2 shows which intervention categories have been most frequently evaluated, and which outcomes were measured in those evaluated interventions.

Category of intervention

Number of separate interventions

Number of these interventions that have been evaluated

Measured outcomes in evaluated interventions

Relief from disorders

Reduced distress

Improved wellbeing

Coping self-efficacy

Reduced isolation

Validate emotions

Resilience and coping

24

9

2

1

2

3

1

 

Capacity building

4

4

1

1

2

   

Social connection

11

5

   

1

2

2

Nature connection

6

5

1

 

2

2

  

Encouraging action (secondary only)[3]

16

(5)

 

1

1

1

1

1

Democratic participation

7

0

Practitioner development

5

0

Public communication

2

0

Climate justice

1

0

Total

60

22

Table 2 Summary of the types of interventions that have taken place, the number which have been evaluated, and the main measured outcomes for the evaluated interventions

Intervention types with evaluated interventions

In this section we focus on intervention types that have evaluated interventions. For each type of intervention, we outline the reasoning for how this may help and the evaluated outcomes from different interventions in this group. We’ve also noted interventions that may be replicable or scaled up further in Scotland.

Psychological resilience and coping interventions

The most common form of mental health and wellbeing intervention[4] in a climate change context were those aimed at building psychological resilience and coping mechanisms. Psychological resilience is the ability to regain or remain in a healthy mental state during crises without long-term negative consequences, whilst coping mechanisms are the patterns and behaviours people use to deal with unusually stressful situations. Both resilience and coping techniques are useful both for ‘bouncing back’ from climate events and for dealing with climate distress day-to-day without being overwhelmed. We identified 24 separate resilience interventions of which nine were evaluated. Of the 24, 17 focused on climate distress, and six on responding to climate events.

Resilience interventions use a number of different tools and approaches to help people cope (Dooley et al, 2021), including reframing climate distress as connection, care and empathy, and cultivating positive emotions, such as optimism and realistic hope (Hickman, 2020). Similarly, resilience interventions for climate distress had a wide variety of target groups: the general population (6 interventions), teachers (4), youth (3), and activists (3). Resilience interventions around climate hazards (such as floods) were targeted at rural populations (2), those with poor mental health (2) or any resident (2).

The diversity and scale of interventions for building resilience is noteworthy. Forty percent of identified interventions primarily focused on building resilience, as well as the range of target groups and diversity of approaches. This indicates that strengthening emotional resilience, rather than moving straight into action, is the most accepted approach for mental health professionals for people facing climate change (Dooley et al, 2021). 

The evaluated interventions for psychological resilience-based programmes were focused on two outcomes: developing coping mechanisms and giving relief from disorders such as anxiety and depression.

For coping mechanisms, one group therapy-based intervention, delivered following Super Typhoon Haiyan, found that participants improved in coping self-efficacy in all module domains managing unproductive thoughts and emotions and identifying personal strengths (Hechenova et al, 2018). A Skills for Life Adjustment and Resilience (SOLAR) intervention delivered after Cyclone Pam resulted in significantly decreased distress/post-traumatic stress symptoms and functional impairment after the intervention, with some effects retained at 6-month follow-up (Gibson et al, 2021).

For relief from disorders, group therapy methods appear to be effective. Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT), a type of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), was administered in groups to 49 participants with depression in Kogi state, Nigeria, following a series of floods. Researchers found that REBT was significantly effective in decreasing post traumatic depression among flood victims. Fatigue, feelings of hopelessness, and suicidal thoughts had been significantly reduced after being exposed to REBT (Ede et al, 2021). Flooding in the UK has been shown to be associated with higher instances of PTSD and anxiety (Jermacane, 2018). A survey in Aberdeenshire found that 71 percent of respondents reported experiencing anxiety (Andrews, 2020). The large effect size which continued at follow-up is promising for potential replication in Scotland. While REBT is currently not a standard therapeutic approach in Scotland, REBT and other talking therapies may be appropriate and fruitful avenues to explore for climate change related mental health issues.

Capacity building interventions

Capacity building is a programme which tries to improve a community’s potential to act and respond to climate events. Whilst only four capacity building interventions were identified, each of these had been evaluated, mostly to a high standard.

The four identified capacity-building interventions in the literature covered two delivery models: training and financial aid.

We found two training programmes. First, a 3-day mental health integrated disaster preparedness intervention was delivered in a group setting in Haiti. This disaster preparation training in Haiti[5] showed reduced symptoms associated with depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and functional impairment, and increased peer-based help-giving and help-seeking (James et al, 2020). The second training programme was the Rural Adversity Mental Health Program (RAMHP) in Australia which offered training and support in the context of drought. The RAMHP training programme increased mental health understanding and willingness to assist others for over 90 percent of participants (Maddox, 2022).

Our search also found two financial assistance programmes. First, livestock trading grants and collective-action groups were delivered to 2300 people in Ethiopia. The livestock trading grant in Ethiopia resulted in confidence in the future and ability to recover from a crisis being much more likely to rise (Gibson et al, 2021). Second, we found a Red Cross intervention in Bangladesh which distributed an unconditional cash transfer in advance of a monsoon flood. These direct cash transfers in advance of flooding in Bangladesh appear to have been effective in improving household access to food and reducing psychosocial stress during and after the flood period (Maddox et al, 2022).

Financial assistance was offered in Bangladesh and Ethiopia, yet the impact may be in part due to both countries having GDP per capita below $3,000. These interventions were mostly funded or run by international humanitarian organisations rather than being integrated into the local system. These factors mean that, despite their high evidence level, there is some uncertainty about the replicability of capacity building interventions in Scotland, which has a high GDP per capita, and fewer outside-party delivery of interventions.

Social connection interventions

We found eleven initiatives which used social connection to help participants deal with mental health issues in a climate change context. Five of these have been evaluated. Social connection interventions are particularly common in the UK, where five of these interventions have been delivered or developed. All social connection interventions were and appear to prioritise two mental health related outcomes: improved social capital and validation of emotions.

First, social connection interventions can help reduce isolation and increase social capital in participants, through forming new acquaintances and resources. Examples include a cooperative enquiry into climate change in a Welsh school. This helped the participants feel less alone and more connected with group members, teachers and the school (Togneri, 2022). Social connection has been shown to protect mental health following disasters. Using a more extreme example to illustrate this, people with higher levels of social support prior to and following Hurricane Katrina had lower levels of psychological distress, even years after the event (Lowe et al, 2010).

The number of wellbeing interventions focused on building connections to others reflects the understanding that social networks are both a basic human need and a primary source of resilience (Holt-Lunstad, 2020). Social support has been found to protect against stress and is strongly associated with both physical and mental health (Leigh-Hunt et al. 2017). This is in line with the social determinants of health model that shows loneliness and social isolation increase the risk of poor mental health (Kirkbride et al, 2024).

The second major outcome from social connection interventions is validation of emotions. In group settings, people can share their feelings about the climate crisis and be heard by others who feel similarly. Climate Cafes (Box 1) are one of the most popular intervention designs to achieve both reduced isolation and validating negative feeling.

Acknowledging and validating feelings in relation to climate distress has been particularly important for young people. As highlighted in Section 4.5.3, young people often feel their concerns about the environment are ignored or belittled and have no one to talk about their worries (Atherton, 2020). Providing safe spaces to express emotions is important for avoiding isolation and emotional repression; often this will involve parents, caregivers and educators initiating conversations or actively listening (Atherton, 2020).

Climate Cafés

Climate Cafes are widespread across Scotland and, increasingly, worldwide. Somewhat confusingly, there are two main types of Climate Café with differing emphases.

First, Climate Psychology Alliance (CPA) Climate Cafes are primarily a space for talking about emotions. A typical CPA Climate Café has two facilitators. An initial round of sharing is often scaffolded by images or natural objects that participants are invited to interact with. After an initial round of reflections from each participant, the conversation is opened up and participants are invited to respond to, and reflect on, the contributions of others. Throughout the Café, the focus of discussion is on participants’ thoughts and feelings about the climate and ecological crises.

A forthcoming study of CPA Climate Cafés found that prior to attending attendees had felt “helpless at times… depressed… angry” . Regarding this type of distress as unique to the climate crisis, it was regarded as impervious to existing therapies: “CBT won’t fix my climate anxiety.” Reflecting upon their Climate Café experience, participants noted how they had not been fully conscious of the depth and breadth of their emotional responses to the climate crisis prior to attendance.

The study showed participants had a sense of surprise at how quickly and strongly a connection developed in a new group. Attendees could “express yourself more authentically”, drop the mask of a “brave face”: “meeting someone who is seeing the same thing that I’m seeing and then saying, oh, that’s really hard, isn’t it…like ‘oh thank God’”. CPA Climate Cafés were seen to offer a contrast to the other climate related groups participants had attended, which often had a tonne of “we need action… there’s this line of anger to it.”

The second type of climate Café offered by the Climate Café® Network is more action orientated, though focused first on sharing and building connections between participants. These Climate Cafés® are defined as “informal spaces for chat [which] often inspire and inform action” and are delivered throughout Scotland and worldwide.

As informal community meetings for people to share climate-related feelings and inspire collective action, Climate Cafés® help participants to validate feelings around climate distress, increase awareness of threats to planetary health, action taken in the face of climate change, and improved social connection. One Scottish participant said, “Here are like-minded people with an equal passion and inspiring, practical answers to climate issues – both wider issues and very close to home.” Another participant stated “I feel completely comfortable when stating my opinion on matters or contributing ideas as I am never alienated, I am always encouraged to just go for it.”

Both CPA Climate Cafés and the Climate Café® Network are well established in Scotland. The Climate Café® Network originated in Scotland where there are 26 ongoing Cafés®. Both types of Climate Café are freely offered to all attendees. A number of tools and training offers exist to set up new cafés. Further evaluation should be commissioned to increase confidence in the outcomes from Climate Cafes and to determine which factors are critical to their success, and how this varies among population groups. Climate Cafes are already used in COP events and Community Climate Action Networks in Scotland and could be further scaled and integrated into mainstream public health, for instance, as an option in social prescription.

 

Nature connection interventions

Our review found seven interventions focused on nature connection, four of which have been evaluated. Two main types of outcomes were found: improvements to wellbeing and increased self-efficacy and coping.

Two evaluated interventions have focused on improving wellbeing among participants. Wetlands for Wellbeing in the UK has been delivered to people with poor mental health with strong results, helping participants connect to nature as a space of reflection, resourcing, and inspiration, supporting them to manage distress. Statistically significant improvements were found in mental wellbeing, anxiety, stress and emotional wellbeing, as well as social isolation, confidence to be in nature, and management of physical health (Maund et al, 2019). Another evaluated nature-based intervention addressing climate change which included a community garden hub demonstrated improvements in mental health and social connectedness for participants (Patrick et al, 2011).

Wellbeing outcomes have been strongly associated with nature connection for some time. As described in 4.3.2, climate-related loss of biodiversity represents a risk to mental health as both nature exposure and nature connection have positive impacts on mental health and wellbeing and allow humans to flourish (Passmore and Howell, 2014). Nature-based interventions have been found to reduce anxiety, reduce stress-related cortisol levels, reduce neurodevelopmental disorders, reduce severity of depression, increase cognitive function and promote social cohesion (Nabhan et al, 2020). Nature connection is also associated with improved wellbeing in general, positive moods and lower distress (Nisbet, Shaw, and Lachance, 2020).

The second outcome, self-efficacy and coping, was found in two evaluated interventions. One example of a nature-based programme delivered in Scotland, the Green Team, showed strong post-activity survey results, particularly around self-efficacy and social connection: 94 percent of young people involved in the one project increased their confidence; for another project 95 percent of young people developed positive relationships (Grant, 2021; The Green Team, 2023). Borderlands Earth Care Youth Institute, a nature-restoration project for young people project on the US-Mexico border, improved emotional strength, as well as leadership, sense of community, and social responsibility (Nabhan et al, 2020).

We found research in a small student population showing exposure to nature improving coping ability for climate distress, often through developing a sense of peace, hope, calm, ease of worries and grounding (Grant, 2021). Most nature-based interventions are delivered to marginalised people or those more susceptible to climate anxiety (such as young people from lower income households) who may have less access to nature.

However, it is notable that only one of the four evaluated interventions was explicitly addressing eco-distress. There’s some evidence to suggest nature-connection interventions have perverse effects for those experiencing climate distress. Whilst studies generally agree that spending time in nature (nature exposure) is an effective strategy for coping with climate distress (Dooley et al, 2021), several studies have found that feeling connected to nature is associated with climate change anxiety (Curll et al, 2022). For this reason, some programmes seek to encourage both nature-connection and optimism simultaneously (Smithsonian, 2021). Nature connection interventions also have different designs depending on the groups that are engaged. In the UK, many minorities feel excluded from rural settings and groups have been established to provide safe spaces for ethnic minorities, such as Black Girls Hike and Flock Together, a bird watching group for people of colour.

Interventions encouraging meaningful action 

We found 16 interventions which encouraged participants to take meaningful action, five of which were evaluated. Fifteen of the 16 interventions related to climate distress. As described in the discussion of eco-anxiety in 4.5, emotions around climate change including distress are increasingly understood as rational and proportionate responses to an existential threat. Our review has found that action taken by government, groups, or individuals to combat climate change can alleviate some of these negative effects. Climate distress often involves feelings of helplessness due to the scale of the issue of climate change. Action and activism can help address these threats by helping individuals focus on what they can control, thereby promoting a sense of agency, efficacy, and competence (Schwartz et al, 2022).

It is particularly notable that all climate action interventions for mental health have action as a follow-on aim rather than encouraging participants to leap straight to solutions. Climate anxiety researcher Pikhala and psychoanalyst Randall caution against pushing clients too quickly into action, emphasising the importance of addressing emotional and identity challenges first (Dooley et al, 2021). For mental health interventions, in order to engage in action, it is vital to first provide a space for the expression of emotion.

The most common outcome of encouraging action is improved levels of empowerment, which was an expected outcome in seven out of the 16 action-based interventions. A social connection intervention in Wales used Cooperative Inquiry to improve knowledge of a group of pupils. Qualitative research found that ‘knowing about solutions’ made a difference. This knowledge was directly connected by the young people to their wellbeing and a sense of hope, highlighting the importance of envisioning alternative futures (Togneri, 2022). In Cameroon, the Ibanikom Climate Mental Health Literacy Project facilitated meetings for flood-affected communities, allowing participants to learn about the effects of climate change on mental health and co-develop local, small-scale culturally relevant integrated health and agriculture projects (Xue et al, 2024).

Another intervention, the Work That Reconnects, has been developed to help participants talk about how they feel, moving from hope and despair, build empathy and begin acting upon these feelings. The intervention is not only focused on climate change but a sense of connection to the wider ecology. Research found that participants find concrete ways of living out hope in their daily lives: one participant noted “these questions made me rethink about the legacy I will leave behind” (Hathaway, 2017). All eleven research participants in a study commented on how it is helpful as a framework for life, sharing that they use it in their relationships with family and friends, activism, and making major life decisions.

Intervention types with lower levels of evidence

We found that government and third-sector responses to climate change’s effect on mental health are not limited to direct services to those effected. The disempowerment felt by many in climate distress has led to innovative new programmes to help restore a sense of agency to those effected, including through participation in decision-making, and communication. This section gives an overview of four types of intervention which are emerging as the scale of the climate crisis becomes apparent, but which to date have no evaluated programmes. We will briefly examine how interventions are theorised to support wellbeing and describe any recognised barriers to impact in Scotland.

Interventions promoting participation in decision-making 

Citizen participation in decision-making is increasingly perceived as not only a matter of justice and democracy but also a practical necessity for transitioning into sustainability (Huttunen et al, 2022). While these interventions mainly concern wider issues than mental health, participation in decision making has been theorised to have benefits to wellbeing, particularly empowerment. We found seven wellbeing interventions which focused broadly on participation. A large number of these were in Scotland, particularly within the umbrella of the Climate Change Public Engagement Strategy.

To date, publicly available evidence remains thin and shows mixed outcomes. The Scottish Climate Assembly (2020-2022) reporting included evidence on the emotional experience of assembly members, focusing on optimism, distress and worry of members throughout the process. Findings indicated that members were less worried and more hopeful than the general population about what Scotland can do to tackle climate change and became increasingly optimistic that ‘things will work out fine’ over the course of the main Assembly period (Andrews et al, 2022). However, 21 percent reported their feelings about climate change were having a negative impact on their mental health. The Assembly member survey showed that feelings of worry increased, and optimism decreased. In addition, many participants reported feeling disappointed at the final meeting which reviewed the government response to their report (Andrews, 2022).

Practitioner development interventions

We identified five interventions aimed at increasing mental health practitioners’ knowledge and skills to respond to climate related mental health issues. These typically involved workshops that facilitated discussion and training in relevant approaches to their practice. These initiatives provide training to practitioners to treat eco-anxiety not as a personal neurosis but rather as evidence of the client being connected to a greater whole (Dooley et al, 2021). Many interventions focus on grief awareness, including anticipatory loss, disenfranchised grief, and use Worden’s model of the tasks of grief[6] to successfully address eco-anxiety (Worden, 2009). 

Climate justice awareness interventions

Climate justice is a movement that connects the climate crisis to social injustice including racial discrimination, poverty, and human rights. Many strategies in Scotland and worldwide are developing programmes to ensure that the transition to net zero is fair to all groups. However, no evaluated interventions were found which had an explicit mental health focus. Evidence suggests that educating people about climate justice can help them cope with climate anxiety and support their involvement in creating fair solutions (Davenport, 2021). Current evaluation work on Just Transition in Scotland (Tavistock Institute, 2024) has found that there will be overlap with outcomes from participative decision-making interventions, since community empowerment is a key objective to both types of intervention.

Public communication interventions

The final area we found for intervening in the mental health risks of climate change was public communication. Messaging on climate change needs to be viewed through the lens of building resilience and agency or it may increase levels of climate dread and denialism (Hathaway, 2017). From a mental health standpoint, communication should seek to give agency to those in distress through engaging empathy, cultivating hope and focusing on local level actions rather than provoking guilt. Scotland has delivered public engagement activities in these areas, including the Let’s Do Net Zero website and toolkit, Our World, Our Impact, Climate Beacons, and Climate Ready Classrooms. Little evidence exists on the success of these or other projects in addressing climate anxiety or climate events. However, the Climate Beacons evaluation report shows results in community engagement that may relate to outcomes of interest, such as new connections made, confidence and empowerment (Hall and Coenon-Rowe, 2022).

Implications for Scotland

From the evidence review on interventions, scaling up appears most promising for interventions which promote resilience and capacity building due to the large volume of impactful and evaluated interventions in these two areas. Resilience building and coping are essential components for both climate distress and ‘bouncing back’ from climate change related events. Scottish policy makers can draw on a wide range of interventions with established mental health outcomes in these two categories. The strength of evidence for capacity building implies that for interventions responding to climate events, building community skills such as disaster preparedness and mental health first aid may be helpful in avoiding and mitigating direct and indirect mental health effects.

We also found three other types of evaluated interventions: social connection, nature connection and meaningful action. Each type is already delivered in Scotland and could possibly be scaled up and integrated with existing services and strategies. Interventions such as Climate Cafes, the Work That Reconnects, and various nature connection initiatives are already delivered in Scotland often as part of strategies including the Climate Change Public Engagement Strategy.

Climate action co-benefits and risks

Summary of findings from Chapter 6

This chapter addresses Research Question 4:

  1. What is the evidence of co-benefits and risks, or unintended consequences, for mental health and wellbeing from climate action (both mitigation and adaptation) relevant in a Scottish context?

Key findings:

  • Climate action can lead to improved mental health and wellbeing through supporting improved physical health and by addressing some of the social determinants of mental health such as financial security, and quality housing. Policymakers taking a cross-disciplinary approach to climate action and understanding the interconnected pathways of impact can achieve a win-win outcome for the climate and mental-health.
  • Energy efficiency measures in homes can lead to warmer homes which may increase thermal satisfaction; improve air quality; and reduce fuel poverty, in turn leading to financial security and improved general physical health. However, with increasing temperatures and overheating risks, it is important that building regulations support proper ventilation and cooling adaptation measures.
  • Active transport measures can improve mental health through increased physical activity and greater social participation. Equitable approaches to transport policy are key to ensure vulnerable groups are able to take advantage of the benefits.
  • Nature-based climate solutions have the potential to improve mental health and wellbeing through increased physical activity and a greater sense of community. However, they currently risk offering most benefits for those who live in more affluent areas given that they have better access to green spaces than those in deprived areas.

Introduction

This section examines the intended or unintended co-benefits and risks of ‘climate action’ for mental health and wellbeing. In the context of this chapter, ‘climate action’ refers to policy interventions that aim to address climate change (mitigation and adaptation). Co-benefits are the range of positive side effects from climate action on mental health and wellbeing that can equal or even outweigh the importance of environmental impacts. Conversely, risks are the range of negative unintended consequences from climate action.

In this review we frame climate action as adopting one of two approaches: climate change adaptation and mitigation. Adaptation is about managing the impacts of climate change as it occurs, for example, installing flood defences (Hiscock et al, 2017). Climate change mitigation is primarily concerned with the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, such as using renewable sources of energy (Ürge-Vorsatz, 2014). While climate action primarily serves an environmental purpose, it sits within a broader interconnected system which targets other major challenges. In Scotland, adaptation and mitigation strategy also focuses on addressing public health issues, reducing poverty and inequality, and building a stronger economy (Liski et al, 2019).

As discussed in Chapter 4, a cause of eco-distress is the (perceived) lack of action by decision makers and governmental institutions to combat climate change. The most direct method to address this cause of eco-distress is therefore to take effective climate action. Climate action on an individual, community and systems level (governments, corporations etc.) can work to help people cope with the difficult emotions surrounding climate change and help generate hopeful perspectives, improving mental health and wellbeing (Lawrance et al, 2022). Individual climate action such as reducing car use or choosing a plant-based diet can lead to a positive emotional response through acting in line with one’s values. Collective climate action can strengthen solidarity and social networks which may be particularly supportive for those living in climate vulnerable areas, such as island communities in Scotland. Systems climate action and its effective communication can improve the population’s trust in societal actors to help solve the climate emergency which can help reduce distress, particularly for young people (Lawrance et al, 2022).

We chose to focus on systems level climate action in our analysis. This is primarily due to there being a sufficient evidence base of relevant research to undertake our analysis for systems level climate action, but not for community or individual levels. Furthermore, putting trust in societal actors with visible climate leadership appears to be one of the most effective strategies to reduce and help prevent eco-anxiety impacting on wellbeing (Lawrance et al, 2022). Therefore, examining system level climate action may be the most useful analysis for policy makers.

Methodology

We reviewed 22 shortlisted sources related to the co-benefits and risks of climate action for mental health and wellbeing. While the health co-benefits or risks of climate action related to physical health are well documented, those related to mental health and wellbeing are less explored, as in most cases mental health and wellbeing are not the primary focus of the climate action so data on these outcomes is rarely collected. We found some evidence indicating risks to wellbeing, particularly when strategies do not adequately address concerns of equity, equality, and justice. However, the extent of these risks were difficult to determine due to limited evidence broken down by population demographic type (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity). We also found very limited evidence for these effects in Scotland.

From the 22 studies, we identified three main areas of climate action were most relevant for mental health and wellbeing co-benefits and risks in Scotland, which we have used as the thematic basis for presenting our analysis: (1) housing (energy efficiency measures), (2) transport (active travel) and (3) nature-based solutions including blue-green infrastructure. Other areas such as land management (biological sequestration, peatland restoration, afforestation) and food have not been included due to less evidence of direct causal pathways between the action and mental health or wellbeing (Lawrance et al, 2022).

Most evidence we found regarding mental health and wellbeing co-benefits of climate action were related to mitigation measures. In a Scottish context, evidence related to adaptation measures was more limited. However, there was some evidence related to how managed realignment, as an adaptation measure to address coastal erosion, can pose both co-benefits and unintended negative consequences for coastal communities. See section 6.4 for discussion.

Climate action related to housing

In Scotland, the housing sector is an important area for developing climate mitigation and adaptation, with mitigation methods addressing the energy efficiency of housing providing the most relevant evidence. Energy efficiency improvement measures, such as wall and roof insulation, boiler upgrading and draught-proofing, can support a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by decreasing the fuel needed to heat homes. Much of the literature analysing energy efficiency measures used environmental, public health, and anti-poverty lenses, which are relevant given the rise of fuel poverty and the cost-of-living crisis in Scotland. Moreover, there are strong links between energy efficiency measures and physical health improvements, particularly respiratory health. This is particularly relevant for Scotland where ill-health related to cold homes is a significant public health issue (UK Climate Risk, 2021).

The co-benefits and risks from climate action on housing are presented below through their causal mechanisms.

Improved thermal satisfaction

The evidence reviewed in our study presented it as an established fact that living in cold housing can contribute to poor mental health and wellbeing (Grey et al, 2017). Common mental health disorders such as anxiety and depression, as well as respiratory conditions such as asthma, have all been linked to living in cold homes. Vulnerable groups are more likely to live in poor quality housing. Vulnerable groups are also more likely to be unable to afford to turn heating on, and to spend more time in their homes (Gray et al, 2017). Energy efficiency measures can lead to warmer homes, and there is substantial evidence to suggest that improved thermal satisfaction can be linked to improved mental health (Hiscock et al, 2017). This is particularly true for those with existing chronic respiratory conditions (Thomson et al, 2013). However, there is also some evidence to suggest that energy efficiency measures could reduce thermal satisfaction through overheating, negatively impacting resident wellbeing (Hiscock et al, 2017). This risk is particularly relevant considering heatwaves and rising temperatures are an outcome of climate change in Scotland.

Improved air quality

Damp housing, the presence of mould, and poor indoor air quality have considerable negative impacts on overall health, including mental health (Hiscock et al, 2017). Access to warm and dry housing, especially for vulnerable groups such as children, older people and those with existing health conditions, is therefore associated with improved wellbeing (Vardoulakis et al, 2015; Bikomeye et al, 2021). Improved air quality can enhance the comfort of a home, making it easier to relax. However, if retrofitting is mismanaged and ventilation is not adequately considered, indoor air quality can worsen, potentially having unexpected negative consequences for wellbeing (Hiscock et al, 2017; Hiscock et al, 2014). By taking a more integrated approach to new-builds and retrofitting, risks associated with high indoor vapour and mould can be avoided (UK Climate Risk, 2021).

Potential reduction of fuel poverty

Energy efficiency measures may contribute to improved wellbeing by making heating more affordable. In Scotland, the majority of residential energy use is spent on heating homes (UK Climate Risk, 2021). Energy efficiency measures can reduce energy costs, alleviating some of the financial burden associated with fuel poverty. There is evidence to suggest that lower energy costs can reduce financial stress, benefitting mental health. Additionally, residents would have more money to spend on other necessities such as food, rent and transport (Grey et al, 2017). It can be inferred from this that energy efficiency measures could have the most impact on vulnerable groups and those in precarious financial situations.

Increased social interaction

Our review found evidence demonstrating the importance people place on their homes as places of comfort and relaxation (Hiscock et al, 2017). Warmer homes and improved air quality can lead to higher home satisfaction, which in turn can have a positive influence on social interaction as residents are more comfortable inviting guests to visit (Grey et al, 2017).

Climate action related to transport

Our review found evidence of the co-benefits for mental health and wellbeing of climate action regarding transport (Hiscock et al, 2017; Davis and White, 2022; ClimateXChange, 2021; Milner, Davies, and Wilkinson, 2012), including climate mitigation strategies such as individuals reducing their use of cars; policies promoting active travel (walking, wheeling, and cycling); and the prioritisation of public transport. These strategies aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while emphasising the health and wellbeing benefits of increased physical exercise and reduced noise and air pollution. These measures are known to provide a range of health and wellbeing benefits such as reduction in depression (Hiscock et al, 2014), reductions in obesity, diabetes, respiratory conditions, and cardiovascular disease and are shown to benefit mental health and wellbeing (Douglas et al, 2023).

In Scotland, the 20-minute neighbourhood concept supports a behavioural shift towards active travel. The idea behind it is that residents can meet their daily needs within a 20-minute walk, cycle or wheel of their home. Daily needs may include food shopping, accessing primary healthcare services, getting to school, and using public transport for onward travel to work and leisure activities (ClimateXChange, 2021). Another mechanism for climate change mitigation found in the literature is road space reallocation. This policy involves repurposing existing motor infrastructure (roads, roadside car parking) to promote sustainable transport (e.g., cycle lanes) or for community use (e.g., greenspace) (Douglas et al., 2023).

The co-benefits and risks from climate action on transport are presented below through their causal mechanisms.

Increased physical activity

The literature reviewed reports strong links between increased physical activity and improved mental health and wellbeing (Penedo and Dahn, 2005; Muirie, 2017). There is evidence that 20-minute neighbourhood infrastructure can increase walking and cycling behaviour in residents by reducing the need to travel by car. This behaviour change has physical health co-benefits, such as reducing the risk of obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular diseases.

However, there may be unintended negative consequences of promoting active travel on residents’ wellbeing if policies that restrict car use are perceived as reducing independence or personal choice (Douglas et al, 2023). Moreover, in some areas, residents may unsafe walking alone or in poorly lit areas, preferring to use a car for personal safety. Feeling afraid may counteract a positive wellbeing effect and reduce people’s willingness to take up active transport options (Hiscock et al, 2014).

Reduced social isolation and improved community relationships

Safer walking and cycling routes can build more connected communities and increase the likelihood of social interaction compared to car use. This is due to people spending more time in their local area and being more likely to interact with others living nearby when using public transport or actively traveling. There is evidence that demonstrates the positive impact this has on wellbeing, including general mood improvement (Hiscock et al, 2017). However, unless a lens of equity is used when implementing 20-minute neighbourhood and active travel infrastructure, accessibility for disabled people may be overlooked. This is particularly true for road space reallocation which can make car travel difficult (Douglas et al, 2023). Such changes may negatively impact the wellbeing of those rely on cars by reducing independence and ability to travel.

Climate action using nature-based solutions

Our review found that nature-based solutions are important climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies with co-benefits for mental health and wellbeing. This was supported by systematic literature reviews such as Hiscock et al. (2017). Nature-based solutions are ‘actions to protect, sustainably manage, or restore natural ecosystems, that address societal challenges’ (World Bank, 2020). While there are many types of nature-based solutions, this report focuses on blue-green infrastructure, which provided the most relevant, high-quality evidence. Blue-green infrastructure can be defined as ‘a strategically planned multifunctional network of natural and semi-natural areas and features designed and managed to deliver multiple benefits to people’ (Kirby and Scott, 2023). Examples include linear greenways and paths; ground, wall and roof vegetation; urban trees and streetscapes; parks and green spaces; peri-urban and rural forests and woodlands; inland blue infrastructure regeneration (ponds, lakes, wetlands, canals, rivers); and coastal blue infrastructure regeneration. Blue-green infrastructure contributes to climate change mitigation by cooling down towns and cities (reducing the urban heat island effect) and capturing carbon. It can also help improve urban resilience to flooding by reducing stormwater runoff (Kirby and Scott, 2023).

Our review identified direct causal mechanisms tied to improved wellbeing through blue-green infrastructure, including increased physical activity, spending time in nature, and a sense of stewardship. Indirect pathways mentioned in the literature include the potential wellbeing benefits and risks of increased tourism and local business use resulting from blue-green infrastructure implementation. Different types of green infrastructure may produce different mental health and wellbeing co-benefits or risks, however the high-level analysis adopted in our approach produced insufficient evidence to offer a more granular typography of this effect. Architectural and urban design-focused green infrastructure, such as sustainable drainage solutions, cannot be covered in our analysis since there is insufficient evidence related to wellbeing co-benefits in a Scottish context. This may warrant future exploration if new evidence becomes available.

The co-benefits and risks from climate action through nature-based solutions are presented below through their causal mechanisms.

Increased physical activity

Regeneration of green and blue assets can lead to more local opportunities for physical activity. There is a strong link between exercise and positive mental health and wellbeing, both immediate and long-term. Being more active and increasing fitness can lead to improved physical health through reduced obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease risk (Bikomeye et al, 2021). Improved self-perceived general physical health can enhance overall quality of life and general wellbeing. However, unless implementation and regeneration of blue-green infrastructure is applied equitably, it risks benefitting primarily those in higher socio-economic communities. Environmental justice studies have demonstrated that those living in more deprived areas of towns and cities have less access to high-quality greenspaces and that the residents have poorer overall physical and mental health compared to those who live closer to green environments (Baka and Mabon, 2022).

Spending time in nature

The implementation and regeneration of blue-green infrastructure positively impact biodiversity, encouraging local people to spend more time in nature. As described in the previous sections in 4.3.2 and 5.2.4, our review found strong evidence of links between time spent in nature and improved wellbeing including reduced stress, recovery from mental fatigue and increased happiness (Bikomeye et al, 2021). Specific examples include studies showing the positive impact of socially prescribed visits to wetlands on patients’ anxiety and depression (Kirby and Scott, 2023). Existing research demonstrates that blue-green infrastructure must have essential components in order to produce these benefits, such as tranquillity, perceived ‘greenness’ and a sense of safety (Baka and Mabon, 2022). There is also evidence to suggest that connecting with nature can enhance ecological awareness, which, along with wellbeing improvements, can also elicit feelings of distress (Smith et al, 2024).

Sense of stewardship and community

Visible efforts to improve communities through linear greenways and paths, parks and green spaces, regenerated canals and wetlands can increase residents’ sense of pride and stewardship in their community. Our review found evidence supporting the idea that an improved sense of place and increased social cohesion benefits social wellbeing (Bikomeye, Rublee, and Beyer, 2021). Furthermore, good quality blue-green infrastructure can support the maintenance of collective identity and social memory (Baka and Mabon, 2022). As mentioned in section 5.4.1, the emphasis on quality infrastructure in realising these benefits is important to note. Blue-green infrastructure differentiates itself from general greenspace in its essence as a nature-based solution which is strategically planned to produce benefits for humans and the planet.

Managed realignment

In addition to ‘blue-green’ infrastructure we found some evidence that climate adaptation could also bring wellbeing benefits. Managed realignment is the restoration of wetlands through the deliberate moving inland of coastal defences (Liski et al, 2018). One study found that managed realignment could contribute to improved local population wellbeing due to the restoration of natural wetland habitat and the possibility for more activities in nature. It was also recognised that managed realignment could affect agricultural yield potential and therefore it may negatively impact farmers’ mental health due to risks to their livelihood and financial security (Liski et al, 2019).

Conclusions and implications for policy

Conclusion

This review has aimed to address four related research topics: the evidence of climate change risks to mental health and wellbeing, the nature of eco-distress in Scotland, evidence on interventions for mental health and wellbeing in a climate change context, and the evidence of co-benefits for mental health from climate action.

Direct and indirect risks to mental health

The findings of the review strongly support the view that climate change is increasing risks to mental health in Scotland and will continue to do so. Based on the third UK Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA3) and other country specific analysis, we found that the main relevant climate change-related hazards for Scotland are increased frequency and severity of flooding, higher temperatures, more frequent and longer droughts, and coastal changes due to sea-level rises. These hazards contribute to a range of negative mental health outcomes through the disruption of the conditions for good mental health in each domain of life. These disruptions operate through direct pathways, such as injury, trauma, and property loss because of extreme weather, and indirect pathways, such as impacts on livelihoods, social networks, and the increased risk displacement. The severity of mental health outcomes varies depending on the nature of exposure to the hazard and the circumstances of those facing them, but includes heightened risks of PTSD, suicide, depression, anxiety and general poor mental wellbeing.

There is strong evidence that the impacts of climate change on mental health are not distributed evenly but will affect some groups more than others. The three main factors that determine a group’s vulnerability to poor mental health outcomes are (1) their exposure to climate change-related hazards, (2) their wider vulnerabilities to poor mental health and (3) their access to resources and support to help them recover. Climate change amplifies existing, social, economic and demographic inequalities by disrupting the positive conditions for good mental health making groups vulnerable. In Scotland, groups at heightened risk include older people, children, women, ethnic minorities, low-income individuals, those with pre-existing health and mental health conditions, coastal and island communities, and workers in agriculture and fisheries.

Eco-distress

We also found that climate change may have an impact on mental health through eco-distress or eco-anxiety, a psycho-social response to the awareness of the threat to the environment. Our review of evidence from this emerging field of research shows that while there is currently no consensus on the definition, some common themes are clear. These include that eco-distress is future-orientated, is associated with feelings of uncertainty, unpredictability, uncontrollability and being overwhelmed, and it particularly affects young people and vulnerable groups. The emotions from eco-distress include anger, frustration, despair, guilt, shame and grief. Crucially, the literature is generally in agreement that eco-distress is not a pathological condition. Eco-distress is considered a rational and justified response that can also lead to pro-environmental behaviours and thoughts.

In Scotland, researchers have found that up to 70% of people express distress and worry about climate change and environmental issues. However, whether this translates to a high proportion of people meeting narrower definitions of eco-distress is very much dependent on the definition employed. Where validated scales of eco-anxiety are used, this figure appears to be lower.

While there remains disagreement on measurement of these emerging constructs the data clearly demonstrates that people, particularly young people and vulnerable groups, are worried about climate change. Whether some forms of worry should be considered damaging to a person’s wellbeing and what should be done about this, is less clear. We expect to see greater clarity in how researchers understand and measure the phenomenon of eco-distress as the field matures.

Mental health interventions

We reviewed the evidence on mental health interventions (programmes, policies and practices) aimed at supporting mental health in the context of climate change. The evidence we found in this area was mostly thin, with only 22 out of 60 identified interventions having been evaluated. Whilst our review indicated that there are many good practices available, it remains uncertain how relevant and helpful any intervention may be to addressing mental health risks related to climate change in Scotland.

Two types of intervention had relatively strong evidence of their effectiveness. First, we found nine evaluated interventions that focused on strengthening psychological resilience and building coping mechanisms. Activities such as group therapy were found to be useful both for bouncing back after experiencing traumatic climate events and for dealing with climate distress day-to-day without being overwhelmed. Second, we found four capacity building interventions with high-quality evaluations. Despite mostly being delivered in developing countries, capacity building programmes may be a useful response to climate events in Scotland, particularly through training on disaster preparation and mental health in the community.

We found some evidence that social connection, nature connection and taking climate action could also help prevent and respond to climate change risks to mental health, particularly for climate distress. Social connection interventions such as climate cafes reduced isolation and increased social capital, and also provided a space to validate climate emotions. Nature-based interventions have been found to reduce anxiety, stress and the severity of depression. Group activities for children and young people in nature were also found to improve emotional strength and develop social skills. Programmes that encouraged climate action improved levels of empowerment, which is particularly relevant for people experiencing climate distress.

Co-benefits of climate action

Climate action can lead to improved mental health and wellbeing through addressing some of the social determinants of mental health such as financial security and quality housing. Policymakers taking a cross-disciplinary approach to climate action and understanding the interconnected pathways of impact can achieve a win-win outcome for the climate and mental health.

Climate action can have co-benefits and unintended consequences. In fact, our analysis found that climate action related to housing provided an important opportunity to address several cross-cutting issues in Scotland, including mental health and wellbeing. Energy efficiency measures such as improved insulation can lead to warmer homes, which may increase thermal satisfaction, improve air quality and reduce fuel poverty. Social determinants of mental health including better financial security and improved general physical health play an important role in wellbeing co-benefits of housing climate action. However, with increasing temperatures and overheating risks posing a serious hazard in Scotland, it is important that building regulations support the installation and proper maintenance of appropriate ventilation and cooling adaptation measures when considering energy efficiency.

Social determinants of mental health were also present in our analysis of transport-related climate action. Prioritising active travel has potential wellbeing benefits through increased physical activity, reduced noise and air pollution, and improved community relationships. It is also important to take an equitable approach to transport policy to ensure vulnerable groups are able to take advantage of its benefits.

Climate action using nature-based solutions demonstrated similar opportunities for improving mental health and wellbeing through increased physical activity and a greater sense of community. However, nature-based solutions offer the most benefits for those who live in more affluent areas given that they have better access to green spaces and resources than deprived areas. Active measures to improve access for all groups within society to green spaces and natural environments can address this inequality.

Lessons for policy in Scotland

It is clear from our research that climate change represents a risk to the mental health and wellbeing of the Scottish population. In this section we discuss the main implication of our findings for policy.

Focus on risk areas

Mental health risks related to climate change derive from three main factors: people’s exposure to or awareness of climate related hazards; their existing vulnerabilities to poor mental health; and their access to resources and support. In general, each of these factors is potentially the site of policy intervention.

  • Exposure to hazards: A primary way to address climate change-related impact on mental health is by addressing climate change itself at a macro-level through climate action (adaptation and mitigation). By lessening the frequency and severity of hazards and managing the severity of their impacts on communities, infrastructure, and services, one can reduce its impacts on mental health outcomes. Put simply, actions will prevent disruptions to the conditions for positive mental health.
  • Existing vulnerabilities: As our research shows, climate change acts as an amplifier of existing vulnerabilities, which are the result of social, economic and demographic factors such as poverty, inequality and social exclusion. By working at a societal level to address the main causes of vulnerability to poor mental health outcomes, you reduce individual and groups vulnerabilities to the additional stressors caused by climate change. The effects of climate change are only one factor among many that impact population mental health. Taking steps to build a healthier and more resilient population will help protect against these impacts.
  • Access to resources and support: Finally, a key determinant of mental health outcomes is people’s access to timely and appropriate support to recover from emergencies, or navigate the disruption caused to lives and livelihoods by climate hazards. Improving the comprehensiveness and accessibility of support in relation to the main hazards (e.g., emergency services, welfare and social services, health and mental health support) is likely to reduce the negative impact of climate change on population mental health. While there is also a need for targeted and climate change-specific interventions, mainstream services have a strong role to play in protecting the population from negative outcomes.

Prioritise areas of urgency and vulnerability

There is a growing body of risk analysis that predicts the most common and impactful climate-related hazards in Scotland. These are flooding, increased temperatures and loss of coastal land. Risk analyses also note the growing risk offered by droughts, poor air quality, and biodiversity loss. There is also an increasing understanding of populations most at risk from these hazards, determined by their exposure to the hazards (i.e., geographical in the case of flood risk or sea-level rises) and social vulnerabilities in terms of social, economic, demographic factors, and living circumstances. With this knowledge, responses may include for example:

  • Integrating mental health awareness/response into emergency response, as more evidence shows the negative mental health consequences of involvement in emergencies, and which groups are most vulnerable to these impacts. Incorporating a mental health lens to emergency response may help reduce the negative mental health impacts. Targeted support for vulnerable people caught up in climate-related emergencies may reduce the prevalence, duration and severity of poor mental health outcomes. This should involve developing cross-sector plans for emergency response prior to emergencies that integrates mental health awareness and support, combined with early identification of mental health concerns and intervention in the event of a climate-related emergency.
  • Specific action about temperature for the most vulnerable: In addition to public health information provision aimed at increasing heat awareness and reducing the impact of temperature on population mental health, there may be value in identifying people at most risk of poor outcomes via their contact with services. This may require the provision of training and awareness raising for professionals. It is also important to ensure that settings with high proportions of vulnerable people such as healthcare and care settings are equipped to manage high temperatures.
  • Support for groups whose livelihoods are impacted by climate change and climate action: Our research identifies groups whose livelihoods may be affected by climate change in the long run, such as agricultural and fisheries workers, those who work in the tourism industry and groups who work in high-emissions industries such as oil and gas whose livelihoods may be affected by the planned transition to net zero. Policymakers should consider measures to mitigate negative mental health and wellbeing outcomes from these changes through, for example, the provision of alternative employment and training opportunities, welfare transfers and other forms of support.
  • Managed displacement: As the effects of climate change advance, it is increasingly likely that communities will be displaced. Our research found that the way this process is managed – whether it is planned and orderly, or unplanned and in response to an emergency – can have a major bearing on mental health and wellbeing. This suggests the importance of long-term planning to identify the most vulnerable communities to work with to manage future displacement.

Reverse disempowerment though building connection and prompting action

A key challenge for policy is to understand climate emotions not only as problems but also as levers and solutions. Emotions are often what lead people to act: “ecological anxiety and grief, although uncomfortable, are in fact the crucible through which humanity must pass to harness the energy and conviction needed for the lifesaving changes now required.” (Cunsolo et al, 2020). In short, policy can use care and emotion as assets.

While eco-anxiety affects people from all demographics, young people are particularly exposed to it and it is important that they are supported to help mitigate this. Early evidence suggests that eco-anxiety is lessened where people are empowered to act in their lives, communities and political systems.

One of the most effective areas for action is to identify affected groups and invest in interventions that empower participants and give agency. In practice, direct climate action and preventing/addressing mental health risks are often two sides of the same coin. Addressing helplessness supports a sense of agency and can often trigger people and groups into action. The way people think and feel about climate change influences climate action, and climate action in turn changes emotions related to the environment (Lawrance et al, 2022). This implies that increasing climate agency and action has the potential to reduce the impact of climate distress on mental health and wellbeing, while also improving the climate itself (Lawrance et al, 2022).

Take visible actions

As described above, a key pillar of any response to climate change-related mental health issues is robust, ambitious climate action on mitigation and adaptation. In order to address people’s rational and legitimate anxieties about the future, they need to feel that proportionate action is being taken to address the threats and local, national and supra-national levels. Our review shows that eco-anxiety is linked to the perception of inaction on climate change by government and other actors. While this is a key condition to manage the mental consequences of climate change, action should be coupled with clear and transparent communication.

Public communication about climate change and climate action

The final area found for intervening in the mental health risks of climate change was public communication. Messaging on climate change needs to be viewed through the lens of building resilience and agency or it may increase levels of climate dread and denialism (Hathaway, 2017). For many experiencing eco-distress, the severity of the ecological crisis is such that it is no longer certain that future generations will arrive and thrive. This creates disorientation. Attempts to shock people with facts or using fear, guilt, or shame to motivate ecological action produce ‘defensive rigidity’ (Hathaway, 2017).

For many who read shocking news on the climate, full awareness of the crisis may be painful. Psychic distress can be reduced by ‘‘turning down the volume’’ instead of acting (Sewall, 1995). Danger signals, which should demand attention and lead to collective action, instead “make us want to pull down the blinds and busy ourselves with other things” (Macy and Brown, 1998). From a mental health standpoint, communication should seek to give agency to those in distress through engaging empathy, cultivating hope and focusing on local level actions rather than provoking guilt.

Select areas for action with existing resources in mind

The scale of climate worry and the necessity for climate action mean that at national, regional and local levels, collaborative efforts should be developed to address the mental health implications of climate change through concrete actions by all key agencies including health and mental health services, and local authorities (Hayes et al, 2018). At present, global studies indicate mental health resources available to intervene specifically in mental health issues arising from climate change are inadequate, insufficient and inequitably distributed (Hayes et al, 2018; Lawrance et al, 2022); As temperatures and climate events increase, investment in effective interventions and climate actions, such as in transport and housing, will be necessary to improve wellbeing of residents in Scotland to cultivate hope and prompt individual and collective action. However, since public finances in Scotland and elsewhere are tight, it is important to build upon existing resources and systems and avoid building a parallel suite of actions:

  • The authors recognise that addressing inequalities of access and care are already a priority in the long-term mental health strategy (Mental Health and Wellbeing Strategy) and the latest delivery plan (2023-2025), and recommend that climate change and its impacts be considered in their implementation.
  • We found many areas of intervention and adaptation that are either already delivered in Scotland or similar actions are taking place. These include nature-based solutions, social connection interventions and nature connection interventions.

Support monitoring of prevalence and evaluation of interventions and adaptations

Evidence on the prevalence and distribution of mental health impacts of climate change in Scotland is inconsistent with substantial gaps. We suggest more systematic monitoring of key indicators to best target support towards the communities with the greatest need. For example, consider including eco-distress as an item on an existing or new longitudinal survey of the population in Scotland.

It is notable that many interventions and adaptations were delivered with very little attention to measuring the mental health impact on participants. This has led to a limited evidence base on what works to address the mental health and wellbeing impact of climate change, despite many promising and worthy actions in this area. As a result, the scope to have fully evidence-informed confident policy decisions for addressing mental health risks in this area or to see which outcomes are produced (and can be reproduced) for vulnerable groups in Scotland is also limited.

The evidence base could be improved by the adoption of a more holistic vision of climate action, taking a system-wide view to include physical health and mental health not as co-benefits but primary benefits. Further, when commissioning infrastructure, adaptations or interventions, we recommend the inclusion of funding for monitoring and evaluation or access to evaluation resources that have at least some focus on the mental health impact on participants. Given the growing incidence of climate events and climate distress, building a knowledge base now will help policymakers make informed decisions to address the wellbeing impact of climate change in Scotland.

Appendix A: Methodology for systematic evidence review

Process overview

The systematic evidence review was conducted in three sequential stages: (1) scoping and collation and assessment of longlist; (2) collation and assessment of shortlist; and (3) synthesis and reporting. This document provides an overview of these stages and the procedures that were applied.

Figure 2 Workflow for the evidence review

A diagram of a process

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Our approach to this review was designed to produce strongly evidenced answers to four research questions which are collectively targeted at understanding the relationship between climate change and mental health, and how interventions may affect this relationship.

These research questions can be clustered according to whether they relate primarily to population studies or interventions.

Population study based and conceptual questions:

  1. What is the evidence of climate related risks and impacts to mental health and wellbeing in Scotland, and how these might differentially affect population groups?
  2. How is ‘eco-distress’ (including ‘eco-anxiety’) currently defined, what is the current/potential prevalence in Scotland and how might this differentially affect population groups?

In general, these questions were answered by reviewing general population studies (for instance, research addressing how people feel because of climate change) or conceptual studies (for instance, defining relevant concepts or identifying types of causal relationship).

Intervention based questions:

  1. What is the evidence on effective prevention and early intervention, and on responding to mental health and wellbeing risks and impacts in a climate change context in Scotland?
  2. What is the evidence of co-benefits and risks, or unintended consequences, for mental health and wellbeing from climate action (both mitigation and adaptation) relevant in a Scottish context?

These questions were mainly addressed through analysis of intervention studies (for instance, studies of how people feel following climate change interventions or after a climate adaptation has been delivered).

Given the potential breadth of these questions and the timeline in which to answer them, the study included four interviews with experts who provided an informed overview of the topic areas, including working definitions of key terms, Scotland-specific insights to the topics, and key studies and interventions. With the help of the project steering group and our own searches we identified individuals with expertise in either/ both academic research in relevant fields to the research questions (i.e., mental health and climate change), and relevant Scottish Government policy and practice.

Stage 1: Collating and assessment of a ‘long list’ of items

The first stage in the evidence review entailed searching and collating relevant material using search engines and identifying other sources to create a longlist of potentially relevant documents. This involved searching, collating, and defining items for review and entering these into an extraction spreadsheet. The items were drawn from two sources:

  1. Items results from search engine searches to identify materials.
  2. Items identified through ‘snowballing’ (recommendations from the Core Team; external experts; other experts; references from other documents)

The documents selected were then assessed and filtered to produce a shortlist. Many of the documents on the longlist were not directly relevant to answer the research questions, therefore were excluded from the shortlist. However, many covered topics tangentially related to mental health and climate change, such as climate migration and job losses, and so were retained in the longlist, shared, and referred to in reporting where relevant to the broader topic or when indicating areas for further research .

Data sources

The searches were performed on a variety of platforms to ensure that two types of sources were identified: i) ‘official’ published literature, e.g., books; peer reviewed journal articles; formal reports and ii) ‘grey’ literature, e.g. website material; intervention descriptions; statistics; company data; government policies and actions. Searching was confined to the period 2015-present unless key ‘landmark’ texts (that have very high levels of citations within the field or are considered to provide key theoretical developments to the field such as coining key terms) and surveys were identified by stakeholders or in other publications that had been published earlier. This search concentrated on the peer reviewed ‘academic’ and practice literature, mapping concepts, theories, policies, and practices with regard to climate change and mental health.

The sources for materials are set out below.

Search terms

The search terms were structured to answer the four key research questions we needed to cover. This initial list was subject to iteration depending on the search results.

Table 3 Search Terms

Identification of studies

Identification of interventions

Risks

Eco-distress

Prevention/ intervention

Climate action

Wellbeing+risk+“climate chang*”

Eco-anxiet*+defin*

“Mental health”+”climate chang*”

Citizen+“climate action”

“Mental health”+risk+”climate chang*”

“Ecological grief”

“Wellbeing”+“climate chang*”

“Green prescription”

Extent+eco-distress

“Environmental psych*”

Eco-anxiety+treat*

“Climate mitigat*”+wellbeing

Extent+eco-anxiety

“Conservation psych*”

Eco-distress+treat*

“Climate adapt*”+wellbeing

Direct+eco-distress

“Solastalgia”

Eco-distress+“early interv*”

“Public climate action”+wellbeing

Indirect+eco-distress

“Determinants of health”+”climate change”

Eco-distress+“prevent*”

“Just transition”+”Mental health”

Vicarious+eco-distress

Groups+eco-distress

All above +Scotland

“Just transition”+Wellbeing

Flooding+”mental health”

Vulnerable+eco-distress

 

All above +Scotland

Snow+disruption+”mental health”

All above +Scotland

  

Heatwaves+”mental health”

   

All above +Scotland

   

Entering items in extraction spreadsheet

Each item identified was logged in an excel spreadsheet, one per row, using the following descriptors (column headings):

  • Item number – for researcher reference
  • Title – of book; article etc.
  • Type – book, article, report etc.
  • Source – where obtained from
  • Authors
  • Date – date published
  • URL – if exists (data consulted)
  • Focus – Short description of which research question(s) it addresses or the focus of the study
  • Summary – A brief one- or two-line summary description of the item, e.g. using an ‘abstract’ of a report or article
  • Who – the researcher who inputted the item.

Table 4 Snapshot of longlist extraction template: basic information

A screenshot of a computer

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Stage 2: collation and assessment of a ‘short list’ of items

Inclusion/exclusion criteria

The searching process generated 238 items that were potentially of value. Due to time constraints, only items that were likely to score ‘1’ on domain relevance were included on the longlist. These items had to be separated into the four research areas and assessed for their rigour, relevance and value to the study. This second stage therefore entailed reviewing the material collected though stage 1 in order to select a shortlist of the most relevant items. The checklist below provided a simple way for the research team to rank relevance and consists of applying seven assessment criteria to each item. Table 4 presents the checklist the research team used which was completed by scoring each of the boxes for which the item meets the criteria to arrive at a total ‘score’. In order for the shortlist to be relevant to Scotland and include systematic reviews, the two relevant criteria were given double weighting.

Table 5 Inclusion-Exclusion criteria for Data Audit

Criteria

Question

Tick box

1.Domain relevance

Does the item directly cover climate change AND mental health/wellbeing?

o

2. Recency

Is the item up to date (published after 2015)?

o

3. Research relevance

 

Does the evidence concern Scotland? (score 2 for Scotland, 1 for UK)

Does this item address vulnerable/target groups?

Does this item address known gaps in our knowledge?

Is this item directly relevant to answering a research question?

Does this item include high quality primary evidence?[7]

Is this item a systematic or scoping review which reviews several studies in one item? (score 2 if so)

o

o

o

o

o

o

SCORE

0-10

The shortlist selection used the checklist as follows:

  • If Criterion 1 not ticked (Domain relevance) then the item was discarded. This includes items relating to potentially indirect effects of climate change, such as the wellbeing impact of losing a job, the impact of migration, that did not explicitly refer to climate change as a cause.
  • Make judgement on selection of the remaining items. Firstly, look at the total score. The higher the score, the stronger the case for selecting a particular item for subsequent analysis. Secondly, look at the ‘relevance’ scores for the items, particularly on whether the study concerned Scotland. The higher the relevance scores the stronger the case for selecting a particular item for subsequent analysis. Finally, check the summaries for the items from the extraction sheet and assess the extent to which they are useful for the study.

Table 6 Snapshot of shortlist extraction template: Inclusion rating

A blue and green wall with a white box

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Many items fulfilled several criteria. All items were relevant to at least one research question and only 13 percent were not published since 2015. Close to half (45 percent) of items were scoping or systematic reviews. Fourteen percent directly concerned Scotland since search terms specifying ‘Scotland’ were included in all searches.

Table 7 Item counts for the shortlisting criteria

Criteria

Number of items fulfilling criteria

Proportion of items which fulfilled criteria

Relevant domain

238

100 percent

Recent

206

87 percent

Concerns Scotland

34

14 percent

Addresses vulnerable/ target groups

120

50 percent

Addresses gap in knowledge

163

68 percent

Direct relevance to a research question

127

53 percent

Includes high quality primary evidence

101

42 percent

Systematic or scoping review

107

45 percent

Table 7 shows that nearly 75 percent of items scored five or above and under 5 percent scored 8 or above. As over 100 items scored between 6 and 10, these high scoring items were the focus of analysis in the analysis and synthesis stage. This scoring system was not infallible, however, and some items were selected from the longlist with lower scores where appropriate. In addition, other items not in the longlist were also added to the analysis where gaps in the literature were found during the analysis stage.

Table 8 Scores of items in the longlist

Score

Item count

Proportion of items

10

1

0.4 percent

9

2

0.8 percent

8

7

3.0 percent

7

45

19.0 percent

6

54

22.8 percent

5

68

28.7 percent

4

31

13.1 percent

3

17

7.2 percent

2

12

5.1 percent

1

1

0.4 percent

Stage 3: Analysing selected items

Using the results of the shortlisting process, we analysed each item selected in the shortlist and summarised the results of the analysis. The approach taken to answering the research questions differed depending on the nature of the research question.

Analysis for research questions 1 and 2

Content analysis of the material related to research questions 1[8] and 2[9] followed the ‘inspection’ method. This entails scanning each item of material manually, creating a classification framework and coding constructs to map the occurrence of particular items, and the relationships between them for each research question. This classification frame and set of constructs were then modified and added to as the analysis develops.

The framework is divided into three sections.

Section 1 provides details on the item (name; type of material; source; summary of the content). This was imported from the extraction template.

Section 2 provides a framework for analysing the item. The initial classification framework is a ‘first baseline’ for the content analysis. Each item was analysed across three dimensions which underwent iteration depending on the results of the exercise:

  • A Thematic dimension (column 1), reflecting the key themes and research objectives of the study, using the language of the research questions. For example, determinants of health; unintended effects; prevention.
  • Each theme is broken down into a number of sub-themes – ‘constructs’ – that should be searched for within each item being analysed. These were initially developed following the shortlisting process and undergo further iteration throughout the analysis. For example, exacerbation of health conditions, prevalence of conditions, community-based interventions etc.
  • Codes and examples or descriptors of how each construct is treated (described) in the material being analysed should be entered into Column 3. This could include direct quotations from the text/material to help illustrate the study research questions. For example, a paragraph of text on the wellbeing effects of being flooded.

In Section 3 additional themes, constructs, and descriptors were added as the analysis developed.

We highlighted evidence particularly relevant to Scotland, particularly research examining Scottish or UK populations; relating to common climate change hazards in Scotland (e.g., flooding); or from similar climatic, geographical, or social/governmental contexts.

A 2021 scoping review identified 120 original research studies that examined mental health and climate change. The earliest study identified was published in 2007 with the review finding an increasing trend in the number of studies on this topic each year up to the present (Charlson et al, 2021). As the number of original research studies has increased, there has been a growing number of literature and evidence reviews that summarise the overall state of the field now (Lawrance et al, 2022; Charlson et al, 2021; Cianconi, Betro, and Janiri, 2020; Hayes et al, 2018; Manning and Clayton, 2018). For this reason, we took the decision to focus our analysis on the most recent and highly cited literature and evidence reviews and those with the most robust review methodologies, for this we following adapted Rapid Evidence Assessment protocols from DfID (2015), research quality assessment for each shortlisted study was related to four criteria: conceptual framing, methodological transparency, validity, and relevance. We then supplemented review findings with reference to original studies or additional evidence where useful.

Analysis for research question 3

For answering research question 3[10] the analytical process initially paid close attention to the core dimensions of Realist Synthesis:

  • Context (where the studies/interventions were conducted, what part context played in the results for example via geography specific effects)
  • Mechanisms that underpinned the effects of interventions (for instance, experiencing a greater sense of agency through direct environmental work)
  • Outcomes (which aspects of mental health, other determinants of health are covered)

Individual interventions were identified from the shortlist for research question 3. Systematic reviews and other scoping reviews were then mapped in terms of how they categorised relevant interventions. Areas of overlap were identified and some intervention types were insufficient data were not included in the analysis. This resulted in eight types of intervention being included in the review: Capacity building, Climate justice, Communication, Nature connection, Participation, Practitioner development, Resilience and coping, and Social Connection.

Interventions were then input into a spreadsheet with the following criteria using descriptive text:

  • Name
  • Level of action
  • Location
  • Study design
  • Climate stressor
  • Target population
  • Intervention details
  • Inclusion of co-design
  • Expected mental health outcome (measure)
  • Evaluation results

From this, further analysis was conducted on the qualitative data to make a simpler set of codes from the descriptive data. These topics are listed below along with the input options [in square brackets]:

  • Location code [Developed country, Global South, UK or Scotland]
  • Evidence effectiveness cluster [A, B or C – see below for more details]
  • Climate distress [Yes or no]
  • Primary subgroup [Any, Indigenous, Low income, Minorities, Poor mental health, Potential activists, Practitioners, Rural, Teachers, Vulnerable, or Youth]
  • Primary outcome [Relief from disorders, Reduce distress, Improved wellbeing, Empowerment, Coping self-efficacy, Social capital, Validate emotions, or Optimism]
  • Secondary outcome [same list as primary outcomes]
  • Primary mechanism [Capacity building, Climate justice, Communication, Nature connection, Participation, Practitioner development, Resilience and coping, and Social connection]
  • Secondary mechanism [same list as primary mechanism]

The framework used for assessment of quality of evidence for the interventions is outlined below.

Evidence of Effectiveness Assessment for Interventions

To ensure the appraisal process measures strength of evidence, the research team assessed each identified initiative using a bespoke Standards of Evidence framework we developed for the Medici project called the Evidence Effectiveness Framework. The framework has tight criteria and clusters initiatives into three categories: Cluster A: Innovative Interventions, Cluster B: Effective Interventions, and Cluster C: Replicable Interventions. These clusters and the inclusion criteria are outlined below.

Cluster A: Innovative Interventions

Cluster A has a low threshold for inclusion as it is for new, innovative interventions which are prepared for further roll out. This is where many interventions were assigned, since interventions related to eco-distress are likely to be relatively new.

We do not expect new interventions to have been subject to rigorous evaluations. However, a promising intervention should be as prepared as possible through research, specification of the intervention logic, piloting and plans for evaluation.

This cluster includes interventions which have:

  • Recently begun delivery
  • Have defined and designed their intervention with care
  • Are likely to have a positive impact if delivered at scale
Assessment questions
  • Has any research been conducted on this intervention type by the originating organisation?
  • Yes / no
  • Has their intervention been piloted by the originating organisation?
  • Yes / no
  • Is there evidence that the intervention has a defined theory or a Theory of Change?
  • Yes / no
  • Is there an evidence plan to determine whether the intervention makes a difference?
  • Yes / no
  • When was the intervention first delivered?
  • Year/month
  • To what extent can this intervention be considered to be innovative?
  • Likert scale 1-5 from not innovative at all to highly innovative
Threshold for inclusion in Cluster A

Projects must achieve the following to be included in Cluster A:

  • Questions 1, 2, 3 & 4 must be ‘yes’ (or don’t know) AND
  • Question 5 must be under 5 years ago
  • Question 6 must be a ‘3’ or higher.

Cluster B: Effective interventions

Cluster B relates to whether the intervention has been shown a positive effect on its target group. This implies a specific evaluation of the project has been implemented, that the evaluation showed a positive effect on relevant outcomes, and that the data which shows this positive effect has been generated using an appropriate methodology.

The questions on methodological fit assume that the intervention logic or theory has been articulated and the methodology is transparent. The question can be answered with respect to which outcomes were measured, how they were measured, and whether (quasi-) experimental methods would be logistically/ethically inappropriate.

This cluster included interventions which have:

  • Received one or more evaluation with positive outcomes
  • Been evaluated using appropriate methods that support confident conclusions
  • Include a well-defined set of outcomes which fits their change model.
Assessment questions
  • Through the data collected and analysed we have seen there is change.
  • Yes / no
  • Is / are the outcome evaluation(s) based on an appropriate / well-articulated and justified evaluation approach that is commensurate with the intervention? This could be either “qual” and/or “quant”.
  • Yes / no
  • How well has the study has been implemented / methodological issues (like sample sizes) been considered to allow rigorous conclusions to be drawn?
  • Likert scale of 1 – 5
Threshold for inclusion in Cluster B

An intervention was included in Cluster B if it:

  • Answers ‘yes’ to question 1 and 2 AND
  • Scores 3 out of 5 or above for question 3.

Cluster C: Replicable interventions

This is the final cluster in the evidence of effectiveness rating system. It is for interventions that already have a strong evidence base behind them that has been generated by a number of evaluations which may also have been implemented in different locations or by applying the intervention with different target groups.

This cluster is differentiated from Cluster B as the evaluations should provide a higher degree of confidence that the intervention has caused or contributed towards the change observed. The evidence provided may be qualitative or quantitative and ideally, combine the two. The chosen methods need to be embedded in, and appropriate to, a well justified evaluation approach and implemented to provide the best data possible.

This cluster included interventions which have:

  • Received more than one evaluation with positive outcomes (without replication but with increasing rigour)
  • Been replicated and evaluated in the replication destination
  • Both of the above.

We have included flexibility as to whether the cluster requires interventions to have been replicated as we feel that there is otherwise too great a distance between the requirements for cluster B and C.

Assessment questions
  • Does the project have a Theory of Change and if so, does this theory of change include evidence based / realistic outcomes that have been shown to materialise (for the target group / beneficiaries)?
  • Yes / no
  • Are the outcome evaluations based on an appropriate / well-articulated and justified evaluation approach that is commensurate with the intervention? This could be either “qual” and/or “quant”.
  • Yes / no
  • How well have the studies been implemented / methodological issues (like sample sizes) been considered to allow rigorous conclusions to be drawn?
  • Likert scale of 1 – 5
  • Has more than one evaluation of this intervention been conducted by an independent evaluator? These evaluations could be in one location or multiple locations.
  • Yes / no
Threshold for inclusion

Projects must achieve the following to be included in Cluster C:

  • Questions 1, 2 & 4 must be ‘yes’ AND
  • Question 3 must be a ‘3’ or higher.

The analysis resulted in 60 interventions being categorised

Table 9 Count of evidence effectiveness categorisation

Evidence Effectiveness Cluster

Count of interventions

Proportion of interventions

A – Innovative interventions

35

61 percent

B – Effective interventions

14

25 percent

C – Replicable Interventions

8

14 percent

The full list of interventions can be found in Appendix D.

Analysis for research question 4

As stated in Chapter 6, analysis of research question 4[11] on the co-benefits of climate adaptation and mitigation largely followed the same process as the three sections outlined for research questions 1 and 2: identifying themes, sub-themes and key extracts from studies, then using this as a basis for further analysis. This resulted in 22 high quality sources being reviewed which related to the co-benefits and risks of climate action for mental health and wellbeing.

Appendix B: Causal pathways between climate change and mental health

Figure Illustrates Lawrance et al (2022)’s idea of a continuum of casual pathways between climate change and mental health (from direct to indirect), starting with the main hazards at the top of the diagram leading through to the main mental health outcomes at the bottom via many possible casual pathways.

A screenshot of a computer

Description automatically generated

Appendix C: Shortlisted items from the Realist Synthesis Review

Item number

Reference

Summary

Score

RQ1

RQ2

RQ3

191

Douglas, M. J., Teuton, J., Macdonald, A., Whyte, B., & Davis, A. L. (2023). Road space reallocation in Scotland: A health impact assessment. Journal of Transport & Health, 30, 101625.

We conducted a health impact assessment to identify and assess the potential impacts of road space reallocation on health and health inequalities in Scotland. This involved a facilitated scoping workshop to identify potential impacts, collation of routine data, interviews with 13 key informants and a rapid review of research literature.

10

  

x

152

Fazey, I., Carmen, E., Rao-Williams, J., Hodgson, A., Fraser, J., Cox, L., Scott, D., Tabor, P., Robeson, D., Searle, B., Lyon, C., Kenter, J. O., & Murray, B. (2017). Community Resilience to Climate Change: Outcomes of the Scottish Borders Climate Resilient Communities Project. University of Dundee

This report presents findings from an action research project conducted in the Scottish Borders between May 2015 and September 2016. The project aimed to: 1) Support a local process of community change through building partnerships, learning and capacity building; and 2) Understand the critical factors involved in facilitating the development of community resilience to climate change to draw out key levers for change nationally.

9

x

 

x

266

Curl, A., & Kearns, A. (2017). Housing improvements, fuel payment difficulties and mental health in deprived communities. International Journal of Housing Policy, 17(3), 417–443. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616718.2016.1248526

This paper examines the effect of warmth interventions on self-reported difficulties affording fuel bills and mental health, using a longitudinal sample in Glasgow, UK

9

  

x

149

Houston, D., Werritty, A., Ball, T., & Black, A. (2021). Environmental vulnerability and resilience: Social differentiation in short‐and long‐term flood impacts. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 46(1), 102-119.

Survey of representative samples (n = 593) of households up to 12 years after they were flooded, one of the first to provide detailed analysis of social differentiation in long-term flood impacts. Social differentiation in flood impacts is relatively small soon after a flood, but widens over time, with socially disadvantaged groups displaying less recovery.

8

x

x

 

156

Tieges, Z., McGregor, D., Georgiou, M., Smith, N., Saunders, J., Millar, R., … & Chastin, S. (2020). The impact of regeneration and climate adaptations of urban green–blue assets on all-cause mortality: a 17-year longitudinal study. International journal of environmental research and public health, 17(12), 4577.

The present observational study used a unique 17-year longitudinal natural experiment of canal regeneration from complete closure and dereliction in North Glasgow in Scotland, U.K. to explore the impact of green and blue canal assets on all-cause mortality as a widely used indicator of general health and health inequalities.

8

  

x

162

Salvador Costa, M. J., Leitão, A., Silva, R., Monteiro, V., & Melo, P. (2022). Climate change prevention through community actions and empowerment: a scoping review. International journal of environmental research and public health, 19(22), 14645.

As society tries to tackle climate change around the globe, communities need to reduce its impact on human health. The purpose of this review is to identify key stakeholders involved in mitigating and adapting to climate change, as well as the type and characteristics of community empowerment actions implemented so far to address the problem.

8

x

  

197

Jill Muirie (2017) Active travel in Glasgow: what we’ve learned so far. Report for the Glasgow Centre for Population Health

This report follows the synthesis of ten years of GCPH evidence published in October 2014 which emphasised, in line with international evidence, the importance of economic, environmental and social factors on health.

8

  

x

227

Paavola, J. (2017). Health impacts of climate change and health and social inequalities in the UK. Environmental Health, 16, 61-68.

This article examines how social and health inequalities shape the health impacts of climate change in the UK, and what the implications are for climate change adaptation and health care provision. Exposure to heat and cold, air pollution, pollen, food safety risks, disruptions to access to and functioning of health services and facilities, emerging infections and flooding are examined as the key impacts of climate change influencing health outcomes. Age, pre-existing medical conditions and social deprivation are found to be the key (but not only) factors that make people vulnerable and to experience more adverse health outcomes related to climate change impacts.

8

x

  

231

Dunnell, K., Farager, R., Haberman, S., Leon, D., Price, D. & Sloman, D. (2022). The current and future effects of climate change on health in the UK. Longevity Science Panel.

UK focus on health effects of Climate Change

7.5

x

x

 

2

Hayes, K., Blashki, G., Wiseman, J., Burke, S., & Reifels, L. (2018). Climate change and mental health: risks, impacts and priority actions. International journal of mental health systems, 12, 1-12.

This article provides an overview of the current and projected climate change risks and impacts to mental health and provides recommendations for priority actions to address the mental health consequences of climate change.

7

x

x

 

3

Hayes, K., Berry, P. and Ebi, K.L., 2019. Factors influencing the mental health consequences of climate change in Canada. International journal of environmental research and public health, 16(9), p.1583.

A scoping review of literature published during 2000–2017 explored risks, impacts, and vulnerabilities related to climate change and mental health.

7

x

x

 

5

Charlson, F., Ali, S., Benmarhnia, T., Pearl, M., Massazza, A., Augustinavicius, J., & Scott, J. G. (2021). Climate change and mental health: a scoping review. International journal of environmental research and public health, 18(9), 4486.

This scoping review aims to assess the available literature related to climate change and mental health across the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) five global research priorities for protecting human health from climate change.

7

x

x

 

24

World Health Organization. (2021). COP26 special report on climate change and health: the health argument for climate action.

The 10 recommendations in the COP26 Special Report on Climate Change and Health propose a set of priority actions from the global health community to governments and policy makers. The recommendations were developed in consultation with over 150 organizations and 400 experts and health professionals.

7

x

  

26

Berry, H. L., Waite, T. D., Dear, K. B., Capon, A. G., & Murray, V. (2018). The case for systems thinking about climate change and mental health. Nature climate change, 8(4), 282-290.

The authors outline current thinking about climate change and mental health, and discuss crucial limitations in modern epidemiology for examining this issue. A systems approach, complemented by a new style of research thinking and leadership, can help align the needs of this emerging field with existing and research policy agendas.

7

x

x

 

28

Hickman, C., Marks, E., Pihkala, P., Clayton, S., Lewandowski, R. E., Mayall, E. E., … & Van Susteren, L. (2021). Climate anxiety in children and young people and their beliefs about government responses to climate change: a global survey. The Lancet Planetary Health, 5(12), e863-e873.

We surveyed 10 000 children and young people (aged 16–25 years) in ten countries (Australia, Brazil, Finland, France, India, Nigeria, Philippines, Portugal, the UK, and the USA; 1000 participants per country).Data were collected on participants’ thoughts and feelings about climate change, and government responses to climate change.

7

x

x

 

47

Ma, T., Moore, J., & Cleary, A. (2022). Climate change impacts on the mental health and wellbeing of young people: A scoping review of risk and protective factors. Social Science & Medicine, 301, 114888.

The article reviews evidence on the scope and nature of the climate change challenge; reviews how these impacts manifest themselves in insecurity at diverse scales; and examines evidence on the political economy of adaptation responses to these impacts.

7

x

  

56

Dooley, L., Sheats, J., Hamilton, O., Chapman, D., & Karlin, B. (2021). Climate change and youth mental health: Psychological impacts, resilience resources, and future directions. Los Angeles, CA: See Change Institute.

this report: (1) synthesizes a decade of research on climate and mental health with a focus on youth and BIPOC, (2) shares a framework of the key components of climate resilience / anxiety interventions, and (3) highlights promising approaches in schools, families, communities, and clinical settings for climate anxiety support. synthesized over a decade of research and theory on climate change and mental health, with a focus on youth and BIPOC groups.

7

 

x

 

84

Elaine C Flores, Laura J Brown, Ritsuko Kakuma, Julian Eaton and Alan D Dangour. Mental health and wellbeing outcomes of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies: a systematic review
2023 IOP Publishing Ltd
Environmental Research Letters, Volume 19, Number 1

We included controlled, quasi-experimental, pilot, and focussed case studies reporting mental health or wellbeing outcomes assessments of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.

7

  

x

101

Kirby, M., & Scott,. AJ. (2023). Green Blue
Infrastructure Impacts on Health and Wellbeing; A Rapid Evidence Assessment: CAPE, University College London.

This rapid evidence assessment assesses current knowledge in the academic literature concerning the impacts of Green Blue Infrastructure on people’s health and wellbeing in the UK, and the implications therein for policy and practice and its use in Parliamentary work.

7

  

x

102

Grey, C.N.B., Jiang, S., Nascimento, C. et al. The short-term health and psychosocial impacts of domestic energy efficiency investments in low-income areas: a controlled before and after study. BMC Public Health 17, 140 (2017).

This study examined the relationship between energy efficiency investments to homes in low-income areas and mental and physical health of residents, as well as a number of psychosocial outcomes likely to be part of the complex relationship between energy efficiency measures and health outcomes.

7

  

x

110

Sanna Markkanen & Annela Anger-Kraavi (2019) Social impacts of climate change mitigation policies and their implications for inequality, Climate Policy, 19:7, 827-844,

This paper synthesizes evidence from the existing literature on social co-impacts of climate change mitigation policy and their implications for inequality.

7

  

x

113

Miller ME, Nwosu CO, Nyamwanza AM, Jacobs PT. Assessing Psychosocial Health Impacts of Climate Adaptation: A Critical Review. NEW SOLUTIONS: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy. 2023;33(1):37-50.

This critical review seeks to contribute towards closing this gap through a synthesis of current literature on the psychosocial health outcomes of climate adaptation actions.

7

x

 

x

121

Hayward, G., & Ayeb-Karlsson, S. (2021). ‘Seeing with Empty Eyes’: a systems approach to understand climate change and mental health in Bangladesh. Climatic Change, 165(1), 29.

hree databases were searched for English primary qualitative studies published between 2000 and 2020. Out of 1202 publications, 40 met the inclusion criteria. This systematic review applies a systems approach to further understand Bangladesh’s ‘climate-wellbeing’ network. The literature indicates diverse factors linking environmental stress and mental ill-health including four key themes: (1) post-hazard mental health risks, (2) human (im)mobility, (3) social tension and conflict, and (4) livelihood loss and economic hardship. This systems analysis also revealed that people’s mental wellbeing is strongly mediated by socio-economic status and gender.

7

x

  

134

Vergunst, F., & Berry, H. L. (2022). Climate change and children’s mental health: a developmental perspective. Clinical Psychological Science, 10(4), 767-785.

Drawing on a developmental life-course perspective, we show that climate-change-related threats can additively, interactively, and cumulatively increase psychopathology risk from conception onward; that these effects are already occurring; and that they constitute an important threat to healthy human development worldwide.

7

x

x

 

138

Thoma, M. V., Rohleder, N., & Rohner, S. L. (2021). Clinical ecopsychology: the mental health impacts and underlying pathways of the climate and environmental crisis. Frontiers in psychiatry, 12, 675936.

This synergy of literature provides a current summary of the adverse mental health impacts of the climate and environmental crisis from the perspective of Clinical Psychology. Furthermore, it presents potential underlying processes, including biological, emotional, cognitive, behavioral, and social pathways.

7

x

x

 

146

Cianconi, P., Hanife, B., Grillo, F., Lesmana, C. B. J., & Janiri, L. (2023). Eco-emotions and Psychoterratic syndromes: reshaping mental health assessment under climate change. The Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine, 96(2), 211.

Paper focusses on what it describes as emergent ‘eco-emotions’ and ‘psychoterratic syndromes’, i.e. psychological categories resultant from the existential (mortal/cultural/societal/personal) threat posed by climate/ecological crises. Owing to this clinical angle, it further distinguishes between phsychological distress resulting in ‘positive outcomes’ (i.e. pro-environmental behaviours/actions) and those which result in psychotherapy – a means of stressing that eco-anxiety should not be pathologised, while acknowledging that eco-anxiety can result in outcomes that require theraputic interventions that have been considered in light of eco-anxiety as a distinct category.

7

x

x

 

148

Brophy, H., Olson, J., & Paul, P. (2023). Eco‐anxiety in youth: An integrative literature review. International journal of mental health nursing, 32(3), 633-661.

This literature review aimed to summarize the relevant works on eco-anxiety in young people, provide a critique of the literature, identify gaps, and discuss the relevance to nursing practice.

7

x

x

 

150

Werritty, A., Houston, D., Ball, T., Tavendale, A., & Black, A. (2007). Exploring the social impacts of flood risk and flooding in Scotland.

This report presents the findings of a social research project, the aim of which was to assess the range of impacts that experience of recent flooding in Scotland has had on people, their attitudes and behaviours; and to establish “what works” with particular popluation groups and locations in relation to flood prevention campaigns and flood warning/dissemination systems.

7

 

x

 

154

Liski, A.H., Ambros, P., Metzger, M.J. et al. Governance and stakeholder perspectives of managed re-alignment: adapting to sea level rise in the Inner Forth estuary, Scotland. Reg Environ Change 19, 2231–2243 (2019).

We interviewed 16 local organisations, landowners and farmers and held workshops with 109 citizens living the Inner Forth estuary in eastern Scotland, to examine how managed realignment is supported by stakeholder attitudes and their engagement.

7

  

x

157

Lawrance, E. L., Jennings, N., Kioupi, V., Thompson, R., Diffey, J., & Vercammen, A. (2022). Psychological responses, mental health, and sense of agency for the dual challenges of climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic in young people in the UK: an online survey study. The Lancet Planetary Health, 6(9), e726-e738.

The COVID-19 pandemic and climate change are affecting the wellbeing of UK young people in distinct ways, with implications for health service, policy, and research responses. There is a need for mental health practitioners, policy makers, and other societal actors to account for the complex relationship between climate agency, distress, and mental wellbeing in young people.

7

x

x

 

161

Majekodunmi, M., Emmanuel, R., & Jafry, T. (2020). A spatial exploration of deprivation and green infrastructure ecosystem services within Glasgow city. Urban Forestry & Urban Greening, 52, 126698.

We map potential of ecosystem services within urban areas to provide cooling and increase resilience to surface flooding and highlight the geographical mismatch between social deprivation and the preponderance of these ecosystem services. We explore the implications for a ‘climate just transition’ using GI as a performance indicator. (Glasgow)

7

x

 

x

201

Hannon, M. J., Cairns, I., Combe, M., Cooper, E., Davidson, M., Kerr, F., McDonnell, A., Phillips, P., Potts,
T., Reay, D., Roberts, J., Wharmby, C. Carbon Offsetting and Communities: Can Nature-Based Voluntary Carbon
Offsetting Benefit Scottish Communities?, Workshop Report University of Strathclyde, Glasgow,
https://doi.org/10.17868/strath.00083777

This briefing note captures the outputs of a workshop, involving team members and guest speakers, from the University of Strathclyde led project: Carbon Offsetting and Communities: co-developing alternative place-based voluntary offsets in Scotland.

7

x

  

213

N. Kabisch et al. (2017), Nature‐based Solutions to Climate Change Adaptation in Urban Areas, Theory and Practice of Urban Sustainability Transitions, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56091-5_1

This book brings together experts from science, policy and practice to provide an overview of our current state of knowledge on the effectiveness and implementation of nature-based solutions and their potential to the provision of ecosystem services, for climate

7

  

x

224

Budziszewska, M., & Kałwak, W. (2022). Climate depression. Critical analysis of the concept. Psychiatr. Pol, 56(1), 171-182.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the challenge posed to mental health by climate change. Our inquiry is based on literature review and original qualitative studies. The data are collected from both desk research and in-depth interviews with participants belonging to following groups: high school and university students, young parents, activists, and psychotherapy patients. This paper also offers the critical review of contemporary terminology used for mental health problems and emotions appearing in the context of climate change, as well as the history of scientific interest in the issue at hand

7

 

x

 

228

Lee, H., Kim, H., & Pehlivan, N. (2023). Heat exposure and mental health in the context of climate change. In Heat Exposure and Human Health in the Context of Climate Change (pp. 155-187). Elsevier.

This investigation aims to determine the impacts of heat exposure on mental health, in a climate change context, by reviewing the literature systematically to contribute to establishing appropriate public health policies and interventions for mental health. Findings are classified into five categories as diagnosed mental disorders and illnesses, suicides, violence, subjective wellbeing, and other outcomes. The mental health outcomes affected by heat exposure consisted of mortality due to mental illnesses, hospitalizations, emergency department or outpatient visits, aggravation of symptoms, incidence of mental disorders, dementia, suicide, and violence including assault and crime.

7

x

  

4

Palinkas, L. A., & Wong, M. (2020). Global climate change and mental health. Current opinion in psychology, 32, 12-16.

Poor mental health is associated with three different forms of climate-related events. Depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress are the most common impacts. Impacts represent both direct and indirect consequences of global climate change. Children and residents of low and middle-income countries are especially vulnerable. Understanding impact scope and scale is critical for prevention and treatment.

6

x

  

23

Coffey, Y., Bhullar, N., Durkin, J., Islam, M. S., & Usher, K. (2021). Understanding eco-anxiety: A systematic scoping review of current literature and identified knowledge gaps. The Journal of Climate Change and Health, 3, 100047.

Scoping review aims to understand 1. how eco-anxiety was operationalized in the existing literature, and 2. the key characteristics of eco-anxiety. Specifically, it seeks to address some conceptual nuance that is overlooked Hence, it focusses on eco-anxiety, not simply as a byword for negative emotions stemming from climate change, but on anxiety as a trauma response to climate change.

6

 

x

 

27

Cianconi, P., Betrò, S., & Janiri, L. (2020). The impact of climate change on mental health: a systematic descriptive review. Frontiers in psychiatry, 11, 490206.

163 items were selected. We looked for the association between classical psychiatric disorders such as anxiety schizophrenia, mood disorder and depression, suicide, aggressive behaviors, despair for the loss of usual landscape, and phenomena related to climate change and extreme weather.

6

x

  

45

Ma, T., Moore, J., & Cleary, A. (2022). Climate change impacts on the mental health and wellbeing of young people: A scoping review of risk and protective factors. Social Science & Medicine, 301, 114888.

This review scopes the current research on what and how RFs and PFs are related to the mental health impacts of both direct and indirect exposure to climate change for young people. RFs and PFs were reviewed through the lens of ecological system theory.

6

x

  

63

Ojala, M., Cunsolo, A., Ogunbode, C. A., & Middleton, J. (2021). Anxiety, worry, and grief in a time of environmental and climate crisis: A narrative review. Annual review of environment and resources, 46(1), 35-58.

Climate change worry, eco-anxiety, and ecological grief are concepts that have emerged in the media, public discourse, and research in recent years. However, there is not much literature examining and summarizing the ways in which these emotions are expressed, to what processes they are related, and how they are distributed. This study finds that negative emotions regarding environmental problems are normal, and often constructive, responses. Yet, given the nature, range, and extent of these emotions, it is important to identify diverse place-based and culturally relevant strategies to help people cope.

6

 

x

 

78

Bikomeye JC, Rublee CS, Beyer KMM. Positive Externalities of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation for Human Health: A Review and Conceptual Framework for Public Health Research. Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2021 Mar 3;18(5):2481. 

We briefly summarize the burden of climate change on global public health, describe important mitigation and adaptation strategies, and present key health benefits by giving context specific examples from high, middle, and low-income settings. We then provide a conceptual framework to inform future global public health research

6

  

x

100

Anastasia Baka & Leslie Mabon (2022) Assessing equality in neighbourhood availability of quality greenspace in Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom, Landscape Research, 47:5, 584-597

We assess the relationship between neighbourhood-level deprivation and local greenspace quality in Glasgow, Scotland…unlock the health, wellbeing and resilience benefits that good quality greenspace can provide.

6

  

x

106

Aylward, B., Cunsolo, A., Vriezen, R., & Harper, S. L. (2022). Climate change is impacting mental health in North America: A systematic scoping review of the hazards, exposures, vulnerabilities, risks and responses. International Review of Psychiatry, 34(1), 34-50.

This scoping review systematically examined the nature, range and extent of published research in North America that investigates climate-mental health interactions.

6

x

  

132

Comtesse, H., Ertl, V., Hengst, S. M., Rosner, R., & Smid, G. E. (2021). Ecological grief as a response to environmental change: a mental health risk or functional response?. International journal of environmental research and public health, 18(2), 734.

In this study, we examined how negative climate-related emotions relate to sleep and mental health among a diverse non-representative sample of individuals recruited from 25 countries, as well as a Norwegian nationally-representative sample. Overall, we found that negative climate-related emotions are positively associated with insomnia symptoms and negatively related to self-rated mental health in most countries.

6

x

  

137

Tang, K. H. D. (2021). Climate change and its impacts on mental wellbeing. Glob Acad J Humanit Soc Sci, 3(4), 144-151.

This review aims to examine the impacts of climate change on people’s mental wellbeing . To achieve the aim, relevant peer-reviewed scholarly articles published between 2000 and 2021. climate change could affect mental health in multiple ways including the experience of mild stress, distress, sleep disturbances, depression and anxiety. Extreme weather events posing risks to life could trigger post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, substance abuse and even suicidal thoughts, in addition to disrupting social support and networks. Gradual climate change yields less dramatic impacts on mental wellbeing. Global warming is associated with transient mental disorders, episodic mood disorders and higher inclination towards aggression while rising sea level stirs fears and worries of inundation, safety and food security. Melting ice changes landscape and triggers solastalgia besides loss of individual identity.

6

x

  

212

Irena Leisbet Ceridwen Connon, Extreme weather, complex spaces and diverse rural places: An intra-community scale analysis of responses to storm events in rural Scotland, UK, Journal of Rural Studies, Volume 54, 2017, Pages 111-125, ISSN 0743-0167

The article makes the claim that policies and practices of Disaster Risk Reduction, including the Scottish Community Resilience initiatives, need to focus more on the intra-community scale in rural settings in order to better protect residents from the risks that extreme weather poses to human wellbeing. 

6

x

  

223

Mullins, J., & White, C. (2018). Temperature, climate change, and mental health: Evidence from the spectrum of mental health outcomes. Working Papers 1801. Polytechnic State University, Department of Economics, California.

We find that higher temperatures increase emergency department visits for mental illness, suicides, and self-reported days of poor mental health. Specifically, cold temperatures reduce negative mental health outcomes while hot temperatures increase them. Our estimates reveal no evidence of adaptation, instead the temperature relationship is stable across time, baseline climate, air conditioning penetration rates, accessibility of mental health services, and other factors. The character of the results suggests that temperature affects mental health very differently than physical health, and more similarly to other psychological and behavioral outcomes.

6

x

  

264

Roe JJ, Thompson CW, Aspinall PA, Brewer MJ, Duff EI, Miller D, Mitchell R, Clow A. Green space and stress: evidence from cortisol measures in deprived urban communities. Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2013 Sep 2;10(9):4086-103. doi: 10.3390/ijerph10094086. PMID: 24002726; PMCID: PMC3799530.

This study extends an earlier exploratory study showing that more green space in deprived urban neighbourhoods in Scotland is linked to lower levels of perceived stress and improved physiological stress as measured by diurnal patterns of cortisol secretion. 

6

  

x

267

Houlden V, Weich S, Porto de Albuquerque J, Jarvis S, Rees K (2018) The relationship between greenspace and the mental wellbeing of adults: A systematic review. PLoS ONE 13(9): e0203000. 

A systematic review of the evidence for associations between greenspace and mental wellbeing, stratified by the different ways in which greenspace has been conceptualised in quantitative research.

6

  

x

17

Hiscock R, Mudu P, Braubach M, Martuzzi M, Perez L, Sabel C. Wellbeing Impacts of City Policies for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2014; 11(12):12312-12345.

Based on survey data (n = 763) from Suzhou, this study used Generalized Estimation Equation approach to model external conditions associated with wellbeing. Then, semi-quantitative analyses were conducted to provide a first indication to whether local climate change policies promote or conflict with wellbeing through altering these conditions. 

5

  

x

21

Hiscock, R., Asikainen, A., Tuomisto, J., Jantunen, M., Pärjälä, E., & Sabel, C. E. (2017). City scale climate change policies: Do they matter for wellbeing?. Preventive medicine reports, 6, 265-270.

It is increasingly realised that enacting climate adaptation policies will have unintended implications for public health, but there has been less focus on their implications for wellbeing. Survey designed to measure living conditions and levels of wellbeing in Kuopio, Finland.

5

  

x

22

Hiscock R, Mudu P, Braubach M, Martuzzi M, Perez L, Sabel C. Wellbeing Impacts of City Policies for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2014; 11(12):12312-12345.

We illustrate how wellbeing can be divided into objective and subjective aspects which can be measured quantitatively; our review of measures informs the development of a theoretical model linking wellbeing to policies which cities use to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

5

  

x

35

Berry, H. L., Bowen, K., & Kjellstrom, T. (2010). Climate change and mental health: a causal pathways framework. International journal of public health, 55, 123-132.

We propose an explanatory framework to enhance consideration of how these effects may operate and to encourage debate about this important aspect of the health impacts of climate change.

5

x

  

40

Lawrance, E. L., Thompson, R., Newberry Le Vay, J., Page, L., & Jennings, N. (2022). The impact of climate change on mental health and emotional wellbeing: a narrative review of current evidence, and its implications. International Review of Psychiatry, 34(5), 443-498.

This article explores the relationship between climate change and mental health, emphasising the need for a comprehensive understanding of the impacts on human wellbeing. The review highlights the urgent need to address the mental health impacts of climate change, emphasizsng the interconnected nature of mental health with environmental conditions. It calls for effective interventions and actions to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change on mental health and wellbeing, advocating for a holistic approach that considers various factors influencing mental health in the context of a changing climate.

5

x

x

 

43

Clayton, S., Manning, C., Krygsman, K., & Speiser, M. (2017). Mental health and our changing climate: Impacts, implications, and guidance.

This is an updated and expanded version of our 2014 report, Beyond Storms & This updated report is intended to further inform and empower health and medical professionals, community and elected leaders, and the public.

5

x

  

44

Manning, C., & Clayton, S. (2018). Threats to mental health and wellbeing associated with climate change. In Psychology and climate change (pp. 217-244). Academic Press.

 The mental health effects of climate change are multifaceted, including post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and suicide, and anxiety. Research has consistently demonstrated that specific risk factors (e.g., gender, socioeconomic status and education, pre-existing mental health symptomatology), are associated with increased vulnerability to mental health conditions post-disaster.

5

x

  

46

Hrabok, M., Delorme, A., & Agyapong, V. I. (2020). Threats to mental health and well-being associated with climate change. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 76, 102295.

This paper aims to describe the impact of climate change on mental health conditions, including risk and protective factors related to the expression of mental health conditions post-disaster, as well as a discussion of our local experience with a devastating wildfire to our region within Canada.

5

x

  

50

Kjellstrom, T., & McMichael, A. J. (2013). Climate change threats to population health and well-being: the imperative of protective solutions that will last. Global health action, 6(1), 20816

This article highlights links between climate change and non-communicable health problems, a major concern for global health beyond 2015.

5

x

  

52

Chersich, M. F., Wright, C. Y., Venter, F., Rees, H., Scorgie, F., & Erasmus, B. (2018). Impacts of climate change on health and wellbeing in South Africa. International journal of environmental research and public health, 15(9), 1884.

We systematically reviewed the literature by searching PubMed and Web of Science. Of the 820 papers screened, 34 were identified that assessed the impacts of climate change on health in the country. Most papers covered effects of heat on health or on infectious diseases (20/34; 59%).

5

x

  

68

Middleton, J., Cunsolo, A., Jones-Bitton, A., Wright, C. J., & Harper, S. L. (2020). Indigenous mental health in a changing climate: a systematic scoping review of the global literature. Environmental Research Letters, 15(5), 053001.

Thus, the goal of this study was to examine the extent, range, and nature of published research investigating the ways in which global Indigenous mental health is impacted by meteorological, seasonal, and climatic changes. Following a systematic scoping review protocol, three electronic databases were searched.

5

x

  

71

Charlson, F., Ali, S., Augustinavicius, J., Benmarhnia, T., Birch, S., Clayton, S., … & Massazza, A. (2022). Global priorities for climate change and mental health research. Environment international, 158, 106984.

Twenty-two experts participated from across low- and middle-income countries (n = 4) and high-income countries (n = 18). Our process identified ten key priorities for progressing research on mental health and climate change.

5

x

  

104

Obradovich, N., Migliorini, R., Paulus, M. P., & Rahwan, I. (2018). Empirical evidence of mental health risks posed by climate change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(43), 10953-10958.

Here, we show that short-term exposure to more extreme weather, multiyear warming, and tropical cyclone exposure each associate with worsened mental health

5

x

  

122

Clayton, S. (2018). Mental health risk and resilience among climate scientists. Nature Climate Change, 8(4), 260-261.

Awareness of the threats to mental health posed by climate change leads to questions about the potential impacts on climate scientists because they are immersed in depressing information and may face apathy, denial and even hostility from others. But they also have sources of resilience.

5

x

  

135

Sharpe, I., & Davison, C. M. (2021). Climate change, climate-related disasters and mental disorder in low-and middle-income countries: a scoping review. BMJ open, 11(10), e051908.

We used the scoping review methodology to determine how exposure to climate change and climate-related disasters influences the presence of mental disorders among those living in LMICs. We also aimed to recognise existing gaps in this area of literature.

5

x

  

147

Seritan, A., Asghar-Ali, A. A., Cooper, R., & Hatcher, A. (2023). The time is now: Climate change and aging adults’ mental health. The American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 31(3), S21.

Review age-specific and socio-economic-cultural determinants which increase the risk of adverse outcomes for this vulnerable population (older people). We will discuss the prevalence and phenomenology of psychiatric conditions that can occur in aging adults exposed to heat waves and/or natural disasters.

5

x

  

158

Jackson, L., & Devadason, C. A. (2019). Climate Change, Flooding and Mental Health. New York: The Rockefeller Foundation.

This review aims to fill an important gap in understanding of the potential key risk factors affecting farmers’ mental health around the world.

5

x

  

170

Trenbirth, H., & Dutton, A. (2019). UK natural capital: peatlands. London, UK: Office for National Statistics.

Peatlands occupy around 12% of the UK land area. This dramatic landscape provides over a quarter of the UK’s drinking water and stores a significant amount of carbon making it an important habitat for providing both provisioning and regulating ecosystem services in the UK. Peatlands are also a major tourist destination and provide cultural history contributing significantly to the UK’s cultural ecosystem service.

5

  

x

265

Beyer KM, Kaltenbach A, Szabo A, Bogar S, Nieto FJ, Malecki KM. Exposure to neighborhood green space and mental health: evidence from the survey of the health of Wisconsin. Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2014 Mar 21;11(3):3453-72. doi: 10.3390/ijerph110303453. PMID: 24662966; PMCID: PMC3987044.

This study contributes a population-level perspective from the United States to examine the relationship between environmental green space and mental health outcomes in a study area that includes a spectrum of urban to rural environments. 

5

  

x

54

Tiatia-Seath, J., Tupou, T., & Fookes, I. (2020). Climate Change, Mental Health, and Well-Being for Pacific Peoples. The Contemporary Pacific, 32(2), 400-430.

This article analyzes existing research on climate change and its impact on mental health and wellbeing, primarily among Pacific Islanders. To compensate for a lack of research in this area, the article also addresses some of the projected mental health implications resulting from disasters linked to climate change, such as flooding, hurricanes, and cyclones.

4

x

  

64

Pihkala, P. Toward a Taxonomy of Climate Emotions. Front. Clim. 2022, 3, 738154.

This article conducts a preliminary exploration of the taxonomy of climate emotions, based on literature reviews and philosophical discussion.

4

 

x

 

133

Willox, C., Harper, L., Ford, D., Edge, L., Landman, K., Houle, K., … & Wolfrey, C. (2013). Climate change and mental health: an exploratory case study from Rigolet, Nunatsiavut, Canada. Climatic Change, 121(2), 255-270.

Through a multi-year, community-led, exploratory case study conducted in Rigolet, Nunatsiavut, Labrador, Canada, this research qualitatively explores the impacts of climate change on mental health and wellbeing in an Inuit context. Drawing from 67 in-depth interviews conducted between January 2010 and October 2010

4

x

  

241

Thomas, F., Sabel, C. E., Morton, K., Hiscock, R., & Depledge, M. H. (2014). Extended impacts of climate change on health and wellbeing. Environmental Science & Policy, 44, 271-278.

Here we propose that greater insight and understanding of the health-related impacts of climate change can be gained by integrating the positivist approaches used in public health and epidemiology, with holistic social science perspectives on health in which the concept of ‘wellbeing’ is more explicitly recognised. Such an approach enables us to acknowledge and explore a wide range of more subtle, yet important health-related outcomes of climate change.

4

x

  

42

Huebner, G., (2021), Climate Change and Mental Health. Web article: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/news/2021/jul/climate-change-and-mental-health

Overview of topic with references

3

x

  

51

Sachs, J. D. (2014). Climate change and intergenerational well-being. The Oxford handbook of the macroeconomics of global warming, 248-259.

Theoretical macro-economic work on wellbeing in a Climate Change context

2

x

  

Appendix D: Interventions included in Chapter 5

Intervention name

Location

Climate distress focus

Primary sub group

Intervention details

Primary outcome

Evidence effectiveness cluster

Evaluation results

Primary mechanism

Livestock trading grants and collective-action groups

Global south

No

Rural

(1) Step-wise capacity-building interventions (59 collective-action groups with total membership of 2300) (2) Livestock trading grant

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

C

Capacity-building package plus trading grant improved personal/household wellbeing attributes in both Districts in comparison to control group. Link

Capacity

Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy in Lagos

Global south

No

Poor mental health

REBT (20 sessions; 50 minutes each) delivered in a group setting by therapists with PhD in career/mental health

Relief from disorders e.g. anxiety/depression/PTSD

C

Intervention group had significantly decreased depression symptoms in comparison to waitlist control group. Link

Resilience

Skills for Life Adjustment and Resilience (SOLAR) program

Global south

No

Poor mental health

Program delivered in a group setting (up to 10 participants per group) over 5 consecutive days, delivered by trained non- specialist facilitators or ”coaches”

Relief from disorders e.g. anxiety/depression/PTSD

C

Participants had significantly decreased distress/post-traumatic stress symptoms and functional impairment after the intervention, with some effects retained at 6-month follow-up. Link

Resilience

Bangladesh flooding grants

Global south

No

Low income

Red Cross Red Crescent Project distributed flood- forecast-based unconditional cash transfer (USD 60 equivalent)

Reduce general psychological distress/stress

C

Intervention group was less likely to experience psychological distress after the flood or feel anxious/depressed in the last seven days before the survey. Link

Capacity

Katatagan health intervention

Global south

No

Any

Locally adapted
“Katatagan” resilience intervention delivered in a group setting (5–7 participants per group) over 2 days as part of multi-day mission trips that provide medical/ dental and social services

Improved coping self-efficacy

C

Participants improved in coping self-efficacy in all module domains managing unproductive thoughts and emotions and identifying personal strengths. Link

Resilience

Katatagan anxiety intervention

Global south

No

Any

Locally adapted “Katatagan” resilience intervention delivered in a group setting (8 participants per group) by trained paraprofessionals

Improved coping self-efficacy

C

Intervention group had reduced anxiety scores and increased individual resilience 7–8 months post-intervention in comparison to control group; improvement in adaptive coping was less sustained. Link

Resilience

Haitian disaster preparedness

Global south

No

Vulnerable

3-day mental health integrated disaster preparedness intervention in a group setting (up to 20 participants per group) delivered by trained Haitian lay mental health workers

Relief from disorders e.g. anxiety/depression/PTSD

C

Intervention group had decreased mental health symptoms and functional impairment from baseline; and exhibited a trend in increase in social cohesion. Link

Capacity

Carbon Conversations

UK

Yes

Any

Guided group sessions (typically 6 sessions with 6–8 individuals per group, moderated by 2 trained volunteer facilitators) with themes set out in the handbook; created by Rosemary Randall and Andy Brown

Validation of emotions

B

Participants reported feeling less scared, less powerless, and more empowered (greatest perceived benefit among those with interest in climate change but has not engaged deeply in addressing carbon footprint). Link

Social

Rural Adversity Mental Health Program

Developed

No

Rural

Various; dedicated full- time drought mental health workers; farmer with lived experience/ RAMHP based on DMHAP with new components targeting aboriginal communities, older farmers, youth, women and substance use

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

B

The RAMHP training programme increased mental health understanding and willingness to assist others for over 90 percent of participants. Link 1

Link2

Capacity

Sonoma Wildfire Mental Health Collaborative

Developed

No

Rural

(1) Free trauma-informed yoga and meditation classes facilitated by trained yoga instructors, and (2) SPR training to counsellors and paraprofessionals

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

B

Most participants (84%) reported feeling better after class; repeat attendees reported feeling better for the rest of the week (32%), “lasting effects at reducing heightened response to ongoing stressors and episodic triggers”. Limited data to conclude SPR was associated with any mental health improvement. Link

Resilience

Environmental Health Clinic

Developed

Yes

Potential activists

Structured problem- based coping

Reduce general psychological distress/stress

B

Helped convert people’s anxiety and concern about environmental issues into specific, measurable, and significant actions. Link

Resilience

Borderlands Earth Care Youth Institute

Developed

Yes

Low income

Borderlands Earth Care Youth Institute (hands-on nature restoration work); essays and reflections on land ethics and nature

Improved coping self-efficacy

C

Program evaluation demonstrated positive effects of the program including improved emotional strength, as well as leadership, sense of community, and social responsibility. Link 1

Link2

Link 3

Nature

Addressing Climate Change impacts through Health Clinics

Developed

Yes

Vulnerable

Community garden hub and many associated programs, including community kitchen, market, school gardening and agricultural courses, tree-planting workshops, and sensory garden for hospital patients and aged-care residents

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

B

Internal program evaluation demonstrated improvements in mental health and social connectedness for participants. Link

Nature

Climate Change and Health Adaptation Program

Developed

Yes

Indigenous

On-the-land activities at fish camp for youth to connect with indigenous traditional knowledge facilitated by local community members including Selkirk Elders; participatory research documenting climate impact

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

B

Evidence presented showing how programme mitigated and adapted to the health impacts of climate change to demonstrate climate change resiliency within Indigenous communities. Link

Nature

All We Can Save

Developed

Yes

Any

Self-organized groups for reading the book “All We Can Save” over 10 sessions (recommended 6–10 people per group); founded by Katherine Wilkinson and Ayana Johnson

Reduced isolation/increased social capital

B

A survey for past
participants is available to fill out on the organization website; results are not public. Link

Resilience

Climate Cares guided journal

Developed

Yes

Youth

Physical journal with 4-weeks of guided activity content to support a person’s “mental wellbeing and effectiveness in acting on environmental issues”; developed by Climate Cares

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

B

Positive qualitative comments from 40 youth who received the journal in a pilot study. Link

Resilience

Climate Café®

Scotland

Yes

Any

Informal community meetings for people to share climate- related feelings and inspire collective action

Validation of emotions

B

Evidence that cafes help participants to validate feelings around climate distress, increase awareness of threats to planetary health, action taken in the face of climate change, and improved social connection. Link

Social

Climate Psychology Alliance’s Climate Cafes

Scotland

Yes

Any

Climate Cafes are a space for talking about emotions.

Throughout the Café, the focus of discussion is on participants’ thoughts and feelings about the climate and ecological crises.

Reduce general psychological distress/stress

B

Participants noted how they had not been fully conscious of the depth and breadth of their emotional responses to the climate crisis prior to attendance

Link 1

Link 2

 

Ibanikom Climate Mental Health Literacy Project

Global south

Yes

Youth

A mental health literacy program built on Ibanikom ancestral and cultural identity and knowledge that involved meetings twice a week for 6 months; participants learned about the psycho-effects of climate change and co-developed local small-scale integrated health and agriculture projects that are ecologically sound

Improved coping self-efficacy

B

One-year internal evaluation results indicative of community having increased awareness of climate disasters and mental preparedness of flood effects. Link

Social

Scotland’s Climate Assembly

Scotland

No

Any

Scotland’s Climate Assembly took place between November 2020 and March 2021. Its purpose was to consider and make recommendations on the question: “How should Scotland change to tackle the climate emergency in an effective and fair way?”. Its report was published in June 2021.

Increased hope/optimism

B

Members were less worried and more hopeful than the population as a whole about what Scotland can do to tackle climate, and became increasingly more optimistic that ‘things will work out fine’ over the course of the main Assembly period. 21% reported their feelings about climate change were having a negative impact on their mental health. Link

Participation

Good Grief Network

Developed

Yes

Any

Group sessions (over 10 weeks) delivered by peers in-person or virtually based on the Alcoholics Anonymous Approach; co- founded by Laura Schmidt and Aimee Lewis Reau

Reduced isolation/increased social capital

B

Internal evaluation suggested “participants report feeling less alone, more connected, empowered to take action in their lives”. Link

Social

Wetlands for Wellbeing

UK

No

Poor mental health

The wetland Nature-based intervention was designed to facilitate engagement with nature as a treatment for individuals diagnosed with anxiety and/or depression. Participants took part in a two-hour session per week for six consecutive weeks

Relief from disorders e.g. anxiety/depression/PTSD

B

Significant improvements in mental wellbeing, anxiety, stress and emotional wellbeing, as well as social isolation, confidence to be in nature, and management of physical health. Link

Nature

Cooperative enquiry Welsh school

UK

Yes

Youth

Two separate, but connected and consecutive
inquiries were conducted in a high school in South Wales; the
first with a group of young people (13-14 year olds), the
second with a group of supportive adults (their teachers and
leaders).

Reduced isolation/increased social capital

B

Cooperative inquiry helped the participants feel less alone and more connected with others in the group, with the teachers and the school, and prompted action. Link

Social

Climate Awakening

Developed

Yes

Any

Climate Emotions Conversations (group sharing and listening sessions; 4 participants per session) that occur 3 times per month guided by videos and conversation prompts; founded by Margaret Salamon

Validation of emotions

A

N/A

Social

Circularity

Developed

Yes

Any

Facilitation of in- person and virtual custom workshops that draw from climate psychology and nature therapy

Reduced isolation/increased social capital

C

N/A.

Social

Public mobile app to reduce symptoms of postdisaster distress

Developed

No

Youth

Sonoma Wildfire Mental Health Collaborative: “Sonoma Rises” mental health app based on SPR and uses select audio tools from PTSD Coach

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

No significant effects on clinical/functional outcomes detected; may be due to confounders/ small sample size. Link

Resilience

Climate Psychology Alliance

UK

Yes

Any

Therapeutic outreach program involving trainings and workshops on climate psychology

Reduce general psychological distress/stress

A

N/A

Resilience

Conceivable Future

Developed

Yes

Any

House parties for
individuals to connect, advocate against fossil fuel subsidies, and provide testimonies on the climate crisis, which is viewed as a reproductive justice crisis; led by Meghan Kallman and Josephine Ferorelli

Reduced isolation/increased social capital

A

N/A

Social

Deep Adaptation Forum

UK

Yes

Any

In-person or virtual groups and recurrent events (nature and frequency dependent on facilitators); speaker and workshop offerings; founded by Jem Bendell

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

N/A

Social

Eco-Anxious Stories

Developed

Yes

Any

Online platform for climate and mental health storytelling; participatory “Sharing our Stories” worksheet, and services include eco- anxiety workshops, content creation and resource development; founded by Rachel Malena-Chan

Reduce general psychological distress/stress

A

N/A

Communication

Force of Nature

UK

Yes

Youth

Training programs
for young people, youth speakers agency, student consulting network for businesses and non-profits, Anxiety- to-Agency workshops for students and educators; founded by Clover Hogan

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

A

N/A

Resilience

Globe and Psyche

Developed

Yes

Practitioners

Local conversation meetings to “explore what climate change means in their area, both its impacts and also opportunities for personal and collective healing”

Reduce general psychological distress/stress

A

N/A

Practitioners

Hold This Space

Developed

Yes

Any

An interactive
website that guides individuals to “feel, imagine and connect” around climate change issues; developed by Common Vision in partnership with Climate Cares and Force of Nature

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

A

N/A

Communication

One Earth Sangha

Developed

Yes

Any

Trainings, courses, and events aimed to build practices, community and action based on Buddhist tradition and Dharma teachings

Improved levels of empowerment

A

N/A

Resilience

Project InsideOut

Developed

Yes

Any

Online hub with interactive tools and resources to engage with and transform feelings, with the goal of becoming Guides to inspire changes in others

Improved levels of empowerment

A

N/A

Practitioners

The Climate Journal Project

Developed

Yes

Activists

Live journal circles and weekly climate journal prompts to “cope with eco- anxiety, move past paralysis and transition into action”; founded by Yvonne Cuaresma

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

N/A

Resilience

The Eco- Anxiety in Africa Project (TEAP)

Global south

Yes

Youth

A project of Sustyvibes founded by Jennifer Uchendu; offers research service, community action events, and physical/virtual spaces for sharing climate emotions

Validation of emotions

A

N/A

Social

The Resilience Project UK

UK

Yes

Youth

Youth are trained
through a residential program then lead
8-week Circles (typically 10 youth per Circle) to build knowledge and co- design programs to build resilience for other youth

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

A

N/A

Participation

The Resilient Activist

Developed

Yes

a

Self-care, speaker’s bureau, online events, climate cafés, and nature- connected programming that support emotional wellbeing; founded by Sami Aaron

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

N/A

Resilience

The Rest of Activism

UK

Yes

Any

A grant-subsidized program (by the Emergence Foundation) founded by Jo Musher- Sherwood that includes a weekly facilitated structured online space to support individuals’ “joy-filled activism”; monthly subscription fee required for membership

Reduce general psychological distress/stress

A

N/A

Resilience

The Resource Innovation Group (TRIG)

Developed

Yes

Practitioners

Workshops, webinars, and conferences based on the Resilience Growth Model of Transformation

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

N/A

Practitioners

Transition Network

UK

Yes

Any

Global network of community-led Transition groups that aim to build resilient communities and caring culture with an “Inner Transition” dimension (and “Heart & Soul” groups) that investigate the emotional/ psychological aspects of climate action

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

N/A

Resilience

Flood Re

Scotland

No

Low income

Underwriting flood insurance in the UK for citizens/businesses in flood-risk areas and building back better (BBB) so that properties are more resilient to flooding

Reduce general psychological distress/stress

A

N/A

Capacity

Psychology for a Safe Climate (PSC)

Developed

Yes

Practitioners

Professional Development series designed to equip health and mental health professionals with knowledge and skills needed to become more climate aware. 3-session series.

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

A

N/A

Practitioners

Ecotherapy and Climate Conscious Training and Consultation for Mental Health Professionals

Developed

Yes

Practitioners

10-session, weekly group based online training for mental health practitioners to train in eco-therapy or climate-conscious therapy

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

A

N/A

Practitioners

The work that reconnects

UK

Yes

Any

Wide variety of activities, including workshops, study groups, webinars, conversation cafes and retreats around the world

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

N/A

Resilience

Living with the Climate Crisis

UK

Yes

Any

Living with the Climate Crisis and its predcessor Carbon Conversations offer emotionally safe spaces to discuss and share feelings arounf climate change

Reduced isolation/increased social capital

A

N/A

Social

Emotional Resilience Toolkit for Climate Work

Developed

Yes

Activists

A facilitation guide for individuals, including a compilation of five practices

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

N/A

Resilience

Green Latinos Coalition

Developed

Yes

Minorities

A broad coalition of Latino leaders committed to addressing national, regional and local environmental issues

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

A

N/A

Participation

Outdoor Afro

Developed

Yes

Minorities

A non-profit that connects more than 100 leaders in 56 cities around the US to connect thousands of people to nature experiences

Reduced isolation/increased social capital

A

N/A

Participation

Sunrise Movement

Developed

Yes

Youth

“A youth movement working to stop climate change and create millions of good jobs in the process”

Improved levels of empowerment

A

N/A

Participation

Fridays For Future

Scotland

Yes

Youth

Youth-led global strike movement, the goal of FFF “is to put moral pressure on policymakers, to make them listen to scientists, and then to take forceful action to limit global warming”

Improved levels of empowerment

A

N/A

Participation

Youth Vs Apocalypse (YVA)

Developed

Yes

Youth

“A diverse group of young climate justice activists working together to lit the voices of youth, in particular youth of color and working-class youth.”

Improved levels of empowerment

A

N/A

Participation

Classroom guide for confronting anxiety and despair

Developed

Yes

Teachers

A paper that includes a strategic guide for confronting anxiety and despair in environmental studies and sciences

Reduce general psychological distress/stress

A

N/A

Resilience

Contemplative pedagogy

Developed

Yes

Teachers

Contemplative pedagogy is a method of integrating emotions into teaching practices, involving using mindfulness, silence, sensitivity to feelings in the body in teaching practice

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

N/A

Resilience

Existential Toolkit for Climate Justice Educators

Developed

Yes

Teachers

A website to help support environmental educators with hundreds of curated resources for educators

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

N/A

Resilience

Staying Sane in the Face of Climate Change

Developed

Yes

Youth

A toolkit (two versions) to support emotional resilience, mental health and action and build capacity of educators and students of crisis students to remain positive, resilient and effective.

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

N/A

Resilience

Transform our world

Developed

Yes

Teachers

An online hub to support teachers in bringing environmental and social action in the classroom

Validation of emotions

A

N/A

Resilience

Biocitizen

Developed

Yes

Youth

Offer summer camps, after-school enrichment, day hikes and overnight trips for children and teens.

Increased hope/optimism

A

N/A

Nature

Acta Non Verba

Developed

Yes

Youth

Offers services including education, childcare, economic empowerment, and access to green, safe spaces and healthy food

Improved general wellbeing or mental health

A

N/A

Nature

The evolving edge

Developed

Yes

A

Undoing Oppression sub-area that includes an Anti-Oppression Resource Group, a Spiral Journey Facilitator Development Program, and School for the Great Turning which is oriented to centering BIPOC activists, organizers, healers, and educators.

Improved coping self-efficacy

A

N/A

Climate justice

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How to cite this publication:

Gieve, M., Drabble, D., Copeland, R., Clay, F., Iacopini, G. (2025) Climate change and mental health & wellbeing – a review of emerging evidence, ClimateXChange. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/6005

© The University of Edinburgh, 2025
Prepared by The Tavistock Institute of Human Relations on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

This work was supported by the Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division of the Scottish Government (CoE – CXC).

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  1. This source suggests that common mental illness and mental disorders include Anxiety Disorders, Depression, Bipolar Disorder and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)



  2. E.g., substantial numbers of high-quality research papers linking climate change impacts (such as flooding, wildfires, increased temperatures) to poorer mental health outcomes (such as increased risk of mental disorders, suicide, or poorer mental wellbeing).



  3. No intervention was primarily focused on moving participants directly into climate action as a way of supporting wellbeing. However, 16 interventions encouraged action through other means, such as group therapy, toolkits, and discussion groups.



  4. Please note, use of the term ‘resilience’ in this section refers to individual psychological/ emotional resilience as opposed to climate/community resilience to extreme weather events, for example.



  5. The research was conducted using a randomised control trial (RCT), with two post-intervention surveys, both undertaken following a typical hurricane season with moderate associated flooding and other storm-related damage in the research communities.



  6. These tasks being: to accept the reality of the loss, to process the pain of grief, to adjust to a world without the deceased, and to find an enduring connection with the deceased in the midst of embarking on a new life.



  7. Evidence quality was assessed using the wording in question 3 for Cluster C, in 8.4.3 below, that is, whether the research was based on an appropriate / well-articulated and justified research approach that is commensurate with the intervention, which could be qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods.



  8. 1. What is the evidence of climate related risks and impacts to mental health and wellbeing in Scotland, and how these might differentially affect population groups?



  9. 2. How is ‘eco-distress’ (including ‘eco-anxiety’) currently defined, what is the current/potential prevalence in Scotland and how might this differentially affect population groups?



  10. What is the evidence on effective prevention and early intervention, and on responding to mental health and wellbeing risks and impacts in a climate change context in Scotland?



  11. What is the evidence of co-benefits and risks, or unintended consequences, for mental health and wellbeing from climate action (both mitigation and adaptation) relevant in a Scottish context?


Research completed: March 2025

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/6006

Executive summary

Our soils underpin all nature-based systems and are therefore vital for Scotland’s communities and economy. From food security to transport disruption through events such as landslides, the climate resilience value of investing in healthy soils is recognised by the Climate Change Committee as a priority adaptation area for Scotland.

There are many risks threatening Scottish soils across different soil types and land covers. However, unlike air and water, there is no single overarching soil policy providing security and governance for Scottish soils. Soils are spread across multiple policy divisions, which results in a lack of cohesive leadership in tackling threats to soils.

The aim of this route map is to consolidate the challenges of managing soil systems to develop an overarching strategy for delivering improved soil security across Scottish landscapes.

Key points

There is increasing awareness of the important role soils play for our communities, economy and environment in terms of their ability to contribute to climate regulation, flood resilience, food security, support forestry and assist biodiversity. This is reflected in recent policy updates which have outlined objectives that directly relate to improvements in soil health and/or security, such as:

This route map acknowledges the challenges of addressing soil security in a policy context due to the absence of an overarching soil-specific policy. Currently actions to support soils sit across different policies, which focus on different environmental challenges at different scales. Nevertheless, this route map outlines opportunities to gain value and effectiveness through better coordination of existing activities and policy delivery.

Next steps

Objectives

This route map recommends six objectives for Scotland to achieve our vision of ‘thriving soils for Scotland’s communities, economy and environment’:

  1. Lead – Inspire and collaborate to deliver the vision for Scottish soils
  2. Protect – Prevent further damage to soils
  3. Restore – Repair damaged soils
  4. Enhance – Strengthen soils for the future
  5. Evidence – Data, knowledge and wisdom relating to Scottish soils
  6. Mobilise – Communicate, engage and participate towards thriving soils in Scotland

Next steps

We recommend that the delivery of the route map is supported by ensuring the following:

  1. Scottish Government support the vision and common goals through the allocation of a soil policy group to lead and coordinate the delivery of this route map
  2. Baseline Scottish soil status to ascertain a starting point towards ‘thriving’ soils
  3. Collaboratively identify specific cross-sectoral actions to protect, restore and enhance Scottish soils
  4. Mobilise actions into practice through bespoke implementation plans
  5. Monitor progress and review future developments

Glossary

Brownfield

Refers to land that was previously urban/used for industry

Ecosystem services

Ecosystem Services are the direct and indirect contributions ecosystems (known as natural capital) provide for human wellbeing and quality of life. This can be in a practical sense, providing food and water and regulating the climate, as well as cultural aspects such as reducing stress and anxiety. In fact, the vast number of services provided by ecosystems can be categorised into more manageable groups of: provisional; regulating; cultural; and the slightly more ambiguous, supporting services

Eutrophication

The gradual increase in the concentration of nutrients (e.g. nitrogen and phosphorus) in aquatic ecosystem

Flood resilience

Reduce the intensity and/or frequency of flood events and severity

Food security

To have reliable access to a sufficient quantity of affordable and nutritious food

Greenfield

Land that was previously undeveloped

Net zero

A target of completely negating the amount of greenhouse gases produced by human activity, to be achieved by reducing emissions and implementing methods of absorbing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere

Peatlands

Peat is a defined soil type that has at least 50 cm organic horizon. NatureScot use Ramsar Convention’s definition of peatland: “Peatlands are ecosystems with a peat deposit that may currently support vegetation that is peat-forming, may not, or may lack vegetation entirely”. The Soil Survey for Scotland states that peat should have an organic layer or layers that exceed 50 cm deep from the soil surface and an organic matter content of more than 60%

Peaty soils

Also known as organo-mineral soil. Mineral soils with a peaty topsoil which is less that 50cm thick

Soil acidification

Soil acidification is the lowering of soil pH due to an accumulation of hydrogen ions. Soils with a pH of less than 5.5 is considered ‘acidic’

Soil carbon sequestration

Soils are in constant exchange with the atmosphere, they take in carbon (via photosynthesis, root exudates and the addition of organic material) and release carbon (through gas emissions associated with respiration or indirectly via leaching). Where a net gain in carbon exists the soils are considered to be ‘sequestering’ carbon

Soil carbon stock

The mass of carbon stored in the soil organic matter per area

Soil compaction

Soil compaction is a form of physical degradation in which soil biological activity and soil productivity for agricultural and forest cropping are reduced, resulting in environmental consequences away from the immediate area directly affected

Soil contamination

Soil contamination is when soil is polluted, implying the presence of chemicals and materials in soil that have a significant adverse effect on any organisms or soil functions. Soil pollutants include inorganic and organic compounds, some organic wastes and the so-called “chemicals of emerging concern”

Soil degradation

Soil degradation is defined as a change in the soil health status resulting in a diminished capacity of the ecosystem to provide goods and services for its beneficiaries

Soil enhancement

To improve soil health and resilience beyond its current state and the status quo

Soil erosion

The process of soil being gradually damaged and removed by the waves, rain, or wind, or the result of this process

Soil function / functionality

Soil Functions refers to the six key roles that soil plays in an ecosystem, including providing a medium for plant growth, supplying and purifying water, recycling nutrients and organic wastes, serving as a habitat for soil organisms, modifying the atmosphere, and acting as an engineering medium

Soil health

Physical, biological and chemical status of a soil which provide a range of soil functions (e.g. see AHDB Soil health card for Scotland)

Soil management

A collective term describing a range of practices and applications imposed on soils for a range of purposes (e.g. food production, ground preparation, urban developments, conservation etc)

Soil organic matter

Soil organic matter means all living, or once-living, materials within, or added to, the soil. This includes roots developing during the growing season, incorporated crop stubble or added manures and slurries

Soil protection

Refers to activities which contribute to the prevention of degradation of soils

Soil resilience

Soil’s ability to buffer or ‘cope’ with stresses such as extreme weather events and disturbance

Soil restoration

To ‘repair’ soils which have been degraded in some way (e.g. physical, chemical or biological degradation)

Soil risks/risks to soil

Refers to the threats and pressures on soils which may negatively impact on soil health and/or soil function

Soil salinisation

Soil salinization is a term that indicates the phenomenon or process of accumulation of water-soluble salt in the soil

Soil sealing

The covering of soil (generally with an impermeable material) for the purpose of urban development

Soil security

To defend soils from risks, dangers and threat that jeopardise its existence, health and function

Soil structure

The spatial arrangement of soil particles (called aggregates, crumbs, blocks or peds). Soil structure influences soil functions, for example how water moves through it and susceptibility to degradation such as erosion and compaction.

Water storage capacity / water retention

The ability for soils to hold or maintain water

Why we need a “Soil Route Map for Scotland”

We rely on soils for a wide range of primary functions (outlined on Scotland’s Soil Website) as soils underpin all nature-based systems and are therefore core to Scotland’s communities, environment and economy (Figure 1). However, evidence shows that there are several risks associated with poor soil management which threatens the future security of Scottish soils.

The costs associated with inaction are not only related to environmental impacts as these risks cascade to include socio-economic repercussions. Baggaley et al (2024) estimated that compacted soils in Scotland costs land managers up to £49 million annually in yield losses, up to £26 million per year in additional fertiliser use required to operate with compacted soils and up to £76,000 per household from increased flood risk and insurance claims attributed to soil compaction and soil sealing (Appendix A). From food security to transport disruption (e.g. through landslides) the climate resilience value of investing in healthy soils is recognised by the Climate Change Committee as a priority adaptation area for Scotland.

A cartoon of a town

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Figure 1. The role of soils in our environment (Figure adapted from the 3rd Scottish National Adaptation Plan and Adaptation Scotland’s Climate-Ready Places)

Risks to soil health

There are many risks to the health and security of our soil systems. Table 1 shows risks outlined in the Scottish Soil Framework (2009) and more recently in the Environmental Standards Scotland (ESS) report (2024). This highlights that many of the risks identified in the Scottish Soil Framework (2009) are still prevalent and jeopardising the future security of Scotland’s soils and the many functions they provide (Figure 1).

Table 1. Risks to Scottish soils outlined in the Scottish Soil Framework (2009)

Threats to soils ranked across all soil functions at the national scale (1 being the highest risk) and the Environmental Standards Scotland Report (2024), ranking threats as high, medium or low based on a set of criteria.

 

Scottish Soil Framework (2009)

Environmental Standards Scotland Report (2024)

Climate change impacts on soil

1

Loss of organic matter and carbon

2

Medium

Soil sealing

3

Low

Acidification and eutrophication

4

Loss of soil biodiversity

5

High

Soil contamination

6

Medium

Soil erosion and landslide

7

High

Pesticide application

8

Soil compaction

9

High

Salinisation

10

Risks from the inconsistent approaches to data collection and monitoring

High

Risks from carbon sequestration schemes

Medium

Water retention/capacity of soils

Medium

Application of waste to land

Medium

Landfilling of waste soil

Medium

Soilborne diseases and pests

Low

In terms of prioritising these risks, the two publications suggest different rankings, with the Scottish Soil Framework (2009) listing the impacts of climate change, the loss of organic matter (and carbon), soil sealing and soil degradation from acidification and eutrophication as the top four threats to Scottish soils. The ESS report (2024) ranked soil erosion and landslides, soil compaction, the loss of biodiversity and risks associated with inconsistent approaches to data collection and monitoring as being of highest priority. Opinions from a recent stakeholder workshop (Appendix B) identified soil disturbance, erosion and organic matter loss to be the highest priorities within agricultural and forestry sectors, with soil sealing ranking highest in the urban/built environment sector. At the landscape scale, the lack of a soil-specific policy was noted as the highest risk to soils in Scotland.

Soil degradation

Soil degradation (i.e. soils with diminished functionality) has wide reaching impacts, not just on soil properties, but also in terms of soil functionality and the broad ecological services which soils provide, which can also result in wider economic impacts. For example, impacts of soil degradation can include loss of yields, greater fuel use, loss of land, increased greenhouse gas emissions, increased diffuse pollution and degraded water quality, increased flooding events and flooding intensity and loss or damage to cultural and archaeological sites.

Soil degradation is not limited to one soil or land use type; it cuts across landscapes making the protection of soils challenging as there is no single solution. Therefore, due to the broad range of soil and land use types across Scotland (Appendix B), addressing the risks to soils will require a multi-layered, cross-sectoral approach. Despite this, unlike air and water, there is no single overarching soils policy focus with governance of soils being spread across multiple policy divisions This has resulted in a fragmented approach to tackling the threats to soil resources.

In addition to the wide range of policy objectives which impact on soils, the Scottish Government has a long history of investing in research for future policy development and delivery through the Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture Strategic Research Programme (SRP) and Centres for Expertise (ClimateXChange, CREW and SEFARI). Through the current SRP (2022-2027), approximately £50 million a year is invested to ensure that ‘Scotland maintains its position at the very cutting edge of advances in agriculture, natural resources and the environment’, with the research of soils being vital across SRP themes (see Appendix D). The protection and enhancement of soils is essential for achieving many of Scottish Government’s policy objectives (e.g. net zero, food security, flood resilience, biodiversity and climate adaptation). However, without an overarching vision for Scottish soils and soil-specific policy, it can be challenging to harness such evidence into impactful implementation to better protect Scottish soils.

The Route Map

The aim of the route map is to consolidate the challenges of managing soil systems (see Appendix E) across multiple land uses and policy themes and to develop an overarching strategy for delivering improved soil security across Scottish landscapes. The route map is also intended to indicate – and drive forward – positive actions towards the protection, restoration and enhancement of Scottish soils while delivering objectives across the nature-based policies highlighted. Specific aims of the route map for Scotland include:

  • Review existing soil protection within Scottish policy – to support the development of a route map, current knowledge and public policy-related research is reviewed to ascertain how Scotland’s policy objectives are underpinned by healthy soils and how available knowledge is used in decision making and policy development.
  • Develop a framework for the ‘Soil route map for Scotland’ – set a vision to act as a common goal across policy themes and identify objectives which offer an effective pathway for improving soil security in the future.
  • Implementation considerations of the ‘Soil route map for Scotland’ – explore potential actions that offer opportunities for delivering the route map objectives across existing policy deliverables.

Soil protection in existing Scottish policy and legislation

Currently, in Scotland the legislative landscape for soils is fragmented across multiple policy divisions within Scottish Government and largely aims to protect other environmental areas (such as water and biodiversity) from poor management of soils, rather than soil itself. However, soil security and soils are referenced across environmental acts, policies and strategies, as outlined below.

The Scottish Soil Framework (2009)

The Scottish Soil Framework (2009) is the most comprehensive, soil-specific document, to date, bringing together the wide range of risks to soils as well as activities that contribute to overcoming these risks through 13 positive soil outcomes, which are;

  • Soil organic matter stocks protected and enhanced where appropriate.
  • Soil erosion reduced and where possible remediated.
  • Soil structure maintained.
  • Greenhouse gas emission from soils reduced to optimum balance.
  • Soil biodiversity, as well as above ground biodiversity, protected.
  • Soils making a positive contribution to sustainable flood management.
  • Water quality enhanced through improved soil management.
  • Soil’s productive capacity to produce food, timber and other biomass maintained and enhanced.
  • Soil contamination reduced.
  • Reduced pressure on soils by using brownfield sites in preference to greenfield.
  • Soils with significant historical and cultural features protected.
  • Knowledge and understanding of soils enhanced, evidence base for policy review and development strengthened.
  • Effective coordination of all stakeholders’ roles, responsibilities and actions

A Scottish Soil Framework Progress Report (2013) highlighted developments since the framework’s publication, which highlights a range of activities such as the launch of the Centres of Expertise (2011), the publication of The State of Scotland’s Soil report (2011) and the development of the ‘Scotland’s Soil Website’.

Other key policy documents

A review of where soils are included in a Scottish policy context is outlined in Appendix F. Recent developments in Scottish policies include some focused consideration of soils, such as:

 

  • Scotland’s National Peatland Plan and Peatland ACTION has the vision to see peatlands in a healthy state and widely regarded as resilient by 2030 and the rewards of restoration effort undertaken in previous decades should be evident by 2050 and beyond.
  • The National Planning Framework 4 (NPF4) – the policy intent of NPF4-Policy 5 is “to protect carbon-rich soils, restore peatlands and minimise disturbance to soils from development with policy outcomes of a) valued soils are protected and restored, b) soils, including carbon-rich soils, are sequestering and storing carbon, c) soils are healthy and provide essential ecosystem services for nature, people and our economy.”
  • Scottish Forestry and UK Forestry Standard (UKFS) 5th edition – chapter 8 provides the ‘UKFS Requirements for Forests and Soil’ and ‘UKFS Guidelines on Forests and Soil’ for soil protection, acidification, contamination, compaction, disturbance, erosion fertility and organic matter (carbon) loss.
  • The Vision for Agriculture and Agricultural Reform Programme (Agriculture and Rural Communities Act) – this includes compliance via Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions (GAECS) in terms of maintaining a minimum soil cover (GAEC 4) to protect soil against erosion after harvest, to protect soil against erosion in certain situations (GAEC 5) and maintaining soil organic matter levels (GAEC 6). In addition to compliance, support has been available since 2022 for soil testing and nutrient management (The National Test Programme, Preparing for Sustainable Farming), which will become a requirement under the Whole Farm Plan introduced to Tier 1 payment requirements, with additional support associated with the introduction of measures contributing to regenerative agricultural practices (including continuous soil cover as outlined in the Agricultural Reform list of measures).
  • The 3rd Scottish National Adaptation Plan 2024-2029 – Outlines the importance of soils and the need for further protection as outlined in ‘Nature Connects objective’ for landscape scale approaches “Landscape scale solutions are implemented for sustainable and collaborative land use, including protecting and enhancing Scotland’s soils.”
  • The Scottish Biodiversity Strategy to 2045 provides a range soil specific objectives, (particularly objective 3 for agricultural soils) notably the action to “ensure increased uptake of high diversity, nature-rich, high soil-carbon, low intensity farming methods while sustaining high quality food production”. This includes the action to revise and update Scotland’s Soil Framework and action/implementation plan by 2030; to develop evidence-based Soil Health Indicators (SHIs) that can be considered for inclusion in Whole Farm Plans and forest management plans (and monitoring frameworks to assess change in soil health) as well as improving information and guidance for land managers.

There is a wide range of Scottish policy themes that are linked to soil systems across our landscapes (Appendix F), however the list above demonstrates that the protection of soils is concentrated to only a few policies. It is worth noting that despite soil protection being a key objective in some of these strategies and policies, the degree to which implementation into action occurs is often more difficult to assess. The varied challenges associated with soil management are outlined in Appendix D. The Scottish Biodiversity Strategy to 2045 offers the most recent policy area to set out specific objectives relating to soil protection is which, despite some gaps, has made great strides in collaborative discussion and objective setting in terms of soil health, particularly in the agricultural section. .

Soils are also considered within a range of Scottish regulations as outlined on Scotland’s Soil website, with their relevance to soils highlighted in Appendix F:

Developing a framework for the “Soil Route Map for Scotland”

The vision for the soil route map is “Thriving soils for Scotland’s communities, economy and environment”. This was developed to encompass the 13 outcomes (listed in Section 4) of the Scottish Soils Framework, which is a comprehensive and representative list of essential soil functions and reflects the contribution soils have to Scottish communities and economic stability.

Six objectives to achieve this vision and address the range of soil risks identified (Table 1) are outlined below (see Figure 2). These objectives are considered essential to support a series of proactive actions which offer practical opportunities for positive change towards soil security in Scotland and are further described in Table 2 below. Appendix G provides further description of approaches taken in the route map development.

Figure 2. The six objectives of the Route Map for Scotland

Table 2. Description of the six objectives within the Route Map for Scotland

Objective

Description

LEAD (L)

‘Inspire and collaborate to deliver the vision for Scottish soils’

Provide an overarching vision and evidence-based policy framework to support the various levels of leadership in conducting activities that relate to the protection, restoration and enhancement of Scottish soils, which is mobilised through effective communication, upskilling and engagement.

PROTECT (P)

Prevent further damage to soils’

Ensure soils across Scottish landscapes are safeguarded against further decline in soil health or increase in vulnerability to physical loss from risks outlined in Table 1

RESTORE (R)

‘Repair damaged soils’

Provide evidence-based guidance, policies and where appropriate legal pathways to identify and alleviate degraded soils across different land uses in Scotland.

ENHANCE (En)

‘Strengthen soils for the future’

Recognising change and additional measures to soil improvement above and beyond the status quo, which contribute to future proofing via resilient healthy soils and maximising the potential of our soils for generations to come.

MOBILISE (M)

‘Communicate, engage, participate’

The delivery of the route map will rely heavily on engaged participation, collaboration and effective communication of the objectives and best practices to achieve them through strengthening delivery mechanisms and processes that will enable actions whether that be via legal pathways or otherwise. This includes participation across policy makers, regulators, researchers, land managers, practitioners, local councils, community groups and land use partnerships working collaboratively to foster positive changes for the future.

EVIDENCE (Ev)

‘Data-information-knowledge-wisdom’

Utilising data to underpin interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral evidence-led decision making and monitoring progress. Harnessing local and cultural knowledge and wisdom to identify areas of success and potential opportunities for change.

Potential implementation of the route map

The six key objectives in the route map (Figure 2 and Table 2) provide a framework to address the range of challenges faced by soils and allow flexibility for specific actions within each objective to be applied across temporal and spatial scales. The aim of the route map is to build upon existing progress, to explore opportunities and develop a cohesive (and inclusive) plan which is effectively communicated to drive the delivery of objectives outlined.

The Scottish policy landscape can appear complex as it represents the diverse environmental landscapes of Scotland which are intertwined with our communities and national economy. Therefore, a vital component of successful implementation will be the active engagement and participation across multiple organisations, agencies and industries spanning a range of sectors that represent the cross-sectoral importance of our soils.

The route map proposes a blended approach of strategic policy-led coordination driven by the identified policies which impact on soils (Appendix F) and a risk-led delivery of actions requiring coordination across multiple stakeholders, outlined across the six objectives.

The risks to soils span different land use types providing cross-cutting themes affecting multiple policy areas. A risk-led approach to identifying actions provides an opportunity for policy teams and wider delivery sectors to come together to collaboratively address soil risks which can then be delivered/implemented within existing policy frameworks. As there are specific, place-based risks and pressures associated with soils, it will be important to engage across the range of stakeholders and sectors with soil-related interests, to share experiences and to exchange knowledge towards a better understanding of good soil management specific to that place.

Objective 1 – Leadership (L)

Actions to support the implementation of leadership

L1

Assemble a ‘Soil Policy Team’ within Scottish Government

L2

Update the Scottish Soil Framework

L3

Review the potential of statutory targets to be introduced and potential alignment with EU Soil Monitoring Law and Nature Restoration Law

Action L1: Assemble a ‘Soil Policy Team’ within Scottish Government

This route map highlights that the legislative landscape for soils is particularly fragmented across different policy areas. To better coordinate the delivery of a cross-sectoral route map for Scottish soils, this action proposes the establishment of a soil-focused policy team to lead in the progression of collaboration to effectively implement objectives and achieve the objectives outlined.

Action L2: Update the Scottish Soil Framework.

This route map provides an initial cross-sectoral framework for integrating soil-focused activities across the current suite of environmental protection policies to safeguard Scottish soils (and wider environment) from future challenges. It is recommended that the Scottish Soil Framework (2009) be updated to contribute to policy priorities including those set out in the 3rd Scottish National Adaptation Plan 2024-2029, Scotland’s National Peatland Plan, National Planning Framework 4 (NPF4), UK Forestry Standard (UKFS) 5th edition, the Vision for Agriculture and Scottish Biodiversity Strategy to 2045 as well as supporting the objectives set out in the recent Natural Environment (Scotland) Bill (2025) and National Flood Resilience Strategy (2024) through soils underpinning nature-based systems (Figure 1) and being central to many nature-based solutions. An updated Scottish Soil Framework will also support progress of the route map objectives and the continuation of the current Soil Policy Working Group (comprising representatives from core Scottish Government policy and analytical services divisions, ClimateXChange, NatureScot, SEPA and Historic Environment Scotland) to allow for regular updates on any developments that influence or impact Scottish soils and to maintain momentum in the delivery of activities relating to soil protection, restoration and enhancement.

Action L3: Review the potential of statutory targets to be introduced and potential alignment with EU Soil Monitoring Law and Nature Restoration Law.

In the ESS report (2024) it was noted that ‘Scotland, formerly a world leader with the Soils Framework, is now falling behind international best practice in this area and should consider mirroring developments in Europe and initiate statutory duties to protect and monitor soils’. It is suggested that statutory duties include mandatory targets for the restoration of drained peatland soil, assessment of contaminated land and soil sealing policy as well as legislative proposals that reflect the proposed EU Soil Monitoring Law and Nature Restoration Law.

Currently, there is no EU-wide soil-specific legislation, however as part of the European Green Deal and EU Biodiversity Strategy 2030 the European Union has developed their EU Soil Strategy for 2030. The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) and International Initiative for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Soil Biodiversity were adopted at the Convention on Biological Diversity COP 15 meeting in December 2022 to support the restoration, maintenance and enhancement of soil health. Following this, the EU proposed a new Soil Monitoring Law in July 2023 to protect and restore soils and ensure that they are used sustainably.

Targets can provide common goals to work towards and benchmarks for assessing progress. However, these need to be in tune with the overarching vision and objectives and in relation to specific soil characteristics and varied land cover types we have in Scotland. Consideration needs to be given to the implications which target-setting can have to avoid unintended consequences. For example, targets for increased soil carbon contents can be set, however managing soil carbon is complex and involves dynamic biogeochemical processes as part of the global carbon cycle (see Appendix H). The simple message of ‘increasing soil carbon’ may lead to management practices which are conducted in goodwill, but whilst leading to improvements in soil health, may also inadvertently lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions from soils.

A workshop was held to review stakeholder views on soil monitoring in Scotland and the potential of EU alignment (Appendix I). The workshop outputs (Appendix I) outline opportunities for Scotland to produce a more appropriate monitoring platform in relation to Scotland’s unique landscape which would better reflect Scotland’s communities, economy and environment (reflected in Objective 5, Action Ev3). Therefore, Action L3 proposes a two-stage review.

  • A thorough examination of the principles and objectives of the EU Soil Strategy for 2030 and the proposed EU Soil Monitoring Law.
  • An assessment of how these principles and objectives can be best implemented in Scotland. The assessment should consider both the potential for a tailored, bespoke soil protection plan that reflects Scotland’s unique landscape and priorities (as informed by stakeholder engagement) and an evaluation of whether direct alignment with the EU framework would be beneficial and feasible for Scotland. This includes reviewing the range of metrics which may be appropriate to apply as targets within future statutory requirements. Finally, to identify opportunities for Scotland-specific targets offering multiple benefits to soil health with transparency in relation to any trade-offs.

Objective 2 – Protect, Restore and Enhance (PREn)

Identify actions needed to protect (P), restore (R) and enhance (En) soil – Identifying what needs to be achieved in practical soil management.

PREn1

Coordinate task groups for shared best practice

PREn2

Place-based evidence reviews to identify actions needed

The route map suggests a collaborative, cross-sectoral approach to mobilise Scottish soil security through evidence-led leadership, soil protection, soil restoration and soil enhancement for the future. To achieve this collaborative approach, Objective 2 suggests the operation of task groups to come together to share knowledge and best practice to protect, restore and enhance soils in relation to risks identified (Section 3).

Action PREn1: Coordinate task groups for shared best practice

Within each ‘task group’ the aim would be to review what activities currently work well and what else can be done to protect, restore and enhance soils in relation to risks identified (Table 1, Section 3). The groups should be forward-thinking and involve appropriate representatives from across different sectors who work with, or are affected by soils (i.e. landowners, practitioners, local authorities, community groups, policy makers, regulators and researchers etc). It is suggested that the task groups have clear terms of reference to outline core purpose, terms for delivery and effective coordination of all stakeholders’ roles, responsibilities and actions. This offers opportunities for co-delivery across various policy objectives to be explored. For example;

Theme 1: Soil sealing and management of soils in construction and urban development

This task group will aim to protect high value soils from sealing and opportunities to reduce, reuse and recycle soil resources. In addition, the task group will share knowledge on soil ‘value’ across land use, land capability and the provision of ecosystem services (and nature-based solutions). Examples of areas the task group could review;

  • Review of tools used to assess soil ‘value’ to provide further support for informed decision-making in relation to new developments, such as how soils and other assessments (for example, The Land Capability for Agriculture) are used in Environmental Impact Assessments during the land use planning process. There are opportunities to support soil protection (particularly high carbon soils) and offer further guidance on interpreting soil data/information for improved understanding of soil systems and their value across soil types/land use types and associated wider functions, contributing to more informed decision making.
  • Engage with local authorities (e.g. Heads of Planning Scotland) and agencies (e.g. SEPA) to provide support on soil protection, restoration and enhancement (where appropriate) in local development plans and Strategic Environmental Assessments (as outlined by SEPA)
  • Promote and support the reuse of valuable soil during developments as outlined by SEPA and review good practice codes (E.g. SEPA Guidance (2017) ; SR/SEPA guidance (2012) and Construction Code of Practice for the Sustainable Use of Soils on Construction Sites, Defra, UK to reduce soil ‘waste’ and limit the quantity of soil going to landfill.

Theme 2: Erosion, compaction and slope stability (physical integrity of the soil)

Review where current guidance exists for supporting the physical integrity of soils as well as the prevention and restoration of soils affected by, or at risk to soil erosion, compaction or diminished stability. Explore where this guidance can be translated across to other land uses/sectors to enable wider application and support co-delivery across sectors. For example, there is guidance relating to soil structure for agriculture in the ‘Valuing your Soils’ brochure, which may offer transferrable knowledge. In addition, the Centres of Expertise have guidance which offers an initial evidence base to develop this action further, such as;

Theme 3: Application of chemicals (nutrient management and soil contamination)

Explore best practice to protect soils from contamination resulting from the application of chemicals (e.g. pesticides), poor nutrient management (e.g. synthetic fertilisers), wastes applied (e.g. sewage sludge) and emerging contaminants (e.g. PFAS, microplastics, pharmaceuticals within or additional to those in wastes applied). Review strategies for alleviating soils already affected by contamination as well as identifying soils at future risk and in need of further protection. For example, the task group could review guidance and legislation which exists to protect soils from poor nutrient management and contamination to identify pathways to improve awareness and implementation through existing policies such as;

  • Scottish Nitrogen Balance Sheet to reduce excess nitrogen in soil systems which can lead to leached nitrates (affecting waters) and emitted as nitrous oxides (indirect and indirect greenhouse gas emissions). This will be considered in the nutrient management plans to come within the Whole Farm Plan of the Agriculture Reform Program, and nitrogen balance sheet of the Climate Change Plan. How can the implementation of improved nitrogen management be applied more widely across sectors?
  • Diffuse pollution prevention (CREW) offers soil management guidance to minimise negative effects on local watercourses
  • The James Hutton Institute and Fidra have outlined the impacts of unregulated microplastic, organic chemical and pharmaceutical contaminants on soil health (Re-assessment of environmental risks of sewage sludge, 2024), some of which are currently not regulated or included in soil routine soil testing.
  • Environmental Standards Scotland has begun investigatory work on the application and effectiveness of Environmental Protection Act Part 2A. Support local authorities to identify and remediate contaminated soils as part of the Environmental Protection Act, Part 2a

Theme 4: Soils in private sector sustainability plans and corporate responsibility

In recent years there has been growing interest in soil health, soil carbon sequestration potential and the role of soils to support biodiversity and other ecosystem services with respect to sustainability reporting within the private sector. This is a rapidly evolving field as businesses look to evaluate how their business may impact climate and nature as well as identifying risks associated with their business being impacted by adverse climate and nature-related events as outlined in TCFD (Taskforce for climate-related financial disclosures) and TNFD (Taskforce for nature-related financial disclosures). There are a range of emerging tools and guidance available for companies to use which offers opportunities for further guidance in relation to soil management in relation to ecosystem services and how this may link to supply chain resilience, nature-related risks and private investment opportunities for nature restoration and carbon sequestration.

Theme 5: Soil monitoring and metrics

To understand the extent to which soils need protecting and restoring requires, to some extent, the need to monitor soil condition. The ESS report (2024) highlighted the lack of a comprehensive monitoring network in Scotland, resulting in, for example, not knowing whether the number of soil erosion incidences (and magnitude of erosion) is increasing or decreasing. There are a range of approaches to monitoring soils and stakeholders agreed (Appendix I) that to formalise a soil monitoring programme for Scotland, an agreed purpose or set of objectives for the programme going forward is required. This will provide clarity in the specific metrics needed to monitor soil health, risk and resilience in Scotland and inform the development of the soil monitoring framework in terms of establishing baselines, whether targets and benchmarks should be incorporated, the degree to which stratification may be required and how the data could contribute to further research and support evidence-led decision making. This also includes scoping opportunities for the soil monitoring programme to contribute to environmental modelling and amalgamated landscape-scale datasets for wider environmental assessment. Therefore, there is scope to review how best to monitor developments in soil protection, restoration and enhancement across the actions proposed (and appropriate metrics required to do so). This may entail exploring the possibility of a Directive on Soil Monitoring and Resilience to be established as outlined in the ESS report (2024). Initial recommendations in relation to evidencing and monitoring Scottish soils are outlined in Objective 4.

Action PREn2: Place-based evidence reviews to identify actions needed

A core objective of the task groups would be to support the delivery of existing ‘good’ practice and explore potential alignment of these practices across other sectors through place-based, cross-sectoral evidence reviews on appropriate practical measures to protect, restore and enhance soils; as well as exploring mechanisms and pathways to mobilise activities identified. This may include identifying where the underpinning research and practical experiences can be translated to inform task groups on future applications, as well as identifying gaps to explore. For example, there may be gaps or areas for improvement in relation to soil literacy and soil-based skills, which could be addressed so that soils can be better protected, restored and enhanced in the future. Evidence reviews will support mechanisms for decision making and identifying ‘minimum viable product’ that can be deployed to initiate change following the evaluation of impacts (positive and negative) in terms of overall trade-offs.

Objective 3 – Mobilise (M)

Actions to support the identification of how to mobilise and achieve objectives.

M1

Identify existing legal/regulatory avenues for implementing actions for soil protection, restoration and enhancement via implementation plans

M2

Identify existing and new avenues to implement actions for soil protection, restoration and enhancement via landscape-scale implementation plans

Task groups might be put in place to identify pathways for implementation, which use existing avenues in the first instance. The groups could also give insight into new opportunities for the implementation of actions that protect, restore, and enhance soils.

Action M1: Identify existing legal/regulatory avenues for implementing actions for soil protection, restoration and enhancement via implementation plans

Current codes of practice and guidance exist across most sectors. These can be updated with latest evidence providing a streamlined approach to safeguarding soils across sectors. Common language, metrics and messaging will support landscape-scale problem-solving. Therefore, it would be useful to develop and expand good practice guidance across Scottish land uses, to share knowledge and best practice, develop commonalities and ensure alignment across the different sectors, for example:

  • Agricultural codes of practice include GAECS, Whole Farm Plan, Prevention of environmental pollution from agricultural activity guidance (PEPFAA), ‘Valuing Your Soils’ brochure
  • Explore opportunities to include additional measures to GAECS or the Whole Farm Plan such as tests for ‘soil compaction’ and/or ‘soil degradation’ to be performed utilising evidence and guidance that is already available, in order to identify and alleviate soil compaction and wider degradation. This would also enable the development and promotion of clear guidance for practitioners and support the Scottish Biodiversity Strategy to 2045 recommendation that by 2030 farm and forestry machinery contractors are engaged in ensuring appropriate use of equipment, uptake of decision-making tools and training, to minimise and ultimately avoid compaction damage to soils.
  • Review opportunities to harness and better utilise information collated through the Agricultural Reform Programme’s Whole Farm Plan, which includes soil testing alongside carbon and biodiversity audits (and will introduce nutrient plans in 2028). This may include the provision of further advice on how to interpret the information collected into sustainable soil management that supports soil heath and resilience in terms of aligning to the objectives of soil protection, restoration and enhancement. In addition, there may be opportunities for the knowledge gathered from soil testing to be collated in some way, for the purpose of supporting evidence and monitoring (e.g. national soil health status and a Scottish soil monitoring framework) and research (e.g. for national soil mapping, modelling changes and forecasting, better understanding of the interaction between soils and land management practices).
  • The Agricultural Reform Programme Tier 4 offers opportunities for mobilising soil protection, restoration and enhancement measures as it refers to additional, ‘complementary’ activities that support good practices, such as developing new skills, knowledge, training and continued professional development, as well as advisory services and business support (advice, knowledge exchange and linkages to wider land management support from Scottish Government officials and/or public partners) and development of measurement tools.
  • Valuing Your Soils’ brochure was published in 2015 and provided case studies of effective management related to challenges such as managing soil pH, nutrient management, compaction and drainage. The booklet provided peer-to-peer learning in the form of short, clear messages and on-farm examples (case-studies). An update to the ‘Valuing your Soils’ brochure offers a mechanism for communicating and mobilising recommendations related to the route map’s objectives on soil protection, restoration and enhancement in relation to the risks identified and incorporating recent developments across the agricultural reform programme.
  • UK Forestry Standards
  • Review whether there is scope to update and widen woodland management guidance and plans (between 2023 and 2030) to reflect greater emphasis on actions that will improve biodiversity including use of elements from ‘Site Condition Monitoring’ and ‘Woodland Ecological Condition’ monitoring as recommended in the Scottish Biodiversity Strategy to 2045.
  • There is also scope to include ‘soil compaction’ or ‘soil degradation tests’ as outlined above, which will support the development and promotion of clear guidance for practitioners on soil compaction and ensure that by 2030 farm and forestry machinery contractors are engaged in ensuring appropriate use of equipment, uptake of decision-making tools and training, to minimise and ultimately avoid compaction damage to soils – as recommended in the Scottish Biodiversity Strategy to 2045.
  • Peatland Action
  • Review whether there is scope to include some protection or further guidance for ‘peaty soils’ in relation to different land uses (notably planning, agriculture and forestry) to enhance the protection of high carbon soils.
  • Originally proposed in The Scottish Strategic Framework for Biodiversity, the development of the targeting of peatland restoration for cost-effective delivery (i.e. identifying priority restoration projects) including for greater private investment in peatland restoration. It is also noted that there’s a need to “scale delivery of the Peatland Action programme, restoring the condition of peatlands as a key ecosystem in line with net zero targets and supporting the expansion and upskilling of the peatland restoration workforce”.
  • Ensure all peatland restoration projects are completed to the same standards regardless of funding source, including transparency in data collected for defining peatland condition used to calculate baseline emissions.

Action M2: Identify existing and new avenues to implement actions for soil protection, restoration and enhancement via landscape-scale implementation plans

The delivery of actions will need to be coordinated at the landscape-scale and will involve engagement with a range of cross-sectoral stakeholders. To begin this process there are opportunities to engage with existing initiatives, for example Regional Land Use Partnerships, Climate Adaptation Partnerships, Landscape Enterprise Networks and Local Authorities. Developing from M1, action M2 seeks to provide evidence-based opportunities and solutions following the identification of gaps, limitations and barriers to implementation. This will entail reviewing the appropriateness and applicability of solutions across sectors, land cover and soil type (for example where soils are naturally compacted) as well as exploring pathways for effective implementation.

Objective 4 – Monitor (Ev)

Actions to support current and future baselining, monitoring and evidencing Scottish soils

Ev1

Baseline soil ‘status’ across land use types of Scotland.

Ev2

Identify evidence gaps and future improvement options across different land uses

Ev3

Scottish soil monitoring framework

Ev4

Evidence-led recommendations for future soil protection, restoration and enhancement.

To effectively manage our landscapes for improved soil protection and future resilience to risks, there is a need to establish a baseline i.e. what is the current status of our soils.

Several attempts have been made to define a set of metrics to monitor soil physical, biological and chemical properties and wider soil functionality (and ecosystem services). A recent UK workshop on soil monitoring reviewed approaches to soil monitoring across the four nations to evaluate the readiness of soil-assessment-focussed research used within UK policy delivery. The workshop highlighted that despite the challenges of identifying the most appropriate strategy for monitoring such complex systems, “there is great potential value in working to ensure the data collected has a degree of consistency, to support wider targets and understanding of soil heath.” Further research into harmonisation of soil monitoring across the four nations is currently being undertaken to develop this knowledge further.

Action Ev1: Baseline soil ‘status’ across land cover types of Scotland.

The assessment of Scottish soils is currently conducted via a range of mechanisms governed by different policy groups across different land uses (e.g. agriculture, peatland, forestry, planning, construction/development, sport & recreation, protected areas etc). Despite this, there is a general consensus amongst policy makers and academics (Appendix I) that there is a need to progress with the current data and knowledge available to create a baseline of soils in terms of soil health plus its vulnerability to risks and the wider potential impacts on soil function. It is acknowledged that there is already a lot of data available in Scotland and so there is a good base from which to develop baselines and a monitoring framework.

Benchmarking soils are not easy as changes occur at different temporal (and spatial) scales and are so diverse that in turn their value in terms of services they provide, vary significantly across sectors and can be quite subjective. In order to set meaningful targets, and to appropriately benchmark across soil-land use types, a specific soil policy lead (team) should be identified. At present there is no single agreed soil monitoring framework for Scotland and little standardisation or harmonisation of data across different sectors. Therefore, this objective proposes further progression of the Scottish Soil Monitoring Action Plan (2012) which followed the State of Scotland’s Soil Report (2011) as well as developments being made through Scotland’s Strategic Research Programme 2022 to 2027 (Appendix D), Centres for Expertise research (E.g. Monitoring soil health in Scotland by land use category – a scoping study) and National Soil Inventory of Scotland (demonstrated on the Scotland’s Soils website) towards a Scottish Soil Monitoring Framework (which aligns with other UK monitoring schemes where appropriate).

Specifically, this objective calls for some agreement on the most appropriate metrics to baseline soil ‘status’ (an indication of soil health, soil functionality and soil’s vulnerability to risk) and resource a baselining exercise from which changes in soils over time can be assessed.

Action Ev2: Identify evidence gaps and future improvement options across different land uses

This action is to identify evidence gaps with respect to monitoring soil protection, restoration and enhancement across different land uses, as identified by the soil monitoring workshop (Appendix I). For example,

  • Review the extent of current soil monitoring and how it may vary across land use types;
  • Assess the availability and accessibility of data across sectors and identify where improvements can be made;
  • Evaluate methods and metrics used and to study soils and how they may vary across sectors due to the contextual differences in soil functioning and ecosystem services provided. Explore where there are opportunities for some harmonisation to better identify the functions offered by soils at a landscape scale (for example how soils are valued across land uses and better connect land management practices to the potential ecosystem services and nature-based solutions which different soils can provide) and understand the drivers of change in soil management and subsequent soil condition across land uses and sectors;
  • Identify priority issues for soil protection, restoration and possible enhancement across landscapes. This includes vulnerable soil types which areas are at most risk of degradation and potential locations for the greatest opportunities for protection, restoration and/or enhancement of soils.
  • Establish how are ‘degraded’ soils currently defined across land use/soil types and policy themes and to what extent are Scottish soils degraded;
  • Review opportunities to better assess soil health and vulnerability to risks through emerging technologies and novel applications in terms of what they provide/contribute to soil protection, their technical readiness and potential to incorporate/implement into baselining soil protection (e.g. Infra-red, soil acoustics, X-Ray Diffraction, eDNA and microbiome characterisation, LIDAR, AI, etc).

Action Ev3: A Scottish Soil Monitoring Framework

A soil monitoring programme will need clear vision, purpose and objectives to ensure the monitoring programme is transparent, robust, fit for purpose and can be interpreted by wide-ranging audiences. Therefore a ‘task group’ comprising key stakeholders is suggested (see Table 3) to agree objectives and technical content of a monitoring framework as well as terms of reference for the governance and management of a soil monitoring framework. This would develop upon the findings from the ‘Scottish Soil Monitoring Framework’ workshop December 2024 (Appendix I). Other considerations include: deciding on the most appropriate metrics to be included in a monitoring framework, align to policy and reporting needs; encourage data sharing (e.g. personal, research, government and third-party data sources), review what tools/mechanisms/technology are available to assess soils in Scotland and to ensure that any framework is future-proofed. There is also scope to review metrics used across different schemes (e.g. agri-environmental schemes and the measuring, reporting, verification used in carbon schemes) and corporate reporting frameworks (see Table 3) to promote some harmonisation across terminology and approaches used in relation to soils, such as how they are valued and how current soil status and/or soils may change over time are measured and interpreted.

A Scottish soil monitoring framework would directly deliver to the Scottish Biodiversity Strategy objective of “set up monitoring frameworks to assess change in soil health, based on evidence from the Strategic Research Programme (2022-2027)”. The framework will provide evidence to monitor and validate impacts as well as contribute to future evidence-led decision making and inform further research developments.

Action Ev4: Evidence-led recommendations for future soil protection, restoration and enhancement.

Action Ev4 is to review progress towards the objectives set out in the route map. The evaluation of progress should allow for flexibility and adaptability to include future/emerging challenges and pressures which may be environmental (e.g. changing climates and emerging contaminants), industry-related (e.g. market vulnerabilities and/or new environmental reporting requirements) and/or community-based (e.g. workforce needs). Action Ev4 will identify knowledge gaps and opportunities for further information to be collected out with the soil monitoring framework, which would provide valuable insight on the progression to soil security in Scotland. For example, identifying what works and does not work to inform where improvements could be made as well as future research needs across fundamental and applied science. This will enable Scotland to be a leading example in mobilising actions towards thriving soils through effective landscape-scale and cross-sectoral soil protection, restoration and enhancement measures, which support future Scottish communities, the economy and environment.

Conclusions

This route map provides an overview of the range of risks threatening Scotland’s soils and highlights challenges in tackling these risks across different soil types, site characteristics, land use types and a range of cross-cutting policy themes at the landscape scale.

Without co-ordination from an overarching soil policy, it will be difficult to overcome the existing, and future, challenges in deploying actions to specifically target landscape-scale challenges relating to soil security in Scotland.

The route map sets out early thinking about the actions which might be put in place to lead, mobilise and gather evidence, in the first instance. The proposed actions that will protect, restore and enhance soils need to be grounded in the latest evidence, requiring development work by interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral task groups to inform evolving overarching policy.

The 3rd Scottish National Adaptation Plan objective NC2 specifically outlines the need to take actions at the landscape scale, in a collaborative way, in order to protect and enhance Scotland’s soils, increasing their resilience to the impacts of climate change, and land use challenges. Therefore, this route map provides an opportunity to build on the existing progress and momentum that has been developed in specific policy areas, to ensure soil protection, restoration and enhancement of all of Scottish soils.

Appendices

Appendix A Socio-economic impacts of soil degradation

Infographic on the assessment of socio-economic impacts of soil degradation on Scotland’s water environment (Baggaley et al 2024)

Healthy soils are important to the Scottish economy improving crop yields, storing water to help limit the impacts of drought and storms, and regulating water flows to rivers and lochs. Degraded soils have both direct and indirect costs to individuals, society and the wider economy. Compacted soils, yield loss estimated at £16-49 million per year. Compacted soils, additional fuel use for field operations £9-26 million per year. Compaction and sealing, increased flood risk and insurance claims £57k-76k per household claim. Soil contamination - loss of land, degraded water and food quality £ not yet able to calculate. By CREW, James Hutton Institute, SRUC, University of Aberdeen and Scottish Government.

Appendix B Soils of Scotland

A national soil map of Scotland, indicating the soil types in different locations, including peaty gleys, peat, peaty podzols, mineral gleys and magnesian soils.

Soils of Scotland, taken from the Scotland’s Soils Web National soil map of Scotland | Scotland’s soils

Appendix C Summary of Workshop 1 outputs – Identifying risks and opportunities for Scottish soils

The workshop aimed to collate stakeholder views and opinions in relation to current issues and opportunities for soil security in Scotland. In particular, to review changes and developments since the publication of the Scottish Soil Framework (2009).

Participants were grouped (where possible ensuring there was a mixture of research & policy representatives and organisation across groups) and asked to engage with two group activities and two individual activities outlined below;

Group Activity 1:

Each group was asked to discuss and note “What do you think are the key risks/threats for soil security and/or soil health in Scottish” and “What do you think are driving these risks?” relating to the specific land use of the session (Agriculture, Forestry, Urban and Integrated landscapes) and feedback to the wider group.

Individual Activity 1:

Following the group discussion and sharing of key risks, threats to soil and their drivers, participants were given 5 stickers each (black for researchers, red for policy/regulator representatives) to vote on the risk they thought is of most priority. Participants could choose to allocate all of their stickers to one specific risk or to spread them out across a range of risks (providing some indication on the weight of concern across the risks identified). Participants were also encouraged to move around the room and review risk/threats identified by other groups when allocating their stickers.

Group Activity 2:

Each group was asked to discuss and note –

  • What policy/regulation is in place (relating to Agricultural soils)? Comments noted on pink post-it notes or directly on the list of policies outlined in the SSF (print out provided)
  • What research, evidence, data, guidance is used to support soils in agriculture? Comments noted on blue post-it notes
  • What do you think are the key gaps, updates and/or opportunities to better protect soil? Comments noted on yellow post-it notes

Discussions were to be specific to the land use session (Agriculture, Forestry, Urban and Integrated landscapes) with the groups feeding back to the wider group of participants

Individual Activity 2:

Following the group discussion and sharing of key gaps and opportunities to better protect soil within agriculture/forests/urban/landscapes in Scotland – participants were again given 5 stickers each (black for researchers, red for policy/regulators) to vote on the gaps and opportunities they thought is of highest priority. Participants could choose to allocate all stickers to one specific gap/opportunity or spread them out across a range of gaps/opportunities (providing some indication on the weighted priority across gaps/opportunities identified). Participants were also encouraged to move around the room and review gaps/opportunities identified by other groups when allocating their stickers.

Information provided by participants was collected and transcribed.

Summary of workshop outputs:

The top 5 risks and threats to Scottish soils voted for by participants across agriculture, forestry, urban and integrated landscapes.

 

Agriculture

Forestry

Urban

Landscape

1

Soil disturbance, erosion & organic matter loss

Soil disturbance, erosion & organic matter loss

Soil sealing & consumption

Lack of soil-specific governance and policy

2

Biodiversity loss

Biodiversity loss

Cumulative effects of climate change

Under valuing soils as an asset/resource

3

Soil contamination & environmental pollution

Climate change (Tree species, pests, weather impacts)

Soil contamination (historic)

Difficulty dealing with spatial heterogeneity

4

Climate change & extreme weather events

Wider impacts (loss of peat)

Soil classification as ‘waste’ going to landfill, limited reuse

Loss of soil function (via compaction, erosion)

5

Lack of collaborative, catchment scale management

Market pressures & demands (driving specific tree species)

Undervaluing soil as an asset

Data available, sharing, accessibility

The top 5 gaps/opportunities voted for by participants relating to ‘securing Scottish soil’ across the four land use sessions.

Rank

Agriculture

Forestry

Urban

Landscape

1

Need for soil governance or policy (joint 1st)

Better data availability & accessibility

Review classification of soil as ‘waste’

Need for soil governance or policy. Mainstream & update SSF

2

Better data availability & accessibility

(joint 1st)

Need for soil governance or policy

Strategic planning for rainwater runoff

Better data availability & accessibility

3

System scale modelling & visualisation tool

Re-design of schemes to better mitigate impacts on soil

Improve enforcement of soil reuse & contamination rules

Integrate soils focus into place-based approaches

4

More peer-to-peer learning

Improve soil literacy, education & training

Assess soil data/information is utilised in planning

Better links across policy areas

5

Improve soils literacy

Include soil assessment in licensing plantations

Biodiversity (above & belowground) in urban soils

Spatial data integration

 

Appendix D Soil research across Scottish Government’s Strategic Research Programme (2022-2027)

Underpinning evidence for informing policy comes from the Scottish government research programme (SRP). Research relevant to soils occurs in all 6 themes in the SRP and Underpinning National Capacity;

  • Theme A: Plant and Animal Health
  • Theme B: Sustainable Food System and Supply
  • Theme C: Human impacts on the Environment
  • Theme D: Natural Resources
  • Theme E: Rural Futures
  • Theme F: BioSS research

It is also a key part of the work within CxC and CREW for example the project on the socio-economic cost of soil degradation funded through CREW and the Soils Fellowship funded through CxC. Soils research highlighted here includes work on understanding how soils function, how changes can be monitored and translation it so it can be used by a range of stakeholders.

The table below gives an outline of how soils underpin SRP themes as well as where there is ongoing direct soil-focused research

Theme

Topic

Link to Scottish soils

A: Plant and Animal Health

A1. Plant Disease

Soil health can influence the prevalence of pests and diseases which may impact plant and animal health. Soils can be a carrier of plant and animal diseases, and soil properties can impact their availability. Soil borne diseases can be a form of soil contamination.

A2. Animal disease

A3. Animal Welfare

B: Sustainable Food System and Supply

B1. Crop improvement

The combination of land management and climate change influences trajectories of soil properties. Long term trials allow the adaptation and mitigation potential, sustainability and trade-offs associated with management practices to be analysed. This includes an exploration of the interactions between management practices and crop cultivars.

B2. Livestock improvement

 Understanding soils in the context of livestock management is important part of understanding feed availability, carbon footprints and how managing livestock is impacted by climate change.

B3. Improving agricultural practice

Soils are vital for sustainable productivity and impact food and drink quality and subsequently human nutrition and overall health.

B4. Food supply and security

B5. Food and drink improvements

Soil contamination including contaminants of emerging concern are held in soils and can be transferred to vegetation and water courses. B5:(Contaminants of emerging concern in the food chain) B6:( Antimicrobial Resistance)

B6. Diet and food safety

Soil contamination including contaminants of emerging concern are held in soils and can be transferred to vegetation and water courses. B5:(Contaminants of emerging concern in the food chain) B6:( Antimicrobial Resistance)

B7. Human Nutrition

 Understanding human nutrition can be linked to the “One Health Concept” but the focus of this work is on human interactions and choices linked to food.

C: Human impacts on the Environment

C2. Agricultural GHGs

Development of options for a monitoring agricultural GHGs within a soil monitoring framework. Interactions between soil health and land management decisions across land covers

C3. Land Use (inc. mapping)

 Soil data and information contributes to wider landscape quality and functioning

C4. Circular Economy (inc. waste)

 Understanding the circular economy can be linked to issues of “waste to land” and “soil as a waste” but there is no specific work on these here.

C5. Large Scale Modelling

Development of options for a soil monitoring framework and the requirements for the incorporation of monitoring data in large scale modelling across landscapes.

C6. Use of Outdoors and Greenspace

Understanding the use and value of our outdoors and greenspace is important part of understanding soils in these areas but the focus of this work is on how these areas are used and viewed by people.

Theme D: Natural Resources

D1. Air Quality

Soil is in constant exchange with the atmosphere. Soil impacts air quality through GHGs. Soil health is impacted by air quality

D2. Water (including flooding)

Nature based solutions – Soil is in constant exchange with the water cycle. Soils can retain water (important for flood resilience), filter and buffer chemicals (important for water quality). Soil leaching and erosion can be problematic for water quality and flood resilience

D3. Soils

Soil health can be impacted by management decisions. Understanding soil functional relationships across different land covers supports improved land management decisions. It also identifies trade-offs and win-win scenarios. Understanding forestry systems, soil health and ecosystem carbon dynamics is important for landscape scale decision making. New technologies and analysis protocols can lead to the ability to rapidly sample soils and also identify changes providing indications of soil contamination. Farmer led soil assessments and data provide tools for on farm decision making. Exploring the potential for real time monitoring and whether this can help inform management in cultivated systems. Peatlands are a unique habitat and understanding GHG fluxes, being able to monitor the interactions between these fluxes, water balance and biodiversity under restoration in a changing climate is important for understanding their impacts on wider ecosystem services such as water quality.

D4. Biodiversity

Soil biodiversity underpins and can be an indicator of soil functions in both semi-natural and cultivated ecosystems. It therefore supports plant communities and underpins our wider biodiversity and natural capital. Understanding links between soil biodiversity, which can be more responsive than other indicators of soil health, soil functions and wider ecosystem services is important for understanding the potential impacts of climate change and setting baselines that better represent soil functions.

D5. Natural Capital

Combining data on climate and soil functions in modelling approaches provides insight into changes in soil vulnerability and risks in a changing climate. Implementation of the LCA in a research platform, enabling it to be updated with new soils and climate data and run with future climate projections to explore consequences on land use.

Theme E: Rural Futures

E1. Rural Economy

Indirect link – soils underpin ecosystem services of rural communities. Healthy soils will contribute to a healthy economy and rural community.

E2. Rural Communities

E3. Land Reform

Theme F: Vision and Impact : Horizon scanning

Development of statistical methods to analyse diverse soils data and inform the design of a monitoring framework. (BIOSS statistical research)

Underpinning National Capacity

 

Soils Data and website

Combining and Managing soils data in Scotland’s soils database increases its power to do policy relevant research. Translation of soils data and making the data available to a wide range of stakeholders. Including the development of apps.

Soils Archive

Management of the soil archive allows for the testing of laboratory protocols and the analysis of samples for new indicators

Appendix E Challenges to landscape-scale soil management

To effectively as well as stakeholder feedback (link to Workshop outputs) highlighted a range of challenges associated with managing soils in a changing climate, which are summarised below

Challenge

Description

Lack of soil focused governance 

No overarching policy to support accountability and leadership to drive soil protection in Scotland

Climate change

Soils play a vital role in climate change adaptation and mitigation. Soils are impacted by variable weather patterns and more frequent extreme weather events (flooding and droughts), which can have knock on effects to soil protection, fertility and productivity, flood resilience, water quality etc.

Diversity of Scottish soils

Scotland’s soils (Appendix B) are diverse, providing a range of specific functions to the wider ecosystem. They include mineral soils which provide fertile land for food production, deep peat storing carbon to depths in excess of 10 meters, soils which are linked to specific land covers and soils where protection is critical to protect wider ecosystem services such as water quality and quantity. However, this variation across soil types, topography, local weather patterns, land capability, land use history and current land use leads to multiple layers of complexity affecting overall soil health and security. This requires the provision of management guidance and a monitoring framework that is fit for purpose across different soil types and land covers.

Multiple demands on Scottish soils

Balancing the multiple demands on soils requires an assessment of the multiple requirements from our land. For example Scottish food security (e.g The production food contributing to Good Food Nation (Scotland) Act (2022)); the production of raw ingredients for wider produce (e.g. whisky production, which requires agricultural soils for barley production but impacts peatlands via peat burning in some malting processes); production of animal feed; soil sealing to support housing developments, infrastructure and urbanisation; platform for achieving forestry targets.

Defining soil ‘value’ across sectors and land uses.

How soils are ‘valued’ varies across land uses and soil types. This leads to variable levels of knowledge, evidence and protection across land uses. Soils have a wide range of properties, and not all soils can deliver the same services. There is scope for decision-making and management to be more place-based in relation to specific value and functions provided by different soils.

Defining, measuring and monitoring soil health, security & resilience

Clearer guidance is required in terms of defining, understanding and measuring various components of soil systems and well as capturing (and understanding) their dynamic nature, such as soil carbon sequestration potential. There is also a need for keeping abreast of UK and wider EU initiatives on defining and monitoring soil health and the indicators that maybe required to align with these.

Linking soil health to functionality

Soil health indicators are context dependant and are not a one size fits all. It is important to understand how ‘soil health’ should be defined and quantified across different soil and land use types where what the soil can deliver (soil functionality) and the ‘value’ of those functions in those areas also vary.

Soil biodiversity

Lack of research relating to the role of soil biodiversity in soil health and protection, particularly in terms of monitoring changes in soil biodiversity, which can often require complex measurements. There is however increasing availability of powerful data analysis techniques that allow more detailed interpretation of this kind of data and along with the availability of archived samples the ability to investigate change.

External (industry) challenges

Markets & supply chains can have direct and indirect influences on our landscapes and soils. With more attention on soil health within corporate nature-related target-setting and reporting, it is important that there are resources available to guide appropriate interpretation and implementation of soil knowledge for future sustainability, environmental net gain, resilient landscapes and carbon management.

Emerging challenges

It is important to consider emerging and future challenges (e.g. new pollutants, increased demands on our soils etc) which may impact soils. For example, ensuring mechanisms exist which support new challenges being identified, monitored and support exists to protect soils from any negative impacts and future degradation.

Soil literacy

As soils support a wide range of ecosystem functions across different sectors, there can be some inconsistencies in relation to how soils are described, understood, valued, evidenced and managed. Improved soil literacy across sectors (e.g. clearer definitions, understanding the dynamic nature of soils, interpreting core soil metrics and potential limitations of soil tests/models) will support informed decision making and land management going forward. It is also important to address any skills gaps that may hinder the delivery of healthy, resilient soils across Scotland.

Appendix F Where soils sit across different policies and legislation

List of policies and their connection to soil protection.

Policy

Are soils mentioned?

Specific action/objective to address soil risks?

Physical (soil loss)

Physical / structural (compaction)

Conservation of OM and C

Soil biology / biodiversity

Chemical / contamination)

General health & protection

Scottish Soil Framework (2009)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Scotland’s National Peatland Plan and Peatland Action;

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

(5th) edition of the UK Forestry Standard (UKFS) (2023)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Agricultural Reform Programme (List of Measures)

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Scottish Biodiversity Strategy and Delivery Plan, 2024

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Scotland’s National Planning Framework 4

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Agricultural Reform Programme (Cross Compliance)

Y

Y

Y

Y

  

Y

Building standards technical handbook 2020: domestic, 2020

Y

 

Y

  

Y

Y

The 3rd Scottish National Adaptation Plan (2024)

Y

  

Y

  

Y

Sludge (Use in Agriculture) Regulations, 1989

Y

    

Y

Y

The Action Programme for Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (Scotland) Regulations, 2008

Y

    

Y

Y

Environmental Protection Act 1990 – Part IIA Contaminated Land (2006)

Y

    

Y

Y

The Pollution Prevention and Control (Scotland) Regulations (2012)

Y

    

Y

Y

Statutory Guidance Waste Management Licensing (Scotland) Regulations (2011)

Y

    

Y

Y

The Radioactive Contaminated Land (Scotland) (Amendment) Regulations (2007)

Y

    

Y

Y

The Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations (2011)

Y

Y

    

Y

The policies below include reference to soil health more generally:

Environmental Assessment (Scotland) Act 2005

Circular Economy and Waste Route Map to 2030

The Public Gas Transporter Pipe-line Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 1999

Climate Change Plan (2018-2032);

Wildlife Management and Muirburn (Scotland) Act 2024

The Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipelines (Environmental Impact Assessment and other Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) Regulations 2017

Forestry and Land Management (Scotland) Act (2018)

The Electricity Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) (Scotland) Regulations 2017

Fitting Landscapes Policy, 2014. Transport Scotland

Scotland’s Forestry Strategy 2019 to 2029

Land Reform (Scotland) Bill, 2024

Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997

Right Tree in the Right Place (RTRP)

Local Food Strategy, 2024

Local development planning guidance, 2023

Sustainable and Regenerative Farming – next steps: statement (2022)

Bioenergy – draft policy statement: consultation (2024)

Onshore wind: policy statement 2022

Appendix G How the ‘Soil Route Map’ was developed

The route map was developed across three key phases:

Phase 1: What do we already know?

The initial phase involved reviewing current policies, regulations, frameworks and evidence (research) across different land uses to ascertain current knowledge as well as policy and/or legislative support in relation to soil health and security in Scotland. This included a review of The Scottish Soils Framework (2009) in terms of developments in knowledge and actions since its publication.

Phase 2: What are the key challenges for securing Scottish soils in a changing climate? Consolidating evidence, guidance and opinions. The second phase of the project comprises the collation of key messages derived from a stakeholder workshop. These discussions included researchers, policy makers, regulators, and representatives from charities and other governmental agencies.

Phase 3: Opportunities and pathways to implementing soil security in Scotland for ‘The Route map’. The development of the proposed route map comprises an iterative process with phase 3 being the refinement of consolidated evidence from phases 1 and 2, into an easy-to-follow report outlining future opportunities, potential barriers/challenges, research gaps and where additional resources may be required.

Stakeholder Engagement

A key component of the route map development is the input from stakeholders across all areas of land management to contribute to- and provide feedback on- the route map development, which included three sets of workshops:

Workshop 1: Identification of the risks and threats to soils across land covers to review the challenges across different land use sectors (August 2024);

Workshop 2: Discuss the development of a soil monitoring framework for Scotland, potential alignment with the EU Soil Monitoring Law and how a monitoring framework could support the objectives within the soil route map (November 2024);

Workshop 3: Refining the vision and objectives of the Scottish soil route map

Within all phases of the route map development, consideration was given to the specific barriers and opportunities outlined in the Scottish National Adaptation Plan 3, particularly the underpinning research and how this is translated into policies and how these can be implemented to protect soils better in the absence of overarching governance relating specifically to soils in a Scottish policy context.

Appendix H The carbon cycle

The carbon cycle from The British Soil Science Society – Science Note on Soil Carbon. Carbon stocks and flows on land and in the oceans (adapted from Jenkinson, 2010). The numbers in bold are stocks in Gigatonnes (Gt) C: those in italics are flows in Gt C per year. Topsoil and subsoil stocks exclude peatlands. 

Appendix I Workshop outputs – A Scottish Soil Monitoring Framework (SSMF)

The workshop comprised 4 group activities (outlined below) to discuss the development of a Scottish soil monitoring framework (SSMF) with attendees from across Scottish research institutes, Scottish Government, NatureScot, SEPA and Historic Environment Scotland.

Activity 1: What do we want to achieve with a SSMF? Objective setting – What should be monitored? For example;

  • Soil health status – a record of physical, biological, chemical characteristics at a given moment in time and space.
  • Soil vulnerability to risk – climate and weather resilience, contamination and diffuse pollution risks, soil compaction, rate of sealing, vulnerability to physical loss (erosion) and destabilisation (landslides)
  • Soil functionality – for example how soils are contributing to biogeochemical cycling and climate change, water storage, water quality and flood management and supporting ecosystem biodiversity etc.
  • Soils across land use – are the objectives of a SSMF the same across different sectors and land uses? (peatlands, agriculture, forestry, horticulture, urban, recreational and mixed land uses)
  • Should a SSMF review compliance, regulation and licensing
  • How could a SSMF inform the delivery of policy objectives and support future decision making?

Activity 2: Reviewing the proposed EU Soil Law and how it relates to Scottish data – Presentation by Dr Allan Lilly followed by a group discussion

Activity 3: Reviewing options for;

  • Baselining Scottish soils – what for and which metrics would be needed
  • Benchmarking – e.g. Is it appropriate to set targets or benchmarks for Scottish soils? What are the Pros and cons
  • Stratification of landscapes and data – how to stratify monitoring needs across different objectives and across different soil types and land cover/uses?

Activity 4: Group discussion on how we move from theory to action? Is there sufficient knowledge/data to initiate a SSMF?

Summary of workshop outputs:

Visions of a soil monitoring framework

  • To be a leader across the 4 nations of the UK and internationally
  • To have sustainable soils in perpetuity
  • Linking monitoring to decision making and ultimately evidence-based policy
  • A system to be able to respond rapidly to policy questions

Key overarching messages from stakeholders

  • Strengthening Scottish soil monitoring with a bespoke soil monitoring framework (SSMF) could make Scotland a ‘global exemplar’
  • Reviewing the EU Soil Monitoring Law demonstrates opportunities for Scotland to develop a more advanced monitoring framework that is more appropriate and beneficial for Scottish landscapes and land uses.
  • Creating a SSMF that can support and co-deliver across different policy objectives (E.g. Biodiversity strategy, vision for agriculture, flood resilience, SNAP3, NPF4 etc)
  • A bespoke SSMF would build a useable resource that supports and informs future evidence-based policy making and delivery (e.g. climate adaptation and mitigation, food security, flood resilience, water quality and air quality) and further utilises historic government funded data/platforms to provide broad scale conclusions and modelling requirements, as well as directing future research and policy needs.
  • We are not starting from scratch – Scotland already has a lot of data and knowledge to utilise and build upon. A monitoring framework needs to start with the soil properties and strong conceptual understanding of the soil functions.
  • “Let’s get started” – Do what we can with what we have and make improvements over time.

Overall Summary

There was wide support for a soil monitoring framework in Scotland that evidences why and how changes in soils may be occurring, as well as being able to better benchmark progress towards ‘thriving’ soils in Scotland. Stakeholders agreed that there is a significant amount of data already available providing a firm foundation from which to develop a SSMF, but in order to develop this further an overarching objective(s) is needed to inform the design and functionality of a SSMF. Across stakeholders present, there was a strong consistent message that the SSMF needs to be able to answer questions across scales, disciplines, sectors and land uses, as well as not letting financial constraints be a barrier for inaction (particularly when the ultimate costs of soil degradation is taken into account as highlighted by Baggaley et al., 2024). There was significant discussion regarding the types of data that may be required to inform soil health, functionality and security as well as how data could/should be translated to inform decision making i.e. how a SSMF can be designed to facilitates the translation of data into knowledge, action and wisdom. This discussion raised many questions relating to data requirements in terms of identifying appropriate soil metrics which will inform on the current state of soil resources as well as allowing the monitoring of changes in soils over time.

There were a variety of views on the use of a baseline, benchmarks and stratification. There was a view that a baseline of Scottish soils was needed even if it is imperfect. It was clarified that a baseline was just that and that it was not a “Preferred state”. Again, there was much discussion with respect to identifying which metrics/properties should be recorded in a baseline assessment and what is needed in terms of harmonisation of existing data sets to achieve the best possible baseline with the data available. Stakeholders were confident that potentially sufficient data exists to derive one, particularly through the national soil surveys (NSIS1 and NSIS2) and monitoring of forest soils (e.g. Forest soil sustainability, BIOSOIL) but that there is a lack data for soils relating to urban/suburban and recreational soils. However, it was highlighted that NSIS 2 was carried out nearly 20 years ago (2007-2009) and so changes in soil condition may have already occurred.

There was a lot of debate about whether there should be soil targets and benchmarks set. The use of benchmarks to incentivise actions and to better monitor progress was emphasised. Conversely there was concern with respect to identifying suitable benchmarks across different soil types and land uses. This includes the dependency on soil type, land use and management practices and the challenges of what defines a benchmark for multi-functional land uses or how to incorporate potential land use change over time. Stakeholders demonstrated caution with respect to the implementation of benchmarks as it is difficult to predict and manage potential unintended consequences, knock-on effects and trade-offs that target setting could bring. Stakeholders highlighted that there is a risk that benchmarks and targets lead to an oversimplification of soils and therefore the overarching message of holistic soil (and ecosystem) health and resilience may become lost as land managers strive to accomplish specific targets set.

Stakeholders agreed that a SSMF needs to represent all soil and land use types, but that there are challenges relating to how best Scotland’s landscapes should be stratified (e.g. based on soil type, land use (or sector) and/or by management) in the SSMF. It was suggested that a tiered or modular approach may be most suitable to reflect the complexity of Scottish landscapes, allowing for simple actions to be identified from collated data/information (and support adaptive learning over time). The challenge of encapsulating changes in land use and land management within a robust statistical SSMF design was identified at the workshop. Therefore, the potential to stratify or interpretation the SSMF based on soil vulnerability was proposed.

An overarching reaction of the workshop relates to the phrase “perfect is the enemy of good” in terms of there being a consensus that a SSMF is needed/wanted by stakeholders but that current data or knowledge gaps shouldn’t be barriers preventing the development of a SSMF. There was a sense of optimism that an agreement on SSMF objectives, purpose and design (metrics included) can be made to generate a transparent work-in-progress SSMF with its implementation informing future developmental needs. A key factor in implementing a monitoring framework is the presentation of data derived from it and ensuring that information is appropriately and proportionately translated to support the needs across Scottish Government, agencies, researchers, investors and land managers.

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How to cite this publication:

Buckingham, S., and Baggaley, N. (2025) ‘Securing soils in a changing climate: A soil route map for Scotland’, ClimateXChange. http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/6006

© The University of Edinburgh, 2025
Prepared by SAC Consulting on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

This work was supported by the Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division of the Scottish Government (CoE – CXC).

ClimateXChange

Edinburgh Climate Change Institute

High School Yards

Edinburgh EH1 1LZ

+44 (0) 131 651 4783

info@climatexchange.org.uk

www.climatexchange.org.uk

Research completed January 2025

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5570

Executive summary

Aims

Degraded peatlands are one of the largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions in Scotland. The Scottish Government has a budget of £250m to spend towards peatland restoration efforts through the Peatland ACTION (PA) programme up to 2030.

This research explored the evidence for peatland restoration costs in Scotland and examined emerging trends. It also investigated opportunities and challenges for contractors delivering peatland restoration services. We reviewed existing literature and analysed cost data compiled by SRUC from the PA programme projects supported by NatureScot funding between 2018 and 2023. We also carried out interviews with contractors. Data from other PA delivery partners post 2021 was not examined in this project phase due to time constraints.

Key findings

  • Observed peatland restoration costs per hectare vary significantly. This reflects a range of influencing factors, including:
    • project-specific factors (e.g. site characteristics, project length)
    • contractor-specific factors (e.g. firm size and history)
    • background commercial conditions (e.g. inflation, funding availability, tendering processes)
    • site location, baseline condition and environmental designation status.
  • Approximately half of the variation in unit costs between sites could not be explained by the statistical analysis, often due to noise in the data, for example:
    • Differences in data recording on restoration processes, project characteristics and costs across projects within the study period
    • Wider economic factors such as regional variations in labour and material costs, poor transport networks and local competition for scarce resources (see the recent SRUC Rural and Islands Insights report for evidence of this at a local scale)
    • Limited local competition due to barriers to entry to the market.
  • There is some evidence for economies of scale i.e. larger projects have lower unit costs. The extent of such economies of scales is difficult to determine due to other differences across projects.
  • Statistically speaking, costs of restoration have not changed over time. The absence of such an observed time trend in restoration unit costs may simplify the use of unit costs as predicted by the model to future years.
  • Interview data highlighted the impact of other factors, confirming the influence of complexities and uncertainties, both real and perceived, in the tendering process. These include:
    • perceived uncertainty in long-term commitment to government support for peatland restoration
    • challenging tendering processes
    • environmental and market conditions that add risk to a business engaged in restoration.
  • This is largely independent of site characteristics but impairs value for money directly by increasing the overhead costs of tendering, and indirectly by constraining the pool of willing contractors.

Improving operational delivery of peatland restoration

  • Estimates for restoration costs from our analysis could be useful for costings of large-scale policy programmes; the spatial approach to estimating variation in unit costs allows extrapolation at larger scale, although further work is needed to understand complex issues.
  • Further research into the extent to which economies of scale are present would be helpful, as would steps to improve confidence in the accuracy of reported costs and associated site characteristics.
  • Regional differences imply that uniform national benchmarking rates might be inappropriate, with large residual uncertainty of unit costs potentially increasing the risk of falsely rejecting projects that may deliver restoration cost-effectively.
  • Using standardised costs to assess projects is also problematic because a large part of variation in costs remains unexplained. Either of the options below can improve this situation.
    • Give greater attention in the tendering process, in particular how that may be improved on both the demand and supply side. This would draw out true context-specific costs in a competitive market.
    • Seek greater transparency around individual cost elements for an individual project bid, including overhead charges and profit margins e.g. open-book tendering with agreed percentage markups.
  • Supply of restoration services might be strengthened and value for money in peatland restoration increased through consideration of the following:
    • Include contingency costings as part of the tendering process, to address contractors’ cost risks regarding e.g. inflation spikes in key inputs (e.g. fuel) or unforeseen site complexities.
    • Commit to long-term funding of a pipeline of restoration projects. This will provide reassurance to existing and potential contractors that their investment in staff and machinery is merited.
    • Ensure prompt payment upon project completion with provision for at least part payment when final inspection is delayed due, for example, to weather conditions.
    • Simplify tendering procedures to stimulate supplier interest in peatland restoration work through rationalisation of information required, improved guidance and support for those tendering the work to provide better feedback.
    • Continue with (well received) training support plus opportunities for mutual knowledge exchange between funders and contractors. A specific area for training is in data collection for contractors.

Strengthening future analysis

Challenges and limitations of the analysis presented in this report could be addressed by:

  • Exploring potential systemic differences across Peatland ACTION delivery partners by comparing the results derived from the NatureScot Peatland ACTION database with estimates generated by, for example the Cairngorms National Park and Forestry and Land Scotland.
  • Confirming that the process of recording spatial location and recording of restoration area based on site outlines is standardised and consistently allows linking area and location with records of restoration costs and activities over time. Verification of reported area estimates through digitization in GIS can reveal important discrepancies. Re-recording of samples of outlines for restored areas, known as restoration footprint, on the ground should be considered for comparison.

Glossary / Abbreviations table

Abbreviations

CCPClimate Change Plan
CEDACentre for Environmental Data Analysis
CEHCentre for Ecology & Hydrology
CNPACairngorms National Park Authority
FLSForestry and Land Scotland
GHGGreenhouse Gas
GISGeographic Information System
JHIThe James Hutton Institute
LULUCFLand Use, Land Use Change and Forestry
NNRNational Nature Reserves 
NSANational Scenic Areas
OSOrdnance Survey
PAPeatland ACTION
PCSPublic Contracts Scotland
SACSpecial Areas of Conservation
SEPAScottish Environment Protection Agency
SGScottish Government
SPASpecial Protection Area 
SRUCScotland’s Rural College
SSESSE plc (formerly Scottish and Southern Energy plc) is a multinational energy company
SSSISite(s) of Special Scientific Interest

Glossary

BiddingProcess thorough which contractors respond to the tender by offering a budget and scale of activities they are capable of delivering within the defined scope of the project.
ComplexityAggregate account of extent and effort required to restore a particular site. A combination of site’s location, topographic features, accessibility, peatland condition and land cover that determine the overall scales of restoration operations and thus represents a proxy for the resources (costs) required.
ContractorPrivate company directly engaged in restoration activities.
Cost DatabaseAlso: SRUC (peatland restoration) cost database; Peat restoration cost database collated by SRUC capturing main activities and costs during restoration collected as part of the NatureScot administered delivery of the Peatland ACTION Programme.
Cost-EffectivenessA ratio of unit costs of restoration and a metric used for measurement of restoration success such as area restored or GHG abated. High cost-effectiveness means low cost for high level of benefit delivered and thus is a common way to measure value for money.
Degraded PeatlandA peatland is considered degraded if it is a source, rather than a sink of GHGs. This is due to a combination of peat draining and surface damage due to use, extraction or propagation of plant species that hinder the natural process of growth of peat moss (sphagnum).
Feasibility studyProcess of determining whether it is practically possible to deliver sufficient levels of improvement in quality of a particular stretch of degraded peatland. Required prerequisite for any implementation activities.
HeterogeneityAccount of patchiness/variability of land cover on a particular peatland site. It is measured as a total length of outline of individual land cover features, i.e. water bodies, patches of forest or grasslands. Land cover heterogeneity is assumed to be linked with high site complexity from the perspective of peatland restoration.
MaintenanceAny work required on a site post-restoration such as repairs to installed features.
MonitoringRegular assessment of a post-restoration site to collect information on the current status of peatland recovery and any evidence of success of implemented measures. Includes inspection of installed features and sampling of peat condition.
NatureScotPreviously Scottish Natural Heritage; public body responsible for advising Scottish Ministers on all matters relating to the natural heritage.
Peatland CodeVoluntary standard for UK peatland projects wishing to market the climate benefit of restoration.
Peatland ConditionClassification of current state of degraded peatlands. Classes consist of a combination of drainage status and surface cover i.e. drained grassland. Peat condition classes are used to calculate annual emission from degraded peatlands.
Peatland RestorationA set of activities required to undertake to return a degraded peatland to its (near) natural state.
PeatlandLand is classified as peatland if within the measured boundary the peat soil profile is at least 50cm deep.
RemotenessRemoteness of a site is an aggregate measure of its distance from population centres, access infrastructure and topographic features such as elevation.
Restoration CostFor the purpose of this analysis, the costs of restoring a particular site represent all the labour, machinery, fuel, equipment, material and other resources used during the measure implementation phase.
Restoration measuresIndividual activities undertaken on a restoration site during the project implementation phase such as installation of peat dams, bunding, moss planting or shrub removal.
Restoration ProjectA complete set of activities funded within a single grant allocation. Each restoration project can consist of restoration of a single or several sites. The implementation of restoration activities can be undertaken in several subsequent or overlapping phases.
Restoration SiteA discrete patch of land on which the restoration activities take place. The area defined as a restoration site is thus equal to the area restored after the project implementation phase is concluded.
RewettingA collection of activities aimed at restoring the natural water content of required peatland. One of the key steps to reduce excess emissions from degraded peatlands.
TenderingProcess of publishing a call for contractors to apply for a delivery of a specific peatland restoration project and subsequently choosing a winning bid based on the set of defined criteria.

Background

A high proportion of Scottish peatlands are in a degraded state and the Scottish Government has been setting ambitious targets for peatland restoration[1]. These reflect various overlapping policy objectives, notably reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) but also biodiversity enhancement and water management. Primarily via the Peatland ACTION (PA) programme supported by Scottish Government and administered by Scottish Natural Heritage (now NatureScot), Forestry and Land Scotland, and the National Park authorities, in excess of 52,000 hectares have been restored since 2012.

In February 2020, the Scottish Government announced an increase in investment in peatland restoration of more than £250 million over 10 years, aiming to support the restoration of 250,000 hectares of degraded peat by 2030, as part of the Scottish Government’s Climate Change Plan for net zero. In the Update of the Climate Change Plan, the restoration target is upheld, and it is emphasised that “[t]o deliver on the 2032 emissions reduction envelope annual peatland restoration needs to be far higher than the current 20,000 hectare annual target”.[2]

Scottish Government funding for peatland restoration is managed via the Peatland ACTION (PA) programme. This has five delivery partners: NatureScot, Forestry and Land Scotland, Cairngorms National Park Authority, Loch Lomond and The Trossachs National Park Authority and Scottish Water. This research examined only NatureScot projects. Harmonising data from all delivery partners was an initial ambition but considered out of scope within the time and budget available in the project. Nevertheless, cost data collated from NatureScot PA administered projects has wide coverage, geographically and in terms of restoration activities and accounts for c.70% of PA restoration.

Over 10,000 ha of Scottish peatlands were restored under PA in 2023/24, an increase in annual restoration area of 40% compared to the previous year. Despite this increase, meeting the policy ambition for peatland restoration will require significant upscaling of restoration efforts over coming years at times of continued pressure on public budgets. Value-for-money and scale of policy ambition imply a need for targeting restoration efforts where it is most cost effective, taking single (GHG emission reduction) or multiple social and environmental outcomes into account. Determining such cost-effective pathways, requires an in-depth understanding of the costs that currently underpin peatland restoration in Scotland. However, whilst variation in restoration costs across different projects are reported (Glenk et al., 2022), the causes of such variation have yet to be investigated systematically. Furthermore, despite the key role that contractors have in peatland restoration delivery (and therefore associated costs), their perceptions of the tendering and restoration process has not yet been sufficiently studied.

This report examines variation of costs of implementing restoration,[3] factors affecting contractors ability and willingness to engage in restoration, and explores barriers to scaling restoration efforts related to costs and the supply of restoration services by contractors.

The project had three main aims:

1. Which factors affect restoration costs? (Section 4)

We take a broad perspective to offer an overview that considers environmental and site conditions, factors affecting bidding of contractors and actual restoration work. The synthesis is based on a rapid review of literature discussing bidding behaviour and cost of implementing nature restoration, combined with the joint expertise of the research team. Where possible, we discuss interactions between factors and how they have been evolving over time.

2. Which factors explain variation in restoration cost? (Section 5)

We provide a data driven quantification of relationships between restoration cost and environmental and site characteristics. The analysis draws on cost data collected via the NatureScot PA funded programme[4], which is matched with spatial information on environmental and site characteristics for statistical analysis. This provides insight into any systematic variation of restoration cost to support restoration budgeting and planning.

3. What are the opportunities and challenges for contractors in engaging with restoration? (Section 6)

We draw on interviews with contractors of restoration services selected to represent a mix of size and geographical spread. Interview notes and transcripts were reviewed to provide perspectives on prospects and difficulties faced by contractors as crucial actors for scaling of restoration efforts.

Factors affecting restoration – an overview

A brief synthesis of related literature

To identify factors affecting restoration cost, we screened relevant literature related to costs of ecosystem restoration and nature-based solutions[5]; and the factors affecting bidding behaviour of contractors.

Cost of conservation efforts, including ecosystem restoration

There is consensus in conservation literature that costs should play an important role for conservation planning, management and evaluation; they affect ‘value for money’ considerations. The efficiency of conservation spending is enhanced if funding is allocated based on considerations of cost-effectiveness, i.e., the benefit achieved relative to cost (e.g., Babcock et al., 1997; Naidoo et al., 2006; Perhans et al., 2008; Burkhalter et al., 2016; Rodewald et al., 2019; Field and Elphick, 2019). How benefits are measured is of relevance, too: counting benefits simply in terms of area or number of conservation units is associated with less efficient allocation of resources compared to measures that better reflected actual intended outcomes (e.g., biodiversity) (Engert and Laurance., 2019).

The efficiency gains of considering costs depend on the accuracy of cost predictions. This requires the development of cost projections that reflect the (spatial) variability in cost of conservation action (Burkhalter et al., 2016; Van Deynze et al., 2022), also allowing the identification of potential economies of scale (Cho et al., 2017; Armsworth et al., 2018).

Ecosystem restoration projects of all types are generally considered to be high cost, often requiring significant up-front capital investment (Sewell et al., 2016). However, costs of restoration vary greatly across contexts and locations (de Groot et al., 2013; Sewell et al., 2016; Van Deynze et al., 2022). Factors quoted to influence cost variation include the baseline level of ecosystem degradation, local infrastructure availability, type and scale of restoration, population pressure and density, the legal framework, existing land use and tenure arrangements, land value, labour costs and method of measurement (Sewell et al. 2016,). We found studies referring to complexity of restoration works, managing and protecting safe access to sites, access to labour and supplies, and other project characteristics including land cover, slope, elevation, number of sites in a project and distance between sites (Van Deynze et al., 2022).

More specific peatland restoration cost estimates for the UK and Scotland also show great variability. For example, costs per hectare vary greatly by restoration technique used (Artz et al 2018; Okumah et al., 2019; Glenk et al., 2020, 2021, 2022). A previous CXC study (Artz et al., 2019) investigated physical limitations to access to restoration sites. They focused on several factors – physical infrastructure (road network), snow days, rainfall, elevation, peat condition, drainage status and a NatureScot remoteness index. Further, Aitkenhead et al., (2021), in their mapping of peatland emission categories, provided evidence for strong regional variation in peatland conditions and levels of degradation. In an outline of a national peatland monitoring strategy, Artz et al. (2023) proposed features such as bare peat extent, topographic and hydrological connectivity, soil erosion levels, microclimatic proxies water table stabilisation such as rainfall or windspeed and changes to vegetation cover among others, as essential dimensions to monitor the potential success of restoration efforts. Previously, Artz et al., (2019) had also identified strong geographic divide in peatland conditions across Scotland and that high site fragmentation levels introduce substantial error into the estimation process.

Other studies confirm the relevance of factors including altitude and distance from roads (remoteness) (Okumah et al., 2019), and site condition (Glenk et al., 2020, 2021, 2022), pre-restoration site use and land-cover.

The conservation and restoration literature emphasises the importance of reporting cost elements (e.g. fixed & variable, capital, labour cost) instead of simply total cost (Cook et al., 2017; Artz et al., 2018). Knowledge of cost elements, ideally collected in a standardised way (Iacona et al., 2018; Artz et al., 2018), facilitates the transfer of cost estimates across sites and contexts, enhances their potential to enter decision support tools, and improves understanding of the relationship between cost and conservation outcome as spending increases or decreases (Cook et al., 2017). Lack of standardising how costs are accounted for adds to an already large variation in reported cost across projects (Sewell et al., 2016; Glenk et al., 2020).

Synthesis of papers investigating contractors’ decisions to bid

Peatland restoration is primarily undertaken by private-sector contractors who are invited to tender competitively for work. However, little research appears to have been undertaken specifically in relation to peatland contractors’ business models and factors influencing their decisions to bid for restoration projects. Nonetheless, some possible insights are offered by findings for other land-based sectors (e.g. forestry, landscaping, and civil engineering).[6] Although the analogies are not perfect, they are sufficient to identify relevant types of issues.

Common factors identified in this broader literature fall into various risk categories: client-related, project-related, contractor-related, and other (Cohan, 2018; Oo et al., 2022; Olatunji et al., 2023). The latter relate to background market conditions and government policies which apply across all contractors and projects, for example, wage and price inflation or regulatory obligations. All other things being equal, uncertainty about relative costs and/or future regulatory requirements dampen contractors’ willingness to bid for projects and/or increase quoted bid prices (Oo et al., 2022; Binshakir et al., 2023; Olatunji et al., 2023).

Client-related factors include financial and organisational reputation plus willingness to foster longer-term relationships. For example, promptness in paying, openness of administrative processes, and degree of mutual trust. All other things being equal, a reliable client with simple(r) bidding processes and a willingness to share project information plus commit to a pipeline of work is more likely to receive bids, and at lower prices (Spencer, 1989; Oo et al., 2022; Binshakir et al., 2023; Olatunji et al., 2023).

Project-related factors essentially relate to the size and complexity of projects (and hence overlap with the site-specific factors noted above). For example, larger projects generally benefit from economies of scale and simpler projects have less risk of encountering unforeseen problems. Hence, all other things being equal, simpler and larger projects are more likely to attract bids, and at lower unit prices (Oo et al., 2022; Binshakir et al., 2023; Johansson et al., 2023; Kronholm et al., 2023; Olatunji et al., 2023).

Contractor-related factors relate to the capabilities and confidence of individual firms. For example, prior experience with similar projects, availability of relevant staff and machinery, and sufficient cash-flow. All other things being equal, a contractor is more likely to bid for a given project if they are familiar with the type of work required and either already have the necessary staff and machinery or are sufficiently confident to invest in additional capacity (e.g. perceive a good chance of follow-on work). Confidence to bid may also reflect the anticipated degree of competition from other contractors and perceived fairness of (client-related) bidding processes. For example, the likelihood of a rival bid by a competitor being viewed as strong and/or favoured may discourage bidding (Cohan, 2018; Spencer, 1989; Oo et al., 2022; Binshakir et al., 2023; Johansson et al., 2023; Kronholm et al., 2023; Olatunji et al., 2023).

Implications for costs

Given that all factors identified above are likely to vary across different projects, clients (e.g. funding bodies), contractors and time-periods, it would be expected that observed unit costs (e.g. per ha) will display significant variation. This is confirmed by previous analysis of peatland restoration costs across Scotland (Okumah et al., 2019; Glenk et al., 2020, 2021, 2022). For example, Glenk et al. (2022) report overall median costs of £1025/ha across 158 completed projects but with a standard deviation of £4328/ha, and also show that medians for different types of projects vary between £939/ha and £1778/ha.

Reported costs for other types of ecosystem restoration also show significant (>40%) variation. This is largely attributed to differences in project scales and complexity, including administrative processes, but also to a lack of standardisation in cost reporting. Econometric analysis of the determinants of cost variation typically struggle to explain all such variation (King and Bohlen, 1995; Keating et al., 2015; Knight et al., 2021; Van Deynze et al., 2022).

Likely factors affecting peatland restoration cost

The findings from the available literature are consistent with anecdotal evidence gleaned previously by members of the research team and of the Steering Group. As such, it is possible to hypothesise the types of factors likely to affect peatland restoration costs, to guide (but not dictate) issues to explore through statistical analysis of secondary data and through discussions with contractors.

We identified a wide overview of potential factors affecting restoration costs across sites and at a given point in time (Appendix Table A4.2). There are potential relationships between factors and restoration costs, for example, costs per hectare are likely to fall as project size increases and overhead cost elements can be spread more thinly. However, costs per hectare are likely to increase with severity of baseline degradation (e.g. proportion of site with eroded or bare peat) as the restoration effort required increases. Similarly, more remote sites and sites with more complex mosaics of features may also be relatively more expensive per hectare.

The issue is complex and factors may confound each other. For example, economies of scale effects may not be immediately apparent if larger sites also happen to be more remote and/or more degraded.

The statistical analysis relied on the cost data already collated by researchers of SRUC into a suitable database from PA NatureScot data, although inconsistencies in reporting over projects and the study period (2018-2023) presented challenges. Specific metrics for characterising projects may include various biophysical indicators (e.g. area, location, topography) as well as baseline condition and access conditions affecting which type and density of restoration techniques is cost-effective.

We understand that PA delivery partners differ in their approach to profiling projects for tendering with potential implications for a full analysis of reported cost. For example, the Cairngorms National Park Authority (CNPA) has a model to translate complexity into labour and machinery days necessary for restoration, providing options for adjustments of typical rates in the process. This approach makes intuitive sense given that many site-specific factors affecting cost are related to complexity (Appendix Table A4.2). However, pre-characterization of complexity of restoration via aerial photography is time consuming and may be challenging to apply at scale. This may change in the future, for example employing machine learning mapping tools to assess drainage and erosion features that provide indication for restoration complexity (Macfarlane et al., 2024).

In addition, background changes over time may affect all projects, including advances in restoration techniques (Appendix Table A4.3). For example, inflation increasing the costs of key inputs (e.g. fuel) but also, potentially, innovation and experience reducing unit costs. Dynamics of supply and demand for restoration services may affect unit cost of restoration and also change over time. For example, contractors of restoration services may become more experienced and thus efficient over time. However, whether this impacts on unit costs depends, among other things, also on the level of competition that contractors face.

In addition to the statistical analysis of reported cost data, more qualitative insights can be gained through interviews with contractors undertaking restoration activities on-the-ground. This offers an opportunity to confirm the relevance of factors identified for statistical analysis. It also offers an opportunity to explore other factors not included in the cost database.

For example, contractors’ willingness to bid and quoted prices for particular projects may be affected by their capacity and experience (e.g. number of diggers, work on similar sites previously), but also by alternative income-generating opportunities (e.g. other civil-engineering work). Moreover, it may also be affected by (perceived) complexity and fairness of tendering processes, including the (perceived) likelihood of bidding successfully (i.e., whether tendering is worth the effort).

Such issues can be explored through discussion with contractors using semi-structured interviews. Whilst a range of different types of contractors (e.g. varying by size, location and experience) can be interviewed, results should not be treated as statistically representative but rather as illustrative cases of the types of factors influencing contractors’ engagement with peatland restoration.

Conclusion

Peatland restoration costs are influenced by a range of factors, including:

  • project-specific factors (e.g., site characteristics, project length),
  • contractor-specific factors (e.g. firm size and history), and
  • background commercial conditions (e.g. inflation, funding availability, tendering processes).

These factors vary across different projects, clients (e.g. funding bodies), contractors and time periods, leading to great variation in observed unit (e.g. per ha) costs. Lack of standardising how costs are accounted for further adds to this already large variation in reported cost across projects. Systematic analysis of the factors to identify variation and evidence collected directly from contractors are needed to gain in-depth understanding.

Explaining variation in restoration cost

In this section we use information entailed in the SRUC cost database, which is compiled from NatureScot Peatland ACTION grant application and final reporting forms (see Section 5.1). We combine data in the SRUC cost database with publicly available spatial data to determine how geography, climate, peat condition, land use and site designation (SSSI etc.) are associated with restoration costs. The main output of the work reported in this section is a statistical model which attempts to explain variation in the restoration cost per hectare across completed projects.

The model results can be used to understand systematic relationships between restoration costs and site characteristics (e.g. access, topography, land use) that vary spatially. Findings may provide answers to questions such as ‘typically, is restoring peatland under grassland or forested land more or less expensive?’; or ‘is there a trend for restoration to be more expensive in one region compared to another?’. Answers to such questions may provide insights on how peatland restoration in Scotland could be delivered more cost-effectively. The model may also be used for to derive estimates of costs associated with expanding restoration across Scotland, for example as part of a cost-benefit analysis. We also highlight gaps in knowledge and highlight areas for review and further research that could make this type of analysis more accurate.

Methodological approach: cost data analysis

The SRUC cost database (see Glenk et al., 2022 for an overview) contains detailed information on project costs and activities, and in its most recent form originates from 289 final project report forms of NatureScot PA administered restoration projects covering a period from April 2016 to March 2023. Due to issues with unreliable historic data contained in the forms (see 5.2.4), only 229 of the 289 final observations for a period between April 2017 to March 2023 were complete and sufficiently reliable to be used in the analysis. Full details of the methodology, including limitations of the SRUC database, are given in Appendix A5.

Cost of restoration of a particular peatland site is here defined as the sum of all expenses within the project implementation phase. This includes all the measure-related costs (labour, material, fuel, equipment/machinery), mobilisation costs, project management and monitoring costs (within implementation phase) and other necessary work not directly attributable to restoration measures, such as changes to access infrastructure, site boundaries/fences, location-specific biodiversity protection measures or livestock/wildlife management/exclusion. Cost estimates exclude costs associated with feasibility studies, bidding and grant application process, any pre-restoration site-specific expenses, post-restoration monitoring and maintenance or loss of income due to limited use of the site post-restoration. These non-implementation costs are excluded because they are not part of the contractor tendering process and relate to a different set of activities. In addition, many sites do not yet have a lengthy period of reporting of post-implementation costs.

A statistical model to infer the cost per hectare of a site in the SRUC cost database based on 37 explanatory variables was developed to determine which variables significantly impact on cost. Spatial variables were extracted from several maps based on the location of the restoration project under the assumption that the sites were perfect circles of an area equal to that reported in the SRUC cost database. Spatial variables used to infer cost include rainfall, peat condition, peat depth, pooled-biogeographical-zones. Various configurations of the model were tested (i.e., different explanatory variables, different units of measurement), but the model presented is the best in terms of statistical test performance (see Appendix A5 for more details). A full list of variables used in the model can be seen in the Appendix Table A5.1. and a more detailed description of the data extraction and statistical model can be found in Appendix A5.

Figure 5.1 displays the geographical distribution of projects considered in the analysis across what we refer to as ‘restoration zones’ (Appendix Table A5.4). It is important to note that Figure 5.1 is not a representative map of PA restoration activity. The eight restoration zones were created by pooling the original 21 ‘biogeographical zones’ for the ease of interpretation. The original biogeographical zones, also referred to as ‘Natural Heritage Zones’ represent discrete regions based on similarities in topography, climate and the composition of biological community. Sites within a restoration zone are expected to have similar environmental and geographical features and thus a similar foundation for peatland restoration.

Figure 5.1: Number of sites per restoration zone. FC) Flow Country; AR) Argyll; CH) Central Highlands; NH) Northern Highlands; EC) East Coast; IS) Isles (Shetland, Orkney, Hebrides except for Argyll); CB) Central Belt; SW) Southwest.
Figure 5.1: Number of sites per restoration zone. FC) Flow Country; AR) Argyll; CH) Central Highlands; NH) Northern Highlands; EC) East Coast; IS) Isles (Shetland, Orkney, Hebrides except for Argyll); CB) Central Belt; SW) Southwest.

Results of cost data analysis

Descriptive data overview

After removing entries with obvious reporting errors (totalling 60 entries), the average cost per hectare (2020-£/ha) of restoration is £1,550/ha. However, there is a large variation in unit cost. To illustrate this: the unit cost at the 5th percentile is £191/ha, while the unit cost at the 95th percentile is £4,483/ha, Appendix Table A5.6.

Therefore, using an overall average cost per hectare to estimate costs of future restoration projects is not advised and further information about the site is required to infer variation in cost per hectare. The average restoration cost per hectare in each restoration zone shows that, all else equal, restoration in the Flow Country was least costly while restoration in the Central Belt was most expensive (Figure 5.2).

On average, 22% of sites were classified as ‘Near Natural Bog’ in the UK LULUCF Inventory (Appendix Table A5.5), and the largest area of restored peatland was classified as ‘Near Natural Bog’ at 32% of the area restored, for the sites considered in this study (Appendix Table A5.5). However, according to information provided by the NatureScot Peatland ACTION team only 3.8% of restored peat bog is near natural bog. It is likely that the ‘circle method’ (Appendix Figure A5.1) for calculating the area of restored peatland and/or the inaccuracy of the peat condition map used in the inventory may cause errors in our calculations.

Size classInterval (ha)Average cost (2020£/ha)
1[0-10]2375.773
2[10-25]1478.852
3[25-40]1,344.1
4[40-85]1,487.4
5[85-578]933.5
Table 5.2: Sites categorised into area classes of equal number of observations (N=46 and N=45 for Size class 5) and their average restoration cost per hectare.

To analyse the relationship between site area on costs per hectare, the sites were distributed equally to size-classes based on spatial area. The average unit costs for sites in the smallest area category were approximately three times as high as the ones in the largest area category, Table 5.2, pointing to the possibility of economies of scale (see Appendix A5.3 for an explanation and illustrative example related to peatland restoration).

These averages, however, need to be interpreted with caution due to the nature of calculation of costs per hectare (total site costs divided by total site area) and confounding factors, i.e., other factors co-vary (in our data) with size. The suggestion that decreased unit cost associated with larger site size in the data is due entirely to economies of scale could therefore be misleading. For example, a high proportion of larger sites are grassland sites rather than bare peat sites, meaning that their lower per ha costs may partly reflect their scale but may also partly reflect the relative ease of restoring grassland rather than restoring bare peat.

This was evident in the cost database, where we find that the largest sites (N=6 representing 17% of the restored area; site area >380ha) had none of the complex restoration activities such as mulching, stabilisation, felling and sphagnum transplanting (one notion of site-complexity). Therefore, it was difficult to determine if a large site was cheaper per hectare due to economies of scale, or because it required less complex restoration activities; both explanations are likely responsible for the observed decrease in cost per hectare with increased site area.


Figure 5.2: Average restoration cost per hectare for each restoration zone. Zones: FC) Flow Country; AR) Argyll; CH) Central Highlands; NH) Northern Highlands; EC) East Coast; IS) Isles (Shetland, Orkney, Hebrides except for Argyll); CB) Central Belt; SW) Southwest.
Figure 5.2: Average restoration cost per hectare for each restoration zone. Zones: FC) Flow Country; AR) Argyll; CH) Central Highlands; NH) Northern Highlands; EC) East Coast; IS) Isles (Shetland, Orkney, Hebrides except for Argyll); CB) Central Belt; SW) Southwest.

Statistical model results: drivers of spatial variation in cost per hectare

The results provide a good overview of the spatial drivers of restoration cost but may mask any interactions between variables. The statistical model (log-linear) helps us unpick all the variables that are driving cost for a site and determine features that are making sites more or less expensive (Appendix Table A5.7). The model explained 52.0% of the variation in cost per hectare amongst the 229 sites used in this study. After accounting for the number of variables (37) used in the model relative to the number observations (Adjusted R-squared), the explained variation was 42.4%, which compares favourably to other studies (Van Deynze et al., 2022). The unexplained part is attributed partly to noise in the reported data (e.g. errors in forms and in data entry) and to unobserved influences on costs – both of which reflect some of the limitations of the data collection process. However, it should be noted that it is unrealistic to expect 100% explanatory power on any statistical model: neither is the underlying relationship between different factors often known sufficiently to specify it perfectly in modelling terms nor are all possible data available to populate a perfect model.

Figure 5.3 displays all the variables considered as having an influence on cost per hectare, and the amount that they are predicted by the statistical model to change costs per hectare[7]. Variables right of the red dashed line increase costs and those left of the dashed line decrease costs. Here we discuss variables which we are almost certain (‘significantly’) to affect cost per hectare according to the available data, i.e. those in green in Figure 5.3 as well as variables we initially expected to drive unit cost.

Year of funding

We expected that cost per hectare would vary across time (Appendix Table A4.3). However, the year in which the funding was granted is not statistically significantly explaining variation in costs. Since the costs are deflated, the data suggests that peatland restoration costs have changed over time in line with inflation. However, mostdata points were unreliable before 2017 and the reliability of data increased after 2019, which leaves only a six-year time period to be investigated here. This then limits conclusions in regards of time trends.

Nevertheless, those interested in time trends may inspect a descriptive analysis of area of restoration sites, restoration measures, land cover and regions over time for the study time period (2018-2023, Appendix 5.4).

Regions

For the pooled biogeographical zones, the lowest restoration unit costs, once all other factors such as forestry land use are controlled for, are reported for the Flow Country (which is used as a reference point in the statistical model and hence does not show up in Figure 5.3). Costs per hectare are significantly greater for sites in all other regions. Note that this applies after controlling for all other factors considered in the model. The restoration zones with the greatest restoration costs per hectare are:

  1. The Isles: On average, log-cost per hectare is 2.1 times greater to restore a site in this region than in Flow Country. The high costs may reflect a mix of greater costs (e.g. fuel and haulage costs) on islands. Furthermore, the limited supply of contractor services on specific islands and their need to travel long distances and potentially transport the heavy machinery by ferry are potentially important factors.
  2. Argyll: On average, log-cost per hectare is 1.4 times greater than for the Flow Country. The complexity of terrain and remoteness to some extent overlaps with The Isles, and thus similar challenges might be expected.
  3. Central & Northern Highlands: log-cost per hectare restored is 1.3 times higher than in the Flow Country. The hilly terrain adds complexity due to more difficult access and environmental conditions in which the restoration needs to take place.

The availability of contractors in different restoration zones may also explain the regional differences (see Section 6 and factors related to demand and supply of contractors in Appendix Table A4.3.) [8].

Peatland condition classification

The proportion of peatland in certain condition categories affects restoration costs. In general, sites with lots of peat classified as ‘grassland’ are cheaper to restore, Figure 5.3. We hypothesize that this is because the land is more homogenous and because the grass is protecting the underlying peat from erosion. Therefore, it is more likely that the restoration activities required will be cheaper, such as drain blocking. It may also be that grassland areas have more favourable access conditions that reduce costs.

In contrast, sites with large proportions classified as ‘eroded bog’ increase the restoration cost. This is likely due to the complexity and raised cost of restoration activities to restore eroded bogs, e.g., hag reprofiling and sphagnum moss transplants. The proportion of the site with peat classified as ‘forest’ has the greatest positive effect on cost per hectare amongst Inventory peatland condition categories. We expect that this is due to the cost of felling, and the associated removal of stumps and possibly mulching, before restoration activities can begin. This finding is in line with earlier analysis presented in Glenk et al., (2022).

Site designation

Each site designation is self-reported and model results can be interpreted as the effect of a particular reported site designation, keeping all other designations the same. If a site reports SSSI designation, the log-costs per hectare are 80% higher than without it, Figure 5.3. This could be tied to careful operation on-site and risk of downtime through presence of important wildlife. The national scenic area (NSA) designation has the opposite effect on costs. If a site falls into this category, the log-costs per hectare are 69% lower. This effect might be the result of better access to scenic areas and overall better pre-restoration site conditions and management. Further work is required to understand the influence of this factor.

Site use

Like site designation, site use is a self-reported category, and each site could have several reported uses. The model results for each site use are interpreted as the effect of a particular reported site use, keeping all other reported site uses the same. Forestry reported as a site use dramatically increases restoration costs per hectare. On a hectare basis, sites that are used for grazing are cheaper to restore than those that are not used for this purpose, Figure 5.3. This is in line with ‘forest’ and ‘grassland’ peat condition categories discussed above (5.2.2.3). Although the effect is less certain (i.e., not significant), costs per hectare of sites self-reported as ‘field sports’ (i.e., shooting grouse) tend to be lower. We expect this is due to the good access on such sites.

Average rainfall

In general, sites with a greater average yearly rainfall rate are associated with lower cost per hectare. This could be due to various reasons, such as comparatively higher water tables that might imply healthier peatland and thus less complex restoration activities.

Figure 5.3: Factors and how they affect the costs of restoration.

Statistical model results: summary

  • The statistical model allows us to explain c.52% of the variation on per hectare peatland restoration costs.
  • Site location within restoration zones and specific categories of peat condition, site use and site designation are significant predictors of variation of costs per hectare of peatland restoration.
  • Of these factors, the geographical area that the site is in is the largest driver of cost per hectare with significantly greater values on the Isles, and significantly lower values for the Flow Country, after accounting for other factors.
  • Forestry, both as a site use and a peat condition category, has a strong effect on overall costs due to complexity of activities related to forest removal[9].
  • High levels of peatland erosion are linked with greater per hectare restoration costs.
  • Presence of floodplains/surface water on site, NSA designation and grazing, or peat covered by grassland all significantly reduce site restoration costs per hectare.
  • On average, larger sites have lower unit costs (£/ha) than smaller sites. We attribute this to a combination of economies of scale and a tendency for larger sites to be associated with relatively less complex and thus cheaper restoration activities.

Main limitations of the analysis

While the explanatory power of our analysis lies within expectations for this type of study, it is important to note sources of ‘noise’ and data uncertainty. Apart from potential issues with data entry and collation into the SRUC cost database, a major source of uncertainty is related to large variation in detail and rigour of reporting of the restoration process via application and reporting forms. Several reports are missing crucial details making them invalid for further analysis. It is important to point out that such issues primarily arise for older sites in the SRUC cost database, and that reporting forms have been adapted several times over the study period to accommodate insights as the PA program evolved within NatureScot.

Each PA project that has been granted funding by NatureScot can be identified via a grant reference number. Thus, the sites that have been restored within the same restoration grant share the same reference number. However, throughout the duration of restoration, the definitions of sites often change, in part reflecting adjustments to initial restoration plans made throughout a project. Differences concern both the number of sites within a grant, and the area of identified sites can both increase or decrease based on what is currently considered feasible/priority. Therefore, the information detailed in project application forms can only be compared to final forms if these changes were sufficiently documented. Likewise, it was sometimes not possible to link past restoration grants to more recent grants on a specific area of peat. We recommend using the same grant reference codes for additional funding or encoding previous grant codes into new grant reference codes so that previous funding can easily be traced back to new funding for the same overall restoration area.

Inconsistencies of grant reference numbers and site IDs between the SRUC cost database and PA spatial data meant that it was impossible to easily link spatial site outlines to the cost data base. Consequently, we manually “triangulated” matches between sites in the SRUC cost database and sites in the spatial data for restoration from NatureScot PA, which was both time consuming and without guarantee of being free of error.

Due to unavailability of geospatial data for all sites in the SRUC cost database considered for analysis, we assumed that each site was a circle of the reported restoration area around a central point which reduces accuracy. According to NatureScot, spatial data has now a site ID field and the final report document has also this site ID field with cost associated, which should facilitate similar analysis of variation in restoration cost per hectare in the future. Furthermore, moving to digital reporting so that spatial information and cost data can be entered into the same data portal may reduce errors in site identification and matching of cost and spatial data. Due to a lack of a standardised methodology for the calculation of a total area of a restoration site, over time of study (2018-2023) and across restoration sites in the SRUC cost database, the account of area restored provided in the reporting form can be only treated as approximate.

Sites for which the reported areas were missing, unclear or otherwise impossible to work with were removed from the analysis. The format in which the type, unit and (unit or total) cost of restoration measures is reported also varies as reporting forms were updated over the years; and depended on preferences and reporting efforts invested by grantees. For example, the installation of wave dams has been reported either as the total number of individual dams, the total length of all the drains that were dammed, or the total area covered by the specific type of dams. Wave dams also feature only in later editions of application and reporting forms. Such issues with reporting complicate measure-specific analysis of restoration cost. For example, differences in units in which measures are reported make judgment on measure intensity in a restoration site challenging if not impossible. A more technical description of the limitations in the analysis can be found in the Appendix A5.1.5. An account of challenges regarding information used for collating an earlier version of the SRUC cost database is also included in Glenk et al. (2022).

Conclusions

  • For costings of large-scale policy programmes, and in the absence of more robust alternatives, our model might be used to provide upper and lower bounds for restoration costs. The use of mostly spatially explicit variables in the statistical model facilitates extrapolation at larger scale. Accepting important caveats regarding the analysis (related e.g. to consistency of recording of cost within SRUC cost database and the proximate approach to deriving spatial variables from reported area), information on variation in unit cost could be combined with spatially explicit restoration pathways to derive baseline estimates of expected costs of large-scale policy implementation and related uncertainty. Such estimates could for example be combined with benefit estimates of peatland restoration in a cost-benefit analysis.
  • Statistically speaking, costs of restoration have not changed over time. The absence of such an observed time trend in restoration unit costs may simplify the use of unit costs as predicted by the model to future years.
  • Prior to extrapolation of unit cost estimates for large scale policy appraisal, further research is needed to assess the extent to which economies of scale are present. This could be combined with further efforts to improve confidence in the accuracy of reported costs and associated site characteristics.
  • Because of the great degree of variation and the relatively large degree of unexplained variation in unit costs, the statistical model should not be used for appraisal of individual projects (as opposed to large scale policy programmes). However, there are potential implications of the unexplained variability for the practice of using standardised costs to assessing projects and benchmarking. Given the large degree of unexplained variability, greater flexibility in appraisals of cost should be offered. In this regard, for example, our model points to a need for accommodating for larger costs on the Isles.
  • There has been great progress in harmonising cost and area reporting for projects, especially since 2019. Based on challenges in linking the SRUC cost database with spatial data on NatureScot Peatland ACTION administered projects for the study period, a review of the methodology for recording of the following data may prove useful. This recognises that much of the points below may already be in hand:
    • Costs: clear, separate categories for measure-related expenses and project management; costs identifiable at a site level and over time.
    • Site outlines: precise recording of site location and dimensions. Guidance for recording outlines and areas (e.g. distance buffers around areas where restoration measures are implemented) to record area impacted by restoration has been developed. It might be worth to review that guidance is implemented consistently and enforced for all projects by Peatland ACTION delivery partners.
    • Applied measures: unified accounting of units (i.e. length vs. number of dams).
    • Common and unified project and site identification: ensure that the system in place allows tracking of sites throughout project lifetime and beyond.
  • Also, compare the statistical results derived from NatureScot Peatland ACTION projects within the SRUC cost database to the estimates generated for projects administered by other delivery partners.
    • For example, CNPA uses a bottom-up approach that classifies peatland restoration needs and associated costs by complexity mapping based on aerial photography. A more detailed analysis of costs of delivery by Forestry and Land Scotland could provide additional insights into the economics of forest to bog restoration.
  • Verify reported area estimates in spatial data provided by NatureScot Peatland ACTION. Re-recording of site outlines (area restored/restoration footprint) on the ground should be considered and could be incentivised and/or organised via Peatland ACTION officers.

Opportunities and challenges for contractors delivering peatland restoration services

The rapid literature review (see 4.1.2) points to a knowledge gap about service providers implementing nature-based solutions. Our research partly addresses this gap with a focus on contractors of peatland restoration and their views and perceptions regarding business models, factors influencing decisions to tender and costing within tenders, and barriers and opportunities to scale business operations in the peatland restoration domain.

Methodological approach: contractor views

Eight interviews were conducted with contractors providing peatland restoration services in Scotland, primarily funded through NatureScot as the PA delivery partner (Table 6.1). Here, we define contractors as the company or individual enacting the peatland restoration. Details of the approach are given in Appendix B6, including the interview protocol (Table B6.2).

Interview notes and transcripts were reviewed to identify commonalities and points of difference in contractor perspectives of the tender process and wider factors affecting the industry. Findings are presented here around nine main themes: factors affecting tendering, alterations to tendering, costs, importance of business diversity to create resilience, consistency of funding and workflow, geographical area of work, recruitment and skills, training and increasing the restoration area.

 Participants
SizeMediumLargeSmallMediumSmallLargeMediumNew Entrant
RegionMain-land NationalMain-land NationalMain-land NEMain-land NWIslandMain-land NationalMain-land NWMain-land NE
Number of Operators928585No data81
Number of Machines9251196No data62

Table 6.1: Study participant overview. To maintain anonymity, we remove identifiers and randomise order of appearance in this table

Results of interview analysis

Factors affecting tendering

A wide range of considerations affecting the decision to tender were mentioned by participants, including

  • Ease of tendering, which determined whether contractors would tender or not. This applied mainly to smaller contractors
  • Current workload
  • Capacity, although this is increased by machinery hire or sub-contracting
  • The accessibility of site
  • Whether the operations matched their machinery portfolio
  • One large contractor does their own formal value for money assessment to decide whether it is worth tendering

Experience of the tendering process was commonly raised as an important factor affecting the decision to tender, in line with findings from the literature (Section 4.1.2). Contractors further highlighted a number of issues with the tendering process that were leading to frustration and could pose a barrier to expanding the industry. Decision makers in administrations involved in implementing peatland restoration have some control over shaping the tendering process, thus offering potential for operational adjustments.

  • Transparency of the process: Contractors highlighted a need for substantiated and clear feedback.
  • Timeframes: knowing what is happening when and sufficiently in advance.
  • Content of tenders was too involved.
  • Public contracts tendering was perceived by smaller contractors as onerous and not always concomitant to the scale of project.
  • Tendering is a non-productive aspect of a business that does not favour micro and small businesses. Several contractors perceived that the complexity of tendering is a barrier to smaller contractors entering the industry.

The time spent on tendering ranged from one to five days. Most contractors indicated that they spent several days working on each tender highlighting that tendering is a significant cost to be absorbed by businesses. Where contractors were very keen on a project, they would visit the site, therefore increasing their investment in, and commitment to, the site.

Tendering success was highly variable with smaller contractors often doing jobs not requiring a full tender process. Several contractors reported low success rates with a perception of time being wasted. One large contractor reported that their success rate was around one third. Two further (well experienced) contractors related that they had not won any “Peatland ACTION” work in the last year although they did work for SSE and FLS and had won PA contracts in the past. Contrastingly, one island-based contractor related that their success rate was near 100%. For those reporting low levels of success, this was understandably leading to frustration.

“Do I want to put good money and time toward chasing peatland action work? Right now we will dabble where we think it’s appropriate, but I’d rather put time and effort into chasing work that will actually go somewhere.” (A4)

Contractors generally regarded the tendering process as overly complex and inefficient, requiring a level of information which could be out of proportion to the value of contracts. A particular problem raised was a lack of standardisation in both the information requested and the format required between different organisations, which increased the amount of time required to respond to each. Even those contractors who had built capacity in tendering through dedicated staff perceived that the tendering process was unnecessarily complex; one highlighted that lack of standardisation was a problem as it increased the risk that key information would be missed; another considered that complexity was a barrier to smaller contractors wishing to enter the industry . Adding to frustration around low tendering success, some contractors perceived that there was insufficient feedback provided on why tenders had been unsuccessful. While feedback on relative pricing was provided, other factors used to discriminate between tenders were rarely communicated.

“You don’t even get feedback that you can work off because everybody just goes, [the winning bidder’s] technical submission was better, and you go well, what was better about it? And they go, I’ll need to get back to you. It’s not like there’s a matrix and they go well, here’s where the other person’s scored higher.” (A5)

A perceived lack of transparency in how tenders were awarded was a key concern for one contractor in particular who considered that tendering had become “closed book” and that “it seems to be a small handful of main players who will all the contracts”. Providing an example of where a contract had been awarded to a company closely connected to the commissioning organisation they also voiced concern that contracts appeared to be being awarded without being listed on Public Contracts Scotland (PCS).[10] These points were raised as breaches in what they considered should be a fair and transparent process to ensure fair allocation of public funds.

Contractors further related that the planning and timeframes for tenders were too often uncertain, which could lead to a “feast or famine” outcome. It was further highlighted that the current funding year had been particularly unusual.

“Due to the way in which projects are being assessed and funded by Scottish Government and Peatland Action, there has been a glut of tenders recently, so I’ve probably done in the space of two months, probably submitted about 24 jobs. And you know never in the history of my working life [have I] ever seen anything quite like it, you know, in terms of a glut of workload, of a single thing.” (A8)

Some contractors also indicated that they had begun bidding strategically to account for the risk that projects ultimately would not go ahead due to funding constraints. One larger contractor related that they ran their own value for money assessment to determine whether it was worth tendering. Another mid-sized contractor similarly indicated that they were starting to consider expected cost per hectare as a factor in their decision to bid for work.

Contractor views on alterations to tendering

Framework agreements were discussed as a potential means to reduce the volume of information in tender submissions. Although easier for the commissioning organisation as they only deal with one contractor, it was considered that the approach favours contractors who have the resources to tender well. One participant raised concern that this would lead to the dominance of larger contractors, leaving the smaller, less lucrative and active part of the contract to be subcontracted to smaller contractors. Although the framework provides a simplified approach, they considered that work could be done at lower cost by directly contracting smaller contractors.

A common view amongst contractors was that restoration work should support the local economy.

“I think it’s only right if the Lewis people get the Lewis work and the Skye people get the Skye work providing they’re doing it at competitive rates” (A7)

Linked to this, one mid-sized contractor questioned whether smaller contracts could be tendered on a different basis, and offered to local contractors first as a means of developing local capacity.

“I know when we were starting up these small jobs were great for us and we even picked up a lot of like ten, twenty grand AECS schemes and they were brilliant for us and they helped us get our feet and learning how to tender for bigger work.” (A4)

A similar view was given by a larger contractor who questioned whether it may be possible to differentiate tenders and make it easier for smaller contractors to bid for the smaller jobs and allow the larger contractors to take larger jobs.

Wishing to highlight a positive example, one contractor pointed to Bidwells as an example of an efficient tender process that was easy to understand and provided a good mapping system. Another contractor similarly praised Bidwells’ efforts to streamline the tender process by maintaining key contractor information on file, reducing the volume of information that must be submitted with each tender.

Risk factors and costs

The key risk factors affecting cost quoted by participants were:

  • Difficulty and distance of site access: distance and accessibility affect costs in terms of additional travel time, machinery breakages and increased risk.
  • Winter risk, flooding and snow restrict access to sites, potentially stranding machines or requiring premature mobilisation from sites.
  • Activities: damming and ditch blocking were assessed as relatively straightforward to estimate, whereas hag- reprofiling was considered to be more variable.
  • Contractors further referred to rising costs of machinery, and wages as future drivers of costs.

Importance of business diversity to create resilience

To survive in what potentially is an uncertain environment of peatland restoration and funding, most businesses had a reasonably diversified business model, not relying too heavily on peatland restoration. Two contractors indicated that they were quite specialised, with peatland restoration accounting for more than 80% of their turnover. In some cases, they reviewed their exposure to risk and considered reducing reliance on peatland restoration. Reducing the exposure to risk from peatland contracts included working with utilities, civil engineering (dualling of the A9), estate access, hydro-schemes, footpaths, fencing, dykeing and tree planting. Many of these alternatives are easier to implement, provide more certain longer-term work, reduced risk, with less travelling and reduced ongoing costs.

Consistency of funding and workflow

Consistency of commitment to funding was important for all the contractors. Prior blips in funding reduced confidence in the industry and ultimately the amount of time committed to peatland restoration. Planning, timelines and long-term contracts could all be improved to provide a more continuous flow of work. Multiyear funding was appreciated but it was felt this needed to be more co-ordinated to create a rolling programme of work for both large and small sites.

Although progress has been made in some areas with more summer restoration, the summer gap and down time reduces the amount of restoration completed. Some contractors considered the summer gap as positive, as it gave operators a break and change of scene to alleviate the monotony of peatland restoration.

Improving the diversity of funding was considered a good idea to reduce reliance on Government funding. If Government funding was to be reduced in the future it was suggested to apply gradual tapering rather than the sudden drop that many contractors experienced when the renewable obligation was suddenly stopped for windfarm construction.

Although a few years away, an early indication of the Scottish Governments long term strategy for funding restoration post 2030 would be appreciated to signal long-term commitment to the sector.

Geographical area of work

Most contractors were willing to travel, with some Scotland based contractors working in Ireland and England. The reasons for the travel were partially to diversify the business and provide new experiences for the business and operators. Most businesses preferred to work in their local area, but inevitably not all operatives could find housing near the business base and had to travel anyway. In some cases, contractors may drive up to an hour from their home base, followed by another ½ hour transiting to the sites via an access track. Finding suitable accommodation for staff is an issue in some cases.

Recruitment and skills

Contractors highlighted the importance of rural skills for working on peatlands efficiently. A key requirement voiced by contractors was the ability to ‘read the landscape and the conditions’. Technical skills in operating diggers and machinery were important, but not as critical as knowing how to move the machine on soft ground which was harder to come by and essential to avoid accidents and bogging. Ideal candidates for recruitment were those with hill experience; “farm kids” (A1) or “ex shepherds, stalkers and gamekeepers [who have] been on the hill most of their lives” (A3).

Fortunately, in terms of operator skills it was considered that due to the video gaming industry there were plenty of competent young people who could quickly learn how to operate diggers, and this aspect is not a problem for the businesses. The key issue requiring training was once on site and reading the landscape, which requires time and perseverance.

Retention of staff, particularly younger members present problems with staff leaving for less repetitive jobs or easier working conditions in civil engineering. Businesses try to combat this by offering variability of work and location, or through benefits such as a four- day week.

It was acknowledged that a wider range of skills is now requested of operators, principally mapping and GIS skills. In the case of smaller businesses this presented problems adding to workloads and need for upskilling. One large contractor questioned whether placing additional demands on operators was the most effective way to monitor work, believing that measurement could be undertaken more efficiently by a dedicated third party. Other (typically mid-sized and larger) contractors indicated that they had invested in IT and mapping capabilities.

Peatland ACTION funded training and apprenticeships were being used and appreciated.

Increasing and using restoration capacity

In circumstances where contractors perceived there to be a funding cut, they were not considering increasing their capacity. It was accepted that over time the amount of available work would increase. Using current capacity more efficiently was the approach being taken. Most contractors did not see evidence of additional work coming forward.[11] The issue for increasing the area restored was not related to capacity.

Current capacity is underutilised due to:

  • Uncertainty of funding, leading to contractors looking for other work to reduce risk.
  • Poor work stream planning that leads to uncertainty and reduces contractor ability to plan and expand operations.
  • A hiatus in contract confirmation after end of March which leads to bunching of contracts, reducing capability to complete within a given timescale.
  • Summer working with long daylight would utilise the current capacity to restore substantially more hectares. Breeding birds are the main factor reducing or stopping restoration through the summer. Generally, restrictions on estates regards stalking seasons is now less of a problem as it is understood that by good planning both operations can coexist.
  • Some contractors were aware that the Peatland Code and collection of information was delaying contracts and made planning more difficult.

Conclusions

Combining the results from the data analysis and the interviews, we can draw the following conclusions on the questions posed by this research.

The interviews with contractors offer insight into the industry’s views and perceptions regarding the tendering process and further engagement with peatland restoration as a business opportunity. Below is a synthesis of findings and options that may help address identified issues.

  • Confidence in future funding is critical for contractors working in the industry. Unexpected reductions in funding reduce contractor confidence and may deter investment. Therefore, funding should ideally be consistent within years, based on a long-term commitment to peatland restoration post 2030 that reflects the importance of restoration to address the twin climate and biodiversity crises. Interest and trust between funder and contractors may also be strengthened if information on how peatland restoration is funded post 2030 involved contractors at a very early stage.
  • The tender process and its transparency were factors that concerned all contractors. Current tendering processes were considered to favour larger contractors with specific staff to respond to tenders. The amount of information required, whether the information was used and the ability to receive meaningful feedback were all factors affecting contractors’ willingness to tender. A review of tenders and information required and how that is achieved would encourage a wider range of contractors to engage and tender. Such a review may focus on simplification and proportionality. Consideration might be given to whether basic tendering information could be submitted on an annual (rather than project) basis to stop repetition of effort. A review might also include guidelines for providing substantiated post tender feedback, as several respondents were unclear on how to improve future tenders. Improved feedback could lead to less contractor comeback and a greater willingness to tender.
  • Underlying the contractor conversations was that they seek to provide good value for money whilst making a profit in a highly variable environment. All the contractors interviewed valued their reputation and wanted to produce quality restoration. Clearly, tendering requires a balance between bureaucracy and accountability. However, a degree of pragmatism is necessary in light of the urgency for action to counter the twin climate and biodiversity crises. Consequently, the amount of information required as part of the tendering process should ideally be concomitant to the scale of work.
  • Access to sites was seen as a key factor influencing the decision to tender (and also the cost of restoration). Poor and long-distance access increases both costs and risk. The purchase of specialised machinery to carry crews to the work site is required and the additional transit time reduces the length of the working day. In addition, poor and rough access results in machinery breakage and costly down time. To improve access conditions, in future any access granted under planning permission could allow for neighbours to use the access for the purposes of land management. There are cases of adjacent road standard tracks to sites that could not be used as they were on neighbouring land. Further considerations might include improving affordable rural housing to increase rural workers and reduce unsustainable travelling.
  • Concerns were raised about consistency of funding and projects across the year. Peatland restoration generally has a short window of operation in the autumn, winter and early spring. This is further shortened due to heavy snow. Historical and current precedents of cuts in funding have made contractors very wary. Contractors suggested that diversified funding may help this situation. In response to this, options to assist contractors should be explored to identify and pursue diversified funding sources to reduce risk and increase contractor confidence.
  • One opportunity to diversify funding sources lies in improved coordination of environmental projects. Currently there appears little or no coordination of environmental projects. With coordination, peatland restoration contracts could seamlessly run into river restoration contracts. Likewise, Scottish Water have many long-term infrastructure projects that could fill gaps in contractor work. Thus, a more continuous flow of conservation work could be achieved through improved planning and coordination of work across the land-based sector to better integrate peatland restoration contracts with, for example, river restoration and Scottish Water projects.
  • Anecdotal evidence suggests that birds are less disturbed by consistent on-site presence than is recorded in scientific literature. A review of bird disturbance policy based on scientific evidence may thus help reducing down time and reducing uncertainty when tendering. To further reduce perceived uncertainty for contractors, low altitude contracts might be retained to cover periods of long-lasting snow.
  • To stimulate investment, there is potential for interest free government backed loans for startups/early growth businesses. Consistency of projects would enable more assured payback of finance. In this regard, it might be worth to explore suitability of existing schemes and further opportunities to ease access to interest free government backed loans for startups/early growth.
  • Training and apprenticeships for delivery of restoration works are of high value to individuals and businesses interested in entering the market, and should continue to be financially supported.

Conclusions

The research findings presented in this report reflect a rapid synthesis of the literature and our research team’s own expertise plus statistical analysis of cost data compiled from NatureScot administered Peatland ACTION (PA) projects and qualitive interviews with peatland restoration contractors. We have identified a multitude of factors affecting peatland restoration costs and contractors’ decisions to tender for restoration work.

Whilst information on peatland restoration costs is available for NatureScot projects funded through the PA programme, the causes of apparent variation in costs have not yet been analysed systematically. Our statistical model, combining cost data with project site characteristics, is able to explain c.52% of observed variation. This is in-line with attempts to model cost variation in analogous sectors (e.g. other ecosystem restoration, landscaping).

Our analysis does not identify a time trend, but highlights that there are regional differences in cost, with higher costs to be expected for the Isles. Site features indicating greater complexity of restoration action, such as forest land cover and high levels of erosion, are associated with greater restoration cost. While restoration cost per hectare decreases as size of restored sites increases, our data does not allow us to fully and causally attribute this effect to economies of scale alone. This requires further investigation. 

Overall, our analysis points to a need to recognise that there is large degree of unexplained variation in unit costs while unit costs vary considerably across sites in our data. This has implications for the relevance of standardisation in assessing projects and developing benchmarking of costings. For example, regional differences imply that uniform national rates might be inappropriate, while large residual uncertainty regarding unit costs would increase the risk of falsely rejecting projects that in fact deliver restoration cost-effectively.

However, although unexplained variation in costs may reflect genuine unobserved causes, our analysis was also hampered by several potential data imperfections. For example, the precise shape and size of individual projects is subject to some uncertainty, which may lead to errors in characterising sites. Equally, across the study period (2018-2023), categorisation of different types of cost is not necessarily consistent across all projects nor are different phases of the same project necessarily recorded consistently across different funding periods. Efforts to improve data quality have already been instigated. Nevertheless, it might be worth to clarify inconsistencies in older data, and confirm that harmonised data collection (site specific data on activities, cost, location, area, consistently recorded over time) is in place to improve the accuracy of future analysis. 

Contractors are service providers who implement restoration work on the ground. The quality of their work is therefore key to restoration success. Despite their important role in the restoration process, there is a paucity of literature on motivations and barriers to contractors to tender for and enter ecosystem restoration work (including peatland restoration), and on factors that affect costs and long-term viability of restoration work to businesses. We interviewed contractors of different size and varying geographical range of operation. We identify recommendations that will affect cost and quality of delivery and thus enhance value for money of peatland restoration delivery in Scotland.

Specifically, we point to a need for a streamlined tendering process that is simplified and proportionate to scale of work, and that provides meaningful post-tender feedback. Fostering reliable and strong relationships with contractors is important, as is mitigation of short-term (e.g. mitigating risk of interruptions to work) and longer-term (e.g. related to funding situation) business risks. Cash flow availability might be improved through more efficient processing of payments to contractors, although delays may be caused by agents and not the funding institutions (PA delivery partners). Business risk may also be reduced through offering opportunities to diversify funding sources, for example via improved planning and coordination of work across the land-based sector. Training opportunities are appreciated, but barriers to entering peatland restoration as a service provider would benefit from enhanced support for start-up, both in terms of e.g. interest free capital provision and tailored advisory support.

All of the above aspects affect costs and quality and thus value for money of peatland restoration delivery. A revision of the modus to deliver peatland restoration using public funds across Scotland should be embedded in a long-term commitment to peatland restoration post 2030 to attract investment and offer business perspective. Such a commitment to consistency of funding is needed to reflect the importance of peatland restoration to a world experiencing twin climate and biodiversity crises.

Acknowledgements

We like to thank the study participants for offering their time and valuable insights. We also thank the members of the project steering group for input throughout the project. Further, we would like to acknowledge the Peatland ACTION Data & Evidence team and the Peatland ACTION Funding team at NatureScot for their active support of this work. The collation and preparation of peatland restoration cost data for use in the analysis presented in Section 5 of this report was support of the Scottish Government, as part of the Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture (ENRA) Strategic Research Programme 2022-2027, project JHI-D3-2 CentrePeat; and the project Wet Horizons (Horizon Europe GAP-101056848).

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Appendices

Appendix A4 Factors affecting restoration – review and synthesis

Web search terms concerning cost-effectiveness of peatland restoration

(“restoration” OR ”nature-based solution*”) AND (“cost-effectiveness” OR “cost*”)

Web of Science Search 1: broad peatland terms, contactor terms narrowed

Peatland Terms

TS = (peat OR peatland OR bog OR restoration OR rewetting OR “ecosystem restoration” OR “nature- based” OR “nature based”) AND

Contractor Terms

TS = (contractor OR supplier OR worker OR workforce) AND NOT

AND NOT (Non- OECD Countries)

TS = (“Afghanistan” OR “Albania” OR “Algeria” OR “American Samoa” OR “Angola” OR “Argentina” OR “Armenia” OR “Azerbaijan” OR “Bangladesh” OR “Barbados” OR “Belarus” OR “Belize” OR “Benin” Or “Bhutan” OR “Bolivia” OR “Bosnia and Herzegovina” OR “Botswana” OR “Brazil” OR “Bulgaria” OR “Burkina Faso” OR “Burundi” OR “Cambodia” OR “Cameroon” OR “Cape Verde” OR “Central African Republic” OR “Chad” OR “Chile” OR “China” OR “Colombia” OR “Comoros Congo” OR “Democratic Republic Congo” OR “Republic Costa Rica” OR “Côte d’Ivoire” OR “Croatia” OR “Cuba” OR “Czech Republic” OR “Djibouti Dominica” OR “Dominican Republic” OR “Ecuador” OR “Egypt” OR “Arab Republic” OR “El Salvador” OR “Equatorial Guinea” OR “Eritrea” OR “Estonia” OR “Ethiopia” OR “Fiji” OR “Gabon” OR “Gambia” OR “Georgia” OR “Ghana” OR “Grenada” OR “Guatemala” OR “Guinea” OR “Guinea-Bissau” OR “Guyana” OR “Haiti” OR “Honduras” OR “Hungary” OR “India” OR “Indonesia” OR “Iran” OR “Islamic Republic” OR “Iraq” OR “Jamaica” OR “Jordan” OR “Kazakhstan” OR “Kenya” OR “Kiribati” OR “Korea Democratic Republic” OR “Kyrgyz Republic” OR “Lao PDR” OR “Latvia” OR “Lebanon” OR “Lesotho” OR “Liberia” OR “Libya” OR “Lithuania” OR “Macedonia FYR” OR “Madagascar” OR “Malawi” OR “Malaysia” OR “Maldives” OR “Mali” OR “Marshall Islands” OR “Mauritania” OR “Mauritius” OR “Mayotte” OR “Mexico” OR “Micronesia” OR “Moldova” OR “Mongolia” OR “Morocco” OR “Mozambique” OR “Myanmar” OR “Namibia” OR “Nepal” OR “Nicaragua” OR “Niger” OR “Nigeria” OR “Mariana Islands” OR “Oman” OR “Pakistan” OR “Palau” OR “Panama” OR “Papua New Guinea” OR “Paraguay” OR “Peru” OR “Philippines” OR “Poland” OR “Romania” OR Russia* OR “Rwanda” OR “Samoa” OR “Sao Tome and Principe” OR “Senegal” OR “Serbia” OR “Montenegro” OR “Seychelles” OR “Sierra Leone” OR “Slovak Republic” OR “Solomon Islands” OR “Somalia” OR “South Africa” OR “Sri Lanka” OR “St. Kitts and Nevis” OR “St. Lucia” OR “St. Vincent and the Grenadines” OR “Sudan” OR “Suriname” OR “Swaziland” OR “Syrian Arab” OR “Republic Tajikistan” OR “Tanzania” OR “Thailand” OR “Timor-Leste” OR “Togo” OR “Tonga” OR “Trinidad and Tobago” OR “Tunisia” OR “Turkey” OR “Turkmenistan” OR “Uganda” OR “Ukraine” OR “Uruguay” OR “Uzbekistan” OR “Vanuatu” OR “Venezuela” OR “Vietnam” OR “West Bank” OR “Gaza” OR “Yemen” OR “Republic Zambia” OR “Zimbabwe”)

Web of Science Search 2: broad contractor terms, peatland terms narrowed

Peatland Terms

TS = (peat OR peatland OR bog OR rewetting) AND

Contractor Terms

TS = (contractor OR supplier OR worker OR workforce OR skill* OR labour OR training) AND NOT

AND NOT (Non- OECD Countries)

TS = (“Afghanistan” OR “Albania” OR “Algeria” OR “American Samoa” OR “Angola” OR “Argentina” OR “Armenia” OR “Azerbaijan” OR “Bangladesh” OR “Barbados” OR “Belarus” OR “Belize” OR “Benin” Or “Bhutan” OR “Bolivia” OR “Bosnia and Herzegovina” OR “Botswana” OR “Brazil” OR “Bulgaria” OR “Burkina Faso” OR “Burundi” OR “Cambodia” OR “Cameroon” OR “Cape Verde” OR “Central African Republic” OR “Chad” OR “Chile” OR “China” OR “Colombia” OR “Comoros Congo” OR “Democratic Republic Congo” OR “Republic Costa Rica” OR “Côte d’Ivoire” OR “Croatia” OR “Cuba” OR “Czech Republic” OR “Djibouti Dominica” OR “Dominican Republic” OR “Ecuador” OR “Egypt” OR “Arab Republic” OR “El Salvador” OR “Equatorial Guinea” OR “Eritrea” OR “Estonia” OR “Ethiopia” OR “Fiji” OR “Gabon” OR “Gambia” OR “Georgia” OR “Ghana” OR “Grenada” OR “Guatemala” OR “Guinea” OR “Guinea-Bissau” OR “Guyana” OR “Haiti” OR “Honduras” OR “Hungary” OR “India” OR “Indonesia” OR “Iran” OR “Islamic Republic” OR “Iraq” OR “Jamaica” OR “Jordan” OR “Kazakhstan” OR “Kenya” OR “Kiribati” OR “Korea Democratic Republic” OR “Kyrgyz Republic” OR “Lao PDR” OR “Latvia” OR “Lebanon” OR “Lesotho” OR “Liberia” OR “Libya” OR “Lithuania” OR “Macedonia FYR” OR “Madagascar” OR “Malawi” OR “Malaysia” OR “Maldives” OR “Mali” OR “Marshall Islands” OR “Mauritania” OR “Mauritius” OR “Mayotte” OR “Mexico” OR “Micronesia” OR “Moldova” OR “Mongolia” OR “Morocco” OR “Mozambique” OR “Myanmar” OR “Namibia” OR “Nepal” OR “Nicaragua” OR “Niger” OR “Nigeria” OR “Mariana Islands” OR “Oman” OR “Pakistan” OR “Palau” OR “Panama” OR “Papua New Guinea” OR “Paraguay” OR “Peru” OR “Philippines” OR “Poland” OR “Romania” OR Russia* OR “Rwanda” OR “Samoa” OR “Sao Tome and Principe” OR “Senegal” OR “Serbia” OR “Montenegro” OR “Seychelles” OR “Sierra Leone” OR “Slovak Republic” OR “Solomon Islands” OR “Somalia” OR “South Africa” OR “Sri Lanka” OR “St. Kitts and Nevis” OR “St. Lucia” OR “St. Vincent and the Grenadines” OR “Sudan” OR “Suriname” OR “Swaziland” OR “Syrian Arab” OR “Republic Tajikistan” OR “Tanzania” OR “Thailand” OR “Timor-Leste” OR “Togo” OR “Tonga” OR “Trinidad and Tobago” OR “Tunisia” OR “Turkey” OR “Turkmenistan” OR “Uganda” OR “Ukraine” OR “Uruguay” OR “Uzbekistan” OR “Vanuatu” OR “Venezuela” OR “Vietnam” OR “West Bank” OR “Gaza” OR “Yemen” OR “Republic Zambia” OR “Zimbabwe”)

Table A4.1: Web of Science Search Terms. Results were supplemented by forward and backward tracing of citations plus the research team’s prior knowledge of relevant references.

#FactorsDescription
Tendering process 
1ClientType of client, payment attitude, history and reputation may impact cost and whether to bid for job
2Ease of procurement processInformation availability and data recording requirements and length of process may impact cost and whether to bid for job
3Expected competitionDepending on degree of (expected) competition and overall availability of (peatland or other substitute) work; can affect decision to opt out of tendering
4Additional benefits to contractorFor example advertisement through open day, enhancing reputation and bringing in additional work through networking; may impact cost and willingness to tender
5Amount of other (substitute) work availableMay affect keenness to tender but also how challenges regarding scheduling and timing of work are costed
General project characteristics 
5Project durationLonger project durations offer income stability and are thus considered better; increased flexibility in allocating work may reduce cost
6Scale of projectLarger projects offer greater, more reliable work and opportunities for reducing mobilisation costs if have machines and operators available
7Type and size of land ownership (including crofts and common grazing)Small land ownership may be associated with more costly implementation that are not easy to mitigate (e.g. access and need for taking apportionment to enable restoration on commons).  However, usually if such projects advance to tender stage, most problems have been sorted out Larger land ownership (e.g. estates) may initially offer opportunities for restoring some land at no or low opportunity cost (in terms of income forgone). Depending on type of business and business objectives, scaling of restoration within large land ownerships may be associated with increasing opportunity costs. This may, however, not affect costs of implementing restoration action.
8Current land use on peatland to be restored and surrounding holdingRestoration costs can be affected if land use is in conflict with peatland restoration and thus there is a need for mitigation (e.g. keeping grazing activity at minimum). In some cases (e.g. grouse shooting) mitigation depends on timing of work
9Stocking density of deer and livestock in areaSimilar to #8, mitigation through keeping grazing at minimum may come at extra cost. Regarding livestock, this also depends on need for fencing and the availability of existing facilities to keep livestock off restoring land
Site location dependent factors 
 facilities 
10Need for overnight accommodationCould instantly make tendering unviable if, for example, restoration is planned for an island location with an available onsite contractor; else can be mitigated easily in most cases and factored into higher costs
11Distance from operator baseThis may affect daily travel costs, and mobilisation cost; can be mitigated by longer daily hours (e.g. 10hr working days) though this may have cost implications (as #10 above)
12Need for on-site welfare facilitiesCosted in and usually quite consistent between contractors    
 access conditions 
13Challenges to access through presence of utilities, powerlines gas pipes and cablesMore difficult access due to presence of utilities, powerlines gas pipes and cables can be associated with higher cost. However, typically not a problem, can be easily mitigated
14Challenges to access through geographical location of siteIf a site is very narrow, steep and/or cut off by watercourses, this complicates access; more difficult access can be associated with higher cost.
15Challenges to access through site conditionAccess to work location on a site, in terms of the length of the daily drive in to the work location, can be affected by overall site condition; more difficult access can be associated with higher cost
16Site wetnessSpecial case of #15. If sites are very wet, this may imply a need for bog mats or more specialised LGP machines, adding to costs
17Potential flooding due to fordsAdds to risk of operation and may be added to tender cost
18Challenges to access due to adverse weather conditions (snow, storm)Adds to risk of operation and may be added to tender cost as contingency; length of snow free period may affect timing of operations and affect cost depending on availability of other work
19Presence of (ground nesting) breeding birds and protected speciesMay delay implementation and complicate scheduling of work; could be added to tender as contingency
20Challenges to access due to prevailing weather conditionsDepending on the conditions of a site, a contingency can be added to tender/costs to account for prevailing weather conditions (e.g. very wet conditions)
21Site use by public (e.g. for recreation)May affect access but typically not a problem
22Archaeological RestrictionsMay affect access but typically not a problem if considered at feasibility study or project approval stage
23Concerns about security of siteAdditional costs for security and potential loss
24Health and Safety risk of boggingThis could be considered an added risk with contingency added to tender. However, it is in practice not considered a problem
25Restrictions on Access: Stalking/ShootingSimilar to #8. Could affect timing of work and cost depending on availability of other work
26Site designationsCould affect access cost but typically not a problem as agreements regarding site designations are usually sorted before tender
 site characteristics 
27AltitudeHigh altitude sites tend to be less easily accessible. This can affect cost, through impact on general accessibility, daily travel costs (see #11), mobilisation costs, but also #18:  length of snow free periods
28SlopeRestoration of sites on steep slopes may affect cost through additional time for restoration in challenging terrain
29ExposureMay be linked to #18 (adverse weather conditions) and #20 (prevailing weather conditions)
Site peatland condition factors 
30Complexity – Degree of erosionMay affect cost through additional time for restoration in challenging terrain; bare peat areas may require stabilisation which can be very time consuming
31Complexity – Density of drains and gulliesMay affect cost through additional time for restoration for greater densities of drains and gullies
32Complexity – Depth of hagsRelates to #30; may affect cost through additional time for restoration in challenging terrain
33Availability of sphagnum for reseedingRelates to #30; and the availability of sphagnum areas that can be used for reseeding (available on site or need to import to site); easier accessibility of sphagnum for reseeding is associated with relatively lower cost
34Complexity – Slope and hydrological connectivity – required density of damsRelates to #28 and #31; greater slopes may require a greater density of dams. Can affect cost through increased need for material (dams) and/or work/time to install dams
35Vegetation cover – forestVegetation cover may have to be removed; for forests this implies harvesting of stands, and possibly removal of stumps and brush. Removal may come at a net cost. Biomass may be mulched which may add to costs
36Vegetation cover – shrubsSimilar to #35; depends on height/thickness/density of shrub; mulching may add costs

Table A4.2: Potential factors affecting cost per hectare of peatland restoration across sites and at a given point in time.

#FactorDescription
1Inflation e.g. rising wages and fuel pricesInflation increases nominal cost over time, that is, prices for goods and services paid in a market over time. However, theoretically inflation should per se not affect real costs over time if nominal prices are adjusted for inflation. In practice, companies might add a mark up to, for example, account for risks associated with inflation. Moreover, adjustments to costs and to funding are not necessarily simultaneous nor made on the same basis, meaning that they can become misaligned. Identifying the correct rate of adjustment may be challenging. Appropriate indices may be price indices for labour and energy use in agriculture and forestry, rather than more generic consumer price indices.
2Technological Innovation: new technologiesInnovation can lead to solutions that allow providing the same service at lower cost, or more of a service for a given budget. In the case of peatland restoration, there have been improvements over time through learning-by-doing and research into materials and approaches.  e.g. construction of dams, reprofiling techniques, revegetation methods
3Overall contractor skills and experiencePeatland restoration undertaken with the aid of heavy machinery differs markedly in the requirements for the machine operators compared to other jobs involving earth movement. Typical digger/excavator jobs involve excavation and harmonisation across a certain area with little restrictions to force applied when operating the machine. Restoration requires careful adjustments using bucket movements in all directions. It can be expected that skills and expertise gained by operators enable them to work a larger area in a given time. Such efficiency gains may be expected to reduce unit costs of restoration; however, expertise may equally attract a price premium especially if competition for skilled workers is high.
4Conditions in related market spaces e.g. dualling of A9Related markets offer opportunities for supplementing or substituting work on restoration projects. Work in related sectors, such as road construction or renewable energy site construction, vary across time and space and may thus affect the opportunity cost of contractors to tender for restoration with implications for cost.
5Overall demand for peatland restorationIncreasing demand for restoration will, all else equal, increase costs, at least in the short run.  However, an expected long-run increase in demand (via committed public budgets and/or private finance) may encourage an expanded supply of contracting services and exert downward pressure on costs.
6Overall contractor capacity i.e. competitionThe number of existing contractors actively tendering for the same jobs in restoration (and related markets) affects competition, with an expectation of greater competition driving costs down, all else equal.

Table A4.3: Factors affecting cost per hectare of peatland restoration over time

Appendix A5 Explaining variation in restoration costs

Appendix A5.1 Methodological approach (detailed) including data preparation and assumptions

Appendix A5.1.1 Factors included in analysis and spatial data sources

The analysis builds on the evidence review in Section 4 and previous work on understanding variation in site-specific restoration costs. For this study, the publicly available spatial data identified as potential predictors of variation in peatland restoration costs come from several sources listed in Appendix Table A5.1.

It is necessary to know location and dimensions (shape) of restored sites to be able to assign spatially explicit data to them. However, due to difficulty to reliably match many of the cost database sites with their Peatland ACTION polygon counterparts (5.2.4 ‘Main Limitations’), the site shape needed to be assumed. As all the sites selected for this analysis reported a UK National Grid location, representing a centroid for each site, and a restored site area (in hectares) was reported, we assumed that all sites were a circle of “restored area” centred at the grid location. This circle was then overlayed with the relevant spatial data and the data extracted. For example, to add the average number of ‘snow days’ expected on a site, we overlay the site circles on the HADUK grid of climate observations and extract the average snow days associated with the site. See Appendix A5.1.4 ‘Merging cost database with external data’ for full details of the methodology.

Appendix A5.1.2 Data modifications

For peatland conditions, land cover classes and biogeographical zones the variables taken from the original data sources were pooled into more general categories to increase the model’s ease of interpretation. For example, all land cover classes associated with forest were classified as one ‘forest’ category in the model, see Appendix table A5.2-A5.4 for more details.

For the costs to be comparable across all the sites, the total cost figure per site was divided by the total site area to arrive at a cost per hectare estimate. The costs have been deflated to 2020 levels using consumer price index (CPI) values from the Office of National Statistics.

Appendix A5.1.3 Multi-linear regression

We developed a multi-linear model which estimates cost per hectare of the final restored area, C, based on the spatial variables described in Table A5.1. The distribution of Cost was right-skewed due to the existence of some notably expensive sites (see Figure A5.2). In such cases it is recommended to transform the dependent variable, for example by taking its natural logarithm. We thus develop a model to predict the natural logarithm of cost per hectare C of the restoration project:

where the variables are continuous, for example ‘Average annual rainfall’ and the variables are dummy variables that take a value of one (else zero) if a condition applies, e.g. if Site Region ‘Argyll’ is associated with the site. Appendix Table A5.1 shows the list of continuous variables and dummy variables considered as well as their sources. Note that not all of the variables were included in the final statistical model (Table A5.7). Since the ‘Biogeographical zones’ are unique and cover every site (every site is in exactly one zone), we can remove one of these dummy variables from the regression and not lose any information. We choose to remove the ‘Flow Country’ and thus analysis of these results is relative to the cost of restoring sites in the Flow Country. Many prospective variables to be used in the log-linear model were likely to co-vary. To ensure there was acceptable levels of multi co-linearity in the variables used in the regression we ensured the variance inflation factors for each variable were less than 5, see Appendix Table A5.8 for the variance inflation factors of the variables used in the model. To account for the fact that multiple observations (sites) can be associated with the same grant, clustered errors for all observations derived from the same grant were calculated.

In the results, we present the coefficients associated with the variables () and dummy variables () on a graph as ‘log Cost multipliers’, along with the 25% confidence interval as error bars (Figure 5.3). For continuous variables this can be interpreted as: For every one-unit change in the variable, by what factor would you expect the log cost per hectare to change. For dummy variables, this can be interpreted as the site having this property will cause this multiplication of the log cost per hectare. Since log is monotonic, we can translate this to how the variable multiplies cost. Each variable has different units and scales, so it is difficult to compare one multiplier to another. A statistically normalised version of the plot can be seen in Figure A5.3, where magnitudes between multipliers can be compared.

Category

Class

Variable

Source

Meteorologi-cal

 

Average wind speed per year (m/s)

Had-UK-Grid

 

Average annual rainfall (mm)

Had-UK-Grid

 

Average daily temperature per year (C)

Had-UK-Grid

 

Minimum daily temperature per year (C)

Had-UK-Grid

Peat Quality

 

Ratio of site that is bare peat

NatureScot

 

Average peat depth(cm)

James Hutton Institute

Peat Condition areas

Forest (ha)

NAEI

Cropland (ha)

NAEI

Extraction (ha)

NAEI

Eroded (ha)

NAEI

Grassland (ha)

NAEI

Modified Bog (ha)

NAEI

Near Natural Bog (ha)

NAEI

Settlement (ha)

NAEI

Landscape

 

Land cover heterogeneity (m)

NatureScot

  

Ratio of site that is floodplain/surface water

Scottish Environment Protection Agency

  

Terrain ruggedness (index)

Ordnance Survey

  

Average slope (%)

Ordnance Survey

  

Remoteness/wilderness (index)

NatureScot

Site Characteristics

Site use (dummies)

Rough Grazing

SRUC cost database

Forestry

SRUC cost database

Field Sports

SRUC cost database

Deer Management

SRUC cost database

Biodiversity Conservation

SRUC cost database

Other

SRUC cost database

Site designation (dummies)

SSSI

SRUC cost database

SAC

SRUC cost database

SPA

SRUC cost database

NSA

SRUC cost database

NNR

SRUC cost database

Other

SRUC cost database

Biogeographical Zones

(dummies)

Argyll

NatureScot

Central Belt

NatureScot

Isles

NatureScot

Central Highlands

NatureScot

East Coast

NatureScot

Northern Highlands

NatureScot

Southwest

NatureScot

Flow Country

NatureScot

Table A5.1: List of variables and dummy variables used in the linear regression to estimate log cost per hectare. If the class of variables are dummy (i.e. binary) then this is indicated in the class column.

Appendix A5.1.4 Merging cost database with external data

The process of merging the SRUC cost database of NatureScot PA administered projects with other spatial data involved the following steps:  

  1. The site grid references in the cost database were converted to Easting-Northing coordinates (using standard UK coordinate reference system EPSG:27700) and converted to a GIS point shapefile (using QGIS software package version 3.16). 
  2. The circular polygon shapefiles with the centre point being the actual site centroids with a total area corresponding to the reported restored area (in NatureScot PA final reporting forms) were created within the GIS framework.  
  3. The maps containing spatial environmental information were overlaid over the circular polygon layer and cropped into the shape of the sites.  
  4. For the microclimatic variables (snow days, temperature, wind speed), topography (elevation, slope, ruggedness) and remoteness, an average value per site was calculated (for raster maps that means the total value of each variable for all raster cells in each site divided by the number of cells). For land cover categories, firstly the raster picture was converted into a vector polygon shapefile by smoothing the cell edges with a fineness down to 15 meters. A total area of each category per site vas calculated and recorded as a separate variable (for all the land cover types that a specific site did not contain the variable values were zero). The areas of each category were divided by the total site area to arrive to a ratio of the site that has the particular land cover. The total length of outlines of individual land cover features was calculated to account for terrain heterogeneity (assuming that the more patchy the site is the longer the outline of the individual features). Similarly for the peatland condition map, a total area of each site that is peatland was calculated, individual peatland condition categories were recorded and ratios per site calculated. The bare peat ratio and floodplain/surface water area ratio were calculated as a ratio of the peatland per site rather than the total area of the site. Similarly, average peat depth was considered only for peatland area of each site.  Finally, sites were assigned to a biogeographical region based on the centroids’ precise location. 
  5. The data was downloaded from the GIS software into a spreadsheet and merged back into the cost database using a unique site identifier (concatenated from a unique site ID and a report type). The further steps of analysis/ model and figure construction were completed in Excel, STATA and Python packages, respectively.  

Variable 

Inventory categories 

Forest

  Forest

Cropland

 Cropland

Eroded  

 Eroded

Modified 

 Modified bog

Near Natural

 Near natural bog

Other 

Other Peatland, Settlement 

Grassland 

Intensive Grassland, Extensive Grassland 

Extraction 

Industrial Extraction, Domestic Extraction 

Table A5.2: Inventory peatland condition classes pooled into larger categories  

Land Cover Categories 

Woodland 

Woodland fringes and clearings and tall forb stands, Broadleaved deciduous woodland, Highly artificial coniferous plantations,  Mixed deciduous and coniferous woodland, Lines of trees, small anthropogenic woodlands, early stage woodland and coppice, Coniferous Woodland   

Shrub 

Arctic, alpine and subalpine scrub, Temperate and mediterranean-montane scrub, Temperate shrub heathland, Riverine and fen scrubs  

Blanket Bogs 

Raised and blanket bogs 

Other 

Inland cliffs, rock pavements and outcrops, Arable land and market garden, Built-up, Bare field, Windthrow, Littoral sediment (predominantly saltmarsh), Coastal dunes and sandy shores, Coastal shingle, Rock cliffs, ledges and shores, Surface standing and running waters   

Mires & Fens 

Valley mires, poor fens and transition mires, Base-rich fens and calcareous spring mires 

Grassland 

Dry grasslands, Mesic grassland, Seasonally wet and wet grasslands, Alpine and subalpine grasslands 

Table A5.3: Land cover classes pooled into larger categories

Restoration Zones

Biogeographical Zones 

Argyll 

Argyll West and Islands 

Central Belt 

West Central Belt 

Isles  

Coll, Tiree and the Western Isles, Orkney and North Caithness, Shetland, Western Seaboard 

Central Highlands 

Central Highlands, Cairngorms Massif, East Lochaber, Loch Lomond, The Trossachs and Breadalbane 

East Coast  

North East Coastal Plain, North East Glens, Eastern Lowlands 

Northern Highlands 

North West Seaboard, Northern Highlands, Western Highlands 

Flow Country 

The Peatlands of Caithness and Sutherland 

Borders  

Western Southern Uplands and Inner Solway, Border Hills 

Table A5.4: Biogeographical zones pooled into larger Restoration zones

  1. Peatland Condition

Area (ha)

Percent of restored peat area

Cropland

5

0%

Other

9

0%

Grassland

108

1%

Extraction

328

3%

Forest

1711

17%

Modified Bog

1764

18%

Eroded

2860

29%

Near Natural Bog

3171

32%

All

9956

100%

  1. Site Designation

Count

Percent of sites

SPA

22

9%

SAC

27

11%

NSA

28

12%

NNR

39

16%

Other

54

23%

SSSI

56

23%

No Designation

103

43%

Multiple Designations

53

22%

  1. Site Use

Count

Percent of sites

Rough Grazing

76

32%

Forestry

20

8%

Field Sports

45

19%

Deer Management

110

46%

Biodiversity Conservation

92

38%

Other Use

22

9%

No use

26

11%

Multiple uses

104

44%

Table A5.5: Percentage of total area of restored sites falling into each: a) peatland condition category as defined by the Inventory peat condition map; b) Site designation, and c) Land use as reported on the final report forms for NatureScot Peatland Action.

Appendix A5.1.5 Main limitations

A major source of uncertainty is related to large variation in detail and rigor of reporting of the restoration process via application and reporting forms. Several reports are missing crucial details that make them invalid for further analysis limiting the power of studies such as this.

Each project that has been granted funding by NatureScot can be identified via a grant reference number. Thus, the sites that have been restored within the same restoration grant share the same reference number. However, throughout the duration of projects, the definitions of sites often change. This includes both the number of sites within a grant, and the area of identified sites can both increase or decrease based on what is currently considered feasible/priority. Therefore, the information entailed in project application forms can only be compared to final forms if these changes were sufficiently documented.

For deriving site area and overlay with GIS information, the circular site outline approach was chosen due to difficulty to reliably link a substantial number of the sites from the cost database with spatial data from Peatland ACTION that contains both centroids and site outlines. The grant reference numbers are often inconsistent between cost database and spatial information, and the number, area, account of applied measures and grant amounts often do not match between the information sources. Consequently, we had to manually “triangulate” matches between sites in the cost database and sites in the spatial data from Peatland ACTION, which was both time consuming and without guarantee of being free of error.

Due to a lack of a unified methodology for calculation of a total area of a restoration site, over time and across sites in the database, the account of area restored provided in the reporting form can be only treated as approximate. Sites for which the reported areas were missing, unclear or otherwise impossible to work with were removed from the analysis. As mentioned above, the site areas were in some cases also pooled together within the same project, and thus arriving at a reliable area estimate for the individual sites was difficult.

The format in which the type, unit and (unit or total) cost of restoration measures is reported also varies as application and reporting forms were updated over the years, and depending on reporting efforts invested by grantees. For example, the installation of wave dams has been reported either as the total number of individual dams, the total length of all the dams combined, or the total area covered by the specific type of dams. Wave dams also feature only in later editions of application and reporting forms. Such issues with reporting complicate measure-specific analysis of restoration cost. For example, differences in units in which measures are reported make judgment on measure intensity in a restoration site challenging if not impossible.

Figure A5.1: An example of populating the circular polygons with the cropped spatial features (In this case different colours represent individual land cover classes).  

Appendix A5.2 Supplementary results

Figure A5.2: Distribution of costs considered in the analysis after deflation to 2020 levels.  

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

5th percentile

95th percentile

Cost per hectare (£/ha)

1549.70

1500.49

190.54

4482.95

Ratio of bare peat

0.00

0.01

0

0.02

Ratio of floodplains/surface waters

0.00

0.01

0

0.01

Snow days per year

28.70

15.06

5.17

55.94

Average wind speed (m/s)

5.98

1.43

3.85

8.62

Annual rainfall (mm)

1679.70

543.40

978.93

2770.40

Average peat depth (cm)

83.11

37.15

25.00

151.18

Terrain ruggedness (index)

191.66

163.14

20.62

489.31

Site cover heterogeneity (m)

390.23

452.66

110.82

750.06

Peat condition (site ratio)

    

Forest

0.19

0.34

0

1.00

Eroded

0.20

0.32

0

0.89

Modified

0.11

0.19

0

0.55

Near Natural

0.22

0.34

0

0.98

Other

0.00

0.01

0

0.00

Grassland

0.01

0.05

0

0.08

Extraction

0.02

0.11

0

0.11

Table A5.6: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variable data and cost per hectare of sites, N=229.

In Figure A5.3, we plot the same figure as Figure 5.3 in the main text, but we divide the multiplier by the standard deviation of the variable so that the magnitude of the multipliers can be compared between variables.

Figure A5.3: Normalised Log of the Cost per hectare multipliers (i.e. coefficients in the regression) according to the multi-linear model. For continuous variables, (e.g. average rainfall) this can be interpreted as for every one standard deviation, the log of the cost per hectare increases by the multiplier represented by the dot. For dummy (binary) variables (e.g. region), can be interpreted as the site having that property will increase the log cost per hectare by the multiplier. Positive log of the cost multipliers (right of the red line) implies increasing the variable increases the cost and vice-versa for negative log cost multipliers. If the entry is green, then the multiplier is significant (p<0.05). In this case magnitude of multipliers can be compared.

 

Coefficient

Standard error

z-value

P>|z|

[0.025

0.975]

Proportion of bare peat

0.0681

0.054

1.266

0.205

-0.037

0.174

Prop. of floodplain/surf. waters

-0.0827

0.035

-2.339

0.019

-0.152

-0.013

Average Wind Speed

-0.0324

0.081

-0.402

0.687

-0.19

0.125

Average rainfall

-0.2711

0.106

-2.564

0.01

-0.478

-0.064

Average peat depth

-0.0594

0.064

-0.926

0.354

-0.185

0.066

Average ruggedness

0.0006

0.075

0.008

0.993

-0.146

0.147

Terrain heterogeneity

0.0334

0.032

1.058

0.29

-0.029

0.095

Site use forestry

-0.2395

0.096

-2.504

0.012

-0.427

-0.052

Site use grazing

0.1622

0.075

2.168

0.03

0.016

0.309

Site use field sports

-0.2271

0.288

-0.788

0.431

-0.792

0.338

Site use deer management

-0.0029

0.154

-0.019

0.985

-0.304

0.298

Site use biodiversity cons.

0.0456

0.168

0.272

0.786

-0.283

0.374

Site use other

-0.1757

0.201

-0.873

0.383

-0.57

0.219

SSSI

0.686

0.223

3.078

0.002

0.249

1.123

SAC

-0.2711

0.277

-0.979

0.328

-0.814

0.272

SPA

-0.1592

0.185

-0.86

0.39

-0.522

0.204

NSA

-0.6967

0.277

-2.517

0.012

-1.239

-0.154

NNR

0.3248

0.311

1.045

0.296

-0.284

0.934

Other designation

-0.1531

0.171

-0.894

0.371

-0.489

0.183

Prop. peat cond. forest

0.2808

0.085

3.306

0.001

0.114

0.447

Prop. peat condition eroded

0.2391

0.081

2.949

0.003

0.08

0.398

Prop. peat cond. modified bog

-0.0908

0.047

-1.949

0.051

-0.182

0.001

Prop. peat cond. near natural

-0.0213

0.088

-0.242

0.809

-0.194

0.151

Prop. peat condition other

0.0083

0.042

0.2

0.841

-0.073

0.09

Prop. peat condition grassland

-0.1133

0.054

-2.09

0.037

-0.22

-0.007

Prop. peat condition extraction

-0.1224

0.07

-1.742

0.081

-0.26

0.015

Zone Argyll

1.158

0.431

2.689

0.007

0.314

2.002

Zone Central Belt

0.7648

0.422

1.811

0.07

-0.063

1.593

Zone Isles

2.0428

0.352

5.797

0

1.352

2.733

Zone Central Highlands

1.4913

0.426

3.503

0

0.657

2.326

Zone East Coast

0.9365

0.373

2.514

0.012

0.206

1.667

Zone Northern Highlands

1.1248

0.413

2.725

0.006

0.316

1.934

Zone South West

0.8308

0.327

2.54

0.011

0.19

1.472

Year 2018/2019

-0.043

0.232

-0.185

0.853

-0.499

0.413

Year 2019/2020

0.1503

0.203

0.74

0.459

-0.248

0.548

Year 2020/2021

-0.0105

0.192

-0.055

0.956

-0.387

0.366

Year 2021/2022

0.1056

0.258

0.409

0.683

-0.4

0.612

Year 2022/2023

0.0486

0.385

0.126

0.9

-0.707

0.804

       

Table A5.7: Ordinary least squared regression of log of the cost per hectare.

Variable

VIF

constant

123.1919

Proportion of bare peat

1.249553

Proportion of flood plain

1.186187

Average wind speed

2.363117

Average rainfall

4.79262

Average peat depth

1.935288

Average ruggedness

3.198891

Terrain heterogeneity

1.708854

Site use forestry

1.568768

Site use field sports

3.643887

Site use deer management

2.73706

Site use biodiversity conservation

1.934092

Site use other

1.549223

SSSI

2.682824

SAC

2.018384

SPA

1.462261

NSA

2.738603

NNR

3.915651

Other designation

1.476853

Proportion peat condition forest

4.666531

Proportion peat condition eroded

3.073554

Proportion peat condition modified bog

1.589749

Proportion peat condition near natural

3.936502

Proportion peat condition other

1.356258

Proportion peat condition grassland

1.679904

Proportion peat condition extraction

1.691232

Zone Argyll

3.050752

Zone Central Belt

2.479631

Zone Isles

2.778177

Zone Central Highlands

4.194155

Zone East Coast

1.638507

Zone Northern Highlands

4.0296

Zone Southwest

3.898588

Year 2018/2019

2.705031

Year 2019/2020

2.128802

Year 2020/2021

1.909482

Year 2021/2022

2.277006

Year 2022/2023

2.325957

Table A5.8: Variance inflation factors (VIF) of the variables used in the log-linear model demonstrating the level of multi-collinearity. Variables were only included in the main model if the VIF<5.

Appendix A5.3 Additional information on economies of scale in peatland restoration with illustrative examples

Economies of scale arise at least partly from a contractor being able to spread fixed overhead costs for a project across a larger area. The literature review and interviews with contactors suggest that two main overhead costs are relevant: project tendering costs (i.e. the time and effort expended on submitting a bid) and project mobilization costs (i.e. the initial costs of getting equipment and materials on-site). Hence, whilst information on overhead costs was not sought explicitly through this research, some initial indicative analysis is possible.

To a first approximation, the costs of compiling and submitting a tender for a project are unrelated to its size since the effort required is determined by the tendering process rather than site size per se (although site complexity may increase required tendering effort). Similarly, again to a first approximation, haulage costs for equipment and materials relate primarily to the charge for moving a transporter carrying such items rather than carrying individual items themselves per se, implying that mobilization costs are likely to increase in a lumpy manner depending on how many haulage events are required rather than linearly with site size (e.g. if two diggers can be hauled on one transporter, mobilization costs will be the same for a small site requiring one digger and a larger site requiring two; only if more than two diggers are required will the larger site see an increase in mobilization costs – with scale still diluting the additional costs).

Contractor interviewees suggested that tendering takes two to three (eight hour) days. If contractors value their managerial time at £30/hour this equates to £480 to £720. If they value their time at £50/hour it equates to £800 to £1200. Online haulage costs suggest generic (i.e. not peatland) individual digger transportation costs mostly lie in the £400 to £500 range, depending on digger size and the distance moved (UShip, 2024; WHC, 2024). Taken together, these imply project overhead costs of c.£900 to £1700. For a five-hectare site these equate to unit costs of c.£180/ha to c.£340/ha. For a 20-hectare site they equate to c.£45/ha to £85/ha. This highlights the potential magnitude of economies of scale effects. A better understanding could be established with further investigation, including how contractors value their managerial time, the effort devoted to tendering and actual mobilizations costs (including for multiple diggers and for items other than diggers).

Appendix A5.4 Additional analysis regarding temporal trends

Area

Year

Sites

Area (ha)

Std. dev.

2017/18

45

42.7

36.4

2018/19

57

64.4

97.3

2019/20

45

54.2

54.5

2020/21

48

65.7

114.8

2021/22

31

73

112.1

2022/23

3

72

66.7

Table A5.9: Summary statistics outlining the average areas (ha) of restored sites per each funding year.

Types of restoration measures

Year

A only

B only

C only

A & B

A & C

B & C

A,B & C

All

2017/18

1

3

3

10

6

3

9

45

2018/19

8

2

15

16

7

1

8

57

2019/20

10

2

9

9

7

0

8

45

2020/21

10

11

3

16

2

4

2

48

2021/22

6

6

0

13

1

2

3

31

2022/23

0

0

0

3

0

0

0

3

Total

35

34

30

67

23

10

30

229

Table A5.10: Number of sites restored using a measure category (A – dams & blocking, B – surface measures (bunding, mulching, replanting), C – forest & scrub removal) per funding year.

Land cover

Year

Shrub

Mires & Fens

Raised & Blanked Bogs

Woodland

Grassland

Other

2017/18

357.2

2.4

1147.8

22.3

324.7

73.1

2018/19

195.0

60.7

1689.2

204.0

1265.6

162.3

2019/20

311.1

6.7

1354.9

101.8

357.3

289.6

2020/21

467.2

6.7

1569.1

53.8

668.4

238.6

2021/22

232.5

1.2

1644.7

15.7

121.5

48.4

2022/23

96.0

0.4

221.9

1.5

37.7

0.5

Table A5.11: Area (ha) of each pre-restoration land cover category restored per each year.

Regions

Year

Flow Country

Argyll

Central Belt

Isles

Central Highlands

East Coast

Northern Highlands

South-west

All

2017/18

10

0

4

3

17

3

3

5

45

2018/19

7

9

10

1

3

5

10

12

57

2019/20

14

10

2

5

5

1

6

2

45

2020/21

10

0

0

1

13

0

6

18

48

2021/22

2

1

0

7

11

0

7

3

31

2022/23

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

0

3

All

43

20

16

17

49

9

35

40

229

Table A5.10: Number of sites restored in each restoration zone per funding year.

Appendix B6 Opportunities and challenges for contractors

Appendix B6.1 Detailed methodological approach

Eight interviews were conducted with contractors providing peatland restoration services in Scotland. Interviews were conducted using an interview script (Appendix Table B6.1) to guide the conversation, yet allowing some flexibility for the discussion to move into other topics that were important to the participants. A semi- structured approach was selected because this is considered most appropriate where the topic of research is novel or under researched, as is the case for research concerning the experience of peatland restoration contractors.

Participants were selected for interview by purposive sampling, from a publicly available list of contractors willing to offer peatland restoration services (7), and from a list of new entrants to peatland restoration that was provided by NatureScot (1). A sampling frame was used to guide recruitment to ensure perspectives were obtained from contractors of different sizes and across geographic areas (Table 6.1).

Interviews were scheduled for thirty minutes, though ranged from 15 minutes to one hour and were conducted as video conference calls using Microsoft Teams (N=7), and by phone (N=1). Most interviews were conducted by interviewer 1 and 2 together (N=6), with interviewer 1 leading the interview. Two more were conducted by interviewer 2 alone.

An initial draft interview script was presented to the project steering group and revised to incorporate their feedback. With the consent of participants, interviews were recorded and later transcribed for analysis. Pre-approval for the overall approach and research instruments was received from the SRUC Ethics committee (Ref. 149 / 89056833).

Interview notes and transcripts were reviewed to identify commonalities and points of difference in contractor perspectives of the tender process and wider factors affecting the industry.

Pre-populated brief of contractor

Add here information collated e.g. from online sources on the contractor, if any

This may include – type of services offered, information on location, range of operation, experience & examples of past work, references, availability of machinery and staff capacity.

  • Contractor name:
  • Contact(s):
  • Website:
  • Useful info:

Type contractor (can be filled and/or revised after interview)

  • Experienced & active contractors focusing on restoration
  • Experienced & active contractors with wide range of business (e.g. forestry, estate management & road construction/maintenance)
  • Occasional contractors focusing on other business & who do not systematically look for restoration opportunities

Adjustments to questions needed if contractor falls into the following categories:

  • Tendering but unsuccessful
  • Not (yet) tendering

Introduction (to be tailored and aligned with contact emails and information provided therein)

We’re conducting research on behalf of the Scottish Government and its Centre of Expertise on Climate Change, looking at peatland restoration undertaken by contractors.

We’re interested in your views on peatland restoration – your experience as a contractor with the tendering process, how you approach costing bids for restoration work, and what influences restoration costs.

Your input will help with further development of funding schemes for restoration, for example by helping delivery partners and funders in having a better idea of the information that should be considered as relevant and make tendering easier for you.

Any information you provide will only be reported in anonymized form.

On this basis is this acceptable?

If not provided consent in email response, ask verbally for consent.

Table B6.1: Interview script.

Main questions

Instructions and Prompts

For context only: what we aim to learn from questions

Part 1 – business characterization

  

Q.1 Can you please briefly explain your role in the business?

 

Helps contextualizing response

Q.2 How long have you been operating as a peatland restoration contractor?

From what background did your peat restoration business start?

What prompted the move into peatland work? Was there anything that facilitated the process?

This is to get some sense of the contractors level of experience with delivering peatland projects, but also a sense how peatland restoration is seen as a business opportunity

Q.3 Is peatland restoration the main focus of the business?

1 Could you estimate the percentage that restoration is to your turnover?

2 What other services does business offer?

3 How many tenders per year and success rate?

4 Total Number of Ha restored per year

5 Do you work on restoration all year round? If not what do you do in the off season?

Get an idea of relative importance of peatland restoration relative to other activities and scale of operation.

Q.4 What is your capacity for peatland restoration?

Geographically, where do you operate i.e. offer restoration services?

How many staff? How many of those are Operators?

Machinery capacity: number of diggers and drivers?

Could you do more Ha than currently?

What stops you from doing more Ha?

Similar to Q.3 Get an idea of the scale and place of operation.

Part 2 – Tendering for projects

  

Q.5 Where do you usually find out about new peatland restoration tenders?

How long do you usually spend on a tender?

Transition to topic of tendering

Q.6 What influences your decisions about whether or not to submit a bid?

Top three most important aspects affecting your decision to tender?

For prompting, notes and coding – see list of related points below.

Contractor business perspective

  • What is our capacity to do this work?
  • Do we have other more profitable work?
  • Does the project fit into the calendar?
  • Will this job fit in with other jobs in the area?
  • Is the work within our competence/machine capability?
  • How flexible is the contract?
  • Hassle factor and contingency required?
  • Can we make a reasonable profit?
  • Level of competition from other contractors?

Overarching constraints

  • Distance – site too far/out of business range
  • No capacity in project timeframe

Client

  • Client reputation & payment attitude
  • Good communication

Tendering process

  • How complicated is the tendering process?
  • Opportunity for site visit. If not may need to add contingency
  • How much documentation is required? How much info (maps etc) is available
  • Are there other benefits of this contract….getting further contracts
  • Return date of tender

Project characteristics

  • Duration of project…longer the better
  • Scale of the project….bigger better usually
  • Start date…too soon to fit in with other work?
  • How close is the finishing date
  • Is this an easy project or complex – how is complexity assessed?
  • Site condition/intensity of work
  • Access issues that can be mitigated or not

Obtain insights on tendering decisions –, i.e., key facilitating factors and barriers to preparing and submitting a tender. Response to Q.6 may lead naturally into Q.7 (appraisal of the tender information to arrive at a bid)

Q.7 What makes for a good profitable project as opposed to a relatively difficult one?

Aspects may already emerge from elaboration on reasons for whether to tender (list above in Q.6).

How do you arrive at estimates of staff and machinery days?

Do you appraise complexity of a job for that, and if so, what are indicators for complexity you look for?

Anything you specifically look out for that has significant cost implications?

This is about appraisal of the tender information to arrive at a bid – i.e. factors affecting contractor cost calculations.

Q.8 How could the tendering process be improved?

Would you prefer if the tenders were based on a number of digger days or specific lengths of ditches for example?

Opportunities for improving tendering process to facilitate (additional) restoration

Part 3 – outlook and trajectory for peatland business

  

Q.9 Have you taken on additional staff to deliver peat restoration, or invested in machinery over past 2 years?

If yes to additional staff:

Did you require additional training and if so how was this delivered?

Have you taken advantage of any publicly-funded training courses?

Would simulator training help encourage you to take on a member of staff?

If yes to machinery:

Have you found the additional investment worthwhile to your operation?

What innovations will help you in the future?

What are the future drivers of costs?

Learn about past investment as indicator of expected direction of business and willingness to expand

Q.10 Do you expect (the peatland restoration side of your) business to grow? In next 1-2 years or 3 to 5 years?

If yes, why?

If no, what makes you think so?

Opportunities and barriers to growth

Q.11 What would encourage you to (further) expand capacity, or to bid for more projects?

E.g.

  • Changes in funding models, if there was bundling of projects?
  • Framework tenders, improving certainty over further income from restoration projects over several years?
  • Support e.g. interest free government loans for machinery
  • Certification indicating e.g. trained supplier of restoration services
  • Consistency of funding
  • … [input from steering group?]

Mitigating barriers to growth and new models to encourage scaling of capacity

Q.12 What do you think keeps other contractors from bidding for restoration projects?

 

Perceptions of other contractors – “themes” emerging across contractors

Q.13 Are you able to suggest to us other contractors who could in theory deliver restoration but don’t bid? Do you know of anyone who we could or should talk to? (and why should we talk to them)?

 

Help with identifying further interviewees (may or may not follow recommendations)

Wrap up

  

Any questions to us?

  

Note if they would like to see published CxC report

  

Thanks and close

  

Table B6.2: Final interview schedule for interviews with (potential) contractors of peatland restoration services.

© The University of Edinburgh, 2025
Prepared by SRUC on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5570

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

This work was supported by the Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division of the Scottish Government (CoE – CXC).

ClimateXChange
Edinburgh Climate Change Institute
High School Yards
Edinburgh EH1 1LZ
+44 (0) 131 651 4783

info@climatexchange.org.uk
www.climatexchange.org.uk

If you require the report in an alternative format such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

  1. Restoration and rewetting are used interchangeably in this report. In doing so, we do not imply that it is likely that peatlands will be restored to their historic undisturbed state, but emphasise the aim of restoring the functioning of the area as a wetland. This is done through raising water tables, i.e. rewetting.

  2. Although the 2032 emission targets have now been acknowledged as unachievable, the peatland restoration target remains in place.

  3. Unless noted otherwise, we will refer to restoration costs as the capital requirements to implement restoration on site. This does not include certain transaction (program administration and monitoring) costs borne by funders, the opportunity costs of restoration related to income forgone (see Moxey et al. 2016), or any private financial benefits of restoration e.g. related to carbon scheme participation or transfer payments. Such costs can make up a considerable amount of total cost of investing in nature based solutions (Kang et al. 2023).

  4. Forestry and Land Scotland and the Cairngorms National Park Authority also hold data on restoration costs (as do Loch Lomond and Trossachs National Park), but these databases were beyond the scope of this project.

  5. For further insights, the search goes beyond peatland and peatland restoration only, including habitat (e.g. wetlands, grassland) restoration more generally but also other land-based sectors requiring similar contracted land management services (e.g. forestry, landscape gardening civil engineering).

  6. For example, Spencer (1989), Cohan (2018), Benjaminsson et al. (2019), Kronholm et al. (2021), Oo et al. (2022), Binshakir et al. (2023), Johansson et al. (2023), Olatunji et al. (2023).

  7. We note that the magnitudes of the factors cannot be compared (see Appendix Figure A5.3 for a version of the Figure where magnitudes can be compared).

  8. Potentially contributing to relatively lower restoration costs, earlier projects especially in the Flow Country may have been subject to sequencing of restoration measures at the same site over several years; with yearly progress entered as new projects into the SRUC cost database. The extent to which such sequencing might have taken place is, however, unclear.

  9. Note that the analysis only includes forest-to-bog restoration by NatureScot PA projects (and not forest-to-bog restoration through, for example, FLS).

  10. At the time of interviewing, interviewees may not have been aware that listing on PCS had recently been made compulsory rather than simply preferable.

  11. It should be noted, however, that interviews were mostly undertaken before an announcement was made regarding funding for an additional 7000ha.

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5898

Context & challenge

Sector policy experts are developing emissions-impact estimates for a large number of climate change policies. For each policy, sector teams are asked to provide:

  • A best estimate (most likely outcome)
  • A plausible best-case estimate (optimistic but realistic)
  • A plausible worst-case estimate (pessimistic but realistic)

From this, an overall uncertainty estimate, or confidence level is to be determined for the portfolio of policies. A simple approach to this would be achieved by summing the total best and worst estimate cases across all policies and calculate the difference to provide a single numerical range value. That is,

∑( plausible worst-cases) – ∑( plausible best-cases).

This would allow statements of the following form to be made:

“Based on expert estimates the total emissions reduction could plausibly go from 10 MtCO₂e to 50 MtCO₂e, with a range of 40 MtCO₂e”

While this gives a basic measure of spread, it has two major limitations:

  • It assumes all policies meet their respective extremes simultaneously, which is highly unlikely.
  • It does not convey how likely any given value within the range is – it’s a bounding box, not a probability distribution.

Thus, a more robust way is needed to present a meaningful range and confidence interval for the aggregated emissions reductions.

Proposed approach

A Monte Carlo simulation is well-suited for this type of uncertainty analysis. It improves upon the simple range aggregation method by:

  • Capturing the combined effect of many policies without assuming extremes occur simultaneously.
  • Providing a probabilistic estimate that better represents likely outcomes.
  • Allowing sensitivity testing (e.g. exploring the impact of policy correlations if relevant)

The key steps for conducting the Monte Carlo simulation are:

  • Define probability distributions – Each policy’s emissions impact is modelled using a probability distribution based on sector team inputs. Pragmatically, a triangular distribution (peaked at the best estimate, with plausible best/worst case as the range) is a practical and transparent choice given limited data.
  • Run simulations – Random values are drawn from each policy’s distribution and aggregated. This process is repeated potentially thousands of times to build a distribution of total emissions outcomes.
  • Analyse the output – The resulting distribution of aggregated policy impacts allows us to:
  • Derive a probable range (e.g. 10th – 90th percentile) rather than an extreme max-min spread of the simplified approach.
  • Identify a central estimate (e.g. the median or mean of the distribution).
  • Calculate confidence intervals (e.g. 95% confidence that total reductions fall within a specific range).

It is important to consider methodological choices before undertaking the analysis, including confidence in the policy estimates that are made by the experts, probability distributions chosen and treatment of policy dependencies.

The Monte Carlo simulations can be implemented using widely available tools, for example, Python, R, or Microsoft Excel (with appropriate plug-ins or add-ins).

Following the analysis of the outputs of the Monte Carlo simulations, specific commentary can be made on emissions-impact estimates for the full policy package, ensuring clarity in the communication of uncertainty.

Dependence on expert inputs

An important caveat in the robustness of the Monte Carlo results is that the method depends entirely on the quality of the underlying inputs. Since the method uses expert-provided worst-case, best estimate, and best-case values, any biases, inconsistencies, or overly optimistic/pessimistic assumptions will be carried through to the results. It is therefore essential to:

  • Encourage sector teams to provide realistic and well-considered bounds.
  • Be clear that the results reflect expert judgement about what could happen, rather than measured variability based on observed data.
  • Revisit and refine inputs as more data or evidence becomes available.

Outputs from Monte Carlo simulation

The Monte Carlo simulation approach would allow statements of the following forms to be made:

In relation to central estimates (median or mean):

“The median estimated emissions reduction from the policy package is 29 MtCO₂e.”

For confidence intervals:

“We estimate with 95% confidence that total emissions reductions will fall between 18 and 43 MtCO₂e.”

For percentile ranges:

“The 10th–90th percentile range for total emissions reduction is 20 to 40 MtCO₂e, reflecting where most outcomes are concentrated.”

For risk-based statements:

“There is less than a 5% chance that the policy package will achieve less than 20 MtCO₂e in emissions reductions.”

_____________

How to cite this publication:

Galloway, S. (2025) ‘ Briefing: Accounting for uncertainty in aggregated emissions – Impact estimates ‘, ClimateXChange. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5898

© The University of Edinburgh, 2025
Prepared by University of Strathclyde on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

This work was supported by the Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division of the Scottish Government (CoE – CXC).

ClimateXChange

Edinburgh Climate Change Institute

High School Yards

Edinburgh EH1 1LZ

+44 (0) 131 651 4783

info@climatexchange.org.uk

www.climatexchange.org.uk

If you require the report in an alternative format such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

Research completed March 2025

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5740

Executive summary

Background

Over 72% of buildings in Scotland still rely on mains gas as their primary heat source. Scotland must further decarbonise heating in homes and buildings to achieve its climate change targets. The Scottish Government’s 2021 Heat in Buildings Strategy identified clean heat networks as a strategic decarbonisation technology. However, given the significant levels of capital investment required to transform Scotland’s buildings and limited public sector budgets, additional investment will be needed from the private sector.

Aims

This study examines present and potential future financing models in the heat network sector (“the sector”) and identifies suitable levers and actions for incentivising private finance. Findings are based on a series of interviews with stakeholders, including operators, funders, advisors and public sector representatives, as well as desk-based research. We draw comparisons and insights from other relevant utility sectors and from other countries (the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Sweden and Estonia) as well as England and Wales.

Findings

Challenges facing the sector

In Scotland and across the UK, the heat network sector has typically been funded by early-stage financing from developers and significant levels of subsidy from the public sector. These public subsidies have encouraged private investment in the sector and supported the roll out of heat networks across Scotland.

The most impactful barriers in the sector are demand uncertainty, revenue instability and the evolving regulatory environment. This limits investment appetite, restricting the roll out of heat networks at scale in Scotland. The barriers are illustrated in Figure 1.

A diagram showing the four categories of Heat network deployment barriers (social and market; financial; technical; regulatory and fiscal) and summarising the top 13 barriers.
Figure 1: Heat network deployment barriers. Source: EY analysis and stakeholder feedback

International comparisons

  • Maturity – Scotland, the rest of the UK and the Netherlands have a developing heat network sector. Germany is expanding its market. Sweden, Finland and Estonia have mature markets where the sector is tried, tested and trusted.
  • Regulation – Many of the developed and mature markets are unregulated: they use self-governing frameworks and technical codes. This is coupled with high levels of local governance, greater pricing transparency and consistent contractual delivery and routes. These markets can focus on consumer pricing that supports investment and stimulates the sector’s development. Additionally, mandatory connections are being used in some circumstances in other countries, to make projects more investible and create demand assurance, which encourages private investment.
  • Ownership profiles and private finance – The more developed markets (including Sweden, Finland and Estonia) have a mixed degree of public ownership. More mature markets are likely to have a higher level of private finance penetration. In Finland, public sector ownership remains at a high level, whilst still seeking investment from the private sector. In Germany there’s a growing commitment to re-municipalise infrastructure and reverse privatisations. In the Netherlands, where over 90% of sector finance is private, the government proposed legislation to part-nationalise the sector in 2022 to mitigate concerns around the affordability and reliability of the sector.

The developed markets are mainly regulated by standard frameworks. These markets can access private finance due to the established nature of the sector. However, the technology has been embedded in the culture of these countries for much longer and so regulators can focus on price transparency and fairness for the end user rather than a framework for developing the market.

  • Financial levers – Most of the comparator countries have adopted a range of financial levers. Many have applied a similar approach to Scotland, including the continued use of capital grant funding, project development funding or individual grants for expanding and upgrading heat networks. Grant funding is still widely used in the less mature sectors. As the sector matures, intervention rates reduce or there is greater requirement for a higher degree of renewable heat sources to be used. Additionally, state-owned infrastructure banks have been investing in the sector to help refurbishments or provide debt financing for expansion.

Utility sectors

Various regulatory regimes and financial support mechanisms have been used in other sectors to stimulate private sector investment in the development of new infrastructure. The Scottish Government must consider the costs and practical challenges of pursuing financial support mechanism models that are not being adopted in England and Wales:

  • Contracts for Difference (CfDs) have proved very successful in securing the necessary investment in a wide range of renewable energy technologies. This approach could provide revenue support to heat networks to incentivise the transition to more sustainable forms of heat generation. In particular, CfDs could support heat networks that use decarbonised heat sources (e.g. heat pumps), which are likely to have a higher cost than conventional gas boilers or heat networks using waste heat. Therefore, as well as providing revenue certainty, a CfD has the potential to subsidise the increased cost of decarbonised heat for end users.
  • A Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model, alongside periodic price reviews, can protect consumer prices whilst also encouraging ongoing capital investment, supporting asset maintenance and providing predictable revenue streams. The model would, however, involve significant administrative and resource cost. Prior to the sector maturing, a RAB model might not result in financially viable heat networks without additional capital or revenue support.
  • The Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) model is a well understood revenue support mechanism previously used in the energy sector. Similar to CfDs, an RHI model would subsidise the cost of heat for consumers if it was based on the amount of heat generated (as opposed to consumption of heat). It would therefore contribute to the cost of deployment, helping to address the increased cost of installing this technology and at the same time, mitigating demand risk. A cap on payments could also be introduced to avoid over-incentivisation. However, the value for money of previous schemes has been questioned.

Market feedback

The private sector views heat networks as an attractive investment opportunity but there are areas of uncertainty that must be resolved, including the need for greater clarity on the development of future regulation. To facilitate private investment, stakeholders highlighted the need for continued grant funding support to de-risk project cashflows. They also emphasised the importance of clear regulation on key topics, including heat zoning, mandatory connection policies, planning and building regulations, as well as a definitive policy direction on phasing out gas boilers.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Scottish Government:

1. Maintains capital funding support for the sector, either via existing programmes, or new bespoke capital schemes. Explore opportunities for extending the timescales for drawing down grant funding.

2. De-risking future revenues is key to unlocking heat network development – private capital is available for projects, but they need to be financeable. More detailed analysis of a revenue support model, such as CfD or a RHI equivalent, is merited. However, the Scottish Government must address the challenges of establishing such schemes, including the significant administrative and resource implications of previous schemes.

3. Explores the benefits of implementing a RAB model, following further regulatory developments and the creation of an established asset base (over 10-15 years). However, consider the complexity and feasibility of this model.

4. Continues to work closely with the Scottish National Investment Bank (SNIB) and the UK National Wealth Fund to explore investment opportunities, create a shared understanding of each party’s objectives and ultimately unlock the capital that has been made available to invest. Both organisations are committed to investing into the sector.

5. Maintains and increases support for pre-construction projects, via the Heat Network Support Unit (HNSU) and specific development funding programmes.

6. Monitors the implementation of the UK Government’s zoning approach and, where appropriate, leverage best practice from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ). This should be used to complement Scotland’s existing zoning approach.

7. Reviews its approach to regulation to help reduce regulatory uncertainty. Where appropriate, this should include leveraging best practice from England and Wales.

8. Continues to work with the UK Government on rebalancing electricity and gas prices. However, this will not eliminate the price difference between electricity and gas.

9. Develops a national Heat Network Strategy setting out a clear long-term vision for heat networks in Scotland.

 

Glossary / Abbreviations table

£/€ bn

Billions of £/€

LCCC

Low Carbon Contracts Company

£/€ m

Millions of £/€

LCITP

Low Carbon Infrastructure Transition Programme

ACM

The Netherlands’ Authority for Consumers and Markets

LHEES

Local Heat and Energy Efficiency Strategies

AMP

Asset Management Plans

MWh

Megawatt hour

ASHP

Air source heat pumps

NFFO

Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation

CAA

Civil Aviation Authority

NIB

Nordic Investment Bank

CAP

Competitively Appointed Provider

NWF

National Wealth Fund

CCC

Climate Change Committee

ODI

Outcome delivery incentive

CCUS

Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage

OFTO

Offshore Transmission Owners

CfD

Contract for difference

ORR

Office of Rail and Road

CXC

ClimateXChange

RAB

Regulated asset base

DBFO

Design, Build, Finance and Operate

RAV

Regulated Asset Value

DESNZ

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero

REMA

Review of Electricity market arrangements

DHLF

District Heating Loan Fund

RESCo

Regional Energy Services Company

DHN

District heat network

RHI

Renewable Heat Incentive

DPC

Direct Procurement for Customers programme

RIIO

Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs

EfW

Energy from Waste

ROC

Renewable Obligation Certificates

EY

Ernst and Young LLP

rUK

Rest of the UK

FOAK

First of a Kind

SFT

Scottish Futures Trust

GHNF

Green Heat Network Fund

SHNF

Scotland’s Heat Network Fund

HN

Heat network

SNIB

Scottish National Investment Bank

HNDM

Heat networks delivery models

SPV

Special Purpose Vehicle

HNES

Heat Network Efficiency Scheme

SRO

Scottish Renewables Obligation

HNIP

Heat Networks Investment Project

T&SCo

Transport and storage infrastructure

HNSA

Heat Networks (Scotland) Act 2021

TWh

Terawatt hours

HNSU

Heat Network Support Unit

UK

United Kingdom

KfW

Germany’s infrastructure bank

WCW

Dutch Collective Heat Supply Act

KPI

Key Performance Indicators

WPG

Germany’s Local Heat Planning Act

Introduction

Research aims

This report examines the heat network sector (also referred to as “the sector”) and will contribute to the Scottish Government’s ambition to accelerate the pace and scale of heat network rollout in Scotland. The report:

  • Summarises current financing models, structures, and barriers in the sector and establishes a baseline for the Scottish heat network landscape
  • Draws comparisons and insights from relevant utility sectors
  • Draws comparisons with international heat networks and their financing models
  • Provides insight into how heat networks are currently viewed by the private and public sector
  • Recommends suitable financial levers, models and policies for the sector

“Heat Network” definition

The definition of a “heat network” in the Heat Networks (Scotland) Act 2021 (HNSA) covers both district heat networks and communal heat networks. A district heat network distributes heat from one or more sources to more than one building. In a communal heating system heat is supplied to one building comprised of more than one building unit (for example, a block of flats).[1]

The majority of the findings in this report refer to district heat networks, but we have included both communal heating and district heating in our definition of a heat network.

Heat networks can be powered by a range of different technologies. Historically, heat networks have often utilised fossil fuels, including gas boilers. As a result, many legacy networks still rely on fossil fuel-based technology. Our analysis considers these legacy networks; however, we recognise that the Scottish Government is committed to supporting the roll out of clean heat networks and supporting the reduction in emissions from the sector. This is important context for the conclusions in this report.

Methodology

Our findings are based on extensive desk-based research conducted by sector specialists. The analysis also draws on insights from a series of interviews with sector stakeholders, including operators, funders, advisors and public sector representatives. This information has been used, together with our own sector experience and evidence from existing literature, to set out the existing baseline position in Scotland (and the rest of the UK) and to develop our recommendations for suitable financial levers, models and structures for the heat network sector in Scotland. Finally, the stakeholder feedback also informed our approach for drawing comparisons with other utility sectors and international comparators.

Our stakeholder engagement methodology and questions were agreed with CXC and the Scottish Government Steering Group. The engagement exercise consisted of 20 meetings and Microsoft Teams calls. In advance of the sessions, participants were issued with the questions and given the opportunity to share feedback either in writing or verbally.

Policy Context

Scotland’s ambitious climate change targets are to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045. To deliver this, Scotland must instigate a step change in decarbonising the heating of its homes and buildings. Domestic buildings account for 15% of Scotland’s total greenhouse gas emissions and around 27% of its total energy consumption[2]. The scale of this decarbonisation challenge is significant – Figure 2 shows that in 2022, over 72% of Scotland’s homes relied on mains gas as their primary heating fuel[3].

Figure 2: Breakdown of primary heating fuel vs number of homes

The chart shows the primary fuel used for heating in Scotland. Mains Gas is the largest proportion at over 72%.

The Scottish Government’s 2021 Heat in Building Strategy identified clean heat networks as a key strategic technology which is tried and tested and can be scaled up.

The Heat Networks (Scotland) Act 2021 established statutory targets for heat supplied by heat networks, requiring that they supply 2.6 Terawatt hours (TWh) of output by 2027, 6 TWh by 2030 and 7 TWh by 2035. In 2022, the Scottish Government estimated that heat networks supplied 1.35TWh of output[4]. To meet Scotland’s ambitious statutory targets, a significant acceleration in deployment is necessary.

Source: Scottish House Condition Survey 2022

The public sector plays an active role in the sector’s development, both at the national and local level. Local Heat and Energy Efficiency Strategies (LHEES) are local authority-led plans to decarbonise heat and improve energy efficiency, including rolling out heat networks in suitable locations. Momentum is building, with Scottish local authorities publishing their LHEES strategies, which include establishing the role of heat networks as a key decarbonisation measure.

The capital investment required to transform Scotland’s buildings (between now and 2045) is expected to be in the region of £33bn[5]. Given the size of this investment and the limited nature of public sector budgets, significant levels of finance will need to come from the private sector.

Current financing structures and models in Scotland’s heat networks

Scotland’s heat network sector

Heat networks distribute heat from a central source, avoiding the need for individual heating systems (such as gas boilers). There are over 1,090 known heat networks (the majority being communal heat networks) supplying heating and cooling to domestic and non-domestic properties[6]; however, most of the larger networks with significant heat loads are in Scotland’s larger towns and cities. Although recent projects have introduced clean heat sources, the sector still relies on mains gas as its primary heat source[7].

Figure 3: Heat networks in Scotland

A map of Scotland covered in green and pink dots, clustered around populated areas.

The number of heat networks, both district and communal, is increasing across Scotland. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of heat networks in Scotland, but the sector is still immature, especially compared to counterparts in Europe, where heat networks have played a central role in heat infrastructure since the 1940s.

Sector growth has been slow, and in recent years, the focus has been on a series of “demonstrator” projects, across a range of sizes and driven by early adopters in both the private and public sectors.

Source: Map – Heat Network Support Unit

Scottish and UK regulatory landscape

There is an emerging focus on the regulation of heat networks within Scotland and the rest of the UK. For the first time in the UK the sector is set to become regulated, like many other utility sectors. Given the decarbonisation requirement and recognising the growing importance and potential of heat networks, the Heat Networks (Scotland) Act 2021 (HNSA) created a regulatory framework for the sector in Scotland.

The regulation of consumer protection (including for heat networks) is reserved to the UK Government. In 2024, the UK Government and Ofgem jointly consulted on regulations to establish an authorisation system to protect heat network consumers under the Energy Act 2023. Ofgem will be the future regulator of that consumer protection regime across England, Scotland and Wales. Ofgem’s will also be responsible for heat network licences and authorisations in Scotland, as set out in the HNSA.

The HNSA includes a series of measures to support the sector and promote growth. These are summarised in table 1 below, alongside the relevant UK position. The UK Government has proposed a regulatory regime but has yet to introduce secondary legislation. For those measures not in force in Scotland, these will also be introduced by the secondary legislation.

Table 1: Scottish and UK regulatory landscape

Scottish landscape[8]

England & Wales landscape

Zoning, permitting and licensing

  • Zones (in force) – Local authorities are required to identify, consult and designate zones suitable for heat networks. The Scottish Government can also designate some zones.

  • Building assessment reports (in force) – Owners of non-domestic public sector buildings must assess whether their buildings are suitable to connect to a heat network.

  • Permits (not yet in force) – Heat network operators may need a permit to build and operate a network in a designated zone, providing operators with exclusive access to the zone.

  • Consents (not yet in force) – Operators will require a consent for each network, ensuring developments take place in areas that will have the most benefit, with the opportunity for community engagement.

  • Licensing (not yet in force) – All heat network companies (including existing operators) will need a licence to operate in Scotland. A licence will give heat network developers certain rights and powers – such as compulsory purchase, road works and surveying rights – to help reduce construction time and costs.

Zoning, permitting and licensing

  • Heat network zones – Zoning proposals will differ in England and Wales. The UK Government (via its Heat Networking Zoning Authority) will designate areas as heat network zones, where heat networks providing decarbonised heat offer the lowest cost solution for consumers. In these zones, certain buildings may be required to connect to the networks through mandatory connection measures.

  • Authorisation – As a regulated activity, all heat networks will be required to be authorised by Ofgem to be able to supply heat to their network. This will be across Scotland, England and Wales, and may duplicate some of the Scottish licensing and consenting requirements.

  • Licensing – Operators will be granted a licence by Ofgem that give them rights and powers, including specific permits, for example for street works, and allow use of land when building and maintaining heat networks as electricity.

  • Consumer protection

  • The regulation of consumer protection (including pricing, transparency and quality of services) is reserved to the UK Government. Consumer protection ensures end users have the opportunity to switch heat network suppliers and have the right to challenge poor quality service. This is critical in order to attract future customers and allow operators to develop new projects and grow existing networks.

  • Ofgem will also establish “step-in” rights, to protect customers in the event that the operator does not meet these minimum standards or needs to be replaced.
  • Technical standards

  • GB-wide technical standards will be regulated through a Heat Network Technical Assurance Scheme (HNTAS), designed to ensure minimum levels of network performance and efficiency. Ofgem, as the regulator, will award a license to a technical standards Code Manager.
  • The HNSA and the new UK Energy Act both aim to introduce legislation that has the potential to align the regulatory landscape across the UK. However, our stakeholder engagement process found that significant regulatory uncertainty currently exists, including the diverging timetable for introducing legislation and the lack of clarity regarding the differences in proposals between Scotland, England and Wales. Without further developments on specific regulatory areas, such as permitting/zoning, this uncertainty will remain. We also acknowledge that there is a complex regulatory landscape, with input required from both the Scottish and UK Governments to clarify the balance between devolved and reserved powers. These observations are further developed in section 4.4.

    The HNSA has created an opportunity for Scotland to benefit from a robust regulatory framework that builds trust for consumers and creates certainty for operators. In order to stimulate sector growth, the market requires further clarity on the ongoing process to regulate the sector and more detailed information regarding the introduction of secondary legislation. This should provide clarity regarding investment opportunities, reduce the complexity of the dual regulatory frameworks and make Scotland a more attractive investment proposition.

    The sector is also impacted by other Scottish regulation, including the New Build Heat Standard, which requires new homes and buildings to install clean heating systems, rather than relying on mains gas. Additionally, the National Planning Framework 4 includes policies which states that development proposals (within or adjacent to a heat network zone) will only be supported if they connect to an existing heat network.

    Existing financing models in the sector

    In Scotland and across the UK, the sector has typically been funded by early-stage financing from developers and significant levels of subsidy from the public sector. The Scottish Government has supported clean heat networks through:

    • Grant support (also in the form of repayable assistance), including:
      • Scotland’s Heat Network Fund (SHNF) – The SHNF offers capital grant funding to support the roll out of new clean heat networks and communal heating systems, as well as the expansion and decarbonisation of existing heat networks across Scotland.
      • Low Carbon Infrastructure Transition Programme (LCITP) – From 2015 until it was replaced by the SHNF in 2022, LCITP provided grant funding support to several heat networks, including Queens Quay and Torry heat network.
      • Both programmes also provided project development and commercialisation support.
    • Loans via the District Heating Loan Fund (DHLF) – Managed by the Energy Savings Trust, the fund provided capital loan funding to support low emission small scale district heating in Scotland until it closed in April 2024.
    • Non-domestic rates reliefs – since April 2024 heat networks (where 80% of the thermal energy in any given year is generated from renewable sources) have been eligible for a 90% rates relief.[9] There is also a 50% rates relief if a premises is wholly or mainly being used for a district heating network.[10]
    • Many demonstrator projects also benefitted from historical UK Government revenue support through the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI), now closed to new applicants.

    These public subsidies have encouraged private investment in the sector and supported the roll out of clean heat networks across Scotland. Many clean heat demonstrator projects have been self-funded by operators (or funded through bespoke delivery vehicles). However, grant funding is required to bridge funding gaps and enable projects to achieve the internal rate of return – often referred to as a hurdle rate – required by operators. This is more important for clean heat networks than for fossil fuel-based systems, where the requirement for public subsidy is less pressing given the lower capital costs.

    The hurdle rate is different for each operator and project. It is impacted by an operator’s cost of capital and project specific risks, but our analysis indicates that, at the time of this report, it tends to range between 8% and 12% (although this range will be impacted by several external factors and will vary on a project-by-project basis). This is explored further in section 0.

    Grant support is among several financial mechanisms (or “financial levers”) which the Scottish Government has historically used. Such support could continue to de-risk heat network projects and help incentivise private sector investment. Figure 4 highlights some of the key mechanisms used to date and others which are considered further in this report. A summary of each mechanism can be found in Appendix B.

    Figure 4: Funding levers the Scottish Government could deploy to attract private investment

    The chart lists the funding levers which could be deployed by Scottish Government to attract private investment within the heat networks
    Source: SFT and EY analysis

    In order to understand how a step change in private investment might be instigated, it is important to highlight the key factors which drive investor confidence, namely:

    • Certainty of demand
    • Revenue stability
    • A stable regulatory environment
    • A clear understanding of project risks with shared ownership and mitigation strategies

    These factors and wider deployment barriers are explored in the following section.

    Heat network deployment barriers

    Overview

    The analysis contained in this section includes feedback from our stakeholder interview exercise, as well as our own professional observations. While many of these barriers are well understood in the market, key stakeholders confirmed that they continue to present significant live obstacles for private sector operators and investors, limiting their investment appetite and restricting the roll out of heat networks at scale in Scotland. Following stakeholder feedback, we have grouped these barriers (shown in figure 5) into four categories:

    • Financial
    • Regulatory and policy
    • Technical
    • Social and market barriers

    Figure 5: Heat network deployment barriers

    A diagram showing the four categories of Heat network deployment barriers (social and market; financial; technical; regulatory and fiscal) and summarising the top 13 barriers.
    Source: EY analysis and stakeholder feedback

    Within these categories, we present the barriers in order of importance (based on the strength of stakeholder feedback). It is important to note that whilst our report is primarily focussed on financial barriers and the private sector, many of these non-financial barriers add further uncertainty and therefore need to be taken into consideration. All these barriers – financial and non-financial – must be addressed in order to instigate a step change in private investment.

    Financial barriers

    Heat networks involve significant levels of financial risk and uncertainty, making it extremely challenging to forecast a project’s cashflows, thereby deterring private investment. These financial risks are highlighted below:

    Demand uncertainty

    Demand uncertainty is the biggest factor inhibiting private sector investment. For a heat network to be financially and commercially viable, it should generate a minimum level of committed revenue in order to meet the operating costs of the network and contribute to the repayment of the initial capital investment. This can be challenging if it is unclear when and how many buildings will connect to the network, their heat offtake requirements and the resulting revenue that will be generated.

    For many Scottish “demonstrator” projects, demand and revenue risk have been reduced by securing anchor loads via public sector buildings, which require large heat offtake requirements and therefore to provide some revenue certainty. Developers and investors prioritise the de-risking of revenue flows as it provides greater certainty in a project’s ability to service the repayment of any debt or shareholder loans and/or equity return. As a result, securing longer term supply agreements with customers is a critical step in securing additional investment.

    Operators stated that investment decisions are not speculative – the extent of committed revenue and certainty of connections are critical considerations to a potential developer and/or investor. To date, projects have typically been funded using balance sheet finance of the project sponsors (corporate finance) in the form of shareholder loans and equity, rather than more conventional third-party debt finance in the form of limited or non-recourse debt finance. When a heat network project reaches critical mass with mature connections and revenues, this provides an opportunity to refinance and secure more competitive finance terms due to reduced lending risk.

    Long development and construction times

    Many heat network projects have significant development and construction timescales, which present barriers to funders. In some cases, projects can take two or more years to develop and several more years to construct. This results in significant development and commercialisation costs, requiring high levels of upfront finance.

    Historically, as a means of mitigating these development costs, the public sector offered support through the Heat Network Support Unit (HNSU) and specific grant funding programmes. However, stakeholders identified a misalignment between the grant funding drawdown profile (the existing grant funding programmes have shorter funding windows, typically four years) and the long construction cost profile (upwards of 5-7 years). This means that operators have had to condense the delivery programmes to meet the grant drawdown deadline or seek additional sources of financing.

    High capital costs

    Heat networks require significant levels of capital investment. Several recent Scottish heat network projects have had capital cost estimates of between £10m and £50m[11]. This barrier is exacerbated in times of high inflation and cost uncertainty. The high levels of capital investment are commensurate with other utilities such as water, gas and electricity. All require significant investment in underlying infrastructure prior to connection with residential, commercial and public sector buildings.

    Large capital projects are often regarded as higher risk and therefore more challenging to finance. Due to cash flow uncertainties, this sector has historically relied on significant levels of grant funding. Public support (including Scottish Government programmes such as LCITP and SHNF) has been essential for improving private sector returns and sharing the risk of the high capital costs. When this support is unavailable, operators mitigate this risk in other ways, for example, by seeking increased connection fees for end users.

    Diverse delivery models and procurement approaches

    The lack of standardisation in procurement approaches and delivery models adds complexity, time and cost to a project’s development timeline. Projects develop bespoke approaches that are not necessarily repeatable for new projects. This inhibits the market’s ability to understand the investment landscape and reduces confidence. Investors are far more likely to pursue projects where there are standard procurement approaches and tried and tested delivery models, where the risks are understood.

    The availability and access to financing

    Debt lenders have been reluctant to invest in the sector due to the risks noted above. Current stakeholder feedback confirms that this remains the case. Typically, large infrastructure projects would look to include both equity and debt to optimise financing costs and spread the risk on investment. However, heat network projects typically struggle to demonstrate that they will have sufficient free cashflows to service the cost of debt. As such, debt lenders will seek to invest their funds in alternative sectors where they have more confidence in the cashflows. If these other sources of financing cannot be brought into the sector, the ability to roll out new projects at scale will be limited.

    Regulatory and fiscal challenges

    Although the financial barriers are significant, they must be considered alongside regulatory and fiscal challenges. These have created uncertainty in the market and have negatively impacted the private sector’s investment appetite. Stakeholder feedback highlighted the importance of these areas in unlocking Scotland’s heat network ambitions. However, as we discuss below, the Scottish Government does not have the ability to resolve all these issues.

    Regulatory uncertainty

    The Heat Networks (Scotland) Act in 2021 introduced powers to regulate the Scottish heat networks market for the first time. The Energy Act 2023 was passed by the UK Parliament in October 2023. Differences in implementation, content and timing of regulation between Scotland and the rest of the UK are negatively impacting investor sentiment and creating uncertainty. Developers and funders are also looking for clarity on the future GB-wide consumer protections and technical and service specifications for operators.

    Without further clarity on the future secondary legislation in Scotland, operators stated they are more likely to focus resources outside Scotland – for example, in other UK areas – where there is more demand for larger urban heat network opportunities.

    This uncertainty also extends to other relevant policy areas, such as the phasing out of domestic gas boilers, which presents barriers to operators. The Scottish Government has introduced the New Build Heat Standard, which states that by 2045, all homes in Scotland will need to have converted to a clean heating system. Across the rest of the UK, there is political uncertainty about this phase out. No equivalent legislation is currently in place, meaning heat networks operators are unclear when customers will be required to adopt low emission heating solutions.

    Structural pricing considerations

    Reducing the gap between the price of electricity and the price of gas may help support the rollout of low carbon heat networks. Under the current domestic[12] electricity pricing model, electrified low carbon heating solutions are unlikely to offer cost savings to consumers when compared against traditional gas boilers.

    Historically, electricity has been more expensive than gas, partly due to the greater proportion of environmental and social obligation costs (green levies) placed on electricity (23%) compared to gas (2%), as shown by the figure 6 below.

    Figure 6: Breakdown of domestic electricity and gas bill

    A bar chart showing the typical cost breakdown of an electricity bill and a gas bill.
    Source: Ofgem

    The UK Government is currently consulting on the “Review of Electricity market arrangements” (REMA), which includes proposals for reducing electricity costs for consumers. Removing these levies from existing energy tariff structures would reduce the running costs of electrified heating solutions and encourage the uptake of low carbon heating.[13] However, there are many complexities involved in this change and the impact of rebalancing these costs must be understood further before it can be proven to be an effective mechanism for reducing electricity costs.

    In addition to the impact of the levies, electricity prices (and gas prices) also include significant distribution and transmission charges (network costs). Electricity bills could be reduced by permitting heat networks connected to the electricity grid to pay lower network charges (recognising their ability to use electricity at times of low demand).

    Regardless of these potential mechanisms, relatively low gas prices will continue to disincentivise the rollout of low emission heat networks, as they make any change to an alternative heat source appear more expensive. This is proving to be a significant barrier in the private sector.

    Technical challenges

    Operators and funders pointed to several heat network-related technical barriers which create further uncertainty and investor reluctance. The high-level technical challenges noted below are not an exhaustive list but rather provide important context for the rest of this report.

    The need for density

    In high density urban areas where there are large levels of heat demand, heat networks often provide the lowest cost low carbon heating option. The alternative is for properties to use individual air source heat pumps (ASHPs), which would place greater electricity demands on the grid and may result in higher customer costs and increased operational costs. Scotland has several areas where there is significant scale and suitable density levels for heat networks. However, operators noted that there are a greater number of large urban areas with multiple opportunities in England. This naturally provides significant competition for investment that might otherwise be made in the Scottish locations, especially for operators (operating both in England and Scotland) exploring opportunities across the UK. Additionally, smaller scale communal heating solutions may be appropriate for lower density areas; however, we do not explore this in detail as it is outside the scope of the report.

    Technical complexity

    Many of the existing heat network projects utilise different heat sources and technological solutions, including things as basic as pipework sizing. As projects increase in size, this lack of standardisation can present challenges for heat networks integrating and/or scaling up.

    Decarbonisation challenges

    Historically, many heat networks across the UK (and internationally) have been powered by carbon-based heat sources. However, operators consistently noted that customers now expect heat networks to use low emission heat sources. Low carbon technology is typically more expensive, and technologically complex than legacy carbon-based fuel sources and this therefore represents an additional factor impacting the commerciality of new projects.

    Social and market challenges

    The sector also experiences wider challenges in the development of the market for heat networks.

    Consumer experience and scepticism

    Operators and funders highlighted recurring customer concerns, including security of supply, pricing and consumer protection, that provide challenges to operators attracting potential domestic consumers to their heat networks.[14] Additionally, countries with a long history of operating heat networks, have an established culture of valuing and trusting the technology meaning consumers better understand the benefits. These factors have supported the development of international heat networks and have resulted in reduced levels of negative consumer experience and scepticism.

    Lack of standardised commercial models

    The lack of a standard delivery and operating model for heat networks results in developers and public sector partners (e.g. local authorities) having to invest significant time and resources developing proposals for their projects. This is explained further in section 4.5. This additional time and complexity increase development timescales.

    Supply chain – the sector has a limited number of heat network developers

    There are a limited number of private sector operators in Scotland, which in turn have a limited supply chain. The current developer landscape includes a number of balance sheet backed developers (SSE, EON, Vattenfall) and some infrastructure fund backed developers (Hemiko, 1Energy and Bring Energy).

    This places a high dependency on a very small number of corporates relative to the scale of the heat network opportunities in the wider UK. Additionally, local authorities have a significant role to play in developing networks but they have limited in-house capacity and resource and therefore, rely on a small number of financial, technical and legal advisors.

    Heat network delivery models – summary/overview

    To address some of the barriers restricting the roll out of heat networks at scale, the Scottish Government is exploring a range of levers, including financial, technical and regulatory, and considering the optimum delivery models to support the sector. Although this report does not undertake a detailed assessment of these models, our overview provides context for the financial levers explored further in this report.

    In 2022, the Scottish Government commissioned the Scottish Futures Trust (SFT) to undertake analysis on potential delivery models that could accelerate the pace and scale of heat network deployment in Scotland. The subsequent Heat Networks Delivery Models (HNDM) report, published in February 2024, identified four models that warranted further detailed development and consideration, namely:

    • Regional Heat Partnership / Regional Energy Services Company (RESCo) model
    • Local authority-led joint venture
    • Local authority-led delivery, with Scottish Government stake
    • Centrally-led delivery

    Following the HNDM report’s publication, Scottish Government has collaborated with SFT to further develop the Regional Heat Partnership and Centrally-led models.

    Overview of international experience

    The Scottish Government can draw insight from comparable European and other international markets. It can be particularly helpful to consider how these sectors are developed, financed and regulated. To develop this insight, we have reviewed approaches in countries with high levels of market maturity, as well as those with characteristics similar to Scotland’s.

    Our analysis is primarily based on five international examples, referred to in this section as the “comparator countries”. As shown in Figure 7, these are the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Sweden and Estonia. During our shortlisting process, we considered jurisdictions such as the USA, Canada, Belgium, Ireland, Latvia and Poland, but found a lack of relevant data from which meaningful conclusions could be drawn. Our analysis will refer to these other countries where relevant.

    Source: EY Analysis

    Table listing the countries Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Sweden, Estonia
    Figure 7: Comparator Summary

    Denmark has a mature and successful heat network sector and is often considered a valuable source of insight for Scotland. It is deliberately excluded from our analysis as the Scottish Government has a detailed understanding of the factors that have contributed to its success. These factors include cultural acceptance of heat networks and high consumer trust. Additionally, it has established regulatory levers such as mandatory connections.

    This section provides an overview of:

    • The history of comparator countries’ heat networks with a brief market overview
    • The availability and impact of public financing levers
    • The regulatory structures
    • The market ownership profile and level of private finance penetration
    • The financial composition of heat network assets

    0B provides supplementary information for each international example.

    History of international heat networks and market overview

    Figure 8 summarises the maturity of each country’s heat network sector, based on the definitions developed by Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ)[15]:

    • Emerging – the market is still a nascent sector with lots of growth opportunity
    • Expanding – the sector is established but is continually growing
    • Consolidating – the market is mature and technology is being refined, updated or refreshed
    • Refurbishing – the market is very mature and heat network technology is on the nth generation, but the networks are aged and require significant replacement and/or refurbishment

    The comparator countries have a range of heat network maturity levels, with Finland and Sweden widely acknowledged as having mature and well-established sectors, while the Netherlands has an emerging heat network sector with many similar characteristics as Scotland.

    DESNZ classified the UK and therefore by implication, both Scotland and the rest of the UK as emerging markets. 0B provides a brief historical overview of each international comparator.

    Figure 8: Maturity of international heat networks

    Emerging

    Expanding

    Consolidating

    Refurbishing

    Scotland

    Germany

    Sweden

    Estonia

    rUK

     

    Finland

     

    Netherlands

       

    Source: DESNZ (BEIS) “International review of heat network frameworks” (2020)

    Key findings

    The Nordic countries (Sweden and Finland) and Estonia are in the “consolidating” and “refurbishing” categories. In each country, the sectors are mature and the technology is tried, tested and trusted.

    Overall, the Nordics have been leaders in district heat networks since the 1940s. The 1970s oil crisis stimulated a transition to alternative fuel sources and acted as a catalyst for rapid expansion in the sector. This early adoption is a significant factor driving the higher degrees of maturity in their district heating networks. Familiarity of the technology has supported the cultural acceptance. By 2015, 46% of Sweden’s heat networks were supplied by biomass and only 7% utilised oil or gas[16].

    Heat networks are common in Germany, with the first pilot system having gone live in the 1950s. The sector has grown over the last decade with significant numbers of large-scale heat networks. Therefore, the market has surpassed the initial emerging phase of high growth but strives to continually expand toward becoming a mature market.

    Germany is in the expanding category. Compared to Scotland, Germany has been using heat networks for much longer and the initial rapid growth phase has taken place. There is now a focus on continuing to add connections to existing networks.

    Although the Netherlands implemented its first heat networks in a comparable time frame to Germany (Utrecht in 1923, followed by Rotterdam in 1949) this early adoption was not built upon, and no new networks were constructed in the 1950s and 1960s. However, there has been a moderate uptake of district heating schemes since the late 1980s.[17] The market is therefore relatively small but undergoing rapid change driven by a political commitment to decarbonise heat and reduce emissions from buildings. Therefore, there are strong similarities between Scotland and the Netherlands both in heat network market size and nascency and the Government’s ambition to decarbonise heat in buildings using district heating.

    The scale of heat networks in most of the comparator countries differs significantly from Scotland. Figure 9 illustrates the cumulative length of heat networks in kilometres in each country[17]. While country size plays a role, Germany has nearly 35,000km of heat network infrastructure, whilst Estonia, although highly developed, is limited by its comparatively smaller size. Notwithstanding that, Scotland’s relative position to the comparator countries is clear.

    Figure 9: Cumulative kilometres of heat networks

    Comparison of cumulative kilometres of heat networks:
Germany: 34,160
Sweden: 24,300
Finland: 16,239
Netherlands: 4,000
Estonia: 1,431
UK: 1,800
Scotland: 108

    Source: EY analysis

    Across Europe, the maturity of the sector varies, with countries such as Sweden, Finland and Estonia building on the successful implementation of decades worth of investment in the sector. The sector is still emerging in Scotland, like the Netherlands, where it does not demonstrate many of the characteristics of the more mature countries, such as cultural acceptance of heat networks and scale in the market. This provides important context for the following section reflecting on the appropriateness and availability of financial levers.

    Impact of public financing levers

    Public financing levers significantly influence the implementation and expansion of heat networks internationally. Financial levers serve as catalysts for innovation, growth and the adoption of low carbon technologies.

    Table 2 provides an overview of the financial mechanisms that aid the development and expansion of heat networks. The levers include capital grants, tax exemptions and incentives, revenue grants, individual connection grants and decarbonisation incentives (for example, grant funding for decarbonised technology). Each country is discussed further in Appendix B.

    Table 2: Summary of public financial levers used by international comparators

    Country

    Financial Levers

    Rest of the UK

    • Capital grant funding
    • Feasibility study support
    • Revenue Grants (existing heat networks)

    The Netherlands

    • Capital grant funding
    • Individual connection grants

    Germany

    • Capital grant funding and operating cost support
    • Feasibility study support
    • Low carbon installation subsidies

    Finland

    • Tax incentives

    Sweden

    • Individual connection grants
    • Tax exemptions

    Estonia

    • Investment support
    • Energy cost compensation
    • Individual connection grants

    Source: EY Analysis

    In addition to the financial levers shown above, most comparator countries also benefit from a state-owned infrastructure bank investing in their district heating sector. State-owned infrastructure banks operate on similar terms to commercial lenders but may have the ability to adopt an increased risk appetite. This enables them to support heat networks in circumstances where commercial banks cannot. Additionally, EU member states benefit from access to EU funding where there are no bespoke heat network funding pots.

    Recent investments reflect a growing appetite to engage across different markets with varying levels of maturity. For example, banks like the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) provide investment support to help refurbish existing heat network assets across the Nordics and Baltics, while Germany’s infrastructure bank (KfW) is providing grants to help continue the transition to a more mature market in Germany.

    Stakeholder engagement confirmed that both Scottish National Investment Bank (SNIB) and National Wealth Fund (NWF) have ample capital to deploy. The issue was reported to be a lack of investible projects.

    0 provides a summary of state-owned infrastructure banks and relevant examples across the chosen countries.

    Key findings

    As illustrated by Error! Reference source not found., most of the comparator countries have adopted a range of financial levers. Many have applied a similar approach to Scotland, including the continued use of capital grant funding, project development funding or individual grants for expanding and upgrading heat networks.

    Grant funding is a common financing lever, especially for the countries who are growing their heat network sectors. For example, in 2022 Germany introduced a €3bn fund to support the development and construction costs of new decarbonised heat networks (where 75% of the heat is sourced from decarbonised heat sources)[18]. This provides grant funding up to 40% of the eligible capital costs. The fund also provides feasibility support to projects. Additionally, the Netherlands is using a €400m fund to support the capital costs of new heat networks. The analysis shows that capital grant funding continues to be popular as an effective funding lever available before the sector reaches maturity. Regarding the UK market, there is continued funding from the Green Heat Network Fund (GHNF), with £288m initially made available and an additional £485m allocated in December 2023. The GHNF is expected to run until 2028, however operators expect that this will continue past 2028.

    Another common lever in more mature countries is using individual grants or connection grants to incentivise connection to heat networks. For example, KfW helps deliver anchor loads to networks by offering increased grant support to local authorities for the connection of public sector buildings. Examples of individual incentives include the Estonian Business and Innovation Agency grant, which offers up to €10,000 for small residential buildings to connect to existing networks.

    Estonia also offers a phased compensation scheme for the use of heat networks versus existing carbon-based alternatives. The Estonian Government provided compensation of 80% of the additional costs faced by heat network users because of increased energy prices.

    Finland is developing a tax credit scheme which projects will be able to benefit from after they become operationally profitable. This has the aim of making project cashflows more appealing to investors, helping increase early returns by reducing the tax expense.

    It is clear that many countries are promoting the use of grant funding to varying degrees. Significant levels of support are provided in jurisdictions with less mature sectors, while more mature countries use and develop other forms of support. The use of grant funding in Scotland and the rest of the UK is well established. Similarly, the Netherlands with its less mature sector also provides significant grant funding programmes. In Germany (an expanding country), grant funding continues to be a well utilised financial lever but intervention rates have decreased from predecessor programmes. Additionally, there is a requirement for a much larger proportion of the heat to be from renewable sources. The example of other emerging countries in Europe indicates that the market in Scotland will continue to rely on grant funding, even if the intervention levels decrease (like Germany) or grant funding is targeted at specific areas of sectors.

    Regulatory structures

    Our international comparator countries employ a range of regulatory structures (regarding operation, pricing and decarbonisation requirements) and national oversight. These range from self-governing municipality frameworks with a limited role for national regulators to nationwide regulatory frameworks governing the entire heat networks market. Whilst regulatory landscapes differ, the varying regimes offer interesting lessons for heat networks in Scotland.

    Table 3 provides an overview of the international regulatory landscape and each country’s approach to mandatory connections. Detailed findings for these countries are shown in 0.

    Table 3: Overview of international regulatory landscape

    Country

    Regulated/Unregulated

    Mandatory Connections

    UK

    Regulation in development

    No*

    The Netherlands

    Regulated

    Yes

    Germany

    Unregulated

    No

    Finland

    Unregulated

    No

    Sweden

    Regulated

    No

    Estonia

    Regulated

    Yes

    *DESNZ is currently shaping its policy approach to mandatory connections. It is expected mandatory connections will be enforced on certain buildings in defined zones to be connected to heat networks by a given deadline[19]. However, details are yet to be fully confirmed.

    Key Findings

    Across our comparator countries, many of the developed and mature markets (e.g. Finland and Germany) are unregulated. The heat networks have a self-governing framework and abide by technical codes and industry standards but no third-party regulatory oversight. Municipalities have their own governance procedures; they are self-governing with greater pricing transparency, consistent contractual delivery and contractual routes. The evidence suggests that these countries focus on consumer pricing and that introducing standardisation supports investment and stimulates the sector’s development.

    Mandatory connection to heat networks is used in some of the comparator countries, establishing base heat loads and reducing demand uncertainty. Mandatory connections are primarily applied to new developments, but barriers exist to using them in the retrofit market. For example, in relation to timing of connection for retrofits: where buildings may have recently installed new carbon-based technologies, connection to a heat network may not be considered for many years until their heat source needs replaced. Finland decided to repeal mandatory requirement having concluded they could be deemed anti-competitive given other decarbonised heating options are also used successfully.

    Clear government policies on decarbonisation and the phasing out of carbon-based fuels are evident among the comparator countries. Germany’s Building and Energy Act 2020 requires municipalities to have heating (including heat networks) powered by 65% renewable energy from January 2024 onward and to phase out existing oil and gas heating systems. The German Government is incentivising the transition via KfW and offering bonus support for an accelerated switch to heat networks or other renewable sources. Similarly, the Netherlands has banned new developments from connecting to the gas grid from 2028 via amendments to Gas Act 2018.

    Market ownership profile and private finance penetration

    Our comparator countries also tend to have different ownership structures, with ownership split between the public and private sector in different ways.

    Figure 10 below shows the current profile of heat network ownership across each country, with Finland’s ownership largely public, the Netherlands and Estonia mostly private, and rUK, Germany and Sweden demonstrating mixed ownership structures.

    Figure 10: Asset ownership profile

    The chart shows the current profile of heat network ownership across each country, with Finland’s ownership largely public, the Netherlands and Estonia mostly private, and rUK, Germany and Sweden demonstrating mixed ownership structures.
    Source: EY Analysis

    Key findings

    Ownership profiles differ across the selected comparator countries with several observable themes. For some comparator countries, there is a high proportion of private sector finance. For example, in the Netherlands more than 90% of heat networks are managed by the private sector. This has helped to scale up investment. Established heat networks offer attractive, stable investments to institutional investors looking for long term consistent returns – as evidenced by Dutch pension institution PGGM investing in Swedish networks.

    In other countries, including Finland, public sector ownership in the sector is at a high level. However, they are still seeking investment from the private sector to support established municipally owned heat networks, where budget restrictions limit upgrades and refurbishments. This ownership profile provides an interesting reference point for Scotland, as it allows the sector to benefit from additional investment.

    The analysis shows significant levels of public ownership in many of the mature and maturing countries. In Germany, for example, Berlin’s municipality acquired the Berlin heat network for €1.4bn from Vattenfall. This demonstrated a commitment to re-municipalising infrastructure and reversing privatisations to gain more influence over the city’s district heating and gas supply. The municipality believes the Berlin network to be profitable and that it will play a significant role in moving toward climate neutrality.

    In the Netherlands, the high levels of private sector ownership have resulted in the Dutch government proposing legislation in 2022 to part-nationalise the sector. Municipalities will have the opportunity to own up to 51% of networks, thereby bringing market ownership into the public sector. The proposal is designed to mitigate concerns regarding the affordability of heat for end users, the reliability of the services and the need to safeguard public sector climate change ambitions and public values. However, this initiative has led to significant concerns from several operators who feel that it will lead to a significant downturn in private sector investment[20]. During our stakeholder interviews, one European operator warned that this move will make the Netherlands “uninvestable”.

    Overall, more mature markets tend to have a greater level of private finance penetration due to reduced risks and more stable operations. However, public sector ownership still allows local government to maintain more control regarding price and climate targets. Operators in the Netherlands indicated that the introduction of legislation to restrict private sector investment (and therefore control over the heat networks) can have a significant negative impact on the market and reduce investment security in the private sector. Under the new Dutch model, the incentives for private companies to invest in public projects are small and short term, as the private sector will lose control of the decision making while retaining significant levels of financial risk. Scotland should consider the impact that future regulatory changes may have on private sector investment appetite while balancing this with its broader objectives of reducing fuel poverty and supporting clean heat networks.

    Financial composition of heat networks

    The upfront capital expenditure expected revenue receipts and cash flow for other asset classes can be estimated with enough certainty to attract debt financing. In contrast, heat networks under development tend to have multiple expansion options and uncertainty around which end users will connect and when. This means costs or revenue inflows are not certain enough to allow a traditional project finance approach.

    Rabobank, a Dutch multinational bank, highlighted that district heating companies self-financing their heating grids is a common approach in developing markets like the Netherlands. Their balance sheets typically include a mixture of debt and equity. Additionally, they also identify that traditional project financing is much harder to implement as it requires a significant portion of a project’s cashflows to be secured (by having contracted demand), which is an inherent problem for heat networks.

    Rabobank also stated that whilst large credit worthy companies may be able to raise finance to fund heat networks and reduce their equity component of a project, smaller less bankable heat network developments may require government guarantees over any debt to help improve their attractiveness to private sector.[21]

    The stakeholder engagement sessions also reflected the view that corporate balance sheet financing will remain the main source of financing in developing markets in the near-term.

    Mature markets like Sweden, Finland and Estonia, benefit from more traditional forms of debt financing because they are well established and understood by lenders. For example, the NIB provided a €12m loan repayable over 10 years to help finance the heat network in Pirkanmaa, Finland.[22] These mature markets can also access EU financing to reduce dependence on carbon-based fuels. For example, the Finnish energy company Helen Ltd received a €150m loan in April 2024 via REPowerEU[23] for building a new heat pump plant and converting fuel use from coal to biomass pellets.

    Consequently, developing heat networks are often funded purely from equity financing until they reach operational profitability. Only once stable profits are achieved can network operators consider refinancing and attracting debt lenders to expand their networks. Private Equity firms often take an equity stake in a heat network, but the composition of their fund could be a mixture of institutional debt and equity.

    Conclusions

    Our comparator countries present a mix of maturity levels, various ownership profiles, regulatory structures and financing levers. Those with more developed sectors have a mixed degree of public ownership and the ability to access private finance. They are mainly regulated by standard frameworks within the municipalities with regulators adopting a back seat approach. However, these countries with less regulation have had the technology embedded in their culture for much longer. Therefore, the regulators can focus on price transparency and fairness for the end user rather than a framework for developing the market.

    Scotland has the opportunity to overcome the barriers faced by the sector by adopting solutions that have been successful elsewhere, including regulation, clear direction on decarbonisation and financing levers:

    • Regulation: Standardised and practical regulatory frameworks help to ensure consistency across the market. They make it simpler for operators to undertake projects by reducing project complexity. Additionally, standardised frameworks and agreements provide greater certainty and transparency regarding control and responsibility of heat network assets. This provides operators with confidence over the assets.
    • Decarbonisation: All of the countries on our shortlist are actively moving away from fossil fuel heat networks and incentivising clean heat networks through policy choices. For example, sector development may be encouraged through connection subsidy or a phased ban on carbon-based alternatives. Additionally, mandatory connections provide a baseline for investment cases, making projects investible as demand assurance can be satisfied. Equally, contracted revenues obtained as part of the demand assurance may provide enough certainty to encourage private investment into heat networks.
    • Financing levers: Comparator countries have provided financial incentives for connecting to existing heat networks offering further incentives for accelerated uptake. Capital grant support is the most common lever used by international comparators across all market maturities as it can make the investment decision for expansion of heat networks more viable. Similarly, when networks are seeking connections, individuals need to be incentivised to connect. For example, by bridging the gap on cost to their current heat sources, particularly when there are no regulations requiring individuals to connect. Additionally, state-owned infrastructure banks can be used to leverage these solutions as the market develops. For example, if connection fees are mandatory, a connection fee facility could be rolled up into the overall financing solution as there will be enough clarity on contracted revenue cashflows to reduce demand assurance risk.

    The key considerations can be summarised as follows:

    • simple and standardised frameworks to ensure consistency within the regulations
    • clear direction on decarbonisation
    • the use of mandatory connections (such as on new developments) to provide certainty
    • public financing levers to develop projects and also to incentivise individuals to connect.

    Review of financing mechanisms in selected utility sectors

    Introduction

    The UK utilities sector is a multifaceted industry that provides essential services for the protection and maintenance of modern daily life and commerce. These services include the provision of electricity, gas, water, telecommunications and transport. Each segment and subsector of the utility sector is integral to the economy’s stability, growth and societal well-being. Regulation of such sectors ensures that individuals, and businesses have access to the critical resources they require at a reasonable cost.

    Each UK utility sector is governed by a specific regulator responsible for consumer protection (including pricing), safety, reliability and sustainability, ensuring a well-developed network of public services provided under regulatory regimes, as outlined in Appendix C. The primary regulators include:

    • The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem)
    • The Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) in England and Wales
    • The Office of Communications (Ofcom)
    • The Office of Rail and Road (ORR)
    • The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)

    The global shift towards net zero, with an emphasis on clean heating systems, requires the development of regulatory regimes to incorporate new energy solutions.

    Regulatory oversight will remain crucial for balancing the objectives of climate change mitigation with continued access to reliable and affordable utility services. As a result, heat networks are planned to be subject to formal regulation across England, Wales and Scotland by 2024/25 in line with primary legislation introduced as part of the Energy Act 2023 and the Heat Networks (Scotland) Act 2021.

    Purpose

    This section of the report examines the origins and current characteristics of other regulated utility sectors. We also explore if specific aspects of the regulation of other sectors can inform the regulatory and financial environment, which will help accelerate the development of heat networks in Scotland.

    To aid in understanding how potential heat networks regimes may develop, we outline how the sectors have historically been financed and how the regulatory structures have facilitated the deployment of capital.

    Methodology

    We performed analysis to identify regulated utilities which offer a good comparator to heat networks. This included examining the characteristics of a long list of 39 regulated sectors covering electricity, water, telecommunications, rail and air regulation against the criteria listed in Appendix D. Based upon the preliminary analysis, we progressed 17 utilities for further examination which is discussed in Appendix K.

    Further to the completion of the detailed analysis (Appendix K), we determined that offshore wind electricity generation, household water & sewerage undertakers and Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage (CCUS) demonstrated relevant attributes for heat networks. The key characteristics of each sector are summarised in Appendix E. This includes risk profile, type of sector the utility operates within and the investment time horizon for each utility.

    These three utilities are used to understand how the utility sector is regulated and how investment supports ongoing development. They are also used to explore how heat networks might be regulated and how regulatory approaches impact levels of financing. Each sector is analysed separately below before evaluating how aspects could be applied to heat networks. A summary of regulatory timelines for these sectors is shown in Appendix F.

    Offshore wind

    Overview

    The UK’s offshore wind sector is rapidly expanding and plays a pivotal role in the nation’s transition to renewable energy. Between the UK’s first offshore wind allocation round (AR1 2015) and AR 6 (2024), a total of 21 GW of offshore wind capacity has been supported by Contracts for Difference (CfDs). CfDs are explained in more detail below.

    Regulatory Structure

    Following the Energy Act 2004, Ofgem has continued to regulate the sector and is adapting its approach as offshore wind projects continue to be deployed, offering new support mechanisms. Ofgem’s regulation of offshore wind is structured around several key elements. It is designed to promote the development of the sector whilst ensuring efficiency, competition and the protection of consumers interests. Regulations cover, licensing, support mechanisms, grid connection, market oversight and consumer protection. Further details can be found at Appendix G.

    Ofgem’s remit also extends to the provision of Innovation Funding to support the transition to net-zero energy systems. This includes support to accelerate technological advancements, improve efficiency and reduce costs.

    Regulatory Financing Mechanisms

    Offshore wind is characterised by large upfront capital expenditure, availability risk (wind variability) and exposure to a competitive and volatile electricity market. All these factors impact the sector’s ability to secure much needed investment. The investment time horizon is around 15 years commensurate with the term of a CfD. Unlike the deployment of heat networks, offshore wind is not exposed to demand risk as it operates on a wholesale basis whereby electricity is exported directly to the national grid.

    CfDs provide long-term stable and predictable revenue for offshore wind developers, thus making offshore wind attractive to investors, creating optimised financing structures that can reduce the overall cost of capital. A CfD has the effect of providing a fixed price for each MWh of electricity that the project generates over a specified period (typically 15 years) referred to as the “Strike Price”. The Strike Price typically reflects the price per MWh a developer considers necessary to achieve its applicable return on investment over the period of the CfD. CfDs are awarded through a competitive auction process (Allocation Round) administered by the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ).

    The Strike Price is different to the actual market price, known as the “Reference Price”, which is calculated based on the average market price per MWh over a given period. When the Reference Price is lower than the Strike Price, a top up payment of the difference in price is made by the Low Carbon Contracts Company (LCCC) to the offshore generator. Conversely, if the Reference Price is greater than the Strike Price, then the generator must pay the difference to LCCC.

    CfDs were originally introduced in 2013 and replaced the Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROC) regime, which was the main support mechanism for renewable energy prior to CfDs. CfDs are an evolution of the support mechanism for renewable energy projects that increases competition and whereby the Strike Price better reflects the underlying levelised cost of the technology.

    Household water & sewerage undertakers

    Overview

    The household water and sewerage sector in the UK provides essential water supply and wastewater services to residential and commercial customers. The sector operates as a natural monopoly and is therefore highly regulated across England and Wales and Scotland.

    Regulatory Structure

    England and Wales

    In England and Wales the sector is regulated by Ofwat. The regulator aims to ensure high-quality services, fair pricing, compliance with environmental standards, and the financial viability of water companies. The regulatory structure has evolved over time to address priorities such as infrastructure investment, customer service improvement and environmental concerns.

    Key changes include the introduction of competition to drive efficiency, periodic price reviews by setting price limits and service targets, increased customer engagement, and innovation funding. These changes aim to create a more outcome-based regulatory regime that encourages water companies to be customer-oriented, efficient, and forward-thinking in their operations and investments, ensuring high standards of water quality and environmental stewardship.

    Scotland

    Scottish Water is regulated by the Water Industry Commission for Scotland (WICS), which ensures value for money and efficiency without a profit motive. This aligns with Scottish Government policies on affordability and public ownership. WICS is governed by the Water Industry (Scotland) Act 2002, as amended by the Water Services etc. (Scotland) Act 2005 and the Water Resources (Scotland) Act 2013.

    WICS’ role is to set charge caps, monitor performance, facilitate retail competition for non-household customers, and support the Hydro Nation vision. Price reviews are conducted every six years. Reviews set price limits based on Scottish Water’s business plan, customer input, and factors such as debt service and operational efficiency, with a transition away from the RAB model since 2010.

    WICS also sets efficiency targets and, while independent, can be influenced by Scottish Ministers on financial matters, potentially impacting long-term infrastructure maintenance if charges are set too low. Scottish Water receives government loans or grants for large capital projects, reducing reliance on customer charges. However, this funding depends on the impact on the Scottish Government’s balance sheet, requiring careful management for long-term sustainability. Further details on this can be found at Appendix H.

    Regulatory Financing Mechanisms

    England and Wales

    The water and sewerage sector relies on long-term investment provided by the capital markets, typically in the form of shareholder equity and bond finance. Most utilities are highly geared and therefore very sensitive to adverse changes in credit ratings (via Moody’s, S&P and Fitch). Nearly all utilities aim for an investment-grade credit rating to secure optimum lending terms with the primary objective of lowering the company’s Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC).

    Ofwat’s regulation and associated pricing reviews provide a stable financial environment for investors. They ensure reliable demand due to the monopolistic nature of the customer base despite some revenue risk from bad debt. The application of a Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model (discussed below) along with the submission of Asset Management Plans (AMPs) that contribute to periodic price reviews, is designed to incentivise investment in infrastructure and services whereby the water companies are required to manage risks related to capital programmes, asset maintenance and operational costs similar to those in the heat network sector.

    Regulated Asset Based (RAB)

    The RAB model regulates water company prices while ensuring infrastructure maintenance and service quality. The RAB represents the value of a company’s capital assets based on historical costs, depreciation, and new investments. Ofwat uses the RAB value to set allowed revenue requirements, applying a WACC to determine the maximum revenue companies can charge, incentivising efficient investment and continual infrastructure improvements. This model is effective in the water sector due to the manageable number of operators, encouraging companies to invest efficiently and include new investments in future revenue streams.

    Periodic Price Reviews

    Ofwat’s price reviews, conducted every five years, determine the revenue water companies can earn. They take into both capital and operational expenditures into consideration to set price controls and encourage large-scale investment projects. The submission of AMPs contributes to the periodic price review process, which includes performance incentives through Outcome Delivery Incentives (ODIs), rewarding companies for meeting targets and penalising underperformance, aligning financial interests with high-quality service delivery. The periodic pricing reviews, coupled with limited demand risk provides greater revenue certainty for investment.

    The latest Asset Management Plan (AMP8) for 2025-2030 focuses on climate change, emissions reduction, water quality improvement, leakage reduction, and reliable services. It also introduces innovative funding solutions such as the Direct Procurement for Customers (DPC) programme to support significant infrastructure investments.

    Innovation funding

    Although there are many external innovation funds available to water companies, Ofwat has established its own Ofwat Innovation Fund. The aim of this £200m fund is to encourage collaborative initiatives and partnerships within the water sector to tackle the larger challenges the sector faces such as climate change, leakage and affordability.

    Scotland

    Whilst Ofwat regulates the water sector in England and Wales, privatisation of the sector has resulted in high debt leverage which can give rise to value leakage to shareholders and risk of under investment of infrastructure. Thames Water, England’s largest water company, has requested that Ofwat approves an increase in water bills of up to 40% by 2030.

    Scotland has sought to mitigate these specific risks through the water services being publicly owned. Services are operated by Scottish Water which remains accountable to the Scottish Government and its customers. This helps to ensure profits are reinvested in the infrastructure rather than distributed to shareholders. WICS is an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body whose principle statutory functions are to:

    • Determine charge caps;
    • Monitor Scottish Water’s performance, encouraging efficiency and sustainability;
    • Facilitate competition by encouraging the entry of retail water and sewerage providers for non-household customers in Scotland; and
    • Support the Scottish Government’s vision of ensuring that Scotland is a Hydro Nation and meet their obligations under the Water Resources Act 2013.

    Water charges are set by WICS and remain relatively stable as profits are reinvested. The domestic charges are linked to council tax bands, with prices increasing as bands increase. Historically charges were calculated using a version of the RAB model. However, since the price review in 2010, WICS has moved away from the RAB based model towards looking at business requirements as the basis for setting prices.

    Price Reviews

    Similar to Ofwat in England and Wales, WICS performs Strategic Reviews of Charges to set price limits for the next regulatory period, usually every six years. The Strategic Reviews of Charges is initially based upon Scottish Water’s long term business plan. This encompasses short and long-term infrastructure investment requirements, debt repayments and operating costs. WICS subsequently evaluates the business plan, with a focus on Debt Service Cover Ratio (DSCR), alongside multiple other factors including inflation, investment needs and operational efficiency to determine annual price caps for customers. These may be adjusted annually within the limits set by WICS to account for inflation or other changes.

    Although a proxy RAB continues to exist to act as an internal comparator to England and Wales water sector, Scottish Water’s customer-focussed business plan helps align Scottish Water with Scotland Government objectives.

    Government Grants and Incentives

    Scottish Water receives loans or grants from the Scottish Government to finance large capital expenditure projects. These reduce reliance upon customer charges, improving affordability for households and businesses. While government-backed loans could offer more favourable terms than private market financing, such a mechanism could impact the Scottish Government balance sheet (borrowing requirement). This impact could mean funding is not granted for infrastructure development and maintenance projects and instead a short-term increase in customer prices would have to be required. As such, any borrowing is carefully managed to ensure long term financial sustainability for both Scottish Water and Scottish Government.

    Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage (CCUS)

    Overview

    CCUS is an emerging sector in the UK, crucial for achieving the net zero emissions target by 2050. The government is actively developing a regulatory framework to support its deployment. This framework, shaped by legislation such as the Energy Act 2023, aims to ensure CCUS projects are financially viable, environmentally effective and resilient. It provides regulatory oversight from bodies like Ofgem, the Oil and Gas Authority, and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ).

    Regulatory Structure

    The UK’s CCUS sector is in its infancy and, to date, no significant facilities have been developed. As a result, it is referred to as a First of a Kind (“FOAK”) project. To facilitate the development, financing and deployment of CCUS technology, a robust regulatory landscape is required, coupled with effective funding support mechanisms. This includes the need to address the revenue uncertainty associated with demand risk from emitter connections. Further details on this can be found within Appendix I. The proposed regulatory framework aims to enable the sector’s development while contributing to net zero goals, with current proposals including a RAB-based model with revenue support to encourage initial investment and asset maintenance, anticipating evolution as technology and risks develop.

    Regulatory Financing Mechanisms

    Similar to the water and sewerage sector, the proposed regulatory RAB model for entities developing, owning, and operating CCUS transport and storage infrastructure (T&SCo) aims to provide long-term reliable revenues in order to secure the private sector funding necessary to construct the infrastructure and meet ongoing operational costs. The allowed revenue is determined similarly to other RAB models. DESNZ will initially administer this for CCUS before Ofgem takes over shortly after commercial operations begin. Despite the significant resources and time required to administer a RAB model, it is considered appropriate and effective for attracting private sector investment in T&SCo projects due to the anticipated limited number of such projects. Further details on how a RAB model operates can be found at Appendix H and Appendix I.

    Revenue Support Agreement

    Due to the uncertain uptake of CCUS technology in the early years, there is significant risk that T&SCos may not generate sufficient allowed revenue under the RAB model. To mitigate this risk, the regulatory structure includes a revenue support agreement, like CfDs in sectors such as offshore wind, until the market matures. The Low Carbon Contracts Company (LCCC) is the proposed counterparty to this agreement, responsible for covering any shortfall in actual revenue compared to the forecasted allowed revenue, thereby mitigating demand and revenue risk until the sector matures.

    The CCUS regulatory framework addresses risks associated with FOAK projects by combining previous regulatory support mechanisms and encouraging investment through long-term, predictable revenue for equity investors supported by a contract with LCCC. The RAB model ensures continual maintenance of assets by increasing allowed revenue to cover maintenance costs, promoting adequate net revenue and visibility for future projects. However, this amalgamation of support mechanisms is still in development and remains untested until large CCUS projects begin construction.

    Integration of regulatory models with heat networks

    For each model described above, the aim has been to provide an economic and financial environment that stimulates private sector investment and develops new infrastructure. Furthermore, it should be noted that such regimes and financial support have evolved over time depending on the maturity of the sector and UK Government’s priorities and policies.

    Each energy or utility sector is very different, with unique characteristics necessitating a bespoke approach to both regulation and financial support mechanisms. Such differences can include the maturity of the sector or technology intervention, including FOAK projects such as CCUS, nature of service provision (e.g. wholesale versus retail) such as electricity and water, the extent and maturity of regulation and the quantum of investment required.

    Furthermore, each sector will be heavily influenced by legislation, such as Section 92 of the HNSA that sets targets for the combined supply of thermal energy by heat networks, to reach 2.6 TWh by 2027 and 6 TWh by 2030.

    Offshore Wind – Contract for Differences (CfDs)

    The purpose, mechanism and award process for CfDs is very well understood and has proved very successful in securing the necessary investment in a wide range of renewable energy technologies, in particular Offshore Wind.

    CfDs have evolved over time. Its predecessor was ROCs, which were in place between 2002 and 2017, and before that the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligations (NFFOs) and Scottish Renewables Obligation (SRO) launched as early as 1990.

    CfDs’ primary purpose, like that of its predecessors, is to provide price assurance to the developer and associated investors in relation to each MWh of electricity generated and sold to the grid. In the majority of cases, the projects utilise proven technology such as Solar PV, On-Shore and Off-Shore Wind, together comprising c.96% of the CfD allocation within AR 6.

    Construction and availability risks are both borne by the developer. While offshore wind generation can be reliably estimated, heat networks depend on gradually increasing connections over time, introducing demand uncertainty. With Solar PV and On-Shore and Off-Shore wind generation, capacity broadly remains the same over the operational life of the asset. For these reasons, a CfD may not be an appropriate mechanism at this moment in time for managing the demand risk associated with heat networks, which is currently a key inhibitor to the deployment of more private sector funding.

    CfDs could however play a role in providing revenue support to those heat networks seeking to utilise decarbonised heat sources (other than industrial waste heat or heat from energy from waste plants). This type of mechanism could incentivise the transition from fossil-based heat sources (e.g. gas boilers) to more sustainable forms of heat generations (e.g. heat pumps). At present, residential customers are unlikely to be able to afford the increase in the cost of heat compared to conventional gas boilers or heat networks using waste heat.

    Household water & sewerage undertakers – RAB-based Model

    The RAB model utilised in the water sector, in conjunction with the associated price reviews, has proven to be an effective mechanism for encouraging investment and securing funding from the capital markets. This approach provides a tried and tested framework for recovering the costs of the investment over a period of time. This in turn encourages utilities to embark on much needed infrastructure development. Ofwat is also looking at new mechanisms such as Direct Procurement for Customers (DPC) for much larger scale capex projects.

    Integral to the regulation and application of the RAB based model, is management of the inter-generational risk of customer charges. This means today’s customers should not feel any greater financial burden from new investment than the customers in the future. In the water sector, utilities still bear the risks associated with inflation, construction and operation costs, interest rates and to a lesser degree demand and bad debt risk within England and Wales.

    The RAB model is widely used across sectors where revenue forecasting is relatively stable due to low demand risk. However, demand risk is highly uncertain for heat networks as a result of the uncertainty of connections. A key risk for potential investors is the heat network sector’s inability to manage demand risk and therefore a RAB model-based approach may not be a viable solution in the short term to incentivise investment. A RAB model could, however, play a key role in the regulation of the sector once it achieves critical mass and the impending regulation of the sector has had sufficient time to evolve and prove effective in the sector.

    Key considerations for any RAB model are the resources and time required to regulate a sector effectively. The model and associated regulation works effectively in the water sector not least due the limited number of water utilities (11). Given that the heat network sector will comprise thousands of heat networks of various sizes, a RAB model may not be practical for all projects unless projects are first consolidated on a regional basis, or are subject to a minimum MW size requirement prior to utilising a RAB model. We do understand, however, that the impending regulation of the heat network sector will focus on tariffs (regarding Value for Money) and customer service, but it is unclear whether this will extend to a RAB-based model approach.

    Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage (CCUS) – RAB Model and revenue support

    The CCUS programme comprises T&SCo projects and carbon capture technologies developed at industrial and Energy from Waste (EfW) facilities. They are at a very early stage in the development cycle and as such referred to as FOAK projects. Furthermore, CCUS projects are not only exposed to technology and construction risk (i.e. the technology is considered unproven at such scale) but also are exposed to significant demand risk as industrial and waste emitters decarbonise over time. Such connections to the T&SCo infrastructure are therefore uncertain. Heat network technology is relatively tried and tested, but the issue of timing and quantum of connections is the same dilemma for both the heat network sector and CCUS. The CCUS sector has had to adapt its regulatory framework to address the issue of “demand risk” not mitigated by utilisation of a RAB model alone. A combination of RAB model and revenue support helps mitigate demand risk within CCUS.

    This could potentially be largely replicated within heat networks, in particular to support the upfront capital expenditure. However, were this method to be adopted, extensive regulatory and legislative discussions would be required to ascertain a suitable counterparty to the revenue support mechanism. Furthermore, the positioning of who bears bad debt risk would need to be established. However, this risk is generally accepted within the water sector and arguably should be no different for heat networks. While this combination of regulatory support is planned for CCUS, it remains an untested regime with the potential for inefficiencies. This is particularly the case for heat networks given the limitations of a RAB model identified above.

    Alternative regulatory structures for heat networks could include offering grants to offset upfront costs and revenue support mechanism to mitigate demand risk. This and other combinations of mechanisms, such as a cap on payments to reduce the risk of over-incentivising, could incentivise investment in heat networks without too great a departure from regulatory norms.

    Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) specifically for heat networks

    It may be possible to develop a RHI specific to heat networks. This could bridge the price gap between gas and electric networks whilst encouraging investment. The RHI was a UK Government financial support scheme designed to encourage the uptake of renewable heat technologies. Since 31 March 2021 it has been closed for new applicants. A similar type of incentive for the deployment of heat networks would aim to promote the development and expansion of the sector and could include the features listed in Table 4.

    Table 4: Summary of features for a potential RHI-type heat network incentive

    Feature

    Description

    Tariff payments

    Operators or users could receive periodic payments based on the amount of low carbon heat generated and supplied per MWh, which could be guaranteed for a period of time (usually quarterly payments over 20 years) to improve financial viability of projects.

    Eligible technologies

    The incentive could cover a range of renewable heat generation technologies that can be integrated into heat networks.

    Tiered tariffs

    A tiered tariff structure to encourage efficient operation which pays a higher rate up to a certain level of heat output and a lower rate beyond that could be implemented to incentivise operators to size systems appropriately and manage demand.

    Upfront capital support

    In addition to ongoing tariff payments, grants or loans to aid cover upfront capital expenditure would reduce the financial barriers to entry.

    Performance standards

    To qualify for the incentive, certain performance and efficiency standards would have to be met.

    Metering and monitoring

    Accurate metering of heat production and consumption would be required in order to calculate incentive payments.

    Support for innovation

    Additional funding could be made available for projects which demonstrate new technologies or business models helping the sectors development.

    An RHI-type incentive in heat networks would aim to stimulate market growth and help achieve net zero emissions through the integration of carbon-based fuels to renewable energy. It could provide a financial impetus for the adoption of heat networks and making them an attractive option for developers, local authorities and consumers particularly if coupled with grants.

    Stakeholder insight

    This section summarises stakeholder feedback from the stakeholder interview exercise. The methodology underpinning this exercise is set out in Section 3.3. Stakeholder feedback also informed conclusions in other sections of this report, including:

    • Overall views and attractiveness of the sector
    • Key investment risks
    • Key initiatives that are required to move to a predominantly privately financed model

    The private sector views heat networks as an attractive investment opportunity. However, there are areas of uncertainty that must be resolved, including the need for greater clarity on the development of future regulation. To facilitate private investment, stakeholders highlighted the need for continued grant funding support (which will help de-risk project cashflows), clear regulation on key areas such as zoning and mandatory connections, and clear direction on future policy banning carbon-based heat systems. Table 5 below summarises the detailed views of each stakeholder group.

    Table 5: Stakeholder Engagement Summary

    Stakeholder Group

    How attractive is the sector?

    What are the key sector investment risks?

    What are the key initiatives that are required to move to a predominantly privately financed model?

    Capital orientated stakeholders

    Operators

    Operators see significant interest from private infrastructure investors. However, there are concerns that private sector investment may move to other asset classes if the government does not provide certainty on future regulation and continue to financially support the sector.

    The main observations from operators were:

  • Demand assurance risk – Uncertainty in cash flows due to lack of contracted revenue.

  • Development risk – Unforeseen issues arising during construction leading to cost overruns and delays.

  • Lack of regulation around statutory undertaking of rights – A barrier exists for the wide scale roll out when operators need to negotiate with each individual landowner rather than having a licence for the full network.

  • Scale of expansion – key strategic projects that support the overall development of the sector should be targeted for support rather than small stand-alone projects.

  • Consumer hearts and minds – Low carbon technology is a more expensive alternative than existing carbon-based technology. Consumers need incentives to adopt the technology.

  • Without continued support, zoning/permitting and regulation are insufficient to improve deployment of heat networks alone.

  • Operators would prefer aligned regulation between Scotland and UK Government.

  • The sector is likely to be primarily financed from developers’ balance sheets.

  • Mandatory connections are a key enabler for development.

  • Grant funding drawdown needs to be flexible to align with project needs.
    • Continued public sector support with extended funding round periods.
    • Long term political support is required.
    • Financial support to facilitate connections.
    • Regulation to address policy gaps including clarity on mandatory connections.
    • Clearer regulation on the decarbonisation of the sector (e.g. phasing out gas boilers).

    Private capital / infrastructure funds

    The sector is attractive to investors, with stable recurring cashflows.

    There is a clear growth opportunity in the UK.

    The main observations from private capital stakeholders were:

  • The pace of regulation needs to increase to bring clarity to the sector.

  • Limited and smaller investment opportunities: Projects with capital costs exceeding £10m are more attractive investment opportunities for funders. This means that larger city scale projects are typically prioritised by funders.

  • Local authority communication and collaboration – On local authority led projects there needs to be clear planning and alignment for projects coming to market between all parties. Investors need clarity on the timing of capital deployment to help them assess investment opportunities effectively.

  • There is uncertainty regarding the phasing out of carbon based heating solutions (e.g. gas boilers), making it difficult for investors to take a strong position in the sector.
    • Continued grant funding support that matches the needs and requirements of the projects.
    • Clear regulation around zoning/permitting and mandatory connections.
    • Clearer regulation on the decarbonisation of the sector (e.g. phasing out gas boilers).

    Policy Banks

    The sector is an attractive investment opportunity however the current market is lacking large commercially ready projects where policy banks can invest.


    • There is ample capital to deploy but limited commercially ready projects to finance.

    • Project scale – Project must be of sufficient size (e.g. £25m+ investment) and therefore, there are fewer investment opportunities in Scottish compared to rUK.
    • Continued grant funding support is needed that also matches project timelines and requirements.
    • Providing connection cost funding to enable public sector anchor loads.

    Non-capital orientated stakeholders

    Commercial Advisors

    Established heat networks are viewed favourably by the private sector. The characteristics are similar to a bond therefore attractive to institutional investors.

    Observations from commercial advisors included:

  • Procurement structures – Operators and investors need clarity on ownership and risk-reward responsibilities in joint ventures with public sector to assess and manage project risks.

  • Carbon based alternatives are still cheaper for consumers. Consumers need incentivised to adopt clean heat networks needs to improve.

  • Market uncertainty via a lack of regulatory clarity. For example, clarity on mandatory connections.
    • Continued public sector grant support that matches project timelines and needs.

    Legal Advisors

    Less appetite from lenders in early-stage heat networks due to uncertainty of payback.

    Key observations from legal advisors included:

  • There is market uncertainty due to lack of regulatory clarity. The market needs greater regulatory alignment with England and Wales.

  • Demand assurance – Stability of revenue streams is crucial to investors.

  • There are too many procurement models from lenders’ perspective. They want a small list of possible approaches which provides familiarity and reduces development costs.

  • The current funding windows of grant support are too narrow and do not align to project development needs.

  • Property rights are difficult to navigate due to the potential disruption associated with construction of heat networks.
    • Continued public sector support in the form of Capex funding and/or revenue support to help provide assurance to lenders in the early stages of a heat network.
    • Public sector support for facilitating connection fees.
    • Clear regulation around zoning and mandatory connections.

    Private capital and operator stakeholders were also asked specific questions regarding financial returns, types of financing, key financial metrics and shareholder structure. A summary of responses for each subcategory is provided below.

    • Rates of return: Stakeholders gave a consistent view of the minimum internal rate of return (IRR) requirement range for heat network developments. This was between 8% and 12% depending on a project’s specific risk profile (which can vary significantly). For example, established trunk/core developments can have lower IRR where demand assurance and contracted revenues are satisfied, while a higher IRR is required on expansions to make the developments feasible and appropriately mitigate risk.
    • Types of financing: Stakeholders unanimously agreed operators would likely use their own balance sheet for financing the short to medium term. Private Equity funds and infrastructure funds would predominantly continue to use equity to invest in the heat network sector. For the reasons outlined in earlier sections, the existing barriers around demand and revenue uncertainty limits debt investment in the sector.
    • Financial metrics: Stakeholders noted that they have certain size requirements when investing and deploying capital. For those stakeholders investing in the sector, the minimum investment required ranged from £10m to £25m+. These stakeholders highlighted this can limit their involvement in Scotland as, compared with rUK, there are fewer projects that meet their investment scale requirements. However, stakeholders did say this issue could be mitigated by investing in multiple projects rather one large project.
    • Scale: Similarly, stakeholders commented that rUK offers more opportunity due to the number of large city scale projects available. Scotland offers significant potential for large city scale networks but the greater number of cities and urban areas in the rest of the UK is more appealing as it offers more connection opportunities and a greater customer base.
    • Shareholder structure: Private capital and operator stakeholders were open to collaborating with Local Authorities in a Joint Venture structure; however, they flagged key legal areas that would need additional scrutiny. For example, clear roles and responsibilities regarding asset risk and reward.

    As illustrated by the stakeholder engagement, stakeholder subgroups all highlighted similar risks and themes and what support mechanisms exist for the heat network sector. The engagement exercise identified key issues and barriers that must be addressed to attract private sector investment. The exercise has therefore helped inform our recommendations as set out in the next section.

    Recommendations

    Summary

    The evidence from this report indicates that the Scottish heat network sector is still maturing and, in the short to medium term, requires significant financial support from the public sector. In the medium to long term, we also recommend models for securing private sector finance and for scaling and speeding up the roll out of large heat networks in Scotland.

    Figure 11 summarises our recommendations, indicating the suggested timeframe and expected impact of each.

    Figure 11: The impact of mechanisms over time

    A graph showing the suggested time frame and expected impact of different policy mechanisms, coloured green to indicate existing mechanisms and orange to indicate new mechanisms
    Source: EY analysis

    Recommendations for rollout of mechanisms or policy initiatives

    The recommendations are explored in more detail below.

    Recommendation 1

    The Scottish Government should maintain capital funding support for the sector through existing programmes or new bespoke capital schemes. The Scottish Government should also explore opportunities for extending grant funding drawdown timescales.

    Timescales – short to medium term e.g. 1-10 years

    This recommendation addresses barriers related to high capital costs, demand uncertainty and long development and construction times.

    • Stakeholders unanimously agreed that the large-scale deployment of heat networks requires continued public support. There is also precedent from other emerging countries to support the sector in this way.
    • Future grant funding programmes must reflect a heat network’s significant development and construction timescales. The Scottish Government aims to avoid piecemeal developments and the development of large-scale heat networks can be significantly longer than the existing grant funding windows. Although cross party support for the sector exists, the Scottish Government could consider secondary legislation which extends timescales. This would provide long term certainty to the market. However, we recognise government funding and budgetary restrictions will make this challenging. We also note that current schemes have open funding windows and seek to create as much flexibility as possible for applicants. Further sub-recommendations could also be considered including:
      • Reducing intervention rates. The level of grant support is subject to numerous factors, but any grant support should be sized to provide developers with a reasonable project IRR (noting that this is already standard practice). This will help support a greater number of projects, with lower levels of capital. There is precedent from the GHNF for lower levels of support, but differences between the GHNF and SHNF must be considered (including the varying volume of applications received through both programmes and different assessment criteria).
      • Targeting intervention at specific geographical areas or aligning with local regional strategies. This could include aligning support to regional zoning activity or targeting support at specific geographic areas where there are significant opportunities for future heat networks.
      • Target grant funding in other ways, for example, to support connection fees and/or enabling costs for end users of new residential areas. There is international precedent for this, including grant support to incentivise anchor loads. Further support for the public sector to meet connection fees could also be considered. Public Sector enabling costs are already supported through the Green Public Sector Estate Decarbonisation Scheme.
      • Grant funding could be exclusively targeted at district heating projects rather than smaller communal heating schemes.

    Recommendation 2

    Our review has found that de-risking future revenues is key to unlocking HN development – private capital is available for projects of this scale, but it must be financeable. Our initial analysis therefore concludes that more detailed analysis of a revenue support model, such as Contracts for Difference (CfD) or a Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) equivalent, is merited. However, the Scottish Government must address the challenges of establishing such schemes, described below.

    Timescale – Medium 5+ years

    This recommendation addresses the barriers associated with demand uncertainty.

    In section 6 we review the benefits of these models in the context of other relevant utility sectors. However, there are additional factors that the Scottish Government must consider before pursing this further. For example, it must consider the significant administrative and resource costs of establishing such schemes. Additionally, constrained revenue budgets mean that the creation of a new revenue model will represent a significant budgetary challenge for the Scottish Government. Lastly, with differences in regulation, policy and powers, the Scottish Government must also consider how a revenue model could be introduced in isolation from the rest of the UK. Additional CfD and RHI considerations are summarised below:

    1. Contracts for Difference – Although this is a well-established model, certain complexities must be resolved before it can be deployed in the sector:
      • Calculating a reference price – heat prices are bespoke, and cannot be benchmarked to a national market price, unless there is regulation on the price of heat. This must be explored further before the model can be introduced.
      • Generation versus consumption – a CfD should be based on the generation of heat, rather than consumption of heat. This will help mitigate demand risk, as the model is not reliant on future unknown connections to the heat network.
      • The CfD could also subsidise the additional capital cost of installing expensive clean heat network technology.
      • Additionally, the higher cost of underlying electricity (compared to gas) could be mitigated and passed on to customers thereby reducing price risk. However, before introducing an alternative mechanism to grant funding, the CfD cost (compared to the level of grant) must be further understood.
    2. RHI model – The RHI model is another well understood revenue support model, which has previously been used in the heat network sector. However, previous RHI schemes have been criticised, for example, the National Audit Office stated the UK Government did not achieve value for money.

    RHI subsidises the cost of heat generated from clean heat networks, compared to alternative forms of heat generation. However, complexities remain that must be addressed before it can be deployed:

      • Generation versus consumption – Similar to CfD, an RHI model would need to be based on the amount of heat generated, rather than consumption of heat, and would therefore act as a contribution to the cost of deployment. It would help to address the increased cost of installing a more expensive heat network technology, and at the same time mitigate demand risk.
      • A payment cap could be introduced to avoid over-incentivisation within the sector.
      • Before adopting an alternative to grant funding, the RHI cost (compared to the level of grant) must be thoroughly assessed.

    Recommendation 3

    Following further regulatory developments and the creation of an established asset base (possibly 10-15 years), the Scottish Government could explore the benefits of implementing a RAB model.

    Timescale – Long term e.g. 10 years +

    This recommendation addresses barriers associated with consumer experience and regulatory uncertainty.

    • The RAB model (coupled with price reviews) has been shown to be helpful in protecting consumer prices whilst encouraging ongoing investment and maintaining assets.
    • However, the cost and resource implications of administering RAB models across a large number of very diverse projects will be significant. This may be mitigated through minimum generation requirements, but this must be explored further. EY and many stakeholders agreed that a RAB model may be appropriate / beneficial in 10-15+ years but only after certain market characteristics are met.
    • The Scottish Government must assess the feasibility of developing a Scottish RAB model, which may diverge from the approach in England and Wales.
    • A transition from one regulatory mechanism to another could occur in the future. However, for this to occur, the sector must mature and must focus on large scale capital investment. This will impact whether a RAB model alone could be introduced to provide consumer protection or whether it will need to be supported with a revenue support mechanism. Furthermore, the market must be economically feasible (meaning the sector is more mature and financially viable) to regulate the assets themselves prior to introducing a RAB model.
    • Importantly, without capital or revenue support, a RAB model will not by itself result in a financially viable heat network. It would therefore need to be coupled with other support mechanisms, as pioneered by CCUS. This reinforces the requirement to pursue short term sector support, including public sector capital funding.

    Recommendation 4

    SNIB and the UK National Wealth Fund are committed to investing in the sector. The Scottish Government must continue to work closely with these organisations in order to explore investment opportunities, create a shared understanding of each party’s objectives and ultimately unlock the capital that has been made available to invest.

    Timescales – short term e.g. now -1 year

    This recommendation addresses the barriers associated with access to funding.

    • The Scottish Government must also consider infrastructure bank restrictions, including who they can support (e.g. local authorities) and minimum lending requirements.

    Recommendation 5

    The Scottish Government should maintain and increase support for pre-construction projects, via the Heat Network Support Unit (HNSU) and specific development funding programmes.

    Timescales – short term e.g. 1-2 years

    This recommendation addresses the barriers associated with access to funding.

    • To support the sector’s development a strong pipeline of projects is required. In Scotland, and across the UK, there are a growing number of pre-construction projects that require commercialisation support.
    • All stakeholders commented on the need for improved funding to develop heat networks until there are sufficient cashflows enabling networks to support themselves and attract other forms of funding.
    • This could include expanding the role of the HNSU to take a more active development role similar to the UK Government’s Heat Network Delivery Unit. However, the HNSU would require additional resources and financial support before it could expand its remit.
    • The Scottish Government could also consider engaging with national development banks, e.g. SNIB or the NWF to co-develop development funding programmes.

    Recommendation 6

    The Sottish Government should monitor the implementation of the UK Government’s zoning approach, and where appropriate, leverage best practice from DESNZ. This should be used to compliment Scotland’s existing zoning approach.

    Timescales – short term e.g. 1-2 years

    This recommendation addresses the barriers associated with demand uncertainty.

    • Robust zoning regulations, with mandatory connections will help reduce demand risk and support private sector investment. Ultimately this will support the roll out of larger heat networks at scale by reducing demand uncertainty for operators and investors.
    • Regional Zones, across local authority boundaries, could be used to identify area of high heat demand, and key heat sources.
    • These proposals could leverage the Advanced Zoning Programme (AZP) model adopted by DESNZ, where pilot heat network zones have been identified to supply.
    • The HNSA creates the opportunity for local authorities and the Scottish Government (in some cases) to designate zones. This should be explored in more detail, including the number of zones required in Scotland. The Scottish Government could also use this route to create larger strategic zones across Scotland.
    • However, zoning proposals must account for heat costs and the risk that consumers are forced to connect to a heat source that is more expensive than alternatives.
    • The Scottish Government must also consider that its limited resources will reduce its ability to replicate the regulatory developments in England and Wales.

    Recommendation 7

    We recommend that Scottish Government reviews its regulatory approach to help reduce regulatory uncertainty, simplify delivery and align with the wider UK framework where appropriate.

    Timescales – short term e.g. 1-2 years

    This recommendation addresses the barriers associated with regulatory uncertainty.

    • The introduction of secondary legislation, including further details on consenting and authorisation, will help to reduce the existing uncertainty in the market.
    • The lack of standardisation in procurement approaches and delivery models adds complexity, time and cost to a project’s development timeline. The Scottish Government should accelerate its activity to provide more clarity to the market. The UK Government is also developing its delivery models. The Scottish Government could consider aligning with the UK Government approach to ensure a consistent landscape for the private sector.
    • As part of the Advance Zoning Programme for Heat Networks in England, DESNZ issued template delivery model guidance for the procurement of Heat Network delivery partners. The purpose this is to assist project sponsors in the identification of opportunities for the acceleration of the scale and pace of zonal heat network delivery. Template documentation provides greater clarity in the marketplace leading to quicker and more effective procurement processes, improving market appetite and reducing bidder fatigue. The guidance for the promoters of AZP projects sets out the principles of three potential delivery models and sets out the characteristics to consider when determining the delivery model to adopt. This includes Development Agreements, the Golden Share and Co-investor models.

    Recommendation 8

    We recommend that the Scottish Government continues to work with the UK Government on rebalancing electricity and gas prices; however, this will not eliminate the price difference between electricity and gas.

    Timescale – Medium 5+ years. However, the Scottish Government does not have the developed powers to implement this recommendation by itself, and therefore further discussions with the UK Government are required.

    This recommendation addresses the barriers associated with structured pricing challenges.

    • The UK Government is continuing to explore opportunities for rebalancing electricity and gas prices, to reduce electricity costs and support the affordability of clean heat networks for consumers. This initiative is not a devolved matter, so the Scottish Government should continue to work with the UK Government on the proposals. If unsuccessful, a revenue support model should be considered as an alternative to address pricing risk.

    Recommendation 9

    The Scottish Government should develop a national Heat Network Strategy setting out a long-term vision for Scotland’s heat networks.

    Timescales – short term e.g. 1-2 years

    This recommendation addresses multiple barriers.

    • Not only will this help provide further clarity and confidence to the private sector, but it will also help to educate and explain the benefits of heat networks to the wider Scottish public.
    • This view was shared by specific stakeholders and mirrors the recently published Scottish Renewables Heat Network Vision.
    • This strategy could also leverage the Scottish Futures Trust (SFT) analysis on sector delivery models which could accelerate the pace and scale of heat network deployment in Scotland.
    • Additionally, the strategy should provide:
      • Clarity on national and regional Heat Network implementation, crossing local authority boundaries.
      • A strategy for future public sector support, including where and how grant funding, should be targeted. This should also include Scottish Government’s external commitment and its ability to invest in the sector.
      • Inform the ongoing development and implementation of regulation.
      • Plans for engaging with the UK Government on recommendations reserved to the UK Government, e.g. structural pricing plans.

    Appendices

    Appendix A – Financing mechanisms

    There are a number of financing mechanisms that the Scottish Government could utilise to help de-risk heat network investments. These mechanisms, or “financial levers”, could increase the attractiveness of heat network projects to private investors and ultimately increase the pace and scale of their deployment. They may achieve this through reducing investment hurdle rates (by decreasing risk), increasing gearing levels to reduce the overall cost of capital and/or improving the project’s IRR to meet the investors’ thresholds. However, the need for these levers and the decision on which (if any) to employ, will vary from project to project and these factors should be assessed as part of the financial structuring of a project.

    The financial levers available to Scottish Government can be broadly grouped into the following categories:

    • Capital funding;
    • Revenue funding;
    • Investment; and
    • Business model support.

    The need for these levers and the decision on which (if any) to employ, will vary from project to project and these factors should be assessed as part of the financial structuring of a project. This section will summarise the key elements of these funding mechanisms and discuss their implications for resource demand, balance sheet treatment and exist strategy.

    Capital funding

    Capital funding uses capital budgets to provide gap funding for heat networks. This may be in the form of, for example, a capital grant or repayable assistance.

    Capital grant

    Capital Grants are allocated to fund activities aligned with government priorities, benefiting public or private entities that contribute to specific public outcomes. These grants come with conditions that must be met to avoid repayment obligations. In Scotland, Repayable Assistance is typically preferred over Capital Grants for heat networks, with the possibility of repayment if profitability exceeds expectations. Administering Capital Grants demands significant resources, particularly during application assessment, construction monitoring and post-commissioning for a period of 3-5 years. The treatment of Capital Grants on balance sheets depends on various factors, including the grant’s size and terms, which may affect asset classification. After fulfilling all grant conditions, the grantee is released from obligations, but the grantor may benefit from maintaining a relationship for continued data access and to support future expansions.

    Repayable assistance

    Repayable Assistance functions similarly to Capital Grants, with the distinction that it must be repaid partially or in full if the project exceeds certain performance-related thresholds in the initial years of operation. This mechanism is designed to prevent grantees from benefiting excessively from public subsidies. Managing Repayable Assistance requires additional resource to evaluate and challenge financial returns and reports from grantees. The treatment of Repayable Assistance on the balance sheet is comparable to that of Capital Grants, with the classification determined by the delivery model, the proportion of Repayable Assistance to total capital costs of the project and the terms of risk allocation. The exit strategy involves ceasing monitoring once grant conditions are satisfied, which may take longer than for Capital Grants.

    Revenue funding

    Certain financial levers utilise revenue budgets to fund heat networks, such as revenue grants, heat purchase agreements (or demand guarantees) and outcomes-based funding.

    Revenue grant

    Revenue Grants fund activities that support government priorities and public benefits, with both public and private entities eligible as grantees. In Scotland, Revenue Grants have often been combined with Repayable Assistance and, from an investor perspective, can help mitigate revenue risk which is one of the most significant barriers to heat network investment. The grants, which are not typically repayable unless certain grant conditions are not met, can be performance-linked to ensure drawdowns align with financial need. The administration of Revenue Grants can be resource-intensive, as they require stringent monitoring across the project lifecycle. The treatment of these grants on government balance sheets is influenced by several factors, including the grants’ size and the delivery model. After fulfilling grant conditions, which may take many years, the grantor’s monitoring ceases, but a continued relationship with the grantee can be beneficial for gathering data and supporting future expansions.

    Heat purchase

    Heat Network developers require a level of assurance to ensure there will be a sufficient customer-base to make their investment viable. This assurance is crucial as it influences the decision to invest and the capacity to future-proof networks for anticipated demand growth. Anchor loads (significant heat demands that are likely to be the first connections to the heat network, typically large public buildings with sustained high heat demand) are essential for making networks investable. The Scottish Government could provide demand assurance through mechanisms such as Heat Purchase Agreements, where public buildings are offered as anchor loads without a guaranteed minimum demand and Demand Guarantees, which involve a “take or pay” commitment for a minimum quantity of heat.

    These agreements require resources for due diligence, negotiation and ongoing monitoring, often requiring specialist expertise and governance to effectively manage the associated risks. The balance sheet treatment of these agreements may lead to on-balance-sheet classification of project assets, if risk transfer is diluted. The exit strategy for such agreements is to have a fixed contract term, after which they can be re-procured or renegotiated, with “take or pay” guarantees being time-bound and including withdrawal clauses under certain conditions, such as when sufficient third-party demand is secured.

    Outcomes based funding

    Outcomes based funding is a financial mechanism that focuses on achieving specific, pre-agreed outcomes rather than outputs. It operates on the principle of “payment by results”, where organisations (typically local authorities, though could also apply to a private company) invest in infrastructure to deliver set outcomes. If these outcomes are met, Scottish Government would make regular payments over a set period, reflecting the pre-agreed value of the outcomes achieved. For example, these outcomes may be successful commissioning of the heat network, the number of heat network connections, carbon savings and/or the social value created. This model shares risk between the organisation and the government, however it is resource-intensive, requiring careful project selection, development and ongoing monitoring to ensure that the agreed outcomes are met. While it may not be efficient for smaller projects due to the resources needed for monitoring, Outcomes Based Funding can support infrastructure without being classified on the Scottish Government’s balance sheet, if the delivery risk is fully transferred to the grantee. The monitoring period is predefined, often spanning 20-25 years, with revenue payments contingent on achieving these outcomes.

    Investment

    Equity

    Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) are often formed for infrastructure projects. SPVs allow for project assets and risks to be held within the vehicle itself and enable investors to make more targeted investments into specific asset classes that align with their desired risk/return profiles. SPVs require one or more shareholders to own the company, appoint its board of directors and provide the necessary funding, typically through equity or shareholder loans as subordinated debt. These SPVs can be solely owned by one entity or jointly owned by multiple organisations, which may include a mix of public and private sector shareholders and can also take the form of corporate joint ventures.

    The Scottish Government can participate in SPVs as an equity investor, either independently or in collaboration with private sector partners. This model affords Scottish Government a degree of control over the project’s strategic direction and the opportunity to share in the profits, but also exposes government to the associated investment risks. In heat network projects, government might invest in the network’s distribution assets and later recoup this investment through ‘use of system’ fees from other parties utilising the network. Managing such equity investments requires a long-term commitment and specialised expertise in investment structuring, due diligence and governance, ensuring that the government’s interests and public funds are appropriately safeguarded. The impact of these investments on the government’s balance sheet is influenced by the degree of control the government has as a shareholder, the size of the equity stake and the risk transfer mechanisms in place. In terms of exit strategies, the Scottish Government could sell its equity stake in the SPV once the project reaches a stage of profitable operation, allowing for the recycling of capital into other projects.

    Debt finance

    Debt finance is a financing mechanism where the government lends money to public or private sector borrowers, who are then obligated to repay the loan with interest according to the terms set out in a loan agreement. There are three key features of debt financing: the seniority of the debt, which determines the order of repayments from project cash flows between debt and equity holders; the security of loans, which may be secured or unsecure; and financial covenants that serve as safeguards for the lender by monitoring the borrower’s financial health and triggering repayment in case of covenant breaches.

    Scottish Government could establish a revolving loan facility aimed at supporting projects during their riskier construction and early operational stages, with the possibility of refinancing by the private sector once more stable operations are achieved. This approach facilitates the recycling of capital into new projects and aligns with the preferences of long-term investors seeking lower-risk opportunities. Administering such finance requires significant resources for project selection, development and monitoring, with the balance sheet treatment determined by factors such as loan terms, size and risk. The exit strategy allows for the recovery of investments through repayments or refinancing, potentially leading to capital receipts that can be reinvested or the sale of loan portfolios to investors, thus enabling ongoing economic development.

    Loan guarantee

    A Loan Guarantee by the Scottish Government provides a safety net over debt repayments to lenders, covering either the entire loan or a portion, with the aim of reducing the cost of capital for borrowers, such as heat network developers. This can make investments more feasible and enable access to loans that might otherwise be unavailable due to risk considerations. While initially having limited budgetary impact, provided the risk of the guarantee being called upon is low, there are Subsidy Control implications that may be offset by charging a fee for the guarantee. Implementing a Loan Guarantee scheme requires resources for design, project assessment, due diligence and ongoing monitoring, requiring specialist expertise and governance to manage financial and reputational risks. The balance sheet treatment of a Loan Guarantee is influenced by various factors, including the delivery model and the size and terms of the guarantee. The Scottish Government’s exit strategy involves offering guarantees for a specific term with withdrawal clauses, allowing for the possibility of refinancing and withdrawing the guarantee once the project is operational and profitable.

    Business Model Support

    This section outlines common business model support mechanisms in the UK, such as Regulated Asset Base, Cap and Floor and Contracts for Difference, which could potentially be adapted for heat networks. These Business Model Supports would draw upon revenue budgets to heat networks. While these models are theoretically adaptable, they face significant challenges that require careful consideration to tailor them to the heat network sector.

    Regulated asset base

    A RAB is a regulatory framework that measures the capital used in a regulated entity, where companies are granted a licence by an economic regulator to charge users regulated prices for services linked to an infrastructure asset (operating on a “user pays” model). The regulator sets or caps the charges that the operator can levy for a certain period, reducing pricing risk for investors and ensuring charges allow for the efficient recovery of costs incurred by the operator in the interest of customers. Charges can be controlled through a revenue cap, which protects investors from both price and market existence/demand risk, or a price cap, which only shields from price risk.

    Hybrid RAB models, combining a price cap with government cash injections, are being explored for Carbon Capture, Transport and Storage infrastructure to mitigate market existence/demand risk. The RAB operator’s prices are calculated to enable recovery of operating expenditure, depreciation costs and an allowed return on capital, balancing risk reduction for investors with cost-efficiency incentives. Charges are reviewed and reset periodically by the regulator in consultation with the operator and customers, protecting investors from subsidy risk within each regulatory period. If applied to heat networks, a RAB model could significantly shield investors from price and market existence risks. However, current regulatory and policy frameworks for heat networks are not conducive to the model’s deployment at this time.

    Cap and floor

    The cap and floor mechanism aims to offer investors a degree of revenue certainty while maintaining incentives for efficient operation. The floor guarantees a minimum revenue, covering at least operating costs and senior debt service, thus limiting investors’ risk and enabling financing. Conversely, the cap sets a maximum revenue, with any excess being repaid, limiting the investors’ returns.

    A revenue sharing arrangement can be incorporated, where excess revenue is split between investors and user/taxpayers, rather than being fully retained by investors or returned to funders. The mechanism’s terms, including cap and floor levels and the applicable period, are contractually agreed, reducing subsidy risk as the support cannot be abruptly withdrawn. This arrangement mitigates price risk and market existence/demand risk by assuring minimum revenue, independent of demand, although it does not protect against cost variability.

    Currently utilised by Ofgem for financing electricity interconnectors and considered for electricity storage in the UK, the mechanism is funded by electricity users or, alternatively, could adopt a ‘taxpayer pays’ model with government involvement. For heat networks, while ‘Cap and Floor’ offers some risk protection, it requires careful implementation to avoid disincentivising network operators from acquiring new customers or charging competitive rates. Additionally, the ‘taxpayer pays’ model could lead to significant financial exposure for the Scottish Government.

    Contracts for difference

    CfDs are a support mechanism that offers investors a fixed, contractually agreed ‘strike price’ per unit of output. This helps to mitigate potential subsidy risk for investors due to the subsidy being a binding, contractual obligation. The strike price may be fixed or index-linked and CfDs can be signed with the government or a government-backed third party, with funding from taxpayers or users. The ‘reference price’, generally the market price, determines the subsidy level during each CfD period, with investors receiving a subsidy if the market price is below the strike price, or paying back if it’s above. This support incentivises operational efficiency, as investors are exposed to cost variability risk and only receive support once the project is operational.

    Although CfDs are used extensively for renewable electricity generation in the UK, applying this mechanism to heat networks poses challenges. It is difficult to define a reference price due to the absence of a wholesale heat market and the localised nature of heat network pricing, which relies on local factors such as the availability of low carbon heat sources and customer demand. Without regulated heat pricing or an accepted methodology for setting a wholesale price, the application of CfDs to heat networks remains complex.

    Appendix B – International experience supplementary information

    The supplementary narrative below provides a brief historical overview, a summary of the public financing levers available and a summary of the regulatory framework for each country. Additionally, the supplementary narrative is followed by additional information regarding the use of state-owned infrastructure banks.

    Rest of the UK (rUK)

    Overview

    Heat network technology has been in the UK since the 1950s where the Pimlico District Heating Undertaking was the first true district heat network in the UK. The network connected 1,600 council homes to the waste heat generated by Battersea Power Station. However, heat networks fell out of popularity in the 1980s and 1990s as the UK shifted away from high rise flats but regained attention in the 2000s as energy prices increased and financial investment cases became more attractive[24].

    Public financing levers:

    The UK Government is aligned with international comparators offering up front capital grants in addition to grants for existing underperforming heat networks to encourage efficiency upgrades. These are as follows:

    England and Wales have a designated heat network fund, the GHNF which was set up by DESNZ and managed by Triple Point Heat Networks Investment Management[25]. The GHNF is the next iteration of grant funding succeeding the Heat Networks Investment Project (HNIP) loans. The GHNF aims to provide up to 50% of upfront construction costs with the aim of making projects more investable for private sector. The GHNF initially had £288m of capital available but further funds of £485m has been additionally allocated.[26]

    DESNZ has also recently published the Heat Network Efficiency Scheme (HNES)[27] which provides both capital grants to part fund installation and revenue grants to fund procurement or mobilisation of external third-party support to carry out Optimisation Studies. This scheme is targeting existing district heating or communal heating projects in England and Wales that are operating sub-optimally and resulting in poor outcomes for customers and operators.

    Regulatory structures

    Refer to section 4.2 for the UK regulatory structure overview.

    Market ownership

    The rest of the UK has a mixed market ownership profile with local authority owned, joint ventures and privately owned heat networks. For example, The London Borough of Enfield own the Energetik heat network, a growing network with its own energy from waste plant providing the heat for the network. Vattenfall own Bristol City’s heat network and work in partnership with Argent and Barnet council[28]. There are also private equity backed heat network developers such as 1Energy backed by Asper Investment who have four projects under development, including the Bradford Energy Network. Local authority budget constraints will mean a continued role for private sector involvement. For example, the UK Government’s routes to market proposals focus on the Concession and Joint Venture models.

    The Netherlands

    Overview

    The Netherlands started exploring district heating in the 1920s, but the sector developed significantly following the 1970s oil crisis which prompted a search for more efficient and sustainable heating solutions. The country has since been expanding its heat network infrastructure, focusing on sustainability and the use of residual heat from industrial processes.

    Public financing levers

    The Netherlands is expanding its heat network market by providing capital grants for qualifying projects and incentivising individuals to connect to heat network via individual grants.

    This includes the Heat Networks Investment Grant (referred to as the WIS programme), which supports the construction of new, efficient heat networks. This €400m programme was open between July 2024 and December 2024 and specifically targeted heat networks that help existing homes transition away from natural gas (capped at €30m available per project). The programme funds up to 45% of capital costs and aims to bridge the ‘unprofitable top’ of heating network investments (the difference between the eligible investment costs and the operating profit)[29]. The subsidy can never be more than 100% of this ‘unprofitable top’. WIS can provide support to full projects as well as individual consumers, as it also provides up to €7,000 for small scale consumer connections.

    Regulatory structure

    The sector has been regulated in the Netherlands since 2014. The legislation was updated with the 2020 Heat Act 2.0, which outlines the requirements for creating a reliable, affordable and sustainable sector. The Act oversees pricing (including price regulation for smaller customers), licensing, private sector profits and customer protections. The Act also sets price caps to ensure that all heat network operators provide price information in a standard format, allowing for greater transparency to consumers.[30] Regarding tariff setting, the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) ensures that costs for a household with a district heat connection are less than an individual condensing gas boiler.[31]

    The Netherlands is also developing the Collective Heat Supply Act which aims to bring the heat network sector into public ownership. The Act will look to incorporate a ‘cost plus’ model where tariffs are based on actual cost plus a reasonable regulated rate of return[32]. However, the Act still needs to finalise ownership arrangements between heat generating companies and operators.

    Additionally, the Netherlands mandates connections. Municipalities are required to prepare heat plans for their respective areas. This specifies that new buildings have to be connected to a heat network for ten years as part of a heat plan.31 Furthermore, the Dutch Building Code states that a house will get a mandatory connection to a heat network when the network is within 40 metres.

    Lastly, the Netherlands amended the Gas Act in 2018 to ban new buildings from connecting to the gas grid and introduced a new incentive scheme (SDE+). SDE+ provides subsidies to companies which generate renewable energy or reduce their CO2 emissions on a large scale. Similarly, the Netherlands will ban new fossil fuel-based heating systems from 2026.[33]

    Market ownership

    The Dutch heat network market has a large level of private finance penetration with more than 90% of heat networks managed by private heat companies (partly through Public-Private Partnerships) and less than 10% are owned fully by public sector heat companies. For example, Vattenfall (a Swedish state-owned company), Eneco Energy (privately owned) and Ennatuurlijk (Dutch utility company) dominate the market owning approximately 90% of the country’s district heating networks as heat infrastructure has not yet been separated by law from the production and supply of heat (unlike gas and electricity).[34] As such, in 2022, the Dutch government first considered part nationalisation of heat networks via the Collective Heat Supply Act (WCW) with the intention of protecting public interests such as affordability, reliability and sustainability.[35] The intention is that municipalities could own 51% of the network, to help encourage consumers to stop using gas fired central heating. The Dutch government believe more citizens would be willing to switch to heat networks if they are not forced into a model that requires the use of a private sector supplier.

    This initiative was met with hostility from operators. Ennatuurlijk withdrew from development of the regional district heating grid Twente, as they were not clear how their assets and investments would be valued at the end of the transition period. Whilst the private sector supports opportunities to give more important roles to local authorities, there are concerns about losing control of the strategy and operations of the heating assets whilst remaining financially responsible for them.

    Details and practicalities are still being refined, but it is envisaged that existing private network operators would be given a 20-30 year grace period to recoup their initial investments made before transferring ownership to municipalities35.

    GERMANY

    Overview

    Germany’s district heating has its roots in the late 19th century, but it became more widespread after World War II, particularly in East Germany. Today, Germany continues to invest in district heating as part of its energy transition, with a focus on integrating renewable energy sources and improving efficiency.

    Public financing levers

    The German Government supports the development of heat networks up front via feasibility, capex funding and additionally operating cost subsidies for renewable projects. Individuals and building owners are also incentivised via grant funding to upgrade heating or connect and further rewarded for an accelerated transition. The levers include legislation where there is €3bn to support the development of 5th generation heat networks[36]. The previous legislation provided funding covering feasibility (up to 60% of costs) and construction (up to 50%). A new BEW fund provides 50% or €600k and 40% of eligible investment/operating cost subsidy, however this is only applicable to projects with 75% renewable heat sources.

    Additionally, companies, landlords of rented family homes and condominium owners are now eligible for financing from KfW (Germany’s state-owned infrastructure development bank) for installing low carbon heating systems or connecting to existing heat networks. The scheme can provide up to 30% of investment costs (plus an additional 5% for more efficient heat pumps)[37]. A €2,500 fixed support payment for efficient biomass heating systems is included and a speed bonus is applied if existing gas or oil heating systems are replaced by 2028. The scheme also can support individual home-owners with up to 70% of costs and municipalities will also be able to apply for support in late 2024.

    Regulatory structures

    Germany has the largest scale heat network market in Europe (illustrated by Figure 9) but it is unregulated. Instead, Germany has regulated electricity and gas markets and operates in a similar manner to Finland, with oversight from competition authorities. Standard terms and conditions for supply of heat networks are defined by Federal law.

    Additionally, Germany amended the Building and Energy Act 2020 in September 2023[38] requiring municipalities to:

    • Phase out oil and gas heating systems
    • develop heating plans by 2028, including a regional heating approach
    • that all heating systems installed in Germany after 1 January 2024 must be powered by at least 65% renewable energy

    Initially the amendments will apply to new builds but extend to existing and under construction properties too.

    The Local Heat Planning Act (WPG) also legally obliges district heating companies to decarbonise their networks[39]. Therefore, residents within these areas are removed from the transitioning process with responsibilities outsourced to professional entities such as private companies or municipal utilities. The WPG also requires building owners to switch from fossil fuels to renewable heating technologies and municipalities with a population over 100,000 to have draft heat plans by June 2026 (smaller municipalities by June 2028) identifying which heating technologies are available to connect to[40].

    Market ownership

    The German heat network market is in transition with several large heat networks becoming municipality owned. For example, in December 2023 Berlin’s municipality acquired the Berlin heat network for €1.4bn from Vattenfall, showing how one of Germany’s largest heat networks has moved into public sector ownership[41]. The heat network was bought by the state of Berlin as they are committed to re-municipalising infrastructure and reversing privatisations to gain more influence over the city’s district heating and gas supply.[42] They also believe the company will be profitable and key in moving toward climate neutrality. The state was able to buy the heat network via a state-owned financing company which received equity from the state budget and loans from Investitionsbank Berlin which the senate backed by a state guarantee.[43]

    As it stands, private companies, for example large energy suppliers, hold a significant share of the market and municipalities owning and operating the other significant proportion of the market.[44] The small remainder of the market is made up via large industrial companies who operate their own networks for industrial processes and heating factory buildings. Whilst market share is small, it is significant in industrial areas. Large public buildings also have their own networks, for example, universities, hospitals and other public sector buildings.

    FINLAND

    Overview

    Finland has a long history of district heating, dating back to the 1950s. The country’s cold climate makes district heating a practical choice for urban areas. Finnish district heating has evolved to use a mix of energy sources, including a significant proportion of renewable and waste energy and it is considered a key component of Finland’s strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

    Public financing levers

    The mature Finnish market is upgrading, refurbishing and decarbonising existing networks and is less focussed construction of new networks. The Finnish Government is facilitating the heat transition upgrades by Investing €21.8m across six projects for waste heat recovery, heat pump solutions and energy storage solutions to help move away from carbon-based heating[45]. Similarly, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment has allocated €469m of energy aid from EU funding for renewable projects via the national Recovery and Resilience Plan[46]. However, there does not appear to be a bespoke heat network capital grant fund. Additionally, Finland is providing grant support for end users – €2k-€4 for heat exchangers and €0.5k-€2k for balanced and adjusted heating systems. Furthermore, the Government are introducing a new tax credit scheme to give projects up to €150m worth of tax credits.[47] The idea is once green projects (renewable projects aiding the transition to net zero) become operationally profitable, a tax credit would aid cash flows making the project more feasible and investible.

    Regulatory Structures

    Finland established a self-governing framework, where there is no official national regulation but instead a clear set of technical codes which form the industry standard[48]. Finland did have legislation with mandatory connections, which was repealed in 2019, as mandatory connections were deemed anti-competitive. Finland has alternative renewable energy heat sources to choose from.

    The Finnish government also introduced a €90m scheme to incentivise the move away from carbon-based fuels to biomass CHP networks and €45m to non-combustion technologies (e.g. heat pumps).

    Market ownership

    The Finnish market currently has a low level of private finance penetration with heat networks being predominantly municipality owned. However, the Finnish Government is seeking foreign investment into the sector, as it recognises public sector budget pressure and the need to attract private sector investment. For example, an important driver behind the introduction of private finance is the requirement to refurbish existing networks as they become old and inefficient.

    Private investors note that Finland is very attractive due to the stability of the heat network sector which allows institutional investors to gain comfort and certainty in their investment.[49]

    Additionally, Finland has seen private equity infrastructure funds acquire individual networks. For example, the largest heat network owned by Fortum Energy (a state-owned energy company) was recently acquired in 2021[50] by a private equity infrastructure investor (Partners Group) demonstrating the shifting landscape.

    Therefore, Finland is demonstrating both the need for private investment as local authorities are capital constrained and offers a stable asset class to invest in an established market.

    SWEDEN

    Overview

    Sweden has been a pioneer in district heating since the early 20th century. The first commercial district heating system was introduced in 1948. The oil crisis of the 1970s also accelerated the transition to district heating, which now utilises a high proportion of renewable energy sources. Sweden’s extensive use of district heating is often cited as a model for other countries.

    Public financing levers

    The Swedish market is well developed and mature. The Government are using a range of capital funding, personal grant incentives and tax exemptions to expand and refine the heat network market. For example, the Swedish government can provide small grants up to 60,000 SEK (approximately £4,300) for conversion to a new heating system moving away from direct-acting electricity or gas for single family homes[51].

    Additionally, Sweden also provides tax exemptions where renewable energy heating sources are exempt from energy and carbon dioxide taxes.[52]

    Regulatory structures

    The Swedish district heat market was deregulated in 1996 which brought issues surrounding high prices and lack of transparency. Subsequently, light-touch voluntary regulation was reintroduced via the District Heating Act (2008)[53] and overseen by the Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate (who also regulate electricity and gas). For example, voluntary initiatives for pricing transparency where the Swedish Competition Authority can investigate any signs of potential market abuse. Additionally, the Swedish Energy Market Inspectorate also have standard contract terms for delivery of district heat networks to ensure a consistent delivery approach across the market.

    Whilst there is regulatory oversight, connections are not mandatory in Sweden. Although Swedish municipalities are responsible for developing energy plans and have a monopoly planning of district heating developments, building owners decide on their sustainable heating source as long as they follow environmental standards[54].

    Market ownership

    The heat network sector in Sweden currently has a mixture of privately and publicly owned networks and operators. For example, the heat network assets are owned by the local authorities and municipalities or the state-owned operator Vattenfall, but there are also private sector operators such as Eon and Fortum. Additionally, Sweden also has some joint venture structures for example between the City of Stockholm and Achiale (private investors).

    A recent example of private investment was the sale of 50% of the Fortum (a Finnish state-owned energy company) holding in Stockholm Exergi to a group of European institutional investors including pension funds.[55] This demonstrates institutional investors recognising the stable returns provided by established heat networks and the opportunity they present to private investors.

    ESTONIA

    Overview

    Estonia’s district heating systems were developed during the Soviet era, with the first systems established in the 1940s and 1950s. After regaining independence, Estonia reformed its district heating sector, improving efficiency and incorporating more renewable energy sources. The country has one of the highest rates of district heating coverage in Europe.

    Public financing levers

    As Estonia’s heat network sector is well advanced, there are limited grants and subsidies available. However, Estonia is encouraging refinement of their heat network market via investment support, compensation schemes and individual connection grants. Examples include the recent €20m investment by Gren (a private energy company) into Tartu, Parnu and Ida-Virumaa heat networks. Gren also received €4.2m of financial support from the Estonian Environment Investment Centre via the European Cohesion Fund and European Regional Development Fund[56].

    Other forms of public funding included the Government compensation scheme for household energy consumed to counter the rising energy prices[57]. For example, the state compensates up to 80 percent of the part of the average monthly price that exceeds 80 euros/MWh for district heating. The subsidies are automatically applied to the district heating bills.

    Additionally, the Estonian Business and Innovation Agency will provide up to a €10,000 grant for small residential buildings for facilitating the connection to an existing heat network[58].

    Regulatory structures

    The Estonian district heat sector is regulated by the District Heating Act 2003 where heat operators must coordinate the price of heat sold to the consumer with the Competition Authority. Additionally, Estonia uses a dynamic pricing structure where changes in the heat price are influenced by changes in the underlying fuel prices and also the required investment that needs to be made in the heat network sector. The District Heating Act also stipulates that within district heating regions connection to the network is mandatory for all located in the region[59]. Furthermore, municipal governments within Finland, for example Tartu, mandated new and renovated buildings in district heating zones must be connected to a heat network.

    Market ownership

    The Estonian market has a high degree of private finance penetration as many heat networks are owned by private equity infrastructure funds. For example, Utilitas is the largest operator of heat networks in Estonia and is majority owned by an infrastructure fund. Similarly, recent transactions such as Gren acquiring Viljandi district heating company[60] and Partners Group acquiring a stake in the Finnish state-owned operator Fortum operating in Estonia demonstrate the attractiveness of a mature and developed heat network sector to private investors.

    The role of state-owned infrastructure banks

    In addition to the public financing levers noted in section 5.2, there are also state-owned infrastructure banks that can support the heat network sector. Table 7 provides a summary of the banks and their financing products. Examples relevant to heat networks are discussed below.

    Table 7: State-owned infrastructure banks

     Country

    Name

    Financing products

    rUK

    National Wealth Fund/ UK Infrastructure Bank (NWF/UKIB)


    • Public Sector Infrastructure loans £5m+

    • Low interest rate finance (lower than Public Works Loan Board)

    • Long maturities up to 50 years

    • Private sector products via Debt, Equity and Guarantees

    The Netherlands

    Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten (BNG)


    • Local authority and public sector loans

    • Bond issuance

    • Balance sheet financing

    • Project financing

    Germany

    KfW Development Bank


    • Project financings with maturities to match the investments

    • Corporate financings for investment measures

    • Structured financings tailored to individual situations

    • Guarantees

    • Derivatives to supplement the product range

    • Grant support

    Finland, Sweden, Estonia

    Nordic Investment Bank (NIB)


    • Project and structured financing

    • Debt financing of PPP projects

    • Long term loans 5-25 years

    • €20m+ ticket size

    Source: EY analysis

    Relevant Examples:

    • rUK: National Wealth Fund (NWF) was set up in2021 and allocated £27.8bn of capital to deploy from the UK Government. Heat networks are a key strategic pillar for the bank.

      NWF explored a connection charge facility[61] to incentivise and fund connection to heat networks and give demand assurance. However, whilst the public sector like the facility to help develop a heat network with the cost of connection rolled into the capex facility, the private sector need clarity on who the risk and responsibility sits with (e.g. project co), and proof of concept to buy in.


    NWF also look to provide project gap funding development expenditure and capital expenditure to make heat networks commercially viable for private sector investors. Similarly, the bank is considering early phase guarantees/loans to help crowd in private finance by bridging up front development risk and the early years of projects.


    NWF has heat networks as a strategic investment pillar and has the capital available to deploy. However, from our stakeholder engagement sessions an additional barrier to deployment is that heat networks are not yet commercially viable enough to enable what NWF can offer.

    • Germany: KfW is the state-owned development bank with a commitment to sustainable infrastructure. The bank has recently introduced support for landlords, homeowners and municipalities to claim grant funding for connecting to existing heat networks or other renewable heating sources. The scheme supports those installing/gaining access to low carbon heating systems with up to 35% of investment costs.[62]
    • Nordics & Estonia: NIB was established as an intergovernmental bank between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in 1975. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania become members of the bank in 2005. The bank has approximately €8.4bn in authorised capital[63]. Whilst not a country in focus, NIB provided €18m loan to finance upgrades[64] to existing heat networks in Riga, Latvia in October 2024, demonstrating how infrastructure banks can support established heat networks.
    • Scotland: Scottish National Investment Bank (SNIB) has net zero as one of its key missions. The bank has identified there could be opportunities around decarbonising and expanding existing heat networks as well as financing new networks and connections[65]. The bank does not have any publications regarding bespoke financing solutions for heat networks yet. This presents the opportunity to shape heat network solutions by analysing the market looking at other international innovations.

    Appendix C – Major UK regulators: a summary of objectives

    Ofgem (The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets)

    Ofgem are responsible for regulating the electricity and gas markets, implement measures that protect consumers and promote competition within the sector. Within the UK, there is a well-established group of entities who operate across the generation, transmission and distribution landscape. Generating firms provide the power, transmission networks transport the power and distribution networks move it into residential and commercial premises with electricity and gas retailers being the interface between the energy market and end consumers. The natural gas sector follows a similar delivery structure where gas is extracted, refined and piped into buildings for heating and energy generation (Ofgem, 2024).

    Ofwat (The Water Services Regulation Authority)

    Ofwat oversees the water and wastewater sector ensuring that water companies provide high quality services at fair prices to consumers whilst ensuring the security of long-term water supplies. Water utilities are responsible for treating and supplying clean water, as well as managing the collection and processing of wastewater. Entities provide these services under strict regulatory supervision to maintain public health and environmental standards. The waste management sector addresses the collection, treatment and disposal of waste, including recycling (Ofwat, 2024).

    Ofcom (The Office of Communications)

    Ofcom is responsible for regulating the broadcasting, telecommunications and postal industries through maintaining the integrity of communication services. Telecommunications serve a critical role in maintaining connectivity within an ever-increasing digital environment, providing phone services, mobile networks, internet access and the infrastructure that underpins them all (Ofcom, 2024).

    ORR (The Office of Rail and Road)

    The ORR is responsible for ensuring the safety, reliability and efficiency of the railways whilst protecting the interests of rail and road users. They supervise network operators, such as Network Rail, through licensing to ensure compliance with health and safety law as well as competition law whilst also enforcing economic regulation (ORR, 2024).

    CAA (The Civil Aviation Authority)

    The CAA maintains a high level of safety in the aviation industry whilst representing the interests of consumers and wider public. It regulates various aspects of airline operations and aircraft management whilst also enforcing economic regulation through controlling pricing at major UK airports to prevent the abuse of market power and ensuring fair charges for passengers and airlines (CAA, 2024).

    Appendix D – Overview of utility comparators methodology

    The different characteristics of utility sectors have been examined acknowledging the following key attributes associated with the development of heat networks:

    • A sector that is immature and in the early stages of its development and growth cycle within the UK
    • A sector that provides services direct to its customers (retail in nature) and therefore exposed to a degree of demand, payment and operational risks akin to more conventional services provided in the private sector
    • A sector that will be subject to incremental development of heat network infrastructure that will be dependent on accelerated connection of residential and commercial customers, ideally supported through zoning and policy in regard to the mandating such connections
    • A sector that must address the affordability challenge of decarbonisation, particularly the cost of transitioning from conventional fossil-based energy sources like gas boilers; noting also that air source heat pumps are increasingly used as the counterfactual cost benchmark when developing an economic case
    • The nature of the investment in heat networks, that involves significant upfront capital expenditure, requires funding that can be invested or repaid over extended time of 25 to 40 years, thus requiring investors and developers to take a long-term view of expected return on capital
    • A sector that has historically and for the foreseeable future (3 to 4 years) been supported by investment support from the Scottish and UK Governments

    Initial analysis was undertaken which focussed on the maturities and similarities between various utility sectors and heat networks across 39 regulated utilities covering electricity, water, telecommunications, rail and air regulation against the criteria listed below, in Table 8. Based upon the preliminary analysis, 17 utilities were taken forward for further examination, which is discussed in Appendix K.

    Table 8: Criteria for longlist analysis of maturity and similarity between utility sectors and heat networks

    Long List Methodology

     

    Area evaluated

    Description

    Maturity of Sector

    This reflects the stage of development and stability of the sector within the utility industry as a whole:

  • A mature sector is well established with known and proven technologies and market structures, such as offshore wind electricity generation.

  • A developing sector, or one in its infancy, is characterised by emerging technologies, evolving regulatory frameworks and less certain market dynamics and funding solutions.
  • Similarities to heat network

    This area examines the extent to which the utility sector shares similar characteristics to heat networks. It considers factors such as:

  • Whether recent infrastructure capital expenditure has occurred within the sector.

  • The type of environment the sector is within in terms of a natural monopoly or a competitive landscape.

  • Typical entities involved within the sector such as private or joint ventures.

  • Regulatory environment of the sector.
  • A shortlist was then derived in accordance with an assessment of the following criteria set out in Table 9.

    Table 9: Assessment criteria for the shortlist

    Short List Methodology

     

    Area evaluated

    Description

    Investment Time Horizon

    This indicates the anticipated timeframe one expects an investor to hold their investment to make an appropriate return on its investment. It can range from the short-term (a few years) to long-term (several decades) depending upon the useful and economic life of an asset, contractual arrangements, market conditions and funding solution.

    Retail versus Wholesale Activity

    This distinguishes between services that are provided direct to end consumers (retail) such as those in the water and sewerage sector and those activities that operate higher up in the supply chain within a wholesale market, such as electricity generation.

    Stakeholders

    This details the parties with an interest or influence over the sector including the customer base, user of assets base, owner of asset and who is subsidising the regulatory regime.

    Investment Support

    This refers to the mechanisms, incentives and financial environment and structure that exist to incentivize investment in the sector. It covers areas such as government grants/subsidies, regulatory frameworks like a RAB model alongside any market mechanisms such as Contracts for Difference (CfDs).

    Areas of Regulatory / Financial Difference

    This identifies some of the unique regulatory and financial characteristics of the sector in terms of market operations, investment models and compliance requirements.

    Risk Profile

    This evaluates the types and level of risk present within each sector. Whilst risk can be subjective and dependent on the risk appetite of the related party, it encompasses design, construction, operations, maintenance, revenue, availability and revenue risk (demand and bad debt).

    Appendix E – Key characteristics of utility sectors evaluated

    The table below summarises the key characteristics of each utility sector evaluated within Section 6.

     

    Risk Profile

    Sector

    Investment time horizon

    Heat networks

    Further to achieving commercial operation of the heat network, there is material demand and revenue risk due to the uncertainty and timing of commercial and residential connections.

    Operates essentially as a retail business whereby sales are direct to end customers and therefore subject to revenue risk (demand and bad debt risk).

    Long term investment time horizon (between 20 and 40 years) due to large upfront capital expenditure, thin operating margins governed by the competitive pricing relative to the counterfactual of gas boilers and/or air source heat pumps.

    Offshore wind

    Once at commercial operations, projects are essentially at full operational capacity and connected to the national grid for energy distribution and as such no demand risk.

    Some availability/revenue risk due to uncontrollable nature of wind.

    Conventionally operates in the wholesale market (direct to grid).

    Long term investment return of around 15 years commensurate with the term of a CfD due to significant upfront capital costs and competitive bid process for revenue pricing.

    Household Water & Sewerage

    Demand/revenue risk from users and price reviews by regulator respectively.

    Large operating expenditure to meet quality assurance requirements.

    In England and Wales, operates in the retail sector which inherently creates revenue risk, in particular, bad debt risk.

    In Scotland, water is devolved with charges occurring alongside the council tax system.

    Long term investment returns due to significant upfront capital costs, maintenance costs and price reviews for revenue pricing to ensure appropriate inter-generational cost recovery from customers in line with the useful and economic life of underlying assets (25 to 40 years).

    CCUS

    Currently a sector proposing to utilise unproven technology at scale, often referred to as a FOAK project (First of a Kind) and therefore subject to material design, construction and commissioning risk.

    Once commercial operation is achieved, there is material demand and revenue risk due to the uncertainty and timing of connections.

    Operates essentially as a retail business whereby sales are direct to end customers and therefore would be subject to revenue risk (demand and bad debt risk) without regulatory funding support mechanism until the sector matures.

    Long term investment returns due to significant upfront capital costs, maintenance costs and pricing reviews to ensure an appropriate return on initial investment acknowledging the useful and economic life of underlying assets (20 to 40 years).

    Sources: EY, Ofwat (2024)

    Appendix F – Timeline of regulatory developments

    The figure below represents a timeline of regulatory development across CCUS, offshore wind and household water & sewerage sectors.

    CCUS

    A timeline of regulatory development in the CCUS sector

    Offshore Wind

    A timeline of regulatory development in the offshore wind sector

    Household Water & Sewerage

    A timeline of regulatory development in the household water & sewerage sectors.

    Appendix G – Detailed overview of offshore wind sector

    The below provides a detailed overview of offshore wind regulation within the UK alongside the regulatory structure and financing mechanisms within the sector.

    Overview

    Offshore wind electricity generation in the UK is a rapidly expanding sector which plays a pivotal role in the nation’s transition to renewable energy and the achievement of its climate change goals. The regulatory framework is overseen by Ofgem who ensure that the sector operates efficiently and contributes to the UK’s energy security since the early development of the sector, with regulation becoming more prominent following the significant expansion of the sector in the 2000s. Ofgem is aided by the Crown Estate and Crown Estate Scotland who own the seabed around the UK and are responsible for awarding leases to developers for offshore wind development.

    Offshore wind farms are subject to a range of regulations, from environmental impact assessments to marine spatial planning, ensuring that developments are carried out responsibly. Ofgem’s regulatory activities encompass various aspects of offshore wind generation. These include connections to the national grid and ensuring that the market operates effectively to facilitate investment and main secure and sustainable electricity supplied.

    Regulatory Structure

    Following on from the Energy Act 2004, Ofgem has continued to regulate the sector and is adapting its approach and offering new support mechanisms as deployment continues to grow. Ofgem’s regulation of offshore wind is structured around several key elements designed to promote the development of the sector whilst ensuring efficiency, competition and the protection of consumers interests:

    • Licensing – generation licences are issued to offshore wind farm operators which set out the conditions operators must meet to legally generate electricity;
    • Support mechanisms – provide long term price/revenue stability and encourage investment in offshore wind through guaranteeing a fixed price for the electricity generated;
    • Grid connections and access – administrating the connections from offshore wind farms to the national grid through Offshore Transmission Owners (OFTOs) who own and operate the transmission assets;
    • Market oversight – monitoring of the market to prevent anti-competitive practices whilst also ensuring offshore electricity generation is integrated safely to aid in the security of electricity supply;
    • Financial incentives and penalties – through the RIIO (Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs) model, Ofgem sets price controls and performance incentives for offshore wind network entities;
    • Consumer protection – ensuring costs associated with offshore wind generation are reflected fairly on consumer bills, with the benefits of low carbon electricity generation passed on to consumers;
    • Innovation funding – innovation technologies and practices which reduce generation costs can be funded by Ofgem. The aim is to accelerate technological advancements, improving efficiency and reducing costs to support the transition to net-zero energy systems whilst ensuring best value for consumers. As part of RIIO-ED2, Ofgem extended their Strategic Innovation Fund to cover electricity distribution companies with £450m of funding across RIIO-ED2 alongside £68.4m of additional allowances for smaller scale innovation projects through the Network Innovation Allowances.

    These structures collectively create a regulatory environment that supports the growth and investment in offshore wind development while managing costs and ensuring the electricity system remains reliable and sustainable.

    Regulatory Financing Mechanisms

    Offshore wind offers investors long term equity returns over a period of c.15 years commensurate with the term of a CfD. Offshore wind is characterised by large upfront capital expenditure, availability risk (wind), a competitive and volatile electricity market, all of which impacts the sector’s ability to secure much needed investment.

    Offshore wind is not exposed to demand risk, given it operates on a wholesale basis. However, to aid in the mitigation of electricity price volatility, availability risk and premium over and above the wholesale price of electricity for the development of Offshore wind, Ofgem awards Contracts for Difference (CfDs) to provide long term stable and predictable revenue for offshore wind developers. The reduced revenue risk attributable to a CfD make Offshore wind attractive to investors resulting in optimised financing structures reducing the overall cost of capital.

    CfDs represent an evolution in the Offshore wind sector from Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) which were originally used as a support mechanism to promote investment in the sector. Further to CfDs offering stable and predictable revenue, continual development of offshore wind assets is promoted through government grants and incentives for innovation and infrastructure development.

    Renewable Obligation Certificates

    The ROCs framework was designed to promote investment across a number of different renewable energy technologies by providing a financial reward for renewable energy generation. It achieved this through the creation of a renewable energy certificate market whereby for each megawatt hour (MWh) of renewable electricity granted, generators would be eligible to claim ROCs.

    These could then be traded on the open market to suppliers who did not meet ROC generation obligations imposed by Ofgem. If suppliers failed to present enough ROCs to meet their obligations, a buy-out fee would be imposed for the shortfall of ROCs. The buy-out fee was set by Ofgem and increased annually with inflation. The money collected by Ofgem from buy out fees was then redistributed to suppliers who had met their obligations to effectively incentivise renewable electricity generation.

    ROCs were the main support mechanism for renewable energy before being gradually phased out and replaced by CfDs for new projects in 2013 with the aim of improving the regulatory regime. One of the reasons ROCs were phased out was due to the relatively primitive nature of the support mechanism whereby different technologies received varying amounts of ROCs per MWh produced in addition to the wholesale power price. In 2012, offshore wind typically received 2 ROCs per MWh compared to onshore wind which typically received 1 ROC per MWh.

    The difference in ROC allocation by technology was arguably quite arbitrary and did not necessarily correlate with the underlying levelised cost of the technology. This potentially stifled the deployment of some technologies or encouraged the development of other sectors, resulting in windfall gains for developers

    Contract for Difference

    Offshore wind projects are eligible to participate in a competitive auction process to obtain a CfD. The auction determines the “Strike price”, which effectively equates to a fixed price per MWh of electricity that the project generates over a specified period (typically 15 years). The Strike Price is the price per MWh a developer considers necessary to make its applicable return on investment over the period of the CfD.

    The Strike Price is different to the actual market price, known as the “Reference Price”, which is calculated based on the average market price per MWh over a given period. When the Reference Price is lower than the Strike Price, a top up payment of the difference in price is made by the Low Carbon Contracts Company (LCCC) to the offshore generator. Conversely, if the Reference Price is greater than the Strike Price, then the generator must pay the difference to LCCC.

    By providing a guaranteed price for electricity, CfDs mitigate price volatility risk within the wholesale electricity market. This helps make offshore wind more attractive to investors and lenders as it reduces financial risk of the project whilst also incentivising generators to produce electricity efficiently and at lowest costs to maximise margins.

    CfDs were originally introduced in 2013 whilst the sector was focussing on scaling but have enabled the sector to develop into a mature one. Recently, the CfD allocation round 6 has been completed. It included three new CfDs for offshore wind alongside seven offshore permitted reductions which allows projects previously awarded a CfD contract to withdraw up to 25% of their original capacity and apply to a future CfD round.

    The balance in setting the correct Strike Price can prove difficult as demonstrated in allocation round 5 in 2023. Figure 11 highlights that there were no successful CfDs awarded for offshore wind in allocation round 5. This was a result of no bids being submitted by developers for offshore wind, which could have been due to the administrative Strike Price set by UK Government of £44/MWh. This Strike Price remained unchanged from allocation round 4 which made offshore wind developments economically unfeasible due to impacts of inflation on development costs.

    Figure 11: Total renewable energy awarded during CfD allocation rounds

    Government Grants & Incentives

    Government grants and incentives are critical tools used to promote the development, operation and maintenance of offshore wind assets. Government grants can help to reduce the upfront capital required for the development of offshore wind farms including research, design and construction helping to mitigate some of the financial risks that developers face. The UK Government, often through Ofgem or other bodies such as Innovate UK, provide this funding and includes grants for innovation in turbine design, foundation structure, grid integration and operations alongside maintenance practices.

    In addition to 21 GW of wind farms benefiting from CfDs through to allocation round 6, another example of government funding is the Strategic Innovation Fund (SIF). This aims to help transform gas and electricity networks for a low-carbon future. It provides funds to projects that could speed up the transition to net zero at the lowest cost to the consumer. After launching in 2021, Ofgem expects to invest £450m by 2028 through partnering with Innovate UK to deliver the programme. Innovate UK offers multiple innovation funding such as the Net Zero Living Pathfinder Places. Oldham Council has secured funding from this to develop an Oldham Green New Deal Delivery Partnership, focussing on delivering the £5.6bn of low carbon infrastructure Oldham needs to achieve Net Zero.

    Appendix H – Detailed overview of household water & sewerage sector

    The below provides a detailed overview of household water & sewerage undertakers within the UK alongside the regulatory structure and financing mechanisms within the sector.

    Overview

    Household water & sewerage undertakers within the UK are a well-established utility sector which provides residential and commercial customers essential water supply and wastewater services. The sector encompasses the entire process of sourcing, treating and delivering water to households and businesses alongside the collection, treatment and disposal of wastewater and sewage. The household water and sewerage sector within England and Wales is typically characterised by a natural monopoly due to the inefficiencies of having multiple sets of water and sewerage infrastructure competing in the same geographic area.

    As a result, the sector is subject to economic regulation which, within England and Wales, is regulated by Ofwat to ensure the provision of high-quality water alongside reliable water and wastewater services at fair prices for consumers. The two main issues Ofwat regulation aims to address are service quality and tariff prices. Service quality is less important than in other sectors like electricity. Ofwat oversees the performance of water companies, enforces compliance with environmental standards and ensures that the sector remains financially viable.

    Regulatory Structure

    The regulatory structure for household water and sewerage companies within England and Wales has evolved over time to adapt to changing priorities in the sector, such as the need for increased investment in infrastructure, improving customer service and addressing environmental concerns. Some of the key changes in the regulatory structure include:

    • Introduction of competition – whilst the water industry in England and Wales has been privatised since 1989, there has been a gradual move to introducing competition within the household water sector to drive efficiency and innovation.
    • Periodic price reviews – Ofwat has moved towards conducting periodic price reviews (such as ‘PR19’ or ‘PR24’) typically every 5 years to set price limits and service targets for water companies. These reviews establish the framework within which water companies must operate and balance the need for investment in infrastructure with the protection of consumer interests.
    • Performance commitments – Ofwat has introduced performance commitments and outcome delivery incentives (ODIs) to ensure water companies focus on delivering outcomes relevant to their customers.
    • Resilience and sustainability – regulatory changes increasingly emphasise the importance of long-term resilience and environmental sustainability through encouraging water companies to invest in approaches that mitigate the risk of drought, flooding and other long term climate related challenges.
    • Customer engagement – a greater emphasis is now placed on customer engagement within the regulatory process with water companies required to consult with customers and consider their preferences in the development of their business plan.
    • Innovation funding – Ofwat has introduced mechanisms to fund innovation within the sector to encourage water companies to develop and adopt new technologies and practices.

    These changes reflect a broader shift towards a more outcome based regulatory regime which encourages water companies to be customer orientated, efficient and forward thinking with their operations and investments. The regulatory framework is designed to incentivise water companies to invest in their networks, improve resilience, reduce leakage and maintain high standards of water quality and environmental stewardship.

    Regulatory Financing Mechanisms

    Within England and Wales, the water & sewerage sector is predicated on a long-term investment time horizon whereby balance sheets are supported by the capital markets in the form of debt (including bond finance) and shareholder equity. Typically, water utilities seek an investment grade credit rating in order to secure the most competitive form of lending within a highly optimised financial structure, most notably gearing. Regulation by Ofwat in England and Wales provides a stable financial environment for investors, whereby the monopolistic nature of the customer base for each utility provides a reliable level of demand assurance, albeit in a retail market that does result in an element of revenue risk from bad debt.

    Ofwat uses various financial levers to encourage initial investment in water infrastructure whilst also encouraging water companies to invest in their infrastructure and services. These financial levers are primarily through a Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model, as well as through the existence of price reviews to adapt to market conditions and innovation funding. Key risks that are borne by utilities in the water sector is that of managing capital programmes, maintenance and operational costs. These risks will be similar in nature to those of the heat network sector.

    Regulated Asset Base (RAB)

    A RAB model provides a structured approach to regulating the prices that water companies can charge alongside ensuring they maintain and improve the infrastructure, whilst delivering high quality services to customers. The RAB represents the value of a water company’s capital assets, such as pipes and treatment plants and is calculated based on historical investment costs, depreciation and new qualifying capital expenditure. The general value of the RAB can be expressed as:

    However, for previously privatised UK network infrastructure sectors such as water, the RAB is generally lower than the current replacement cost of the net book value as when privatised, the assets were sold at a substantial discount to the replacement cost. Within the water industry, the current replacement costs of the assets in 2010 prices are greater than £200bn but the privatisation proceeds were just £10.3bn in 2010 prices. This difference is a combination of the privatisation discount and the capital investment net of depreciation undertaken since privatisation. As such, for UK infrastructure industries privatised after 1980, such as water, the RAB value is further defined as:

    Ofwat then uses the RAB value to derive the allowed revenue requirement, which is used to ultimately set prices for consumers, to cover the costs of operations, maintenance as well as providing a fair return on the capital investment on the RAB. This is done through the regulator setting a Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)% which is then applied to the RAB value to calculate the total amount of allowed revenues each company can charge to its consumers. This process, albeit simplified and not considering inflation, is expressed as:

    The RAB model inherently encourages water companies to invest efficiently in their assets as a company retains some of the savings as profit if it can deliver the required services at a lower cost than the allowed revenue. Furthermore, since depreciation is active in the RAB, unless ongoing capital expenditure is made, the allowed revenue dwindles. This incentivises water companies to continually invest in their infrastructure, with these investments eventually being included in the Regulated Asset Value (RAV) and therefore in future revenue streams (Frontier Economics, 2010). The RAB model works particularly well within the water sector due to the limited number of operators within the sector (11 regional water and wastewater companies in England and Wales) meaning the time and cost requirements of administrating this regime is manageable.

    Price reviews

    The price reviews performed by Ofwat determine the revenue that water companies can earn from customers, usually lasting for a 5-year period. Price reviews adopt a total expenditure approach, considering both capital expenditure and operational expenditure when setting price controls. Price reviews promote the development of new assets by providing a framework for recovering the costs of the investment over a period of time. This in turn encourages companies to undertake necessary large scale capex projects.

    Furthermore, the price review process also includes performance incentives, through ODIs which reward companies for meeting or exceeding targets set by Ofwat. Conversely if targets are not met, water companies are penalised for underperformance. This system helps align the company’s financial interests with the delivery of high-quality utility services.

    Every 5 years each utility must submit an Asset Management Plans (AMP) to the regulator Ofwat. Ofwat will then use the AMP to set price increases and review the quality of services provided which take the form of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).

    The latest AMP is AMP8 for the period 2025 to 2030. AMP 8 will have a greater focus on climate change & emissions reduction challenges, improving water quality, reducing leakage and ensuring reliable water supply and wastewater services. Ofwat has highlighted a strong desire to find new and innovative funding solutions to meet the significant investment in infrastructure required to achieve these goals. An example of this is the Direct Procurement for Customers programme (DPC) which involves the utilities competitively tendering services in relation to the delivery of large new water and wastewater assets. It is envisaged the projects will be similar in nature to Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO) whereby the chosen Competitively Appointed Provider (CAP) will be paid essentially a service fee for a period of between 25 and 30 years.

    Innovation funding

    Innovation funding impacts the financial environment by providing the means and incentive for water companies to invest in the future. It supports an approach to asset management and service delivery which is proactive in nature. Although there are many external innovation funds available to water companies, Ofwat has established their own Ofwat Innovation Fund. The aim of this £200m fund is to encourage collaborative initiatives and partnerships within the water sector to tackle the larger challenges the sector faces such as climate change, leakage and affordability. Most recently, 17 projects have been awarded funding in the fourth round of the Water Breakthrough Challenge (‘Breakthrough 4’), sharing in approximately £40m towards solutions that will bring benefits to water customers, society and the environment. One example of this is the award of £1.6m to Pipebot Patrol. This aims to develop an autonomous sewer robot which constantly inspects sewers, raising alerts to the precise location of blockages as they begin to form. This proactive approach allows maintenance teams enough time to respond before sewer flooding occurs, potentially contaminating the environment.

    Although Ofwat regulates the water sector in England and Wales, due to the privatisation of the sector combined with regulatory models used, profits made by companies can be either distributed to shareholders or reinvested in infrastructure. If too great an emphasis is placed on the former, issues can arise in under-investment in infrastructure, impacting the long-term viability of the sector. Thames Water, England’s largest water company, over the years has significantly borrowed debt totalling over £15 billion under the RAB model, creating about 80% leverage in the company. This has allowed owners of Thames Water to take billions of pounds out the company as loans or dividends within the last 5 years, including over £200m in dividends to other group entities. However, the debt servicing requirements, alongside the need for infrastructure investment to meet efficiency targets, has led to Thames Water requesting Ofwat to allow water bills to rise by 40% by 2030. Ofwat has however rejected these proposals and has currently suggested a rise of 23% as part of its 2024 price review and suggests further capital injection from shareholders to develop infrastructure and service debt payments. As such, without careful regulation throughout the years, potential mismanagement of utilities can arise leading to price increases for consumers.

    Scotland has mitigated these specific risks through the water services being publicly owned and operated by Scottish Water who remains accountable to the Scottish Government and its customers. This helps to ensure profits are reinvested in the infrastructure rather than distributed to shareholders.

    Water Regulation Within Scotland

    Scottish Water remains economically regulated by the Water Industry Commission for Scotland (WICS) which ensures Scottish Water delivers value for money whilst achieving efficiency targets. Regulation ensures that public funds are used efficiently with no profit motive influencing decisions. The social focus of WICS places an emphasis on affordability and maintaining public ownership which is aligned with Scottish Government policies. Furthermore, since Scottish Water is the sole provider of water within Scotland, regulation can be simplified as it benefits from economies of scale.

    WICS is governed by the Water Industry (Scotland) Act 2002, as amended by the Water Services etc (Scotland) Act 2005 and the Water Resources (Scotland) Act 2013. WICS is an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body whose principle statutory functions are to:

    • Determine charge caps and, in so doing, promote the interests of customers of Scottish Water both in terms of quality of services and the charges that have to be paid;
    • Monitor Scottish Water’s performance, encouraging efficiency and sustainability;
    • Facilitate (in a manner not detrimental to Scottish Water’s core functions) the entry of retail water and sewerage providers that want to supply non-household customers in Scotland;
    • Support the Scottish Government’s vision of ensuring that Scotland is a Hydro Nation and meet their obligations under the Water Resources Act 2013.

    Water charges are set by WICS and remain relatively stable as profits are reinvested. The domestic charges are linked to council tax bands, with prices increasing as bands increase, and historically were calculated based off a version of the RAB model. However, since the price review in 2010, WICS have moved away from the RAB based model and instead moved towards looking at business requirements as the basis in setting prices during price reviews.

    Price Reviews

    Similar to Ofwat in England and Wales, WICS performs Strategic Reviews of Charges to set price limits for the next regulatory period (usually every 6 years). The Strategic Reviews of Charges is initially based upon Scottish Water’s long term business plan which encompasses short- and long-term infrastructure investment requirements, debt repayments and operating costs. As part of this business plan, Scottish Water also works with the Customer Forum to ensure that customer views influence the business plan and pricing requests. WICS subsequently evaluate the business plan, with a focus on Debt Service Cover Ratio (DSCR), alongside multiple other factors including inflation, investment needs and operational efficiency to determine annual price caps for customers. These may be adjusted annually within the limits set by WICS to account for inflation or other changes.

    Alongside setting price caps, WICS will also set efficiency targets for each period based upon what it deems Scottish Water should be able to achieve. Although a proxy RAB continues to exist to act as an internal comparator to England and Wales water sector, this customer focussed business plan helps to align Scottish Water with Scotland Government objectives.

    Although WICS exercises these functions independently of the Scottish Ministers, whose power to direct WICS, is confined to matters relating to the WICS financial management and administration, ministers can potentially influence agreed charges to customers. If agreed charges are lower than Scottish Water’s requirement, the cash surplus may be insufficient to meet required investment and maintenance programmes. This in turn could impact the long-term lifecycle maintenance and development of new assets meaning the extension of useful economic lives of existing assets is required. There is a risk that, despite it being a public body, if agreed charges are continually lower than what Scottish Water deems as necessary, the integrity of the network in the future is compromised.

    If a cash shortfall is present for infrastructure expansion or maintenance of assets, public borrowing could provide the required capital for required expansion or maintenance of assets.

    Government Grants and Incentives

    Scottish Water receives loans or grants from the Scottish Government to finance large capital expenditure projects such as upgrading treatment plants, replacing aging pipes and building flood defences. This aids in reducing the reliance upon customer charges to fund these large capital expenditure projects helping to ensure affordability for households and businesses. This could provide an advantage over private companies as government-backed loans typically offer more favourable terms than private market financing resulting in further cost savings being passed onto consumers. However, this funding route depends upon the impact this borrowing would have upon Scottish Government balance sheet. This impact could mean funding is not granted for infrastructure development and maintenance projects and instead a short-term increase in customer prices would have to be required. As such, any borrowing is carefully managed to ensure long term financial sustainability for both Scottish Water and Scottish Government.

    Appendix I – Detailed overview of CCUS sector

    The below provides a detailed overview of CCUS within the UK alongside the regulatory structure and financing mechanisms within the sector.

    Overview

    CCUS is an emerging sector within the UK and is expected to play a crucial role in the UK achieving its net zero emissions target by 2050. The UK Government has recognised the importance of CCUS in reducing carbon emissions from industrial processes and power generation and as such is actively developing a regulatory framework to support the deployment of CCUS related projects.

    This framework aims to ensure that CCUS projects are financially viable, environmentally effective and financially resilient to market uptake. The regulatory environment is shaped by multiple pieces of legislation including the Energy Act and the Infrastructure Act which establish the legal basis for CCUS operations and the regulatory role of bodies like Ofgem, the Oil and Gas Authority and Department for Energy Security and Net Zero.

    Regulatory Structure

    The CCUS sector is in its infancy within the UK and as such projects are unlikely to be at full operating capacity at the point the facilities are commissioned, in terms of emitter uptake. As such, any proposed regulatory structures will need to take into account:

    • Financial incentives: Providing financial incentives to encourage investment in CCUS technology and making it cost effective;
    • Economic regulation: To provide stable and predictable revenue streams for CCUS infrastructure investments;
    • Licensing: Licensing and permits for CCUS operations including the capture, transport and storage of carbon;
    • Safety Standards: Safety and environmental standards to protect public health and the environment;
    • Liability Frameworks: Liability and risk management frameworks given the first of a kind nature of CCUS;
    • Market Development: Facilitating the development of markets for carbon utilisation and promoting innovation in CCUS technologies; and
    • Infrastructure Planning: Planning and developing the necessary infrastructure for carbon transport and storage, including considering shared access and usage to maximise efficiency and reduce costs.

    The proposed regulatory structure will need to enable the growth of the CCUS sector whilst ensuring it contributes effectively to net zero goals. It is anticipated that the regulatory framework is likely to evolve as technology and risks develop. Current regulatory proposals to encourage initial investment, development and maintenance of assets include having a RAB based model with revenue support.

    Regulatory Financing Mechanisms

    Regulated Asset Base

    Similar to the RAB model used within the water and sewerage sector, it is proposed that the entities that will develop, own and operate the transport and storage infrastructure (T&SCo) will have a regulatory RAB model as the basis to provide long term reliable revenues to service the initial upfront expenditure and ongoing operating costs.

    The process for establishing the amount of allowed revenue is derived in the same way as that used in other RAB models, such as that used in water and sewerage. The difference between the RAB model in water and sewerage sector when compared to CCUS is that the allowed revenue and qualifying operating and capital expenditure, will initially be administered by DESNZ prior to Ofgem fulfilling this regulatory role a short period after commercial operations date. RAB based models require significant resources requirements and time to administer. However, on the basis there is not anticipated to be a large number of T&SCo projects, a RAB based model is deemed an appropriate and effective mechanism to provide an attractive financial proposition (environment) to attract investment from the private sector in a cost-efficient manner.

    Revenue Support Agreement

    As uptake of CCUS technology is uncertain due to the maturity of the market there is a significant risk associated with T&SCos being able to generate sufficient allowed revenue under the RAB model based upon number of emitters committed to CCUS on day one. As such, the regulatory structure, at least until the market is more mature and developed, includes a revenue support agreement which acts in a similar manner as CfDs in other sectors such as offshore wind. LCCC is the proposed counterparty to the revenue support agreement responsible for paying T&SCo any shortfall in actual revenue generated when compared to the allowed revenue forecast as per the RAB model. This support mechanism helps to address demand risk as the sector develops.

    The CCUS regulatory framework helps to address risks associated with a First of a Kind (“FOAK”) project through the amalgamation of previous regulatory support mechanisms. Although the current mechanism is likely to evolve as the sector matures, it currently encourages investment within the CCUS sector through providing long term and predictable revenue for equity investors which is supported through a contract with LCCC. Furthermore, it is predicted continual maintenance of assets will occur due to the RAB model and increasing allowed revenue to enable a return on maintenance expenditure. This helps to encourage the adequacy of the level of net revenue alongside the visibility of sufficient value of future similar projects. However, this amalgamation of support mechanisms is not yet practically tested and remains in development until construction beings on large CCUS projects.

    Appendix J – Possible implications of regulatory regimes

    Regulatory Support Mechanism

    Possible impact within heat networks

    CfDs

    • Competitive allocation of subsidy support could help to reduce the overall levels of subsidy required.
    • Helps to develop the market through smaller scale investors’ input, before large scale investors are involved as the sector develops and uncertainties reduce.
    • Demand risk heat networks are exposed to would still be present as unlike sectors for which CfDs are actively present, heat networks are not at full capacity from commercial operations.
    • CfDs more suited to competitive environments as opposed to natural monopolies.
    • Provides long term stable and predictable revenue for a specified period of time.
    • Counterparty for heat networks would need to be agreed.
    • Adequacy of the level of net revenue could be achieved through the competitive CfD process helping to promote investment in the sector.
    • Visibility of sufficient value of future similar projects could be achieved through governments ambition of renewable energy and the availability of implementation into networks.

    RAB & Periodic Price Reviews

    • Could encourage investment within heat networks sector through competition for licencing rights with a set pricing mechanism.
    • Could help mitigate demand and revenue risk for projects of large enough size.
    • Provide long term stable and predictable returns whilst potentially mitigating revenue risk and demand risk if underpinned through a revenue support mechanism.
    • A minimum MWh requirement could be introduced to reduce administrative burden through limiting qualifying project numbers.
    • Potential district heat networks could be added to existing RAB network business subject to legal power and regulatory alignment.
    • Adequacy of the level of net revenue could be achieved through the RAB regime which allows for recovery of the notional cost of debt and equity alongside performance incentives helping to promote investment in the sector.
    • Visibility of sufficient value of future similar projects could be achieved through price controls for each RAB network.

    Grants

    • Could encourage investment within heat networks through subsidising the upfront capital expenditure to aid in commercial operations.
    • Long term stable and predictable revenue alongside the adequacy of the level of net revenue would likely be dependent upon the company managing demand and revenue risk unless further regulatory support mechanisms are put in place.
    • Visibility of sufficient value of future similar projects could help to be addressed through the continuation of government grants and aims for renewable energy generation.
    • Grants could be used to prioritise the development of specific projects which could have the greatest impact in meeting net zero aims.

    RHI type Incentive

    • Could provide long term stable revenue alongside the adequacy of level of net revenue through the aid of tariff payments.
    • Grants and incentives could be used concurrently with tariff payments to provide subsidy for upfront capital costs.
    • Visibility of sufficient value of future similar projects could be achieved through the incentive programme especially when coupled with grants and government net zero aims.

    Appendix K – Regulatory regime overview

    The table below includes analysis performed over regulatory regimes and serves as a basis in selecting comparators for heat networks. The analysis includes typical characteristics of the regulatory sector, timeframe of returns, stakeholders typically involved, key differences in the sector alongside the risk profile of each sector.

    The table can be accessed by downloading the report as a PDF (see top of page).

    How to cite this publication:

    Thomson, N., Davidson, H., Smallman, J. (2025) ‘Funding and financing heat networks in Scotland’, ClimateXChange. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/5740

    © The University of Edinburgh, 2025
    Prepared by EY on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

    While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

    This work was supported by the Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division of the Scottish Government (CoE – CXC).

    ClimateXChange
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    If you require the report in an alternative format such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

    1. Heat Networks (Scotland) Act 2021

    2. Scottish Energy Statistics Hub

    3. Scottish House Condition Survey 2022

    4. Heat Networks Delivery Plan: review report 2024 – gov.scot

    5. Heat In Buildings Strategy: Achieving Net Zero Emissions in Scotland’s Buildings

    6. 2. Overview of policy & regulatory landscape – Heat Networks Delivery Models – gov.scot (www.gov.scot)

    7. Heat In Buildings Strategy: Achieving Net Zero Emissions in Scotland’s Buildings

    8. Heat networks – Renewable and low carbon energy – gov.scot

    9. Heat Networks Delivery Plan: review report 2024 – gov.scot

    10. District Heating Relief – mygov.scot

    11. Heat Network Projects Quarterly Report : Scottish Government Supported Heat Network Projects – September 2024

    12. Heat networks are often driven by non-domestic pricing arrangements. Green levies on non-domestic bills represent a smaller proportion of the total costs but are still a driver of higher electricity prices.

    13. Review of gas and electricity levies and their impact on low carbon heating uptake (climatexchange.org.uk)

    14. The Future of Heating: Meeting the challenge (publishing.service.gov.uk)

    15. DESNZ (BEIS) “International review of heat network frameworks” (2020)

    16. CXC “Lessons from European regulation and practice for Scottish district heating regulation” (2018)

    17. Euroheat & Power “DHC Market Outlook 2024” (2024), CXC “Lessons from European regulation and practice for Scottish district heating regulation” 2018, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications “Possibilities of efficiency in heating and cooling in Estonia” (2016)

    18. Solarthermalworld.org (2022) – Fund of EUR 3 billion for decarbonising German district heating | Solarthermalworld

    19. Burges-Salmon (2024) – The Heat Network Zoning Consultation: Will you be required to connect?

    20. Dutch state set to take control of district heating schemes – DutchNews.nl

    21. Rabobank “Effects of the New Collective Heat Supply Act Determine Investment Climate for District Heating Sector” (2023)

    22. Nordic Investment Bank “NIB finances investments in electricity distribution and district heating in Finland” (2023)

    23. European Investment Bank “Finland: EIB makes loan to replace Helsinki’s fossil-based heating plants with renewable energy” (2024)

    24. AECOM “The rise of energy-efficient heat networks in the UK’s public sector” 2023

    25. Triple Point Heat Networks – “Green Heat Network Fund – guidance for applicants version 8.0” (2024)

    26. Gov.uk – “Full Business Case for Green Heat Network Fund GHNF” (2023)

    27. DESNZ– “Heat Network Efficiency Scheme (HNES) – Guidance for applicants version 5.0) (2024)

    28. Vattenfall (2024) – We’re working to deliver low carbon heat to homes and businesses across the UK. – Vattenfall Heat UK

    29. RVO.NL (2024) – “Heat network investment subsidy (WIS)” Heat Networks Investment Subsidy (WIS)

    30. DLA Piper (2024) – The Decarbonisation of Heat – what can the UK learn from the US, Germany and the Netherlands? | DLA Piper

    31. Interreg HeatNet North West Europe (2020) “Netherlands – national policy framework”

    32. Rabobank “Effects of the New Collective Heat Supply Act Determine Investment Climate for District Heating Sector” (2023)

    33. EIBI (2024) – The Netherlands to ban fossil fuel installations from 2026 – EIBI

    34. Dutch News (2022) – Dutch state set to take control of district heating schemes – DutchNews.nl

    35. Rabobank “Effects of the New Collective Heat Supply Act Determine Investment Climate for District Heating Sector” (2023)

    36. Solarthermalworld.org (2022) – Fund of EUR 3 billion for decarbonising German district heating | Solarthermalworld

    37. BMWK (2024) – BMWK – New heating subsidies

    38. DLA Piper (2024) – The Decarbonisation of Heat – what can the UK learn from the US, Germany and the Netherlands? | DLA Piper

    39. DBDH (2024) “The missing actor in the heat market: how to fill the gap in Germany”

    40. Linklaters (2024) – District heating, heat pumps and hydrogen – how Germany plans to decarbonise its heating sector, Ruth Losch

    41. Vattenfall (2024) – Vattenfall completes sale of its heat business in Germany to the State of Berlin – Vattenfall

    42. Berlin (2023) Berlin considers purchase of Vattenfall’s district heating business – Berlin.de

    43. Berlin (2023) State of Berlin takes over heating network from Vattenfall – Berlin.de

    44. DBDH “The missing actor in the heat market: how to fill the gap in Germany” (2024)

    45. Euroheat & Power (2024) – New projects granted Recovery and Resilience Facility Funding in Finland – Euroheat & Power

    46. Finnish Government (2024) – EUR 72.6 million in investment aid granted to 13 clean energy projects – Finnish Government

    47. Bird & Bird (2024) – Significant tax aid for green investments in the pipeline – Bird & Bird

    48. BEIS (2020) – International Heat Networks – Masrket frameworks research – Regulatory document review

    49. Abrdn (2024) – abrdn: Feeling the heat in Finland

    50. Partners Group (2021) – Partners Group acquires District Heating Platform in Northern Europe

    51. Ulma (2023) – Contribution to the energy efficiency of single-family houses: This means the government’s new proposal

    52. RES Legal (2019) – Renewable energy policy database and support: single

    53. CXC “Lessons from European regulation and practice for Scottish district heating regulation” (2018)

    54. Salite et al (2024) “A comparative analysis of policies and strategies supporting district heating expansion and decarbonisation in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – Lessons for slow adopters of district heating”

    55. PGGM (2021) – PGGM acquires minority stake in Swedish heating company Stockholm Exergi | PGGM

    56. Gren (2024) – Gren in Estonia invests over EUR 20 million in upgrading heating networks – Gren Finland

    57. IEA.org – “Energy price compensation for households” (2023)

    58. EIS Estonia (2024) – Grant for upgrading heaters for small residences | EIS

    59. Riigi Teataja District Heating Act- District Heating Act–Riigi Teataja

    60. Gren (2024) – Gren acquires Viljandi district heating company ESRO – Gren Energy

    61. Triple Point Heat Networks “Unlocking Private Finance in heat networks” (2023)

    62. Clean Energy Wire “Germany opens heating transition support scheme to all groups of building owners” 2024

    63. Nordic Investment Bank – Member countries, governing bodies and capital – Nordic Investment Bank

    64. Nordic Investment Bank – NIB and Rīgas Siltums continue cooperation for efficient heating – Nordic Investment Bank

    65. The Scottish National Investment Bank “Scotland’s transition to net zero heat” (2022)

    Research completed July 2024

    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/4863

    Executive summary

    Aims

    The buildings sector in Scotland accounted for approximately 20% (8.6 MtCO2e) of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in 2020. To help meet Scotland’s climate change emission reduction targets measures to decarbonise heating and deployment of energy efficiency measures will be required. The Scottish Government has consulted on proposals for a Heat in Buildings Bill, setting out how Scotland plans to use its regulatory and policy levers to incentivise deployment of clean heating technologies and energy efficiency measures. The proposals would enforce minimum energy efficiency standards for Scottish homes and, after 2045, prohibit the use of polluting heating systems.

    This study investigates potential impacts of the Bill on the housing market, through a literature review, interviews with stakeholders and a qualitative assessment. We considered potential impacts on a range of metrics, including property and rental prices, length of time properties spend on the market, the number of properties sold or privately let, geographical or archetypical distributional effects and the impact on the mortgage market. We assessed the following four different scenarios against a policy-free baseline:

    • Heat in Building Bill (S1-A): assumes the implementation of all proposals consulted on to form a Heat in Buildings Bill, which sets minimum energy efficiency standards for owner-occupiers and private landlords by the end of 2033 and 2028 respectively and prohibits polluting heating systems after 2045. It also assumes inclusion of the proposed early action trigger points including a requirement that properties replace polluting heating systems within a grace period of two years from the point of purchase, and that properties within a Heat Network Zone end their use of polluting heating systems by a certain date and with a minimum notice period.
    • Heat in Building Bill with a five-year grace period (S1-B): assumes the same regulatory measures as in S1-A, but includes a longer, five-year grace period following both early action trigger points.
    • No-trigger points (S2): assumes the same regulatory measures as in S1-A, but with the removal of early action trigger points.
    • First-time buyers’ exemption (S3): assumes the same backstop dates and early action trigger points as in S1-A, but with an exemption for first-time buyers from compliance with early action trigger points.

    Findings

    While the Heat in Buildings Bill scenario ensures earlier compliance with the regulation, it may also result in a slowdown in activity of the Scottish housing market.

    In the rental market, tenants are likely to bear some of the upfront costs of energy efficiency retrofits in the form of higher rents. Following the introduction of the proposed Bill, landlords may decide to exit the market if they do not want to comply with the regulations.

    Extending the grace periods to five years is not expected to affect compliance rates, compared to a two-year grace period. However, it could delay clean heating installation timings, as homeowners often defer action until the deadline.

    If there were no early-action trigger points, compliance with the regulatory framework may be postponed, leading to delayed action in achieving emissions savings. This could result in a significant increase in demand for energy-efficient homes specifically around the backstop dates, potentially causing a shortage of energy efficient properties.

    The market slowdown where an exemption for first-time buyers is introduced is relatively modest compared to the Heat in Buildings Bill scenario where there are no exemptions.

    Policy implications

    The potential introduction of heating decarbonisation and energy efficiency regulation could decrease purchasing activity in the Scottish housing market, particularly in the Heat in Building Bill scenario (S1-A). Deferring or setting varied deadlines for vulnerable segments of the market (i.e., first-time buyers, low-income households, small-scale private landlords etc.) could partially mitigate this downturn.

    Additionally, extending the grace periods could partially mitigate the adverse market effects induced by the proposed early action trigger points.

    Pairing the regulatory framework with targeted financial support programmes could help lessen these impacts, particularly where they are designed to safeguard vulnerable individuals and help ensure they are able to adhere to the regulations.

    First-time buyers might still encounter difficulties with the additional costs required to meet minimum energy efficiency standards when purchasing properties that are not energy efficient. Extending the deadlines for first-time buyers to meet energy efficiency standards, even when they are exempt from trigger points, could be explored as an option. Additionally, integrating these exemptions with support from help-to-buy schemes could maximise market activity.

    Glossary

    Backstop date

    Backstop dates in the context of Scottish consultation on proposals for a Heat in Buildings Bill are proposed deadlines before which owners of properties are obliged to undertake any work required to meet the Heat in Buildings Standard.

    Clean heating system

    Clean heating systems do not produce emissions directly when used. The most common types include heat pumps, solar PVs and district heating.

    Early action trigger point

    Early action trigger points in the context of the Scottish Consultation on proposals for a Heat in Buildings Bill are obligations placed (a) on purchasers of properties to undertake any work required to meet the clean heating element of the proposed Heat in Buildings Standard after the purchase, within a reasonable timeframe, the so-called ‘grace period’ and (b) on homeowners to join a heat network or install an alternative clean heating system after a notice period when a heat network is available.

    EPC rating

    The Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) rating is a standardised, qualitative assessment of a building’s energy efficiency. It typically ranges from A (most efficient) to G (less efficient).

    Green mortgage

    In this report the term refers to loans intended to finance the purchase energy efficient properties and/or the installation of clean heating systems, as well as to finance energy efficiency retrofits and upgrading to a cleaner heating system. These mortgages often come with incentives such as lower interest rates, cashbacks or additional borrowing capacity to fund eco-friendly upgrades. The market for green mortgages has been growing rapidly in the UK, having grown from 4 such products in 2019 to over 60 in 2024, nevertheless there continue to exist cheaper non-green mortgages available in the UK that may be perceived as more attractive options.

    Green premium/Brown discount

    In this report green premium and brown discount refer to the price difference between comparable energy efficient (equivalent to EPC band A-C) and energy inefficient properties (equivalent to EPC band D-G), and the price difference between comparable clean heating system and polluting heating system properties.

    Homeowner

    Someone who owns a property. This includes both owner-occupiers and landlords.

    Owner-occupier

    Someone who has purchased the home that they live in.

    Polluting heating system

    Polluting heating systems produce emissions directly when used. These include technologies such as oil and gas boilers.

    Introduction

    Background

    Through the Climate Change Act 2019, Scotland has committed to reach net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2045, across all sectors of the economy.

    The buildings sector in Scotland accounts for approximately 20% of the country’s total GHG emissions (Scottish Government, 2024a), hence representing a major source of emissions. GHG emissions in the residential sector are caused mostly by polluting heating systems, such as gas and oil boilers, which produce emissions when used to heat buildings or produce hot water. Decarbonising the residential building stock by 2045 is therefore key to reducing Scotland’s contribution to climate change and achieving net zero targets.[1] However, the current installation rate of clean heating systems falls short of what is needed for Scotland to reach net zero. Taking no action to accelerate the transition to clean heating technologies is expected to lead to missing the 2045 net zero target.

    In this context, effective regulation is expected to accelerate actions towards achieving desired climate and energy efficiency goals, by encouraging property owners to carry out necessary improvements to decarbonise homes. In November 2023, the Scottish Government published a consultation on proposals to make new laws around the energy efficiency of residential buildings and how they are heated (Scottish Government, 2023a). The proposals include homes across Scotland being required to meet a new Heat in Buildings Standard, encompassing both a minimum energy efficiency standard and a prohibition on the use of polluting heating systems. Specifically, the Consultation on proposals for a Heat in Buildings Bill includes the following proposals:

    • Use of polluting heating systems to be prohibited after 2045.
    • An early action trigger point to ease the transition to 2045, whereby those purchasing a home are required to end use of polluting heating systems within a grace period of 2-5 years following completion of the sale.
    • A further trigger point requiring properties within a Heat Network Zone to end use of polluting heating systems (by a certain date, and with a minimum notice period).
    • A minimum energy efficiency standard to be met by owner-occupiers by the end of 2033 and by the end of 2028 for private landlords.

    Objectives of this study

    This study aims to investigate the potential impacts of the Consultation proposals for a Heat in Buildings Bill on the Scottish housing market with a particular focus on the following key indicators:

    • Sales and rental prices;
    • Length of time properties spend on the market;
    • Number of properties sold or privately let;
    • Geographical or archetypical distributional effects;
    • Impacts on the mortgage market, particularly focusing on changes in supply and demand for green mortgages.

    Specifically, it explores the implications for the housing market associated with four different scenarios of potential regulatory measures. These include the introduction of heating and energy efficiency regulations at proposed backstop dates and trigger points (S1-A), extension of the grace period for trigger points (S1-B), removal of point of purchase trigger points from regulatory proposals (S2), and potential exemptions for first-time buyers from trigger points (S3).

    Data limitations hinder quantitative assessment, so the study included a systematic desk-based review to capture a wide body of evidence, followed by stakeholder engagement and an extensive qualitative assessment. These were used to infer potential housing market implications associated with the introduction of heat and energy efficiency regulatory measures. We consulted with a wide range of housing market actors, including Scottish Property Federation, Property Mark, Scottish Association of Landlords, Charted Institute of Housing, ESPC, Zoopla, Rightmove, Rettie, RICS, UK Finance, Lloyds Banking Group, Nationwide, and Savills (see Section 8.1).

    A review of linkages between heating and energy efficiency regulations and the housing market

    This section presents the evidence on the linkages between heating and energy efficiency regulations and the housing market. We carried out a literature review, examining both academic and grey literature sources to inform our work[2]. The key findings of this research are presented below. However, a more detailed summary of the literature review can be found in Section 8.3.

    The literature review focused on the impact of domestic energy efficiency on house sale and rental prices and other elements of housing market dynamics, more specifically on whether and to what extent heating and energy efficiency regulations affect the housing market. We considered several different housing market impacts, including price premiums or discounts, and the time it takes to sell or let a property depending on its energy efficiency and the type of heating system (i.e., clean or polluting). The variation in these indicators was considered based on geography and property archetypes. Additionally, we carried out research on the potential impact of different grace period lengths on the housing market and on homeowners’ behaviours.

    Only a very limited number of studies were found to assess the impact of the installation of clean heating systems on property prices. Also, the number of homes sold and the number of properties available for short-term let were found to be largely understudied in the reviewed literature. While we found no evidence of the impact of energy efficiency and the installation of heating systems on the Scottish housing market specifically, there is a body of relevant academic and grey literature that contains important findings:

    • Energy efficiency matters when purchasing or renting a home. Properties are sold or let at a higher price if they are more energy efficient. However, the green premium and brown discount (see Glossary) are less pronounced in the rental market than in the sales market. Also, it is difficult to decouple the green premium and brown discount from other property characteristics (i.e., style, quality, newness, decoration).
    • Limited information is available on the price impact of installing clean heating systems. While clean heating systems tend to increase property prices, studies have assessed this impact in climatic and market conditions that differ from Scotland. Some factors can significantly influence the existence and magnitude of green premiums and brown discounts. These include the region, climate conditions, urban-rural differences, local property prices and dwelling archetypes.
    • Longer grace periods associated with clean heating system installation trigger points reduce the perceived costs of installation.
    • There is a convincing business case for green mortgages and green retrofit mortgages, yet market availability in Scotland is currently quite low.

    How different heating and energy efficiency regulation scenarios could affect the Scottish housing market

    In order to assess the impact of different policy options for heating and energy efficiency regulations, we developed a policy-free baseline, which assumes that no proposed policies consulted in the Heat in Buildings Bill are introduced. Four regulatory scenarios were considered:

    • Heat in Buildings Bill scenario (S1-A), assuming all proposals included in the consultation on a Heat in Buildings Bill are implemented.
    • Heat in Buildings Bill scenario with a longer grace period for the proposed early action trigger points (S1-B).
    • Heat in Buildings Bill scenario with the removal of the proposed early action trigger points (S2).
    • Heat in Buildings Bill scenario with first-time buyer exemption from proposed early action trigger points (S3).

    These are illustrated in Figure 1 and assessed in detail in the following sections.

    We conducted a qualitative scenario analysis to compare each regulatory scenario against the policy-free scenario. The assessment draws upon important findings from the literature review (discussed in Section 4 and further explored in Section 8.3) with further insights from the stakeholder consultation process (see Section 8.1). The qualitative assessment reveals the relationship between different proposed regulatory measures and their expected impacts (e.g., the direction of the impact and potential consequences), but does not quantify them due to the scope of the research and limitations around data availability. As the scenarios differ only in their policy assumptions and assume the same evolution of other factors, only the impact of the policy is assessed.

    We use the terms “(green) premium” and “(brown) discount” to refer to the price difference between comparable energy efficient (equivalent to EPC band A-C) and energy inefficient properties (equivalent to EPC band D-G), and the price difference between comparable clean heating system and polluting heating system properties (see Glossary).

    Figure 1: Summary of regulatory scenarios considered in this study

    Notes: The Heat in Buildings Bill scenario (S1-A) assumes the implementation of the proposals outlined in the Scottish Government’s consultation on a Heat in Buildings Bill. Trigger points refer to early actions requiring (a) property purchasers to install a clean heating system within a grace period after purchasing a property (property purchase trigger point) and (b) homeowners to join a heat network or install an alternative clean heating system after a notice period when a heat network is available.

    Policy-free baseline

    The policy-free baseline has been designed to capture the key underlying trends against which the other scenarios are compared.

    Our policy-free baseline assumes that no further Scottish or UK-wide policies are introduced up to 2045 to regulate the installation of clean heating or energy efficiency in the residential buildings sector. However, this does not imply that decarbonisation of the residential building stock will stop. Several market drivers and behavioural changes are expected to continue driving energy efficiency and clean heating uptake without policy intervention. These drivers refer to regulations already in force, including changes to Building Regulations which require that all new build properties meet strict energy efficiency requirements from 2023, and the New Build Heat Standard (NBHS) which prohibits the installation of polluting heating systems in new buildings applying for a building warrant from 1 April 2024[3] (Scottish Government, 2024b). Drivers also include increasing climate awareness, greater awareness of the comfort enjoyed in energy efficient buildings and the expected reduction in the installation costs of clean heating systems.

    Other key drivers including electricity and gas prices or general macroeconomic conditions (e.g., GDP growth rate, inflation) also affect the decarbonisation rate of domestic buildings. However, it was not within the scope of this project to make assumptions about the future evolution of these drivers.

    Heat in Buildings Bill (S1-A)

    The Heat in Buildings Bill scenario (hereafter S1-A) includes the proposed policies in the consultation on a Heat in Buildings Bill (hereafter: policies) (Scottish Government, 2023a), and assumes that all proposals as consulted on are introduced. It includes the following measures:

    • All domestic buildings achieve a minimum energy efficiency standard, which is broadly equivalent to EPC band C, before the end of 2033 for owner-occupied homes and before the end of 2028 for privately let properties.
    • Polluting heating systems are phased out by 2045, with trigger points ahead of this date in the following circumstances:
      • Point of purchase trigger point: all sold dwellings must end the use of any polluting heating systems within 2 years of purchase[4].
      • Heat network zones trigger point: properties within a Heat Network Zone end their use of polluting heating systems with a 3-year specified notice period[5].

    This section first describes the expected impact of this scenario on the property market (for owner occupiers), followed by the rental market. Finally, the intra-market effects between the property and rental market are discussed.

    Owner-occupied homes

    The expected impacts of the policies are illustrated in Figure 8 (see Section 0) which separates owner-occupied homes into two categories: homes which do not meet the requirements of the policies (referred to as energy-inefficient properties, with EPC rating of D to G, without clean heating systems); and energy-efficient homes with an EPC rating of A-C (with or without a clean heating system)[6]. While several housing market impacts are described in this section, an in-depth analysis about the price premium of installing energy-efficiency retrofits and clean heating systems is included in Section 5.6.

    The proposed property purchase trigger point, which requires clean heating systems to be installed within a set grace period following the purchase of a property (assumed to be 2 years in this scenario), is expected to place an additional financial burden on purchasers. This may substantially influence the decisions of individuals considering moving, as they will face an additional cost when moving to a new property without a clean heating system installed. The proposed property purchase trigger point affects both individuals living in energy-inefficient and energy-efficient homes. However, the proposed regulation is likely to particularly impact owner-occupiers currently living in energy-efficient properties. These owner-occupiers are not required to retrofit their homes under the proposed policies, which may result in them being discouraged from moving elsewhere (however, they are still required to install a clean heating system by 2045). A study by Zalejska-Jonsson (2014) indicates that people living in green properties are less likely to move to a non-green property[7]. As a result, the regulation could result in a reduction of the number of energy-efficient homes put up for sale.

    Alternatively, trigger points may shift the demand towards properties where clean heating systems are already installed. Therefore, the prices of properties that have already had a clean heating system installed are expected to rise, reflecting the costs of installation in the property’s value[8],[9].

    As a result, future homebuyers are likely to postpone or abandon their plans for moving, leading to a lower number of properties sold in the market. In other words, by raising the overall cost of moving for all potential buyers, early action trigger points may behave akin to a tax on a house purchase, reducing the number of transactions. As the housing market slows down, the time properties take to sell is also expected to increase. The housing market impacts of trigger points can be likened to the UK Stamp Duty Land Tax, which the literature deems to be an excessively distortive tax (Scanlon et al., 2021), causing market slowdown and ensuing housing inefficiencies (people do not move as expected when there is a change in their living circumstances, e.g., when children move away).

    From a policy point of view, when people move from an energy-inefficient home to a new property, they face three options:

    1. Moving to an energy-efficient property with clean heating system. When people move from an energy-inefficient property to an energy-efficient home with a clean heating system, they will not be required to carry out any further retrofitting after moving in. As a result, energy-efficient properties with a clean heating system can become more attractive when people are looking to buy. Retrofitting a home (either due to energy efficiency backstop dates or the property purchase trigger point) involves additional financial and non-financial costs. These include the time and effort spent making arrangements with professionals to carry out the retrofitting and installation works, as well as the general disruption the work causes. In fact, backstop dates in general may incentivise some people to move to an energy-efficient home with a clean heating system instead of retrofitting their own property to avoid these non-monetary burdens[10]. As a result, backstop dates may increase the number of homes sold [11].
      Theoretically, regulation may also lead to a shift in the demand from houses to flats as they are typically more energy efficient than other building archetypes[12]. Some stakeholders could also imagine a shift towards different archetypes. However, they emphasised the high uncertainty behind this and the fact that energy efficiency is not a key driver when people buy (or rent) a property. Therefore, the proposed policies are expected to have only a marginal impact on demand for different building archetypes. As a result of the regulation, more people are expected to search for an energy-efficient property with a clean heating system when considering moving. This may lead to an increased demand for energy-efficient properties, while the supply of energy-inefficient properties may also increase. Ultimately, this may lead to greater brown discounts for energy-inefficient properties or properties without a clean heating system. Over time, however, energy-efficient properties with clean heating systems are expected to represent a higher proportion of the residential building stock due to the policies. This may lead to greater supply of these properties[13], counterbalancing the increased demand to some extent. For more discussion of the evolution of the price premium due to energy efficiency and clean heating system see Section 5.6.
    2. Moving to an energy efficient property without a clean heating system. People moving into these types of properties are required to install a clean heating system within a defined grace period. This purchase trigger point will place both financial (i.e., the cost of installing a clean heating system) and non-financial (i.e., finding the optimal solution) costs on purchasers. This can lead to a higher brown discount for properties without a clean heating system. Purchasers comparing similar homes with or without a clean heating system may demand a discount for properties with a polluting heating system. This is because they are required to install a clean heating system within 2 years of the purchase, which is in addition to the purchase price.
    3. Moving to an energy inefficient property without clean heating system. Moving to an energy-inefficient property without a clean heating system will activate the purchase trigger point and requires the owner to install a clean heating system within the grace period and meet energy efficiency requirements by the backstop date[14]. However, people are likely to factor in the upfront costs of retrofitting as an additional burden on the top of the purchase price. This is particularly important close to the energy efficiency backstop date. Higher additional costs due to the energy inefficiency of the property could lead to a harder negotiation when purchasing these kinds of properties, since people depreciate the value of the property to some extent. As a result, the brown discount could increase. This is broadly consistent with one of the key findings of the stakeholder interviews highlighting that closer to the backstop dates, fewer people will be willing to move to an energy-inefficient property, resulting in the brown discount increasing over time (see Section 8.1).

    When people decide not to move, they will not be affected by the proposed property purchase trigger points and will only have to meet the policy requirements by the backstop dates. Others, who would not move anyway, will also be unaffected by the purchase trigger point but required to meet requirements by backstop dates.

    However, properties that are not sold or purchased between the introduction of the regulations and 2045 may be affected by the proposed heat network zones trigger point and are still required to comply with the minimum energy efficiency standards by the end of 2033. If the owner of a property is notified (e.g. by the local government) that a heat network is available for connection, they need to stop using a polluting heating system within a specified period of time, such as 2 or 3 years. It is proposed that owner-occupiers would have a choice of either joining the heat network or installing alternative clean heating solutions within the same grace period. While this trigger point is important in accelerating the decarbonisation of the residential building stock, it is challenging to assess its impact. The First National Assessment of Potential Heat Network Zones study (Scottish Government, 2022) assessed the potential geographical areas for heat networks based on different criteria, but no decision has been made on the final area. Some stakeholders also mentioned that there is uncertainty about the extent of heat network zones. They also reported that current and potential future homeowners have a poor understanding and awareness of heat network technology and its potential zones. Therefore, in this study we assume that homeowners do not consider a heat network as an opportunity when looking for a new property or as a potential future cost if they decide not to move from their current home. This assumption significantly diminishes the potential housing market impacts of the heat network zones trigger point, but it may still affect it to some extent.

    Due to the uncertainty around the future extension of the heat network zones, the heat network zone trigger point may interact with the housing market in three cases:

    • People may decide to purchase a property without a clean heating system installed in an area where connection to the heat network is not possible at the time of purchase. In this case, they will be required to install a clean heating system within the grace period, and they are likely to negotiate the price similarly to any other property without a clean heating system. If the heat network becomes available for connection within the grace period, the purchasers can decide to join it (or install a different type of clean heating system), but this is not expected to have an impact on the housing market as it was not known at the time of purchase. It is important to note that the proposed policies do not require a home located in a future heat network zone to join it if that home already has a clean heating system installed.
    • Alternatively, people may decide to move into a home which is located in an announced heat network zone but has not joined it. In this case, purchasers are free to install the most appropriate clean heating system option, such as joining the heat network or installing a different type of clean heating system[15]. If connecting to the heat network is cheaper than installing another type of clean heating system, the seller and the purchaser may agree on a higher price compared to a similar home not located in a heat network zone: the purchaser could offer a higher price because of the expected lower financial burden of connecting to a heat network.
    • For owner-occupiers who have not moved since the policy was introduced, the heat network trigger point could accelerate the phase-out of polluting heating systems. Notified owner-occupiers are required to connect to the heat network or install a clean heating system within a grace period which could be earlier than the backstop date. This requirement could increase the supply of homes with clean heating systems. However, most heat network zones won’t be available for connection until after 2035. Most owner-occupiers would therefore be phasing out their polluting heating system (due to the backstop dates) when most heat network connections become available (around 2040). The overall impacts of the heat network trigger point for existing owner-occupied homes are therefore likely to be minimal.

    The proposed policies are also expected to increase the demand for green mortgages. The increase is expected due to the additional burden of covering the upfront costs of retrofitting (due to the trigger points or backstop dates). When people cannot fully finance the retrofit, they may apply for a loan[16]. If the supply of green mortgages is sufficient and the product is competitively priced, it is expected that the regulation could lead to the growth of the green mortgage market. Stakeholders involved in green mortgages also expect an increase in the total value of green mortgages over time.

    One caveat is that, without further measures, the policies included in this scenario can have a disproportionally high cost on people in lower income groups. Due to their lower incomes, they are less likely to be able to afford the upfront costs of retrofitting and to get a green mortgage at a competitive price. In addition, the increase in the brown discount could have a negative impact on them as they may need to sell their homes at a lower price if they want to move.

    Rental market

    The proposed policies in the consultation on a Heat in Buildings Bill (hereafter: policies) also require private landlords to carry out energy efficiency retrofits (equivalent to EPC band C) before the end of 2028 and to install a clean heating system by 2045. The property purchase trigger would also be required to be met by landlords wishing to enter the market or expand their portfolio.

    Three main factors can drive the impacts on the private rental market as a result of the policies, which are illustrated in Figure 9 (see Section 0):

    • Retrofitting due to the policies. The policies require landlords to retrofit their properties. A key issue is whether and to what extent landlords and tenants bear the upfront costs (in the form of higher rents). Stakeholders reported that there is a significant housing shortage in the Scottish rental market, particularly in larger cities. Therefore, an increase in rents is expected to have a low impact on the demand for rented properties. In other words, renters would have little or no opportunity to move to another property if they do not want to or cannot afford to pay a higher rent. This implies that tenants are expected to bear the costs of retrofitting, at least to some extent, in the form of higher rents.
      It is important to note that at the time of writing there were temporary modifications in place to the way in which applications for a review of a rent increase are determined by Rent Service Scotland, which limit rental increases to some extent where a review is sought. These measures are intended to support the transition away from the rent cap under the Cost of Living (Tenant Protection) (Scotland) Act 2022 which ended on the 31 March 2024. (Scottish Government, 2024c).
      Also, due to the shortage of rental properties, landlords may not be concerned about losing their tenants while carrying out refurbishments (i.e., tenants need to bear some non-financial costs, such as the general disruption installation work causes)[17],[18] as they expect new tenants to move into the property following completion of the works.
    • Exiting the market. Landlords who do not want to carry out or cannot afford the cost of retrofitting have the option of selling their properties. Stakeholders agreed that this option may be considered by many. According to interviewed representatives in the Scottish rental market, many landlords plan to reduce the size of their portfolios, as a result of market interventions during the pandemic and the energy crisis[19]. The heat and energy efficiency regulation might lead to a similar effect, particularly if the housing shortage in the sales market is taken into account (i.e., a high price in the property market can be achieved). According to a recent Rightmove report (2023), 33% of all landlords in Great Britain who own a property with an EPC rating below C would choose to sell rather than retrofit. If some landlords do decide to leave the rental market, this could exacerbate the rental housing shortage and lead to higher rental prices.
    • New dwellings can enter the market. Properties which meet the requirements of the policies may enter the rental market. These are likely to be new builds or already retrofitted homes which were owner-occupied or unoccupied prior to entering the rental market[20]. High rental prices can create an incentive (among other considerations[21]) for new landlords to enter the market and for the landlords already holding buy-to-let properties to expand their portfolio. As a result, these properties can reduce the shortage in the rental market (increase the supply) and, therefore, reduce rental prices.

    Interactions between the sales and rental market

    The policies proposed in the consultation on a Heat in Buildings Bill (hereafter: policies) are expected to have an impact on the number of homes sold and let. There are two main interacting impacts, partly outlined already in Sections 5.2.1 and in 5.2.2 and depicted in Figure 11 (Section 0):

    1. Landlords may sell their properties due to the implementation of the regulation. This can have a negative impact on the rental market since it can reduce the supply of properties for letting and, therefore, rents may increase. Conversely, these properties can appear on the sales market. They therefore can increase the supply of properties for sale and may reduce sales prices.
    2. New buy-to-let properties may enter the rental market. Properties that meet the policy requirements are more likely to enter the rental market, particularly when local rental prices are high. In this case, they can increase the supply in the rental market and, therefore, rent prices may be reduced. Conversely, these properties would not enter the sales market (e.g., new builds would not be sold for owner-occupation but used as buy-to-let properties). This can lead to a reduction in the housing supply and therefore can lead to higher sales prices.

    The number of properties on the rental and sales markets is not affected by decisions made by owner-occupiers and landlords to retrofit their homes (while retrofitting is likely to affect the rental prices and/or the value of the property).

    In conclusion, the rental and sales markets are strongly linked to each other. Policy-induced actions (e.g., exit or entry to the rental market) can have a converse effect on the other market (e.g., increase or decrease in the number of homes sold). However, determining the relative magnitude of these impacts is challenging and therefore the overall impact on the rental and housing market cannot be concluded at this point.

    Heat in Buildings Bill with 5-year grace period (S1-B)

    The Heat in Buildings Bill with 5-year grace period (hereafter: S1-B) includes the same policies as the S1-A scenario, but the grace periods for the property purchase and heat network trigger points are set to 5 years (compared to 2 and 3 years, respectively) (see Figure 1). The reason for exploring S1-B is to consider the impact of a longer grace period for both early action trigger points on the housing market. For this reason, the outcomes of S1-B are compared against the outcomes of S1-A, and not against a policy-free baseline.

    While key housing market impacts of the S1-B scenario are presented below, a more in-depth analysis about the price impact of installing energy-efficiency retrofits and clean heating systems are included in Section 5.6.

    Sales market

    We based findings from the literature presented in Section 8.3, which draws heavily on the findings of behavioural economics, and on the stakeholder interviews (see Section 8.1). Implications of a longer grace period for the heat network zone trigger point are discussed later in this section. Three key housing market drivers in the sales market associated with a longer grace period of the proposed property purchase trigger points have been identified (see also Figure 10 in Section 0).

    • Lower average cost per year. In the case of a longer grace period, the average cost per year of installing a clean heating system (the salient cost of compliance) is lower compared to a 2-year grace period (in the case of the purchase trigger point) as owner occupiers are expected to spread out the perceived costs over the longer 5-year period. This may result in a lower perceived financial burden for purchasers. In addition, some homeowners may expect further innovation in clean heating solutions (in particular a reduction in price) in future, which may lead to lower real cost of installation.
    • More time to plan and install the optimal solution. A longer grace period allows people to better plan their finances. Stakeholders agreed that a two-year grace period may rush people into decisions, and they may not properly consider their options in this period. This could lead them to install a clean heating system which is more expensive or less efficient than another solution.
    • Poorer understanding and/or appreciation of future costs and opportunities. Based on the findings of behavioural economics, supported by the views of stakeholders, it is realistic to assume that a longer grace period may lead to a poorer understanding of costs. This means, for example, that purchasers are more likely to see the installation of a clean heating system as a future problem. Purchasers would be more biased about how much the installation would cost and would have less incentive to track these future costs. This contrasts with the previous point, i.e., that people would plan more carefully if the grace period were longer. Instead of rational planning, many people may rush to install a clean heating system at the end of the grace period. Stakeholders mentioned that most purchasers are often unaware of the available clean heating system solutions and their financial and non-financial costs. Also, the type of the heating system in a property is not the primary focus of the purchasers and they may not be aware of or realistically consider the requirements of the policy.

    These three drivers all lead to a lower perceived cost of installing a clean heating system in a newly purchased home and to a lower perceived value of an installed clean heating system. As a result, a longer grace period may reduce the green premium for properties with a clean heating system installed compared to a shorter grace period from the proposed property purchase trigger point. In addition, the purchase of a new home can be perceived to be relatively cheaper in the case of a longer grace period, compared to S1-A, due to the lower average cost per year and to the lower perception of future costs. Therefore, more properties are expected to be sold when the grace period is longer. In other words, the 2-year grace period for the property purchase trigger point can be a stronger disincentive to move than a 5-year grace period, as highlighted by stakeholders when interviewed[22].

    It is also important to note that a 5-year grace period can make it more likely that people move into a different property before the end of the grace period. As highlighted by the interviewed stakeholders, this is especially the case for first-time buyers, who are the most likely to move multiple times in a shorter period of time compared to others, due better financial circumstances or a growing family. Those individuals who purchased a property after the introduction of the policy and are required to install a clean heating system within the grace period are more likely to resell their property prior to the installation of a clean heating system at the end of the grace period. This can lead to less intense negotiation when they buy a property without a clean heating system: they may consider moving again in a 5-year period, so they would not fully assess the cost of installing a clean heating system[23]. This can result in a smaller brown discount (i.e., a smaller difference in price between similar homes with and without a clean heating system). However, stakeholders mentioned that owner-occupiers are more likely to use this opportunity than landlords. This is due to the relatively high tax on purchase (which significantly diminishes the return on the property investment in the short term) and the general view that landlords purchase properties as a form of long-term investment.

    The S1-B scenario also includes a longer grace period for the proposed heat network trigger point (i.e., 5 years compared to 3 years in the S1-A scenario). However, the extension of this grace period is expected to have little impact on the housing market under the assumption made in Section 5.2. As people are not aware of the future geographic extent of the heat network and the potential time when connection will be available, they cannot consider the potential costs and benefits of connection. This uncertainty is independent of the length of the grace period. However, when a home is purchased in an area where the connection to the heat network is possible, but not yet carried out, the purchasers have a longer period to comply with the regulation. Similar to the property purchase trigger point, this longer grace period can lead to a lower average cost per year, more time to plan and a poorer understanding of the benefits of connecting to the heat network[24]. This may result in a lower green premium for these homes compared to the S1-A scenario. As a key finding, the overall impact of the 5-year grace period on the heat network trigger point may lead to a smaller green premium compared to a 3-year grace period.

    Rental market

    The length of the grace period does not directly affect most rental market participants. Landlords who already own a property at the time of the introduction of the policy and those landlords who decide to leave the rental market (for any reason) are not affected by the property purchase trigger point and are therefore not affected by the length of the grace period (see Figure 12 in Section 0). However, a clean heating system needs to be installed by 2045.

    The length of the grace period could affect the potential for new entrants to the rental market and therefore can have a direct impact on the supply of homes let. Potential new landlords (or landlords expanding their portfolio) considering buying a property to let, would face similar market drivers to owner-occupiers. These could include, in a case of a longer grace period, more time for financial and non-financial planning[25]; finding the optimal clean heating system without rushing to install one and a poorer understanding and lower perception of actual costs. In addition, some landlords may delay the installation due the expectation of lower future costs, driven by innovation (price reduction) or, if they manage a portfolio, through learning-by-doing effects (i.e., they can gain experience in installing a clean heating system in one property and apply it later in another property). As a result, a 5-year grace period could reduce the disincentive for landlords to purchase a property compared to a 2-year grace period, resulting in a relatively higher supply of rental properties. However, most stakeholders highlighted that the property purchase trigger point is likely to discourage landlords from entering the market in the first place, irrespective of the length of the grace period.

    The aforementioned housing market impacts can also affect rental prices. Stakeholders agreed that most purchasers do not perceive a value in having a clean heating system installed in their rental property, and therefore landlords cannot fully pass on the cost to the tenants through higher rents (although there will of course be value-driven tenants in some cases). In other words, when comparing two similar properties with and without a clean heating system, landlords cannot fully differentiate through rents based on the type of clean heating system installed. However, the type of local housing market is also relevant here: if it is supply-driven (there is a shortage of rental properties), landlords have more power to pass on the upfront costs to the tenants in the form of higher rents. Conversely, in a demand-driven local market, where tenants have more power and choice, less differentiation in rents is possible. Ultimately, this means that in a supply-driven housing market, landlords can pass on the upfront cost of installing a clean heating system to the tenants, which can be higher if the grace period is shorter. Alternatively, a 5-year grace period may reduce the disincentive for new landlords to enter the market, resulting in a relatively higher supply of rental properties, ultimately leading to reduced rental prices.

    No-trigger points (S2)

    The ‘No-trigger points’ scenario (hereafter: S2) includes the same policies as the S1-A scenario but excludes both early action trigger points (see Figure 1). While key housing market impacts of the S2 scenario are presented below, a more in-depth analysis about the price impact of installing energy-efficiency retrofits and clean heating systems are included in Section 5.6. Figure 13 in Section 0 illustrates the main changes in the S2 scenario.

    As discussed in Section 5.2, early action trigger points can raise the total cost of moving. This could be through the cost of installing a clean heating system where it had not been installed yet, or through the costs being included in the price where the installation had already been carried out. In the S2 scenario, this increase in costs is not present, so the sales market is not expected to slow down, and the time it takes to sell a property on the market is also expected to remain unaffected.

    As buying and selling properties does not trigger any further actions from the buyers’ side, the main question owners of energy inefficient homes face is how they want to meet the energy efficiency requirements before the end of 2033 and later the clean heating system requirement by 2045. The closer in time a given backstop date is, the more it is expected to matter to buyers. Since the backstop date for clean heating systems is likely perceived to be far into the future, initially only a small fraction of buyers may take this into consideration and with a relatively small weight compared to a policy-free baseline. However, as the backstop dates approach, a growing fraction of market players could account for them, and the ensuing market dynamics impact everyone who participates in the housing market or is considering participation.

    Owner-occupiers of energy-inefficient homes without a clean heating system face the choice of carrying out the retrofitting works and/or installing a clean heating system in their own homes, but they also have the option to move to another home in which the required works have already been carried out. This latter option can be attractive as not only have the financial costs of retrofitting been covered, but owner-occupiers can also avoid the non-financial costs associated with retrofitting (such as the time and effort spent on searching for and arranging professionals to carry out the installation, and the stress and disruption the work can cause). If owner-occupiers choose to move, the demand for energy-efficient homes with clean heating system and the supply for energy-inefficient homes can increase, while the demand for energy-inefficient homes would tend to decrease. This would bring about an increased brown discount. Although the backstop dates only directly concern owner-occupiers of energy inefficient properties, owners of energy-efficient properties moving for other reasons might also be increasingly inclined to look for energy-efficient properties. This could reinforce the increase of the brown discount.

    If owner-occupiers choose to stay and carry out energy efficiency retrofitting in their homes as the relevant 2033 backstop date approaches, it is arguable that there are efficiencies to exploit if they also decide to install a clean heating system. Should they not do so, by the end of 2045 they will have to undergo further work to replace their heating system with a clean technology or move to a home with a clean heating system.

    First-time buyer exemption (S3)

    The final scenario (hereafter: S3) includes the same policies and trigger points as the S1-A scenario, but with an exemption from the property purchase trigger point for first-time buyers. In other words, first-time buyers would not need to replace polluting heating systems within the grace period (assumed to be 2 years in this scenario)[26]. Figure 14 in Section 0 illustrates the main changes in the S3 scenario.

    Since the removal of help-to-buy schemes, first-time buyers cease to be financially supported by the government in buying a property. As their relative purchasing power is likely to be lower compared to those that have already owned a home, potential first-time buyers either have to remain in their current living arrangements (on the rental market or with family) or settle for more affordable, likely energy-inefficient properties (without a clean heating system).

    Especially in the early years of the policy, a first-time buyer exemption from the proposed property purchase trigger point is similar to the 2017 Stamp Duty Land Tax First-time Buyers’ Relief in England and Northern Ireland. This amounted to a reduction of up to £10,000 of overall costs of moving. A report published by the UK Government (2023) suggests that the relief resulted in an 11% and 18% increase in transactions over and above the volume of the transactions of first-time buyers that would have taken place in absence of the policy for the two relevant discrete mortgage value bands studied. Although first-time buyers are subject to the clean heating system backstop date of 2045, the exemption from the proposed property purchase trigger point is likely to enhance their purchasing power in the housing market compared to S1-A and S1-B scenarios. It follows that exempting first-time buyers from the trigger point could make homes with a polluting heating systems more attractive to first-time buyers as it postpones the burden of having to upgrade to a clean heating system. Moreover, the brown discount for polluting heating system homes could still be present on the market, as the additional cost of the heating system upgrade would still remain for the majority of buyers. As a consequence, properties with polluting heating systems could be cheaper on the market. However, as first-time buyers are only obliged to install a clean heating system by the backstop date (the end of 2045), they do not bear the cost of installing a clean heating system in the near future. As a result, they would face a lower effective price for properties without a clean heating system. Although the costs of installation are expected to continue to affect first-time buyers in the long run, they could receive some short-term financial relief from their liquidity limitations.

    Property price premium associated with energy efficiency and clean heating systems

    In this section, the price premium associated with energy efficiency retrofitting and the installation of clean heating systems is analysed in greater detail.

    Property price premium associated with installing a clean heating system

    The expected property price premium associated with installing a clean heating system over time by scenario is visualised in Figure 2 below. Figure 2 is illustrative only, as no quantitative assessment has been carried out to estimate values. The blue line in the chart shows the main trend in the evolution of the price premium. The shaded area represents the degree of uncertainty: the larger the area is in a given year, the greater the expected uncertainty.

    Stakeholders interviewed agree that there is currently no price premium for properties with clean heating systems in the Scottish housing market (see Section 8.1). This is due to several factors, including the fact that clean heating technologies are not yet widely used in Scotland, which leads to a lack of understanding about and confidence in these technologies. The most valued heating system is gas central heating as it is perceived to be easy to use and households are familiar with it. For these reasons, the price premium in Figure 2 starts at zero in all scenarios.

    In the policy-free baseline, we expect a slow increase in the price premium for properties with clean heating systems. The main drivers include the expected decrease in installation costs due to forthcoming innovation, increased supply of trained installers and the lower running cost due to the greater efficiency of clean heating systems (subject to the relative price of electricity to gas at any point in time). Additionally, the increasing climate consciousness and the increased confidence in new technologies (due to higher installation rates and awareness) could contribute to a slowly increasing price premium. These are supported by a study carried out in Finland, where heat pumps are already widely understood and used. Vimpari (2023) reported a significant price premium for homes with ground-source heat pumps compared to other heating technologies in Finland[27]. Also, properties with an air-source heat pump tend to have a higher price premium in those US regions where climate consciousness is higher (Shen et al., 2021).

    In S1-A and S1-B, there are two main drivers of the premium:

    1. Time effect: As the backstop date of the prohibition on polluting heating systems (2045) approaches, more people are expected to realise that they need to comply with the clean heating regulations. As shown earlier, this could lead to harder negotiations on price for properties without clean heating systems and higher demand for properties where they are already installed. As a result, the premium for properties with clean heating systems may increase over time.
    2. Impact of trigger points: If the proposed property purchase trigger point is introduced, buyers are required to retrofit their heating system within a proposed grace period after a house purchase. However, close to the introduction of this proposed regulation, only a limited number of properties are expected to be equipped with clean heating systems. Those people who want to avoid retrofitting their home after moving will likely need to pay a higher premium for these homes as the supply is constrained. However, in time, the number of homes with clean heating systems will increase (e.g., due to the trigger points and due to the New Build Heat Standard (Scottish Government, 2024b) enforcing the installation of clean heating systems in new builds from 1 April 2024). This could lead to a jump in the green premium at the introduction of the policies, but it is expected to decrease over time.

    The effects of time and trigger points are expected to work in the opposite direction over the regulatory period (i.e., from the introduction of the proposed regulations to 2045). This could lead to a ‘U’ shape over time, as visualised in Figure 2 below. However, it is important to note that there is a high degree of uncertainty in the magnitude of the different impacts. This uncertainty is particularly pronounced in the case of the impact of the trigger points (introduced in the second point above) as the housing shortage on the property market is a key driver. In addition, while buyers do consider the heating technology when purchasing a property, many stakeholders emphasised that other factors, such as characteristics of the neighbourhood, property archetype, size, etc. can be more important to buyers.

    In S2, only time has an impact on the price premium. Therefore, a constant increase is expected in the price premium. As people become aware of the approaching backstop dates, the installation of clean heating systems cannot be postponed any longer. This is why the shaded area below the main trend in Figure 2 is shrinking: a relatively higher premium is expected for properties with clean heating systems, with less uncertainty. It is also important to note that the installation rate of clean heating systems (see Figure 4 in Section 8.2) is also a key driver of the premium. If only a limited number of properties have clean heating systems installed, and the backstop date for the prohibition on polluting heating systems is close (2045), potential purchasers are likely to pay more for a property with a clean heating system – otherwise, they will have to install it themselves. In S2, we expect the installation rate of clean heating systems to be relatively lower than S1-A due to the lack of trigger points resulting in the majority of installations taking place around the backstop date. This may inflate the price of properties with a clean heating system, as their supply is expected to be limited.

    Finally, in S3, we expect the price premium to be a mix of the S1-A and S2 scenarios. This means that we expect first-time buyers to behave as in the S2 scenario, i.e. to postpone the installation of clean heating systems to some extent. Other buyers would (and are required to) behave similarly as in the S1-A scenario. As first-time buyers represent around 25% of the market (calculated from Scottish Government, 2023c and Bank of Scotland, 2024), the premium is expected to be closer to the premium observed in the S1-A scenario.

    Figure 2: Price premium of properties with a clean heating system over time in all scenarios, compared to properties without a clean heating system.

    Note: Price premium on the y-axis refers to the premium compared to the value of the property; blue line and shaded area indicate the mean estimate of the price premium, and the degree of uncertainty around it. The figures are illustrative only, as no quantitative assessment has been carried out to estimate their values.

    Property price premiums associated with energy efficiency

    In the case of the energy efficiency price premium, there are no differences between the S1-A&B, S2 and S3 scenarios (there are no relevant trigger points for energy efficiency, and the backstop dates are universal). As a result, these three scenarios are referred to in this section as the ‘Heat in Buildings Bill scenarios’ (S1-S3).

    In the case of the policy-free baseline scenario, we expect a constant, and relatively low price premium for more energy-efficient homes. This is supported by the majority of academic sources and some of the stakeholders we consulted. However, many stakeholders were in disagreement that there is currently a green premium in the Scottish housing market (e.g., due to the housing shortage or because levels of energy efficiency are less important to buyers and renters). The lower band of the shaded area of Figure 3 is therefore zero[28]. Stakeholders also reported that energy efficiency (usually measured by EPC rating) is a good proxy for the quality of a property (e.g., having a high quality interior). It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the price impact of energy efficiency from the impact of quality.

    In the case of the S1-S3 scenarios, the proposed backstop dates to achieve a minimum energy efficiency standard (i.e., before the end of 2028 for rented homes and before the end of 2033 for owner-occupied homes) can drive an increase in the price premium for energy-efficient homes. Investors of buy-to-let properties could have a higher interest in energy-efficient dwellings as they will have to install energy-efficiency retrofits before the end of 2028. Therefore, they would include these costs when investing in an energy-inefficient property.

    However, as the majority (62%) of the residential building stock is owner-occupied (Scottish Government, 2023a), a steeper increase is expected close to 2033. Stakeholders mainly agreed that the proposed regulatory policy will create a green premium in future, even if they do not think that a green premium currently exists. However, the size of the potential price premium is uncertain, and stakeholders rather reported a discount for energy inefficient properties. This is explained by the fact that fewer people are expected to be willing to move into an energy-inefficient property as the backstop dates approach.

    Additionally, we expect the price premium to decrease after the backstop dates. Some properties in the owner-occupied market are expected to remain energy inefficient (e.g. some people will not be able to afford to retrofit their home and may have been considered as temporarily exempt from the regulations). However, these properties will slowly be taken off the market (e.g., sold or retrofitted after the backstop date) and only a very limited number of them could remain. As the majority of homes are expected to meet the minimum energy efficiency standards, the price premium is expected to fall sharply after 2033. A few years after the policy comes into force, it is expected that there could be no price premium on the market as most homes will comply with the policy requirements[29],[30].

    Figure : Price premium of energy efficiency over time in different scenarios, compared to properties which does not meet minimum energy efficiency standards.

    Note: Price premium on the y-axis refers to the premium compared to the value of the property; blue line and shaded area indicate the mean estimate of the price premium, and the degree of uncertainty around it. The figures are illustrative only, as no quantitative assessment has been carried out to estimate their values.

    Key takeaways

    We created four scenarios to be compared against a policy-free baseline to analyse the potential housing market impacts of the proposed regulations in the consultation on a Heat in Buildings Bill. The main findings are as follows:

    • In the sales market, an increase in the brown discount for energy-inefficient homes without a clean heating system is expected as the energy efficiency and clean heating backstop dates approach under the Heat in Buildings Bill scenario. The proposed property purchase trigger point may lead to a jump in the green premium after the introduction of the proposed regulation. A longer grace period for trigger points is expected to lead to a smaller difference in the price of similar homes with and without a clean heating system. Without trigger points, a steadily increasing premium is expected, which is ultimately higher than in the Heat in Buildings Bill scenario.
    • In the rental market, tenants are likely to bear some of the upfront costs of energy efficiency retrofits in the form of higher rents (particularly in supply-driven local rental markets). Some landlords may decide to exit the market to avoid complying with the regulations. This would lead to further housing shortages and higher rents. However, high rental prices could also incentivise investors to enter the rental market, mainly purchasing new builds and already retrofitted properties, leading to an increase in the supply of rental properties and subsequently lower rents. A longer grace period for early action trigger points may be less of a disincentive to enter the rental market and increase supply compared to a scenario with shorter grace period. However, according to the interviewed stakeholders, the proposed minimum energy efficiency standard requirement and the proposed property purchase trigger point can be a significant disincentive for landlords to enter the market and an incentive to exit. The overall effect on the rental market depends on the strength of each impact.
    • The time properties take to sell is increased by the introduction of the proposed property purchase trigger point, as the increase in the overall costs of moving slows the market down.
    • We found that several factors may affect the number of homes sold as a result of the proposed policies. On the one hand, some factors could disincentivise purchasing a property. For example, the additional costs of installing a clean heating system required by the proposed trigger points mean an additional burden on purchasers. This burden is expected to decrease if the associated grace periods were set longer. On the other hand, other factors would increase the demand for energy-efficient properties and the supply of energy-inefficient properties (e.g., those who would rather prepare for the backstop dates by moving to an energy-efficient property from an energy-inefficient one). Due to these opposing impacts, the joint impact on the total number of sales is unclear.
    • The proposed policies are also likely to affect the number of homes let. On the one hand, proposed policy interventions (i.e., policy requirements) may cause some landlords to sell their properties. The proposed property purchase trigger point could be a significant disincentive to landlords entering the market or expanding their portfolio, but a longer grace period may partially mitigate its negative impact. On the other hand, new properties (particularly energy-efficient ones) may enter the rental market if rental prices are a good incentive to enter. Again, the joint impact on the number of homes let is ambiguous.
    • When considering geographical differences, we found that larger cities are more likely to face housing shortages. This shortage may override the potential positive price impact of energy efficiency as purchasers have limited options to select a home. Therefore, we expect a smaller difference in the price of energy efficient and inefficient homes and/or between homes with and without a clean heating system in urban areas, where the local market is more supply-driven (i.e., the supply of available homes for rent is more limited).
    • In considering the impacts of the policy we could not identify clear differences in the housing market impacts by dwelling archetype. While there may be a moderate shift from houses to flats (i.e. more people would prefer to choose a flat instead of a house when moving, as flats are in general more energy-efficient), this impact remains uncertain.
    • Regulation is expected to stimulate the green mortgage market if appropriate products are offered at a competitive price.
    • A first-time buyer exemption from the proposed property purchase trigger points is expected to give this group of buyers an advantage on the housing market by lowering potential financial pressures associated with the purchase of properties without a clean heating system installed.

    Conclusions

    • The presence of strict backstop dates for energy efficiency standards is expected to ensure that actions to comply with the proposed Heat in Buildings Bill regulations are taken early on. This could lead to a green premium in the value of energy-efficient properties occurring gradually after the introduction of the regulatory frameworks, and then accelerating as the backstop dates approach in both sales and rental markets. However, the green premium attributed to efficient properties can be expected to diminish over time, as the market adjusts to a higher availability of such properties.
    • The introduction of the proposed early action trigger points can be expected to result in an additional financial burden for property purchasers. By raising the overall cost of moving for all potential buyers, trigger points behave akin to a tax on property purchases, reducing the number of transactions in the housing market. The inclusion of trigger points may ultimately reduce the number of owner-occupiers deciding to move as well as the number of landlords purchasing buy-to-let properties, likely leading to decreased activity in the Scottish residential housing market. Deferring or setting varied deadlines for more vulnerable segments of the market (i.e., first-time buyers, low-income households, small-scale landlords etc.) would mitigate this. The regulatory framework could be adjusted to extend the grace periods, thereby partially mitigating the adverse market effects induced by the property purchase trigger points.
    • In the rental market, tenants are likely to bear some of the upfront costs of energy efficiency retrofits in the form of higher rents. Following the introduction of the proposed Heat in Buildings Bill, landlords may decide to exit the market if they do not want to comply with the regulations. This could lead to potential housing shortages and higher rents. It then follows that high rental prices could also incentivise investors to enter the rental market, mainly purchasing new builds and already retrofitted properties, leading to an expected increase in the supply of rental properties and subsequently lower rents, which partially offsets the adverse effect of landlords exiting the market.
    • Although homeowners may postpone the installation of clean heating systems until the deadline looms, extending the grace period for trigger points from two to five years could alleviate their immediate financial strain and partially mitigate a potential slowdown of the housing market. However, in this context, the market slowdown is relatively modest compared to a scenario with a two-year grace period. A longer grace period can ease the financial burden on homeowners by providing more time for planning and by spreading compliance and cost over a longer period.
    • Not introducing early action trigger points could lead to delayed actions in complying with the proposed regulatory framework, resulting in a more gradual adoption of clean heating technologies. The absence of trigger points leads to both owner-occupiers and landlords postponing necessary actions until closer to the backstop dates. This causes the demand for properties with a clean heating system to surge significantly around the backstop dates, potentially leading to supply shortages, and a peak in the green premium for properties with a clean heating system during the same period, reaching higher levels than if trigger points were used.
    • The absence of trigger points prevents any distortion in property purchasing decisions. This contributes to keeping the Scottish housing market broadly as active as it would be in a scenario without any regulatory interventions.
    • An exemption for first-time buyer could assist individuals with lower purchasing power within the housing market, and who are more likely to be long-term renters, by lowering barriers to enter the property sales market. In the absence of targeted help-to-buy schemes, exempting first-time buyers from the property purchase trigger point is still expected to result in a slowdown in transactions in the Scottish residential housing market. However, this effect is less pronounced compared to scenarios where the property purchase trigger point applies to all homeowners, as it eases the financial burden on first-time buyers by granting exemptions from the proposed property purchase trigger point. Although the first-time buyer exemption aims to support these buyers, they might still encounter difficulties with the additional costs required to meet minimum energy efficiency standards when purchasing properties that are not energy efficient. Combining trigger points exemptions with extended deadlines for meeting energy efficiency standards could mitigate this.
    • While green mortgages only represent a niche segment of the Scottish mortgage market, the introduction of proposed heating decarbonisation and energy efficiency regulations and the need to comply with them, is expected to lead to a substantial increase in the demand for efficient properties and clean heating solutions, ultimately boosting the green mortgage market in Scotland. It may also boost demand for other financial products, including unsecure personal loans, where these are available. Targeted products and financial support schemes for first-time buyers and lower-income individuals could help these groups comply with the regulation, reducing the potential disproportionate impacts.
    • In the absence of additional financial assistance programs, the proposed implementation of heating decarbonisation and energy efficiency regulations could disproportionately impact those with lower incomes as well as the ‘late adopters’ of energy efficiency measures and clean heating systems. Targeted financial support could help lessen these impacts, particularly where they are designed to safeguard vulnerable individuals and help ensure they are able to adhere to the regulations. This can be achieved by offering a range of financial incentives to owner-occupiers, such as grants, subsidies, low-interest loans, favourable financing options, and tax credits. These incentives could be provided both by the UK Government, with the aim of leveraging additional private investment, or by private sector entities, particularly in the case of loans and financing options. Additionally, the Scottish Government could work in close collaboration with the clean heating and energy efficiency industries to identify and implement solutions that could help reduce costs for owner-occupiers.
    • The design of an effective regulatory framework requires consideration of various, and sometimes conflicting, priorities, including timely installation of clean heating systems, ensuring all homeowners can bear the costs of compliance and mitigating adverse effects on the housing market.

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    Money Saving Expert, 2024. Green mortgages [WWW Document]. URL https://www.moneysavingexpert.com/mortgages/green-mortgages/ (accessed 4.12.24).

    Propertymark, 2023. Energy efficiency in UK property: Where to go from here? | Propertymark [WWW Document]. URL https://www.propertymark.co.uk/resource/energy-efficiency-in-uk-property.html (accessed 4.12.24).

    Rightmove, 2023. Greener Homes Report 2023 [WWW Document]. URL https://www.rightmove.co.uk/guides/energy-efficiency/rightmove-greener-homes-report-2023/ (accessed 4.12.24).

    Santander, 2022. Buying into the Green Homes Revolution [WWW Document]. URL https://www.santander.co.uk/about-santander/media-centre/press-releases/a-green-premium-house-buyers-willing-to-pay-almost-10 (accessed 4.12.24).

    Scanlon, K., Whitehead, C., Blanc, F., 2021. Lessons from the stamp duty holiday [WWW Document]. URL https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lselondon/ (accessed 4.12.24).

    Scottish Government, 2022. Potential heat network zones: first national assessment, Gov.Scot.

    Scottish Government, 2023a. Delivering net zero for Scotland’s buildings – Heat in Buildings Bill: consultation [WWW Document]. URL https://www.gov.scot/publications/delivering-net-zero-scotlands-buildings-consultation-proposals-heat-buildings-bill/ (accessed 4.12.24).

    Scottish Government, 2023b. Scottish Housing Market Review Q3 2023.

    Scottish Government, 2024a. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Projections, Scotland. Results of Phase 1 and Phase 2 modelling.

    Scottish Government, 2024b. New Build Heat Standard: factsheet [WWW Document]. URL https://www.gov.scot/publications/new-build-heat-standard-factsheet/ (accessed 4.12.24).

    Scottish Government, 2024c. Rent adjudication – Cost of living: rent and eviction [WWW Document]. URL https://www.gov.scot/publications/cost-of-living-rent-and-eviction/pages/rent-adjudiction/ (accessed 4.12.24).

    Scottish Government, 2024d. Scottish House Condition Survey: 2022 Key Findings [WWW Document]. URL https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-house-condition-survey-2022-key-findings/pages/1-key-attributes-of-the-scottish-housing-stock/ (accessed 4.12.24).

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    Vimpari, J., 2023. Impact of ground source heat pumps on house sales prices in Finland. Energy Effic 16, 1–13.

    Zalejska-Jonsson, A., 2014. Stated WTP and rational WTP: Willingness to pay for green apartments in Sweden. Sustain Cities Soc 13, 46–56.

     

    Appendices

    Appendix A: Stakeholder consultations

    Stakeholder interviews were carried out to gain an in-depth understanding of the Scottish housing market dynamics, to obtain views of different stakeholders on the impact of the proposed policies and to validate the findings of the literature review, specifically when the eviudence review was not Scotland-specific. The participants of the stakeholder interviews are listed in Table 1. As the S1-B scenario was decided to be added to the study later (to analyse the potential housing market impact of a longer grace period), it involved a second round of stakeholder interviews – the participants of the second round is noted in the last column.

    Organisation

    Number of interview stakeholders

    Sector

    Second interview about length of grace period

    ESPC

    2

    Real estate agent

    Yes

    Houseful

    2

    Real estate agent

    No

    Lloyds

    2

    Banking institution

    No

    Nationwide

    4

    Banking institution

    Yes

    Property Mark

    1

    Real estate associations

    Yes

    Rettie

    1

    Real estate agent

    No

    RICS

    2

    Real estate agent

    Yes

    Rightmove

    1

    Real estate agent

    No

    River Clyde

    1

    Real estate associations

    No

    Savills

    2

    Real estate agent

    No

    Scottish Association of Landlords

    1

    Real estate associations

    Yes

    UK Finance

    1

    Banking institution

    No

    Table : List of interviewed stakeholders

    The main topics covered in the stakeholder interviews included:

    • The assessment of the impact of energy efficiency and clean heating systems on the sales and rental market. The expected impact of the proposed regulation was also considered;
    • Any new, emerging trends due to the pandemic, energy crisis, climate change or any other factors;
    • The time it take to sell or let a property depending on its energy efficiency or on type of heating system;
    • Geographical differences, such as climatic conditions, local property prices in the neighbourhood, and urban-rural differences;
    • Differences between archetypes, potential shift to some types of properties due to the regulation;
    • Differences between the Scottish and English housing markets;
    • The current state of the green mortgage market, credit risks by EPC rating and the expected growth of the green mortgage market (e.g., key products, increase in the supply of them);
    • Discussion of fuel poverty and the expected impact of the proposed policies on it;
    • How first-time buyers behave in the housing market and the key challenges they face.

    The second round of the interviews focused on the potential housing maket impact of a 5-year grace period of the purchase and heat network zone trigger points. This included more detailed questions on the difference between a shorter and longer grace period:

    • Perceptions of the financial and non-financial costs of installing a clean heating system (including differences between owner-occupiers and landlords).
    • The timing and compliance rate of installing a clean heating system (including differences between owner-occupiers and landlords)
    • The impact on financial planning
    • The potential impact of moving or reselling a home within the grace period
    • Impact on the green premium of properties with clean heating systems
    • Impact on rental prices and the number of homes let
    • Impact on the mortgage market

    While most of the points were discussed with all stakeholders, the depth of their insights depended on their expertise and background. For instance, we had a closer look at the rental markets with the Scottish Association of Landlords, while stakeholders from financial institutions, such as Lloyds or UK Finance were able to provide more detailed information on the state of the green mortgage market in Scotland. Real estate agents could better assess the impact of energy efficiency and clean heating systems on property prices and provide further insights into customer decision making processes.

     

    Appendix B: Installation rate of clean heating systems and rate of energy efficiency retrofit

    Figure 4 illustrates the installation rate of clean heating systems by scenario from the current rate to 2045. The main factors driving the trends are summarised below:

    • In the case of the policy-free baseline scenario, a steady but small increase is expected in the installation rate of clean heating systems, as described in section 5.6.1. The main drivers are the prohibition on polluting heating systems in new builds from 2024 (Scottish Government, 2024b), the expected decrease in the installation costs, the lower running costs due to the high energy efficiency of heat pumps and other clean heating systems (subject to the relative price of electricity to gas at any point in time), the increasing climate consciousness and the increased confidence in new technologies due to higher installation rates and awareness.
    • The highest adaptation rate over time occurs in the Heat in Buildings Bill scenario (S1-A). This is due to the proposed property purchase and heat network zone trigger points, which increase the installation rate of clean heating systems.
    • In the case of the no-trigger point scenario (S2), only a very moderate increase is expected in the installation rate of clean heating systems prior to a few years of the backstop date (2045). It is only expected to be slightly higher than in the policy-free baseline, as some people will realise earlier that they eventually need to comply with the clean heating regulation. However, there is expected to be a greater increase close to the proposed backstop date, as all homes are expected to face the prohibition on polluting heating systems by 2045.
    • In the first-time buyer exemption scenario (S3), the installation rate is the mix of the S1-A and S2 scenarios. First-time buyers are expected to behave as in the S2 scenario. Conversely, other buyers are expected to behave as in the S1-A scenario. As first-time buyers represent a smaller share of the purchasers, the joint impact is closer to the S1-A scenario.
    • It is important to note that we assume that all homes that are not exempted from the regulations will be fully adapted to clean heating by 2045. Failure to meet this target is likely to mean that Scotland would not fully meet its net zero target in the buildings sector.
    Figure 4: Installation rate of clean heating systems by scenario

    Figure 5 illustrates the installation rate of clean heating systems under different grace periods in the Heat in Buildings Bill scenario from the current rate to 2045. If there is a grace period of five years (S1-B) as opposed to two (S1-A), the installation rate could be impacted by the following factors:

    • The longer grace period would allow for later installation of clean heating systems or joining a heat network zone, so effectively adaptation is shifted to three years later in time (see Appendix 8.3.3 on procrastination).
    • A grace period of five years means more homeowners are expected to move again within the grace period without having installed a clean heating system or joining a heat network zone, further slowing adaptation.
    • As described in Section 5.3.1, more properties are expected to be sold under a longer grace period due to the lower perceived costs. Therefore, take-up is expected to be somewhat accelerated by those that do not move again within the grace period.

    All in all, the first impact is expected to dominate the emerging installation dynamics, so a significantly slower take-up is expected in scenario S1-B, bringing about a steeper increase in take-up at the years right before the clean heating system installation backstop date at the end of 2045.

    Figure 5: Installation rate of clean heating systems under different grace period lengths, S1-A and S1-B scenarios

    Figure 6 illustrates the expected share of properties meeting the minimum energy efficiency standards. The policy-free baseline is driven by similar factors as in the case of clean heating systems: higher comfort of homes, lower running costs and increasing climate consciousness. The other scenarios, which do not differ in the case of the energy efficiency regulations, are visualised as the Heat in Buildings Bill scenario. As the private rented sector is required to meet energy efficiency standards by the end of 2028, an increase in the retrofits is expected in the following years. However, the majority (62%) of the residential building stock is owner-occupied and does not need to be retrofitted by the end of 2033. Therefore, we expect a sharper increase in the retrofits between 2028 and 2033 than between today and 2028.

    Unlike the case of the clean heating system regulation, we do not expect that all homes which are not exempted from the policy will meet the policy requirements by the backstop date. This is due to the relatively short time to the backstop date (less than 10 years): fewer properties are expected to be sold in that time, and fewer people are likely to afford to retrofit. The consultation on proposals for a Heat in Buildings Bill also mentions that no ban on the sale of energy inefficient homes will be introduced to avoid people being unwillingly left in energy inefficient properties.

     

    Figure 6: Rate of homes meeting minimum energy efficiency standards by scenario

    Appendix C: Additional findings from the literature review

    Property and rental prices

    When analysing the impact of the installation of energy efficiency and clean heating systems in residential buildings on the housing market, we are interested in the existence of a green premium and/or brown discount. The main body of the literature defines a green premium (brown discount) as a term indicating the price premium (discount) of properties with high (low) energy-efficiency compared to their counterparts of EPC band D. The country or region where the impact is assessed is also important. While the focus of this study is solely the Scottish housing market, we found no Scotland-specific analysis available. However, the evidence gathered across the UK and in other countries in the northern hemisphere (e.g., Ireland, Finland, the US) is also relevant and is therefore used to inform our study. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that energy efficiency has a similar impact on housing markets across various developed markets, particularly if the climate and the cost of energy is similar to those in Scotland.

    Property sales prices

    In the case of property sales prices, most UK-specific academic and grey literature sources report the existence of a green premium and brown discount based on the level of energy efficiency of properties (in England: Fuerst et al., 2015, 2020; in Wales: Fuerst et al., 2016; grey literature using more recent data: Lloyds Banking Group, 2021; Rightmove, 2023). Academic sources in other European countries also agree with the existence of green premiums and brown discounts (e.g., Brounen & Kok, 2011 in the Netherlands, and Jensen et al., 2016 in Denmark).

    However, grey literature sources do not always agree with the existence of the green premium and brown discount. For example, most property agents surveyed by Propertymark (2023) reported that they do not think higher energy efficiency leads to a price premium. For example, 66% of them said that the property price does not increase more than the cost of the retrofitting. The controversy between the academic and grey literature sources can partly be explained by the fact that studies cannot fully control for the quality (i.e., overall condition, presentability) of a property[31]. Energy efficiency is usually correlated with the quality of a property: more energy-efficient homes tend to have other desirable characteristics, such as a high-quality interiors and design. This bias is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle in a quantitative assessment.

    A summary of the magnitude of the green premium and brown discount, based on different sources, is shown in Table 2. The different columns show the price difference due to energy efficiency compared to EPC band D by source. For example, a property with an EPC band ‘A’ or ‘B’ is sold at a premium of 5-11% compared to a property with an EPC band ‘D’, assuming all other factors equal (e.g., age, location). Conversely, less energy-efficient homes (in bands F or G) are priced 1-11% lower than comparable properties with an EPC band ‘D’.

    EPC band

    Fuerst et al. 2015

    Fuerst et al. 2020

    Fuerst et al. 2016

    Lloyds Banking Group 2021

    Rightmove 2023

    A/B

    5.0%

     No data

    11.3%

    8.0%

    No data

    B/C

     

    6.0%

     

    4.0%

    No data

    C

    1.8%

     

    2.0%

    2.0%

    3%

    D

    Base of comparison

    E

    -0.7%

    No impact

    -2.0%

    -2.4%

    -4%

    F/G

      -0.9-6.8%

    -10-11%

     -5.0-7.0%

     -5.2-8.8%

    -10%

    Geography

    England

    England

    Wales

    England and Wales

    Great Britain

    Sample time

    1995-2012

    1995-2013

    1995-2013

    2015-2019

    Ca. 2008-2022[32]

    Table 2: Price impact of energy efficiency on property prices

    Note: Some sources only report results for merged categories (e.g., for F and G combined). Positive values indicate a green premium, while negative values indicate a brown discount compared to EPC band D. If the results are not significant, ‘no impact’ is reported.

    A Swedish report used surveys and found that people who live in energy-efficient homes are willing to pay a higher green premium when buying or renting a new home (Zalejska-Jonsson, 2014). This indicates that people are less likely to move from an energy efficient home to an inefficient one.

    Not only do energy efficiency measures impact property prices, but the type of heating system used also can affect the value of homes. While no Scottish or UK-specific evidence were found on this, some studies have assessed this impact in other developed countries, albeit, under different conditions. In Finland, where, unlike in Scotland, heat pumps are already widely used and gas heating is not common, ground-source heat pumps and district heating have a positive impact on property prices, particularly in the largest city, Helsinki (Vimpari, 2023). In addition, under different climatic conditions, air-source heat pumps (ASHPs) are associated with positive impacts on US sales prices, particularly in warmer regions (where cooling is more important, as ASHPs can provide cooling as well as heating) and where climate consciousness is higher (Shen et al., 2021).

    Rental prices

    In the rental market, price impacts follow a similar pattern to that of sales prices, although their magnitude differs. While both buyers and renters attribute a monetary value to the energy efficiency of homes, buyers place a higher value on it. Therefore, the green premium in rental markets (in a form of higher rents for more energy efficient properties) is smaller (Hyland et al., 2013).

    While the premium for energy-efficient rental properties with EPC band A-C can range from 3% to 18%, the discount for energy-inefficient properties is often insignificant in various parts of the UK (Wales: Fuerst et al., 2016; England: Fuerst et al., 2020). In other words, energy efficiency is a factor in determining rental prices for properties in EPC band A-C, but rarely for those in bands E-G. This may be explained by sharper competition for the most energy-efficient properties between owner-occupiers and buy-to-let landlords (Fuerst et al., 2016). In Ireland, Hyland et al. (2013) found a significant brown discount (2-3). Table 3 summarises the key findings of the impact of energy on the rental market by source, similar to Table 2.

     

     EPC band

    Fuerst et al. 2020

    Fuerst et al. 2016

    Hyland et al. 2013

    Impact

    Impact

    Impact

    A/B or B

    3-4%

    18.5%

    2-4%

    C

    3-5%

    4%

    No impact

    D

    Base of comparison

    E

    No impact

    No impact

    -2%

    F/G

    -4-5%

    No impact

    -3%

    Geography

    England

    Wales

    Ireland

    Sample time

    1995-2013

    1995-2013

    Jan/2008 – March/2012

    Table 3: The impact of energy efficiency on rental prices

    Note: Some sources only report results for merged categories (e.g., for F and G combined). Positive values indicate a green premium, while negative values indicate a brown discount compared to EPC band D. If the results are not significant, ‘no impact’ is reported.

    Time to sell

    The length of time a property spends on the market is a key factor to consider when evaluating its value. Properties that sell quickly are generally considered more liquid assets.

    Academic sources usually report a reduction in the length of time properties spend on the rental market, if characterised by higher levels of energy efficiency. In other words, higher energy efficiency reduces the time taken to secure a tenant. For example, in England more energy efficient properties are let up to 35% faster compared to those with F or G ratings (Fuerst et al., 2020)[33]. In the rental market of the seven largest German cities, less efficient homes were found to spend 17% more time on the market, controlling for rent, living area, property age as well as hedonic, spatial and socioeconomic variables (Cajias et al., 2019, pp. 188-189).

    On the sales market, a Santander study (2022) had a similar conclusion, reporting that 75% of agents in the UK think that properties with a higher EPC band rating can be sold two to four months quicker.

    Regarding the installation of clean heating systems, no sources have been found which report its impact on the time to sell or let a property given the early stage of policy and the availability of technologies.

    Geographical and archetypical considerations

    Section 4.1. focused on the impact of the installation of energy efficiency and heating systems on property and rental prices in general. However, these price impacts may vary depending on other factors such as location (regional and urban-rural differences) and housing archetypes.

    Our desk-based research did not discover any Scotland-specific evidence. Nevertheless, Irish, English and Welsh studies and findings from other developed countries in Europe describe impact mechanisms which can be applied to Scotland.

    Geographical distribution

    There is substantial variability in the impact of energy efficiency on property sales prices in England (Fuerst et al., 2015 and UK Government, 2013). Typically, the green premium is higher in the northern part of the country (see Figure 7). The evidence suggests that this variation can be attributed to the following drivers of regional differences:

    • Variation in climatic conditions: It can be expected that energy efficiency is valued more highly in regions where the average temperature is colder.
    • Variation in property prices: In areas where house prices are above average, a fixed amount of annual energy saving accounts for a smaller proportion of total property price. Therefore, the impact of higher energy efficiency is smaller in relative terms.
    • Variation in housing supply: In the south, where housing supply is more severely constrained, energy efficiency may be pushed down the list of pricing determinants. As there are relatively fewer housing options of given size and location in these areas, the cost savings due to energy efficiency are reflected less in prices.

    In Germany, the rental price impact of energy efficiency was found to be less pronounced in more densely populated cities compared to other cities. This is likely driven by more severe housing shortages in big cities (Cajias et al., 2019). Although in a different climatic setting, evidence available from Spain shows that regions with more weather instability have a higher green premium for energy efficiency (La Paz et al., 2019). In the US, the price impact of air source heat pumps, which provide cooling as well as heating, was higher in regions with a warmer climate (Shen et al., 2021).

    Urban-rural differences also have an impact on the magnitude of the green premium and brown discount. In Ireland, lower energy efficiency ratings have a significant negative impact on sales prices. This impact is smaller in urban areas than in rural areas. Also, green premiums and brown discounts are smaller in the rental market (Hyland et al., 2013). Urban-rural differences can be explained by stronger demand for houses in urban areas, for example due to increasing demand for living in the agglomeration of larger cities, and the increasing number of new job opportunities in larger cities[34]. Therefore, energy efficiency has a higher impact on sales prices where the supply of properties is higher (in rural markets) and a smaller impact where demand for properties is stronger (in urban areas) (Hyland et al., 2013).

    Figure 7: Variations of green premium by UK regions. Source: UK Government, 2013

    Archetypal distribution

    It is also important to examine whether there are significant green premiums and brown discounts for different types of dwelling. In Scotland, the usual archetypal categories include detached, semi-detached, terraced houses, tenements and other flats (Scottish Government, 2024d). To our knowledge, no Scottish study has yet been carried out on the price impact of energy efficiency by different archetypes. Also, due to the early stage of clean heating systems adoption, we encountered a lack of literature on the property price impact of installing clean heating systems by different archetypes. Therefore, this section focuses solely on evidence related to the impact of energy efficiency.

    Table 4 presents the key findings on whether the price impact of energy efficiency (i.e., the green premium and brown discount) was found to be significant for different archetypes. In general, studies using property sales data in England (Fuerst et al., 2015) and in Wales (Fuerst et al., 2016) report a significant brown discount for less energy efficient properties (EPC band E-G) for almost all archetypes. However, there is greater variability in green premiums. In England, there is a significant green premium for flats, terraced and semi-detached houses with EPC rating A-C. In Wales, only terraced houses and A or B rated semi-detached houses have a green premium – there is no green premium for detached houses and for flats. The variation in the price premium for different archetypes may be explained by other factors, as for example the local housing shortage[35]. If the supply of properties is severely constrained, purchasers may place less value on energy efficiency.

     

    Detached- rural

    Detached- urban

    Semi-detached

    Terraced

    Flats

    England

    Green premium

    Negative

    No impact

    Positive

    Positive

    Positive

    Brown discount

    No impact

    Negative

    Negative

    Negative

    Negative

    Wales

    Green premium

    No impact

    No impact

    Positive or no impact

    Positive

    No impact

    Brown discount

    Negative

    Negative

    Negative

    Negative

    No impact

    Table : The impact of energy efficiency on sales prices by different types of dwellings in England and Wales

    Notes: In the case of a green premium, ‘Positive’ and ‘Negative‘ indicate that there is positive or negative price impact of energy efficiency in EPC band A-C, compared to D. In the case of brown discount, ‘Negative‘ indicates that there is a negative price impact of lower energy efficiency in EPC band E-G, compared to D.
    When there is ‘Negative‘ or ‘Positive’ sign and ‘no impact’ is also added to a cell, it means that results depend on the model specification
    Source: England – Fuerst et al., 2015 (Table 4); Wales – Fuerst et al., 2016 (Table 2)

    Due to the large variety in the stock of detached houses, they are often divided into two categories, depending on whether they are located in urban or rural areas. In the case of rural detached houses, energy efficiency has a less pronounced or counterintuitive impact (i.e., in England there is a price discount for more energy efficient detached houses). The explanation might be that buyers are willing to pay more for inefficient rural detached houses due to their aesthetic characteristics and emotional values this fosters, without evaluating their energy performance (Fuerst et al., 2016). For example, a Georgian house is likely to be less energy-efficient than a modern home, but the buyers do not consider it as key barrier due to its historic charm.

    In the case of rental markets, there is less evidence on differences across archetypes available. Fuerst et al. (2020) report that energy-efficiency has a higher premium for semi-detached and terraced houses, as well as for flats, compared to detached houses[36].

    In summary, the price impact of energy efficiency varies for different types of dwellings. However, a brown discount for reduced energy efficiency is usually reported for almost all dwelling types, while a green premium is not significant in many cases. Emotional and aesthetic characteristics of properties can override the valuation of energy efficiency standards, especially in the case of detached houses. This impact is stronger in the case of rural detached houses, therefore urban-rural differences are relevant.

    Grace period length

    Our desk-based research covered a substantial range of academic and non-academic literature on policies encouraging the take-up of clean heating systems but have found no inquiry into the marginal effect of differing grace periods. Despite widening our scope to learn from the analysis of other policies which included grace periods, we still did not find any reliable policy-focused study. Therefore, we have directed our attention to theoretical and empirical studies of behavioural economics in the context of timing decisions and cost.

    In standard economic thinking (including the so-called neoclassical models of mainstream economics), the timing of cost incurrence is mostly relevant because of liquidity constraints: not having enough available money to meet all consumption needs temporarily. A grace period is an instrument driving the timing of cost incurrence, as it defines the latest point in time when the cost of installing a new heating system after purchasing a new property will be incurred. The so-called ‘life cycle hypothesis,’ widely accepted in economics, would predict that consumers even out consumption throughout their lifetime. In other words, this means that spending behaviour is not affected specifically when costs are incurred, as people will optimise their borrowing and saving decisions to smooth consumption over time. However, as borrowing and saving is not possible for everyone and can be costly, the timing of costs would indeed become a relevant factor to consider.

    Consequently, the prediction of the standard economic thinking is that a longer grace period alleviates some of the burden on liquidity-constrained consumers. In the context of the proposed Heat in Buildings Bill regulations, this would mean that buyers could save more money due to the longer grace period either to purchase a clean heating systems or to save enough for a down payment for a retrofit remortgage.

    However, as Carter et al. (2022) show in the context of payday loan repayment, contrary to standard economic theory, consumers do not really benefit from a longer grace period. Borrowers who are granted an extended grace period exhibit repayment behaviours that are largely comparable to those who are not, with the primary distinction being the extension provided by the longer grace period. One driver they attribute this result to is “naïve present bias” as described by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999): overweighting present costs and benefits, even slightly, leads to a procrastination of payments. Regardless of the length of the grace period, the necessary reduction in consumption would take place immediately before the end of the grace period. So, although this reduction in consumption could be spread out over a longer period, alleviating the liquidity burden, present biased consumers would not make use of it. In the context of the Heat in Buildings Bill, this means such present biased consumers would not benefit from a longer grace period.

    Akerlof (1991) characterized present bias as occurring when “present costs are unduly salient in comparison with future costs, leading individuals to postpone tasks until tomorrow without foreseeing that when tomorrow comes, the required action will be delayed yet again” (p. 1). The lack of attention to the future costs of postponed tasks is very relevant in the context of our study, as for many people longer grace periods would indeed cause inattention to the costs of clean heating system installation. As these costs are to be incurred further in the future, many people will not fully account for the cost of installation of the clean heating system. Therefore, the price premium for properties with clean heating systems will be significantly smaller. Altmann et al. (2019) provide evidence that reminders increase the probability of timely compliance.

    Another important behavioural phenomenon that could be relevant is described by uncertainty in the cost of retrofitting, in which case an individual may wait and delay incurring the cost in the hopes of lower costs in future. However, separating this driver (usually dubbed ’the option value of waiting’) from simple naïve present bias is very challenging (see Heidhues and Strack, 2021).

    In summary, standard economic thinking (i.e., neoclassical theory) and behavioural economics both suggest that a longer grace period is less of a disincentive to purchase a property. As the costs of clean heating system installation is less salient and can be spread out over a longer period of time, potential buyers perceive a lower effective price. According to behavioural economics theories, installation can be expected to be carried out close to the end of the grace period due to present bias and the option value of waiting.

    Mortgage market

    In the US (Kaza et al., 2014) and Dutch (Billio et al., 2022) mortgage markets, higher energy efficiency of homes leads to lower energy bills, which in turn reduces the risk of default. Therefore, taking energy efficiency into account in the mortgage underwriting process has clear benefits for lenders via reduced financial risk. Moreover, in the Netherlands, three plausible impact mechanisms underlying the relationship between energy efficiency and the probability of mortgage default have been identified (Billio et al., 2022), namely:

    • personal borrower characteristics captured by the choice of an energy-efficient properties;
    • improvements in building performance that could help to free-up the borrower’s discretionary income;
    • improvements in dwelling value that lower the loan-to-value ratio.

    Energy efficient mortgages or green mortgages that exploit this exact relationship have been on the market for decades (The New York Times, 2006). Recently however, they have become more available in the EU, gathering attention from policymakers (Euractiv, 2021, EEML, 2024)[37].

    A high-level review of the current UK green mortgage market shows that some mortgage lenders offer better deals for borrowers that buy energy-efficient homes in the form of green mortgages. Green mortgages to finance retrofitting, so called ‘retrofit mortgages’, are also offered at the point of purchase and as a remortgage. Nevertheless, as green mortgages are still scarce, there continue to exist cheaper non-green mortgages available in the UK that can be more attractive options (Green Finance Institute, 2023; Money Saving Expert, 2024).

    Fuel poverty

    The Scottish Government has pledged to lift people out of fuel poverty[38]. The Fuel Poverty Act (2019) set out interim targets for 2030 and 2035, as well as final targets for 2040 to reduce the proportion of households in fuel poverty and extreme fuel poverty[39] to 5% and 1% respectively. In this study it is therefore useful to also touch on the fuel poverty implications of energy efficiency regulation.

    According to the 2019 Scottish house condition survey, fuel poverty is most prevalent among households living in energy-inefficient homes and remote rural locations.

    • 40% of households living in dwellings rated EPC band F or G are fuel poor
    • 38% of households living in dwellings rated EPC band F or G are extremely fuel poor
    • Remote rural areas have the highest rates of fuel poverty and extreme fuel poverty:
      • 43% of remote rural households are fuel poor
      • 33% of remote rural households are extremely fuel poor

    Appendix D: Theory of change – figures

    The following pages includes the key theory of change charts. These are fully explained in the appropriate sections of the main report.

    Figure 8: Expected impacts of proposed policies in Heat in Buildings Bill consultation on housing market, S1-A scenario
    Colour code: light blue – owner-occupier type; dark blue – actions available; turquoise – market impact; grey – mechanism driver

    A diagram of a flowchart

Description automatically generated
    Figure 9: Expected impacts of proposed policies in the consultation on a Heat in Buildings Bill on rental market, core scenario
    Colour code: dark blue – actions available; turquoise – market impact; grey – mechanism driver

    A diagram of a system

Description automatically generated with medium confidence
    Figure 10: Expected impact of a longer grace period on housing market, S1-B scenario
    Colour code: dark blue – actions available; turquoise – market impact; grey – mechanism driver

     

    A diagram of a graph

Description automatically generated with medium confidence
    Figure 11: Expected interactions between the sales and rental market under the proposed policies in Heat in Buildings Bill consultation, S1-A scenario

    Figure 12: Expected impact of a longer grace period in rental market, S1-B scenario
    Colour code: dark blue – actions available; turquoise – market impact; grey – mechanism driver
    Figure 13: Expected impacts of proposed policies in S2 scenario on housing market
    Figure 14: Expected impacts of first-time buyer exemption on housing and rental market, compared to S1
    Colour code: turquoise – market impact

     

    How to cite this publication:

    Benyak, B; Heilmann, I; Dicks, J and Dellaccio, O (2024) Housing market impacts from heating and energy efficiency regulations in Scotland, ClimateXChange. http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/4863

    © The University of Edinburgh, 2025
    Prepared by Cambridge Econometrics on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

    While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate as at the date of the report, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

    This work was supported by the Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division of the Scottish Government (CoE – CXC).

    ClimateXChange

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    info@climatexchange.org.uk

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    If you require the report in an alternative format such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

    1. The scope of this report is to provide evidence on the impact of heating and energy efficiency regulations on the residential housing market, while excluding considerations of the non-residential sector.

    2. Grey literature refers to non-academic publications and documents, usually published by various types of organisations, such as agencies, government bodies or experts. Examples include reports, studies, technical papers or conference proceedings (e.g. slides).

    3. The New Build Heat Standard (NBHS) is currently being reviewed, as announced by the Scottish Government on 28 May 2024.

    4. The Scottish Government consulted on a grace period of 2-5 years for installation of clean heat systems following the purchase of a property. For the purpose of this study, we have assumed a grace period of 2 years, in all scenarios except for S1-B which assumes 5 years.

    5. The Scottish Government did not specify a grace period for the proposed heat network trigger point in the consultation on a Heat in Buildings Bill, but for the purpose of this study, this scenario assumes a grace period of three years.

    6. Based on the consultation on proposals for a Heat in Buildings Bill, owner-occupied homes are not required to carry out energy efficiency improvements if they have clean heating systems installed (as they have no direct emissions). This can potentially create a loophole where owner-occupiers can avoid making energy efficiency improvements.

    7. The paper defines green properties as energy-efficient properties with low environmental impact.

    8. Hence, while people living in clean heating system homes are more likely to sell them at a competitive price, they would face more competition when searching for another clean heating system home.

    9. A few homeowners may install a clean heating system before they sell their property in order to increase its value. However, based on the stakeholder interviews, this effect is expected to be marginal.

    10. It is important to note that people are unlikely to move just to avoid carrying out energy efficiency retrofits as the financial (e.g., stamp duty, solicitors fee) and non-financial (e.g., the burden of moving or the emotional cost of leaving a familiar environment) costs can be high. However, those considering a move may advance their plans due to the backstop dates. It is also likely that most owner-occupiers will choose to stay and bear the costs of retrofitting, especially if the financial and non-financial costs of moving outweigh the costs of retrofitting.

    11. This also means that there are two opposing impacts (i.e., a driver increasing and a driver decreasing the market activity), but the slowdown due to the purchase trigger point is expected to be stronger.

    12. Based on the 2022 edition of the Scottish House Condition Survey (Scottish Government, 2024d), tenements and other flats had an average energy efficiency rating by 3-7 percentage points higher (on a scale of 100) and 67-68% of them were in EPC bands A-C, compared to 40-48% for other archetypes (detached, semi-detached, and terraced houses).

    13. As shown earlier, the proposed regulation could discourage people from moving out of energy-efficient properties with clean heating systems, resulting in a lower number of these types of properties being put up for sale. However, as the share of energy-efficient properties with clean heating systems in the residential building stock is expected to increase (also due to the policies), the supply of these homes is still expected to increase.

    14. If owner-occupiers install a clean heating system (e.g., due to the purchase trigger point), they are not required to meet the minimum energy efficiency standards. Therefore, the purchase trigger point can reduce the installation rate of energy efficiency retrofits. However, it is not expected that a large number of owner-occupiers will choose to install only a clean heating system without energy efficiency retrofits.

    15. A recent CCC study (2021) found that the low carbon heat network technology has the lowest average investment cost per home across the clean heating system options in the UK, both in 2020 and in 2035. Therefore, it is likely that most homeowners will choose this option if available. If the purchasers are aware of this cost difference, the price discount on these polluting heating system properties may be lower compared to properties which are not located in a heat network zone (as the upfront cost of installing a clean heating system is lower).

    16. This may be in addition to the mortgage they would have taken out anyway for a new home, or a green mortgage customised for green retrofitting. Some stakeholders mentioned that they already offer products for green retrofitting.

    17. However, landlords might face other non-financial costs, such as time spent finding workers to carry out the retrofitting work.

    18. Some types of retrofitting works do not cause major disruption to the lives of tenants, e.g., changing light bulbs, glazing windows.

    19. These interventions included the increase of eviction time (removed from April 2024) and a 3% temporary rent cap which is replaced by a new rent adjudication mechanism from April 2024 (Scottish Government, 2024c).

    20. For example, based on a Rightmove report (2023), 61% of landlords in Great Britain would not buy a rental property below an EPC rating of C, which is a significant increase from 47% in 2022.

    21. Potential new landlords may have to consider several other factors when deciding whether to enter the rental market. These may include financial (in particular, second home tax) and non-financial considerations (for example, potential issues with new tenants).

    22. Stakeholders emphasised that the purchase trigger point is expected to slow down the market in general. However, a shorter grace period can have a higher negative impact.

    23. Moreover, individuals who would typically move after a period slightly longer than the grace period (e.g., in 6 years) may advance their relocation plans (e.g., to 5 years) due to the purchase trigger point, thereby further stimulating the housing market.

    24. If the heat network zone trigger point has a longer, 5-year notice period, purchasers in areas where connection to the heat network is possible but not yet carried out, are more likely to postpone the decision whether they want to connect to the heat network or to install an alternative type of clean heating system as perceiving it as a future problem. Similar to a longer grace period after a purchase of property, this can lead to a delayed planning and to a poorer understanding of costs and benefits of alternatives.

    25. Landlords need to consider that tenants might need to be relocated elsewhere for the period of time when a new heating system is installed, particularly in colder periods.

    26. First-time buyers are not assumed to be exempted from the Heat Network Zone trigger point for the purpose of this scenario.

    27. Gas heating is not widely used in Finland.

    28. In the case of some specific properties, such as Georgian and Victorian houses, stakeholders agree that despite their low energy efficiency, there is a price premium for them due to their historic charm and aesthetic value. This could lead to a price premium for inefficient homes in some sub-groups of properties.

    29. We do not consider those properties which will be exempt from the policy.

    30. While all properties are required to meet a minimum energy efficiency standard, some variations in the extent of energy efficiency could remain. This may still lead to some price premium for more energy-efficient homes (e.g., an EPC rating of A compared to C).

    31. Also, grey literature sources usually rely on the qualitative assessment of market participants (e.g. agents), while academic sources are based on quantitative methods.

    32. A more precise sample period is not mentioned in the study.

    33. The impact is only significant in the case of B and E rated properties, but insignificant for C and D. The authors explain it with statistical bias (e.g., missing variables, such as the number of listed properties or tenant mobility), and with individual over- and under-pricing.

    34. The study assessed price impacts around the time of the 2008 financial crisis (i.e. between 2008 and 2012).

    35. Local, as housing supply is strongly linked to settlements – a housing shortage in one city does not necessarily mean a shortage in another one.

    36. The study compares the price premium of different archetypes to detached houses and reports significantly higher rental price for higher EPC ratings on a scale of 0-100.

    37. Policies that facilitate green mortgage products include the Energy Efficient Mortgage Label. This was developed by the Energy Efficient Mortgages Initiative to drive the upgrade of the housing energy efficiency profile of lending institution portfolios and to act as a global benchmark for energy efficient mortgages (EEML, 2024).

    38. Defined by the Scottish Fuel Poverty Act 2019: “A household is in fuel poverty if the fuel costs necessary for the home in which members of the household live to meet reasonable fuel needs and requisite temperatures are more than 10% of the household’s adjusted net income, and if after deducting such fuel costs, benefits received for a care need or disability (if any) and the household’s childcare costs (if any), the household’s remaining adjusted net income is insufficient to maintain an acceptable standard of living for members of the household.

    39. Defined as costs of reasonable fuel needs (e.g. adequate heating; detailed definition at paragraph 4 and 3 of the Fuel Poverty Act 2019) exceeding 20% of the household’s adjusted net income.


    Research completed: February 2023

    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/3385

    Executive summary

    Background

    Decarbonisation of domestic heating systems is crucial for achieving the Scottish Government’s ambitious climate change targets of net zero emissions by 2045. The transition to zero direct emissions heating systems (e.g., heat pumps, district heating) will require a suite of changes to the Scottish housing stock, including preparing it to operate at lower flow temperatures than the current majority of 70-80°C. Flow temperature is the temperature a wet heating system warms water to before sending it to radiators in different areas of a building.

    This study summarises the current evidence for flow temperature reduction in hot water (wet) systems and considers how this might be applied to the Scottish housing stock. Suitability is defined as a dwelling’s ability to reach thermal comfort for a range of external temperature test criteria. We assess the suitability of the present housing stock as it is today and then with two different cost levels of retrofit. The assessment method includes a literature review, stakeholder interviews and scenario modelling to test different temperature cases.

    Findings

    We have found that most of the Scottish housing stock is currently unsuitable for flow temperature reduction to 55°C or below on a winter peak day (see Figure 1).

    Many dwellings in Scotland could reach suitability for 55°C flow temperatures after the inclusion of retrofit(s). Effective retrofit measures include efficiency measures such as wall and/or loft insulation, upgrading radiators or a combination of smaller efficiency measures such as hot water tank insulation, draughtproofing and reduced infiltration measures.

    In our higher cost retrofit scenario, 76% of homes become suitable for a flow temperature of 55°C on a winter peak day (see Figure 2). This could prepare the housing stock to be ready for zero direct emissions systems without requiring gas boilers to be removed from homes immediately.

    Figure 1 Absolute number of dwellings suitable to meet thermal comfort at each flow temperature (°C) on a winter peak day with no retrofits

    Figure 2 Absolute number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature (°C) on a winter peak day with more extensive, higher cost, retrofits

    We find that 30% of the overall housing stock is unsuitable for a flow temperature below 75°C, and 20% require a flow temperature above 75°C. This suggests these dwellings are either running at temperatures higher than 75°C or are currently unable to reach thermal comfort during periods of peak demand.

    Fuel bill savings and emissions reduction from reducing flow temperature is significant and range from £151m to £501m in the stringent external temperature test cases. The associated greenhouse gas emission savings are estimated to be 6.17–10.18 MtCO2 equivalent per year, depending on external temperature cases and retrofit scenarios. Exploring the potential for varying flow temperatures throughout the year could be one way to increase savings.

    The most important factor when assessing suitability for flow temperature reduction is in setting temperature criteria that captures the needs of occupants. We used particularly stringent criteria in our assessments, requiring a dwelling to be heated to 20°C during the coldest hour of an average or 20-year winter peak. This may not reflect the reality of how heating systems should be, or are currently, expected to perform but it was selected to ensure the heating needs of the most vulnerable households were considered.

    Technical Glossary

    Flow temperature

    The temperature at which water or another heat transfer medium in a heating system is warmed to before being sent to heating emitters such as radiators in different areas of a building.

    Heating emitter

    A product that sends out heat, used to distribute heat around a building, e.g. radiators.

    Thermal comfort

    The condition of mind that expresses satisfaction with the thermal environment and is assessed by subjective evaluation.

    Building envelope

    The physical separator between the conditioned and unconditioned environment, typically including the building’s floors, walls, windows, and roofing.

    Draughtproofing

    Measures to reduce airflow, such as applying physical fillers and sealants, around doors and windows.

    Reduced infiltration measures

    Measures to reduce airflow throughout the dwelling – this is like draughtproofing measures but is applied to other points of airflow throughout the dwelling.

    Peak (or peak heating hour)

    The calendar hour with the highest measured demand for heating in the previous calendar year, or the timespan being measured if otherwise specified.

    Shoulder season

    The period between typical warming seasons and cooling seasons. This typically refers to spring and autumn when lower demands for heating are observed. The November average is used in this report.

    1-in-20 peak (historic cold snap)

    The peak heating hour as measured over the previous 20 calendar years. This metric is often used to capture “historic” weather events such as cold snaps and heat waves.

    Oversizing factor

    The ratio of peak radiator capacity to peak energy demand in a building.

    U-value

    The U-value, also called thermal transmittance, measures how well a building element conducts heat. It quantifies the heat transfer rate, with lower values indicating better insulation. It is measured in W/(m²·K).

    Specific heat loss

    Specific heat loss refers to the rate of heat loss from a building at a given temperature differential between internal and external conditions. This is measured in W/m2 of building envelope and is dependent on the U-value of the building envelope.

    Introduction

    Domestic heating system decarbonisation is crucial for achieving the Scottish Government’s ambitious climate change targets of 75%, 90% and net zero emissions, relative to 1990, by 2030, 2040 and 2045 respectively. The transition to zero direct emissions heating (ZDEH) systems will require changes to the Scottish housing stock. This will potentially including preparing the building stock to operate at the lower flow temperatures that ZDEH options such as heat pumps operate.

    Currently, the majority (approximately 85%) of dwellings in Scotland are heated by water based (wet) boiler systems, which typically operate at flow temperatures between 70-80°C. The remaining dwellings are heated by a mix of communal, heat pump, electric and off-grid systems. Flow temperature reduction has the benefit of reducing the energy required to meet the same internal room temperature, thus leading to reduced emissions and fuel bill costs in gas boiler and ZDEH systems alike.

    We summarise the current evidence base for reducing flow temperature in the existing housing stock. We consider how flow temperature reduction might be applied to Scottish housing by modelling a range of lower flow temperature and assessing the potential suitability with varying degrees of retrofits.

    Findings from literature review and stakeholder interviews

    Range of temperatures for consideration

    Evidence base for 55°C

    According to the Heat Pump Association (see Appendix 8.1), 55°C is considered the “target” temperature for transitioning existing residential heating systems to lower-flow temperature systems. This is because it is an effective and relatively feasible “middle ground” between flow temperatures of current residential gas boiler currently (>70°C) and the direction of travel towards ZDEH technologies such as heat pumps (which operate optimally between 30-55°C).

    At 55°C, most condensing boilers will run more efficiently (because more latent heat can be transferred from the flue gases at lower return temperatures) and there will be a reduction of wear and tear caused by cycling at current flow temperatures. Heat pumps, on the other hand, will reach the limits of their peak efficiency at approximately 55°C; at higher flow temperatures, efficiency will drop below quoted performance.

    We found wide agreement in the stakeholder interviews (see Appendix 8.1 for stakeholder engagement overview) that most homes in the UK, and most homes in Scotland, will be able to run heating systems at 55°C without significant retrofitting. According to the CCC (2022), based on a report conducted by Nesta and Cambridge Architectural Research (2022), approximately 27% of homes in the UK currently are suitable for flow temperature reduction based on assumed ancillary attributes (namely radiator and pipework suitability). It is our understanding that a property assessment was not undertaken as part of the Nesta/Cambridge work. This estimate is about half of that found in previous research (Element Energy, 2021), which found that 53% of the UK stock was able to run at 55°C on a typical winter day (the percentage is reduced to 10% to reach thermal comfort on a winter peak day).

    It was the opinion of our interviewed stakeholders that most homes in Scotland can successfully be run at 55°C, and that there were few attributes that would rule out this flow temperature (see Appendix 8.4).

    Potential for further reduction

    It is difficult to transition the housing stock to even lower flow temperatures below 55°C. The proportion of homes which are suitable without any works (or without major works) is significantly lower. Stakeholders suggested that some homes may not be suitable at all, but it is unclear if there was any tangible evidence or guidelines this was based on.

    Our previous work (Element Energy, 2021) showed that the percentage of stock suitable for reduced flow temperatures reduces from 53% to 25% at 50°C, 6% at 45°C and <1% at 40°C. On a winter peak day (with an assumed external temperature almost 10°C lower) these proportions of houses suitable reduce to 3% at 50°C, 1% at 45°C and <1% at 40°C.

    At lower flow temperatures, the specific heat loss of a property becomes increasingly important. Specific heat loss, in practice, is an indicator of how much heat will be required to maintain thermal comfort. Heat loss tends to have an inverse relationship with efficiency – a home with a low specific heat loss rate will be highly efficient, while homes with a high heat loss rate tend to be less efficient.

    This is an important consideration when assessing the suitability of reducing flow temperature because in a home without retrofitting, a reduced flow temperature will decrease the amount of heat delivered to a room. If a room is difficult to heat because the home has a high heat loss rate, it becomes increasingly difficult to reach the desired temperature of that room because the system cannot adequately deliver or retain heat.

    In this situation, one or both of the following paths can be taken to make a home suitable for a lower flow temperature:

    Increase delivered heat. To do this, specific components of the heat system may need to be replaced or adjusted. The two key components are pipework, which impacts the flow rate of water through the system; and radiators, which emit heat transferred from the water. Existing pipework may need to be replaced to allow for a higher flow rate (which would help move more heat through the radiator in a given time period). Radiators could be replaced with larger units, which will allow more heat to be emitted due to an increase in absolute surface area. One or both options will increase delivered heat.

    Decrease specific heat loss. To do this, a home needs to become more efficient through retrofitting to increase efficiency and airtightness. The two most important retrofits that can be undertaken are insulation (loft or wall) and window glazing. In addition, draughtproofing can be applied to windows and doors. These measures will lead to a higher rate of heat retention, meaning the absolute amount of heat that needs to be transferred to reach thermal comfort in a home is decreased.

    Building envelope measures to increase suitability for flow temperature reduction

    Increasing the efficiency of the building envelope decreases specific heat loss, thus supporting flow temperature reduction. Stakeholder interviews emphasised the importance of home retrofitting and maintenance, especially where homes are poorly insulated, as it also leads to heat demand reduction.

    Home insulation

    In general, more insulated homes will be more suitable for lower flow temperatures, due to the lower heat demand to reach thermal comfort. It is unlikely that there is a situation in which a home is “too insulated”, except if this insulation does not allow for moisture to be driven from the masonry.

    Interviewed stakeholders considered insulation as one of the most influential aspects for suitability to operate at lower flow temperatures. Despite a general concern that traditionally built homes were unlikely to be suitable for a lower flow temperature, one stakeholder suggested loft and wall insulation is likely to be sufficient. It makes little difference if the loft is used as a room (CCC, 2022), as insulating in either case will decrease the home’s heat loss, but additional care should be taken due to the likely increased cost.

    Window glazing

    Similar to insulation, improving window glazing to double glazing or secondary glazing, is always beneficial for increasing the suitability of homes for reduced flow temperatures because they reduce the specific heat loss of a property. While triple glazing may offer benefits, it can introduce ventilation concerns and results in a lower marginal efficiency gain for flow rates compared to the adoption of double glazing.

    Both double glazing and secondary glazing can effectively lower heat loss, but double glazing is a more expensive process and involves replacing entire units. Replacing existing windows with double glazed windows may be more difficult or restricted in traditional homes due to conservation/listed building status or for aesthetic reasons. Care should also be taken to balance ventilation requirements with increased glazing.

    Ancillary components for the reduction of flow temperature

    Ancillary components are key to effectively increasing delivered heat and/or decreasing specific heat loss. The overall efficiency of the heating system and, more generally, home energy efficiency will increase the suitability for flow temperature reduction. Some ancillary components are particularly important to a home’s suitability, and these are discussed in the following sections.

    Radiators

    When radiators are fitted, the size of radiator suitable for a home is determined with consideration to the flow temperature the heating system runs at, alongside flow rate, to determine an adequate size to meet thermal comfort. If all else remains constant but the flow temperature is reduced, it is possible that the heat transferred to the radiator will not be sufficient. To mitigate this, existing radiators can be replaced with larger units which can transfer more heat, but this may be more expensive than other retrofit measures.

    Pipework

    Pipework is likely to be a key attribute for suitability of a home to increase the flow rate of the heating system. Like radiators, piping tends to be sized for the heating distribution system. Pipework may need to be replaced to account for a lower flow temperature, but our previous work (Element Energy, 2021) and stakeholders consulted had mixed opinions as to whether increased flow rate was an effective counterbalance to reduced flow temperature, and whether it would be required.

    During our engagement with Renewable Heat (see Appendix 8.1, it was suggested homes were built or had heating system replacements between the 1980s and 2002 are more likely to require pipework replacements. During this period, a copper shortage led to smaller piping instalments across the industry. Due to an update to buildings regulations in 2002 this is not an issue for newer builds.

    Pipework, compared to other ancillary components, is particularly susceptible to maintenance problems leading to inefficiencies. For example, past analysis (Element Energy, 2021) found that efficiency reductions due to sludge (15%), hydraulic imbalance (10%), air (6%) and limescale (15%) can impact the ability for a heating system to reach thermal comfort.

    Other considerations

    The efficiency improvements possible for pipework highlight the importance of regular maintenance for heating systems. Heat distribution systems should have annual maintenance servicing, but our recent analysis (Element Energy, 2021) found that currently only 20% currently participate in this. Proper maintenance would increase overall system efficiency, thus making reaching thermal comfort at lower flow temperatures more feasible.

    Key risks to reducing flow temperature

    Thermal comfort (human and fabric)

    Reaching adequate thermal comfort is the goal of assessing the feasibility of lowered flow temperatures. There are clear guidelines (British Gas, 2022) set by knowledgeable bodies (including the Lullaby Trust, Energy Savings Trust, World Health Organisation and Age UK) for temperatures homes should be heated to depending on the occupant, including:

    • Homes with new-borns should be heated between 16–20°C
    • Homes with healthy occupants should be heated to 18°C
    • Homes with occupants which are old, young or unwell should be heated to 20–21°C (some recommendations state homes can be warmed to 18°C as long as the main living space of the older occupant is heated to 21°C)

    In practice, there are many instances where these temperature thresholds are not met, for technical and behavioural reasons. This complicates suitability assessments, because setting the above thresholds may require heating systems to perform to temperatures that are not used in practice. Some behavioural reasons homes are not heated to the above thresholds may include:

    • Turning heating on/off in bursts, instead of maintaining a constant temperature
    • Regularly keeping heating at a comfortable temperature below the guideline temperature (for example, 18°C instead of 21°C)
    • Refraining from heating despite discomfort (often associated with fuel poverty)

    The disconnect between recommended thermal comfort and behavioural practice makes assigning a temperature threshold for lowered flow temperature complex, but previous reports and stakeholders generally agree a reasonably lower flow temperature will not cost consumers’ thermal comfort. It should be noted that special care may need to be taken for identified vulnerable consumers.

    Nesta and The University of Salford (2022) suggests lower flow temperatures may lead to longer warming times, if flow rate and radiator size are not changed at the same time, due to the decrease in transferable heat. The acceptability of increased warming times would likely require a behavioural study.

    Reduced flow temperature could also mean that room temperature cannot reach thermal comfort guidelines. It is not clear by how much and if this would cause a reduction from current practice. In the Nesta and The University of Salford (2022) study, homes with boilers and reduced flow temperature were able to reach within 0.5–2°C of thermal comfort (set at 21 °C in the living room, 22°C in the bathroom and 18°C in all other zones) on an average heating day, which is likely to be sufficient for most homes with healthy consumers.

    Similarly, reduced flow temperature may make reaching thermal comfort on peak heating days more difficult. Further testing is likely to be required to better understand the impact of heating during periods of lower external temperatures. It could be the case that systems with reduced flow temperatures are within 2°C of thermal comfort on these peak days, which may be acceptable to occupants, but this is masked by the binary threshold of reaching thermal comfort.

    Stakeholders agreed that buildings generally do not suffer from damp, moisture, and mould when the home is heated to human thermal comfort levels. Ensuring thermal comfort for humans is likely to provide adequate heating and avoid impacts on the building structure as well.

    Unsuitable ancillary components

    In many homes, reducing flow temperature without also retrofitting (e.g., adding insulation, replacing pipework, upgrading radiators) may cause the system to under-perform. The home would not reach thermal comfort due to the reduction of transferable heat and unimproved specific heat loss or system efficiency. Conversely, if the heating system is replaced before the home is retrofitted (insulation and window glazing, for example) the heating emitter could be oversized, causing increased cycling or inefficiency. To ensure this is not the case, retrofitting measures should be implemented before or in tandem with reducing flow temperature for an individual property.

    Concerning the building masonry, the level of energy efficiency retrofitting should be balanced against the need to ventilate the home properly and drive moisture out of the walls to avoid deterioration of the home’s exterior. This is a particular concern in older dwellings but should be considered for all dwellings. One stakeholder suggested approximately 100mm of wall insulation would be a good balance, but previous analysis suggests this may not be adequate insulation for energy efficiency. More research may be needed to understand this balance better.

    Costs incurred by significantly lower temperatures

    The Heat Pump Association suggests homes which are not properly retrofitted to increase heat delivery or decrease specific heat loss could be required to heat their homes for significantly longer periods of time, and thus higher overall energy consumption. This, in turn, would lead to an increase in both energy usage and the absolute value of energy bills.

    Our engagement with the Heat Pump Association suggested that lower temperatures will require increasingly airtight, well-insulated homes with larger radiators to ensure the heat loss doesn’t rise above 150W/m2. For most homes, a flow temperature reduction to 45°C should not incur significant financial costs. To reduce flow temperatures further, homes must be increasingly efficient and airtight, potentially with larger radiators. These costs are likely to be prohibitive for many without financial support.

    Key benefits to reducing flow temperature

    Energy savings

    When combined with required retrofits, reducing flow temperatures is expected to reduce energy use significantly. Previous work suggests savings are roughly correlated to the degree of change between the baseline temperature and new flow temperature. There are continued savings to be achieved by lowering flow temperature below 55°C.

    Nesta and the University of Salford (2022) found 16–23% energy savings in gas used for heating when flow temperatures as low as 48.2°C were tested. This correlates to roughly 12–17% of overall gas savings at household level (assuming heating accounts for 75% of gas use in residential buildings). At low flow temperatures, care must be taken to ensure a boiler’s intended operating regime is maintained, for example maintaining efficiency of a condensing boiler.

    These energy savings will lead to savings in in fuel bill costs at the household level, due to the lowered energy required to heat the distribution system. The level of fuel bill savings will depend on a combination of flow temperature and fuel prices.

    Emissions savings will also be a result of flow temperature reduction. Most homes in Scotland are heated with natural gas, so the direct reduction in natural gas use will reduce emissions. For homes heated with electricity, reducing electricity use on a grid that is not completely zero carbon will have indirect emissions reductions.

    ZDEH readiness

    The Salford Energy House (2022) study shows that even homes using boilers can benefit from reduced flow temperatures. The retrofits and system upgrades required for such a switch are often “no regret” decisions, no matter what future heat source the home will use (whether it be natural gas, hydrogen, electricity or district heating) because these changes improve the overall efficiency of the homes.

    In general, low carbon heating systems run on lower temperatures, so all ancillary works, maintenance and upgrades will smooth the transition to a low carbon heating system across all home archetypes. There was agreement amongst stakeholders that ancillary works and reducing flow temperatures prepare houses for ZDEH systems. Systems with lower flow temperatures (including those currently using gas) use less overall energy to meet demand because the whole home system is more efficient.

    Methodology for assessing flow temperature reduction

    Overview

    This study seeks to model the suitability for potential flow temperature reduction in heating systems in Scottish homes. The ideal methodology for an assessment of flow temperature reduction potential would include a property-specific heat loss calculation. In lieu of this, our method uses heat demand and property characteristics as a proxy for current ability to meet demand.

    Property characteristics including levels of insulation, current heat distribution systems and heat demand was provided by the Home Analytics Scotland (HAS, 2022) dataset. The HAS dataset provides characteristics of the Scottish housing stock based on a compilation of datasets and modelling. This dataset is the result of whole-stock modelling conducted by the Energy Saving Trust. It should be noted that there is a discrepancy between the number of properties modelled as part of the work in this report (2,747,067 dwellings) and data in the Scottish House Condition Survey (Scottish Government, 2021) which accounts for approximately 10% less homes. We believe this is due to the modelling method used by Home Analytics Scotland.

    Our assessment of suitability was led by stakeholder interviews and previous work (Element Energy 2020b, 2021). The previous work developed a suitability assessment for the UK housing stock based on dwellings’ current oversizing factor.

    Retrofit options were modelled using prices for materials and labour for individual retrofits taken from previous work for the CCC (Element Energy, 2020a).

    Results from suitability modelling were then translated into energy demand reduction using heat demand profiles from the National Energy Efficiency Data-Framework (NEED), Scottish weather data and heat system efficiencies. Cost and emissions savings were calculated using up-to-date fuel prices and emissions data from recent Element Energy analysis.

    Modelling approach

    Defining suitability

    The first step in this study’s methodology was defining suitability, which considered both internal temperature and external temperature. Both sets of temperatures were based on previous work commissioned by BEIS (Element Energy, 2021).

    The target internal temperature was 20°C, which is the lower end of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) recommended internal temperature range for dwellings with vulnerable occupants. While not every home has vulnerable occupants, there is no robust way to predict what homes will be occupied by vulnerable consumers, and as such an internal temperature target was chosen which could meet the needs of any consumer at any hour of a given year. This temperature is also aligned with the Microgeneration Installation Standard (MIS) 3005 (MCS, 2019), which recommends living zones maintain a temperature of 18–22°C.

    We tested a dwelling’s ability to reach thermal comfort (20°C) at various external temperature cases:

    • Winter peak, our central case which tests suitability during the peak heating hour of an average year.
    • 20-year peak, which tested a dwelling’s ability to reach thermal comfort during the peak heating hour of a historic cold snap. Also referred to as a historic cold snap.
    • Winter average, which tested a dwelling’s ability to reach thermal comfort during an average heating hour in an average winter (as opposed to the peak heating hour in the winter peak).
    • November average, which tested a dwelling’s ability to reach thermal comfort during an average heating hour in an average “shoulder season” (the heating hour used in this study is taken from an average November).

    Suitability at a set internal and external temperature test case was measured based on the dwelling’s oversizing factor, which is the ratio of peak radiator capacity to peak demand. See Appendix 8.2 for more information on why oversizing factors were used in lieu of specific external temperatures. Based on this oversizing factor, we know what minimum flow temperature each dwelling can operate at and still meet thermal demand. Oversizing factor ranges are set out in the BEIS study (Element Energy, 2021). Oversizing factors of between 1.00 and 1.20 suggest a dwelling’s radiator capacity is adequately sized for the dwelling, while an oversizing factor under 1.00 suggests a heat distribution system will not be able to reach thermal comfort and a factor of over 1.20 suggests a heat distribution system is larger than required for the dwelling at a given flow temperature.

    Archetyping and radiator mapping

    The housing stock was aggregated into seven archetypes with the aim of modelling the suitability and impact of flow temperature reduction for a set of “average” homes. These archetypes were primarily based on stakeholder insights on the key determinates of flow temperature reduction based on their experience (age and house type). These were compared to the archetype design of the BEIS study, which used similar archetypes. The seven archetypes were:

    • Pre – 1919 flats (approximately 10% of stock)
    • Pre – 1919 houses (approximately 7%)
    • 1919 – 2002 flats (approximately 23%)
    • 1919 – 1949 houses (approximately 6%)
    • 1950 – 1983 houses (approximately 27%)
    • 1984 – 2002 houses (approximately 10%)
    • Post – 2002 dwellings (flats and houses) (approximately 14%)

    All dwellings in the HAS database were assigned an archetype, which was used for energy demand reduction, fuel bill and emissions savings calculations. We then assigned oversizing factors. Extrapolation of BEIS (Element Energy, 2021) survey data to the entire UK housing stock provided a distribution pattern across archetypes. This was used to assign oversizing factors for Scottish dwellings across the archetypes. Dwellings surveyed in the BEIS study were assigned archetypes from the above list and reassigned a proportion of the archetype stock that they represented based on extrapolation from the original study which maintained the robustness of the original study’s housing stock mapping.

    The clearest relationship observed in this data was that between building footprint and radiator capacity, with larger dwellings tending to have larger capacities. Dwellings in the BEIS survey and HAS dataset were ordered by archetype and building footprint. The radiator size, building peak demand and oversizing factors were assigned to dwellings from smallest to largest building footprint, maintaining the correct proportions in the housing stock. For example, if the smallest surveyed home in the pre-1919 flats archetype was found to represent 2.7% of the stock, this dwelling’s data was assigned to the smallest 2.7% of HAS dwellings in the same archetype, and so on. This allowed the data to maintain the same oversizing factor distribution.

    Suitability modelling

    The suitability of the current housing stock portfolio was modelled based on the minimum flow temperatures each HAS dwelling could operate at using the oversizing factor. Retrofit packages were assigned to dwellings based on their archetype and existing levels of insulation. Two retrofit scenarios were modelled:

    • The Lower cost retrofit scenario, where retrofit package costs could total approximately £2000 per dwelling, and
    • The Higher cost retrofit scenario, where retrofit package costs could total up to 10% of the cost of a whole-home renovation. To determine this cost, the average price of a whole home renovation was taken for an “average” home, which was then scaled up or down for each archetype. This led to a range of costs between £6,000 – £12,000 (see Table 1 for these costs).
     

    Flats

    Mid Terrace

    End Terrace

    Semi Detached

    Detached

    Bungalow

    Maximum cost (£/dwelling)

    6,123

    7,459

    9,106

    10,670

    13,585

    11,143

    Table 1 Retrofit costs for dwellings in the Higher cost retrofit scenario, by dwelling type

    Dwellings were assigned retrofit packages based on the specific dwelling attributes in the HAS dataset. Because these attributes are in the original dataset, retrofit packages were assigned regardless of what external temperature case or radiator sensitivity was being tested.

    Each dwelling was assigned two packages, one for each retrofit scenario (see Appendix 8.3 for list of retrofits). In both scenarios, most homes are assigned standard energy efficiency measures and/or radiator upgrades (75% and 71% in the Lower and Higher cost retrofit scenarios, respectively, see Figure 3 below). For many dwellings, additional insulation measures are required based on current level of insulation modelled by HAS. In some of these cases, dwellings can be insulated within the approximately £2000 price bracket, while other homes are more expensive to insulate. In these situations, the cost to insulate falls within the more expensive retrofit scenario.

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    Figure 3 (Top) Retrofit packages assigned to the Scottish housing stock (Lower cost retrofit scenario); (Bottom) Retrofit packages assigned to the Scottish housing stock (Higher cost retrofit scenario)

    Retrofit packages took a fabric first approach, prioritising measures with higher efficiency gains (mostly wall and loft insulation), then measures with lower-efficiency gains (increased draughtproofing, reduced infiltration measures and hot water tank insulation) and finally radiator upgrades where applicable. See Appendix 8.3 for details.

    After a retrofit package was assigned to all dwellings in each retrofit scenario, the efficiency increases are applied to the dwellings assigned oversizing factors. This study assumed a direct relationship between energy efficiency increases and demand reduction, so an efficiency increase of 18% was applied by reducing the oversizing factors by 18%. These new oversizing factors were used to reassign dwellings to minimum flow temperatures. In practice, this may not reflect how efficiency increases are observed in dwellings, but an implementation-based study would be required to accurately capture this.

    Fuel bill and emissions modelling

    Results were aggregated at archetype level and used to find archetype-level energy demand reduction for fuel bill and emissions savings modelling. To calculate energy demand reduction at the archetype level, the average energy demand was calculated from the NEED (BEIS, 2022). Hourly energy demand profiles were calculated using the Watson method (Watson et al., 2019). We assumed all dwellings currently operate at 75°C flow temperature. The difference between 75°C flow temperature and lower temperatures (down to 50°C) was calculated based on the proportion of the stock which could support this for different external temperature case and retrofit scenarios. All dwellings suitable at temperatures below 50°C were modelled using 50°C savings, due to uncertainty over some boiler’s efficiency at lower temperatures. The cost and emissions modelling outputs were expected to be conservative estimates for fuel bill and emissions savings, due to not capturing the potential savings from 85°C to 75°C and temperatures under 50°C.

    To calculate fuel bill savings, two fuel prices (representing a historic average and more recent fuel costs) were used to give a range of savings based on the energy demand reduction on national, archetype and archetypal individual dwelling levels.

    To calculate emissions savings, the average natural gas emissions in Scotland were applied to the energy demand reduction on national, archetype and archetypal individual dwelling levels. In this calculation, all dwellings were modelled as gas boilers due to the overwhelming majority of boilers in the breakdown of heat distribution systems in the Scottish housing stock. Only 15% of homes do not currently use gas boiler systems, instead running on electricity or off-grid heating systems. Due to higher price per kWh for electricity, we expect these modelled results to be conservative estimates.

    Method limitations

    This study sets out to model flow temperature reduction suitability, for which practical research has not been conducted previously on Scottish housing stock. Our study aggregated several data sources and relied on previous research to assess suitability in lieu of property-by-property heat loss calculations and real time case studies for retrofitting and monitoring. As such, the method has several limitations that should be acknowledged when considering findings and conclusions (see Table 2 below for an overview of these limitations).

    Limit

    Rationale

    Impact

    Mapping radiator capacity, heat demand from BEIS (Element Energy 2021) study

    UK/Scottish subset were reasonably aligned; allowed bigger spread of radiator capacity

    This means a key element of the suitability criteria is modelled based on UK stock when ideally, we would have data from Scottish property surveys. In addition, this may predispose certain archetypes to being unfairly penalised or rewarded in the suitability modelling based on the smaller sample of dwellings surveyed as part of the BEIS study. This may be the case for the pre-1919 houses, for example, which are difficult to make suitable.

    Lack of available data on ancillaries such as pipework

    Data not available, so modelling would not have been robust

    This factor for flow temperature reduction could not be assessed at present. Stakeholders provided useful insights and guides for further study. We confirmed that pipework was not an essential upgrade to meet the suitability levels we modelled but could be an additional factor to further increase proportions of stock that are suitable.

    Thermal comfort was set at 20°C for all scenarios

    We felt it was important to keep conservative estimates for internal temperature (led by WHO health standards for vulnerable occupants)

    The use of a relatively high internal temperature target risks unfairly comparing dwellings with lower flow temperatures to a counterfactual that does not exist (because homes are often not heated to 20°C, and many homes are currently unsuitable for this level of heating).

    Assume all current flows are 75°C in cost and emissions modelling

    No reliable data to allow us to assign a proportion of the stock to higher flow temperatures

    This may give a conservative estimate to fuel bill and emissions savings (because it captures the change from 75°C to X°C, so the additional savings from 85°C to 75°C are not accounted for).

    All costs are set at 2022 prices (adjusted from 2019 data)

    Lack of more up to date data with the same level of robustness

    Does not consider inflation in future years (a retrofit package in 2024 may be pushed into a higher cost bracket by inflation or other market pressures in future years).

    Table 2 Summary of method limitations and key assumptions with rationale and impact

    Modelling results

    Overview

    We find that the majority of Scottish housing stock is currently unsuitable for flow temperature reduction to 55°C or below on a winter peak heating hour. However, more than half (60%) of the stock is suitable for a flow temperature reduction during the less stringent test case using the winter average. Both retrofit scenarios considered increase suitability for flow temperature reduction across all external temperature cases and home types. With Higher cost retrofits, between 64% (winter peak) and 97% (November average) of homes become suitable for a flow temperature of 55°C or below.

     

    Suitability now (2022)

    Suitability with lower cost retrofits

    Suitability with higher cost retrofits

    Winter peak

    15%

    55%

    76%

    20-year peak

    7%

    41%

    64%

    Winter average

    60%

    85%

    94%

    November average

    80%

    92%

    97%

    Table 3 Suitability for Scottish housing stock for flow temperatures of 55°C for different temperature cases

    Winter peak

    The winter peak temperature case measures a heat system’s ability to maintain thermal comfort during the peak heating hour in an average year.

    Before Retrofit

    Without retrofits, 15% of the housing stock (approximately 410,000 dwellings) in Scotland are suitable for flow temperature reduction to 55°C (See Figure 4 and Figure 5). Most of these dwellings are flats and post-2002 properties. 30% of post-1919 flats are suitable for flow temperature reduction, and 27% of post-2002 flats and houses. Combined, these two archetypes represent 75% of the suitable stock, and 11% of the overall stock. These two archetypes also capture the portions of the stock that can reduce to the lowest flow temperature without retrofits. In both archetypes, a small subset of homes is suggested to be suitable at a 40°C flow temperature without retrofits (7% of suitable post-1919 flats and 1% of suitable post-2002 flats and houses).

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    Figure 4 Proportion of stock suitable for 55°C, by archetype (no retrofit scenario)

    Figure 5 Dwellings suitable for each flow temperature (cumulative, no retrofit scenario)

    Pre-1919 houses and flats and mid/late-century houses (1919-2002) are least suitable for 55°C flow temperatures, all having less than 10% of the archetype stock suitable. The majority for each archetype would be able to reduce flow temperature below 75°C (Figure 5). For example, among pre-1919 flats, 58% of homes are suitable for flow temperatures between 60°C and 70°C.

    Pre-1919 houses are not suitable for flow temperatures of 55°C. This result is directly related to the archetype’s lower proportion of adequately sized radiators from the mapping exercise and may also be related to the high heat loss rates in these dwellings. This archetype will require more significant energy demand reductions for homes to reach lower flow temperatures. Despite this, there is a proportion of the stock suitable for a more modest flow temperature reduction, with 30% of the stock being suitable to reduce to flow temperatures between 60°C and 70°C.

    30% of Scottish housing stock is currently unsuitable for flow temperature below 75°C. 20% of the stock may also be unsuitable to run at 75°C. This suggests these dwellings are either running at temperatures higher than 75°C or are currently unable to reach thermal comfort during periods of peak demand.

    Lower cost retrofit scenario

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    Figure 6 Proportion of stock suitable for 55°C, by archetype (Lower cost retrofit scenario)

    Lower cost retrofit packages are effective in increasing the proportion of homes suitable at a range of lower flow temperatures. After retrofits of around £2k, the proportion of homes suitable for 55°C increases to 55%. In addition to homes being suitable for 55°C, 36% of homes are suitable for lower flow temperatures.

    Figure 7 Dwellings suitable for each flow temperature (cumulative, Lower cost retrofit scenario)

    Post-1919 flats and post-2002 archetypes continue to be most suitable, while the pre-1919 flats and houses and mid/late century (1919-2002) house archetypes had lower suitability, see Figure 6 and Figure 7. While the archetypes maintained the same relative standing, there are large differences in terms of proportions of the archetype stock that become suitable at lower flow temperatures.

    The biggest beneficiaries of lower cost retrofits are the 1919-2002 house archetypes and the pre-1919 flat archetype. The absolute value of suitable homes increased between factors of 5x and 11x (pre-1919 flats and 1919-1949 houses, respectively).

    Before retrofits are applied, older dwellings are generally less suitable for lower flow temperatures (see Figure 4). When retrofits are applied, the age of a dwelling appears to matter less than dwelling type (flat or house) with the suitability of pre-1919 flats being similar to houses built from 1950-2002.

    The large proportion of the stock that becomes suitable after lower cost retrofits suggests that many dwellings in Scotland may be close (in monetary terms) to suitability for flow temperatures of 55°C. If 55°C is chosen as a “target” temperature, this suggests many homes in Scotland could achieve this target, even with stringent suitability criteria, for a relatively small amount of money. One or two larger efficiency measures (wall and/or loft insulation), an ancillary upgrade (radiators) or three smaller efficiency measures (hot water tank insulation, draughtproofing and reduced infiltration measures) would be required.

    Higher cost retrofit scenario

    After more extensive retrofits, 76% of the housing stock reaches suitability for reduced flow temperatures of 55°C. Similar, to the base and lower cost retrofit scenario, the post-1919 flats and post-2002 dwellings have the highest rates of suitability (see Figure 8). All archetypes other than pre-1919 houses are above 66% suitability for 55°C flow temperatures within their respective archetype stocks. The archetype with the largest change between scenarios is the pre-1919 homes, with suitability increased by a factor of over seven. In this scenario, almost half of the stock in this archetype reaches suitability (46%).

    More homes in this scenario can reach even lower flow temperatures (i.e., flow temperatures between 30°C and 50°C). However, the lower cost retrofits changed the proportion of suitability for 55°C for a higher absolute number of homes than the higher cost retrofits (an additional ~1 million homes suitable, compared to an additional ~600,000 homes).

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Description automatically generated Figure 8 Proportion of stock suitable for 55°C, by archetype (Higher cost retrofit scenario)

    Figure 9 Dwellings suitable for each flow temperature (cumulative, Higher cost retrofit scenario)

    20-year peak (historic cold snap)

    The 20-year peak temperature case is our most stringent external temperature case, testing the ability for a dwelling to meet thermal comfort in a historic cold snap (the coldest day recorded in a given postcode for the past 20 years).

    Without retrofits, the proportion of homes suitable to reduce to a flow temperature of 55°C include is only 7% of the stock (see Figure 10 and Figure 11), mostly consisting of post-1919 flats (4%) and post-2002 houses and flats (2%).

    Some housing remains suitable for a flow temperature reduction below 75°C. Most suitable homes are post-1919 flats (15%), 1950-1983 houses (11%) and post-2002 flats and houses (10%).

    In this case, over half (52%) of dwellings cannot meet thermal comfort below 75°C. In addition, 33% of the stock is not suitable for 75°C and is either currently operating at a higher flow temperature or would be unable to meet thermal comfort during a 20-year peak/historic cold snap.

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    Figure 10 Proportion of stock suitable for 55°C, by archetype (no retrofit scenario)

    Figure 11 Dwellings suitable for each flow temperature (cumulative, no retrofit scenario)

    Lower cost retrofit scenario

    The application of lower cost (~£2k) retrofits also brings a significant portion of the housing stock to suitability for 55°C flow temperatures. 40% of the total housing stock could reach suitability even during a 20-year peak/historic cold snap (see Figure 12 and Figure 13).

    Post-1919 flat and post-2002 dwellings archetypes continue as most suitable archetypes, both increasing by just over a factor of four. Combined, the suitable stock in these two archetypes represents almost one quarter of the total housing stock (23%).

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    Figure 12 Proportion of stock suitable for 55°C, by archetype (Lower cost retrofit scenario)

    Figure 13 Dwellings suitable for each flow temperature (cumulative, Higher cost retrofit scenario)

    Before retrofits, a correlation between age and suitability could be observed, with newer homes having slightly higher rates of suitability. After retrofits, the 1919-1949 homes and 1984-2002 houses have similar rates of suitability (24% and 27% respectively), while 10% more houses in the 1950-1983 archetype are suitable (36%). This suggests more houses in this archetype had oversizing factors on the higher end of each range, thus the same retrofit measure could have transitioned one home to 55°C and a house from one of the other archetypes to only 60°C. It could also suggest that more houses in this archetype required wall or loft insulation, and thus benefited more than other archetypes which received smaller energy efficiency uplifts from the “standard” measures.

    Higher cost retrofit scenario

    The archetypes with the highest proportions of suitability continue to be the post-1919 flats and post-2002 dwellings (78% and 92% of their respective stocks, and 32% of the total stock, see Figure 14 and Figure 15). All archetypes other than pre-1919 houses improve suitability for 55°C flow temperatures to above 51% of their respective archetype stock. In total, 64% of the stock becomes suitable after more extensive retrofits.

    The change in suitability across the archetypes between the lower and higher cost retrofits are larger than in the winter peak case. Therefore, if the 20-year peak was chosen as the external temperature case to assess dwelling suitability, higher cost retrofits would be required achieve a high degree of suitability for lower flow temperatures. The absolute number of stock suitable would still be lower than in the other external temperature cases considered.

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Description automatically generated Figure 14 Proportion of stock suitable at 55°C, by archetype (Higher cost retrofit scenario)

    Figure 15 Dwellings suitable for each flow temperature (cumulative, Higher cost retrofit scenario)

    Average external temperature cases

    The two ‘average temperature’ cases (winter average and November average) were tested to gauge the suitability of dwellings under less stringent criteria. The results show that with less stringent criteria, much larger proportions of the stock are already, or can be made suitable, for 55°C and lower flow temperatures. See Appendix 8.5 for full archetype results.

    The results show that 60-80% of homes are already suitable for 55°C flow temperatures for these less stringent external temperature cases. Lower cost retrofits increase this to 85-92% (for winter average and November average respectively). Higher cost retrofits result in almost all homes being suitable for 55°C (94-97%).

    Importance of radiator upgrades

    In half of the model runs, we investigated a reduced potential for radiator upgrades in all dwellings. The intention was to model the potential for flow temperature reduction when there were significant barriers to radiator upgrades (which could be caused by impracticalities or aesthetics).

    In the winter peak cases, reducing radiator uptake decreases the suitability of the stock at every flow temperature tested. This demonstrates that upgrading radiators could be a key retrofit measure for facilitating flow temperature reduction.

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Description automatically generated Figure 16 Comparison of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature (cumulative) when reduced and recommended rates of radiator uptake are tested in peak external temperature cases, Lower cost retrofit scenario (above) and Higher cost retrofit scenario (below)

    Fuel bill and emissions modelling

    The final step in this study is translating energy demand reductions from lower flow temperatures into fuel bill and emissions savings estimates by archetype.

    Fuel bill modelling

    At a flow temperature of 55°C, dwellings can save between £50 and £300 per year depending on the archetype and fuel cost scenario. The ranges for each archetype are set by applying low and high fuel costs to the archetype’s average annual heat demand from the NEED database (BEIS, 2022). As such, this is reflective of the archetype’s average energy demand patterns as opposed to being reflective of anything tested or modelled in the suitability assessment detailed above. Based on the NEED data, the flat archetypes and 1984-2002 houses will potentially save the most in fuel bills on a per dwelling basis (see Figure 17).

    Figure 17 Cost savings when moving from 75°C to 55°C (showing cost range from 4.5p/kWh and 10.3p/kWh)

    When aggregated, the potential for fuel bill savings is significant (Table 4). At the lower fuel price, savings range from £151m-£249m depending on the temperature case and retrofit scenario. Higher fuel prices increase this to £345m-£624m.

     

    Lower cost retrofits

    Higher cost retrofits

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Winter peak

    £181m

    £414m

    £219m

    £501m

    20-year peak

    £151m

    £345m

    £198m

    £454m

    Winter average

    £233m

    £580m

    £244m

    £624m

    November average

    £244m

    £558m

    £249m

    £570m

    Table 4 Aggregated total fuel bill savings per year for all temperature cases and retrofit scenarios (at both fuel prices)

    Table 5 shows the potential savings if all dwellings’ flow temperatures are reduced as low as they are suitable higher cost retrofits are applied at archetype level. In this temperature case, highest savings come from the post-1919 flats and the 1950-1983 houses.

    The winter peak temperature case results in higher savings than the 20-year peak. This is due to a higher absolute number of suitable homes at increasingly lower flow temperatures in the winter peak case, which uses less stringent suitability criteria.

    Savings per year, by archetype (£m)

    Winter peak

    20-year peak

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    34.58

    79.16

    30.40

    69.59

    Pre-1919 house

    9.19

    21.03

    7.16

    16.39

    1919-2002 flat

    64.40

    147.40

    60.70

    138.94

    1919-1949 house

    12.95

    29.63

    11.38

    26.04

    1950-1983 house

    47.85

    109.52

    41.44

    94.85

    1984-2002 house

    26.01

    59.54

    23.62

    54.06

    Post-2002

    23.92

    54.75

    23.48

    53.75

    Table 5 Potential for fuel bill savings (£m/yr) in peak external temperature cases when all suitable dwellings reduce flow temperatures to 55°C, aggregated to the archetype level (Higher cost retrofit scenario)

     

     

    Savings per year, by dwelling (£)

    Winter peak

    20-year peak

     

    Average cost to retrofit

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    £1331

    117.43

    268.78

    103.23

    236.28

    Pre-1919 house

    £4831

    45.27

    103.62

    35.29

    80.78

    1919-2002 flat

    £754

    99.76

    228.35

    94.04

    215.24

    1919-1949 house

    £2354

    72.09

    165.00

    63.35

    145.00

    1950-1983 house

    £2600

    63.35

    145.01

    54.87

    125.59

    1984-2002 house

    £2404

    96.39

    220.63

    87.52

    200.31

    Post-2002

    £396

    59.89

    137.08

    58.79

    134.57

    Average

    £2096

    £79.68

    £182.39

    £72.14

    £165.13

    Table 6 Potential for fuel bill savings in peak external temperature cases when all suitable dwellings reduce flow temperatures to 55°C, on a per dwelling basis (Higher cost retrofit scenario)

    When assessed on a per dwelling basis (see Table 6), the archetypes with the highest fuel bill savings include the pre-1919 flats, post-1919 flats and 1984-2002 houses. These all have the highest rates of savings per dwelling as a direct result of their archetypes’ NEED data. The other archetypes have similar savings per archetype, and the pre-1919 houses have the lowest potential savings at the household level.

    Table 7 shows the impact of reducing flow temperatures a further 5°C, to 50°C. Estimates for total fuel bill savings are given. Dwellings suitable for reduction beyond 55°C are assigned savings from reducing to 50°C. The range of savings is increased to £181m-£802m (from £151-£624m at 55°C) depending on the temperature case and retrofit scenario.

    Savings per year

    Lower cost retrofits

    Higher cost retrofits

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Winter peak

    £227m

    £519m

    £291m

    £666m

    20-year peak

    £181m

    £414m

    £251m

    £575m

    Winter average

    £318m

    £728m

    £350m

    £802m

    November average

    £347m

    £795m

    £363m

    £831m

    Table 7 Aggregated total fuel bill savings per year for all temperature cases and retrofit scenarios (at both fuel prices) when all suitable dwellings reduce flow temperatures to 50°C

    Emissions modelling

    At 55°C, dwellings can save between 2.5 kgCO2/year and 5.5 kgCO2/year depending on the archetype. The emissions saving estimate for each archetype is set by applying the archetype’s average annual heat demand to the carbon intensity of natural gas used for residential heating in Scotland. Based on this, the flat archetypes and 1984-2002 houses have the highest potential emissions savings (see Figure 18).

    Figure 18 Emission savings when moving from 75°C to 55°C – showing emissions based on 0.184 kgCO2/kWh for natural gas

    When aggregated to the archetype level, the potential for emissions savings ranges from 8.10 MtCO2/yr in the 20-year peak to 8.95 MtCO2/yr in the winter peak for higher cost retrofits. The November average and winter average result in higher emissions savings than the winter peak and 20-year peak temperature case (see Table 8). This is expected due to the increasingly stringent suitability criteria meaning that more homes are suitable for reduced flow temperatures in the average cases compared to peak cases. Lower cost retrofits also reduce potential emissions savings, with a range of 6.17 MtCO2/yr (in the 20-year peak temperature case) to 9.96 MtCO2/yr (November average temperature case).

    Total savings per year (MtCO2/yr)

    Lower cost retrofits

    Higher cost retrofits

    Winter peak

    7.40

    8.95

    20-year peak

    6.17

    8.10

    Winter average

    9.54

    10.00

    November average

    9.96

    10.18

    Table 8 Potential emissions savings across all temperature cases and retrofit scenarios when all suitable dwellings reduce flow temperatures to 55°C

    Table 9 shows the potential savings if all dwellings’ flow temperatures are reduced as low as they are suitable after higher cost retrofits are applied. Most savings come from the post-1919 flats, followed by the 1950-1983 houses and pre-1919 flats.

    Savings per year, by archetype (MtCO2/yr)

    Winter peak

    20-year peak

    Winter average

    November average

    Pre-1919 flat

    1.41

    1.24

    1.56

    1.57

    Pre-1919 house

    0.38

    0.29

    0.49

    0.51

    1919-2002 flat

    2.63

    2.48

    2.82

    2.84

    1919-1949 house

    0.53

    0.47

    0.62

    0.64

    1950-1983 house

    1.96

    1.69

    2.33

    2.40

    1984-2002 house

    1.06

    0.97

    1.19

    1.23

    Post-2002

    0.98

    0.96

    0.99

    0.99

    Table 9 Potential emissions savings in peak external temperature cases when all suitable dwellings reduce flow temperatures to 55°C, aggregated to the archetype level (Higher cost retrofit scenario)

    Table 9 shows the breakdown of the emissions savings by archetype for all temperature cases with higher cost retrofits. The pre-1919 house archetype has the lowest potential savings at archetype level while post-1919 flats and 1950-83 houses provide the highest emissions savings.

    Table 10 shows the impact of reducing flow temperatures a further 5°C, to 50°C. Dwellings suitable for reduction beyond 55°C are assigned savings from reducing to 50°C. This shows that emissions savings increase at the lower flow temperature.

    Savings per year, by archetype (MtCO2/yr)

    Lower cost retrofits

    Higher cost retrofits

    Winter peak

    9.27

    11.90

    20-year peak

    7.39

    10.27

    Winter average

    13.01

    14.33

    November average

    14.19

    14.85

    Table 10 Potential emissions savings in all external temperature cases and retrofit scenarios when all suitable dwellings reduce flow temperatures to 50°C

    Conclusions

    The evidence base for flow temperature reduction

    This study finds a strong theoretical case for broad flow temperature reduction in heating systems and suggests that 55°C is a suitable temperature target, which could result in reductions in energy demand and emissions at individual dwelling level.

    While previous work and stakeholders suggest many dwellings will be able to run at 55°C without significant retrofitting, we note the importance of assessing suitability with property-by-property specific heat loss calculations. Our study and others use a variety of factors including ancillary component characteristics, building insulation levels and oversizing factors as proxies for a dwelling’s suitability. However, minimum flow temperature potential should be based on a property-level assessment where possible.

    Suitability of the Scottish housing stock

    This study has found a lower current level of suitability than suggested through the literature review and stakeholder engagement process. We found 15% of the current housing stock would be suitable for reduced flow temperature at present in our winter peak temperature case, which decreases to 7% in the 20-year peak case.

    Suitability increases significantly after retrofits, reaching 55% and 76% of the total stock in the winter peak case after lower cost and higher cost retrofits, respectively. In the 20-year peak case, overall stock suitability rises to 41% to 64% after lower cost and higher cost retrofits, respectively.

    There is also potential for dwellings to lower flow temperatures below 55°C, potentially into the 30–50°C range (60% of dwellings in the winter peak, higher cost retrofit scenario), given the heat distribution system’s operating regime is properly maintained and sufficient retrofits are undertaken. This may be more straight forward in some dwelling types than others, particularly flats and recent properties.

    The most important factor when assessing suitability for flow temperature reduction is setting suitability criteria that adequately captures the needs of occupants. Our two key temperature cases use particularly stringent criteria, requiring that dwellings should be heated to 20°C during the coldest hour of an average or historic year. This is an ambitious goal and not one currently being met by many heating systems operating between 70°C–80°C, as evidenced by the significant portion of homes that could not meet thermal comfort while operating at 75°C in the scenarios modelled in this study. Care should be taken to ensure that suitability is sufficiently, but not overly, stringent.

    The other temperature cases tested in this study (winter average and November average) test a dwelling’s ability to meet suitability during a heating hour in average winter temperatures. Significantly larger proportions of dwellings are suitable for low flow temperatures in these cases suggesting that for most of the year, many homes are suitable to run at lower flow temperatures than in our stringent test cases. Exploring the potential for varying flow temperatures throughout the year could be one way to increase the fuel bill and emissions savings overall, only increasing the flow temperature when heat distribution systems need to meet thermal comfort in peak hours.

    Varying internal temperatures may also bring more homes into suitability for lower flow temperatures but this was not modelled in this study. If the internal temperature was lowered (for example to 18°C, which is in the healthy living range for healthy, not vulnerable, occupants) during peak heating hours, more homes could be made suitable. In practice, this would imply an acceptance that domestic heating systems are not expected to meet the higher end of thermal comfort during peak heating hours, which is already the case in many dwellings.

    Our study suggests some dwelling archetypes will have higher proportions of the stock already suitable at lower temperatures and that these archetypes will also likely be easier to retrofit for flow temperature reductions. These dwellings tended to include flats and post-2002 dwellings. This could be due to multiple factors, including building footprint in the case of the flats and better building regulations which mandate higher levels of efficiency in the newer dwellings.

    Conversely, some dwellings are likely to be harder to prepare for flow temperature reduction and will have a smaller proportion of the stock able to transition without retrofits. This study showed the difficulty in transitioning the pre-1919 houses, which are currently unsuitable for 55°C. These are larger, built with solid walls and tend to have undersized heating systems. This means more expensive retrofits will likely be required to support these dwellings in transitioning to lower flow temperatures. Our modelling identifies that after higher cost retrofits than for other dwelling types, almost half of homes in this archetype can reach suitability for reduced flow temperatures to 55°C.

    Retrofitting the housing stock

    A consistent finding from this study is that across archetypes and scenarios, retrofits significantly improve the proportion of the housing stock suitable for flow temperature reduction. We have found that building envelope retrofits (insulation, window glazing) and ancillary upgrades (pipework, radiators) are complementary in the transition to ZDEH systems. This means that building retrofits could be a reliable way to increase suitability for reduced flow temperatures and, at a later date, ZDEH systems.

    To prepare a dwelling for lower flow temperatures, we suggest that building envelope measures are prioritised to reduce the overall energy demand of the home. Where this is not possible (because dwellings are not adequately insulated, for example) ancillary upgrades should be implemented. Radiator upgrades could be implemented, and the same goal of flow temperature reduction could be achieved but this does not improve energy efficiency in the domestic heating system.

    Increased budgets for retrofits lead to increased gains in fuel bill and emissions reductions by allowing dwellings to achieve lower flow temperatures. Even the lower cost retrofit packages resulted in significant fuel bill savings (£151m–£580m depending on temperature case and fuel cost) and potential emissions savings (6.17–9.96 MtCO2/year depending on temperature case).

    Benefits to flow temperature reduction

    Our findings indicate that there is potential for fuel bill and emissions savings across all archetypes. With higher cost retrofits, fuel bill savings from transitioning the stock to lower flow temperatures could total between £198m and £501m depending on the winter temperature case. Emissions savings are suggested to follow the same trends, with potential to save between 8.10 MtCO2/year and 10.18 MtCO2/year (depending on the winter temperature case).

    The fuel bill savings and emissions reduction modelling undertaken in this work supports the view that any flow temperature reduction, whether around 55°C or lower, will bring benefits.

    Appendices

    Stakeholder engagement summary

    Targeted stakeholder engagement was carried out to source further quantitative information and qualitative insights from industry experts. Stakeholders were selected due to their expertise on specific areas of interest and practical experience in this area. A summary of the relevance of the organisation and topics discussed for each stakeholder organisation is shown below.

    Organisation: Historic Environment Scotland

    Relevance: Knowledgeable government agency

    Topics discussed:

    • Thermal comfort of occupants and building fabric (with an emphasis on maintaining enough ventilation in the dwelling to avoid moisture build-up, resulting in damp and mould).
    • Potential to reduce the flow temperature in historically built dwellings (in our study, this means the pre-1919 flats and houses) and what insulation measures might best support this aim.
    • Suitability for historically built dwellings to maintain lower internal temperatures than occupants can safely live in, thus suggesting internal temperature is not a concern for the health of the building envelope.
    • Potential difficulty in renovating historically built homes, particularly challenges around floor insulation and double/triple window glazing.
    • Benefits to lowering flow temperatures and heating the house more gradually.

    Organisation: Heat Pump Association

    Relevance: Industry organisation

    Topics discussed:

    • Confirmation of HPA’s assertion that 55°C is the “target” flow temperature for all dwellings, and reasoning behind this (discussion around 55°C as the “compromise” between the increased efficiency of boilers at lower flow temperatures and heat pumps’ ability to operate efficiently at up to approximately this temperature).
    • The trade-off between benefits of reduced flow temperature and increasingly stringent requirements for air tightness and increased energy efficiency measures in the dwelling, which also played a role in HPA’s selection of a “target” flow temperature.
    • Discussion of risks of legionella, and components of heat pumps which will guard against legionella risk (including a broader discussion on factors causing legionella).

    Organisation: Renewable Heat

    Relevance: Heat pump installation specialists

    Topics discussed:

    • Potentially for the Scottish housing stock to reduce flow temperature, based on experience and monitoring efforts by renewable heat (this include a conversation regarding how to best consider whether dwellings might be suitable for flow temperature reduction based on their type and age, then being further segmented by insulation measures and specific heat loss rates).
    • Discussion around credibility of HPA’s target flow temperature across homes, which Renewable Heat thought was a generally sound target.
    • Discussion around potential to reduce flow temperature beyond 55°C, and the difficult of preparing the housing stock for temperatures this low, including what potential considerations may need to be taken for various dwellings, particularly the historically built dwellings.
    • Rules of thumbs for what heat loss rates are required for reducing the flow temperature in 5°C increments, and at what point underfloor heating would be required regardless of building envelope and a low heat loss rate, based on the company’s installations.
    • Potential for pipework replacement required as part of ancillary upgrades to the dwelling due to pipes with smaller diameters being common in the late 20th century (this would be relevant if the flow rate of the heat distribution system needed to be increased to improve heat transfer).

    Organisation: Ovo Energy

    Relevance: Energy company, heat pump trial participant

    Topics discussed:

    • Potential for boiler and heat pump systems to reach flow temperatures of 55°C or lower, and the difference in low temperature versus high temperature units.
    • Impact of refrigerant type on heating system performance.
    • Importance of prioritising building envelope retrofits to increase energy efficiency as a means of overall energy use reduction.
    • Potential oversizing of radiators in the housing stock today.
    • Importance of retrofitting the dwelling before/as the heat system or ancillary components are being replaced, to avoid an unnecessarily large oversizing factor.
    • Ability for homes with heat pumps and lower flow temperatures to meet thermal comfort, with discussion of case studies in cold-weather climates (i.e., Scandinavia).

    Organisation: Energy Saving Trust

    Relevance: Knowledgeable company

    Topics discussed:

    • Validation of topics discussed in above stakeholder engagement.
    • Potential oversizing of radiators in the housing stock today.
    • Building envelope efficiency measures versus ancillary component (mainly radiators) upgrades for flow temperature reduction.
    • Importance of prioritising overall energy efficiency over ancillary upgrades as a means of overall energy use reduction (and the importance of preparing the stock for flow temperature reduction as a means of achieving other goals such as overall energy reduction, decarbonisation, etc.).

    Peak external temperature cases

    In this study, we used external temperature cases assigned to specific properties from previous analysis for BEIS (Element Energy, 2021) to inform oversizing factors for heating systems. Oversizing factors for properties, which included the relationship between peak external temperature and radiator capacity, were used instead of assigning specific peak external temperatures to each home. Homes are not explicitly assigned peak external temperatures because this would require granular data about the heat system capacity of individual homes, which was not available in the HAS data.

    The temperatures in the original modelling (Element Energy, 2021) are more akin to Scottish central belt temperatures. The external temperatures from the original study would not be an accurate reflection of average Scottish temperatures across the whole country, so were not used in this work. Instead, we extrapolated the relationship between external temperature and the ability for heat systems to meet demand in homes.

    These temperatures, and the distribution of homes they were applied to in the original BEIS modelling, were used with other factors, e.g., heat system capacity, to determine oversizing factors under different external temperature cases to determine suitability for lower flow temperatures.

    Although specific external temperatures were not used directly in this work, the approximate temperatures represented by the four external temperature cases would be in the order of:

    • Winter peak: around 0 to -10°C
    • 20-year peak: around -10 to -20°C
    • Winter average: around 1 to 3°C
    • November average: around 3 to 5°C

    Retrofit package data

    Retrofit Package

    Average cost (£, flat)

    Efficiency increase

    Cost per marginal increase to efficiency (£/% efficiency gained)

    Average cost (£, houses)

    Efficiency Increase

    Cost per marginal increase to efficiency (£/% efficiency gained)

    Loft and cavity wall insulation

    £1003.48

    35%

    £28.67

    £1521.65

    24%

    £63.40

    Loft (partial) and cavity wall insulation

    £1003.48

    23%

    £43.63

    £1521.65

    17%

    £89.51

    Hard to treat (HTT) cavity wall insulation

    £1989.30

    28%

    £71.05

    £3427.56

    19%

    £180.40

    HTT loft and cavity wall insulation

    £1529.81

    35%

    £43.71

    £1751.11

    22%

    £79.60

    HTT loft insulation

    £1100.20

    23%

    £47.83

    £1174.38

    14%

    £83.88

    Standard efficiency measures[1]

    £176.20

    13%

    £13.55

    £361.88

    10%

    £36.19

    Radiator upgrades (<90m)

    £2206.10

    Oversizing factor doubles

    £2206.10

    Oversizing factor doubles

    Cavity wall, loft and floor insulation

    £3924.94

    45%

    £87.22

    £4323.97

    33%

    £131.03

    Cavity wall, loft and floor insulation with radiator upgrade

    £7633.16

    24%+ Oversizing factor doubles

    £318.05

    Loft and floor insulation

    £3495.33

    29%

    £120.53

    £5410.75

    24%

    £225.45

    Solid wall and loft insulation

    £2979.05

    37%

    £80.51

    £5766.00

    28%

    £205.93

    Solid walls, loft and floor insulation

    £5900.51

    48%

    £122.93

    £8253.73

    37%

    £223.07

    Building-envelope led method for suitability assessment

    A central finding from our stakeholder engagement is the estimation of a dwelling’s suitability based on a combination of the dwelling’s building envelope (i.e., levels of various insulation) and peak heat demand. This approach is based on the following principle:

    • In pre-1919 dwellings (flats and houses), operating at 55°C is possible with double/triple window glazing, loft insulation of at least 100mm and draughtproofing measures.
    • In flats, operating at 55°C is possible with double/triple window glazing and wall insulation. These conditions are the same to operate at 50°C (only achievable in homes built after 1984) and 45°C (only achievable in homes built after 1992).
    • In houses, operating at 55°C is possible with double/triple window glazing, loft insulation of at least 100mm and wall insulation. To run at lower temperatures, houses must have 250mm of loft insulation and floor insulation. Temperatures below 45°C are not suitable without underfloor heating or a heat demand threshold below 45Wm2.

    Based on this, dwellings could be roughly designated a minimum flow temperature based on their archetype and insulation levels. See below for an estimate of what dwellings are considered always suitable (green – always), suitable depending on insulation measures (yellow – depends) and unsuitable without underfloor heating or peak heat demand below 45W/m2 (red – unsuitable).

     

    55°C

    50°C

    45°C

    40°C

    35°C

    Pre-1919 flat

    sometimes

    unsuitable

    unsuitable

    unsuitable

    unsuitable

    Pre-1919 house

    sometimes

    unsuitable

    unsuitable

    unsuitable

    unsuitable

    ’19-’02 flat

    sometimes

    sometimes

    sometimes

    unsuitable

    unsuitable

    ’19-’49 house

    sometimes

    sometimes

    sometimes

    unsuitable

    unsuitable

    ’50-’83 house

    sometimes

    sometimes

    sometimes

    unsuitable

    unsuitable

    ’84-’02 house

    sometimes

    sometimes

    sometimes

    unsuitable

    unsuitable

    Post-‘02 flats and houses

    always

    always

    sometimes

    unsuitable

    unsuitable

    The results of our modelling generally agree with the finding that all dwelling types could, in theory, reach lower flow temperatures (45 – 55°C). Our study additionally finds that many dwellings in all archetypes, after some level of retrofits, could operate at even lower flow temperatures (35 – 45°C). This contrasts the stakeholders’ assumptions that for older dwelling types these low temperatures may not be attainable. It is important to note that while this approach was discussed with us by stakeholders with ample experience in home retrofitting, it is not backed by any quantitative study and as such may best be considered as “robust rules of thumbs”. In practice, dwelling suitability should be based on a quantitative assessment undertaken at the property level.

    Detailed results – suitability modelling

    Winter peak – suitability now (all winter peak scenarios)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    40°C

    13,129

    555

    45°C

    34,106

    5,140

    6,127

    7,851

    50°C

    86,664

    2,740

    17,290

    6,127

    38,145

    55°C

    12,515

    193,456

    12,718

    63,901

    18,180

    107,716

    60°C

    34,830

    13,479

    323,560

    40,452

    184,780

    74,660

    188,503

    65°C

    105,485

    35,131

    409,306

    87,930

    347,068

    167,539

    246,342

    70°C

    183,445

    60,266

    494,218

    108,147

    505,634

    204,541

    358,035

    75°C

    212,125

    102,801

    566,410

    129,864

    601,460

    216,426

    375,979

    80°C

    253,320

    122,005

    589,514

    144,744

    670,749

    229,331

    392,185

    85°C

    273,917

    154,294

    608,833

    152,820

    712,624

    241,216

    392,185

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    Winter peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    13,929

    448

    40°C

    85,543

    17,960

    286

    17,143

    45°C

    6,350

    268,355

    14,754

    79,266

    17,672

    85,326

    50°C

    88,836

    1,837

    396,258

    38,466

    236,930

    72,603

    158,850

    55°C

    138,703

    12,591

    522,090

    60,495

    377,385

    126,057

    267,161

    60°C

    200,687

    33,866

    575,252

    100,921

    502,890

    162,693

    294,799

    65°C

    244,355

    63,463

    611,965

    129,972

    609,035

    206,203

    349,079

    70°C

    272,197

    104,343

    631,749

    146,453

    670,055

    214,351

    390,531

    75°C

    279,739

    130,707

    640,352

    154,715

    705,860

    227,956

    397,162

    80°C

    291,369

    156,971

    643,239

    162,089

    737,202

    241,242

    399,267

    85°C

    292,231

    178,000

    644,254

    170,539

    748,796

    241,553

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    Winter peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    21,939

    3,962

    7,703

    40°C

    126,863

    3,765

    14,154

    10,084

    53,145

    45°C

    35,813

    7,774

    338,881

    46,074

    139,737

    64,469

    211,578

    50°C

    150,202

    45,992

    487,979

    89,093

    351,768

    145,208

    350,313

    55°C

    239,712

    94,330

    555,898

    121,505

    497,471

    186,626

    386,730

    60°C

    269,706

    143,666

    592,894

    146,453

    611,384

    221,411

    396,474

    65°C

    278,537

    169,788

    627,336

    159,300

    667,660

    236,768

    398,483

    70°C

    291,168

    181,024

    637,547

    167,637

    714,021

    240,638

    399,009

    75°C

    293,226

    184,379

    640,342

    171,366

    729,163

    245,907

    399,398

    80°C

    294,362

    186,921

    642,979

    175,204

    743,553

    246,189

    399,419

    85°C

    294,373

    188,866

    643,767

    177,725

    744,431

    247,343

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    Winter peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    1,329

    40°C

    14,037

    286

    715

    45°C

    42,023

    5,392

    6,127

    12,162

    50°C

    2,370

    104,575

    3,997

    25,527

    10,324

    49,899

    55°C

    18,455

    5,567

    221,982

    21,846

    110,092

    55,507

    178,177

    60°C

    57,730

    23,398

    363,690

    65,526

    240,279

    103,306

    207,535

    65°C

    123,510

    51,429

    431,606

    103,900

    417,431

    176,704

    294,268

    70°C

    192,207

    90,725

    508,913

    125,326

    544,019

    205,708

    368,677

    75°C

    223,714

    122,276

    571,891

    138,338

    627,757

    227,956

    383,521

    80°C

    268,439

    148,540

    594,523

    153,263

    703,624

    241,242

    393,314

    85°C

    275,900

    173,013

    612,117

    161,749

    715,272

    241,553

    393,466

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    Winter peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    6,987

    1

    40°C

    15,849

    87

    913

    2,165

    593

    45°C

    1,063

    2,492

    70,646

    1,592

    12,615

    7,618

    16,437

    50°C

    16,556

    17,687

    154,457

    13,474

    65,705

    22,975

    56,313

    55°C

    50,676

    45,554

    276,700

    38,557

    191,423

    77,426

    183,423

    60°C

    92,093

    79,999

    418,668

    84,958

    353,694

    140,440

    219,451

    65°C

    182,336

    113,544

    497,086

    116,029

    526,282

    202,213

    313,225

    70°C

    220,030

    142,140

    562,040

    134,671

    623,564

    212,776

    367,606

    75°C

    261,756

    156,948

    592,909

    149,802

    681,262

    233,959

    392,427

    80°C

    277,857

    173,271

    602,469

    157,048

    719,032

    242,036

    392,448

    85°C

    284,142

    181,786

    617,125

    166,516

    725,504

    243,190

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    20-year peak – suitability now (all 20-year peak scenarios)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    40°C

    13,129

    555

    45°C

    14,444

    555

    50°C

    54,596

    5,140

    6,127

    8,406

    55°C

    105,604

    2,740

    22,542

    12,254

    45,441

    60°C

    12,515

    228,970

    20,739

    107,372

    23,603

    128,535

    65°C

    22,315

    17,972

    316,995

    45,930

    187,124

    80,295

    197,983

    70°C

    76,024

    30,638

    417,764

    82,508

    307,202

    142,242

    272,028

    75°C

    158,415

    55,772

    500,781

    106,332

    481,949

    193,477

    329,359

    80°C

    199,611

    94,005

    550,970

    122,626

    563,482

    217,446

    375,979

    85°C

    248,888

    118,332

    578,322

    135,690

    634,460

    229,331

    375,979

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    20-year peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    12,037

    448

    40°C

    57,454

    4,059

    555

    45°C

    180,145

    6,081

    43,583

    6,127

    61,474

    50°C

    25,738

    1,837

    322,225

    23,349

    131,382

    33,777

    123,861

    55°C

    89,909

    1,837

    447,529

    43,689

    272,703

    71,987

    189,548

    60°C

    169,371

    20,207

    524,233

    67,770

    410,699

    118,243

    269,896

    65°C

    206,907

    31,536

    580,993

    98,510

    502,766

    155,102

    311,011

    70°C

    245,626

    62,757

    604,261

    124,745

    588,437

    206,869

    322,107

    75°C

    261,437

    98,199

    631,868

    139,249

    656,151

    222,692

    385,489

    80°C

    277,752

    126,318

    639,831

    150,072

    692,811

    229,368

    391,736

    85°C

    281,481

    142,554

    641,828

    156,617

    723,820

    230,006

    399,205

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    20-year peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    13,024

    554

    40°C

    76,118

    1,872

    10,598

    4,485

    29,868

    45°C

    15,146

    1,829

    221,053

    15,637

    78,297

    20,744

    147,464

    50°C

    91,229

    25,806

    380,846

    62,467

    237,061

    121,390

    273,859

    55°C

    177,740

    60,940

    505,511

    98,484

    388,291

    159,045

    368,331

    60°C

    241,697

    105,701

    570,990

    124,025

    518,556

    189,663

    394,570

    65°C

    271,720

    139,737

    589,884

    148,256

    615,544

    227,994

    397,189

    70°C

    277,320

    164,168

    622,390

    158,597

    665,440

    236,466

    398,256

    75°C

    291,154

    179,683

    637,448

    165,030

    706,443

    240,775

    399,159

    80°C

    293,143

    183,872

    639,035

    169,908

    726,531

    243,417

    399,353

    85°C

    293,277

    185,024

    642,234

    172,430

    742,425

    246,180

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    20-year peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    609

    40°C

    13,265

    555

    45°C

    19,145

    664

    6,127

    1,007

    50°C

    66,232

    592

    7,764

    6,137

    20,206

    55°C

    3,443

    127,154

    6,816

    39,808

    12,969

    53,236

    60°C

    19,352

    13,183

    254,896

    31,096

    142,446

    51,201

    184,041

    65°C

    48,638

    22,914

    354,533

    63,779

    242,819

    97,188

    217,794

    70°C

    128,226

    50,723

    438,192

    100,538

    391,214

    172,370

    280,139

    75°C

    181,741

    84,581

    514,346

    116,896

    523,864

    207,288

    365,533

    80°C

    211,104

    117,796

    557,819

    133,644

    601,360

    220,725

    378,095

    85°C

    255,227

    134,123

    583,512

    144,201

    671,898

    230,006

    385,564

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    20-year peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    956

    40°C

    13,864

    256

    523

    555

    45°C

    29,249

    367

    6,682

    6,643

    985

    50°C

    3,876

    9,876

    85,108

    4,348

    29,327

    11,702

    31,235

    55°C

    19,995

    22,538

    197,209

    18,427

    86,152

    28,297

    86,749

    60°C

    59,090

    55,685

    291,025

    46,036

    216,619

    84,547

    191,293

    65°C

    94,107

    79,360

    409,352

    84,303

    361,875

    150,122

    256,425

    70°C

    181,119

    107,924

    477,443

    108,119

    510,680

    199,635

    282,937

    75°C

    215,638

    138,819

    551,689

    130,257

    591,746

    221,428

    376,509

    80°C

    258,269

    155,035

    581,920

    142,190

    665,691

    231,469

    376,703

    85°C

    268,436

    162,505

    606,729

    150,866

    710,271

    234,232

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    Winter average – suitability now (all winter average scenarios)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    13,129

    555

    40°C

    43,403

    5,140

    6,127

    8,406

    45°C

    164,293

    2,740

    22,542

    12,254

    92,631

    50°C

    22,315

    13,479

    345,944

    38,691

    178,163

    74,660

    188,503

    55°C

    158,415

    39,624

    471,833

    100,071

    413,283

    177,603

    286,237

    60°C

    212,125

    89,893

    559,845

    128,103

    590,790

    204,541

    375,979

    65°C

    261,403

    125,677

    592,248

    142,005

    670,749

    229,331

    392,185

    70°C

    282,000

    158,787

    608,833

    160,114

    717,763

    241,216

    399,419

    75°C

    282,000

    179,230

    628,152

    172,008

    723,294

    247,343

    399,419

    80°C

    294,515

    182,903

    638,938

    172,008

    729,351

    247,343

    399,419

    85°C

    294,515

    187,396

    645,503

    176,840

    744,016

    247,343

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    Winter average – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    5,832

    35°C

    76,561

    4,059

    16,578

    40°C

    16,985

    319,867

    17,798

    86,087

    21,162

    92,186

    45°C

    134,034

    3,467

    481,831

    44,556

    320,833

    79,733

    206,680

    50°C

    208,772

    28,919

    586,587

    98,834

    494,791

    151,135

    294,401

    55°C

    259,944

    77,714

    630,357

    133,708

    638,844

    209,884

    383,903

    60°C

    281,481

    126,350

    640,332

    152,426

    700,839

    218,527

    390,948

    65°C

    292,111

    152,714

    643,667

    163,833

    742,252

    241,242

    399,373

    70°C

    293,420

    182,550

    644,688

    171,069

    749,369

    245,613

    399,419

    75°C

    294,515

    186,111

    645,302

    176,277

    751,508

    247,343

    399,419

    80°C

    294,515

    190,566

    645,503

    178,506

    752,960

    258,925

    399,419

    85°C

    294,515

    190,566

    645,503

    179,383

    753,762

    258,925

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    Winter average – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    11,499

    35°C

    102,461

    1,872

    10,755

    4,754

    43,940

    40°C

    55,082

    14,483

    363,366

    50,096

    175,705

    95,833

    240,776

    45°C

    211,162

    73,999

    537,510

    108,094

    434,246

    157,876

    368,809

    50°C

    271,410

    136,115

    594,714

    145,663

    609,595

    218,739

    396,551

    55°C

    291,030

    171,706

    629,353

    161,994

    682,087

    237,154

    398,847

    60°C

    293,143

    183,798

    639,544

    169,888

    725,973

    243,416

    399,398

    65°C

    294,362

    188,456

    642,917

    176,031

    743,553

    246,180

    399,419

    70°C

    294,427

    192,752

    645,020

    177,831

    745,902

    247,343

    399,419

    75°C

    294,515

    195,843

    645,503

    178,463

    750,535

    257,387

    399,419

    80°C

    294,515

    197,806

    645,503

    179,108

    752,284

    257,475

    399,419

    85°C

    294,515

    197,868

    645,503

    179,580

    754,121

    258,921

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    Winter average – Lower cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    13,352

    555

    40°C

    54,024

    5,426

    6,127

    19,022

    45°C

    13,786

    47

    184,797

    6,992

    71,422

    13,954

    111,278

    50°C

    50,503

    20,297

    385,831

    64,137

    227,471

    91,748

    207,137

    55°C

    180,248

    64,096

    487,289

    109,501

    490,093

    187,461

    329,092

    60°C

    225,456

    116,055

    566,399

    134,879

    614,570

    209,884

    377,307

    65°C

    275,780

    144,283

    597,323

    151,238

    703,643

    241,242

    393,420

    70°C

    283,309

    175,894

    612,551

    165,419

    719,769

    245,613

    399,419

    75°C

    284,404

    181,357

    629,704

    172,987

    726,006

    247,343

    399,419

    80°C

    294,515

    187,396

    639,442

    175,216

    732,190

    247,343

    399,419

    85°C

    294,515

    187,396

    645,503

    177,454

    744,437

    247,343

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    Winter average – Higher cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    37

    35°C

    14,310

    413

    792

    555

    40°C

    3,876

    3,733

    74,968

    2,427

    16,336

    8,802

    23,910

    45°C

    38,788

    29,944

    235,488

    26,544

    132,227

    39,012

    116,727

    50°C

    103,542

    75,549

    420,488

    84,111

    346,882

    141,440

    219,528

    55°C

    209,225

    120,491

    535,920

    118,723

    559,708

    209,292

    367,444

    60°C

    268,302

    156,367

    592,111

    145,215

    664,080

    226,177

    376,748

    65°C

    284,131

    171,250

    611,969

    157,875

    719,032

    242,027

    399,419

    70°C

    284,196

    184,342

    629,838

    168,989

    726,975

    247,343

    399,419

    75°C

    294,515

    189,058

    639,745

    173,226

    735,245

    247,343

    399,419

    80°C

    294,515

    192,983

    645,503

    177,165

    745,039

    247,431

    399,419

    85°C

    294,515

    193,045

    645,503

    177,637

    746,876

    248,877

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    November average – suitability now (all November average scenarios)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    35°C

    13,849

    555

    40°C

    86,664

    5,140

    6,127

    38,145

    45°C

    22,315

    8,986

    261,790

    20,739

    134,879

    57,977

    188,503

    50°C

    150,332

    35,131

    469,099

    87,930

    408,143

    183,027

    255,822

    55°C

    232,722

    94,195

    571,037

    128,103

    590,790

    204,541

    375,979

    60°C

    269,486

    125,677

    608,833

    148,264

    700,473

    241,216

    392,185

    65°C

    282,000

    171,255

    614,226

    163,199

    723,294

    241,216

    399,419

    70°C

    294,515

    182,903

    638,938

    172,008

    729,351

    247,343

    399,419

    75°C

    294,515

    187,396

    645,503

    176,840

    737,959

    247,343

    399,419

    80°C

    294,515

    187,396

    645,503

    176,840

    744,016

    247,343

    399,419

    85°C

    294,515

    187,396

    645,503

    179,580

    749,721

    247,343

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    November average – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    11,984

    448

    35°C

    151,542

    3,765

    18,624

    6,127

    58,345

    40°C

    88,836

    1,837

    415,895

    34,983

    220,724

    67,864

    151,771

    45°C

    192,928

    21,839

    567,126

    80,194

    452,326

    140,407

    282,866

    50°C

    259,944

    77,581

    620,344

    132,779

    618,576

    209,823

    384,278

    55°C

    281,481

    129,106

    640,332

    153,575

    703,684

    222,459

    392,421

    60°C

    292,231

    164,426

    643,687

    168,170

    743,641

    241,242

    399,419

    65°C

    293,420

    183,421

    645,302

    175,048

    749,764

    247,343

    399,419

    70°C

    294,515

    189,267

    645,503

    176,521

    752,199

    258,925

    399,419

    75°C

    294,515

    190,566

    645,503

    179,307

    753,730

    258,925

    399,419

    80°C

    294,515

    191,371

    645,503

    179,580

    754,709

    258,925

    399,419

    85°C

    294,515

    192,752

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    258,971

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    November average – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    11,846

    554

    35°C

    8,717

    191,671

    9,096

    53,444

    16,839

    112,958

    40°C

    159,005

    41,003

    495,297

    82,547

    334,873

    143,283

    367,608

    45°C

    268,029

    122,898

    586,338

    136,328

    568,203

    209,701

    395,204

    50°C

    290,106

    170,085

    628,649

    160,424

    678,752

    236,134

    398,847

    55°C

    293,143

    183,900

    640,931

    170,718

    728,989

    245,881

    399,398

    60°C

    294,373

    188,828

    642,991

    176,284

    744,024

    246,189

    399,419

    65°C

    294,515

    192,778

    645,023

    178,117

    747,483

    257,387

    399,419

    70°C

    294,515

    195,843

    645,503

    178,942

    751,827

    257,475

    399,419

    75°C

    294,515

    197,868

    645,503

    179,580

    754,120

    258,921

    399,419

    80°C

    294,515

    198,036

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    258,972

    399,419

    85°C

    294,515

    198,432

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    262,795

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    November average – Lower cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    556

    35°C

    17,237

    664

    6,127

    1,007

    40°C

    2,370

    103,816

    4,167

    13,449

    12,299

    49,933

    45°C

    40,879

    14,815

    298,689

    43,596

    177,161

    73,365

    195,602

    50°C

    173,946

    63,963

    484,267

    105,530

    470,477

    190,966

    329,467

    55°C

    242,251

    118,811

    575,934

    136,028

    617,415

    213,816

    378,780

    60°C

    282,120

    155,995

    611,550

    157,415

    714,411

    241,242

    393,466

    65°C

    283,309

    180,168

    617,706

    169,398

    724,262

    247,343

    399,419

    70°C

    294,515

    186,097

    639,442

    173,231

    731,429

    247,343

    399,419

    75°C

    294,515

    187,396

    645,503

    177,378

    739,587

    247,343

    399,419

    80°C

    294,515

    188,201

    645,503

    177,651

    745,384

    247,343

    399,419

    85°C

    294,515

    189,582

    645,503

    179,580

    750,957

    247,389

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    November average – Higher cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Number of dwellings suitable at each flow temperature, by archetype

     

    Pre-1919 flat

    Pre-1919 house

    1919-2002 flat

    1919-1949 house

    1950-1983 house

    1984-2002 house

    Post-2002

    30°C

    384

    35°C

    19,069

    87

    5,312

    6,143

    971

    40°C

    18,216

    14,694

    151,171

    12,497

    58,928

    21,050

    56,091

    45°C

    81,548

    65,841

    388,607

    64,348

    268,811

    106,725

    191,927

    50°C

    208,301

    118,870

    532,422

    117,153

    546,140

    205,234

    367,444

    55°C

    268,302

    158,015

    593,498

    146,045

    671,635

    228,642

    385,410

    60°C

    284,142

    173,340

    612,043

    163,855

    719,503

    242,036

    399,419

    65°C

    284,284

    185,993

    639,265

    172,880

    728,556

    247,343

    399,419

    70°C

    294,515

    191,020

    645,503

    175,165

    736,537

    247,431

    399,419

    75°C

    294,515

    193,045

    645,503

    177,637

    746,875

    248,877

    399,419

    80°C

    294,515

    193,213

    645,503

    179,580

    751,960

    248,928

    399,419

    85°C

    294,515

    195,337

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    249,955

    399,419

    90°C

    294,515

    202,925

    645,503

    179,580

    755,251

    269,874

    399,419

    Detailed results – fuel bill modelling

    Winter average – suitability now

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    28.40

    64.99

    96.41

    220.68

    29.79

    68.19

    101.16

    231.55

    Pre-1919 house

    6.14

    14.07

    30.28

    69.31

    6.57

    15.04

    32.38

    74.12

    1919-2002 flat

    58.97

    134.97

    91.35

    209.09

    76.92

    176.07

    119.17

    272.76

    1919-1949 house

    11.40

    26.10

    63.49

    145.33

    13.07

    29.91

    72.76

    166.53

    1950-1983 house

    45.28

    103.63

    59.95

    137.22

    52.06

    119.16

    68.93

    157.78

    1984-2002 house

    24.95

    57.11

    92.46

    211.63

    29.26

    66.98

    108.43

    248.19

    Post-2002

    21.44

    49.07

    53.68

    122.87

    26.94

    61.66

    67.45

    154.38

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    196.58

    449.95

    71.56

    163.79

    234.62

    537.02

    85.41

    195.49

    Winter average – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    36.34

    123.38

    83.17

    282.39

    49.42

    113.11

    167.79

    384.05

    Pre-1919 house

    8.29

    40.83

    18.96

    93.45

    9.20

    21.06

    45.34

    103.77

    1919-2002 flat

    68.95

    106.82

    157.82

    244.49

    99.40

    227.51

    153.98

    352.45

    1919-1949 house

    13.60

    75.73

    31.13

    173.34

    17.85

    40.86

    99.40

    227.51

    1950-1983 house

    55.31

    73.24

    126.60

    167.63

    74.15

    169.73

    98.18

    224.73

    1984-2002 house

    27.12

    100.51

    62.08

    230.05

    35.85

    82.06

    132.84

    304.06

    Post-2002

    23.80

    59.58

    54.47

    136.38

    32.39

    74.13

    81.09

    185.61

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    233.41

    580.09

    98.26

    194.48

    318.26

    728.45

    115.85

    265.17

    Winter average – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    38.19

    129.66

    87.40

    296.77

    55.19

    126.33

    187.40

    428.93

    Pre-1919 house

    12.00

    59.14

    27.47

    135.37

    16.31

    37.33

    80.36

    183.94

    1919-2002 flat

    68.88

    106.71

    157.66

    244.24

    99.75

    228.31

    154.53

    353.69

    1919-1949 house

    15.21

    84.71

    34.82

    193.90

    21.48

    49.16

    119.59

    273.73

    1950-1983 house

    56.94

    75.40

    130.33

    172.57

    80.16

    183.47

    106.13

    242.93

    1984-2002 house

    29.15

    108.00

    66.71

    247.20

    41.78

    95.62

    154.80

    354.32

    Post-2002

    24.23

    60.67

    55.47

    138.88

    35.80

    81.95

    89.64

    205.18

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    244.60

    624.29

    101.17

    203.81

    350.46

    802.16

    127.58

    292.01

    Winter peak – suitability now

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    9.17

    20.98

    31.12

    71.23

    9.17

    20.98

    31.12

    71.23

    Pre-1919 house

    1.47

    3.36

    7.23

    16.55

    1.47

    3.36

    7.23

    16.55

    1919-2002 flat

    35.59

    81.46

    55.13

    126.19

    40.09

    91.75

    62.10

    142.14

    1919-1949 house

    4.85

    11.11

    27.03

    61.87

    4.97

    11.38

    27.69

    63.37

    1950-1983 house

    18.92

    43.30

    25.05

    57.34

    19.58

    44.81

    25.92

    59.33

    1984-2002 house

    12.07

    27.62

    44.72

    102.35

    12.42

    28.43

    46.03

    105.35

    Post-2002

    12.42

    28.42

    31.08

    71.15

    13.53

    30.96

    33.87

    77.52

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    94.49

    216.25

    34.39

    78.82

    101.23

    231.67

    36.85

    84.33

    Winter peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    26.40

    60.42

    89.63

    205.14

    31.96

    73.16

    108.52

    248.40

    Pre-1919 house

    3.03

    6.94

    14.95

    34.21

    3.09

    7.08

    15.23

    34.87

    1919-2002 flat

    62.18

    142.32

    96.32

    220.48

    82.75

    189.40

    128.19

    293.41

    1919-1949 house

    9.13

    20.89

    50.83

    116.35

    10.78

    24.68

    60.04

    137.43

    1950-1983 house

    40.79

    93.35

    54.00

    123.61

    49.81

    114.01

    65.95

    150.95

    1984-2002 house

    20.38

    46.65

    75.53

    172.87

    24.57

    56.25

    91.06

    208.42

    Post-2002

    19.13

    43.80

    47.91

    109.65

    23.77

    54.41

    59.51

    136.21

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    181.04

    414.37

    65.90

    150.84

    226.73

    518.99

    82.53

    188.91

    Winter Peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    34.58

    79.16

    117.43

    268.78

    44.00

    100.70

    149.38

    341.92

    Pre-1919 house

    9.19

    21.03

    45.27

    103.62

    10.64

    24.36

    52.44

    120.03

    1919-2002 flat

    64.40

    147.40

    99.76

    228.35

    89.73

    205.37

    139.00

    318.16

    1919-1949 house

    12.95

    29.63

    72.09

    165.00

    16.78

    38.40

    93.42

    213.82

    1950-1983 house

    47.85

    109.52

    63.35

    145.01

    61.24

    140.18

    81.09

    185.61

    1984-2002 house

    26.01

    59.54

    96.39

    220.63

    34.40

    78.73

    127.46

    291.74

    Post-2002

    23.92

    54.75

    59.89

    137.08

    34.14

    78.15

    85.48

    195.65

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    218.9

    501.03

    79.68

    182.39

    290.93

    665.89

    105.90

    242.40

    Winter peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    10.91

    24.98

    37.06

    84.83

    11.06

    25.32

    37.56

    85.98

    Pre-1919 house

    2.36

    5.40

    11.63

    26.63

    2.36

    5.40

    11.63

    26.63

    1919-2002 flat

    38.55

    88.23

    59.71

    136.68

    43.97

    100.65

    68.12

    155.92

    1919-1949 house

    6.29

    14.39

    35.01

    80.14

    6.46

    14.78

    35.97

    82.33

    1950-1983 house

    23.11

    52.89

    30.60

    70.03

    24.08

    55.12

    31.88

    72.98

    1984-2002 house

    14.72

    33.70

    54.56

    124.88

    15.32

    35.07

    56.77

    129.93

    Post-2002

    14.97

    34.27

    37.49

    85.81

    16.43

    37.61

    41.13

    94.15

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    110.91

    253.87

    40.38

    92.41

    119.69

    273.95

    43.57

    99.72

    Winter peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    15.91

    36.43

    54.04

    123.68

    16.95

    38.80

    57.56

    131.74

    Pre-1919 house

    5.74

    13.13

    28.27

    64.72

    6.30

    14.41

    31.03

    71.03

    1919-2002 flat

    44.71

    102.34

    69.26

    158.54

    52.73

    120.69

    81.68

    186.96

    1919-1949 house

    7.63

    17.46

    42.47

    97.20

    8.21

    18.78

    45.69

    104.59

    1950-1983 house

    30.66

    70.18

    40.60

    92.93

    33.16

    75.91

    43.91

    100.51

    1984-2002 house

    17.59

    40.25

    65.16

    149.15

    18.91

    43.29

    70.08

    160.40

    Post-2002

    15.52

    35.53

    38.86

    88.95

    17.17

    39.29

    42.98

    98.37

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    137.76

    315.31

    50.15

    114.78

    153.42

    351.17

    55.85

    127.83

    20-year peak – suitability now (all 20-year peak scenarios)

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    2.84

    6.49

    9.63

    22.04

    2.84

    6.49

    9.63

    22.04

    Pre-1919 house

    4.42

    10.11

    21.76

    49.81

    4.42

    10.11

    21.76

    49.81

    1919-2002 flat

    26.03

    59.57

    40.32

    92.29

    28.86

    66.06

    44.71

    102.34

    1919-1949 house

    2.82

    6.45

    15.69

    35.90

    2.82

    6.45

    15.69

    35.90

    1950-1983 house

    10.51

    24.05

    13.91

    31.84

    10.70

    24.50

    14.17

    32.43

    1984-2002 house

    6.51

    14.91

    24.13

    55.24

    6.87

    15.72

    25.45

    58.24

    Post-2002

    8.62

    19.72

    21.58

    49.38

    8.86

    20.29

    22.19

    50.79

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    61.73

    141.30

    22.47

    51.44

    65.36

    149.61

    23.79

    54.46

    20-year peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    21.45

    49.09

    72.83

    166.69

    23.06

    52.78

    78.30

    179.22

    Pre-1919 house

    1.59

    3.63

    7.82

    17.90

    1.65

    3.77

    8.11

    18.56

    1919-2002 flat

    56.76

    129.92

    87.94

    201.28

    73.49

    168.21

    113.85

    260.58

    1919-1949 house

    6.88

    15.75

    38.32

    87.71

    7.89

    18.05

    43.91

    100.50

    1950-1983 house

    33.02

    75.58

    43.72

    100.07

    38.02

    87.03

    50.35

    115.24

    1984-2002 house

    15.24

    34.87

    56.45

    129.22

    17.19

    39.34

    63.68

    145.76

    Post-2002

    15.87

    36.32

    39.73

    90.93

    19.48

    44.59

    48.77

    111.64

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    150.80

    345.17

    54.90

    125.65

    180.77

    413.76

    65.81

    150.62

    20-year peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    30.40

    69.59

    103.23

    236.28

    36.12

    82.67

    122.64

    280.70

    Pre-1919 house

    7.16

    16.39

    35.29

    80.78

    7.98

    18.26

    39.31

    89.98

    1919-2002 flat

    60.70

    138.94

    94.04

    215.24

    80.47

    184.19

    124.66

    285.34

    1919-1949 house

    11.38

    26.04

    63.35

    145.00

    14.06

    32.19

    78.31

    179.23

    1950-1983 house

    41.44

    94.85

    54.87

    125.59

    50.47

    115.52

    66.82

    152.95

    1984-2002 house

    23.62

    54.06

    87.52

    200.31

    30.63

    70.10

    113.49

    259.76

    Post-2002

    23.48

    53.75

    58.79

    134.57

    31.47

    72.04

    78.80

    180.36

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    198.18

    453.62

    72.14

    165.13

    251.20

    574.96

    91.44

    209.30

    20-year peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    5.23

    11.96

    17.75

    40.62

    5.23

    11.96

    17.75

    40.62

    Pre-1919 house

    1.16

    2.65

    5.71

    13.07

    1.16

    2.65

    5.71

    13.07

    1919-2002 flat

    28.86

    66.06

    44.71

    102.34

    32.30

    73.93

    50.04

    114.53

    1919-1949 house

    3.83

    8.77

    21.34

    48.85

    3.86

    8.83

    21.48

    49.17

    1950-1983 house

    13.88

    31.76

    18.37

    42.05

    14.17

    32.44

    18.76

    42.95

    1984-2002 house

    8.46

    19.37

    31.36

    71.79

    8.82

    20.19

    32.68

    74.80

    Post-2002

    9.97

    22.81

    24.95

    57.11

    10.56

    24.16

    26.43

    60.49

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    71.39

    163.39

    25.99

    59.48

    76.09

    174.16

    27.70

    63.40

    20-year peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    9.85

    22.55

    33.45

    76.56

    10.09

    23.10

    34.27

    78.44

    Pre-1919 house

    3.90

    8.92

    19.20

    43.94

    4.21

    9.63

    20.74

    47.47

    1919-2002 flat

    34.57

    79.12

    53.55

    122.56

    38.98

    89.23

    60.39

    138.23

    1919-1949 house

    5.07

    11.61

    28.24

    64.63

    5.26

    12.03

    29.28

    67.02

    1950-1983 house

    20.48

    46.88

    27.12

    62.08

    21.60

    49.44

    28.60

    65.46

    1984-2002 house

    12.16

    27.84

    45.07

    103.17

    12.84

    29.39

    47.58

    108.90

    Post-2002

    11.36

    26.01

    28.45

    65.12

    12.27

    28.10

    30.73

    70.34

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    97.39

    222.92

    35.45

    81.15

    105.26

    240.92

    38.32

    87.70

    November average – suitability now

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    34.45

    78.85

    116.97

    267.74

    43.87

    100.41

    148.95

    340.94

    Pre-1919 house

    8.94

    20.47

    44.08

    100.89

    10.06

    23.02

    49.55

    113.42

    1919-2002 flat

    65.06

    148.91

    100.79

    230.69

    89.41

    204.64

    138.51

    317.03

    1919-1949 house

    13.34

    30.53

    74.28

    170.02

    17.12

    39.19

    95.34

    218.21

    1950-1983 house

    53.36

    122.13

    70.65

    161.70

    68.90

    157.70

    91.23

    208.81

    1984-2002 house

    27.59

    63.16

    102.25

    234.04

    38.16

    87.35

    141.41

    323.67

    Post-2002

    23.65

    54.14

    59.22

    135.54

    31.12

    71.22

    77.91

    178.32

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    226.40

    518.20

    82.41

    188.64

    298.63

    683.54

    108.71

    248.82

    November average – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    37.70

    86.30

    128.02

    293.01

    53.99

    123.57

    183.32

    419.59

    Pre-1919 house

    10.61

    24.29

    52.30

    119.70

    13.07

    29.91

    64.39

    147.38

    1919-2002 flat

    69.46

    159.00

    107.61

    246.31

    101.66

    232.70

    157.49

    360.49

    1919-1949 house

    14.88

    34.05

    82.84

    189.60

    20.58

    47.12

    114.63

    262.37

    1950-1983 house

    58.07

    132.92

    76.89

    176.00

    81.63

    186.84

    108.08

    247.39

    1984-2002 house

    28.76

    65.82

    106.55

    243.89

    40.87

    93.55

    151.45

    346.64

    Post-2002

    24.10

    55.16

    60.34

    138.11

    35.31

    80.83

    88.41

    202.36

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    243.58

    557.54

    88.67

    202.96

    347.12

    794.51

    126.36

    289.22

    November average – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (£million) and by dwelling (£)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Archetype (£m)

    Dwelling (£)

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Lower fuel price

    Higher fuel price

    Pre-1919 flat

    38.33

    87.72

    130.13

    297.86

    56.50

    129.33

    191.85

    439.12

    Pre-1919 house

    12.46

    28.52

    61.40

    140.55

    17.84

    40.84

    87.92

    201.24

    1919-2002 flat

    69.46

    158.99

    107.61

    246.30

    102.09

    233.67

    158.16

    362.00

    1919-1949 house

    15.68

    35.89

    87.32

    199.86

    22.58

    51.68

    125.73

    287.78

    1950-1983 house

    58.72

    134.40

    77.75

    177.96

    84.57

    193.57

    111.97

    256.30

    1984-2002 house

    30.12

    68.95

    111.62

    255.50

    43.76

    100.16

    162.14

    371.13

    Post-2002

    24.25

    55.50

    60.70

    138.94

    35.88

    82.13

    89.84

    205.63

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    249.02

    569.98

    90.65

    207.49

    363.22

    831.38

    132.22

    302.64

    Detailed results – emissions modelling

    Winter average – suitability now

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    1.16

    3.94

    1.22

    4.14

    Pre-1919 house

    0.25

    1.24

    0.27

    1.32

    1919-2002 flat

    2.41

    3.74

    3.15

    4.87

    1919-1949 house

    0.47

    2.60

    0.53

    2.97

    1950-1983 house

    1.85

    2.45

    2.13

    2.82

    1984-2002 house

    1.02

    3.78

    1.20

    4.43

    Post-2002

    0.88

    2.19

    1.10

    2.76

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    8.04

    2.93

    9.59

    3.49

    Winter average – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    1.49

    5.04

    2.02

    6.86

    Pre-1919 house

    0.34

    1.67

    0.38

    1.85

    1919-2002 flat

    2.82

    4.37

    4.06

    6.30

    1919-1949 house

    0.56

    3.10

    0.73

    4.06

    1950-1983 house

    2.26

    2.99

    3.03

    4.01

    1984-2002 house

    1.11

    4.11

    1.47

    5.43

    Post-2002

    0.97

    2.44

    1.32

    3.32

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    9.54

    3.47

    13.01

    4.74

    Winter average – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    1.56

    5.30

    2.26

    7.66

    Pre-1919 house

    0.49

    2.42

    0.67

    3.29

    1919-2002 flat

    2.82

    4.36

    4.08

    6.32

    1919-1949 house

    0.62

    3.46

    0.88

    4.89

    1950-1983 house

    2.33

    3.08

    3.28

    4.34

    1984-2002 house

    1.19

    4.42

    1.71

    6.33

    Post-2002

    0.99

    2.48

    1.46

    3.67

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    10.00

    3.64

    14.33

    5.22

    Winter peak – suitability now

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    0.37

    1.27

    0.37

    1.27

    Pre-1919 house

    0.06

    0.30

    0.06

    0.30

    1919-2002 flat

    1.46

    2.25

    1.64

    2.54

    1919-1949 house

    0.20

    1.11

    0.20

    1.13

    1950-1983 house

    0.77

    1.02

    0.80

    1.06

    1984-2002 house

    0.49

    1.83

    0.51

    1.88

    Post-2002

    0.51

    1.27

    0.55

    1.38

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    3.86

    1.41

    4.14

    1.51

    Winter peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    1.08

    3.66

    1.31

    4.44

    Pre-1919 house

    0.12

    0.61

    0.13

    0.62

    1919-2002 flat

    2.54

    3.94

    3.38

    5.24

    1919-1949 house

    0.37

    2.08

    0.44

    2.46

    1950-1983 house

    1.67

    2.21

    2.04

    2.70

    1984-2002 house

    0.83

    3.09

    1.00

    3.72

    Post-2002

    0.78

    1.96

    0.97

    2.43

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    7.40

    2.69

    9.27

    3.37

    Winter peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    1.41

    4.80

    1.80

    6.11

    Pre-1919 house

    0.38

    1.85

    0.38

    2.14

    1919-2002 flat

    2.63

    4.08

    3.67

    5.68

    1919-1949 house

    0.53

    2.95

    0.69

    3.82

    1950-1983 house

    1.96

    2.59

    2.50

    3.32

    1984-2002 house

    1.06

    3.94

    1.41

    5.21

    Post-2002

    0.98

    2.45

    1.40

    3.50

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    8.95

    3.26

    11.85

    4.33

    Winter peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    0.45

    1.52

    0.45

    1.54

    Pre-1919 house

    0.10

    0.48

    0.10

    0.48

    1919-2002 flat

    1.58

    2.44

    1.80

    2.79

    1919-1949 house

    0.26

    1.43

    0.26

    1.47

    1950-1983 house

    0.94

    1.25

    0.98

    1.30

    1984-2002 house

    0.60

    2.23

    0.63

    2.32

    Post-2002

    0.61

    1.53

    0.67

    1.68

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    4.54

    1.65

    4.89

    1.78

    Winter peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    0.65

    2.21

    0.69

    2.35

    Pre-1919 house

    0.23

    1.16

    0.26

    1.27

    1919-2002 flat

    1.83

    2.83

    2.16

    3.34

    1919-1949 house

    0.31

    1.74

    0.34

    1.87

    1950-1983 house

    1.25

    1.66

    1.36

    1.80

    1984-2002 house

    0.72

    2.66

    0.77

    2.87

    Post-2002

    0.63

    1.59

    0.70

    1.76

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    5.63

    2.05

    6.27

    2.28

    20-year peak – suitability now (all 20-year peak scenarios)

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    0.12

    0.39

    0.12

    0.39

    Pre-1919 house

    0.18

    0.89

    0.18

    0.89

    1919-2002 flat

    1.06

    1.65

    1.18

    1.83

    1919-1949 house

    0.12

    0.64

    0.12

    0.64

    1950-1983 house

    0.43

    0.57

    0.44

    0.58

    1984-2002 house

    0.27

    0.99

    0.28

    1.04

    Post-2002

    0.35

    0.88

    0.36

    0.91

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    2.52

    0.92

    2.67

    0.97

    20-year peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    0.88

    2.98

    0.94

    3.20

    Pre-1919 house

    0.06

    0.32

    0.07

    0.33

    1919-2002 flat

    2.32

    3.60

    3.00

    4.66

    1919-1949 house

    0.28

    1.57

    0.32

    1.80

    1950-1983 house

    1.35

    1.79

    1.55

    2.06

    1984-2002 house

    0.62

    2.31

    0.70

    2.60

    Post-2002

    0.65

    1.62

    0.80

    1.99

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    6.17

    2.24

    7.39

    2.69

    20-year peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    1.24

    4.22

    1.48

    5.01

    Pre-1919 house

    0.29

    1.44

    0.33

    1.61

    1919-2002 flat

    2.48

    3.85

    3.29

    5.10

    1919-1949 house

    0.47

    2.59

    0.57

    3.20

    1950-1983 house

    1.69

    2.24

    2.06

    2.73

    1984-2002 house

    0.97

    3.58

    1.25

    4.64

    Post-2002

    0.96

    2.40

    1.29

    3.22

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    8.10

    2.95

    10.27

    3.74

    20-year peak – Lower cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    0.21

    0.73

    0.21

    0.73

    Pre-1919 house

    0.05

    0.23

    0.05

    0.23

    1919-2002 flat

    1.18

    1.83

    1.32

    2.05

    1919-1949 house

    0.16

    0.87

    0.16

    0.88

    1950-1983 house

    0.57

    0.75

    0.58

    0.77

    1984-2002 house

    0.35

    1.28

    0.36

    1.34

    Post-2002

    0.41

    1.02

    0.43

    1.08

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    2.92

    1.06

    3.11

    1.13

    20-year peak – Higher cost retrofit scenario (reduced radiators)

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    0.40

    1.37

    0.41

    1.40

    Pre-1919 house

    0.16

    0.78

    0.17

    0.85

    1919-2002 flat

    1.41

    2.19

    1.59

    2.47

    1919-1949 house

    0.21

    1.15

    0.21

    1.20

    1950-1983 house

    0.84

    1.11

    0.88

    1.17

    1984-2002 house

    0.50

    1.84

    0.53

    1.95

    Post-2002

    0.46

    1.16

    0.50

    1.26

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    3.98

    1.45

    4.30

    1.57

    November average – suitability now

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    1.41

    4.78

    1.79

    6.09

    Pre-1919 house

    0.37

    1.80

    0.41

    2.03

    1919-2002 flat

    2.66

    4.12

    3.66

    5.66

    1919-1949 house

    0.55

    3.04

    0.70

    3.90

    1950-1983 house

    2.18

    2.89

    2.82

    3.73

    1984-2002 house

    1.13

    4.18

    1.56

    5.78

    Post-2002

    0.97

    2.42

    1.27

    3.19

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    9.26

    3.37

    12.21

    4.45

    November average – Lower cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    1.54

    5.23

    2.21

    7.50

    Pre-1919 house

    0.43

    2.14

    0.53

    2.63

    1919-2002 flat

    2.84

    4.40

    4.16

    6.44

    1919-1949 house

    0.61

    3.39

    0.84

    4.69

    1950-1983 house

    2.37

    3.14

    3.34

    4.42

    1984-2002 house

    1.18

    4.36

    1.67

    6.19

    Post-2002

    0.99

    2.47

    1.44

    3.62

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    9.96

    3.63

    14.19

    5.17

    November average – Higher cost retrofit scenario

    Savings, by archetype (MtCO2/yr) and by dwelling (tCO2/yr)

    Reduction to 55°C

    Reduction to 50°C

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Archetype

    Dwelling

    Pre-1919 flat

    1.57

    5.32

    2.31

    7.84

    Pre-1919 house

    0.51

    2.51

    0.73

    3.59

    1919-2002 flat

    2.84

    4.40

    4.17

    6.47

    1919-1949 house

    0.64

    3.57

    0.92

    5.14

    1950-1983 house

    2.40

    3.18

    3.46

    4.58

    1984-2002 house

    1.23

    4.56

    1.79

    6.63

    Post-2002

    0.99

    2.48

    1.47

    3.67

    Total/Average (archetype/dwelling)

    10.18

    3.71

    14.85

    5.41

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    How to cite this publication:

    Martin, M; Foster, S; Dias, J; Benjamin, S. (2023) Reductions in maximum flow temperatures in Scottish domestic heating, ClimateXChange. http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/3385

    © The University of Edinburgh, 2025
    Prepared by Element Energy (ERM Group) on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

    While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

    This work was supported by the Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division of the Scottish Government (CoE – CXC).

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    1. Note “Standard efficiency measure” includes draughtproofing, reduced infiltration and hot water tank insulation. All packages except radiator upgrades in the Lower cost retrofit case include standard efficiency measures.